ÿWPC  0# °UN» %  0(b7w@?4“¢ 0Jª 0Tô 0^H 0h¦ 0r 0|€ 0†ü 0‚ 1u 0d‡U>ë 0@) D3i Bœ U*¹ B)ã DC AMO 4œ v~Ð AQN ÆŸ 0De 0D© D/í BvÓ9˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- =>?e@r‚ABeCDDEÓ€Q B\J#3|xQ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd* %Cþÿ << Gÿÿ *Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òOctober€10,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€gXXdìXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò ò›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̜ـ*ÙßR€&'%A1-j|Yl` Å `€€@ÿRß›ÌAT€JACKSONÌÌJUNE€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€02C01„9507„CC„00194Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHARDIN€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€C.€CREED€MCGINLEYó óÌò òSHONDA€KAY€MCGILL,ó óà àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àœ(Pre„Trial€Diversion)›Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌW.€Jay€Reynoldsà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌReynolds€&€Reynoldsà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ611€Court€StreetÌSavannah,€TN€€38372à àà àà àWilliam€David€BridgersÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àRobert€RadfordÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€OvertonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHardin€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSavannah,€TN€€38372ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÇòòò òÓ  ÓÔ€#„ÔOPINIONó óóóÔ€#ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThis€is€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€Rule€9,€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏAppellate€Procedure,€from€the€judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€of€Hardin€CountyÏaffirming€the€District€Attorneyððs€refusal€to€grant€pretrial€diversion.€€On€appeal,ÏAppellant€claims€that€the€District€Attorney€abused€his€discretion€by€failing€toÏconsider€all€of€the€factors€he€is€required€by€law€to€consider.€€For€the€reasons€setÏforth,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌà à€On€March€20,€1995,€Appellant€Shonda€Kay€McGill€was€indicted€for€threeÏcounts€of€aggravated€burglary.€€Appellant€applied€for€pretrial€diversion.€€By€letterÏdated€May€9,€1995,€the€District€Attorney€denied€the€application,€writing€asÏfollows:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓI€am€compelled€to€deny€your€client€diversion€on€the€following€grounds:Ì1.€The€fact€that€there€are€three€distinct€home€burglaries€committed€overÏa€three€week€period€indicates€a€continuing€intention€to€violate€the€lawÏand€not€just€a€casual€flirtation€with€an€illegal€act.Ì2.€Your€client€has€a€sporadic€work€record€that€would€indicate€instabilityÏin€functioning€as€a€contributing€member€of€society.Ì3.€€It€is€certainly€clear€from€my€vantage€point€that€the€crime€ofÏaggravated€burglary€is€a€prevalent€one€and€one€that€is€steadilyÏincreasing€in€number€in€this€county.€€I€have,€therefore,€consideredÏdeterrence,€both€of€the€defendant€and€others,€as€a€factor.Ì4.€€I€have€also€taken€into€consideration€the€views€of€the€victims€asÏexpressed€in€the€presentence€report.ÌAfter€considering€all€factors€set€out€by€law,€I€do€not€feel€this€is€anÏappropriate€case€for€the€extraordinary€relief€of€diversion.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓUpon€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial,€Appellant€petitioned€the€Circuit€Court€ofÏHardin€County€for€a€writ€of€certiorari,€alleging€that€the€District€Attorney€abused€hisÏdiscretion€in€denying€her€application.€€The€Circuit€Court€of€Hardin€County€affirmedÏthe€District€Attorneyððs€denial.€€ÌÌà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„15„105€creates€a€procedure€forÏdiverting€deserving€individuals€charged€with€certain€crimes€out€of€the€criminal€trialÏprocess.€€The€decision€to€grant€this€pretrial€diversion€rests€in€the€discretion€of€theÏDistrict€Attorney.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(b)(3)€(Supp.€1996).€€InÏexercising€that€discretion,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€offered€thisÏguidance:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ[A]€prosecutor€should€focus€on€the€defendantððs€amenability€toÏcorrection.€€Any€factors€which€tend€to€accurately€reflect€whether€aÏparticular€defendant€will€or€will€not€become€a€repeat€offender€should€beÏconsidered....€€Among€the€factors€to€be€considered€in€addition€to€theÏcircumstances€of€the€offense€are€the€defendantððs€criminal€record,€socialÏhistory,€the€physical€and€mental€condition€of€a€defendant€whereÏappropriate,€and€the€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€will€serve€the€endsÏof€justice€and€the€best€interest€of€both€the€public€and€the€defendant.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€352,€355€(Tenn.€1983).€€€However,€ð ðthe€focusÏon€amenability€to€correction€is€not€an€exclusive€one....ðð€€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861ÏS.W.2d€850,€855€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€Deterrence€of€the€defendant€andÏothers€is€also€a€proper€factor€to€consider.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€354.€€InÏfact,€the€circumstances€of€the€crime€and€the€need€for€deterrence€may€outweighÍother€applicable€factors€and€justify€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòStateÏv.€Helmsóó,€720€S.W.2d€474€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986);€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€661ÏS.W.2d€91€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983).ÌÌà àIn€deciding€whether€to€grant€diversion,€the€District€Attorney€must€considerÏall€the€relevant€factors€and€cannot€ignore€any€relevant€factors.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏHerronóó,€767€S.W.2d€151,€155€(Tenn.€1989);€òòState€v.€Markhamóó,€755€S.W.2d€850,Ï853€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€When€denying€an€application€for€pretrial€diversion,Ïthe€District€Attorney€must€clearly€articulate€the€specific€reasons€for€denial€in€theÏrecord€in€order€to€provide€for€meaningful€appellate€review.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650ÏS.W.2d€at€355.€€The€record€must€reflect€consideration€of€all€the€relevant€factors.€ÏòòState€v.€Kirkóó,€868€S.W.2d€739,€742„43€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€As€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€said€in€òòHerronóó:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓThis€requirement€(that€the€District€Attorney€consider€all€relevant€factors)Ïentails€more€than€an€abstract€statement€in€the€record€that€the€districtÏattorney€general€has€considered€these€factors.€€He€must€articulate€whyÏhe€believes€a€defendant€in€a€particular€case€does€not€meet€the€test.€€òòIfÏthe€attorney€general€bases€his€decision€on€less€than€the€fullÏcomplement€of€factors€enumerated€in€this€opinion€he€must,€for€theÏrecord,€state€why€he€considers€that€those€he€relies€on€outweigh€theÏother€submitted€for€his€consideration.óó€(emphasis€added)ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓ767€S.W.2d€at€156.€€In€òòCarróó€this€Court€said€in€dicta€that€failure€of€the€record€toÏreflect€that€the€District€Attorney€considered€all€of€the€applicable€factors€wouldÏallow€a€reviewing€court€to€find€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€861€S.W.2d€at€858.ÌÌà àWhen€reviewing€a€District€Attorneyððs€decision€to€deny€pretrial€diversion,Ïthe€trial€court€must€uphold€the€District€Attorneyððs€decision€unless€there€has€beenÏan€abuse€of€discretion.€€€€òòPace€v.€Stateóó,€566€S.W.2d€861€(Tenn.€1978).€€€InÏother€words,€the€decision€ð ðof€the€prosecutor€is€presumptively€correct€and€it€shouldÏonly€be€set€aside€on€the€basis€of€patent€or€gross€abuse€of€prosecutorialÏdiscretion.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€870€(concurring€op.,€J.€Henry).€€The€trial€court€may€find€anÏabuse€of€discretion€only€if€there€is€an€absence€of€any€substantial€evidence€toÏsupport€the€decision€of€the€District€Attorney.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€356.€ÏAs€this€Court€pointed€out€in€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€700€S.W.2d€568,€570€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1985),€under€the€abuse€of€discretion€standard,€a€trial€judge€is€not€allowedÏto€determine€whether€he€thinks€a€defendant€should€be€granted€diversion,€but€isÏrestricted€to€determining€whether€the€District€Attorney€abused€his€discretion.€ÏTherefore,€in€a€close€case,€where€the€District€Attorney€could€have€legitimatelyÏgranted€or€denied€the€application,€the€trial€judge€must€defer€to€the€judgment€of€theÏDistrict€Attorney.€€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€856.ÌÌà àOn€appellate€review€of€€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€in€diversion€casesÏthe€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€binding€on€an€appellate€court€unless€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€those€findings.€€òòHelmsóó,€720€S.W.2d€at€476.€ÏHowever,€in€cases€where€there€is€no€factual€dispute,€an€appellate€court€is€left€toÍdetermine€whether€the€trial€court€properly€concluded€that€the€District€Attorney€didÏor€did€not€abuse€his€discretion.€€Since€the€appellate€court€is€reviewing€aÏconclusion€of€law€made€by€the€trial€court€and€such€findings€are€not€binding€onÏan€appellate€court,€the€review€by€an€appellate€court€where€there€are€noÏcontested€findings€of€fact€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€856;€òòHelmsóó,€720ÏS.W.2d€at€476.€€The€District€Attorneyððs€decision€must€stand€unless€there€is€aÏlack€of€any€substantial€evidence€to€support€it.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€356.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€there€is€no€dispute€over€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact.€ÏThus,€we€focus€our€review€on€whether,€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€District€AttorneyÏabused€his€discretion.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€856.€€As€a€preliminary€matter,€weÏrecognize€that€the€District€Attorney€did€not€document€consideration€of€all€theÏapplicable€factors€in€his€letter€of€denial.€€The€District€Attorney€failed€to€mentionÏAppellantððs€lack€of€criminal€record€and€positive€social€history.€€In€addition,€theÏDistrict€Attorney€failed€to€state€why€the€factors€on€which€he€chose€to€relyÏoutweighed€the€other€factors€he€was€required€to€consider.€€Therefore,€the€DistrictÏAttorneyððs€letter€is€deficient.€€The€issue€then€becomes€whether€a€DistrictÏAttorneyððs€deficient€letter€mandates€a€finding€that€the€District€Attorney€abused€hisÏdiscretion.€ÌÌà à€As€stated€previously,€it€is€important€for€the€District€Attorney€to€memorializeÏhis€consideration€of€the€applicable€factors€in€his€denial€letter.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòHerronóó,Ï767€S.W.2d€at€156;€òòMarkhamóó,€755€S.W.2d€at€853;€òòKirkóó,€868€S.W.2d€at€742„43;ÏòòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€858.€€The€letter€found€as€an€appendix€in€òòCarróó€is€anÏexcellent€example€of€how€such€letters€should€be€written.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€atÏ859.€€In€the€òòCarróó€letter,€the€District€Attorney€stated€the€reasons€for€denial,€theÏfactors€which€reflected€positively€on€the€applicant€and€why€the€positive€factorsÏwere€outweighed.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€District€Attorneyððs€letter€is€important,€deficiencies€in€suchÏletters€do€not€always€mandate€a€finding€of€abuse€of€discretion.€€While€the€letterÏin€this€case€could€have€been€more€comprehensive,€it€does€reflect€a€deliberate,Ïreasoned€judgment.€€The€District€Attorneyððs€letter€was€not€so€deficient€that€in€andÏof€itself€it€constitutes€an€abuse€of€discretion.Ìà àÌà àIn€addition,€there€is€substantial€evidence€to€support€the€District€AttorneyððsÏdenial€of€diversion.€€The€first€reason€the€District€Attorney€gave€for€denyingÏAppellantððs€application€was€that€the€circumstances€of€the€offense€reflect€moreÏthan€a€casual€flirtation€with€illegal€activity.€Appellant€was€charged€with€threeÏcounts€of€aggravated€burglary€for€burglaries€which€stretched€over€a€three€weekÏperiod.€€Although€two€of€the€burglaries€were€committed€in€one€night,€AppellantÍchose€to€participate€in€another€burglary€two€weeks€later.€€We€conclude€thatÏAppellantððs€actions€indicated€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€law€and€notÏsimply€a€one€time,€impetuous€illegal€act.€ÌÌà àThe€District€Attorney€also€gave€Appellantððs€sporadic€work€record€as€aÏreason€for€denying€her€application€for€pretrial€diversion.€€Between€1993€andÏ1994,€Appellant€had€three€different€jobs.€€Nevertheless,€Appellant€is€nineteenÏyears€old,€and€one€would€not€necessarily€expect€a€lengthy€established€careerÏhistory.€€While€social€history€is€an€appropriate€consideration,€application€of€thisÏfactor€in€support€of€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€is€not€supported€by€this€record.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€355.€€However,€improper€application€of€oneÏfactor€does€not€prevent€us€from€finding€that€there€is€substantial€evidence€toÏsupport€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€857.€ÌÌà àThe€District€Attorney€also€relies€on€the€deterrence€of€Appellant€and€othersÏin€denying€Appellantððs€application.€€Deterrence€of€the€defendant€and€others€is€aÏproper€consideration€in€pretrial€diversion€cases.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€atÏ355.€€As€we€observed€in€òòHollandóó,€ð ðNo€one€is€in€a€better€position€to€be€informedÏof€criminal€activity€in€a€circuit€than€the€District€Attorney€General.ðð€€661€S.W.2d€atÏ93.€€The€need€to€deter€Appellant€and€others€from€committing€aggravatedÍburglaries€supports€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial€of€Appellantððs€application€forÏpretrial€diversion.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€District€Attorney€cited€the€views€of€the€victims€as€a€reason€forÏdenying€Appellantððs€application.€€While€the€views€of€victims€do€not€constitute€aÏseparate€factor€which€the€District€Attorney€must€consider,€they€do€relate€to€theÏnature€and€circumstances€of€the€offense.€€The€victims€expressed€great€sorrow€atÏthe€irreplaceable€loss€of€valuables€such€as€a€sonððs€savings€and€a€cameraÏcontaining€film€with€Christmas€photos.€€One€victim€was€financially€harmed€asÏher€insurance€would€not€cover€the€economic€loss€she€sustained.€€The€victimsÏwere€so€scared€by€the€burglaries€that€one€had€trouble€sleeping€at€night€andÏanother€slept€with€a€gun€by€her€head.€€€Again€we€find€that€the€circumstances€ofÏthe€offense€support€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial.ÌÌà àWe€note€that€Appellant€has€no€prior€criminal€record€and€seems€to€have€aÏfavorable€social€history.€€Nevertheless,€the€circumstances€of€the€crime€and€theÏneed€for€deterrence€support€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial€and€outweigh€theseÏfactors€which€weigh€in€favor€of€approval€of€pretrial€diversion.ÌÌà àAlthough€one€of€the€factors€offered€by€the€District€Attorney€is€notÏsupported€by€the€record,€we€find€that€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial€is€supportedÍby€substantial€evidence€of€other€relevant€considerations€and€that€the€DistrictÏAttorney€did€not€abuse€his€discretion.€€We€therefore€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt.ÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGE