ÿWPC© tÌtÎç}›èªl§éöƒ,Y\›±pŠ§ªó27Ū;mÒKvZOÛsVÁH…ƒ'j »hår-Ô|ÑÂUø¼ʳûðcï?ÔA¯&÷‰9Ï ° ‚»2 6£ŠV©„s߬›¤vNR"én;„ûjùáPÂý‡àgIãSö£l<ÿcNèqÂÙ"êƒB©G–"ôÑò 3£™¨TZà›àMaÉݲˆ‡IÃ]TÎËý8ÙýÆs@ƒ†1ÜJ¨7¦«ÓÜŠ˜-ég–ñú>$7…ö8¬Õ•v?=:èË’ÞçPjÁðžôc·7uÑzÆ9»1cŒÎþ[¥…?W§-vä›{feƒDïG§R†‹^Û ð“\ý«HäÞéZ*lß<\§Ã»ÓC©ìé†q^ ³[‘:ÂIì1%ê.Yž¿AÖ鯩Kùûù¬Çü;Ï1PŒÓZ¥q©ðmdŒžh—²í3us0“~X1†&¤§Wˆð¿ó I\¨C§¨I†¾j Zà)¡åá ŒQ2*ÂZËF ø”ìm¨ËS2Ãn÷ÐjØc—s´i›’·¨Êz  >”Ž…DáœIjg€c2ÕýAÍ“«y[;ÊwÙº ÁN¬ÈŠb#É\ %% 0D+ 0ˆo UN÷ NE wG zK ÒÅ U@— — i× × Æ@ÆÆÌÆ’’NX^ Z4fEz|‹ mú¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤bžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž 0릦¦¦ B‘‘ 0¤® D3R D-… 0K²² ASýÆP 0¤ 0Dº A«þ˜\\IB01S08T\knoxclerk3ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman  _Ý ƒRÇú$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô·Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔInitially,€the€lower€court€denied€the€motion€to€suppress€the€defendantððs€statements€to€law€enforcement.€€UponÐ ° Ðmotion€to€reconsider,€however,€it€reversed€the€earlier€ruling€and€suppressed€the€statements.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5b¤/Ï óbï.˜Cê:i¢×+003|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ðÝ ƒRÇú$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô·Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThere€are€certain€exceptions,€which€are€not€pertinent€here.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„201(c)(2)€(2000).- ù-(|G2Çú$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€å»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô·Eò»»Ô d(|3‡‚$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€å»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‡‚$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€å»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€å»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼å»»»ÔÑ8€_‘XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ttìàÔ‡î¬î»¼åÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼å»îî¬ #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓJanuary€22,€2003€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X_‘X»¼åÔÌò òÔ#†¼å»XX_‘þ#ÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€LESLIE€Ô_ÔTHURMANÔ_Ô€MITCHELLòòóóÔ‡X_‘X»¼åÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€73807€€€€€€Mary€Beth€Ô_ÔLeibowitzÔ_Ô,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2002„01537„CCA„R3„CD€Ð ¥õ  ÐAugust€1,€Ô_Ô2003Ô_ÔÐ ‘á  ÐßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ‡ XéJXXX_‘ÔThe€State€of€Tennessee€appeals€the€Knox€County€Criminal€Courtððs€suppression€and€exclusion€ofÐ xÈ  Ðevidence€in€the€second„degree€murder€prosecution€of€Leslie€Ô_ÔThurmanÔ_Ô€Mitchell.€€The€evidenceÐ d´ Ðconsists,€first,€of€the€defendantððs€statements€to€law€enforcement€officers€pertaining€to€the€homicideÐ P  Ðfollowing€his€arrest€for€an€unrelated€matter,€and€second,€of€the€defendantððs€wifeððs€testimonyÐ <Œ Ðregarding€marital€communication€pertaining€to€the€alleged€crime.€€We€granted€the€stateððs€applicationÐ (x Ðfor€interlocutory€appeal,€òòseeóóTenn.€R.€App.€P.€9,€and€upon€review,€we€reverse€the€lower€courtððsÐ d Ðrulings.Ô#†X_‘XX XéJù#ÔÔ#†¼å»XX_‘#ÔÔ‡X_‘X»¼åÔÐ P ÐÓíÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€9;€Judgment€of€the€Criminal€Court€is€Reversed.ó óÐ Ø( ÐÌòòÓ  ÓJames€Ô_ÔCurwoodÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔWittÔ_Ô,€Jr.Ô#†¼å»àX_‘W#ÔÔ‡X_‘X.¼åÔ,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòGary€R.€Wade,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,óóÐ ° Ðand€òòNorma€McGee€Ogle,€J.óó,€joined.Ð œì ÐÌRobert€L.€Ô_ÔJolleyÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€Leslie€Ô_ÔThurmanÔ_Ô€Mitchell.Ð tÄ ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€&€Reporter;€Thomas€E.€Williams,€III,€Assistant€AttorneyÐ L œ ÐGeneral;€Randall€E.€Ô_ÔNicholsÔ_Ô,€District€Attorney€General;€and€Marsha€Mitchell,€Assistant€DistrictÐ 8!ˆ  ÐAttorney€General,€for€the€Appellant,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð $"t! ÐÓúÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼å»XX_‘€ #ÔÔ‡X_‘X»¼åÔÐ ü#L# ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼å»XX_‘ž #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X_‘X»¼åÔÔ‡ XéJXXX_‘Ôà  àà ` àThe€defendant€is€charged€with€second„degree€murder€for€the€stabbing€death€of€JuanÐ Ô%$!% ÐBlanco„Ô_ÔGuerraÔ_Ô,€which€occurred€on€or€about€October€20,€2001,€following€an€evening€in€which€theÐ À&"& Ðdefendant,€his€wife,€and€the€victim€had€socialized€together.à p àà È àà  àà x àà Ð àÐ ¬'ü"' Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àÌà  àà ` àThe€defendant€was€suspected€of€the€crime,€and€on€or€about€October€21,€2001,€theÐ „)Ô$) Ðdefendant€was€arrested€on€an€outstanding€child€support€warrant.€€After€he€was€taken€into€custody,Ð p*À%* Ðtwo€Knoxville€Police€Department€officers€questioned€the€defendant€about€the€death€of€Mr.€Blanco„Ð \+¬&+ ÐÔ_ÔGuerraÔ_Ô.€€The€defendant€gave€an€inculpatory€statement€and€was€ultimately€indicted€for€second„degreeÐ H,˜', Ðmurder.€Ð 4-„(-ý ÐÔ_Ô‡à  àà ` àApparently,€the€defendant€also€made€inculpatory€statements€about€Mr.€Blanco„Ð ° ÐGuerraððs€death€to€his€wife,€Kimberly€Dotson,€shortly€after€the€relevant€events€took€place.€€Ms.Ð œì ÐDotsonððs€testimony€about€those€communications€was€offered€at€the€preliminary€hearing,€and€herÐ ˆØ Ðtestimony€was€potential€evidence€for€the€state€in€the€criminal€trial€of€the€defendant.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àà ` àDuring€pre„trial€proceedings,€the€defendant€filed€a€motion€to€suppress€the€statementsÐ L œ Ðhe€made€to€Officers€Jones€and€Moyers,€a€motion€to€suppress€any€statements€the€defendant€made€toÐ 8 ˆ Ðhis€wife€on€the€basis€of€the€marital€communications€privilege,€and€a€motion€to€dismiss€the€indictmentÐ $ t Ðbecause€it€was€based€entirely€upon€evidence€which€was€violative€of€the€marital€communicationsÐ  ` Ðprivilege.Ð ü L  ÐÌà@² ² ìàòòDefendantððs€Statement€to€Law€Enforcement€OfficersóóˆÐ Ô$  ÐÌà  àà ` àAt€the€suppression€hearing€relative€to€the€defendantððs€own€statement,€the€stateÐ ¬ü  Ðpresented€evidence€via€the€testimony€of€the€two€law€enforcement€officers€who€questioned€theÐ ˜è  Ðdefendant€after€his€arrest€on€an€outstanding€child€support€òòcapiasóó.€€The€first€to€testify€was€SergeantÐ „Ô  ÐGary€Moyers.€€According€to€Sergeant€Moyers,€the€defendant€was€questioned€in€the€early€morningÐ pÀ Ðhours€of€October€21,€2001.€€The€defendant€was€advised€of€his€rights€and€refused€to€sign€an€adviceÐ \¬ Ðof€rights€form.€€ò òó óThe€defendant€refused€to€discuss€anything€with€the€officers€and€asked€why€he€wasÐ H˜ Ðthere.€€After€being€told€that€he€was€suspected€of€being€involved€in€a€stabbing,€the€defendant€saidÐ 4„ Ðsomething€like,€ð ðI€think€I€may€need€an€attorney,ðð€or€ð ðI€think€I€need€an€attorney.ðð€€According€toÐ  p ÐSergeant€Moyers,€Investigator€Gary€Jones€then€advised€the€defendant€that€he€would€be€charged€withÐ  \ Ðmurder.€€The€defendant€asked€why€he€would€be€charged,€and€Investigator€Jones€explained€in€detailÐ øH Ðthe€evidence€against€the€defendant.€€The€defendant€then€said,€ð ðI€need€to€tell€you€what€happened.ðð€Ð ä4 ÐThe€defendant€then€gave€an€incriminating€statement,€during€which€he€became€emotional.€€TheÐ Ð  Ðofficers€left€the€room,€allowed€the€defendant€to€compose€himself,€and€then€returned.€€The€officersÐ ¼  Ðadministered€a€second€admonition€of€rights,€obtained€the€defendantððs€signature€on€a€waiver€of€rightsÐ ¨ø Ðform,€and€took€a€tape„recorded€statement€from€the€defendant€regarding€his€involvement€in€theÐ ”ä Ðstabbing€death€of€the€victim.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àà ` àSergeant€Moyers€admitted€that€the€defendant€was€not€provided€a€lawyer€after€heÐ X ¨ Ðmentioned€that€he€might€need€one.€€Sergeant€Moyers€likewise€admitted€that€he€did€not€seek€to€clarifyÐ D!” Ðthe€defendantððs€statement€by€questioning€the€defendant€further€about€whether€he€wanted€an€attorney.€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€state€also€offered€the€testimony€of€Investigator€Gary€Jones.€€Investigator€JonesÐ $X" Ðaffirmed€that€the€testimony€of€Sergeant€Moyers€was€consistent€with€his€recollection€of€events€relativeÐ ô$D # Ðto€the€interrogation€of€the€defendant.€€Investigator€Jones€testified€that€the€defendant€believed€he€wasÐ à%0!$ Ðin€custody€for€charges€relative€to€nonpayment€of€child€support.€€Jones€told€the€defendant€that€theyÐ Ì&"% Ðwere€also€investigating€a€murder€case,€and€the€defendant€professed€that€he€had€been€at€home€and€didÐ ¸'#& Ðnot€know€anything€about€the€murder.€€Before€Jones€advised€the€defendant€of€his€rights,€the€defendantÐ ¤(ô#' Ðasked,€ð ðDo€you€think€I€need€a€lawyer?ðð€€€Jones€replied,€ð ðThatððs€up€to€you.ðð€€When€Jones€mentionedÐ )à$( Ðfirst„degree€murder€charges,€the€defendant€told€Jones€that€he€wanted€to€explain€his€side€of€the€story.€Ð |*Ì%) ÐJones€then€advised€the€defendant€of€his€rights,€and€the€defendant€refused€to€sign€the€admonitionÐ h+¸&* Ðform.€€Jones€claimed€that€he€did€not€hear€the€defendant€say€to€Sergeant€Moyers,€ð ðI€think€I€need€aÐ ° Ðlawyer,ðð€although€he€did€not€dispute€that€this€may€have€happened.€€By€his€own€admission,Ð œì ÐInvestigator€Jones€did€nothing€to€procure€an€attorney€for€the€defendant.€€Later,€when€the€defendantÐ ˆØ Ðindicated€his€willingness€to€talk€on€tape€to€the€officers€about€the€murder€investigation,€InvestigatorÐ tÄ ÐJones€heard€the€defendant€say,€ð ðI€changed€my€mind,ðð€when€asked€about€his€previous€statement€aboutÐ `° Ða€lawyer.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àà ` àNear€the€beginning€of€the€recorded€statement,€the€following€exchange€occurred:Ð $ t ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àThe€time€is€now€3:39€a.m.€€Leslie,€earlier€Gary€and€I€were€talking€toÐ ü L  Ðyou€and€during€the€process€of€that€talking,€we€had€in€conversation,€weÐ è 8  Ðadvised€you€of€your€rights€and€during€that€conversation€we€had,€youÐ Ô$  Ðsaid€that€you€thought€that€you€needed€to€talk€with€an€attorney,€is€thatÐ À  Ðcorrect?à  àà h àЬü ` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` àYeah.€€I€changed€my€mind.Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àYou€changed€your€mind.€€Okay,€we€told€you€that€what€we€wereÐ \¬ Ðinvestigating€and€the€potential€charges€that€you€were€looking€at,€isÐ H˜ Ðthat€correct?Ð4„` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à0 ` àYeah,€thatððs€true.Ð \` (#` (# ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àAnd€when€we€told€you€what€the€potential€charges€was€[sic]€and€weÐ ä4 Ðexplained€to€you€the€evidence€we€had€and€you€asked€why€and€all€thatÐ Ð  Ðwe,€we€explained€that€to€you,€did€we€not?м ` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` àRight.Дä` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àAnd€after€that€conversation€we€told€you€that€you€were€looking€at€aÐ l¼ Ðmurder€charge€and€that€the€guy€had€died.€€You€told€us€that€youÐ X ¨ Ðwanted€to€tell€us€what€took€place,€is€that€correct?ÐD!”` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à0 ` àYes€sir.Ð#l!` (#` (# ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àOkay.€€At€this€time,€we€acknowledge€the€fact€that€you€do€understandÐ ô$D # Ðwhat€your,€your€rights€are€and€that€you€are€going,€are€willing€to€talkÐ à%0!$ Ðto€us€at€this€time.€€We€read€your€rights€to€you€earlier,€is€that€correct?ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` àUm€hmm.Ф(ô#'` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àDo€you€remember€what€they€were?€€Weððll€go€over€them€again.Ð|*Ì%)` x` x ÐÐ h+¸&* ÐDefendant:à0 ` àRight€to€an€attorney.à h àа` (#` (# ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àLet€me,€let€me€read€them€to€you.ЈØ` x` x ÐÌà8  à[unintelligible€because€Moyers€and€Defendant€talking€simultaneously]Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` à.€.€.€have€the€right€to€an€attorney.€€I€have€the€right€to,€you€know,€not€toÐ 8 ˆ Ðsay€nothing€[sic]€if€I€donððt€want€to.Ð$ t` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àThatððs€correct.€€You€have€all€those€rights€and€you€also€have€the€rightÐ ü L  Ðto,€to,€to€have€an€attorney€present.Ðè 8 ` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` àPresent,€yeah.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àAnd€you€understood€all€those,€is€that€correct?Иè ` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à0 ` àYeah.ÐpÀ` (#` (# ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àOkay,€did,€you€did,€weððre€gonna€go€over€them€again€just€to€make€sureÐ H˜ Ðthat€you,€that€you€understand.Ð4„` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` àOr€should€I€wait€for€this€right€here,€for€my€attorney,€cause€like€yððallÐ  \ Ðgot€a€written€thing?ÐøH` x` x ÐÌMoyers:à8 ` àIt€just€makes€it€more€clear€that,€that€we€donððt€misunderstand,Ð Ð  Ðmisunderstand,€or€.€.€.€.м ` x` x ÐÌDefendant:à8 ` à[unintelligible]€I€mean,€I€donððt,€I€donððt€need€no€attorney.€€I€donððtÐ ”ä Ðknow€why€you€even€ask€me€that.ЀÐ` x` x ÐÌà8  à[Moyers€then€proceeds€to€explain€Defendantððs€rights€to€him,€and€DefendantÐ X ¨ Ðacknowledges€each€of€them.€€Defendant€admits€that€he€stabbed€the€victim€during€aÐ D!” Ðconfrontation.]Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€support€of€his€suppression€motion,€the€defendant€took€the€stand€at€the€hearing.€€HeÐ $X" Ðclaimed€that€he€asked€why€he€was€brought€to€the€police€station€but€was€not€told€about€the€murderÐ ô$D # Ðinvestigation.€€Rather,€Investigator€Jones€said,€ð ðYou€know€why€youððre€here.ðð€€The€defendant€claimedÐ à%0!$ Ðthat€he€was€asked€questions€about€the€homicide€before€he€was€advised€of€his€rights.€€When€he€wasÐ Ì&"% Ðlater€advised€of€his€rights,€the€defendant€refused€to€sign€the€admonition€form€and€said€that€he€neededÐ ¸'#& Ðto€see€a€lawyer.€€According€to€the€defendantððs€testimony,€the€officers€did€not€cease€discussion€of€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðhomicide€at€this€point.€€Investigator€Jones€told€him€that€if€he€did€not€explain€what€happened,€heÐ )à$( Ðwould€be€charged€with€first„degree€murder.€€The€defendant€did€not€want€to€tell€his€side€of€the€story,Ð |*Ì%) Ðbut€as€the€discussion€continued,€Sergeant€Moyers€made€him€feel€like€what€had€happened€would€beÐ h+¸&* Ðmore€or€less€understandable.€€The€defendant€decided€to€tell€the€officers€about€the€homicide.€€TheÐ ° Ðdefendant€admitted€that€although€he€was€very€emotional,€no€one€forced€him€to€give€a€statement.€€TheÐ œì Ðdefendant€claimed€that€he€had€been€confused€when€he€said€he€changed€his€mind€about€talking€to€anÐ ˆØ Ðattorney.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àà ` àFollowing€hearings,€the€court€suppressed€the€defendantððs€statements.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€stateÐ L œ Ðsought€permission€to€pursue€an€interlocutory€appeal,€which€this€court€and€the€lower€court€granted.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@IIìàòòDefendantððs€Statements€to€His€WifeóóˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€lower€court€also€had€before€it€the€defendantððs€motion€(1)€to€exclude€evidence€ofÐ è 8  Ðthe€defendantððs€statements€to€his€wife€about€the€alleged€crime,€and€(2)€to€dismiss€the€indictmentÐ Ô$  Ðbecause€it€was€returned€based€entirely€upon€such€evidence,€which€violates€the€maritalÐ À  Ðcommunications€privilege.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€lower€court€conducted€a€hearing€at€which€Kimberly€Dotson€testified€that€she€hadÐ „Ô  Ðbeen€married€to€the€defendant€since€October€30,€1998.€€At€the€time€of€the€hearing,€Ms.€Dotson€hadÐ pÀ Ðnot€filed€for€divorce€because€she€could€not€afford€to€do€so,€but€she€was€saving€money€for€thatÐ \¬ Ðpurpose.€€Ms.€Dotson€recounted€that€she€and€the€defendant€had€been€separated€for€approximately€sixÐ H˜ Ðmonths€in€October€2001€and€had€seen€each€other€three€or€four€times€during€the€separation.€€AlthoughÐ 4„ Ðthey€were€working€towards€reconciliation,€they€were€not€living€together.€€For€two€to€three€days€priorÐ  p Ðto€October€19,€which€was€Ms.€Dotsonððs€birthday,€the€defendant€spent€the€night€at€Ms.€DotsonððsÐ  \ Ðresidence.€€They€engaged€in€sexual€relations€on€October€19€prior€to€going€out€in€the€evening.€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àà ` àMs.€Dotson€did€not€testify€in€any€detail€about€the€events€leading€up€to€Mr.€Blanco„Ð Ð  ÐGuerraððs€death.€€However,€she€testified€that€after€Mr.€Blanco„Guerra€left€her€home,€the€defendantÐ ¼  Ðtold€her€that€he€had€been€upset€by€the€way€the€victim€had€touched€Ms.€Dotsonððs€bottom€during€theirÐ ¨ø Ðearlier€visit€to€a€nightclub.€€Ms.€Dotson€asked€about€Mr.€Blanco„Guerraððs€whereabouts,€and€theÐ ”ä Ðdefendant€said€that€he€ð ðkilled€the€m„„„„€f„„„„„.ðð€€Ms.€Dotson€asked,€ð ðYou€for€real?€[sic]ðð€€TheÐ €Ð Ðdefendant€responded,€ð ðNo,€I€know€I€didnððt;€I€just€stabbed€him€right€here€in€his€shoulder.ðð€€AccordingÐ l¼ Ðto€Ms.€Dotson,€the€marriage€was€ð ðoverðð€once€this€conversation€transpired.€€However,€Ms.€DotsonÐ X ¨ Ðalso€testified€that€they€later€went€to€bed€and€spent€the€night€together€but€did€not€have€sexual€relationsÐ D!” Ðuntil€the€next€day€when,€according€to€Ms.€Dotson,€ð ð[the€defendant]€took€the€sex€from€me.ððÐ 0"€  ÐÌà  àà ` àBased€upon€this€evidence,€the€lower€court€ruled€that€any€statements€the€defendantÐ $X" Ðmade€to€Ms.€Dotson€regarding€the€alleged€crime€were€privileged€marital€communications€that€couldÐ ô$D # Ðnot€be€used€as€evidence€in€the€prosecution€of€the€defendant.€€It€does€not€appear€from€the€record€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€court€ruled€on€the€motion€to€dismiss.€€ò òÐ Ì&"% Ðâ âó óÐ ¸'#& Ðò òà  àà ` àó óThe€state€sought€permission€to€pursue€an€interlocutory€appeal€of€the€maritalÐ ° Ðâ âcommunications€ruling,€which€this€court€and€the€lower€court€granted.Ð œì Ðà  àà ` àÌà  àà ` àBoth€the€suppression€and€exclusion€issues€have€now€been€presented€by€the€parties€inÐ tÄ Ðtheir€briefs€and€oral€arguments,€and€they€are€before€us€for€disposition.Ð `° ÐÌà@ÅÅ*ìàò òIˆÐ 8 ˆ Ðó óÌà  àà ` àWe€consider€first€the€suppression€of€the€defendantððs€statements€given€to€OfficersÐ  ` ÐJones€and€Moyers€of€the€Knoxville€Police€Department.€€ò òÐ ü L  Ðó óÌà  àà ` àThis€case€presents€issues€which€are€interesting€both€legally€and€factually.€€Legally,Ð Ô$  Ðthe€issue€is€whether€law€enforcement€officers€have€any€duty€to€inquire€and€clarify€when€a€suspectÐ À  Ðmakes€an€ambiguous€statement€regarding€his€desire€for€counsel.€€Factually,€the€issue€is€whether€theÐ ¬ü  Ðdefendantððs€statements€regarding€his€desire€for€counsel€were€ambiguous.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àWith€respect€to€these€issues,€the€state€takes€the€position€that€the€defendantððsÐ pÀ Ðstatements€about€counsel€were€equivocal;€therefore,€Officers€Moyers€and€Jones€had€no€duty€toÐ \¬ Ðinquire.€€Further,€the€state€argues€that€the€defendant€then€initiated€discussion€of€the€crime,€effectivelyÐ H˜ Ðwaiving€his€right€to€counsel.€€The€defendant,€however,€posits€that€he€first€made€an€equivocalÐ 4„ Ðstatement€when€he€asked,€ð ðDo€you€think€I€need€a€lawyer?ðð€€He€claims€he€then€made€an€unequivocalÐ  p Ðassertion€of€his€right€to€counsel€when€he€said,€ð ðI€think€I€need€an€attorney.ðð€In€light€of€the€second,Ð  \ Ðallegedly€unequivocal€statement,€the€defendant€argues€that€it€is€unnecessary€for€this€court€toÐ øH Ðdetermine€whether€there€was€a€duty€to€clarify€the€first€statement,€for€the€reason€that€the€officersÐ ä4 Ðclearly€breached€their€duty€to€cease€questioning€upon€an€unequivocal€statement€of€a€desire€forÐ Ð  Ðcounsel.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€begin€with€consideration€of€the€legal€issue.€€Under€the€United€States€Constitution,Ð ”ä Ðan€ambiguous€invocation€of€a€suspectððs€right€to€counsel€does€not€trigger€any€duty€that€theÐ €Ð Ðinterrogating€officer€stop€substantive€questioning€of€the€suspect€and€clarify€the€suspectððs€desireÐ l¼ Ðregarding€counsel.€€òòDavis€v.€United€Statesóó,€512€U.S.€452,€460„61,€114€S.€Ct.€2350,€2355€(1994).€Ð X ¨ ÐUnder€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€however,€the€question€is€not€so€easily€answered.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€most€recently€addressed€the€issue€as€a€matter€of€stateÐ #l! Ðconstitutional€law€in€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530,€548€(Tenn.€1994),€which€was€decidedÐ $X" Ðprior€to€òòDavisóó.€€In€òòStephensonóó,€Tennesseeððs€high€court€held€that€the€state€and€federal€constitutionsÐ ô$D # Ðrequire€that€when€a€suspect€makes€an€equivocal€statement€about€the€need€for€an€attorney,€the€lawÐ à%0!$ Ðenforcement€officer€must€limit€further€questioning€to€clarifying€whether€the€suspect€wanted€anÐ Ì&"% Ðattorney.€€òòStephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€at€548.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àà ` àTwo€years€after€òòStephensonóó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€considered€the€issue€asÐ )à$( Ða€matter€of€federal€constitutional€law€in€òòState€v.€Huddlestonóó,€924€S.W.2d€666€(Tenn.€1996).€€TheÐ |*Ì%) Ðcourt€acknowledged€the€interim€òòDavisóó€holding€that€a€suspect€ð ðmust€articulate€his€desire€to€haveÐ h+¸&* Ðcounsel€present€sufficiently€clearly€that€a€reasonable€officer€[in€the€circumstances]€would€understandÐ ° Ðthe€statement€to€be€a€request€for€an€attorneyðð€and€that€absent€such€an€unambiguous€statement,Ð œì Ðsubstantive€questioning€need€not€cease.€€òòHuddlestonóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€670€(quoting€òòDavisóó,€512€U.S.Ð ˆØ Ðat€458,€114€S.€Ct.€at€2355).€€€Without€commenting€on€the€bearing,€if€any,€that€the€TennesseeÐ tÄ ÐConstitution€had€on€the€issue€or€overruling€òòStephensonóó,€the€court€held€that€the€facts€in€òòHuddlestonóóÐ `° Ðdid€not€present€a€case€in€which€the€defendant€made€an€unambiguous€request€for€counsel.€€òòIdóó.€€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€question€of€the€effect€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€is€a€significant€one.€€ThisÐ $ t Ðcourt€has€held€that€Article€I,€section€9€of€the€state€constitution€provides,€in€some€respects,€broaderÐ  ` Ðprotections€of€a€suspectððs€individual€rights€than€does€the€Fifth€Amendment.€€òòState€v.€Farmeróó,€927Ð ü L  ÐS.W.2d€582,€594€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996)€(citing€òòState€v.€Crumpóó,€834€S.W.2d€265,€268€(Tenn.Ð è 8  Ð1992)).€€In€the€wake€of€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€silence€in€òòHuddlestonóó€on€the€issue€as€a€matterÐ Ô$  Ðof€state€constitutional€lawòòóó,€this€court€has€struggled€to€define€the€parameters€of€a€suspectððs€rightsÐ À  Ðunder€Tennessee€constitutional€law.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€State€v.€Gerald€E.€Sayloróó,€No.€E2001„00604„CCA„R3„Ð ¬ü  ÐCD€,€slip€op.€at€7„10€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€July€11,€2002),€òòperm.€app.€grantedóó€(Tenn.,€Dec.Ð ˜è  Ð2,€2002);€òòSlater€Belcher€v.€Stateóó,€No.€E1999„02287„CCA„R3„PC,€slip€op.€at€4„5,€concurring€slip€op.Ð „Ô  Ðat€1€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Oct.€10,€2001),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€2002);€òòState€v.€JamesÐ pÀ ÐClayton€Young,€Jr.óó,€No.€01C01„9605„CC„00208,€slip€op.€at€22„29€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,Ð \¬ ÐMay€22,€1998);€òòState€v.€Jack€Jay€North,€Jr.óó,€No.€02C01„9512„CC„00369,€slip€op.€at€25„31€(Tenn.Ð H˜ ÐCrim.€App.,€Jackson,€Dec.€9,€1996),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1997).Ð 4„ Ðà  àà ` àÌà  àà ` àRecently,€a€panel€of€this€court€interpreted€òòHuddlestonóó€to€overrule€òòStephensonóó€relativeÐ  \ Ðto€the€equivocal€request€for€an€attorney€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€òòGerald€E.€Sayloróó,€slip€op.Ð øH Ðat€10.€€Thatòòóópanel€noted€that€its€interpretation€of€òòHuddlestonóóððs€effect€on€òòStephensonóó€was€consistentÐ ä4 Ðwith€decisions€of€other€panels€of€this€court.€€òòId.óó€(citing€òòJames€Clayton€Young,€Jr.óó€and€òòJack€Jay€North,Ð Ð  ÐJr.óó);€òòcf.€State€v.€Kerry€L.€Dowellóó,€No.€M2002„00630„CCA„R3„CD€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,Ð ¼  ÐJune€27,€2003)€(following€òòHuddlestonóóððs€rule€that€unambiguous€request€for€counsel€is€necessary€toÐ ¨ø Ðforeclose€further€questioning,€without€discussing€its€effect€on€òòStephensonóó).€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÐ ”ä ÐCourt€has€accepted€review€of€òòSayloróó;€in€the€interim,€we€agree€with€the€result€reached€by€the€òòSayloróóÐ €Ð Ðpanel€of€this€court.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àà ` àThus,€the€defendant€in€this€case€is€entitled€to€suppression€of€his€statement€if€heÐ D!” Ðunequivocally€requested€counsel€and€that€request€was€not€honored.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€lower€court€interpreted€the€defendantððs€statements€about€counsel€to€beÐ $X" Ðambiguous.€€The€lower€court€analogized€the€facts€to€those€of€òòStephensonóó,€in€which€the€suspect€madeÐ ô$D # Ðan€equivocal€statement€regarding€his€desire€to€have€counsel.€€The€lower€court€found€that€theÐ à%0!$ Ðdefendant€declined€to€sign€a€rights€waiver,€inquired€whether€the€interrogating€officers€thought€heÐ Ì&"% Ðneeded€a€lawyer,€and€made€statements€such€as€ð ðI€think€I€need€a€lawyer.ðð€€It€further€found€that€theÐ ¸'#& Ðofficers€had€a€duty€to€clarify€the€request€for€counsel,€which€they€failed€to€do.€€Rather,€they€pursuedÐ ¤(ô#' Ða€discussion€of€the€basis€for€the€charge.€€Based€upon€the€lack€of€clarification€and€the€furtherÐ )à$( Ðsubstantive€discussion,€the€lower€court€suppressed€the€defendantððs€statement.à x àà Ð àÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àThe€lower€courtððs€determination€that€the€defendant€made€equivocal€statements€aboutÐ ° Ðcounsel€is€a€question€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Darryl€Gene€Farmeróó,€No.€01C01„9804„CC„00166,€slip€op.€atÐ œì Ð3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Apr.€23,€1999)€(citing€òòState€v.€Farmeróó,€927€S.W.2d€582,€594€(Tenn.Ð ˆØ ÐCrim.€App.€1996)),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1999);€òòsee€also€State€v.€Gdongalay€P.€Berryóó,€No.Ð tÄ ÐM2001„02023„CCA„R3„DD,€slip€op.€at€15€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Apr.€10,€2003),€òòapp.Ð `° Ðdocketedóó(Tenn.€Apr.€28,€2003);€òòState€v.€Wayne€Joseph€Burgess,€Jr.óó,€No.€M1999„02040„CCA„R3„Ð L œ ÐCD,€slip€op.€at€8€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Jan.€18,€2001),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€2001).€€TheÐ 8 ˆ Ðlower€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€binding€on€this€court€unless€the€evidentiary€record€preponderatesÐ $ t Ðto€the€contrary.€€òòDarryl€Gene€Farmeróó,€slip€op.€at€3€(citing€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.Ð  ` Ð1996)).€€In€this€case,€the€evidence€of€record€does€not€so€preponderate.€€The€defendant€had€a€duty€toÐ ü L  Ðð ðarticulate€his€desire€to€have€counsel€present€sufficiently€clearly€that€a€reasonable€officer€[in€theÐ è 8  Ðcircumstances]€would€understand€the€statement€to€be€a€request€for€an€attorney.ðð€€òòHuddlestonóó,€924Ð Ô$  ÐS.W.2d€at€670€(quoting€òòDavisóó,€512€U.S.€at€458,€114€S.€Ct.€at€2355).€€The€lower€court€found€that€theÐ À  Ðstatements€attributed€to€the€defendant€fell€short€of€such€articulation.€€We€defer€to€the€lower€courtððsÐ ¬ü  Ðfactual€determination€that€the€defendantððs€statements€regarding€counsel€were€equivocal.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€next€step€is€application€of€the€law€to€the€lower€courtððs€factual€determination.€€InÐ pÀ Ðthis€respect,€we€hold€that€the€lower€court€erred.€€As€stated€above,€we€believe€that€òòStephensonóó,€uponÐ \¬ Ðwhich€the€lower€court€relied,€was€implicitly€overruled€by€òòHuddlestonóó€and€that€the€correct€analysisÐ H˜ Ðis€that€which€is€embodied€by€the€principles€of€òòHuddlestonóó€and€òòDavisóó.€€Those€cases€support€aÐ 4„ Ðconclusion€that€Officers€Moyers€and€Jones€had€no€duty€to€curtail€substantive€questioning€of€theÐ  p Ðdefendant€when€he€made€equivocal€statements€regarding€his€desire€for€counsel.€€Moreover,€theÐ  \ Ðofficers€had€no€duty€to€clarify€the€defendantððs€statements€before€continuing€with€substantiveÐ øH Ðquestioning€about€the€crime€under€investigation.€€Accordingly,€the€defendantððs€inculpatory€statementÐ ä4 Ðwas€not€properly€subject€to€suppression€on€this€basis.€€The€lower€courtððs€order€suppressing€theÐ Ð  Ðstatement€is€reversed.Ð ¼  ÐÌà@žž)ìàò òIIˆÐ ”ä Ðó óÌà  àà ` àò òó óWe€now€consider€the€lower€courtððs€ruling€excluding€evidence€of€the€defendantððsÐ l¼ Ðstatements€to€his€wife€about€the€alleged€crime.€€This€issue€requires€us€to€examine€the€law€relative€toÐ X ¨ Ðthe€marital€communications€privilege.€€The€rule€relative€to€that€privilege€is€defined€by€statute,€whichÐ D!” ÐsaysÐ 0"€  ÐÌà8  àIn€a€criminal€proceeding€a€marital€confidential€communication€shall€be€privileged€if:Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà0  à(A)à0` (#(#àThe€communications€originated€in€a€confidence€that€they€will€not€be€disclosed;Ðà%0!$` (#` (# Ðà0  à(B)à0` (#(#àThe€element€of€confidentiality€is€essential€to€the€full€and€satisfactory€maintenance€ofÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€relation€between€the€parties;и'#&` (#` (# Ðà0  à(C)€à8` (#(#àThe€relation€must€be€one€which,€in€the€opinion€of€the€community,€ought€toÐ ¤(ô#' Ðbe€sedulously€fostered;€andÐ)à$(` Ð ` Ð  Ðà0  à(D)€à8` (#(#àThe€injury€to€the€relation€by€disclosure€of€the€communications€outweighs€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðbenefit€gained€for€the€correct€disposal€of€litigation.Ðh+¸&*` Ð ` Ð  ЇTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„201(c)(1)(A)€„€(D)€(2000).€€If€a€communication€is€found€to€be€privileged,Ð ° Ðit€is€inadmissible€upon€objection€of€either€spouse.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòId.óó€ðð€24„1„201(c)(2)€(2000).Ð œì ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€lower€court€found€that€all€four€factors€existed€and€ordered€suppression€of€theÐ tÄ Ðdefendantððs€statements€to€his€wife€about€the€alleged€crime.€€On€appellate€review,€we€must€defer€toÐ `° Ðthe€lower€courtððs€findings€of€fact€that€all€four€factors€exist€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€to€theÐ L œ Ðcontrary.€€òòSee€State€v.€Priceóó,€46€S.W.3d€785,€802€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€2000),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.Ð 8 ˆ Ð2001).Ð $ t ÐÌà  àà ` àResolution€of€this€case€turns€on€whether€the€time€of€analysis€for€the€presence€orÐ ü L  Ðabsence€of€the€four€factors€is€when€the€communication€occurs€or€at€the€time€of€the€trial€courtððsÐ è 8  Ðinquiry€into€the€application€of€the€privilege.€€That€determination€is€critical€where,€as€here,€theÐ Ô$  Ðmarriage€was€in€a€very€different€state€at€the€time€of€the€marital€communication€than€it€is€when€theÐ À  Ðtrial€court€later€rules€on€the€applicability€of€the€privilege.€€For€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€hold€thatÐ ¬ü  Ðfactor€(A)€focuses€on€the€expectation€of€the€communicating€spouse€at€the€time€of€the€communication,Ð ˜è  Ðwhereas€assessment€for€the€presence€of€factors€(B),€(C)€and€(D)€must€be€done€from€the€facts€as€theyÐ „Ô  Ðexist€at€the€time€of€the€trial€courtððs€ruling.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àà ` àFactor€(A)€considers€whether€ð ð[t]he€communications€originated€in€a€confidence€thatÐ H˜ Ðthey€will€not€be€disclosed.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„201(c)(1)(A)€(2000).€€Because€theÐ 4„ Ðstraightforward€language€of€this€factor€focuses€on€when€the€communication€ð ðoriginatedðð€and€usesÐ  p Ðpast€tense€language,€we€conclude€that€this€factor€requires€the€trial€court€to€consider€the€intent€andÐ  \ Ðbelief€of€the€parties€to€the€communication€at€the€time€of€the€communication.€€òòSee€State€v.€Gosnellóó,Ð øH Ð62€S.W.3d€740,€747€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.)€(evaluating€subjective€intent€of€spouses€regardingÐ ä4 Ðconfidentiality€at€time€of€surreptitiously€recorded€conversation),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€2001).Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àUnlike€factor€(A)ððs€focus€on€the€communication€itself,€the€remaining€three€factorsÐ ¨ø Ðfocus€on€the€relationship€of€the€parties€and€the€effect€on€the€relationship€of€spousal€testimony€aboutÐ ”ä Ðmarital€communications.€€A€second€distinction€is€that€these€factors€use€present„tense€language€„„Ð €Ð Ðfocusing€on€whether€confidentiality€òòisóó€essential€to€the€relationship,€the€relationship€òòoughtóó€to€beÐ l¼ Ðsedulously€fostered,€and€injury€from€disclosure€òòoutweighsóó€the€benefit€of€correct€disposition€of€theÐ X ¨ Ðlitigation.€€òòSee€id.óó€ðð€24„1„201(c)(1)(B)€„€(D).€€From€this,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€mustÐ D!” Ðconduct€its€inquiry€relative€to€factors€(B),€(C),€and€(D)€by€assessing€the€present€status€of€the€maritalÐ 0"€  Ðrelationship€at€the€time€it€is€called€upon€to€do€so,€rather€than€at€the€time€of€the€communication€inÐ #l! Ðquestion.€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àà ` àThis€is€consistent€with€the€historic€purpose€of€the€privilege€at€common€law,€whichÐ à%0!$ Ðwas€to€foster€ð ðthe€sacredness€of€the€home€and€the€peace€of€families.ðð€€€òòState€v.€Priceóó,€46€S.W.3d€785,Ð Ì&"% Ð799€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€2000)€(citing€òòMcCormick€v.€Stateóó,€135€Tenn.€218,€186€S.W.€95,€97€(1916)),Ð ¸'#& Ðòòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€2001).€€Recognition€of€the€privilege€will€tend€to€promote€continued€maritalÐ ¤(ô#' Ðharmony,€provided€it€exists€at€the€time€that€the€spouse€is€called€upon€to€testify;€however,€recognitionÐ )à$( Ðof€the€privilege€would€do€nothing€to€promote€marital€harmony€which€does€not€already€exist,€evenÐ ° Ðif€it€did€at€some€previous€time.Ð œì ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€are€likewise€persuaded€by€the€decision€of€a€panel€of€this€court€in€òòState€v.€Price.€Ð tÄ ÐóóThe€panel€in€that€case€considered€the€effect€that€spousal€testimony€would€have€on€the€òòcurrentóó€stateÐ `° Ðof€the€marriage,€finding€that€ð ðthe€defendantððs€marriage€was€already€failing,€whether€his€wife€testifiedÐ L œ Ðat€this€trial€or€not.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€802.€€Although€this€finding€was€made€relative€to€factor€(D),€we€find€itÐ 8 ˆ Ðpersuasive€with€respect€to€factors€(B)€and€(C),€as€well,€given€the€previously€mentioned€similaritiesÐ $ t Ðamong€factors€(B),€(C),€and€(D).€€òòBut€cf.€State€v.€Ralph€C.€Hauckóó,€No.€01C01„9105„CR„00151,€slipÐ  ` Ðop.€at€5„6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Apr.€16,€1992)€(factors€(B)€and€(C)€do€not€exist€whereÐ ü L  Ðdefendant€via€force€or€threat€of€harm€seeks€to€involve€witness„spouse€in€ongoing€criminal€enterpriseÐ è 8  Ðfor€which€defendant€is€on€trial;€focusing€on€relationship€at€time€of€communication),€òòperm.€app.Ð Ô$  Ðdismissedóó€(Tenn.€1992).òòóóà  àà h àà À àÐ À  ÐÌà  àà ` àTurning,€then,€to€the€case€at€bar,€the€state€concedes€that€factors€(A)€and€(C)€areÐ ˜è  Ðpresent€but€claims€that€the€lower€court€erred€in€finding€that€factors€(B)€and€(D)€apply.€€We€believeÐ „Ô  Ðthat€the€stateððs€concession€regarding€factor€(A)€is€apt;€we€disagree€with€respect€to€factor€(C).€Ð pÀ ÐConsidering€first€factor€(A),€the€record€supports€the€lower€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€defendant€madeÐ \¬ Ðstatements€to€his€wife€in€confidence€that€they€would€not€be€disclosed.€€The€defendant€and€his€wifeÐ H˜ Ðwere€discussing€their€marital€situation,€including€Ms.€Dotsonððs€behavior€with€the€victim,€when€theÐ 4„ Ðdefendant€made€inculpatory€admissions.€€This€occurred€at€a€time€when€they€were€attempting€toÐ  p Ðreconcile€their€differences€in€furtherance€of€their€marital€relationship.€€Up€until€the€time€that€theÐ  \ Ðdefendant€made€the€inculpatory€admissions,€it€was€Ms.€Dotsonððs€desire€to€reconcile€her€differencesÐ øH Ðwith€the€defendant€and€maintain€the€marital€relationship.Ð ä4 Ðà  àà ` àÌà  àà ` àWe€disagree€with€the€state€that€the€record€supports€the€lower€courtððs€finding€withÐ ¼  Ðregard€to€factor€(C)€that€the€relation€was€one€which,€by€community€standards,€should€be€sedulouslyÐ ¨ø Ðfostered.€€At€the€time€of€the€hearing,€the€defendant€and€Ms.€Dotson€were€estranged.€€Ms.€DotsonÐ ”ä Ðwanted€to€divorce€the€defendant€after€he€confessed€his€involvement€in€Mr.€Blanco„Guerraððs€death,Ð €Ð Ðand€only€her€financial€situation€kept€her€from€doing€so.€€Given€these€circumstances,€it€cannot€be€saidÐ l¼ Ðthat€community€opinion€would€be€that€this€relationship€should€be€encouraged€and€maintained.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€now€turn€to€the€contested€portion€of€the€issue,€that€is,€whether€the€evidenceÐ 0"€  Ðpreponderates€against€the€lower€courtððs€findings€that€factors€(B)€and€(D)€exist.€€Factor€(B)€existsÐ #l! Ðwhen€ð ð[t]he€element€of€confidentiality€is€essential€to€the€full€and€satisfactory€maintenance€of€theÐ $X" Ðrelation€between€the€parties.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„201(c)(1)(B)€(2000).€€On€this€point,€the€lowerÐ ô$D # Ðcourt€found,€ð ð[T]he€relationship€between€the€parties€and€their€marriage€was€the€reason€for€theÐ à%0!$ Ðconversation.€€The€element€of€the€confidential€communication€that€bound€them€together.€[sic]ðð€InÐ Ì&"% Ðadvocating€that€this€factor€does€not€exist,€the€state€points€to€evidence€that€Ms.€Dotsonððs€marriage€toÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€defendant€ð ðhad€been€languishing€for€six€months€prior€to€his€confession€to€herðð€and€was€ð ðoverÐ ¤(ô#' Ðwithðð€once€she€learned€of€the€homicide.€€Further,€the€state€highlights€Ms.€Dotsonððs€testimony€thatÐ )à$( Ðshe€had€not€yet€initiated€divorce€proceedings€because€she€could€not€afford€to€do€so,€but€she€wasÐ |*Ì%) Ðsaving€money€for€that€purpose.€€The€defendant€claims€that€the€lower€court€correctly€found€that€factorÐ h+¸&* Ð(B)€existed€based€upon€evidence€that€the€continued€maintenance€of€the€marital€relationship€was€whatÐ ° Ðcaused€the€conversation€to€occur,€and€further,€Ms.€Dotson€voluntarily€slept€with€the€defendant€afterÐ œì Ðthe€conversation€took€place.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€evidence€demonstrates€that€at€the€time€of€the€lower€courtððs€ruling,€theÐ `° ÐDotson/Mitchell€marriage€was€not€one€in€which€confidentiality€of€the€previous,€inculpatoryÐ L œ Ðcommunications€was€essential€to€full€and€satisfactory€maintenance€of€the€relationship.€€To€be€sure,Ð 8 ˆ Ðthe€parties€were€separated,€Ms.€Dotson€had€harbored€no€desire€for€reconciliation€since€learning€thatÐ $ t Ðthe€defendant€was€involved€in€Mr.€Blanco„Guerraððs€death,€and€Ms.€Dotson€was€saving€money€forÐ  ` Ða€divorce.€€Thus,€the€lower€court€erred€in€finding€the€presence€of€factor€(B).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àà ` àFinally,€factor€(D)€requires€consideration€of€whether€ð ð[t]he€injury€to€the€relation€byÐ Ô$  Ðdisclosure€of€the€communications€outweighs€the€benefit€gained€for€the€correct€disposal€of€litigation.ðð€Ð À  ÐòòId.óó€ðð€24„1„201(c)(1)(D)€(2000).€€In€the€present€case,€the€lower€court€focused€on€the€fact€that€althoughÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€defendant€and€Ms.€Dotson€were€separated,€they€ð ðwould€have€continued€to€work€on€reconciliationÐ ˜è  Ðin€the€marriage€had€these€incidents€not€occurred.ðð€€However,€as€we€have€discussed€above,€we€believeÐ „Ô  Ðthe€proper€point€in€time€for€evaluating€the€potential€for€injury€to€the€marriage€is€at€the€time€of€theÐ pÀ Ðtrial€courtððs€ruling.€€òòSee€Priceóó,€46€S.W.3d€at€802.€€Had€the€lower€court€examined€the€state€of€theÐ \¬ Ðdefendantððs€marriage€at€the€time€of€the€hearing,€it€would€have€concluded€that€the€marriage€was€over,Ð H˜ Ðwith€lack€of€money€being€the€only€reason€that€Ms.€Dotson€had€not€yet€filed€for€divorce.€€In€thisÐ 4„ Ðsituation,€the€benefit€gained€from€the€òòóócorrect€disposal€of€the€litigation€would€far€outweigh€theÐ  p Ðdamage€to€the€marital€relationship.€€Thus,€the€lower€court€erred€in€finding€that€factor€(D)€existed.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àà ` àBased€upon€the€absence€of€factors€(B),€(C),€and€(D),€we€hold€that€the€lower€courtÐ ä4 Ðerred€in€ruling€that€Ms.€Dotsonððs€testimony€regarding€the€defendantððs€inculpatory€statements€shouldÐ Ð  Ðbe€excluded€based€upon€the€marital€communications€privilege.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€have€reached€this€conclusion€notwithstanding€the€defendantððs€attempt€to€placeÐ ”ä Ðevidence€before€us€that€he€and€Ms.€Dotson€have€reconciled€since€the€evidentiary€hearing.€€On€the€dayÐ €Ð Ðof€oral€argument€in€this€court,€defense€counsel€filed€a€ð ðMotion€for€Consideration€of€Post„JudgmentÐ l¼ ÐFact.ðð€€The€motion€is€based€upon€facts€contained€in€an€order€of€the€trial€court€pertaining€to€theÐ X ¨ Ðdefendantððs€bond,€in€which€the€trial€court€recites€that€the€defendant€and€Ms.€Dotson€have€reconciled.€Ð D!” ÐThe€trial€court€order€was€entered€òònunc€pro€tuncóó€October€14,€2002,€several€months€after€the€hearingÐ 0"€  Ðand€ruling€on€admissibility€of€the€marital€communication€evidence.€€The€state€filed€a€responseÐ #l! Ðvigorously€opposing€this€court€taking€notice€of€this€fact.€€The€state€concedes€the€relevance€of€theÐ $X" Ðinformation€to€the€merits€of€the€issue,€but€it€contends€that€consideration€of€such€factual€informationÐ ô$D # Ðis€improper€under€Tennessee€Rule€of€Appellate€Procedure€14.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€14,€AdvisoryÐ à%0!$ ÐCommððn€Comments€(ð ð[Rule€allows€the€appellate€court€to€consider€post„judgment€facts,]€unrelatedÐ Ì&"% Ðto€the€merits€and€not€genuinely€disputed,€[which]€are€necessary€to€keep€the€record€up€to€date.€.€.€.Ð ¸'#& ÐThis€rule€is€not€intended€to€permit€a€retrial€in€the€appellate€court.ðð);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòBook„Mart€v.€NationalÐ ¤(ô#' ÐBook€Whse.óó,€917€S.W.2d€691,€693€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòTown€of€Dandridge€v.€Pattersonóó,€827Ð )à$( ÐS.W.2d€797,€802€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àGiven€the€scope€of€Rule€14€and€the€interlocutory€nature€of€this€appeal,€we€do€notÐ ° Ðbelieve€it€proper€for€us€to€consider€any€information€of€a€matrimonial€reconciliation€occurring€afterÐ œì Ðthe€hearing€on€the€admissibility€of€the€marital€communication€evidence.€€Rather,€we€view€the€issueÐ ˆØ Ðbefore€us€to€be€limited€to€the€propriety€of€the€lower€courtððs€ruling€òòon€the€evidence€that€was€beforeÐ tÄ Ðitóó.€€Should€either€party€desire€that€the€lower€court€take€into€account€new€evidence€and€revisit€theÐ `° Ðruling€as€it€stands€following€remand,€that€party€may€direct€a€motion€to€the€lower€court€to€do€so.€€AtÐ L œ Ðsuch€time,€the€lower€court€will€have€the€opportunity€to€hear€evidence€on€the€then„existing€state€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€marriage.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€conclusion,€we€reverse€the€lower€courtððs€ruling€suppressing€the€defendantððsÐ ü L  Ðstatement€to€law€enforcement€officers.€€We€likewise€reverse€the€lower€courtððs€ruling€excluding€Ms.Ð è 8  ÐDotsonððs€testimony€about€the€defendantððs€inculpatory€statements€to€her.€€The€matter€is€remanded€toÐ Ô$  Ðthe€lower€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.Ô#†X_‘XX XéJ' #ÔÐ À  ÐÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð H˜ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àJAMES€CURWOOD€WITT,€JR.,€JUDGE