ÿWPC€… …UNV %¤U:ªä 0 ôþ w@ 4F 0NZ 0D¨ 0Jì 0T6 0^Š 0hè 0rP 0| 0†> 0Ä 1uT 0dÉ D3-U>`U*žB)ÈDCñ AM4™‚ 0@œ BÜ­ù.¦àÔ´!ÍÆ$L“)Ùß)f¸/Ó0çñ2ëØ;“Ã@pVH1ÆJ‘÷M¢ˆSb*WŒZà`—mcEg¶InpÿpžosÈ xµÕzv~Š|vÓ~ AOÛƒÆ*„ 0Dð„ D/4… Bc…(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular3|x&%(â,A$¡¡Ñ  ÑÔ€Xå6XXXÔÔ€XÛÃXXXå6ÔÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÑÑÑ  ÑÑTRY 3Ø'Letter3Ø' 3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  Ó %%%D%%%%%%Ó€&%&UÚƒç"(þ(3ÇØ$¤¤Ý ƒ,A!ÝÑ  ÑÔ€XÕkXXXÔÔ€X£XXXÕkÔÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÑÑÑ  ÑÑTRY3Ø'Letter3Ø'3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ....'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òDecember€9,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó xÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àThe€trial€on€October€3€„€4,€1991€was€the€second€trial.€€On€June€5,Ï1991,€the€jury€acquitted€the€petitioner€of€first€degree€murder€but€could€not€reachÏa€decision€on€the€lesser€included€offense€of€murder€in€the€second€degree.€€€Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò d £Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àSpecifically,€the€petition€alleges€that€Momonððs€attorney€failed€toÏraise€a€defense,€failed€to€consult€with€his€client,€failed€to€investigate€theÏcircumstances€surrounding€the€death,€failed€to€impeach€the€witnesses,€failed€toÏconduct€an€adequate€voir€dire,€and€failed€to€obtain€the€victimððs€medical€andÏpsychological€records.€€At€the€hearing,€testimony€about€counselððs€failure€to€raiseÏa€defense€centered€on€the€right€of€the€defendant€to€testify€on€his€own€behalf,Ïand€the€trial€judge€made€findings€on€that€issue.€€In€this€instance,€the€allegationsÏraised€in€the€petition,€particularly€the€failures€to€raise€a€defense€and€to€consultÏwith€the€defendant€prior€to€the€second€trial,€are€sufficient€to€raise€the€issue€ofÏwhether€an€attorneyððs€unilateral€decision€to€put€on€no€proof€violates€aÏdefendantððs€constitutional€right€to€be€heard€on€his€own€behalf.€€We€are€mindful,Ïhowever,€that€post„conviction€petitions€are€heard€upon€the€issues€raised€by€theÏpleadings€and€that€the€failure€to€allege€a€specific€ground€for€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€may€result€in€waiver€of€the€issue€on€appeal.€€€òòStevenÏMason€v.€Stateóó,€No.€01CO1„9610„CC„00428,€slip€op.€at€€4(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏNashville,€Sept.€30,€1997).€€òòSee€alsoóó€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€814€S.W.2d€45,€49Ï(Tenn.1990).€€Ì $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àAlthough€the€petitioner€had€known€Jacqueline€Momon€for€aboutÏfourteen€years,€they€had€been€married€only€three€months€at€the€time€of€herÏdeath.Ì ÖÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àThe€petitioner€is€also€blind€in€one€eye,€deaf,€€and€diabetic.€€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àThe€record€of€the€first€trial€is€not€part€of€the€record€on€appeal.€ÏMartin€Biesack,€who€served€as€defense€counsel€in€both€trials€and€on€directÏappeal,€said€that€he€had€the€transcript€at€one€time€but€that€he€was€unable€toÏlocate€it.€€He€opined€that€he€may€have€sent€it€to€Nashville€to€the€Board€ofÏProfessional€Responsibility€in€response€to€the€petitionerððs€complaint.Ì ÃÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àWe€are€unable€to€summarize€the€stateððs€position€because€the€stateÏhas€not€responded€specifically€to€any€of€the€petitionerððs€allegations.€€AfterÏreciting€the€appropriate€standard€as€found€in€òòStricklandóó€and€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€theÏstateððs€brief€concludes€with€the€following€paragraph:€€ÌÌà àà8 àà àIn€the€case€at€hand,€the€trial€court€found€thatÏthe€petitioner€was€not€deprived€of€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.€€The€Court€€found€that€two€ofÏthe€four€instances€of€ineffective€assistance€asÏcharged€by€the€petitioner€to€be€without€basis€in€fact.€ÏThe€Court€found€further€that€the€other€complaintsÏamounted€to€trial€strategy,€and€that€the€petitioner€hasÏfailed€to€carry€the€burden€to€show€that€this€wasÏineffective€assistance€or€that€the€outcome€wouldÏhave€been€any€different.€€ÌC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT ÏÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àFor€federal€cases€holding€that€the€right€to€testify€is€a€fundamentalÏconstitutional€right€see,€òòe.g.,óó€òòUnited€States€v.€Ortizóó,€82€F.3d€1066,€1069€(D.C.ÏCir.€1996);€òòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€10€(3d€Cir.€1995);€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Joelsonóó,€7€F.3d€174,€177€(9th€Cir.€1993):€€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953ÏF.2d€1525,€1530(11th€Cir.€1992):€òòUnderwood€v.€Clarkóó,€939€F.2d€473,€475,€(7thÏCir.€1991);€òòUnited€States€v.€Scottóó,€909€F.2d€488,€490€(11th€Cir.€1990);€òòWright€v.ÏEstelleóó,€572€F.2d€1071,€1073€(5th€Cir.€1978)(en€banc);€òòUnited€States€ex€rel.ÏFrierson€v.€Gramleyóó,€952€F.€Supp€578,€586€(N.D.€Ill.€1997):€òòCampos€v.€U.S.óó,€930ÏF.€Supp.€787,€790€(E.D.N.Y.€1996);€€òòPorter€v.€Singletaryóó,€883€F.Supp.€660,€666Ï(M.D.€Fla.€1995);€òòSmith€v.€Campbellóó,€781€F.Supp.€521,€530€(M.D.€Tenn.€1991),Ïòòaffððdóó€without€an€opinion€in€961€F.2d€1578€(6th€Cir.€1992),€òòcert.€deniedóó€113€S.Ct.Ï423€(1992);€òòUnited€States€v.€DiSalvoóó,€726€F.Supp.€596€(E.D.€Pa.€1989);ÏòòSiciliano€v.€Voseóó,€834€F.2d€29€(lst€Cir.€1987).Ì \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ÉÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àSince€1858€the€defendantððs€right€to€be€heard€has€been€protectedÏby€statute€as€well:€€€Ìà8 àà8 àò òSpeedy€trial€„„€Right€to€be€heard.€„„€ó óIn€allÏcriminal€prosecutions,€the€accused€is€entitled€to€aÏspeedy€trial,€and€to€be€heard€in€person€and€byÏcounsel.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„101€(1990).Ì ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àVirtually€every€state€court€that€has€considered€the€issue€has€madeÏsimilar€findings€based€on€either€their€state€constitutions€or€the€U.S.€SupremeÏCourtððs€dicta€in€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€483€U.S.€at€€49„52;€107€S.Ct.€at€2508„2709Ïand€òòFaretta€v.€Californiaóó,€422€U.S.€806,€829„834,€95€S.Ct.€2525,€2538„41Ï(1975).€€See,€e.g.,€òòLaVigne€v.€Stateóó,€812€P.2d€217,€219€(Alaska,€1991);€€òòPeopleÏv.€Mosquedaóó,€5€Cal.€App.3d€540,€545,€85€Cal.€Rptr.€346,€348€(1970);€€òòPeople€v.ÏCurtisóó,€681€P.2d€504,€509„510€(Colo.€1984);€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2dÏ670,€672€(D.C.€App.€1991);€òòGill€v.€Stateóó,€632€So.2d€660,€662€(Fla.App.€1994);€ÏòòKing€v.€Stateóó,€391€S.E.2d€660,€662€(Ga.€1990);€€òòTachibana€v.€Stateóó,€900€P.2dÏ1293,€1305€(Haw.€1995);€€òòAragon€v.€Stateóó,€760€P.2d€1174,€1178€(Idaho,€1988);ÏòòPeople€v.€Rasoóó,€602€N.E.€2d€53,€55€(Ill.€App.€1992);€òòTaylor€v.€Stateóó,€843€P.2dÏ682,€687€(Kan.€1992);€€òòCommonwealth€v.€Watersóó,€506€N.E.€2d€859,€864„865Ï(Mass.€1987);€òòPeople€v.€Simmonsóó,€364€N.W.2d€783,€784€(Mich.€App.€1985);ÏòòState€v.€Rosilloóó,€281€N.W.2d€877,€878€(Minn.€1979);€òòCulberson€v.€Stateóó,€412ÏSo.2d€1184,€1186€(Miss.€1982);€€òòState€v.€Hammóó,€818€P.2d€830,€833€(Mont.Ï1991);€€òòIngle€v.€Stateóó,€546€P.2d€598,€599€(Nev.€1976);€òòState€v.€Savageóó,€577ÏA.2d€455,€471€(N.J.€1990);€òòState€v.€Duranóó,€731€P.2d€374,€376€(N.M.€App.€1986);€ÏòòState€v.€Rayóó,€427€S.E.2d€171,€174€(S.C.€1993);€òòState€v.€El„Tabechóó,€453€N.W.2dÏ91,€95€(Neb.€1990);€€òòState€v.€Brooksóó,€833€P.2d€362,€364€(Utah€App.€1992);€òòStateÏv.€Mumleyóó,€571€A.2d€44,€45€(Vt.€1989);€€òòState€v.€Thomasóó,€910€P.2d€475,€477Ï(Wash.€1996);€€òòState€v.€Neumanóó,€371€S.E.2d€77,€80„81(W.Va.€1988);€òòState€v.ÏAlbrightóó,€291€N.W.2d€487,€492€(Wis.€1980);€€òòSanchez€v.€Stateóó,€841€P.2d€85,€87Ï(Wyo.€1992).€€Ì áÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àSee,€e.g.,€òòUnited€States€v.€Boydóó,€86€F.3d€719,€723€(7th€Cir.€1996);ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Ortizóó,€82€F.3d€1066,€1071€(D.C.€Cir.€1996);€òòUnited€States€v.ÏPennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€11€(3rd.€Cir.€1995);€òòUnited€States€v.€Joelsonóó,€7€F.3dÏ174,€177€(9th€Cir.€1993);€€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953€F.2d€1525,€1532€(11thÏCir.€1992);€òòUnited€States€v.€Scottóó,€909€F.2d€488,€490(11th€Cir.€1990);€òòDon€v.€Nixóó,Ï886€F.2d€203,€207(8th€Cir.€1989);€òòSiciliano€v.€Voseóó,€834€F.2d€29€(1st€Cir.€1987);ÏòòCampos€v.€United€Statesóó,€930€F.Supp.€787,€790€(E.D.N.Y.€1996);€òòPorter€v.ÏSingletaryóó,€883€F.Supp.€660,€666€(M.D.€Fla.€1995);€òòSmith€v.€Campbellóó,€781ÏF.Supp.€521,€530€(M.D.€Tenn.€1991),€òòaffððdóó€by€memorandum€in€961€F.2d€1578Ï(6th€Cir.€1992);€€òòUnited€States€v.€DiSalvoóó,€726€F.Supp.€596€(E.D.€Pa.€1989).Ì ‰Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòLaVigne€v.€Stateóó,€812€P.2d€217,€219„220€(Alaska,€1991);€òòPeople€v.ÏCurtisóó,€681€P.2d€504,€509„510€(Colo.€1984);€€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2dÏ670,€673€(D.C.€App.€1991);€òòGill€v.€Stateóó,€632€So.2d€660€(Fla.€App.€1994);ÏòòTachibana€v.€Stateóó,€900€P.2d€1293,€1299€(Haw.€1995);€€òòAragon€v.€Stateóó,€760ÏP.2d€1174,€1179€(Idaho,€1988);€òòPeople€v.€Rasoóó,€602€N.E.2d€53,€56€(Ill.€App.Ï1992);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Freemanóó,€564€N.E.€2d€11,€14€(Mass.€App.€1990);€òòStateÏv.€Rosilloóó,€281€N.W.2d€877,€878„79€(Minn.€1979);€€òòCulberson€v.€Stateóó,€412ÏSo.2d€1184€(Miss.€1982);€òòIngle€v.€Stateóó,€546€P.2d€598€(Nev.€1976);€òòState€v.ÏSavageóó,€577€A.2d€455,€471€(€N.€J.€1990);€€òòState€v.€Rayóó,€427€S.E.2d€171,€174Ï(S.C.€1993);€òòState€v.€Brooksóó,€833€P.2d€362,€364€(Utah€App.€1992);€òòState€v.ÏMumleyóó,€571€A.2d€44,45€(Vt.€1989);€€òòState€v.€Thomasóó,€910€P.2d€475,€477€(Wash.Ï1996);€€òòState€v.€Neumanóó,€371€S.E.€2d€77,€81€(W.Va.€1988);€òòSanchez€v.€Stateóó,Ï841€P.2d€85,€89€(Wyo.€1992).€€In€a€few€states,€however,€courts€have€held€that,Ïabsent€exceptional€circumstances,€decisions€to€put€on€a€defense€or€to€waive€aÏdefendantððs€right€against€self„incrimination€at€trial€are€strategic€choices€whichÏcounsel€may€make€without€defendantððs€consent.€€€òòState€v,€Rodriguezóó,€612€P.2dÏ484,€490€(Ariz.€1980);€€òòState€v.€Mannóó,€934€P.2d€784,€789€(Ariz.€1997);€òòKing€v.ÏStateóó,€391€S.E.2d€660,€662€(Ga.€1990);€€òòState€v.€Albrightóó,€291€N.W.2d€487,€492Ï(Wis.€1980).Ì fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àThe€òòEvansóó€court€held€that€since€the€petitioner€had€neither€allegedÏnor€proven€that€the€alleged€constitutional€violation€had€an€adverse€effect€on€hisÏcase€he€was€not€entitled€to€post„conviction€relief.€€Ì 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòLaVigne€v.€Stateóó,€812€P.2d€217€(Alaska,€1991);€òòPeople€v.€Curtisóó,Ï681€P.2d€504€(Colo.€1984);€€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2d€670€(D.C.€App.Ï1991);€òòCulberson€v.€Stateóó,€412€So.€2d€1184€(Miss.€1982);€òòBrown€v.€Stateóó,€453ÏS.E.€2d€251€(S.C.€1994)€(only€in€capital€cases);€òòState€v.€Neumanóó,€371€S.E.2d€77Ï(W.Va.€1988);€€òòTachibana€v.€Stateóó,€900€P.2d€1293€(Haw.€1995).ÌÌ ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòUnited€States€v.€óóOrtiz,€82€F.3d€1066,€1071€(D.C.€Cir.€1996)(may€beÏadvisable€under€some€circumstances);€òòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3dÏ9,13€(3d€Cir.€1995)(within€discretion€of€trial€court€in€certain€circumstances);ÏòòState€v.€Gulbrandsonóó,€906€P.2d€579,€598€(Ariz.€1995);€òòWoodward€v.€UnitedÏStatesóó,€626€A.2d€911,€915€(D.C.€App.€1993);€€òòGill€v.€Stateóó,€632€So.2d€660,€662Ï(Fla.€App.€1994);€òòState€v.€Hoffmanóó,€778€P.2d€811,€814€(Idaho€App.€1989);€ÏòòPhillips€v.€Stateóó,€782€P.2d€381,€382€(Nev.€1989);€òòState€v.€Mumleyóó,€571€A.2d€44Ï(Vt.€1989).€€We€note€that€one€panel€on€the€Tennessee€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏhas€advised€that€the€defendantððs€waiver€of€the€right€to€testify€be€placed€on€theÏrecord.€€òòWalter€Keith€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.€1037€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,ÏSept.€2,€1992).€€However,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€granted€permission€toÏappeal€and€affirmed€the€case€per€curiam€on€Feb.€22,€1994.€€The€court€orderedÏthat€the€opinion€not€be€published.Ì ˜Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòSee€alsoóó€òòLiegakos€v.€Cookeóó,€106€F.3d€1381,€1386€(7th€Cir.€1997);€ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€13€(3d€Cir.€1995);€òòUnited€States€v.ÏJoelsonóó,€7€F.3d€174,€178€(9th€Cir.€1993);€òòUnited€States€v.€Scottóó,€909€F.2d€488,Ï492„93€(11th€Cir.€1990);€€òòSiciliano€v.€Voseóó,€834€F.2d€29,€30€(1st€Cir.€1987);€òòKingÏv.€Stateóó,€391€S.E.2d€660,€662€(Ga.€App.€1990);€€òòAragon€v.€Stateóó,€760€P.2d€1174,Ï1178€(Ida.€1988);€òòPeople€v.€Simmonsóó,€364€N.W.2d€783,€785€(Mich.€App.€1985).Ì XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòUnited€States€v.€Boydóó,€86€F.3d€719€(7th€Cir.€1996)€(dicta);€UnitedòòÏStates€v.€Edwardsóó,€897€F.2d€445€(9th€Cir.€1990);€òòState€v.€Gulbrandsonóó,€906ÏP.2d€579€(Ariz.€1995);€€òòPeople€v.€Bradfordóó,€929€P.2d€544€(Calif.€1997);€òòTaylor€v.ÏStateóó,€843€P.2d€682€(Kan.€1992);€€òòState€v.€Hammóó,€818€P.2d€830€(Mont.€1991);€€ÏòòPeople€v.€Simmonsóó,€364€N.W.2d€783€(Mich.€App.€1985);€òòState€v.€Albrightóó,€291ÏN.W.2d€487€(Wis.€1980).€Ì ÷Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòSee,óó€òòe.g.óó€òò€Liegakos€v.€Cookeóó,€106€F.3d€1381€(7th€Cir.€1997);€ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Ortizóó,€82€F.3d€1066€(D.C.€Cir.€1996);€òòUnited€States€v.ÏPennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9€(3d€Cir.€1995);€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953€F.2d€1525Ï(11th€€Circ.€1992);€òòUnderwood€v.€Clarkóó,€939€F.2d€473€(7th€Cir.€1991);€òòSicilianoÏv.€Voseóó,€834€F.2d€29€(1st€Cir.€1987);€€òòCampos€v.€United€Statesóó,€930€F.Supp.€787Ï(E.D.N.Y.€1996);€òòPorter€v.€Singletaryóó,€883€F.Supp.€660€(M.D.Fla.€1995);€òòSmith€v.ÏCampbellóó,€781€F.Supp.€521€(M.D.€Tenn.€1991);€€òòUnited€States€v.€DiSalvoóó,€726ÏF.Supp.€596€(E.D.Pa.€1989);€€€òòPeople€v.€Mosquedaóó,€5€Cal.App.3d€540,€85€Cal.ÏRptr.€346€(1970);òòGill€v.€Stateóó,€632€So.2d€660€(Fla.€App.€1994);€òòCommonwealthÏv.€Freemanóó,€564€N.E.2d€11€(Mass.€App.€1990);€òòState€v.€Rosilloóó,€281€N.W.€877Ï(Minn.€1979);€òòState€v.€Savageóó,€577€A.2d€455€(N.J.€1990);€€òòState€v.€Brooksóó,€833ÏP.2d€362€(Utah.€App.€1992);€òòBrown€v.€Stateóó,€453€S.E.2d€251€(S.C.€1994);€òòStateÏv.€Mumleyóó,€571€A.2d€44€(Vt.€1989);€òòState€v.€Thomasóó,€910€P.2d€475€(Wash.Ï1996).€€€Ì ÖÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòVermilyeóó€was€decided€before€the€decision€in€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó.€ÏThe€court€discussed€neither€the€constitutionality€of€the€right€nor€€the€issue€ofÏwaiver€but€held,€based€on€A.B.A.€Standards€of€Criminal€Justice,€€that€theÏdecision€to€testify€or€to€remain€silent€should€be€made€by€the€defendant.€754ÏS.W.2d€at€88.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àIn€òòEvansóó,€the€court€recognized€the€practice€of€many€criminalÏdefense€lawyers€to€request€a€ð ðjury„outðð€hearing€in€which€the€attorney€places€theÏdefendant€on€the€stand€and€questions€the€defendant€about€the€decision€on€theÏrecord.€€Slip€op.€at€10.€€We€believe€this€to€be€a€prudent€practice€in€manyÏinstances.€€Trial€courts€have€it€within€their€discretion€to€allow€such€hearing€toÏtake€place€when€defense€counsel€requests€it€or€extraordinary€circumstancesÏalert€the€trial€court€to€the€necessity.€Ì ;Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àOur€research€uncovered€two€other€cases€that€have€some€bearingÏon€this€issue.€€In€a€post„conviction€proceeding,€a€panel€of€this€court€found€thatÏdefense€counselððs€belated€remarks€did€not€suffice€to€show€an€intelligent€andÏknowing€waiver€of€the€right€to€testify€and€found€that€counsel€had€denied€theÏpetitioner€the€right€to€testify€at€trial.€€€€òòWalter€Keith€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.€1037,Ïslip€op.€at€6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Sept.€2,€1992),€òòperm.€to€appealÏgrantedóó€(Tenn.€1993),€òòaffððdóó€per€curiam€in€òòWalter€Keith€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï03S01„9306„CR„00032€(Tenn.,€Knoxville,€Feb.€22,€1994)€(not€for€publication).€ÏIn€its€discussion€of€the€issue,€the€panel€recommended€that€defense€counselÏplace€the€defendantððs€decision€on€the€record.€òòIdóó.€at€4.€€In€a€second€case,€theÏUnited€States€District€Court€for€the€Middle€District€of€Tennessee€consideredÏwhether€a€defendantððs€constitutional€rights€had€been€violated€by€the€trial€judgeððsÏrefusal€to€allow€him€to€testify€after€the€stateððs€rebuttal€case€had€ended.€€òòSmith€v.ÏCampbellóó,€781€F.Supp.€521,€530€(M.D.Tenn.€1991)€€The€court€concluded€thatÏthe€defendant€had€knowingly€and€voluntarily€waived€his€right€to€testify€uponÏadvice€of€counsel€and€that€the€trial€court€had€not€erred€in€refusing€to€allow€him€toÏtestify€after€the€stateððs€rebuttal€because€the€defendantððs€proffered€testimonyÏwould€not€have€been€appropriate€as€rebuttal.€€òòIdóó.€Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àThe€situation€would€have€precluded€much€discussion€betweenÏany€defendant€and€attorney,€but€for€this€particular€defendant,€who€is€deaf€andÏpartially€blind€in€addition€to€being€confined€to€a€wheel€chair,€his€attorneyððsÏpronouncement€left€him€with€little€opportunity€to€object.€Ì fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àCounsel€mentioned€the€inconsistent€statements€in€his€openingÏand€attempted€to€explain€them€away€as€natural€given€the€conditions€underÏwhich€the€shooting€occurred€and€length€of€time€between€the€two€statements.Ì ”Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àòòButóó€òòseeóó,€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2d€670,€673€(D.C.App.Ï1991)òò€óó(òòChapmanóó€standard€inapplicable€where€right€is€designed€to€protectÏhuman€dignity);€€òòState€v.€Rosilloóó,€281€N.W.€2d€877,€879€(Minn.€1979)€(denial€ofÏthe€right€to€testify€is€never€harmless€error).€€We€note€that,€in€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó,Ïthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€€found€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€allow€certainÏtestimony€by€the€defendants€to€be€ð ðharmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubtðð€underÏòòChapman€v.€Californiaóó,€386€U.S.€18,€87€S.Ct.€824€(1967).€òòCampbellóó,€469ÏS.W.2d€at€509.€However€òòCampbellóó€was€a€direct€appeal€and€involved€an€actionÏof€the€trial€court€rather€than€a€collateral€attack€based€on€the€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.Ì ¾Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà à€At€one€point,€counsel€asked€Momon€what€he€told€his€trial€attorneyÏabout€the€letter€to€his€sister„in„law€in€which€he€invites€her€to€let€him€ð ðlove€her€justÏonce.ðð€€Momon€readily€admitted€writing€the€letter€and€his€brief€remark€impliesÏthat€his€wife€had€somehow€initiated€the€communication.€€Ì «Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ @ ÑÑ\R3Ø'\Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà àSee€footnote€4€above.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÔ€&ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R3Ø'\ÑÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° Òò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ÕkXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ` Ü` ˜XÓÙ€€ÙßR€*+)A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌ€à@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌó óÌò òà@ àJUNE,€1997€SESSIONó óÌÌÌÌò òNAPOLEON€MOMON,€à àà àó ó)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€€03C01„9605„CR„00187à àÌà àAppellant,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà à)à àHamilton€Countyà àÌà àà àà àà à)Ìò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,€à àó ó)à àHonorable€Stephen€M.€Bevil,€Judge€Ìà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àAppellee.à àà à)à à(Post„Conviction)Ìà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌOn€Appeal:à àà àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌSTEPHEN€M.€GOLDSTEIN€à àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌ314€Vine€St.ÌChattanooga,€TN€37403à àà àà àJANIS€L.€TURNERÌà àà àà àà àà àCounsel€for€the€StateÌAt€the€Hearing:à àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌWILLIAM€J.€MARETT,€JR.à àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à àÌBryan€&€MarettÌ211€Third€Ave.€Northà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€COXÌNashville,€TN€37201à àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€J.€EVANSà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà à600€Market€St.,€€Ste.€310Ìà àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TNÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€____________________ÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDó óÌÌÌCURWOOD€WITT€ÌJUDGEÌÌÌÇà@ àOPINIONÓÓÓ` °‚X˜XÓÌà àThe€petitioner,€Napoleon€Momon,€appeals€pursuant€to€Rule€3€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure€from€the€Hamilton€CountyÏCriminal€Courtððs€denial€of€post„conviction€relief.€€The€petitioner€was€convicted€inÏ1991€of€second€degree€murder€in€the€shooting€death€of€his€wife,€JacquelineÏDaniel€Momon,€and€received€a€twenty„five„year€sentence.× ƒ, ××  ×€€His€conviction€wasÏaffirmed€on€direct€appeal€to€this€Court.€€òòState€v.€Napoleon€Momonóó,€No.€€03C01„9205„CR„00174€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Nov.€20,€1992).€€ÌÌà àOn€August€17,€1995,€the€petitioner€instituted€this€post„convictionÏproceeding€in€which€he€alleged€that€he€was€denied€effective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€in€violation€of€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€ConstitutionÏand€Article€1,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€After€an€evidentiaryÍhearing€on€the€merits,€the€trial€court€found€that€(1)€defense€counselððs€decision€toÏrest€without€calling€the€defendant€to€the€stand€was€the€result€of€trial€strategyÏbased€on€the€results€of€the€first€trial;€€(2)€based€on€the€defendantððs€claim€ofÏaccident,€his€attorney€had€no€reason€to€pursue€a€self„defense€theory;€(3)€anyÏevidence€relating€to€self„defense,€including€the€victimððs€counseling€records,Ïwould€have€been€irrelevant;€(4)€defense€counsel€had€numerous€meetings€withÏthe€defendant€and€his€son€and€was€sufficiently€familiar€with€the€case;€and€(5)€theÏattorney€conducted€an€appropriate€voir€dire€and€the€defendant€never€indicatedÏto€the€attorney€that€he€wanted€any€particular€juror€removed.€€€Based€on€theseÏfindings,€the€trial€judge€held€that€the€petitioner€was€not€denied€the€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€and€dismissed€the€petition.€€Ì€Ìà àIn€this€appeal,€the€petitioner€contends€that€his€counsel€wasÏineffective€because€he€€à àÌÓÓà à1.à8 àrefused€to€allow€him€to€testify€at€theÏsecond€trial;ÌÌà à2.à8 àfailed€to€raise€the€defense€of€self„defense€and€failed€to€obtain€the€victimððsÏcounseling€records€that€would€haveÏbeen€relevant€to€that€defense;ÌÌà à3.à8 àfailed€to€investigate€and€interview€theÏstateððs€witnesses.ÌÌà à4.à8 àfailed€to€confer€with€the€petitioner€priorÏto€his€second€trial.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWe€have€carefully€reviewed€the€record€and€the€applicable€law,Ïand,€for€the€reasons€discussed€below,€€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€ÌÌà@ àò òStandard€of€ReviewÌó óÌà àThe€Sixth€Amendment€of€the€United€States€Constitution€and€ArticleÏI,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€both€require€that€a€defendant€in€a€criminalÏcase€receive€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930Ï(Tenn.€1975).€€€When€a€defendant€claims€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€theÏstandard€applied€by€the€courts€of€Tennessee€is€"whether€the€advice€given€or€theÏservice€rendered€by€the€attorney€is€within€the€range€of€competence€demandedÍby€attorneys€in€criminal€cases."€òòSummerlin€v.€Stateóó,€607€S.W.2d€495,€496Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€€ÌÌà àIn€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏdefined€the€Sixth€Amendment€right€to€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€€466€U.S.Ï668,€104€S.Ct.€2052€(1984).€€First,€the€appellant€must€show€that€counsel'sÏperformance€fell€below€an€objective€standard€of€reasonableness€underÏprevailing€professional€norms€and€must€demonstrate€that€counsel€made€errorsÏso€serious€that€he€was€not€functioning€as€"counsel"€guaranteed€by€theÏConstitution.€òòStricklandóó,€€466€U.S.€at687,€104€S.Ct.€at€2064.€€Second,€theÏpetitioner€must€show€that€counsel's€performance€prejudiced€him€and€that€thoseÏerrors€were€so€serious€as€to€deprive€the€defendant€of€a€fair€trial€and€to€call€intoÏquestion€the€reliability€of€the€outcome.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àA€reviewing€court€must€indulge€a€strong€presumption€thatÏcounsel's€conduct€falls€within€the€range€of€reasonable€professional€assistanceÏand€must€evaluate€counsel's€performance€from€counsel's€perspective€at€theÏtime€of€the€alleged€error€and€in€light€of€the€totality€of€the€evidence.€€òòStricklandóó,Ï466€U.S.€at€695.€€Petitioner€must€demonstrate€that€there€is€a€reasonableÍprobability€that€but€for€counsel's€deficient€performance,€the€result€of€theÏproceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àThe€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€at€the€conclusion€of€aÏhearing€on€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€has€the€weight€of€a€jury€verdict.€€ÏòòClark€v.€Stateóó,€800€S.W.2d€500,€506€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€As€a€result,€thisÏcourt€is€bound€by€those€findings€unless€the€evidence€contained€in€the€recordÏpreponderates€against€the€judgment.€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746Ï(Tenn.1993).€€€€In€our€review€we€are€bound€by€well„established€standards.€€First,€€Ïthe€standard€established€in€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó€does€not€require€perfectÏrepresentation.€€òòState€v.€Vermilyeóó,€754€S.W.2d€82,€85€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€ÏSecond,€an€appellate€court€does€not€ð ðsecond€guessðð€trial€counselððs€tactical€andÏstrategic€choices€unless€those€choices€are€made€without€adequate€knowledgeÏof€the€facts€or€the€applicable€law.€€òòIdóó.€€Third,€the€fact€that€a€different€procedure€orÏstrategy€might€have€produced€a€different€result€does€not€necessarily€deprive€anÏaccused€of€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€€òòIdóó.€€The€burden€is€on€theÏpetitioner€to€demonstrate€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findingsÏof€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Cookóó,€749€S.W.2d€42,€45€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€ÌÌà àWe€discuss€and€decide€the€issues€petitioner€has€raised€with€theseÏstandards€in€mind.ÌÌò òI.€€Denial€of€the€Right€to€TestifyÌó óà àThe€grand€jury€indicted€the€petitioner€for€murder€in€the€first€degreeÏin€the€death€of€his€wife,€Jacqueline€Momon.× ƒ0 ××  ×€€The€petitioner,€who€is€a€paraplegicÏconfined€to€a€wheel€chair,€testified€in€his€own€defense€during€the€first€trial.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€TheÏjury€returned€a€verdict€of€not€guilty€of€premeditated€and€deliberate€murder€butÏwas€unable€to€reach€a€verdict€on€the€lesser€included€offense€of€second€degreeÏmurder.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€€Four€months€later,€at€the€second€trial,€the€state€called€the€sameÏwitnesses€and€presented€virtually€the€same€evidence€as€in€the€first€trial.€€TheÍdefense€rested€without€putting€on€any€proof,€and€the€jury€found€Momon€guilty€ofÏsecond€degree€murder.€€ÌÌà àTrial€counselððs€testimony€at€the€post„conviction€hearingÏcorroborates€the€petitionerððs€contention€that€the€attorney€made€the€decision€notÏto€call€the€petitioner€as€a€witness€in€the€second€trial.€€The€attorneyÏacknowledged€that,€€on€the€second€day€of€trial,€he€made€the€decision€withoutÏconsulting€the€petitioner€and€that€he€told€Momon€and€Momonððs€son€of€theÏdecision€just€before€re„entering€the€courtroom.€€The€attorney€based€his€decisionÏon€the€comments€of€two€jurors€in€the€previous€trial€who€told€him€that€they€hadÏnot€believed€Momon€when€he€testified€that€he€shot€his€wife€accidentally.€€TheÏpetitioner€contends€that€the€decision€to€testify€or€not€testify€rests€with€theÏaccused,€and€that€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€in€that€counsel€denied€theÏpetitioner€his€fundamental€constitutional€right€to€testify€on€his€own€behalf.€ÏMoreover,€petitioner€argues,€if€he€had€testified€at€the€second€trial,€there€is€aÍreasonable€probability€that€the€outcome€would€have€been€different.× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌà àFor€the€reasons€discussed€below,€we€find€that€defense€counselÏfailed€to€advise€and€consult€with€his€client€on€the€matter€of€whether€or€not€heÏshould€take€the€stand€in€his€own€behalf€at€the€second€trial€and€that,Ïconsequently,€the€petitioner€was€deprived€of€his€constitutional€right€to€be€heardÏat€trial.€€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.€€amend.€V,€VI,€XIV;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€1,€sec.€9;€òòRock€v.ÏArkansasóó,€483€U.S.€44,€49„52,€107€S.Ct.€2704,€2708„09€(1987);€òòState€v.ÏBurkhartóó,€541€S.W.2d€365,€369€(Tenn.1976);€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó,€469€S.W.2dÏ506,€509€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1971);€òòState€v,€Frazieróó,€683€S.W.2d€346,€353€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1984).€€€However,€the€petitioner€has€not€carried€the€burden€ofÍdemonstrating€that,€if€his€attorney€had€properly€advised€him€and€consulted€hisÏwishes€on€the€matter,€he€would€have€testified€and€that€there€is€a€reasonableÏprobability€that,€because€of€his€testimony,€€the€outcome€of€the€trial€would€haveÏbeen€different.€€ÌÌA.€€òòA€Constitutional€RightóóÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€€has€made€it€clear€that€aÏcriminal€defendant€has€a€constitutional€right€to€testify€at€trial.€€òòUnited€State€v.ÏDunniganóó,€507€U.S.€87,€96,€113€S.Ct.€1111,€1117€(1993);€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€483ÏU.S.€44,€49„52,€107€S.Ct.€2704,€2708„2709€(1987);€òòJones€v.€Barnesóó,€463€U.S.Ï745,€751,€103€S.Ct.€3308,€3312€(1983);€òòFaretta€v.€€Californiaóó,€422€U.S.€806,Ï829„834,€95€S.Ct.€2525,€2538„41€(1975);€òòHarris€v.€New€Yorkóó,€401€U.S.€222,Ï225,€91€S.Ct.€643,€645€(1971).€€In€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€the€Supreme€Court€statedÏthat,€although,€under€the€common€law,€a€criminal€defendant€was€disqualifiedÏfrom€testifying,Ìð ð[a]t€this€point€in€the€development€of€our€adversary€system,€it€cannot€be€doubtedÏthat€a€defendant€in€a€criminal€case€has€the€right€to€take€the€witness€stand€and€toÏtestify€in€his€or€her€own€defense.ðð€€483€U.S.€at€49,€107€S.Ct.€at€2708.€€ÌÌà àA€defendantððs€right€to€testify€at€a€criminal€trial€originates€in€threeÏprovisions€of€the€United€States€Constitution.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€The€Fourteenth€AmendmentððsÏguarantee€of€due€process€of€law€includes€the€right€to€be€heard€and€to€offerÏtestimony.€€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€483€U.S.€at€51,€107€S.Ct.€at€2709;€òòFaretta€v.ÏCaliforniaóó,€422€U.S.€at€819€n.15,€95€S.Ct.€at€2533€n.€15.€€€The€Sixth€Amendment,Ïwhich€grants€an€accused€the€right€to€call€witnesses,€logically€includes€the€rightÏto€testify€at€trial€if€the€accused€decides€it€would€be€advantageous€to€place€his€orÏher€testimony€before€the€jury.€€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€483€U.S.€at€52,€107€S.Ct.€atÏ2709.€€€Moreover,€the€Court€recognized€that,€under€the€Sixth€Amendment,€theÏright€to€present€the€accusedððs€version€of€events€in€the€accusedððs€own€words€isÏeven€more€fundamental€than€the€right€to€self„representation,€a€right€ð ðnecessarilyÏimplied€by€the€structure€of€the€amendment.ðð€òòIdóó.€(quoting€òòFaretta€v.€Californiaóó,Í422€U.S.€at€819,€95€S.Ct.€at€2533).€€The€right€to€testify€is€also€ð ða€necessaryÏcorollaryðð€to€the€Fifth€Amendmentððs€guarantee€against€compelled€self„incrimination.€€òòIdóó.€€€€ÌÑ€6ÑÇà àTennessee€has€long€held€that€an€accusedððs€right€to€be€heard€atÏtrial€is€protected€under€Article€1,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€whichÏstates,€in€pertinent€part,€ð ð[t]hat€in€all€criminal€prosecutions,€the€accused€hath€theÏright€to€be€heard€by€himself€and€his€counsel.€.€.€.ðð× ƒ7 ××  ×€€Because€the€provision€wasÏdrafted€in€1776€when€a€criminal€defendant€did€not€have€the€right€to€testify€in€hisÏown€behalf,€our€supreme€court€at€first€interpreted€this€provision€to€grant€anÏaccused€the€right€to€make€an€unsworn€statement€to€the€jury€but€not€the€right€toÏtestify.€€òòHopkins€&€Hoopers€v.€Stateóó,€78€Tenn.€204,€206€(1882);€€òòWilson€v.€Stateóó.Ï50€Tenn.€232,€242„243€(1871).€€A€hundred€years€after€òòWilsonóó,€in€òòCampbell€v.ÏStateóó,€469€S.W.2d€506,€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòcert.€denied€óó(Tenn.€1971),€€the€courtÏnoted€that€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution€a€person€accused€of€a€crime€hasÏthe€right€to€be€heard€in€his€own€defense,€and€that€ÌÓÓà8 à[w]hile€it€is€true€that€no€person€accused€of€crime€mayÏbe€compelled€to€testify€at€his€trial,€he€may€do€so€if€heÏchooses;€and€such€evidence€is€competent€if€heÏdesires€to€introduce€the€evidence€in€his€own€behalfÏor€in€any€event€if€he€consents€to€its€introduction.ÌÌÓÓ469€S.W.2d€at€€509.€€òòCampbellóó€makes€no€reference€to€either€òòWilson€v.€Stateóó€orÏòòHopkins€&€Hoopers€v.€Stateóó.€€Five€years€later,€the€supreme€court€revisited€theÏissue€and€specifically€overruled€the€holdings€of€both€òòWilsonóó€and€òòHopkinsóó.€òòStateÏv.€Burkhartóó,€541€S.W.2d€365,€369€(Tenn.1976).€€In€òòBurkhartóó,€the€court€held€that€aÏcriminal€defendant€has€the€right€to€self„representation€but€no€right€to€makeÏunsworn€statements€to€the€jury.€€541€S.W.2d€at€371„372.€€€The€court€reasonedÏthat€since€criminal€defendants€had€been€recognized€by€statute€and€by€actualÏpractice€as€competent€witnesses,€the€better€interpretation€of€Article€1,€Section€9Ïis€that:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€all€criminal€prosecutions€òòthe€accused€has€the€rightÏto€testify€as€a€witness€in€his€own€behalfóó€and€to€beÏrepresented€by€counsel.Ì€€ÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€371(emphasis€added).€€òòIn€State€v.€Frazieróó,€this€court€cited€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€and€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó€in€support€of€itððs€statement€that€ð ð[i]nÏTennessee,€a€person€accused€of€a€crime€is€constitutionally€entitled€to€testify€inÏhis€own€behalf.ðð€€òòState€v.€Frazieróó,€683€S.W.2d€346,€353€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984).€ÏòòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Danny€Evansóó,€No.€02C01„9205„CR„00109,€slip€op.€at€6„8Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€Nov.€10,€1993).œ× ƒ8 ××  ×›€€The€Tennessee€Court€of€CriminalÍAppeals€€recognized€the€right€to€testify€as€being€inherent€in€Article€1,€Section€9Ïof€the€Tennessee€Constitution€in€1971,€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó,€€469€S.W.2d€at€€509,Ïand€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€overruled€contradictory€precedent€in€1975.ÏòòBurkhart€v.€Stateóó,€€541€S.W.2d€at€369.€€We€reaffirm€that,€although€the€testimonyÏmay€not€be€compelled,€€the€constitutions€of€the€United€States€and€the€State€ofÏTennessee€recognize€that€a€criminal€defendant€has€the€right€to€testify€for€theÏdefense€at€trial.€€€€ÌÌB.€€òòA€Right€Personal€€to€the€DefendantóóÌà àThe€United€States€Constitution€grants€essentially€two€categories€ofÏrights:€those€that€defense€counsel€may€waive€on€the€defendantððs€behalf€€andÏthose€that€are€so€fundamental€and€personal€that€only€the€defendant€may€waiveÏthem.€€òòSee€Henry€v.€Mississippióó,€379€U.S.€443,€85€S.Ct.€546€(1965).€€€ThoseÏrights€included€in€the€former€are€generally€matters€of€trial€strategy€and€tacticsÏsuch€as€what€evidence€should€be€introduced,€what€stipulations€should€beÏmade,€and€what€pre„trial€motions€should€be€filed.€€òòUnited€States€œv.€Teagueóó,€953›ÏF.2d€1525,€1531€(11th€Cir.€1992).€€Although€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏhas€not€directly€addressed€the€issue,€the€Court€stated€in€dicta€that€ð ðthe€accusedÏhas€the€ultimate€authority€to€make€certain€fundamental€decisions€regarding€theÏcase,€as€to€whether€to€plead€guilty,€waive€a€jury,€òòtestify€in€his€or€her€own€behalfóó,Ïor€take€an€appeal.ðð€€òòJones€v.€Barnesóó,€463€U.S.€745,€751,€103€S.Ct.€3308,€3312Ï(1983)(emphasis€added).€€The€right€to€testify€is€a€necessary€corollary€to€the€FifthÏAmendment€guarantee€against€compelled€testimony,€€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€483ÏU.S.€at€52,€107€S.Ct.€at€2709,€and€ð ðevery€criminal€defendant€is€privileged€toÏtestify€in€his€own€defense,€or€to€refuse€to€do€so.ðð€€òòHarris€v.€New€Yorkóó,€401€U.S.Ï222,€225,€91€S.Ct.€643,€645€(1971).€€ÌÌà àThe€vast€majority€of€federal€courts€that€have€considered€the€issueÏhave€concluded€that€the€right€to€testify€is€a€fundamental€right€that€is€personal€toÍthe€defendant.× ƒ9 ××  ×€€The€most€serious€decisions€in€a€criminal€case€are€whether€toÏhave€counsel€or€represent€oneself,€to€stand€trial€or€to€plead€guilty,€to€be€tried€byÏa€judge€or€a€jury,€and€to€tell€oneððs€story€or€to€keep€silent,€òòUnited€States€v.€Boydóó,Ï86€F.3d€719,€723€(7th€Cir.€1996),€and€the€decision€whether€to€testify€may€be€theÏsingle€most€important€factor€in€a€criminal€case.€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953ÏF.2d€1525,€1533€(11th€Cir.€1992).€€€ð ðIn€fact,€the€most€important€witness€for€theÏdefense€in€many€criminal€cases€is€the€defendant€himself,ðð€€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,Ï483€U.S.€44,€52,€107€S.Ct.€2704,€2709€(1987),€and€as€the€Court€has€noted€inÏanother€context,€ðð[t]he€most€persuasive€counsel€may€not€be€able€to€speak€for€aÏdefendant€as€the€defendant€might,€with€halting€eloquence,€speak€for€himself.ðð€ÏòòGreen€v.€United€Statesóó,€365€U.S.€301,€304,€81€S.Ct.€653,€655€(1961)(pluralityÏopinion).€€€€€Most€state€courts€that€have€considered€the€issue€have€concludedÍthat€the€accusedððs€right€to€testify€is€both€fundamental€and€personal€and€may€beÏwaived€only€by€the€defendant.× ƒ: ××  ×ÌÌà àThis€court,€relying€upon€the€American€Bar€Association€òòStandardsóóÏòòfor€Criminal€Justiceóó,€has€€previously€found€that€the€decision€as€to€whether€anÏaccused€should€€testify€at€trial€belongs€to€the€accused.€€€òòVermilye€v.€Stateóó,€754ÏS.W.2d€82,€88€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€€The€standards€provide:ÌÓÓà8 à(a)€Certain€decisions€relating€to€the€conduct€of€theÏcase€are€ultimately€for€defense€counsel.€€TheÍdecisions€which€are€to€be€made€by€the€accused€afterÏfull€consultation€with€counsel€are:Ìà àà à(I)€€€what€plea€to€enter,Ìà àà à(ii)€€€whether€to€waive€jury€trial;€andÌà àà à(iii)€€whether€to€testify€in€his€or€her€own€behalf.€€Ìà àÌÓÓ1€òòStandards€for€Criminal€Justiceóó€Standard€4„5.2(a)€(2d€ed.€1980).€€TheÏcommentary€to€this€section€states€that€ð ðbecause€of€the€fundamental€nature€ofÏthese€three€decisions,€so€crucial€to€the€accusedððs€fate,€the€accused€must€makeÏthe€decisions.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€commentary.€€€In€accordance€with€the€weight€of€authority€inÏthe€federal€courts,€in€the€decisions€of€our€sister€states,€and€in€our€priorÏdecisions,€we€hold€that€the€right€to€testify€in€oneððs€own€behalf€in€a€criminal€trial€isÏa€fundamental€and€personal€right€that€may€be€waived€only€by€the€accused.€ÌÌC.€€òòWaiver€of€the€RightóóÌà àWe€must€next€consider€what€constitutes€waiver€of€the€right€toÏtestify,€what€obligations€defense€counsel€has€and€whether€the€trial€court€isÏrequired€to€determine,€òòsuaóó€òòsponteóó,€whether€the€defendant€is€voluntarily€andÏknowingly€waiving€the€right.€€ÌÌà àIn€an€unpublished€case,€one€panel€of€this€court€stated€that€ð ðtheÏdefendantððs€conduct€provides€a€sufficient€basis€from€which€to€infer€that€the€rightÍto€testify€has€been€waived,ðð€and€that€ð ðthe€trial€court€had€no€duty€to€advise€theÏdefendant€of€his€right€to€testify,€nor€.€.€.€to€ensure€that€on€the€record€waiver€hadÏoccurred.ðð€€òòState€v.€Danny€L.€Evansóó,€No.€02C01„9205„CR„00109,€slip€op.€at€11Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€Nov.€10,€1993),€€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1994).€× ƒ; ××  ×ÏThe€panel€relied€solely€upon€the€decision€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Martinezóó,€883€F.2dÏ750€(9th€Cir.€1989).ÌÌà àThe€Ninth€Circuit€decided€òòMartinezóó€in€1989€only€two€years€after€theÏSupreme€Courtððs€decision€in€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó,€and€a€number€of€the€federalÏcourts€of€appeals€and€various€state€courts€have€ruled€on€this€issue€since€thatÏtime.€€€€Moreover,€the€Ninth€Circuit€€vacated€òòMartinezóó€on€other€grounds€in€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Martinezóó,€928€F.2d€1470€(9th€Cir.€1991).€€Therefore,€we€deem€itÏprudent€to€reexamine€the€issue€in€light€of€more€recent€decisions.ÌÌà àCourts€throughout€the€country€have€generally€adopted€one€ofÏthree€differing€approaches€to€determine€whether€a€defendant€has€effectivelyÏwaived€the€right€to€testify.€€The€general€rule€is€that€a€personal€and€fundamentalÍright€may€be€waived€only€if€there€is€evidence€in€the€record€demonstrating€ð ðanÏintentional€relinquishment€or€abandonment€of€a€known€right€or€privilege.ðð€ÏòòJohnson€v.€Zerbstóó,€304€U.S.€458,€464,€58€S.Ct.€1019,€1023€(1938).€€A€number€ofÏour€sister€states€require€or€strongly€encourage€the€trial€court€to€engage€eachÏdefendant€in€an€on„the€record€colloquy€to€ensure€that€any€waiver€of€theÏdefendantððs€right€to€testify€is€knowing€and€voluntary.× ƒ< ××  ×€€Other€courts€have€heldÏthat€it€may€be€ð ðadvisable,ðð€at€least€under€some€circumstances,€for€trial€courts€toÏplace€a€defendantððs€waiver€on€the€record.× ƒ= ××  ×€€These€courts€reason€that€since€theÍrights€at€issue€are€fundamental€to€a€fair€trial,€the€courts€have,€under€òòJohnson€v.ÏZerbstóó,€ð ða€serious€and€weighty€responsibilityðð€to€determine€whether€the€accusedÏintelligently€€and€competently€waived€the€right.€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2dÏ670,€675€(D.C.€App.€1991).€€In€addition,€proponents€contend,€advisement€on€theÏrecord€will€preclude€post„conviction€disputes€between€the€defendant€andÏcounsel€over€the€issues,€and,€if€the€issue€does€arise,€the€record€will€facilitateÏpost„conviction€and€appellate€review.€€òòPeople€v.€Curtisóó,€681€P.2d€504,€515Ï(Colo.€1984).€€Under€this€approach,€a€trial€judge€conducts€an€inquiry€into€theÏcircumstances€of€the€waiver€outside€the€juryððs€presence€if€the€defense€restsÏwithout€calling€the€defendant€to€the€stand.€€òòCurtisóó,€681€P.2d€at€514„515.€€ÌÌà àOther€courts€have€rejected€the€colloquy€requirement€for€twoÏreasons.€€First,€virtually€every€court€considering€the€issue€has€concluded€that€aÏtrial€court€is€under€no€constitutional€requirement€to€advise€a€defendant€of€theÏright€to€testify.€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€,€òòUnited€States€v.€Ortizóó,€82€F.3d€1066,€1071€(D.C.€Cir.Ï1996);€€òòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€11€(3d€Cir.€1995);€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Joelsonóó,€7€F.3d€174,€177€(9th€Cir.€1993);€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953ÏF.2d€1525,€1532€n.€8€(€11th€Cir.€1992).€€The€right€to€testify€is€correlative€with€theÏright€to€remain€silent.€The€right€to€remain€silent€is€waived€by€the€act€of€taking€theÏstand,€and€the€trial€court€is€not€required€to€ascertain€for€the€record€whether€theÍdefendant€is€knowingly€and€voluntarily€waiving€those€rights.€€òòState€v.€Thomasóó,Ï910€P.2d€475,€479€(Wash.€1996);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Freemanóó,€564€N.E.2d€11,Ï15€(Mass.€App.€1990).€€Second,€courts€have€rejected€the€requirement€fearingÏthat€a€formal€waiver€requirement€ð ðmight€provoke€substantial€judicialÏparticipation€that€could€frustrate€a€thoughtfully€considered€decision€by€theÏdefendant€and€counsel.€.€.€,ðð€€òòPeople€v.€Simmonsóó,€364€N.W.€2d€783,€785Ï(Mich.App.€1985)(quoting€from€òòState€v.Albrightóó,€291€N.W.2d€487,€490€(Wis.Ï1980)),€and€a€discussion€between€the€trial€judge€and€the€accused€ð ðmight€haveÏthe€undesirable€effect€of€influencing€the€decision€not€to€testify.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏThomasóó,€910€P.2d€at€479.× ƒ> ××  ×€€òòÌóóÌà àA€few€courts€have€adopted€the€so„called€ð ðdemandðð€rule.€€In€theseÏjurisdictions,€a€defendant€who€fails€to€complain€about€the€right€to€testify€duringÍtrial€is€conclusively€presumed€to€have€waived€that€right.× ƒ? ××  ×€€These€courts€will€notÏentertain€a€post„trial€challenge€based€on€the€right€to€testify€unless€the€defendantÏbrought€the€matter€to€the€attention€of€the€trial€court.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Edwardsóó,Ï897€F.2d€445,€447€(9th€Cir.€1990).€The€demand€rule€is€justified€in€several€ways.€ÏThe€right€may€be€viewed€not€as€ð ðfundamentalðð€but€a€matter€of€trial€strategy,€andÏtherefore€counsel€may€waive€the€right€without€consulting€the€defendant.€€òòState€v.ÏRodriguezóó,€612€P.2d€484,€489„91(Ariz.€1980);€òòKing€v.€Stateóó,€391€S.E.2d€660,Ï662€(Ga.€App.€1990).€€Some€courts€have€presumed€that€a€defendant,€educatedÏby€television€and€past€courtroom€experiences,€has€knowledge€of€his€right€toÏtestify.€òòUnited€States€v.€Edwardsóó,€897€F.2d€445,€447€(9th€Cir.€1990);€€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Martinezóó,€883€F.2d€750,€761€(9th€Cir.€1989),€€òòvacated€on€otherÏgroundsóó,€928€F.2d€1470€(9th€Cir.€1991);€òòTaylor€v.€Stateóó,€843€P.2d€682,€688Ï(Kan.€1992).€€€At€least€one€court€has€concluded€that,€because€of€the€peculiarÏnature€of€this€right,€it€does€not€ð ðattachðð€unless€the€accused€claims€it€at€trial.€€òòStateÏv.€Albrightóó,€291€N.W.2d€487,€490„491€(Wis.€1980);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.ÏTeagueóó,€953€F.2d€1525,€1537€€(11th€Cir.€1992)(concurrence€by€J.€Birch).ÌÌà àOpponents€of€the€ð ðdemandðð€rule€argue€it€is€fatally€flawed€becauseÏit€ignores€the€basic€realities€that€both€trial€judges€and€defendants€face.ÏòòTachibana€v.€Stateóó,€900€P.2d€1293€(Haw.€1995);€€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586ÏA.2d€670,€677€(D.C.€App.€1991).€€Requiring€that€a€defendant€address€the€courtÏdirectly€during€the€trial€and€express€the€desire€to€testify€places€a€heavy€burdenÏon€the€defendant.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Ortizóó,€82€F.3d€1066,€1071€(D.C.€1996).€€ÏEven€if€a€defendant€is€aware€of€the€right€to€testify,€the€defendant€may€not€beÏaware€that€an€objection€must€be€made€or€that€the€right€will€forever€be€lost.€€òòBoydóó,Ï586€A.2d€at€677.€€Because€the€waiver€of€a€fundamental€constitutional€right€mustÏbe€ð ðthe€intentional€relinquishment€or€abandonment€of€a€known€right€orÏprivilege,ðð€finding€waiver€upon€a€presumption€of€knowledge€may€beÏproblematic.€òòJohnson€v.€Zerbstóó,€304€U.S.€458,€464,€58€S.Ct.€1019,€1023€(1938).€ÏMoreover,€these€courts€note,€it€is€a€reality€of€the€courtroom€that€defendants€whoÏspeak€out€of€turn€at€trial€are€often€quickly€reprimanded€and€instructed€to€addressÏthe€court€only€through€counsel.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€908€F.2d€752,€759Ï(11th€Cir.€1990).ÌÌà àA€third€group€of€courts€has€devised€a€compromise€between€the€twoÏapproaches€previously€described.€€This€method€has€been€called€the€ð ðpost„trialÍchallenge€approach.ðð€€òòBoyd€v.€Stateóó,€586€A.2d€670,€677€(D.C.€App.€1991).€€InÏthis€approach,€the€trial€judge€need€not,€òòsua€sponte,óó€question€the€defendantÏduring€the€trial,€but,€even€if€the€defendant€does€not€bring€the€matter€to€theÏattention€of€the€trial€court,€€the€defendant€is€free€to€bring€a€post„trial€challengeÏgenerally€based€on€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€€This€approachÏappears€to€be€the€practice€in€the€largest€number€of€jurisdictions,€both€state€andÏfederal.œ× ƒ@ ××  ×›€€€These€courts€hold€that€defense€counsel€has€the€responsibility€toÏadvise€the€defendant€of€the€reciprocal€rights€to€testify€or€to€remain€silent€and€toÏexplain€the€tactical€advantages€or€disadvantages€of€each,€and,€although€theÏdecision€is€one€that€is€fraught€with€implications€for€defense€strategy,€the€ultimateÏdecision€rests€with€the€defendant.€€€òòState€v.€Savageóó,€577€A.2d€455,€473€(N.J.Í1990).€€€The€duty€of€providing€advice€and€ensuring€that€any€waiver€of€the€right€toÏtestify€is€knowing€and€intelligent€rests€not€with€the€trial€court,€but€with€defenseÏcounsel.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€12€(11th€Cir.€1995).€€ÌÌà àThe€courts€that€follow€the€demand€rule€and€those€that€adhere€toÏthe€post„trial€challenge€approach€agree€that€a€trial€court€may€presume€that€theÏdefendant€has€knowingly€and€voluntarily€waived€the€right€to€testify€from€theÏdefendantððs€€conduct.€€However,€a€major€difference€between€the€two€is€thatÏthose€that€follow€the€ð ðdemandðð€rule€find€that€the€defendantððs€silence€at€trial€notÏonly€waives€the€constitutional€right€but€denies€the€defendant€the€possibility€ofÏever€rebutting€that€presumption.€€The€post„trial€challenge€approach€allows€aÏdefendant€to€demonstrate,€either€on€direct€appeal€or€in€a€post„convictionÏproceeding,€€that€his€waiver€was€neither€knowing€nor€voluntary€becauseÏdefense€counsel€was€ineffective.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€Tennessee€courts€have€not€addressed€this€issue€directly,Ïthe€post„trial€challenge€approach€is€most€€consistent€with€the€manner€in€whichÏTennessee€courts€have€resolved€the€question€of€whether€an€accused€has€beenÏdenied€the€right€to€testify.€€In€òòVermilye€v.€Stateóó,€754€S.W.2d€82€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1987),€a€post„conviction€petitioner€claimed€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€dueÍto€the€failure€of€defense€counsel€to€prepare€him€to€testify€at€trial€and€therebyÏdenied€him€the€right€to€testify€effectively.× ƒA ××  ×€€This€court€held€that€counsel€was€notÏineffective€as€he€had€met€with€the€petitioner€many€times,€the€recordÏdemonstrated€that€the€petitioner€had€made€the€decision€to€testify,€and€theÏpetitioner€had€failed€to€show€how€his€attorney€could€have€better€prepared€him€toÏtestify.€€òòIdóó.€at€88.€€€In€an€unpublished€case,€a€panel€of€this€court€held€that,€underÏTennessee€law,€the€trial€court€is€not€required€to€hold,€òòsua€sponteóó,€a€ð ðjury„outððÏhearing€for€the€purpose€of€advising€the€defendant€on€the€record€that€he€has€theÏright€to€testify€or€to€remain€silent€€and€determining€the€defendantððs€wishes.× ƒB ××  ×€ÏòòState€v.€Danny€L.€Evansóó,€No.€02C01„9205„CR„00109,€slip€op.€at€10€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.,€Jackson,€Nov.€10,€1993),€òòperm.€app.€denied€óó€(Tenn.€1994).€€€At€theÏhearing,€petitioner€admitted€that€he€had€discussed€testifying€with€his€counselÍand€that€counsel€did€not€tell€him€not€to€testify.€€òòEvansóó,€slip€op.€at€6.€€The€courtÏnoted€that€the€petitioner€was€ð ðno€stranger€to€the€criminal€justice€systemðð€andÏaffirmed€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€defendantððs€conduct€provided€aÏsufficient€basis€from€which€to€infer€that€he€had€waived€the€right€without€theÏnecessity€of€holding€an€on„the„record€inquiry.€€òòEvansóó,€slip€op.€at€10€„11.× ƒC ××  ×€€€BothÏòòVermilyeóó€and€òòEvansóó€were€post„conviction€proceedings€in€which€the€petitionersÏalleged€that€trial€counsel€had€been€ineffective€by€denying€them€the€right€toÏtestify€on€their€own€behalf.€€Neither€had€raised€the€issue€in€the€trial€court,€and,€inÏboth€instances,€this€court€concluded€that€the€record€contained€sufficient€proof€toÍdemonstrate€that€the€òòdefendantóó€had€made€the€decision€based€on€advice€ofÏcounsel.€€€€€ÌÌà àFor€the€reasons€stated€above,€we€affirm€that€in€Tennessee€the€trialÏcourt€is€not€required€to€engage€each€defendant,€òòsuaóó€òòsponteóó,€€in€an€on„the€recordÏcolloquy€to€ensure€that€any€waiver€of€the€defendantððs€right€to€testify€is€knowingÏand€voluntary.€Because€of€the€delicate€balance€between€a€defendantððs€right€toÏremain€silent€and€his€equally€fundamental€right€to€testify,€òòCampbell€v.€Stateóó,€469ÏS.W.2d€506,€509€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1971),€€we€believe€that€the€responsibility€forÏinforming€the€defendant€of€this€right€lies€with€defense€counsel.€€A€defendantÏshould€personally€make€the€decision€whether€to€testify€after€receiving€counselððs€Ïcareful€and€thorough€advice€as€to€the€benefits€and€detriments€of€placing€theÏdefendantððs€testimony€before€the€jury.€€Absent€any€indications€€to€the€contrary,€aÏtrial€judge€may€presume€from€the€defendantððs€conduct€that€the€defendantÏpersonally€made€a€knowing€and€intelligent€€decision€to€testify€or€not€to€testifyÏupon€the€advice€of€competent€counsel.€€However,€in€accordance€withÏTennessee€case€law€and€that€of€numerous€federal€and€state€jurisdictions,€theÏdefendant€may€attempt€to€rebut€that€presumption€in€a€post„trial€challenge€even€ifÏthe€defendant€did€not€bring€the€matter€to€the€trial€judgeððs€attention€during€theÏtrial.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Pennycookeóó,€65€F.3d€9,€13€(3rd€Cir.€1995);€ÍòòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€953€F.2d€1525,€1534€(11th€Cir.€1992);€€òòPeople€v.ÏBradfordóó,€929€P.2d€544,€574€(Cal.€1997);€òòKing€v.€Stateóó,€391€S.E.2d€660,€662Ï(Ga.€App.€1990);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Freemanóó,€564€N.E.€2d€11,€14€(Mass.€App.Ï1990);€€òòState€v.€Savageóó,€577€A.2d€455,€473€(N.J.€1990).ÌÌII.€€òòApplication€of€the€law€to€the€facts€of€this€caseóóÌÌà àThe€issue€of€whether€defense€counsel€rested€his€case€withoutÏadvising€and€consulting€with€the€defendant€€is€ultimately€a€question€of€fact.€ÏòòSmith€v.€Campbellóó,€781€F.Supp.€521,€531(M.D.€Tenn.€1991).€€Both€NapoleonÏMomon€and€the€attorney€who€represented€him€at€trial€testified€that€the€attorneyÏhad€decided€that€Momon€would€not€testify€and€that€the€attorney€informedÏMomon€through€his€son€as€they€were€reentering€the€courtroom.€€Although€theÏattorney€explained€to€the€defendantððs€son€that€two€jurors€in€the€previous€trialÏhad€not€found€Momon€to€be€credible,€the€attorney€clearly€stated€that€he€wasÏpassing€on€the€information€rather€than€giving€advice€upon€which€the€defendantÏcould€make€his€own€decision.€€Moreover,€since€the€defendant€was€notified€of€theÍdecision€at€the€door€to€the€courtroom,€there€was€little€if€any€opportunity€for€him€toÏengage€in€any€discussion€with€his€attorney.€× ƒD ××  ×€€ÌÌà à€€In€his€written€findings€of€fact,€the€post„conviction€judge€found€thatÏtrial€counsel€made€the€decision€not€to€call€the€defendant€to€the€stand.€€However,Ïthe€judge€erroneously€determined€that€since€the€decision€was€a€matter€of€trialÏstrategy,€counsel€was€not€ineffective.€€Because€the€right€to€testify€is€aÏfundamental€constitutional€right€that€is€personal€to€the€defendant,€only€theÏdefendant€may€waive€that€right.€€Although€the€trial€judge€was€justified€inÏpresuming€at€trial€that€the€defendant€had€knowingly€and€intelligently€waived€hisÏright€to€testify,€uncontradicted€testimony€at€the€hearing€conclusivelyÏdemonstrates€that€his€attorney€neither€advised€him€that€he€had€the€right€to€testifyÏif€he€so€desired€nor€discussed€with€him€the€advantages€and€disadvantages€thatÏmight€flow€from€his€decision.€€Counsel€knew€that€the€defendantððs€statementsÏwere€inconsistent€in€some€regards€and€that€a€letter€from€Momon€to€his€sister„in„law€cast€the€defendant€in€an€unfavorable€light.× ƒE ××  ×€€€Yet€he€did€not€raise€theÏquestion€of€Momonððs€testimony€until€the€stateððs€proof€was€complete€or€nearlyÏcomplete.€€In€fact,€the€record€indicates€that€his€preparations€for€the€second€trialÏdid€not€include€meeting€with€his€client.€In€other€words,€trial€counsel€neverÏinformed€the€defendant€of€his€ultimate€right€to€decide€whether€or€not€to€testifyÏand€failed€to€consult€with€and€advise€his€client€on€what€may€be€the€single€mostÏimportant€decision€made€at€trial.€€òòBoyd€v.€United€Statesóó,€586€A.2d€670,€673Ï(D.C.App.€1991).€€Counsel,€despite€the€directives€of€the€American€BarÏAssociationððs€Standards€of€Criminal€Justice€and€the€pronouncements€of€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòCampbellóó€and€òòBurkhartóó€and€the€holding€of€thisÏcourt€in€òòVermilyeóó,€€apparently€believed€that€it€was€his€prerogative€to€make€theÏdecision€as€to€whether€the€petitioner€would€testify.€€€In€this€respect,€counselððsÏconduct€ð ðfell€below€an€objective€standard€of€reasonableness.ðð€€òòStrickland€v.ÏWashingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€690;€104€S.Ct.€2052,€2065€(1984).€€ÌÌà àOur€inquiry,€however,€does€not€stop€with€the€first€prong€of€theÏòòStricklandóó€standard.€€We€must€now€consider€whether€counselððs€error€was€soÍserious€as€to€deprive€the€defendant€of€a€fair€trial€and€to€call€into€question€theÏreliability€of€the€outcome.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€at€687,€104€S.Ct.Ïat€2064;€òòUnited€States€v.€Teagueóó,€935€F.2d€1525,€1534,€(11th€Cir.€1992);ÏòòCampos€v.€United€Statesóó,€930€F.Supp.€787,€793€(E.D.N.Y.€1996);€€òòPorter€v.ÏSingletaryóó,€883€F.Supp.€660,€667€(M.D.€Fla.€1995).œ× ƒF ××  ×›€€€ÌÌà àA€Tennessee€case,€although€not€directly€on€point,€providesÏguidance€in€our€determination€of€whether€Stricklandððs€second€prong€has€beenÏsatisfied.€€In€òòState€v.€Zimmermanóó,€823€S.W.2d€220€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991),€thisÏcourt€considered€on€direct€appeal€whether€trial€counsel€had€been€ineffective€inÏthat,€after€he€had€told€the€jury€in€his€opening€statement€that€the€defendant€andÏother€witnesses€would€testify€about€the€ð ðbattered€wife€syndrome,ðð€€he€changedÏhis€mind€and€rested€without€putting€on€any€proof.€€Counsel€then€referred€to€theÏabsent€evidence€again€in€his€closing€argument.€€òòIdóó.€at€225„226.€€€€Unlike€theÍattorney€in€the€present€case,€defense€counsel€in€òòZimmermanóó€discussed€theÏmatter€with€his€client€and€she€confirmed€her€approval€of€his€decision€in€a€jury„out€hearing.€€òòZimmermanóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€221.€€There€was,€therefore,€noÏdeprivation€of€the€constitutional€right€to€testify.€€The€issue€addressed€is€whetherÏthe€attorneyððs€decision€to€rest€without€putting€on€the€defendant€or€several€otherÏwitnesses€was€ineffective.€€In€determining€that€counsel€had€been€ineffective,€theÏZimmerman€court€cited€five€factors€which€tend€to€indicate€ineffective€assistanceÏwhen€defense€counsel€fails€to€call€a€defendant€to€the€stand:ÌÌÓÓà8 à(1)à àonly€the€victim€and€the€defendant€wereÏpresent€when€the€offense€was€committed;ÌÌà8 à(2)à àonly€the€defendant€could€present€a€ð ðfullÏversion€of€[the€defendantððs]€theory€of€the€factsðð;€ÌÌà8 à(3)à àthe€defendantððs€testimony€could€not€beÏimpeached€by€prior€criminal€convictions;ÌÌà8 à(4)à àthe€defendant€could€give€an€account€of€theÏrelationship€with€the€victim;€andÌÌà8 à(5)à àthe€attorney€had€let€in€objectionable,Ïprejudicial€testimony€with€the€intention€of€clarifying€itÏwith€the€testimony€of€the€defendant.ÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Zimmermanóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€227€(quoting€from€òòState€v.€Gfelleróó,€No.€87„59„III€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€July€24,€1987).€€The€court€concluded€that€allÍfive€of€these€factors€were€applicable€and€that,€in€addition,€other€evidenceÏfavorable€to€the€defendant€would€have€come€into€the€record€had€the€otherÏwitnesses€testified€as€planned€€€òòIdóó.€€ÌÌà àWe€recognize€the€special€nature€of€a€defendantððs€testimony€in€aÏcriminal€trial.€€A€defendantððs€testimony€gives€the€jury€ð ðan€immediate€and€visibleÏimpression€of€him€as€a€personðð€and€may€ð ðcolor€their€view€of€the€entire€caseÏagainst€him.€ð ð€€€òòPeople€v.€Curtisóó,€681€P.2d€504,€513€(Colo.€1984).€€Only€theÏdefendant€can€present€direct€evidence€of€his€state€of€mind,€and€when€anÏaccused€takes€the€stand€he€has€had€ð ðhis€day€in€courtðð€in€the€most€literal€sense.€ÏòòState€v.€Neumanóó,€371€S.E.2d€77,€81€(W.Va.€1988).€€€Therefore,€a€defendantððsÏtestimony€is€often€of€greater€significance€than€that€of€any€other€witness.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€as€in€òòZimmermanóó€and€òòGfelleróó,€only€the€victim€and€theÏdefendant€were€present€when€the€offense€occurred€and€only€the€defendantÏcould€present€a€full€version€of€the€defense€theory€of€the€facts€and€testify€to€hisÏrelationship€with€the€victim.€€If€he€had€testified,€he€may€have€been€able€to€bluntÏthe€prosecutionððs€attack€on€his€credibility€in€closing€argument€by€explaining€€theÏinconsistencies€between€his€statement€to€the€police€and€his€deposition€taken€inÏa€related€civil€matter.€€He€may€have€convinced€the€jury€that€his€letterÍpropositioning€his€sister„in„law€was€inconsequential.€€This€defendant,€inÏparticular,€who€has€many€physical€infirmities,€may€have€colored€the€juryððs€viewÏof€the€entire€case€had€he€testified.€€And,€as€the€defendant€points€out,€when€heÏtestified€at€his€first€trial,€the€jury€acquitted€him€of€first€degree€murder€and€wasÏunable€to€return€a€verdict€on€second€degree€murder.€€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€Momonððs€theory€of€the€facts€was€before€the€juryÏin€his€statement€to€the€police€and€in€his€deposition.€€€Although€there€wereÏinconsistencies€between€the€two€statements,€the€inconsistencies€concernedÏrather€minor€points€such€as€whether€he€put€the€pistol€in€the€drawer€or€on€theÏstand€beside€the€bed,€or€the€precise€manner€in€which€he€was€holding€the€pistolÏwhen€he€alleged€she€grabbed€for€it.€€Moreover,€if€Momon€had€testified,€the€stateÏmay€have€been€able€to€impeach€Momonððs€credibility€with€a€twenty„year€oldÏconviction€for€manslaughter.€€The€fact€that€the€jury€in€the€first€trial€could€notÏreach€a€verdict€on€second„degree€murder€does€not€necessarily€mean€that€theÏdefendantððs€testimony€would€have€changed€the€result€in€the€second€trial.€ÏDefendants€are€not€infrequently€convicted€in€a€second€trial€despite€having€aÏð ðhungðð€jury€in€the€first.€€€€The€record€contains€indications€that€Momon€may€notÏhave€been€a€good€witness.€€According€to€the€trial€attorney,€he€interviewed€twoÏjurors€after€the€first€trial.€€These€jurors€told€him€that€they€had€not€believedÍMomonððs€story€of€an€accidental€shooting,€and€the€trial€judge€at€the€sentencingÏhearing€also€found€Momon€to€be€without€remorse€and€lacking€€credibility.€€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€record€before€us€lacks€sufficient€indication€of€whatÏMomonððs€testimony€would€have€been€had€he€testified.€€Although€he€took€theÏstand€at€the€post„conviction€hearing,€little€of€his€testimony€reflects€what€he€mightÏhave€said€at€trial.× ƒG ××  ×€€The€transcript€of€the€first€trial€is€not€in€the€record€onÏappeal.× ƒH ××  ×€€Unlike€the€jury€in€òòZimmermanóó,€this€jury€was€not€led€to€believe€that€theÏdefendant€would€testify,€nor€were€other€witnesses€favorable€to€the€defenseÏsilenced€by€the€unilateral€decision€to€rest€without€putting€on€any€proof.€€DespiteÏthe€obvious€importance€of€any€defendantððs€testimony,€€it€would€be€sheerÏspeculation€to€evaluate€the€potential€impact€of€Momonððs€testimony€absent€someÏknowledge€of€what€that€testimony€would€have€been.ÌÌà àWe€find,€therefore,€that€although€trial€counselððs€performance€fellÏbelow€an€objective€standard€of€reasonableness€under€prevailing€professionalÏnorms€so€that€he€was€not€functioning€as€"counsel"€guaranteed€by€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution,€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€meet€his€burden€ofÏdemonstrating€that€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that€but€for€counsel's€failureÏto€inform€and€advise€the€defendant€of€his€right€to€testify,€the€result€of€theÏproceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€695.€€ÌÌIII.€€ò òOther€Allegations€of€Ineffective€Assistance€of€Counseló óÌà àThe€petitioner€also€contends€that€trial€counsel€was€ineffectiveÏbecause€he€failed€to€raise€the€theory€of€self„defense,€because€he€did€notÏinvestigate€the€stateððs€witnesses€thoroughly,€and€because€he€failed€to€conferÏwith€the€defendant€prior€to€his€second€trial.€€We€have€already€found€that,€prior€toÏthe€second€trial,€€the€attorney€failed€to€inform€and€advise€his€client€about€hisÏright€to€testify,€but€that,€on€these€facts,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€thisÏdeficiency€deprived€the€defendant€of€a€fair€trial€or€created€serious€questionsÏabout€the€validity€of€the€outcome.€€With€respect€to€the€other€allegations,€the€trialÏjudge€found€that€the€defendant€had€never€raised€the€issue€of€self„defense€withÏhis€attorney€and€that€the€entire€defense€was€predicated€on€Momonððs€statementÏthat€the€shooting€was€accidental.€€The€trial€judge€accredited€the€attorneyððsÍtestimony€and€found€that€the€attorney€had€met€with€the€defendant€and€his€sonÏnumerous€times€prior€to€the€first€trial€and€that€he€was€sufficiently€familiar€with€theÏcase€at€the€second€trial.€€After€a€thorough€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€judgeððs€findings€and€that,Ïwith€respect€to€these€matters,€trial€counsel€performance€was€not€deficient.€€Ìà@ àÌIV.€€ò òConclusionó óÌà àThe€decision€to€waive€or€exercise€the€constitutional€right€to€testifyÏmust€be€made€by€the€accused€with€the€thorough€and€careful€advice€of€counsel.€€€ÏIn€this€case,€the€petitionerððs€trial€counsel€failed€to€advise€him€of€his€constitutionalÏright€to€testify€and€made€the€unilateral€decision€that€the€petitioner€would€not€takeÏthe€stand€at€the€second€trial.€€€In€this€respect,€trial€counselððs€performance€wasÏdeficient.€€However,€on€this€record,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that,€but€forÏcounselððs€error,€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that€the€outcome€of€the€trialÏwould€have€been€different.ÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€post„conviction€court.ÌÌÓÓÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCURWOOD€WITT,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€Judge€ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JudgeÌ̛̜œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›œÌ›