ÿWPCô ¶n 'Òh;=Ñ`©DIlóWb.ðÚ}8Qüšz‹ÂÓ¡!ÖFÄ1™êÜ 0‹÷T‚BÛšýï»Pb¿øc ¦ö”h¯Ý™Ù(áoÇë • 4m³gznÃGÇc•Vx ‘RÒln^„ 5Oö*îÐiB ¶@Ö SÐ^7´àNC÷óÚª1­ÿE5CsIÇËŽ$.åß^ãmÀÙÇSH€Î`ºÉÂÈ›˜?D2ˆë{åE•­ø%~ÓCì=±š8ìÆ…Æ×mwtÁުפ7u8䃞&f(íll979ëÑ#ßøþæuŒò[€ ±ýÉš¼_ã‘ÅœÝ+r{ñ›-œ ³"íÌ RMüµäˆªXÍ4üÀV¸ß9POïAk›ñ/UV†ò@œ¦E|,D l–I"®¸®=B B "âÉ⊗ßâpsºÂØ5¹/{C§«L@:Ú/á…)ß(š©Yý6Nk–N\[’Æfùùùî> û|ÝÆÅU_„•át†S!TÚ`è™ÎÿKË[ ~¦[£hz±ˆ-àã Ê>@rš *Xý‚¦Ì4UkÎxá•~²µ¶ÀÞ†@5´N@áiò5Î} ÎO!Vlgr Á¢®$XñÔaX ñJÎ… %F w@L 0ÜŒ U:h 4¢ ¶ U:Å ÿ é 0 ð 0DU:TŽç–H}U:ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅHÿU:GU: B»»»»»»»»»»» D3ØØØ 0D                                                                                   AOOÆžž 0Dd D/¨ B×X <V=U>U?D@DAUBUCDDÓ€N(´`$¡¡Ñ°ÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€‰GXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularuM%3|xS, øð AZ"Arial Regular ßÔ€ X¼ÝXXXÔÔ€ ( X X¼ÝÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X¼ÝX  (ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€3,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó(Ð(3äˆ$¤¤Ý ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€¼ÝXXdædæ7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular þÒ°ÒÔ‡X^0XXXÔÔ‡ôqìôXX^0ÔÝ ƒ äˆÿÝÑ@°ÑÒÒÑT@R[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7À¼ÝXXdædæ7ÑÑ @ Ñà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ#†ôãôôôqì#ÔÔ‡ôqìôôôãÔAt€trial,€material€variances€existed€between€the€testimony€of€the€prosecuting€witnessesÐ  Ðand€that€of€the€appellant.€€Under€our€standard€of€review€on€appeal,€this€court€is€required€to€takeÏthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€favoring€the€prevailing€party,€discarding€all€contraryÏevidence.€€òòSeeóó€òòÔ#†ôãôôôqìf#ÔÔ‡ôqìôôôãÔJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319€(1979),€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2791„92€(1979)Ô#†ôãôôôqìô#Ô;Ð ` X ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€Accordingly,€we€review€the€facts€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State. ÝÔ€X¼ÝXXXÔÔ€( XX¼ÝÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X¼ÝX (ÔÐ  ÐÌAugust€31,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó >Ò°ÒÔ€ô“„ôXXÔÔ‡ôáµôôô“„ÔÝ ƒ üÝÿÝà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€this€case,€the€appellant€was€not€placed€in€the€cell€because€Officer€Gilliam€wasÐ  Ðconcerned€that,€due€to€her€condition,€she€might€fall€and€injure€herself.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular >Ò°ÒÔ€ôcÒôXXÔÔ‡ô÷ôôôcÒÔÝ ƒ üÝÿÝà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€this€case,€the€appellant€was€not€placed€in€the€cell€because€Officer€Gilliam€wasÐ  Ðconcerned€that,€due€to€her€condition,€she€might€fall€and€injure€herself.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular, øð AZ"Arial Regular d'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€¼ÝXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝñDñ›ñDñÓ ÔþÓò òñNññDñßr€ *<,(j 8` `€€@EÈ ` 8ttxPð  rßñDññNññNñßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@EÈ ` 8ttxPð  rßñNññDñ›ñDñà@. . ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@ÜÜ(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌà@±±%®àJUNE€SESSION,€1998ˆÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à h àà À à)Ð | t Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àNo.€01C01„9710„CC„00472Ð h` Ðà ` àAppelleeà  àà h àà À à)Ð TL  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àFRANKLIN€COUNTYÐ @8  Ðvs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ð ,$  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHon.€J.€Curtis€Smith,€JudgeÐ   ÐCAROLYN€F.€PICKETT,à h àà À à)Ð ü  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à(DUI,€First€Offense)Ð ðè  Ðà ` àAppellantà  àà h àà À à)Ð ÜÔ  ÐÌó óÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à  àà h àà À àà  àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:Ð €x ÐÌò òRobert€S.€Petersó óà  àà h àò òà À àà  àJohn€Knox€Walkupó óÐ LD ÐSwafford,€Peters€&€Priestà h àà À àà  àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ 80 Ð100€First€Avenue,€S.W.à h àÐ  ÐWinchester,€TN€€37398à h àà À àà  àò òKaren€M.€Yacuzzoó óÐ ü Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€Generalà Ð àà (# àÐ ðè Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à x àà Ð àà (# àÐ ¢ š Ðà ` àÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àÌò òà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àJames€Michael€Tayloró óÐ T#L Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àò òBill€Copelandó óÐ  &" Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDinah€Shore€Blvd.Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWinchester,€TN€€37398ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ B-:&* ÐÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌò òDavid€G.€Hayesó óÐ ¦2ž+0 ÐJudgeÐ  ’3Š,1¿ ÐÓÓÔ‡X^0XXXÔà@__(®àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant,€Carolyn€F.€Pickett,€appeals€as€of€right€her€conviction€by€aÏFranklin€County€jury€for€driving€under€the€influence,€first€offense.€€Following€herÏconviction,€the€trial€court€sentenced€the€appellant€to€ten€days€in€jail,€to€be€served€onÏweekends,€with€the€balance€of€her€eleven€months,€twenty„nine€days€sentence€to€beÏserved€on€supervised€probation.€€On€appeal,€she€raises€the€following€issues€(1)Ïwhether€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€support€her€conviction€and€(2)€whether€theÏdelay€by€the€police€in€affording€her€the€right€to€a€phone€call€violated€due€process€ofÏlaw.Ìà ` àÌà ` àAfter€review,€we€affirm.ÌÌà@ff)®àò òBackgroundó óˆÐ h` ÐÌà ` àAt€approximately€3:30€a.m.€on€August€6,€1995,€Sewanee€Police€Officer€TonyÏGilliam,€with€radar€equipment,€clocked€the€appellant€traveling€70€m.p.h.€in€a€35Ïm.p.h.€speed€zone.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Officer€Gilliam,€after€initiating€pursuit,€observed€the€speedingÐ è&à" Ðvehicle€swerving€from€the€left€lane€of€traffic€into€the€right€lane.€€After€a€pursuit€ofÏapproximately€two€miles,€with€blue€lights€and€sirens€activated,€the€vehicle€eventuallyÏstopped.€€The€vehicle,€a€red€1993€Cadillac,€was€operated€by€the€appellant.€€After€theÏdriverððs€side€window€was€finally€lowered€by€the€appellant,€the€officer€immediatelyÏobserved€ð ða€strong€odor€of€alcohol€about€her€person€and€car.ðð€€The€appellantððsÏspeech€was€slurred€and€her€responses€were€ð ðuncoordinated.ðð€€She€was€unable€toÏemerge€from€her€vehicle€without€assistance€from€the€officer.€€The€appellant€refusedÐ 4-0 Ðto€perform€any€field€sobriety€tests€nor€would€she€submit€to€a€blood€alcohol€test,Ïstating€that€her€lawyer€had€advised€her€not€to€submit€to€any€such€test.€€She€admittedÏto€Officer€Gilliam€that€she€had€consumed€a€ð ðcouple€of€drinksðð€and€had€taken€ð ðaÏcouple€of€nerve€pillsðð€because€ð ðsheððd€had€a€bad€day.ððÌÌà ` àAfter€the€appellantððs€arrest,€she€was€transported€to€the€Sewanee€PoliceÏStation.€€Officer€Gilliam€explained€that€the€standard€processing€procedure€is€to€firstÏtransport€the€arrestee€to€a€temporary€holding€cell€at€the€police€station€while€theÏarresting€officer€completes€the€appropriate€paperwork,€including€the€arrest€report.ñ)ñ׃×ñ)ññ)ñ׃×ñ)ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р ÐAfter€the€paperwork€has€been€completed,€the€officer€then€transports€the€person€inÏcustody€to€the€Franklin€County€jail€in€Winchester€where€that€person€is€lodgedÏpending€formal€charges.€€Prior€to€being€placed€in€a€jail€cell€at€the€county€jail,€theÏperson€under€arrest€is€then€allowed€to€make€a€phone€call.ÌÌà ` àWhile€the€appellant€was€at€the€Sewanee€Police€Station,€she€asked€OfficerÏGilliam€if€she€could€make€a€phone€call.€€The€officer€advised€her€that,€as€soon€as€theÏpaperwork€was€completed,€she€would€be€transported€to€the€Franklin€County€jailÏwhere€she€would€be€allowed€to€make€the€call.€€Officer€Gilliam€acknowledged,€onÏcross„examination€at€trial,€that€he€did€not€want€the€appellant€ð ðto€make€a€phone€callÏto€get€someone€over€there€to€try€to€get€her€out€of€trouble.€.€.€.€I€refused€to€let€her€doÏthat.ðð€€After€the€paperwork€was€completed,€the€appellant€was€transported€to€theÏcounty€jail.€€After€arriving€at€the€jail,€the€appellant€was€permitted€to€make€theÏrequested€phone€call.ÌÌà ` àAt€trial,€two€additional€witnesses€corroborated€the€testimony€of€Officer€GilliamÏconcerning€the€appellantððs€state€of€intoxication.€€Brian€Wiley,€a€back„up€officer€whoÐ è5à.2 Ðwas€called€to€the€scene€because€of€the€ensuing€pursuit,€observed€the€appellantððsÏdemeanor€after€being€stopped.€€Becky€Byers,€a€dispatcher€with€the€Sewanee€PoliceÏDepartment,€was€present€when€the€appellant€was€brought€to€the€police€station.€ÏBoth€witnesses€testified€at€trial€that€the€appellant€was€intoxicated.ÌÌà ` àThe€defense€proof€consisted€solely€of€the€appellantððs€testimony.€TheÏappellant,€a€beauty€shop€operator,€testified€that€on€this€date,€she€was€emotionallyÏupset€due€to€the€recent€death€of€her€sister.€€€The€appellant€denied€that€she€wasÏtraveling€at€70€m.p.h.,€denied€that€she€was€ever€offered€a€field€sobriety€test,€deniedÏthat€a€BAC€test€was€ever€mentioned,€and€denied€telling€Officer€Gilliam€that€she€hadÏbeen€drinking€alcohol.€€At€trial,€the€appellant€testified€that€she€ñ)ñœñ)ñhad€hadñ)ñ›ñ)ñ€no€alcohol€toÏdrink€at€all,€except€for€some€cough€syrup€which€she€had€taken€earlier€in€the€evening.€ÏShe€explained€that€when€Officer€Gilliam€asked€if€she€had€been€drinking,€she€repliedÏthat€she€had€consumed€ð ðtwo€cans,ðð€meaning€two€cans€of€caffeine„free€Diet€Pepsi.€ÏMoreover,€she€testified€that€she€asked€repeatedly€to€call€her€attorney€or€her€nephew,Ïhowever,€this€request€was€denied.€€Finally,€the€appellant€concluded€that€all€of€theÏwitnesses€who€stated€that€they€smelled€alcohol€on€her€breath€were€lying.ÌÌÌà@*®àò òAnalysisó óˆÐ ¨* #& ÐÌà@ˆˆ®àòòI.€€Sufficiency€of€the€EvidenceóóˆÐ h.`'* ÐÌà ` àThe€appellant€first€contends€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€as€a€matter€of€lawÏto€support€her€conviction€for€driving€under€the€influence.€€When€an€accusedÏchallenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€an€appellate€courtððs€standard€of€review€isÏwhether,€after€considering€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÏprosecution,€òòanyóó€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€theÐ ¨9 26 Ðcrime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€at€324,€99€S.Ct.€atÐ  Ð2791„92;€òòState€v.€Duncanóó,€698€S.W.2d€63,€67€(Tenn.€1985),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€475€U.S.Ð èà Ð1031,€106€S.Ct.€1240€(1986);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).ÌÌà ` àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€does€not€reweigh€orÏreevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð h`  ÐApp.€1990).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€andÏvalue€of€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€areÏresolved€by€the€trier€of€fact€and€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,Ð  Ð835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Nor€may€this€court€substitute€its€inferences€for€those€drawn€byÏthe€trier€of€fact€from€the€evidence.€€òòLiakas€v.€Stateóó,€199€Tenn.€298,€286€S.W.2d€856,Ð ÈÀ Ð859,€òòcert.€deniedóó,€352€U.S.€845,€77€S.Ct.€39€(1956);€òòFarmer€v.€Stateóó,€574€S.W.2dÐ ¨  Ð49,€51€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€On€the€contrary,€this€court€must€afford€the€StateÏthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€contained€in€the€record€as€well€as€allÏreasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€the€evidence.€ÏòòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€at€835.Ð (#  ÐÌà ` àThe€elements€of€driving€under€the€influence€are:€(1)€driving€or€being€inÏphysical€control€of€a€motor€vehicle€(2)€upon€a€public€thoroughfare€while€(3)€under€theÏinfluence€of€an€intoxicant€or€drug.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401€(1993);€òòState€v.Ð ¨* #& ÐRayóó,€563€S.W.2d€454,€459€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€In€this€case,€the€appellantÐ ˆ,€%( Ðchallenges€only€the€finding€that€she€was€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€at€theÏtime€of€her€arrest.€€The€jury€heard€three€prosecuting€witnesses€testify€that€theyÏsmelled€alcohol€on€the€appellantððs€breath.€€Moreover,€Officer€Gilliam€testified€thatÏshe€could€not€exit€her€vehicle€without€assistance.€€Both€Officers€Gilliam€and€WileyÏtestified€that€her€speech€was€slurred.€€Ms.€Byers€testified€that€the€appellant€wasÏunsteady€when€she€arrived€at€the€police€station.€€Both€Wiley€and€Byers€testified€that,Ïin€their€opinion,€the€appellant€was€intoxicated.€€Finally,€proof€at€trial€established€theÐ ¨9 26 Ðerratic€driving€behavior€of€the€appellant€prior€to€her€arrest.€€We€conclude€that€theÏevidence€in€the€record€before€us,€viewed€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,Ïamply€supports€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€driving€under€the€influence,€firstÏoffense.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@XX®àòòII.€€Alleged€violation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„7„106(b),€the€right€to€a€telephone€callóóˆÐ H@  ÐÌà ` àNext,€the€appellant€asserts€that€her€constitutional€right€to€due€process€wasÏviolated€because€Officer€Giliam€refused€to€allow€her€to€make€a€phone€call€from€theÏSewanee€Police€Station.€€The€appellant€argues€that€the€officerððs€action€preventedÏher€ð ðfrom€phoning€her€nephew€or€her€attorney€while€confined€at€the€police€stationÏand€by€doing€so,€prevented€the€defendant€from€obtaining€exculpatory€evidence€noÏlonger€available.ðð€ÌÌà ` àWe€begin€by€addressing€the€right€to€a€phone€call€without€undue€delay.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„7„106(b)€(1990)€states:ÌÓÓà8 ` àNo€person€under€arrest€by€any€officer€or€private€citizen€shall€have€hisÏname€entered€on€any€book,€ledger€or€any€other€record€until€such€timeÏthat€the€person€has€successfully€completed€a€telephone€call€to€anÏattorney,€relative,€minister€or€any€other€person€that€he€shall€choose,Ïwithout€undue€delay.€€One€(1)€hour€shall€constitute€a€reasonable€timeÏwithout€undue€delay.€€However,€if€the€arrested€person€does€not€chooseÏto€make€a€telephone€call,€then€he€shall€be€ð ðbookedðð€or€docketedÏimmediately.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÓË0ÓÌà ` àIn€òòHarrill€v.€Blount€County,€Tennesseeóó,€55€F.3d€1123,€1125€(6th€Cir.€1995),Ð H0@), Ðthe€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€found€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„7„106(b)€createdÏno€due€process€liberty€interest€nor€property€right€protected€by€the€FourteenthÏAmendment.€€ÌÓÓà8 ` àFederal€law€governs€the€obligation€of€officers€under€the€Due€ProcessÏClause€in€according€arrestees€the€right€to€counsel€and€the€right€ofÏpresentment€to€a€magistrate.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòCounty€of€Riverside€v.Ð ¨9 26 ÐMcLaughlinóó,€500€U.S.€44,€111€S.Ct.€1661,€114€L.Ed.2d€49€(1991).€.€.€.Ð  ÐIf€states€could€vary€these€federal€constitutional€rights€by€statute€or€localÏordinance,€the€federal€constitutional€law€governing€arrest€would€varyÏfrom€state€to€state€and€from€city€to€city.€€The€right€to€make€a€phone€callÏimmediately€upon€arrest€is€not€a€recognized€property€right,€nor€is€it€aÏtraditional€liberty€interest€recognized€by€federal€law.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÓ04Óà ` àà ¸ àÌà ` àThe€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€and€Article€I,€SectionÏ8€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€embody€similar€procedural€protections.€€òòDoe€v.Ð h`  ÐNorrisóó,€751€S.W.2d€834,€838€(Tenn.€1988);€òòState€ex€rel.€Anglin€v.€Mitchellóó,€596Ð H@  ÐS.W.2d€779,€786€(Tenn.€1980).ÌÌà ` àAs€recognized€in€òòHarrillóó,€although€no€constitutional€right€is€cognizable,€ourÐ èà Ðlegislature€has€found€it€prudent€to€create€a€statutory€right€to€a€phone€call€followingÏarrest.€€A€statutory€right,€by€itself,€is€not€tantamount€to€a€constitutional€right.€ÏNonetheless,€when€an€abridgement€of€a€statutory€right€leads€to€an€infringement€of€aÏconstitutional€guarantee€such€abridgement€must€be€scrupulously€reviewed.€€Thus,Ïalthough€the€right€to€make€a€phone€call€without€undue€delay€is€not€òòper€seóóÐ H!@ Ðconstitutionally€compelled,€it€remains€that€such€right,€when€denied,€may€beÏconsidered€as€one€factor€within€the€purview€of€other€relevant€factors€in€establishingÏthe€constitutional€infringement.€€For€example,€within€the€context€of€a€FifthÏAmendment€claim,€whether€the€accused€was€denied€a€phone€call€may€beÏconsidered€in€determining€the€voluntariness€of€the€statement.€€òòState€v.€Claybrookóó,Ð ¨* #& Ð736€S.W.2d€95,€103€(Tenn.€1987).€ÌÌà ` àWithin€this€context,€we,€in€turn,€address€the€merits€of€the€appellantððsÏargument€that,€because€she€was€denied€a€phone€call€from€the€Sewanee€PoliceÏStation,€her€ability€to€present€exculpatory€evidence€in€her€defense€was€effectivelyÏforeclosed.€€Specifically,€she€argues€that€Officer€Gilliamððs€action€prevented€her€fromÏarranging€an€independent€blood€alcohol€test€and€prevented€her€from€presentingÏwitnesses€who€could€have€ð ðattested€to€her€lack€of€impairment€and€lack€ofÐ ¨9 26 Ðintoxication.ðð€€We€find€this€argument€misplaced.€€First,€the€proof€establishes€that,Ïalthough€the€appellant€was€denied€a€phone€call€from€the€Sewanee€Police€Station,Ïshe€was€afforded€this€right€upon€her€arrival€at€the€Franklin€County€jail.€€The€record,Ïhowever,€fails€to€establish€the€elapsed€time€between€her€arrest€and€when€the€callÏwas€made€and€also€fails€to€establish€to€whom€the€call€was€made.€€Accordingly,€theÏrecord€does€not€reflect€whether€the€call€from€the€Franklin€County€jail€constitutedÏð ðundue€delay.ðð€€Furthermore,€because€the€record€does€not€identify€the€person€calledÏby€the€appellant,€we€are€unable€to€exclude€ð ðher€nephew€or€her€attorneyðð€as€theÏperson€called.€€It€is€clear,€however,€that€whomever€was€telephoned€could€haveÏtestified€at€trial€as€to€the€appellantððs€demeanor€but€was€not€called€as€a€witness€to€doÏso.ÌÌà ` à€In€a€case€very€similar€to€the€one€at€bar,€òòState€v.€Propesóó,€No.€03C01„9211„Ð ˆ€ ÐCR„00376€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€July€13,€1993),€this€court€found€that€anÏappellantððs€constitutional€rights€were€not€violated€after€being€allowed€a€phone€callÏfour€to€four€and€a€half€hours€after€his€arrival€at€the€police€station.€€€In€òòPropesóó,€weÐ (#  Ðstated:€ÌÓÓà8 ` à[The]€appellant€has€failed€to€demonstrate€how€any€violation€of€thisÏstatute€[Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„7„106(b)]€would€have€affected€the€wayÏin€which€he€defended€his€case.€€The€record€shows€that€when€permittedÏa€telephone€call,€it€was€placed€to€his€wife,€not€an€attorney.€€Moreover,Ïappellant€has€not€demonstrated€that€an€independent€breath€analysisÏhad€been€or€would€have€been€requested,€or€if€requested€that€theÏoutcome€of€his€breath€analysis€and€this€conviction€would€have€beenÏdifferent.€€Any€error,€therefore,€at€best€would€be€harmless.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓQCÓThus,€assuming€for€argumentððs€sake€that€the€appellantððs€statutory€right€to€a€phoneÏcall€without€undue€delay€was€violated,€the€appellant€has€failed,€as€in€òòPropesóó,€toÐ 810*- Ðestablish€prejudice.Ìœñ2ñÌñ2ñ›œñ4ññ3ñÌñ3ñ›ñ4ññ1ñà ` àFinally,€in€òòState€v.€Choateóó,€667€S.W.2d€111,€112€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983),Ð Ø6Ð/3 Ðòòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1984),€this€court€held€that€a€defendant€who€refuses€aÐ ¸8°15 Ðbreathalyser€or€blood€alcohol€test€from€the€State€is€not€a€ð ðperson€testedðð€within€theÏmeaning€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„410(e)€and,€therefore,€has€no€right€to€obtainÏan€independent€blood€or€urine€test€at€a€medical€laboratory€at€her€own€expense.€€InÏthis€case,€although€the€evidence€was€disputed,€the€jury€accredited€the€StateððsÏversion€of€events.€€Officer€Gilliam€testified€that€the€appellant€refused€to€take€a€bloodÏtest.€Again,€assuming€òòarguendo€óóthat€ð ðundue€delayðð€had€occurred,€the€appellantÐ h`  Ðforfeited€any€right€to€an€independent€blood€sample€when€she€refused€the€StateððsÏrequest€for€a€blood€test€because€she€was€not€a€ð ðperson€testedðð€within€the€meaningÏof€the€statute.Ìñ1ññ4ñ›Ìñ4ñ›œñ5ñÌñ5ñ›œñ5ñÌñ5ñ›Ð ¸8°15 Ðò òà@)®àConclusionˆÐ  ÐÌà ` àó óIn€sum,€although€the€proof€establishes€that€a€delay€occurred€in€affording€theÐ È À Ðappellant€a€phone€call,€the€question€before€us€is€whether€the€phone€call€constitutedÏð ðundue€delay.ðð€€We€are€unable€to€make€such€a€determination€for€numerous€reasons.€ÏFirst,€as€previously€noted,€we€are€unable€to€make€this€determination€from€theÏfactually€incomplete€record.€€Second,€from€the€record€before€us,€we€do€not€find€a€òòperÐ H@  Ðseóó€statutory€violation.€€Finally,€the€appellant€does€not€allege€any€constitutionalÐ (  Ðinfringement€arising€from€the€ð ðdelay.ðð€€Accordingly,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àNotwithstanding,€this€ruling€should€not€be€perceived€as€giving€tacit€approvalÏto€the€officerððs€explanation€at€trial€that€he€didnððt€want€ð ðsomeone€over€there€to€try€toÏget€her€out€of€trouble.ðð€€This€perspective€ignores€the€presumptive€innocence€of€theÏaccused€and€endorses€a€result„oriented€gamesmanship,€referred€to€as€the€ð ðsportingÏtheory€of€justice,ðð€which€must€be€condemned.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Gaddisóó,€530€S.W.2d€64,Ð H!@ Ð69€(Tenn.€1975).€€Clearly,€the€better€policy€would€have€been€for€the€officer€to€haveÏpermitted€the€appellant€a€phone€call€from€the€Sewanee€Police€Station.€€Ìœñ;ññ:ñÐ  è&à" Ðñ:ññ;ñ›Ìà ` àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.Ìœñ?ñÌñ?ñ›ÓÓœñ:ñ›ñ:ññ?ññ<ñÐ  ¨* #& Ðñ<ññ=ñÌÌÌÌñ=ññ?ññ=ññ=ññBñÌñBññ=ñÌÌñ=ñà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌñ?ñ›ñ?ññAñÌñAññ>ñÌñ>ññ?ñ›ñ?ññ@ññ>ñÌñ>ññ@ññ?ñ›ñ?ññ@ññ>ñÌñ>ñ›Ìñ@ññAñ›ñAññ:ñ›ñ:ññ@ñ›Ìñ@ñCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JudgeÌœñCñÌñCñ›ÌÌ_____________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€œJudgeÔ#†X\ìXXX3 #Ô›