ÿWPCS …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0JH 0T’ 0^æ 0hD 0r¬ 0| 0†š 0 1u° 0d% U>‰ U *Ç B)ñ DCb] AMe B²Ïv~êvÓh D3; 0@n AO®Æý 0Dà D/ B6˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ tDuDvwxDyDz{|D}Ó€Úƒç"ó3|xˆ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd- ù-€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òDecember€11,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€#ÑÑ7€9XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€$&"A1-j| ` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌFEBRUARY€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)€€€€€€€C.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9608„CC„00310Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àó óÌà àà àAppellee,ò òà àà àà à)€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€BLEDSOE€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€HON.€J.€CURTIS€SMITH,ÏJUDGEó óÌò òTRACEY€PENDERGRASS,à àà à)à àó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò òà à)ó óÌà àà àAppellant.à àà àò òà à)€€€€€€€€(AGGRAVATED€CHILDÏABUSE)Ìó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àòòà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òL.€THOMAS€AUSTINà àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌó óAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌP.O.€Box€666ÌDunlap,€TN€37327à àà àò òà àà àSANDY€R.€COPOUSÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à425€Fifth€Avenue€North€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à2nd€Floor,€Cordell€Hull€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òà àJAMES€MICHAEL€TAYLORÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òà àWILL€DUNN€ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à265€Third€Avenue,€Suite€300Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDayton,€TN€€37321ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌREMANDEDÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€ °Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€Defendant,€Tracey€Pendergrass,€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€toÏRule€3€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€The€Defendant€wasÏconvicted€of€aggravated€child€abuse€following€a€jury€trial€in€the€Circuit€Court€ofÏBledsoe€County.€€She€was€sentenced€to€ten€years€as€a€Range€I€offender.€€TheÏDefendant€argues€the€following€five€issues€in€her€appeal:€(1)€Whether€the€trialÏcourt€abused€its€discretion€when€it€allowed€family€members€to€testify€as€toÏstatements€made€by€the€minor€child€several€hours€after€he€was€injured;€(2)Ïwhether€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€when€it€allowed€the€attending€nurseÏto€testify€as€to€statements€made€by€the€child€which€identified€the€Defendant€asÏthe€cause€of€the€injury;€(3)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€neglected€toÏinclude€a€lesser€included€offense€in€its€charge€to€the€jury;€(4)€whether€the€trialÏcourt€abused€its€discretion€when€it€refused€to€grant€the€Defendantððs€motion€for€aÏmistrial€after€four€jurors€were€allowed€to€use€the€telephone€after€the€case€wasÏsubmitted€to€the€jury;€and€(5)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€imposed€aÏsentence€of€ten€(10)€years€upon€the€Defendant.€€For€the€reasons€stated€below,Ïwe€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€court€for€a€hearing€on€the€issue€of€juryÏseparation.€€ÌÌà àThe€victim€in€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó€was€the€Defendantððs€three€year„oldÏstep„son.€€He€was€brought€to€the€Bledsoe€County€General€Hospital€withÏsevere€burns€from€his€waist€down€to€his€toes.€€The€burns€were€consistent€withÏan€ð ðimmersion€burn,ðð€which€is€where€a€person€is€held€down€in€a€substanceÏwhich€results€in€a€burn.€€In€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€child€was€burned€byÏscalding€hot€water€in€a€bathtub.€€The€Defendant€contended€that€the€child€fell€intoÏthe€water€on€his€own,€while€she€was€not€in€the€room.€€There€was€proof€at€trialÏthat€the€burn€was€not€consistent€with€this€explanation€as€there€was€a€definiteÏline€around€the€childððs€waist€that€was€the€demarcation€for€the€burn.€€There€wereÏno€splatter„type€burns€as€would€be€expected€if€he€had€fallen€into€the€tub.ÌÌà àAfter€being€brought€to€the€Bledsoe€County€General€Hospital,€the€childÏwas€then€taken€to€T.C.€Thompson€Childrenððs€Hospital€in€Chattanooga€byÏhelicopter.€€He€was€treated€for€his€burns€at€the€hospital€and€had€to€be€kept€forÏtwenty„one€(21)€days.€€He€was€given€whirlpool€treatments€after€which€the€boyððsÏskin€would€peel€and€bleed.€€His€treatment€was€very€painful.€€He€has€permanentÏscarring€from€his€waist€down€as€a€result€of€the€burns.€€After€being€released€fromÏthe€hospital,€physical€custody€of€the€child€was€granted€to€his€paternalÏgrandparents.€€He€was€undergoing€therapy€at€the€time€of€trial.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Defendantððs€first€issue€is€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretionÏwhen€it€allowed€the€Stateððs€witnesses€to€testify€as€to€statements€made€by€theÏminor€child€several€hours€after€he€was€injured.€€At€trial,€the€victimððs€grandmother,ÏCarol€Pendergrass,€testified€that€while€they€were€at€the€hospital€in€ChattanoogaÏseveral€people€were€in€the€victimððs€room.€€She€was€standing€next€to€her€son,ÏBruce€Pendergrass,€who€is€also€the€victimððs€father.€€When€he€asked€the€victimÏhow€he€got€in€the€bathtub,€the€victim€replied,€ð ðMommy€put€me€in€the€water.ðð€ÏBrad€Pendergrass,€the€victimððs€uncle€also€testified€that€he€was€in€the€hospitalÏroom.€€He€heard€the€victim€reply€to€Bruce€Pendergrassððs€question€as€to€how€theÏaccident€occurred.€€He€also€heard€the€victim€respond€that€his€mother€had€put€himÏin€the€water.€€There€was€proof€at€trial€that€the€victim€called€his€step„mother,€theÏDefendant,€ð ðMommy.ððÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€overruling€his€objectionsÏto€the€admission€of€these€statements.€€The€trial€court€allowed€these€statementsÏinto€evidence€under€the€excited€utterance€exception€to€the€hearsay€rule€pursuantÏto€Rule€803(2)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€Rule€803(2)€states€that€anÏexcited€utterance€is,€ð ð[a]€statement€relating€to€a€startling€event€or€condition€madeÏwhile€the€declarant€was€under€the€stress€of€excitement€caused€by€the€event€orÏcondition.ðð€€The€Defendant€argues€that€these€statements€should€not€have€beenÍallowed€into€evidence€€because€the€statements€were€too€remote€in€time€from€theÏincident.€€Several€hours€had€passed€since€the€child€was€initially€burned.€€HeÏhad€been€taken€to€the€Bledsoe€County€General€Hospital€and€treated€and€thenÏairlifted€to€Chattanooga€for€treatment.€€The€Defendant€also€argues€that€the€childÏwas€given€pain€medication,€Tylenol€with€codeine€and€three€(3)€milligrams€ofÏmorphine,€and€this€medication€would€preclude€the€statements€from€being€madeÏspontaneously€or€when€the€child€was€in€an€excited€state.ÌÌà àThe€decision€to€apply€the€exception€is€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trialÏjudge.€€òòState€v.€Paytonóó,€782€S.W.2d€490,€494€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989).€€ð ð[T]heÏprimary€consideration€[is]€whether€the€comments€are,€because€of€theÏcircumstances,€reliable.ðð€€òòPaytonóó,€782€S.W.2d€at€494€(citing€òòMcCormickððs€Law€ofÏEvidenceóó,€ðð€297€at€854„55;€òòShelton€v.€Stateóó,€460€S.W.2d€869€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1970)).€€Our€supreme€court€has€addressed€what€is€necessary€for€a€statementÏto€meet€the€excited€utterance€exception.€€In€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1Ï(Tenn.),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€510€U.S.€996€(1993),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏstated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓÌThe€ultimate€test€is€spontaneity€and€logical€relation€to€the€mainÏevent€and€where€an€act€or€declaration€springs€out€of€theÏtransaction€while€the€parties€are€still€laboring€under€the€excitementÏand€strain€of€the€circumstances€and€at€a€time€so€near€it€as€toÏpreclude€the€idea€of€deliberation€and€fabrication.€€òòSeeóó€òòGarrision€v.ÏStateóó,€163€Tenn.€108,€116,€40€S.W.2d€1009,€1011€(1931);€Paine,ÍòòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€(1974),€Part€F.€Excited€utterance,€ððÏ69.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòSmithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€9.€€Also,€a€statement,€even€if€it€is€elicited€by€another,€isÏadmissible€as€an€excited€utterance€declaration.€€òòSmithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€9.ÌÌà àIn€his€ruling€in€response€to€the€Defendantððs€objection€to€the€entry€of€theseÏstatements€as€excited€utterances,€the€trial€court€stated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓI€believe€in€the€situation€before€the€Court€now€there€has€beenÏsome€several€hours€between€the€event€the€child€was€treated€at€theÏBledsoe€County€Nursing€Home€[sic]€and€then€transported€byÏhelicopter€[to]€T.C.€Thompsonððs€Childrenððs€Hospital€in€Chattanooga.€ÏSo€we€have€a€several€hours€time€lapse,€but€the€circumstancesÏwhich€should€be€considered€are€the€nature€and€the€seriousness€ofÏthe€event€or€condition,€the€appearance€of€the€declarant,€theÏbehavior€of€the€declarant,€the€outlook€of€the€declarant,€and€otherÏcircumstances.€€What€we€have€here€is€a€three€year€old€childÏadmittedly€severely€burned€over€the€lower€portion€of€the€childððsÏbody.€€We€would€obviously€have€pain€associated€with€whatððsÏbeen€said€to€be€first€and€second€degree€burns€over€the€lowerÏportion€of€the€body.€€We€have€an€attempted€catheterizationÏapparently€unsuccessful€at€the€Bledsoe€County€Hospital.€€WeÏhave€an€IV€started€at€the€Bledsoe€County€Hospital.€€We€have€aÏchild,€a€young€child,€wrapped€in€bandages.€€We€have€a€youngÏchild€in€a€strange€and€probably€frightening€environment€at€theÏBledsoe€County€ER€room,€emergency€room.€€We€have€a€childÏtransported€by€helicopter€to€another€hospital,€which€would€be€aÏnew€series€of€strangers.€€I€think€under€these€circumstances€that€thisÏchild€still€was€under€the€stress€of€excitement.€€I€think€the€offeredÏevidence€is€an€excited€utterance€under€the€hearsay€exception€andÏIððm€going€to€allow€Mrs.€Pendergrass€to€testify€in€the€matter€asÏoffered.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓThe€trial€court€also€stated€that€this€ruling€applied€to€Brad€Pendergrass,€theÏvictimððs€uncle.ÌÌà àWe€do€not€find€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion.€€The€child€wouldÏobviously€have€been€under€a€great€deal€of€stress€from€the€time€he€was€burnedÏin€the€bathtub€throughout€his€treatment€by€many€strangers€at€two€differentÏhospitals.€€There€is€also€little€danger€of€fabrication€by€a€child€so€young€in€soÏmuch€pain€and€distress.€€We€do€not€find€that€the€fact€the€child€was€given€painÏmedication€precludes€the€trauma€and€distress€of€the€event€for€the€child.€€We€findÏthat€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court€is€correct€under€the€circumstances€in€the€case€òòsubóóÏòòjudiceóó.ÌÌà àEven€if€error,€we€feel€it€would€be€harmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€ÏWe€note€from€the€record€that€several€witnesses,€who€were€called€to€testify€byÏthe€Defendant,€testified€that€the€child€stated€that€he€had€fallen€into€the€bathtub,Ïand€not€that€his€ð ðMommyðð€had€put€him€into€the€tub.€€In€addition,€there€wasÏoverwhelming€proof€that€the€child€had€been€forcibly€placed€into€the€scalding€hotÏwater,€and€that€Defendant€was€the€only€adult€in€the€house€at€the€time€of€theÏincident.€€ÌÌà àTherefore,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÌÓ  Óà àIn€Defendantððs€second€issue,€she€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏallowing€testimony€of€the€flight€nurse€regarding€statements€made€by€the€victimÏthat,€ð ðMy€Mommy€did€it,ðð€when€inquiry€was€made€by€the€nurse€as€to,€ð ðWho€didÏthis€to€you?ðð€€The€trial€court€admitted€the€testimony€under€Rule€803(2),€excitedÏutterance,€and€Rule€803(4),€statements€for€purposes€of€medical€diagnosis€andÏtreatment.€€The€life€flight€nurse,€Kathleen€Cornett,€testified€at€trial€that€before€theyÏlifted€off€she€repeatedly€asked€the€child€what€had€happened€to€him.€€She€finallyÏasked€him€who€had€done€that€to€him,€and€he€stated€that€his€mommy€had€doneÏit.€€She€testified€that€the€child€had€been€given€Tylenol€with€codeine€about€anÏhour€prior€to€their€arrival,€but€it€had€no€affect€on€the€child.€€He€was€unresponsiveÏto€their€questions.€€The€victim€was€given€three€(3)€milligrams€of€morphine,€andÏsubsequently€became€responsive.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€stated€these€reasons€for€allowing€Ms.€Cornettððs€testimony€ofÏthe€childððs€statements€into€evidence:€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓÌà àThis€statement€of€the€child€was€actually€made€prior€in€time€toÏthe€statement€that€was€made€in€the€presence€of€the€grandmotherÏlater€on€at€T.C.€Thompsonððs€Hospital.€€I€think€that€the€statement€ofÏthe€child€is€proper€under€the€excited€utterances€exception€for€theÏsame€reasons€that€Iððve€already€outlined€as€relates€to,€I€believeÏMrs.€Carol€Pendergrassðð€testimony.€€I€think€under€the€three€criteriaÏset€out€in€the€Rucker€case€that€it€is€also€an€exception€to€theÏhearsay€rule€based€on€the€medical€diagnosis€and€treatment€in€thatÏthe€statement€was€made€for€the€purpose€of€medical€diagnosis€andÏtreatment,€thatððs€the€first€criteria.Ìà àNumber€two,€the€medical€history€of€the€declarant€past€orÏpresent€symptoms,€pain€sensation€and€the€general€character€of€theÏcause€or€source€thereof,€and€it€was€reasonably€pertinent€toÏdiagnosis€and€treatment.€€The€Stateððs€arguing€that€as€part€of€theÏdiagnosis€and€treatment€essentially€the€identification€of€child€abuseÏis€part€of€the€diagnosis€and€treatment,€and€that€is€in€fact€what€thisÏwitness€has€testified€to.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àUsing€the€law€set€out€above,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏabuse€its€discretion€in€allowing€Ms.€Cornett€to€testify€to€the€childððs€statementÏunder€the€excited€utterance€exception€to€the€hearsay€rule.€€The€trial€courtððsÏresponse€to€the€Defendantððs€objection€is€correct€concerning€the€excited€utteranceÏexception.ÌÌà àWe€now€turn€to€whether€the€statement€should€have€been€allowed€intoÏevidence€under€the€exception€for€statements€made€for€medical€diagnosis€andÏtreatment.€€The€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€byÏallowing€this€statement€in€under€the€medical€diagnosis€and€treatment€exceptionÏbecause€of€the€childððs€young€age,€the€persistent€questioning€by€Ms.€CornettÍand€the€influence€of€narcotics.€€The€proper€issue€is€whether€the€statement€meetsÏthe€criteria€set€out€in€Rule€803(4),€ð ð[s]tatements€made€for€purposes€of€medicalÏdiagnosis€and€treatment€describing€medical€history;€past€or€present€symptoms,Ïpain,€or€sensations;€or€the€inception€or€general€character€of€the€cause€or€externalÏsource€thereof€insofar€as€reasonably€pertinent€to€diagnosis€and€treatment.ðð€ÏTenn.€R.€Evid.€803(4).ÌÌà àTrial€courts€have€broad€discretion€in€determining€the€admissibility€ofÏevidence,€and€their€rulings€will€not€be€reversed€absent€an€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏòòState€v.€Bakeróó,€785€S.W.2d€132,€134€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989).€€In€òòState€v.ÏRuckeróó,€847€S.W.2d€512€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),€this€court€stated,€ð ð[t]his€CourtÏis€of€the€opinion€that€ðð[s]tatements€made€by€a€child€abuse€victim€to€a€physicianÏduring€an€examination€that€the€abuser€is€a€member€of€the€victimððs€immediateÏhousehold€are€reasonably€pertinent€to€treatment.ðððð€òòRuckeróó,€847€S.W.2d€at€519„20€(quoting€òòUnited€States€v.€Renvilleóó,€779€F.2d€430,€436€(8th€Cir.€1985)).€€It€isÏthought€that€the€name€or€identity€of€a€perpetrator€is€pertinent€in€the€diagnosisÏand€treatment€of€a€child€abuse€victim€because€ð ðððthere€is€a€direct€correlationÏbetween€identity€and€recurrenceðððð€which€often€reveals€a€pattern€of€abuse.ÏòòRuckeróó,€847€S.W.2d€at€519€(quoting€òòState€v.€Maldonadoóó,€536€A.2d€600,€603Ï(Conn.€1988)).ÌÌà àOur€supreme€court€recently€addressed€the€issue€of€child€abuse€casesÏand€the€admissibility€of€statements€made€by€children€which€are€allowed€intoÏevidence€through€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€Rule€803(4)€in€òòState€v.ÏMcLeodóó,€937€S.W.2d€867€(Tenn.€1996).€€In€òòMcLeodóó€our€supreme€court€stated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓÌIn€making€the€determination€under€Rule€803(4),€trial€courts€mustÏconsider€criteria€such€as€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€makingÏof€the€statement,€which€would€include€the€timing€of€the€statementÏand€its€contents.€€If€the€trial€court€finds€that€the€statement€wasÏinappropriately€influenced€by€another,€the€court€should€exclude€it€asÏnot€having€been€made€for€the€purpose€of€diagnosis€and€treatment.€ÏThe€inquiry,€however,€will€vary€depending€on€the€facts€of€eachÏcase.€€To€illustrate:€(1)€the€trial€court€may€consider€whether€theÏchildððs€statement€was€in€response€to€suggestive€or€leadingÏquestions;€and/or€(2)€the€trial€court€may€consider€any€other€factorÏthat€may€affect€trustworthiness,€such€as€a€bitter€custody€battle€orÏfamily€feud.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòMcLeodóó,€937€S.W.2d€at€871.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€trial€court€held€a€jury€out€hearing€on€theÏadmissibility€of€the€statement.€€The€trial€judge€decided€to€allow€the€statementÏbecause,€ð ðthe€identification€of€child€abuse€is€part€of€the€diagnosis€and€treatment,Ïand€that€is€in€fact€what€this€witness€has€testified€to.ðð€€We€do€not€find€that€theÏtrial€judge€abused€his€discretion.€€He€had€a€jury€out€hearing,€and€his€reasoning€isÏbased€on€the€same€principles€on€which€òòRuckeróó€and€òòMcLeodóó€are€based.ÌÌà àThis€statement€was€admissible€under€both€the€excited€utterance€andÏmedical€diagnosis€and€treatment€exceptions€to€the€hearsay€œrule.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏMaurice€Gordonóó,€___€S.W.2d€___€(Tenn.€Sept.€29,€1997)€(three„year„old€sexÏabuse€victimððs€complaint€of€pain€and€statement€of€who€caused€the€pain€wereÏadmissible€as€both€excited€utterance€and€statement€for€the€purpose€of€medicalÏdiagnosis€and€treatment).€€Ì›Ìà àTherefore,€this€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌÓ  ÓIII.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Defendantððs€next€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€when€itÏneglected€to€include€the€lesser€included€offense€of€child€abuse€in€its€charge€to€theÏjury.€€The€jury€was€given€an€instruction€for€the€charge€of€aggravated€child€abuse.€ÏThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€crime€of€child€abuse€is€a€lesser€included€offenseÏof€aggravated€child€abuse€and€should€have€been€charged€in€this€case.€€ÌÌà àWe€agree€that€child€abuse€is€a€lesser€included€offense€of€aggravatedÏchild€abuse.€€The€Defendant€relies€upon€òòState€v.€Howardóó,€926€S.W.2d€579Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996),€in€support€of€her€argument€that€the€trial€court€committedÏreversible€error€by€failing€to€charge€the€jury€on€the€lesser€included€offense€of€childÍabuse.€€However,€in€òòHowardóó,€this€court€recognized€the€established€law€thatÏwhen€the€proof€shows€that€either€the€indicted€offense€occurred€or€no€offenseÏoccurred,€then€the€trial€court€is€not€required€to€charge€the€lesser€included€offense.€ÏòòHowardóó,€926€S.W.2d€at€586.ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€the€offense,€aggravated€child€abuse€was€defined€inÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„15„402€as€follows:€ð ð(a)€A€person€isÏguilty€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse€who€commits€the€offense€of€childÏabuse€as€defined€in€ðð€39„15„401€and:€€(1)€the€act€of€abuse€results€in€seriousÏbodily€injury€to€the€child;.€.€.€.ððÌÌà àœAlso€at€the€time€of€the€offense,€Tennessee›€Code€Annotated€section€39„15„401€defines€child€abuse€as,€ð ð(a)€€Any€person€who€knowingly,€other€than€byÏaccidental€means,€treats€a€child€under€€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age€in€such€aÏmanner€as€to€inflict€injury€or€neglects€such€a€child€so€as€to€adversely€affect€theÏchildððs€health€and€welfare€is€guilty€of€a€Class€A€misdemeanor.ððÌÌà àThe€indictment€in€Defendantððs€case€charged€that€she€did€ð ð.€.€.unlawfully,Ïknowingly,€and€other€than€by€accidental€means,€inflict€injury€upon€[victim],€a€childÏunder€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age,€such€act€resulting€in€serious€bodily€injury,€inÏviolation€of€T.C.A.€ðð€39„15„402.€.€.€.ðð€€ÌÌà àIt€is€clear€from€both€the€allegations€in€the€indictment,€and€the€proof€at€trial,Ïthat€what€made€this€particular€offense€aggravated€child€abuse,€was€the€seriousÏbodily€injury€inflicted€upon€the€victim.€€ÌÌà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„11„106(a)(33)€defines€seriousÏbodily€injury€as€follows:ÇÌÓÓà8 à(33)€ð ðSerious€bodily€injuryðð€means€bodily€injury€which€involves:ÌÌà8 àà à(A)€à8 àA€substantial€risk€of€death;Ìà àà8 à(B)€à8 àProtracted€unconsciousness;€Ìà8 àà à(C)€à8 àExtreme€physical€pain;Ìà8 àà à(D)€à8 àProtracted€or€obvious€disfigurement;€orÌà8 àà à(E)à8 àProtracted€loss€or€substantial€impairmentÏof€a€function€of€a€bodily€member,€organ,Ïor€mental€faculty;ÌÓÓÌà àThe€Defendantððs€theory€at€trial,€including€her€testimony,€was€that€theÏinjuries€suffered€by€the€victim€were€as€a€result€of€the€victim€accidentally€fallingÏinto€the€scalding€water.€€As€observed€in€the€statute€defining€aggravated€childÏabuse,€which€incorporates€the€definition€of€child€abuse,€an€accidental€injury€is€aÏdefense€to€the€criminal€charge.€€There€was€uncontradicted€and€uncontestedÏproof€at€trial€that€the€victim€had€a€protracted€and€obvious€disfigurement€as€aÏresult€of€scarring€from€his€waist€down,€that€he€suffered€extreme€physical€pain,Ïand€that€the€injury€posed€a€substantial€risk€of€death.€€While€Defendant€offeredÏproof€to€contradict€evidence€of€how€well€the€victim€had€recovered,€this€proof€didÏnot€contradict€the€proof€of€serious€bodily€injury.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€proof€of€bruises€on€the€victimððs€chest,€back,Ïface,€and€whip€marks€across€his€buttocks€required€the€trial€court€to€charge€theÏlesser€included€offense€of€child€abuse.€€She€bases€this€argument€on€the€theoryÍthat€the€jury€could€believe€the€burns€were€caused€by€accidental€means,€butÏcould€still€convict€the€Defendant€on€the€lesser€included€offense€of€child€abuseÏbased€upon€the€proof€of€the€bruises.ÌÌà àHowever,€our€review€of€the€record€requires€us€to€reject€DefendantððsÏargument.€€Dr.€William€Belknap,€a€pediatrician€who€examined€the€victim€at€theÏChattanooga€hospital€on€the€night€of€the€incident€testified€that€bruising€on€theÏchild€was€consistent€with€the€restraining€type€of€hold€that€the€medical€personnelÏthought€had€occurred€during€the€victimððs€immersion€into€the€scalding€water.€ÏSpecifically,€the€doctor€testified:ÌÓÓÌà8 àAn€immersion€injury€appearance€taken€together€with€bruising€andÏalso€in€addition€noting€that€the€knees€were€flexed,€the€legs€wereÏflexed€at€the€knees€indicated€to€us€that€an€individually€clearly€hadÏheld€the€child€somewhere€about€the€trunk€and€actually€had€dippedÏthe€child€in€the€scalding€water€to€achieve€this€kind€of€an€injury€andÏwe€felt€most€compelled€to€make€that€conclusion€based€on€theÏobservation€of€the€bruising.ÌÌÓÓÌAlso,€Dr.€Belknap€noted€that€the€bruising€about€the€victimððs€face€was€mostÏconsistent€with€a€restraining€type€of€hold€necessary€to€immerse€someone€intoÏscalding€water.€€The€smaller€bruises€were€approximately€the€size€of€fingertips.€€ÌÌà àWhile€it€is€not€clear€from€the€record€how€the€whip€marks€across€theÏvictimððs€buttocks€would€have€been€caused€by€the€immersion€of€the€victim€intoÏthe€bathtub,€we€note€there€was€no€proof€in€the€record€by€circumstantial€or€directÏevidence€that€Defendant€had€caused€the€whip€mark€bruising€on€the€victimððsÏbuttocks.€€The€only€proof€in€the€record€regarding€the€cause€of€the€whip€markÏbruising€on€the€buttocks,€including€the€Defendantððs€testimony,€was€that€herÏhusband€had€whipped€the€child€€with€a€belt€a€day€or€two€before€the€child€wasÏburned€in€the€water.€€The€Defendant€also€offered€proof€that€the€other€bruising€onÏthe€child€was€as€a€result€of€the€child€accidentally€falling€in€the€bathroom€on€anÏearlier€occasion€and€from€the€child€possibly€being€struck€by€another€child€at€anÏovernight€church€related€ð ðlock„in.ðð€€The€Defendant€concluded€her€direct€testimonyÏby€stating€the€entire€incident€was€an€accident,€and€she€would€do€nothing€to€hurtÏany€of€her€children.€ÌÌà àIn€her€argument€on€this€issue,€the€Defendant€wants€to€focus€on€someÏinjuries,€the€bruises,€and€separate€them€for€consideration€from€the€burn€injuries.€ÏThe€Stateððs€proof€was€that€all€the€bruises,€except€for€the€whip€marks€on€theÏbuttocks,€were€consistent€with€a€restraining€hold€by€the€perpetrator€whoÏimmersed€the€child€into€the€hot€water.€€There€is€no€proof€that€the€DefendantÏherself€inflicted€the€whip€marks€on€the€buttocks€area.€€The€Defendantððs€proofÏwas€that€bruising€on€the€buttocks€was€caused€by€the€Defendantððs€husband,Íand€other€bruises€were€not€caused€by€the€Defendant,€but€by€accidental€means.€ÏÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó€under€the€proof€presented€at€trial,€the€DefendantÏcould€be€guilty€of€the€greater€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse,€or€no€offense€atÏall.€€In€such€situations,€it€is€not€error€for€the€trial€court€to€refuse€to€charge€the€lesserÏoffense.€€òòWhitwell€v.€Stateóó,€520€S.W.2d€338,€344€(Tenn.€1975);€òòState€v.€Atkinsóó,Ï681€S.W.2d€571,€577€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€470€U.S.€1028Ï(1985).€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÓ  ÓIV.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Defendantððs€fourth€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€when€it€refused€to€grant€Defendantððs€motion€for€a€mistrial€after€fourÏjurors€were€allowed€to€use€the€telephone€during€the€course€of€the€juryððsÏdeliberations.€€The€jury€began€deliberations€at€approximately€3:30€p.m.€€DuringÍthe€supper€break,€at€around€7:50€p.m.,€a€few€of€the€jurors€wanted€to€make€callsÏto€make€arrangements€for€staying€over€another€night.€€The€jury€wasÏsequestered.ÌÌà àIn€òòGonzales€v.€Stateóó,€593€S.W.2d€288€(Tenn.€1980),€our€supreme€courtÏstated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓÌà àIn€òòHines€v.€Stateóó,€27€Tenn.€597€(1848),€the€ð ðsettled€lawððÏapplicable€to€jury€separations€was€stated€as€follows:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ 4 Òð ðThe€principles€laid€down€in€these€cases€are,€1st,€thatÏthe€fact€of€separation€having€been€established€by€theÏprisoner,€the€possibility€that€the€juror€has€beenÏtampered€with,€and€has€received€other€impressionsÏthan€those€derived€from€the€testimony€in€court,€exists,Ïand€òòprimaóó€òòfacieóó€the€verdict€is€vicious;€but,€2d,€thisÏseparation€may€be€explained€by€the€prosecution,Ïshowing€that€the€juror€had€no€communication€withÏother€persons,€or€that€such€communication€was€uponÏsubjects€foreign€to€the€trial,€and€that,€in€fact,€noÏimpressions€other€than€those€drawn€from€theÏtestimony,€were€made€upon€his€mind.€€But,€3d,€in€theÏabsence€of€such€explanation,€the€mere€fact€ofÏseparation€is€sufficient€ground€for€a€new€trial.ðð€€27ÏTenn.€at€602.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòGonzalesóó,€593€S.W.2d€at€291.€€This€passage€of€òòGonzalesóó€was€also€cited€withÏapproval€in€òòState€v.€Furloughóó,€797€S.W.2d€631,€645€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€ÏAfter€the€State€meets€its€affirmative€burden€that€no€prejudice€occurred,€aÏharmless€error€analysis€is€permitted.€€òòFurloughóó,€797€S.W.2d€at€645;€òòGonzalesóó,Ï593€S.W.2d€at€293.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€orally€moved€for€a€mistrial€immediately€after€the€juryÏreturned€with€the€verdict,€at€about€8:10€p.m.,€and€a€hearing€on€the€matter€wasÏheld€immediately.€€The€officers€who€had€taken€the€jurors€to€make€their€phoneÏcalls€testified.€€Deputy€Sheriff€Mel€Matthews€testified€that€the€jurors€wanted€toÏmake€phone€calls€to€make€arrangements€for€the€night.€€He€was€in€the€roomÏwhile€they€were€calling,€but€did€not€hear€any€portions€of€the€conversations.€€OneÏof€the€court€officers,€Tammy€Turner,€also€testified€at€the€hearing.€€The€phone€theÏjurors€used€was€at€her€desk.€€On€direct€examination€by€the€Defendant,€sheÏstated€that€two€women€and€two€men€made€the€calls.€€During€cross„examinationÏby€the€State,€she€testified€that€she€heard€the€whole€conversations,€andÏð ðEveryone€said€I€need€you€to€bring€clothes,€put€ððem€in€my€car,€I€donððt€knowÏwhen€Iððll€be€home,€bye.ðð€€On€redirect,€the€officer€stated€that€she€did€not€knowÏwhat€was€being€said€on€the€other€end€of€the€telephone€conversations.€€SheilaÏJohnson,€another€court€officer,€stated€that€what€the€previous€two€witnesses€hadÏtestified€to€was€the€same€as€her€recollection€of€the€events.€€On€cross„examination€by€the€State,€she€stated€that€the€conversations€were€very€short,Ïand€she€did€not€see€the€jurors€arguing€with€anyone.€€The€trial€court€ruled,€ð ðI€doÏnot€find€that€thereððs€been€anything€improper.€€I€donððt€find€any€prejudice€to€theÏdefendant€as€far€as€the€activities€of€the€jury.€€Iððll€overrule€the€motion.ððÌÌà àIn€making€its€ruling,€the€trial€court€used€an€erroneous€test€to€consider€theÏDefendantððs€motion€for€mistrial.€€As€stated€above€in€òòGonzalesóó,€once€there€hasÏbeen€a€jury€separation€during€sequestration,€and€in€this€case€during€the€juryððsÏdeliberations,€the€possibility€that€the€juror€has€been€tampered€with€and€received€Ïimpressions€other€than€those€derived€from€the€testimony€exists€and€the€verdict€isÏòòprimaóó€òòfacieóó€ð ðvicious.ðð€€However,€the€prosecution€should€be€allowed€theÏopportunity€to€show€that€all€of€the€communications€to€each€juror€were€uponÏsubjects€not€involving€the€trial€and€that€no€impressions€other€than€those€drawnÏfrom€the€testimony€were€made€upon€the€jurorððs€mind.€€If€there€is€an€absence€ofÏsuch€explanation,€the€mere€fact€of€the€separation€is€sufficient€grounds€forÏgranting€the€motion€for€a€new€trial.€€òòGonzalesóó,€593€S.W.2d€at€291€(quoting€òòHinesÏv.€Stateóó,€27€Tenn.€597,€602€(1848)).€Ìà àÌà àIn€this€case€the€jury€separation€occurred€only€a€few€moments€before€theÏjury€returned€with€its€verdict.€€After€the€jury€reported€its€verdict,€the€trial€courtÏdismissed€the€jury.€€Defendantððs€counsel€promptly€made€the€motion€for€mistrial,Ïindicating€that€he€had€brought€the€possibility€of€jury€separation€to€the€attention€ofÏthe€court€a€few€moments€before€and€had€intended€to€have€a€hearing€on€theÏrecord€prior€to€the€jury€returning€its€verdict.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court,€as€stated€above,€issued€its€ruling€after€the€Defendant€hadÏput€on€her€proof€showing€a€separation€of€the€jury,€but€based€its€ruling€upon€anÏimproper€standard.€€The€State€is€entitled€to€offer€whatever€proof€which€may€beÏavailable€to€show€that€any€communications€made€to€the€jurors€during€the€phoneÏconversations€were€upon€matters€not€pertaining€to€the€trial,€and€that€the€jurorsÏdid€not€obtain€any€impressions€other€than€those€drawn€from€the€testimony.€ÏEven€if€we€suspect€that€those€people€who€spoke€with€the€œjurors›€œdid›€not€speakÏof€matters€pertaining€to€the€trial,€or€make€any€impressions€upon€the€jurors€whichÏaffected€the€verdict,€we€are€unable€to€make€such€an€assumption€under€theÏmandates€of€òòGonzalesóó.€€ÌÌà àTherefore,€it€is€necessary€for€the€judgment€to€be€vacated€and€this€matterÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€solely€for€an€evidentiary€hearing€and€decision€by€theÏtrial€court€on€the€issue€of€jury€separation€in€a€manner€consistent€with€this€opinion.€ÏIf€the€trial€court€finds€that€all€of€the€jurorsðð€communications€were€on€subjectsÏforeign€or€upon€subjects€not€pertaining€to€the€trial€and€that€no€impressions€wereÏmade€upon€the€jurors€in€reaching€the€verdict€other€than€the€proof€heard€at€trial,Ïand€after€making€this€determination€that€no€prejudice€occurred€to€the€Defendant,Ïthe€judgment€shall€be€reinstated.€€Absent€such€a€finding€by€the€trial€court,€the€trialÏcourt€shall€grant€the€Defendant€a€new€trial.€€The€Defendant€can€appeal€from€anÏadverse€decision€on€this€issue.€€€Ì€€ÌÓ  ÓV.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Defendantððs€final€issue€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€imposing€aÏsentence€of€ten€(10)€years.€€When€an€accused€challenges€the€length,€range,€orÏthe€manner€of€service€of€a€sentence,€this€court€has€a€duty€to€conduct€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóóÏreview€of€the€sentence€with€a€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€theÏtrial€court€are€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€This€presumption€isÏ"conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€courtÏconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances."€ÏòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àIn€conducting€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€review€of€a€sentence,€this€court€must€consider:Ï(a)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€at€the€trial€and€the€sentencing€hearing;€(b)€theÏpresentence€report;€(c)€the€principles€of€sentencing€and€arguments€as€toÏsentencing€alternatives;€(d)€the€nature€and€characteristics€of€the€criminal€conductÏinvolved;€(e)€any€statutory€mitigating€or€enhancement€factors;€(f)€any€statementÏthat€the€defendant€made€on€his€own€behalf;€and€(g)€the€potential€or€lack€ofÏpotential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€ XÔððððÔ€ ŠÔ€40„35„102,€„103,Ïand€„210;€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€735€S.W.2d€859,€863€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).ÌÌà àIf€our€review€reflects€that€the€trial€court€followed€the€statutory€sentencingÏprocedure,€imposed€a€lawful€sentence€after€having€given€due€consideration€andÏproper€weight€to€the€factors€and€principals€set€out€under€the€sentencing€law,Ïand€that€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€are€adequately€supported€by€the€record,Ïthen€we€may€not€modify€the€sentence€even€if€we€would€have€preferred€aÏdifferent€result.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).ÌÌÓ  ÓA.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€Defendant€first€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€used€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€as€enhancing€factors.€€The€Defendant€argues€thatÏenhancement€factor€(4),€the€victim€was€particularly€vulnerable€because€of€age€orÏphysical€or€mental€disability,€factor€(5),€the€defendant€treated€or€allowed€theÏvictim€to€be€treated€with€exceptional€cruelty,€and€factor€(6),€personal€injuriesÏinflicted€upon€the€victim€were€particularly€great,€are€all€inherent€in€the€offense,€andÏcannot€be€used€to€enhance€the€Defendantððs€sentence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114€(4),€(5)€&€(6).€€ÌÌà àThe€statute€under€which€the€Defendant€was€convicted€provides€that,€ð ð[a]Ïperson€is€guilty€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€child€abuse€who€commits€theÏoffense€of€child€abuse€as€defined€in€ðð€39„15„401€and€:(1)€The€act€of€abuseÍresults€in€serious€bodily€injury€to€the€child.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„402.€ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„15„401€states€that€child€abuse€is€ð ð[a]nyÏperson€who€knowingly,€other€than€by€accidental€means,€treats€a€child€underÏeighteen€(18)€years€of€age€in€such€a€manner€as€to€inflict€injury€or€neglects€suchÏa€child€so€as€to€adversely€affect€the€childððs€health€and€welfare.ððÌÌà àWe€first€address€enhancement€factor€(4),€the€victim€was€particularlyÏvulnerable€because€of€age€or€physical€or€mental€disability.€€Our€supreme€courtÏhas€stated€that€this€enhancement€factor,€ð ðrelate[s]€more€to€the€natural€physicalÏand€mental€limitations€of€the€victim€than€merely€to€the€victimððs€age.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏAdamsóó,€864€S.W.2d€31,€35€(Tenn.€1993).€€Therefore,€factor€(4)€is€not€inherent€inÏan€offense€based€on€the€age€of€a€victim.€€In€òòState€v.€Andrew€Johnson,€IIIóó,€No.Ï02C01„9304„CR„00050,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App,€Jackson,€filed€April,Ï20,€1994),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1994),€the€defendant€was€convictedÏof€the€aggravated€rape€of€his€four„year„old€daughter.€€This€court€held€that€factorÏ(4)€applied€because€the€four„year„old€was€home€alone€and€in€the€sole€care€ofÏthe€defendant€when€the€crime€occurred.€€The€court€went€on€to€say,€ð ð[i]t€would€beÏludicrous€to€say€that€she€was€capable€of€resisting€the€assault€of€her€adultÏfather.€€There€was€no€one€in€the€house€or€otherwise€available€to€help€her.ðð€ÏòòJohnsonóó,€slip.€op.€at€4.€€The€victim€did€testify€in€òòJohnsonóó,€but€this€court€statedÏthat€it€was€with€extreme€difficulty.ÌÌà àThe€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee€recently€addressed€this€issue€again€inÏòòState€v.€Pooleóó,€945€S.W.2d€93€(Tenn€1997).€€The€court€reiterated€the€requirementÏthat€the€State€has€the€burden€of€proving€a€victimððs€limitations€causing€the€victimÏto€be€particularly€vulnerable€and€cited€òòAdamsóó€in€support€thereof.€€The€supremeÏcourt€also€held€the€trial€court€must€make€factual€findings€whether€the€evidenceÏwith€regard€to€the€victimððs€age€demonstrated€an€ability€to€resist€the€crime,Ïsummon€help,€or€testify€at€a€later€date.€€òòPooleóó,€945€S.W.2d€at€96.€ÌÌà àIn€Defendantððs€case,€the€trial€court€noted€that€the€victim€was€three€(3)Ïyears€old€at€the€time€of€the€offense€and€discussed€case€law€in€TennesseeÏwhich€speaks€in€terms€of€youthful€age€precluding€a€victim€from€resisting€or€callingÏfor€help€or€being€capable€of€testifying.€€The€trial€court€specifically€referred€toÏòòAdamsóó€among€other€cases€in€determining€that€this€enhancement€factor€applied.€ÏThe€record€reflects€that€the€victim€was€left€alone€with€the€Defendant,€his€step„mother,€and€that€the€offense€occurred€during€a€time€period€when€the€victimððsÏfather€was€away€from€the€home€at€work.€€There€was€no€one€present€to€helpÏthe€victim€and€the€victim€was€unable€to€resist€the€abuse€inflicted€upon€him€byÏthe€Defendant.€€We€find€that€this€enhancement€factor€was€appropriately€appliedÏby€the€trial€court€and€that€the€trial€court€made€sufficient€findings€in€the€record€toÏsupport€application€of€this€enhancement€factor.€€ÌÌà àRegarding€factor€(5),€that€the€Defendant€treated€or€allowed€the€victim€toÏbe€treated€with€exceptional€cruelty€during€the€commission€of€the€offense,€the€trialÏcourt€relied€upon€the€fact€that€the€victim€was€forcibly€held€in€extremely€hot€waterÏto€support€application€of€this€enhancement€factor.€€On€appeal,€the€State€reliesÏupon€evidence€of€bruises€on€the€victimððs€face€and€bottom,€and€well€as€the€burnÏinjuries€in€support€of€application€of€this€enhancement€factor.€€However,€when€theÏvery€facts€which€caused€the€crime€to€be€aggravated€under€the€law€are€alsoÏused€to€support€the€finding€of€ð ðexceptional€cruelty,ðð€our€court€has€held€that€theÏenhancement€factor€could€not€be€applied.€€òòManning€v.€Stateóó,€883€S.W.2d€635,Ï639€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Therefore,€we€agree€with€Defendant€thatÏenhancement€factor€(5)€is€not€applicable.€€Likewise,€proof€of€serious€bodily€injuryÏalso€constitutes€proof€of€particularly€great€injury€and€enhancement€factor€(6)Ïshould€not€have€been€applied.€€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€597,€602€(Tenn.Ï1994);€òòState€v.€Croweóó,€914€S.W.2d€933,€939„40€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€ÌÌà àThe€State€argues€that€application€of€enhancement€factor€(10),€that€theÏDefendant€had€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€when€the€risk€to€humanÏlife€was€high,€is€applicable€in€this€case.€€We€respectfully€disagree.€€There€wasÏproof€in€the€record€from€a€physician€who€treated€the€child€that€extensive€burnsÏon€the€victimððs€body€were€potentially€fatal.€€However,€ð ða€substantial€risk€ofÍdeathðð€is€one€of€the€definitions€of€ð ðserious€bodily€injury.ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„106(a)(33).€€A€fair€review€of€the€record€clearly€shows€that€proof€of€ð ðaÏsubstantial€risk€of€deathðð€was€one€of€the€factors€relied€upon€by€the€State€inÏproving€ð ðserious€bodily€injuryðð€to€sustain€a€conviction€of€aggravated€child€abuse.€ÏWe€therefore€conclude€that€factor€(10)€is€an€essential€element€of€the€offense€asÏcharged€in€the€indictment€and€should€not€be€included€as€an€enhancement€factor.€ÏWe€find€that€only€enhancement€factor€(4)€applies€to€the€Defendantððs€sentence.€€Ìœ›ÌÓ  ÓB.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àDefendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€apply€the€followingÏmitigating€factors€from€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„113:ÌÓÓÌà8 à(3)à8 àSubstantial€grounds€exist€tending€to€excuse€or€justifyÏthe€defendantððs€criminal€€conduct,€though€failing€toÏestablish€a€defense.€€ÌÌà8 à(8)à8 àThe€defendant€was€suffering€from€a€mental€or€physicalÏcondition€that€€significantly€reduced€his€culpability€forÏthe€offense;€however,€the€voluntary€use€of€intoxicantsÏdoes€not€fall€within€the€purview€of€this€factor;ÌÌà8 à(11)à8 àThe€defendant,€although€guilty€of€the€crime,€committedÏthe€offense€under€such€unusual€circumstances€that€itÏis€unlikely€that€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€lawÏmotivated€his€conduct;ÌÌà8 à(12)à8 àThe€defendant€acted€under€duress€or€under€theÏdomination€of€another€person,€even€though€the€duressÍor€the€domination€of€another€person€is€not€sufficient€toÏconstitute€a€defense€to€the€crime;ÌÌà8 à(13)à8 àAny€other€factor€consistent€with€the€purposes€of€thisÏchapter.€€Ìà8 àà8 à[Defendant€urges€her€lack€of€a€prior€criminal€record,Ïattendance€at€church,€and€other€ð ðgood€characterÏevidenceðð€submitted€at€the€sentencing€hearing€wouldÏmake€this€mitigating€factor€applicable.]ÌÌÓÓ€Ìà àWe€agree€with€the€State€and€the€trial€court€that€factors€(3),€(8),€(11),€andÏ(12)€do€not€apply€in€this€case.€€Actually,€the€record€is€devoid€of€any€proofÏwhatsoever€to€support€any€of€these€mitigating€factors.€€The€trial€court€heard€theÏtestimony€of€all€of€the€witnesses€and€found€that€the€only€ð ðcatch„allðð€mitigatingÏfactor€under€(13)€which€might€be€applicable€would€be€the€fact€that€theÏDefendant€does€not€have€a€prior€criminal€record.€€However,€in€this€particularÏcase,€the€trial€court€held€that€this€factor€should€be€given€little€weight€in€sentencingÏDefendant,€and€we€agree.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€specifically€found€that€any€one€of€the€enhancement€factors€itÏbelieved€were€applicable€would€support€a€sentence€above€the€minimumÏpresumptive€sentence€of€eight€(8)€years,€in€light€of€the€fact€that€the€one€mitigatingÏfactor€which€was€applicable€should€be€given€very€little€weight.€€ÌÌà àHaving€found€that€one€(1)€enhancement€factor€is€applicable,€and€that€oneÏ(1)€mitigating€factor€is€applicable,€but€that€the€mitigating€factor€should€be€givenÏvery€little€weight,€and€being€in€agreement€with€the€trial€court€that€any€one€of€theÏenhancement€factors€found€by€that€court€should€be€afforded€great€weight€in€thisÏparticular€case,€we€conclude€that€the€record€supports€the€sentence€imposed€byÏthe€trial€court.€€Therefore,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àCONCLUSIONÌÌà àWe€vacate€the€judgment€and€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€court€solely€forÏan€evidentiary€hearing€and€decision€by€the€trial€court€on€the€issue€of€juryÏseparation€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.€€All€other€issues€raised€by€theÏDefendant€are€overruled.€€Ìœ›ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JudgeÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€Judge