WPCAP 1k/w,UjibĤ[=<4ZŰ֓VXnaU]:ik~>oSݭ\m6-ѫZhw(DxH U* U@> z~   Q'Y+JNGI^ ' E3 w5 49 M \ \ m^ #u u u u u u u u u u u u 1u6" 72" 0c"" 0D@#b###### 0U# 0# 0$ 0% 0& 0s' 0P( 0*) 0* 0C* 0+ 0+ 0, 0- 0b. 0-/ 0/ 00 0@z1 01 02 0_3 0-4 04 05 06 0G7 008 0<48 0p8 0.9 0>: 0vW: 0`: B-; 0`J; 0; D3N< D-< 0K< 0`< ASY== 0r> 0D? AZ? 0`@ 0`e@ 08@ 0@ 02A 0B 0:B 0Y7C 0_C 0 C 0jD 0cF B*G D/H 0@H D/I 0I 06J 0J 0:K 0^9L 0<LLLL D5L BM D5%M BZM D5wM BM D5M BM D1N D5LN D5N B*N D5N B*O D5?O B*tO D5O B7O B7 P<6X9`(Courier New(`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial( Z(Times New Roman  C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt } R$      1  E  Inhisbrief,theDefendantalsoassertsthattheportionofTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection5510403(a)(3)  whichallowstheprosecutiontogobackmorethantenyearsfromthedateofthepresentconvictionwhenassessingprior t convictionsforenhancementpurposesisvoidasanexpostfactolaw.However,heconcedesinhisbriefthatthis 8 argumenthasalreadybeenrejectedbythisCourtinStatev.Clever,70S.W.3d771(Tenn.Crim.App.2001).Having L madesaidconcession,theDefendantoptstonotfurtherarguetheissueinhisbrief.BecauseCleveriscontrolling  authority,wechoosenottoaddresstheissuefurther.SeeTenn.S.Ct.R.4(H)(2).  R$      2  E  _TheDefendantsrelianceon_Boykin_Ԁv.Alabama,395U.S.238,89S.Ct.1709,23L.Ed.271(1969),andState  v._Mackey_,553S.W.2d337(Tenn.1977),inthisregardismisplaced.Thesecasesaddresstherequirementthataguilty t pleabeenteredintoknowingly,intelligently,andvoluntarily.Whiletheunderstandingthattheresultingconvictionmay 8 beusedtoenhancethepunishmentofsubsequentcriminalactivityisanimportantfactortoconsiderwhenassessingthe L intelligenceandvoluntarinessofguiltypleas,thesecasesinnowaystandforthepropositionthatthelackofawarning  ofenhancementpossibilitiesrendersanotherwisevalidconvictionvoid.  R$      3  E  _Inhisbrief,theDefendantarguesthatthespecialjudgewasnotdulyelectedpursuanttoTennesseeCode  Annotatedsection172118.However,thisprovisionisapplicableonlytocourtsofrecord.BecausetheDefendants t 1997judgmentofconvictionwasenteredinageneralsessionscourt,theapplicablestatuteissection1615209. O R$      5  E  _TheDefendantalsoassertsthat,ifthe1997convictionweredeclaredinvalid,the1990convictionwouldbe  morethan10yearspriortothepresentconvictionandthereforeunavailabletobeusedtoenhancethepenaltyforthe t presentconvictionpursuanttoTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection5510403(a)(3).Becausewefindthatthe1997 8 judgmentisvalid,itisnotnecessarytoaddressthisargument.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  R$      6  E  _EEThisCourthasheldthatthe_Momon_requirementsapplytobenchtrialsaswellasjurytrials.SeeStatev.  CharlesRandall_Elrod_,No.M200101125CCAR3CD,#EE~#EEԀ2002Tenn._Crim_.App.LEXIS83,at*8(Tenn._Crim_.App. t Jan.31,1999).#EE#  R$      4  E  _Priortoenactmentofexistinglaw,priorlawcontainedsimilarprovisionsconcerningtheappointmentofa  specialgeneralsessionsjudge.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.1615209(Repl.1994).Thedifferencesbetweenpriorlawand t currentlawarenotrelevanttoourdispositionofthisissue.h-s 3j1,p}.bk23|xUHP LaserJet 405003#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a))i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0  (#$  0  - -*+ (_2623  ..*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5(|G2$ !.8-dd8         0  U86Definition(''&H1      (&H2   d(&H3  (|3`$ !.8-dd8     VVVV'dxd)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  (&H4 XXX ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3`$ !.8-dd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK(&H5  (&H6  20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7o(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7Z(X7&  d dn)1dxd<:zTop of For7q(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7Z(X7n)2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  ||||)!dxdx  d~~~~)!dxdxP Pd)!dxdx d)!dxdx d~~)! dxdxnnnn)!dxdx)!dxdx&P d d)!dxdx&p d Pd)!dxdx&p Pd d)!dxdx3+0 d d d3+0 d d d !.8dd8     _   8BXXdd8@tt INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @WW$ATKNOXVILLE# #Ԉ &    @  @` June18,2002Session L XBX #XXB#STATEOFTENNESSEEv.WILLIAMROBERT_POSEY_XBX  J @@ AppealfromtheCriminalCourtforHamiltonCounty  J @@No.232588StephenM._Bevil_,Judge  6 @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.E200102665CCAR3CD   August_26,_Ԁ2002   AV) ` dE<|` A }     TheDefendant,WilliamRobert_Posey_,appealsasofrightfromthejudgmentofthetrialcourt,which x  foundhimguiltyofdrivingundertheinfluence(_DUI_)asathirdoffender.TheDefendantraisestwo d centralissuesonappeal.First,theDefendantarguesthatthetwopreceding_DUI_Ԁconvictionsare P invalidontheirfaceandthereforecannotbeusedtoenhancehispunishmentforthepresent < conviction.Second,theDefendantarguesthatthetrialcourtcommittederrorbyfailingtoholda (x hearingpursuantto_Momon_Ԁv.State,18S.W.3d152(Tenn.1999),todeterminewhetherthe d Defendantpersonallywaivedhisrighttotestify.Becausetherecordisvoidofanyevidencethatthe P Defendantdidpersonallywaivehisrighttotestify,weremandthecasetothetrialcourtforahearing < todeterminewhethertheDefendantsrighttotestifywasviolated,andifso,whethertheviolation ( oftheDefendantsrighttotestifywasharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.   Tenn.R.App.P.3AppealasofRight;RemandedtotheTrialCourt     #XB#XBX.DavidH.Welles,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichGaryR.Wade,_P.J._,andNorma t McGeeOgle,J.,joined. ` LloydA.Levitt,Chattanooga,Tennessee,fortheappellant,WilliamRobert_Posey_. 8!  PaulG.Summers,AttorneyGeneralandReporter;ElizabethB._Marney_,AssistantAttorneyGeneral; #`" BillCox,DistrictAttorneyGeneral;andThomasE.Kimball,AssistantDistrictAttorneyGeneral, #L# fortheappellee,StateofTennessee. $8 $  @@OO& OPINION #XXB #XBX &"&   #XXB #XBXXBXXXB   `     h     OnOctober24,1999,theDefendantwasarrestedfordrivingundertheinfluenceofan )$) intoxicantinviolationofTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection5510401.AtthebenchtrialonMay p*%* 14,2001,Brian_Ashburn_ԀoftheHamiltonCountySheriffsDepartmenttestifiedthathewasonpatrol \+&+ onOctober24,1999.Whilehewasdrivingsouthboundonatwolaneroad,heobservedavehicle, H,', drivenbytheDefendant,travelingnorthbound.TheDefendantsvehiclecrossedthecenterlineand 4-(-7 _almoststruckOfficerAshburnsvehicleheadon.Toavoidacollision,OfficerAshburnswerved  offtheroadintoaparkinglot.Hethenturnedhispatrolcararound,activatedhislights,and  followedtheDefendant.TheDefendantpulledhisvehicleintoaparkinglotanddrovetotherear  ofabuilding,wherehestopped.OfficerAshburndrovehispatrolcarbehindtheDefendant,and, t ashewasexitinghisvehicle,sawtheDefendantopenhisdoorandjumpoutofhisvehicle.Officer ` AshburnthenpursuedtheDefendantonfoottothefrontofthebuilding,whereanotherofficerwho L  hadarrivedonthescenestoppedtheDefendant. 8    OfficerAshburntestifiedthatupontalkingwiththeDefendant,henoticedastrongodorof  ` alcoholontheDefendantsbreath.TheDefendantwasveryunsteadyonhisfeet.Hewasunable  L  toproduceadriverslicense,andhegaveOfficerAshburnfalseinformationabouthimself.The  8  Defendantrefusedtosubmittofieldsobrietytestsandabreathalyzertest.InOfficerAshburns $  opinion,theDefendantwasclearlyintoxicated.     Afterhearingtheevidence,thetrialcourtfoundbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthe   DefendantwasguiltyofdrivingundertheinfluenceonOctober24,1999.BecausetheDefendant   hadtwopriorconvictionsforDUI,thecourtsentencedhimasathirdoffenderpursuanttoTennessee p CodeAnnotatedsection5510403(a)(1).ItisfromthisjudgmenttheDefendantnowappeals. \   ThefirstofthetwomainargumentsthattheDefendantadvancesisthatthejudgmentsofhis 4 twopriorDUIconvictionsarefaciallyinvalidandthereforecannotbeusedtoenhancethepenalty  p fortheinstantconviction.  -#  1      ׀WebeginouranalysisbynotingthattheTennesseeSupremeCourthas  \ recognizedtherule thatafaciallyvalid,unreversedjudgmentinacourtwithjurisdictionoverthe H subjectmatterandthepersoncannotbecollaterallyattackedinasubsequentproceedingexceptby 4 theauthorizedroutesofattack.Statev.McClintock,732S.W.2d268,271(Tenn.1987). The   authorizedrouteforattackingafaciallyvalid,finaljudgmentofconvictionisbythePostConviction   ProcedureAct.Id.at272.However,ifajudgmentisfaciallyinvalid,thenitmaynotbeusedto  enhancepunishmentinasubsequentprosecution.Seeid;seealsoStatev.Whaley,982S.W.2d346,  34849(Tenn.Crim.App.1997)(holdingthataGeorgiaconviction,whichwasfaciallyinvalid  becauseitlackedthejudgessignatureandanyindicationthatthedefendantwasrepresentedby l counselorhadwaivedherrighttocounsel,couldnotbeusedtoenhanceasubsequentTennessee X  conviction). D!   TheDefendantwasfirstconvictedofdrivingundertheinfluenceinRheaCounty,Tennessee, #l! in1990.TheDefendantallegesthatthisconvictionisinvalidonitsfacemerelybecauseitfailsto $X" containwrittenadviceofanenhancedpenaltyforasubsequentconvictionorawarningthata $D # convictioninanotherstatemaybeusedtoenhancethepunishmentforaDUIcommittedin %0!$ Tennessee.TheDefendantstatesthattheseomissionsrenderthe1990convictionvoidsothatitmay  becollaterallyattackedandshouldnothavebeenusedtoenhancethepunishmentforhispresent  DUIconviction.Wedisagree.  -#  2         )(#33)  TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection5510403(g)(1)statesthat [a]nypersonconvictedof ` aninitialorsubsequent[DUI]offenseshallbeadvised,inwriting,ofthepenaltyforsecondand L  subsequentconvictionsand [w]rittennoticebythejudgeshallinformthedefendantthata 8  convictionfortheoffenseofdrivingundertheinfluenceofanintoxicantcommittedinanotherstate $ t shallbeusedtoenhancethepunishmentforaviolationof5510401committedinthisstate.  ` However, thestatutedoesnotrequirethatadefendanthavereceivedsuchnoticepriortobeing  L  sentencedonasecondorsubsequentoffense.Statev.GeorgeS.Mercier,No.02C019404CC  8  00066,#XBXXXBf#XBXXXBԀ1994Tenn.Crim.App.LEXIS695,at*2(Tenn.Crim.App.Oct.19,1994).Priorto $  Mercier,thisCourtheldinStatev.Rea,865S.W.2d923,924(Tenn.Crim.App.1992),thatthe   defendantsclaimthatshehadnotbeenwarnedinwritingbytheAlabamatrialcourtofthe   enhancingpenaltiesforsubsequentDUIconvictionswaswithoutmerit.Morerecently,thisCourt   heldthat thefactthatthedefendantdidnothavethebenefitofbeingwarnedpursuanttoTenn.   CodeAnn.5510403(g)(1)ofenhancedpunishmentforfutureDUIsbeforehewaschargeda p secondtimeforDUIisofnoconsequence.Statev.Bowen,67S.W.3d826,828(Tenn.Crim.App. \ 2001). Thestatutedoesnotprovidethatfailuretowarnbarsenhancedsentencingforsubsequent H DUIs.Id.Becauseprecedentclearlystatesthatthefailuretowarnofenhancedpunishmentdoes 4 notbarenhancedsentencingforsubsequentDUIs,weholdinthiscasethatthefailuretoinclude  p intheDefendants1990judgmentawrittenwarningofenhancementdoesnotrenderthejudgment  \ faciallyinvalid.Therefore,McClintockprohibitstheDefendantscollateralattackonhis1990DUI H conviction. 4   WenowaddressthevalidityoftheDefendantssecondconvictionofDUI,whichoccurred   intheGeneralSessionsCourtofHamiltonCounty,Tennessee,in1997.TheDefendantallegesthat  thisconvictionisinvalidonitsface#XBXXXB&#XBXXXBԀfortworeasons:(1)Itfailedtocontainawarningthata  convictioninanotherstatemaybeusedtoenhancethepunishmentforaDUIcommittedin  Tennessee,and(2)thejudgewhoacceptedtheDefendantsguiltypleawasaspecialjudgewhowas l notproperlyappointed.Havingpreviouslyconcludedthatthefailuretowarnofthefuturepossibility X  ofenhancedpunishmentdoesnotrenderajudgmentofconvictionfaciallyvoid,wenowconsider D!  theDefendantssecondgroundforattackingthe1997conviction,thatthespecialjudgewho 0"  acceptedtheguiltypleawasnotdulyelectedpursuanttoTennesseelaw.  -#  3      ׀TennesseeCode   Annotatedsection1615209addressestheproceduretobefollowedwhenappointingaspecial  judgetopresideoveracourtofgeneralsessionsorajuvenilecourt.First,thejudgewhofindsit  necessarytobeabsentfromcourtshouldattempttolocateajudge,current,former,orretired,tosit t asspecialjudge.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.1615209(a)(1)(2).Ifnecessary,theabsentjudgemay ` applyforassistancefromtheadministrativeofficeofthecourtsinfindingajudgetositasspecial L  judge.Id.1615209(a)(3). Onlyafterexhaustingtheproceduressetoutinsubdivisions(a)(1), 8  (2)and(3),ajudgemayappointalawyerfromalist,onarotatingbasis,oflawyersthathavebeen $ t previouslyapprovedbythejudgeorjudgesofthedistrictorcounty....Id.1615209(a)(4).  ` Wherealawyerissittingasaspecialjudge,thepartiesandcounselmustbenotifiedthatthelawyer  L  isaspecialjudgewhoissittingintheregularjudgesabsence.Seeid.1615209(a)(4)(A).Then  8  thepartiesmustchoosetoproceedandhavetheircaseheardbythespecialjudgeratherthanawait $  thereturnoftheregularjudge.Seeid.1615209(a)(4)(B). -#  4      ׀     Therecordbeforeuscontainsnoproofwhatsoeveroftheprocedurefollowedintheelection   ofattorneyWilliamHallasaspecialjudgetoheartheDefendantscaseonJune10,1997.Theonly   evidenceintherecordtosupporttheDefendantspositionisthetestimonyoftheDefendantandthat p ofShawnJohnson,theCourtAdministratorofHamiltonCounty,Tennessee,who,atthetimeof \ Defendantsguiltypleain1997,wastheAssistantCourtAdministrator.#XBXXXB)-#XBXXXBMr.Johnsontestifiedthat H in1997,thegeneralpracticeforappointingspecialjudgesinHamiltonCountywastohavetheCourt 4 Administrator,thenMs.BobbieHelton,attempttofindaretiredjudgewhowouldsitasspecial  p judge.Ifshewasunabletofindaretiredjudge,shewouldconsultalistofpracticingattorneysand  \ calloneofthemwiththerequestthattheyserveasaspecialjudgefortheday.Mr.Johnsonstated H thathewasnotawareofanyformalelectionheldbytheattorneyswhowerepresentincourt,buthe 4 admittedthathewasnotparticularlyinvolvedintheprocess.Mr.Johnsonfurthertestifiedthathe   wasunabletofindarecordindicatingthatWilliamHallhadtakenanoathasspecialjudgeonJune   10,1997.However,hestatedthattherecordsfrom1997were mixedupandhehadnothadtime  tothoroughlygothroughthem.Finally,Mr.JohnsonsaidthatatthetimeoftheDefendants1997  guiltyplea,noformwasusedforobtainingtheconsentofallthepartiestoaspecialjudgehearing  theircase.Hedidnotknowwhetherthespecialjudgesorallyinformedthepartiesoftheirrightto l havetheircasesheardbyaregularjudge.TheDefendanttestifiedthatatthetimeofhis1997plea, X  nooneinformedhimthatWilliamHallwasaspecialjudgeasopposedtoaregularjudge,andnoone D! askedhimtoconsent,eitherorallyorinwriting,toWilliamHallpresidingoverhiscase. 0"    ItappearsdoubtfulthattheprocedureutilizedbytheHamiltonCountyCourtAdministrator $X" in1997forappointingspecialjudgesfullycompliedwithTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection1615 $D # 209.Firstofall,theCourtAdministratorisnotauthorizedunderthestatutetoseekaspecialjudge.  Second,otherthanMr.JohnsonstestimonythattheCourtAdministrator triedtogetaretiredjudge  first,thereisnoindicationthattheproceduressetoutinTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection1615  209(a)(1)(3)wereexhaustedbeforesheconsultedthelistofprivateattorneys.Finally,the t DefendanttestifiedthathewasneitherapprisedofMr.Hallsstatusasaspecialjudgenoraskedto ` consenttothespecialjudgehearinghiscase. L    However,evenassumingthatthestatutewasnotstrictlyadheredtoinselectingaspecial $ t judge,ouranalysisdoesnotendthere.ThejudgewhopresidedovertheDefendantscasecouldact  ` asadefactojudgeevenifhewerenotproperlyappointedorselected.Thepositionofdefactojudge  L  haslongbeenrecognizedinTennesseeandiswidelyacceptedthroughoutthecountry:  8  8  8`   Ajudgedefactoisoneactingwiththecolorofrightandwhois $  regardedas,andhasthereputationof,exercisingthejudicialfunction   heassumes.Hediffers,ontheonehand,fromamereusurperofan   officewhoundertakestoactwithoutanycolorofright:andonthe   otherhand,fromanofficerdejurewhoisinallrespectslegally   appointedandqualifiedtoexercisetheoffice....p` x` x 48AC.J.S.Judges2(1981).TheTennesseeSupremeCourthasrecognized thatevenwherethere H areconstitutionalinfirmitiesinthemannerinwhichajudgetookoffice,thatjudgemaystillbe 4 deemedtobeactingundercolorofauthorityasadefactojudge.Stateexrel.Newsomev.Biggers,  p 911S.W.2d715,718(Tenn.1995).Thecourtdrewadistinctionbetweenthesituationwherethe  \ judgmentofadefactocourtisdirectlychallengedandwheretheDefendantseekstocollaterally H attackthejudgment. BecauseNewsomedidnotchallengethemunicipalcourtsexerciseof 4 jurisdictioneitherduringthetrialphaseinwhichhepleadedguiltyorondirectappeal,heacquiesced   tothecourtsexerciseofjurisdiction.Id.at719.       ThisCourthasrecognizedthedoctrineofdefactojudgesasrecentlyas1999.InStatev.  MarkJohnTurner,No.01C019703CR00071,#XBXXXB,9#XBXXXB1999Tenn.Crim.App.LEXIS584,at*1213  (Tenn.Crim.App.June.16,1999),adefendantsoughttohavehispriorDUIconvictiondeclared l voidasanenhancementfactorbecausetherecorddidnotreflectthatthespecialjudgewhoaccepted X  hisguiltypleahadbeenproperlyelected.Inaffirmingthejudgmentofthetrialcourt,thisCourt D! stated, 0"  8  8`   [T]hespecialjudgewas,ataminimum,adefactojudge....There #l! wasnoobjectiontothespecialjudgesexerciseofauthorityatthe $X" timethepleawasenteredin1990,andnoappealwastakenfromthe $D # resultingconviction. Like#XBXXXBPL#XBXXXBanyjudgment,apresumptionofregularity %0!$ intheproceedingsattachesuponbecomingfinal.Becausethe &"% specialjudgeactedwithdefactoauthorityandbecausethisauthority '#& wasnotchallengedduringtrialoronappeal,thedefendantcannot (#' nowattacktheintegrityofthejudgment.)$(` x` x   |*%) Id.(citationsomitted);seealsoBankstonv.State,908S.W.2d194,198(Tenn.1995)(holdingthat   becausethedefendantdidnotchallengethejurisdictionofthemunicipalcourteitherinthatcourt  orondirectappeal,themunicipalcourtwasadefactocourt).    Weseenoreasontodepartfromtheaboveprecedent.AlthoughWilliamHallmaynothave ` beenelectedaccordingtothespecificstatutoryprovisionsregardingspecialjudges,hewasadefacto L  judicialofficerwhosejudicialactsarevalidandnotsubjecttocollateralattack. 8  Ѐ  HavingconcludedthatneitherofhispriorDUIconvictionsisfaciallyinvalidandsubjectto  ` collateralattack,wenowaddresstheDefendantssecondprincipalissue,thatthetrialcourterred  L  bynotholdingahearingtodeterminewhethertheDefendantpersonallywaivedhisrighttotestify.  -#  5      ׀  8  TheStatearguesthattheDefendanthaswaivedthisissuebyfailingtoraiseitinatimelymotionfor $  anewtrial.#XBXXXBO#XBXXXBԀAlthoughtheDefendantdidnotraisethisissueinamotionforanewtrial,thisCourt   hasdiscretionpursuanttoRule52(b)oftheTennesseeRulesofCriminalProceduretotakenotice   atanytimeofaplainerrorwhichaffectsasubstantialrightoftheaccusedwhereitmaybenecessary   todosubstantialjustice.SeeStatev.Ogle,666S.W.2d58,60(Tenn.1984);Veachv.State,491   S.W.2d81,83(Tenn.1973);Herronv.State,3Tenn.Crim.App.39,51,456S.W.2d873,878 p (1970),vacatedonothergrounds,408U.S.937,92S.Ct.2865,33L.Ed.756(1972).When \ decidingwhetheranerrorconstitutes plainerror,weconsiderfivefactors: H 8  8`   (a)therecordmustclearlyestablishwhatoccurredinthetrialcourt; 4 (b)aclearandunequivocalruleoflawmusthavebeenbreached;(c)  p asubstantialrightoftheaccusedmusthavebeenadverselyaffected;  \ (d)theaccuseddidnotwaivetheissuefortacticalreasons;and(e) H considerationoftheissueis necessarytodosubstantialjustice.S74 S7` x` x   #XBXXXBV# SXBXXXBStatev.Smith,24S.W.3d274,28283(Tenn.2000)(quotingStatev.Adkisson,899S.W.2d v 626,641(Tenn.Crim.App.1994)).Withrespecttothefirstfactor,therecordisclearthatno b hearingwashadpursuanttothemandateofMomonv.State,18S.W.3d152,162(Tenn.1999), N todeterminewhethertheDefendantpersonallywaivedhisrighttotestify.InMomon,18S.W.3d : at161,theTennesseeSupremeCourtheldthattherightofadefendanttotestifyinhisown &v behalfisafundamentalconstitutionalrightthatmayonlybewaivedpersonallybythedefendant;  b thusthesecondandthirdfactorsaresatisfied.Thereappearstobenotacticalreasonforthe  N DefendanttohavewaivedtheissueofnothavingaMomonhearing;thereforethefourthfactoris !: satisfied.Andfinally,iftheDefendantdidnotpersonallywaivehisrighttotestifyonhisown "&  behalf,whichisafundamentalright,itisnecessarythatweconsidertheissuetoensurejustice. #! Therefore,wefindthatthefailuretoconductahearingpursuanttoMomontodeterminewhether $" theDefendantdidpersonallywaivehisrighttotestifywasplainerror.Assuch,thefailureofthe % # DefendanttoraisethisissueinamotionforanewtrialdoesnotprecludethisCourtfrom &!$ consideringtheissue.SeeTenn.R.Crim.P.52(b). r'"% Ї  Toensurethatthedefendantsrighttotestifyhasbeenpersonallywaivedbythe  defendant,thecourtinMomonadoptedproceduralguidelinesthatcallfordefensecounselto  requestajuryouthearingtodemonstratethatthedefendantswaiveroftherighttotestifyhas  beenknowingly,intelligently,andvoluntarilymade.SeeMomon,18S.W.3dat163. -#  6      ׀Thereis t noevidenceintherecordthattheproceduralguidelinesestablishedbyMomonwerefollowed. ` Furthermore,thereisno evidenceintherecordtoestablishthattherightwasotherwise L  personallywaivedbythedefendant.Id.Thewaiverofadefendantsrighttotestifyonhisown 8  behalfwillnotbepresumedfromasilentrecord.Seeid.at162. Intheabsenceofevidenceto $ t showthat[a]defendantpersonallywaived[the]righttotestify,wemustpresumethathedid  ` not.Statev.DwayneSimmons,No.M200001199CCAR3CD,#XBXXXBk\#XBXXXBԀ2001Tenn.Crim.App.  L  LEXIS359,at*17(Tenn.Crim.App.May11,2001).  8    Onremand,thetrialcourtmustfirstconsiderwhethertheDefendantdidpersonallywaive   hisrighttotestify.ItmaybethattheDefendantdidnotdesiretotestify.Therecordisvoidof   anyindicationonewayortheother.IftheDefendantdidnotdesiretotestify,andthecourtfinds   fromtheevidencethathepersonallywaivedhisrighttotestify,thennofurtherinquiryneedbe   made.However,iftheDefendantdidwishtotestify,butwasdeprivedofthatright,thenthetrial p courtmustdeterminewhethertheviolationoftheDefendantsrighttotestifywasharmlesserror \ beyondareasonabledoubt.SeeMomon,18S.W.3dat166(holdingthatthedenialoftherightto H testifyononesownbehalfmaybefoundharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt). 4   IndeterminingwhethertheStatehasproventhattheconstitutionalviolationisharmless  \ beyondareasonabledoubt,courtsshouldconsiderthefollowingfactors:(1)theimportanceof H thedefendantstestimonytothedefensecase;(2)thecumulativenatureofthetestimony;(3)the 4 presenceorabsenceofevidencecorroboratingorcontradictingthedefendantonmaterialpoints;   and(4)theoverallstrengthoftheprosecution'scase.Seeid.at167.Theabovefactors are   merelyinstructiveandnotexclusiveconsiderations.Id.    AswasthecaseinMomon,thereisnotsufficientevidenceintherecordforthisCourtto  givefullconsiderationtothesefactors.Wehavenoindicationofwhatthesubstanceofthe l Defendantstestimonywouldhavebeenhadhetestified.Therecorddoesnotreflectwhetherthe X  Defendantdesiredtotestify.#XBXXXBg#XBXXXBTherecorddoesnotreflectthattheDefendantpersonallywaived D! hisrighttotestify.TheDefendantsimplyassertsthatthetrialcourtdidnotcomplywiththe 0"  Momonguidelines#XBXXXBp#XBXXXB.#XBXXXBq#XBXXXBFindingthistobethecase,weconcludethatthecasemustberemandedto #l! thetrialcourtforthedeterminationofwhethertheDefendantdid,infact,wishtotestifyonhis $X" ownbehalf.Ifhedid,thenahearingmustbeheldatwhichtheStatewillbeartheburdenof $D # establishingthatthedenialoftheDefendantsrighttotestifyonhisownbehalfwasharmless %0!$ beyondareasonabledoubt.IfthetrialcourtconcludesthattheStatehasmetitsburden,the &"% Defendantsconvictionwillbesustained.However,iftheStatefailstoprovethattheerrorwas '#& harmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt,thetrialcourtmustvacatetheDefendantsconvictionand  granttheDefendantanewtrial.    Wethereforeremandthiscasetothetrialcourtforadeterminationofwhetherthe t Defendantwaivedhisrighttotestifyand,ifhedidnot,whethertheviolationoftheDefendants ` righttotestifyonhisownbehalfwasharmlesserror. L  #XBXXXB r#   `     h     ___________________________________  `    `     h     DAVIDH.WELLES,JUDGE