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D3-é`I 0@K„‹Ø·ç¤žv~B#vÓÀ$ AO“*Æâ* 0D¨+ D/ì+ B,˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLüÏ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ï ð Eñ ò ó ô Dõ  ö Õù eú Ó€³†;$3|x (‚*2‚$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X‡KXXXÔÔ€&Ïÿ&XX‡KÔÓ  Ó€€à ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó, øð AZ"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌJuly€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó 'ÿÿdxd ßÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔ€€Petitioner€was€indicted€for€five€counts€of€aggravated€rape€in€violation€of€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€ðð€39„2„603€(1982€&€Supp.€1988),€and€one€count€of€aggravated€rape€in€violation€ofÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„13„502€(1990).Ì øÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔ€€The€State€raises€two€ð ðpreliminaryðð€issues€that€may€be€addressed€here.€€First,€the€StateÏargues€that€this€Court€should€affirm€ð ðinstanterðð€the€decision€of€the€trial€court,€due€to€the€PetitionerððsÏfailure€to€prepare€a€complete€record€for€appeal.€€The€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact,€incorporated€byÏreference€in€its€Order,€were€not€attached€to€the€Order€in€preparation€for€the€hearing€of€this€appeal.€ÏThe€record€reflects,€however,€that€the€State€did€not€respond€to€a€motion€by€Petitioner€to€permitÏsupplementation€of€the€record€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Appellate€Procedure€24(e);€and€theÏmotion€was€granted€on€October€1,€1997.Ìà àSecond,€the€State€urges€that€the€Petitionerððs€Amendment€to€Petition€for€Post„ConvictionÏRelief€be€stricken€from€the€record€as€an€ð ðunauthorized€pleading.ðð€€Although€this€pleading€was€notÏsigned€by€appointed€counsel,€it€was€signed€by€Petitioner€himself;€and€in€the€interest€of€justice,€weÏchoose€to€consider€its€allegations,€noting€the€objection€by€the€State.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò zÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔ€€Though€the€bodygram€is€not€dated,€the€State€does€not€seem€to€dispute€the€date€of€theÏvictimððs€examination€at€General€Hospital.€Ì ÎÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔ€€Petitioner€recounted€difficulty€in€locating€Nurse€McInnis€for€interview€and€requested€that€theÏtrial€court€provide€funds€for€an€expert.€€We€note€that€our€Supreme€Court€ð ðis€of€the€opinion€that€theÏstate€is€not€required€to€provide€expert€assistance€to€indigent€non„capital€post„conviction€petitioners.ðð€ÏòòDavis€v.€Stateóó,€912€S.W.2d€689,€696„97€(Tenn.€1995);€and€we€accept€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€toÏdeny€Petitionerððs€request€for€an€expert€as€correct.Ì ­Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔFor€post„conviction€petitions€filed€after€May€9,€1995,€petitioners€have€the€burden€of€provingÏfactual€allegations€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f).Ì šÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%&ÔÓ  Ó€€à àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€%ôÔ€€This€is€not€a€case,€as€in€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52,€54„55€(1985),€in€which€counsel€hasÏgiven€erroneous€advice.€€òòSee€id.óó€(counsel€told€defendant€he€would€be€eligible€for€parole€after€servingÏone„third€of€sentence,€when€defendant€was€actually€not€eligible€for€parole€prior€to€serving€one„half€ofÏhis€sentence);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòDonald€F.€Walton€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01C01„9603„CR„00110,€DavidsonÏCounty€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Jan.€30,€1997)€(finding€that€ð ðerroneous€advice€regarding€paroleÏthat€induces€a€defendant€to€forego€his€or€her€right€to€a€jury€trial€can€be€used€to€establish€a€claim€forÏineffective€assistanceðð).€€As€just€discussed,€the€trial€court€found€that€Petitioner€was€advised€only€thatÏhe€would€be€eligible€for€parole€at€thirty€percent.€€Although€Petitioner€may€have€other€parole€conditionsÏsuch€as€psychological€evaluation,€he€remains€ð ðeligible€for€paroleðð€at€thirty€percent.€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€$ŠÔÔ€%ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€|´XXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€()'A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌMARCH€SESSION,€1998ÌÌÌÓ  ÓRICKY€RUTLEDGE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9706„CC„00201Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àAppellant,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àBEDFORD€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€WILLIAM€CHARLES€LEEó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó ó€à àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àò ò)à àó ó(Post„Conviction)ò òÌó óÌÌÓ  Óò òON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCRIMINAL€COURT€OF€BEDFORD€COUNTYó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌROBERT€H.€STOVALL,€JR.à àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌP.O.€Box€160à àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌCharlotte,€TN€37036Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à425€5th€Avenue€NorthÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMIKE€McCOWNÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àROBERT€G.€CRIGLERà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àOne€Public€Square,€Suite€300Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àShelbyville,€TN€€ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€%°Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€%ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€Petitioner,€Ricky€Rutledge,€appeals€from€the€order€of€the€trial€courtÏdismissing€his€Petition€for€Post€Conviction€Relief.€€Petitioner€sought€post„conviction€relief€asserting€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€priorÏto€entering€his€plea€of€guilt.€€In€addition,€Petitioner€maintains€that€because€ofÏcounselððs€deficient€representation,€his€guilty€plea€was€not€knowingly,€intelligently,Ïand€voluntarily€given.€€Following€an€evidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€deniedÏrelief€and€we€affirm.ÌÌà àIn€April€1990,€Petitioner€was€indicted€on€six€counts€of€aggravated€rape× ƒ+ ××  ×Ïand€one€count€of€aggravated€sexual€battery.€€The€victim€as€set€forth€in€theÏindictment€was€the€9„year„old€daughter€of€the€Defendant.€€Petitioner€entered€aÏð ðbest€interestðð€guilty€plea€on€December€17,€1990,€to€the€first€count€of€aggravatedÏrape;€and€the€State€retired€all€other€counts€of€this€indictment€as€well€as€a€priorÏindictment€for€multiple€counts€of€passing€worthless€checks.€€Judge€Charles€LeeÏof€the€Circuit€Court€for€Bedford€County€sentenced€Petitioner€to€twenty„five€yearsÏas€a€Range€I€standard€offender.ÌÌà àPetitioner€filed€a€òòproóó€òòseóó€Petition€for€Post€Conviction€Relief€in€the€CircuitÏCourt€for€Bedford€County€on€November€22,€1993;€the€trial€court€appointedÏcounsel€on€March€24,€1994;€and€an€amended€Petition€was€filed€with€the€courtÏon€May€26,€1994.€€The€trial€court€held€an€evidentiary€hearing€over€the€course€ofÏMay€26€and€27,€1994,€and€dismissed€the€Petition€at€the€conclusion€of€thisÏhearing.€€On€February€17,€1997,€the€trial€court€entered€its€Order€Dismissing€PostÏConviction€Petition,€from€which€the€Petitioner€appeals.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓI.€€INEFFECTIVE€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELà ààH@ÈÈ7ÈààH@ÈÈ7ÈàÌÓ  Óà àThe€first€issue€for€review€is€whether€Petitioner€suffered€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€in€violation€of€his€Sixth€Amendment€right€to€counsel.× ƒ, ××  ×€€TheÏPetition€presents€several€claims€for€post„conviction€relief€based€upon€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel,€yet€only€certain€of€these€claims€were€pursued€at€theÏevidentiary€hearing.€€Because€the€Petitioner€bears€the€burden€of€proving€hisÍfactual€allegations€in€this€proceeding,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f)€(1997),Ïwe€will€address€only€those€claims€for€which€proof€was€offered.ÌÌÓ  ÓòòA.€€Failure€to€InvestigateóóÌÓ  Óà àFirst,€Petitioner€asserts€that€counsel€failed€to€adequately€investigate€hisÏcaseð"ðspecifically,€by€failing€to€determine€the€meaning€and€significance€of€aÏdiagnosis€made€following€a€medical€examination€of€the€victim.€€To€be€entitled€toÏpost„conviction€relief€on€the€basis€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€PetitionerÏmust€show€both€that€his€counselððs€representation€was€ð ðdeficientðð€and€that€ð ðtheÏdeficient€performance€prejudiced€the€defense.ðð€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466ÏU.S.€668,€687€(1984).€€Because€Petitioner€has€failed€to€satisfy€either€prong,€thisÏclaim€lacks€merit.€€ÌÌà àThis€Court€has€been€provided€extensive€guidance€by€which€to€reviewÏcontentions€that€conduct€was€below€competence€when€judged€by€ð ðan€objectiveÏstandard€of€reasonableness.ðð€€òòSeeóóòòid.óó€at€688;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523ÏS.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975)€(ð ðWe€believe€a€better€standard€.€.€.€is€simplyÏwhether€the€advice€given,€or€the€services€rendered€by€the€attorney,€are€withinÏthe€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.ðð).€€We€beginÏwith€the€principle€that€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€following€PetitionerððsÏevidentiary€hearing€are€conclusive€and€binding€on€this€Court€unless€the€evidenceÍpreponderates€against€those€findings.€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746Ï(Tenn.€1993)€(citing€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990)).€€In€thisÏcase,€the€trial€court€was€ð ðconvinced,€based€upon€his€demeanor€and€basedÏupon€his€answers€to€the€questions,ðð€that€John€Norton,€one€of€Petitionerððs€priorÏattorneys,€was€ð ðfamiliar€with€those€terms€of€artðð€that€Petitioner€now€claims€wereÏnot€investigated.€€We€hold€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€thisÏdetermination€and€we€examine€the€evidence€with€respect€to€failure€to€investigateÏthe€medical€diagnosis€of€the€victim.ÌÌà àTo€support€his€first€claim,€Petitioner€entered€two€exhibits€into€the€record€ofÏthe€evidentiary€hearing.€€The€first€exhibit€was€a€letter€from€Dr.€Frank€Jayakody€ofÏShelbyville€to€Brenda€Bramlett,€Petitionerððs€other€attorney€at€the€time€of€his€guiltyÏplea.€€This€letter€stated€that€upon€examination€of€the€victim€on€February€27,Ï1990,€Dr.€Jayakody€found€ð ðno€abrasions€or€discoloration€in€[the€victimððs]€perinealÏarea€and€her€hymen€appeared€intact.ðð€€Furthermore,€ð ð[a]ttempts€to€insert€aÏpediatric€speculum€into€her€vagina€was€[sic]€unsuccessful€due€to€pain,ðð€andÏð ðbased€upon€her€examination€.€.€.€I€could€not€conclusively€say€that€any€abuseÏhad€occurred.ðð€€The€second€exhibit€relevant€to€this€issue,€a€ð ðChild€AbuseÏBodygramðð€of€the€victim€signed€by€Registered€Nurse€LeeAnne€McInnis€atÏMetropolitan€General€Hospital€in€Nashville,€revealed€ð ðFindings€[consistent€with]Ïpast€history€of€trauma€to€hymen=category€3€findings.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€crux€of€Petitionerððs€argument€is€that€Brenda€Bramlett€and€John€NortonÏshould€have€researched€the€term€ð ðcategory€3€findingsðð€to€determine€whetherÏsuch€trauma€can€result€from€causes€other€than€sexual€abuse.€€Specifically,ÏPetitioner€argues€that€Bramlett€and€Norton€could€have€discovered€that€Dr.ÏJayakodyððs€frustrated€attempts€to€insert€a€pediatric€speculum€into€the€victim€threeÏdays€earlier× ƒ. ××  ×€were€within€the€range€of€potential€causes.€€At€the€evidentiaryÏhearing,€however,€Petitioner€presented€no€evidence€to€support€his€hypothesis;Ïcounsel€merely€motioned€to€continue€the€proceeding€until€such€time€as€evidenceÏcould€be€presented.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€ÌÌà àAs€noted€by€this€Court€in€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1990),€ÌÓÓà8 àà àWhen€a€petitioner€contends€that€trial€counsel€failed€toÏdiscover,€interview,€or€present€witnesses€in€support€of€the€defense,Ïthese€witnesses€should€be€presented€by€the€petitioner€at€theÏevidentiary€hearing.€.€.€.€It€is€elementary€that€neither€a€trial€judge€norÏan€appellate€court€can€speculate€or€guess€on€the€question€ofÍwhether€further€investigation€would€have€revealed€a€materialÏwitness€or€what€a€witnessððs€testimony€might€have€been€ifÏintroduced€by€defense€counsel.€.€.€.€In€short,€if€a€petitioner€is€able€toÏestablish€that€defense€counsel€was€deficient€in€the€investigation€ofÏthe€facts€.€.€.,€the€petitioner€is€not€entitled€to€relief€from€his€convictionÏon€this€ground€unless€he€can€produce€a€material€witness€who€(a)Ïcould€have€been€found€by€reasonable€investigation€and€(b)€wouldÏhave€testified€favorably€in€support€of€his€defense€if€called.ÌÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€757„58€(footnote€omitted).€€Although€òòBlackóó€involved€a€conviction€after€trial,Ïits€import€is€also€well„taken€in€the€context€of€guilty€pleas.€€Petitioner€bears€theÏburden€to€demonstrate€(1)€that€Bramlett€and€Norton€failed€to€investigateÏð ðcategory€3€findingsðð€of€trauma€and€such€failure€was€unreasonable€ð ðconsideringÏall€the€circumstances,ðð€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€688;€and€if€so,€(2)€that€ð ðthere€is€aÏreasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€errors,€he€would€not€have€pleadedÏguilty€and€would€have€insisted€on€going€to€trial.ðð€€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52,€59Ï(1985).€€Petitioner€must€do€more€than€merely€present€evidence€tending€to€showÏincompetent€representation€and€prejudice;€he€must€prove€his€factual€allegationsÏby€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòBrooks€v.€Stateóó,€756€S.W.2d€288,€289Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€1988).× ƒ0 ××  ×€ÌÌà àAs€recognized,€Petitioner€has€presented€no€affirmative€evidence€on€thisÏissue€other€than€to€show€on€cross€examination€that€Norton€never€spoke€with€Dr.ÏJayakody€or€Nurse€McInnis€and€did€not€investigate€their€findings,€and€thatÍBramlett€only€spoke€with€Nurse€McInnis€by€telephone.€€By€explanation,€NortonÏtestified€that€he€did€not€speak€with€Dr.€Jayakody€because,€in€his€experience,€ifÏa€ð ðdoctor€really€wants€his€opinion€to€be€credible,€he€puts€everything€in€it€that€heÏdid,€and€you€get€back€a€reportðð€that€is€ð ðgraphicðð€and€detailed.€€For€this€reason,ÏNorton€stated€that€he€ð ðdid€not€have€any€reason€to€believe€that€[Dr.€Jayakody]Ïwould€have€been€any€more€enlightening€in€person€than€he€was€on€the€writtenÏpage.ðð€€In€addition,€Norton€testified€that€he€did€not€speak€with€Nurse€McInnisÏbecause€he€presumed€she€would€not€change€her€opinion€and€because€heÏbelieved,€even€from€his€admittedly€limited€medical€knowledge,€that€Dr.€JayakodyÏcould€not€have€caused€the€injury€that€Nurse€McInnis€found.€€€Ìà àÌà àPetitionerððs€other€counsel,€Brenda€Bramlett,€testified€at€the€evidentiaryÏhearing€that€while€she€had€not€spoken€with€Dr.€Jayakody€personally,€she€hadÏconsulted€another€doctor€about€Jayakodyððs€findings.€€This€consultant€doctorÏspoke€personally€with€Dr.€Jayakody€and€subsequently€offered€Bramlett€herÏopinionð"ðthat€the€victimððs€injury€ð ðcould€not€have€been€caused€by€anything€otherÏthan€abuseðð€and€that€the€location€of€the€scarring€was€ð ðconsistent€with€what€youÏfind€in€sexual€abuse€cases.ðð€€Furthermore,€Bramlett€instructed€her€investigator€toÏpersonally€interview€Nurse€McInnis,€and€the€investigator€complied€and€reportedÏback€to€Bramlett.€€ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€rationalization€of€attorney€conduct€in€an€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€case,€the€Supreme€Court€of€the€United€States€instructed,€ÌÓÓà8 àà àJudicial€scrutiny€of€counselððs€performance€must€be€highlyÏdeferential.€€It€is€all€too€tempting€for€a€defendant€to€second„guessÏcounselððs€assistance€after€conviction€or€adverse€sentence€.€.€.€.€AÏfair€assessment€of€attorney€performance€requires€that€every€effortÏbe€made€to€eliminate€the€distorting€effects€of€hindsight,€to€reconstructÏthe€circumstances€of€counselððs€challenged€conduct,€and€to€evaluateÏthe€conduct€from€counselððs€perspective€at€the€time.ÌÌÓÓòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€688€(1984).€€The€courts€of€this€stateÏalso€have€long€ð ðrecognized€that€it€is€not€our€function€to€ððsecond„guessðð€tacticalÏand€strategical€choices€pertaining€to€defense€matters€or€measure€a€defenseÏattorneyððs€representation€by€ðð20„20€hindsightðð€when€deciding€the€effectiveness€ofÏtrial€counsel.ðð€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746€(Tenn.€1993)€(quotingÏòòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982)).€€We€find€counselððs€conduct€toÏbe€reasonable€under€the€circumstances.€€Ì€Ìà àAs€the€State€commented€at€the€evidentiary€hearing,€ð ðThere€are€otherÏsources€of€research€that€[sic]€the€medical€books,€other€doctors,€criminal€defensesÏassociation€resources,€where€[present€counsel]€could€have€researched€thisÏmatter€himself€and€not€come€into€[the]€hearing€saying,€ððWell,€it€may€have,€it€couldÏhave€been.ðððð€€The€trial€court€agreed,€finding€that€ð ðthere€has€not€been€a€showingÏto€the€Court€that€there€would€be€the€likelihood€that€would€assist€the€Defendant.ðð€ÏIn€the€absence€of€sufficient€evidence€to€support€either€òòStricklandóó€prong,€and€withÍthe€presence€of€evidence€supporting€reasonable€conduct€by€counsel,€we€mustÏhold€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€ofÏno€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€based€upon€failure€to€investigate€theÏmedical€evidence.€€€ÌÌÓ  ÓòòB.€€Failure€to€Advise/MisinformationóóÌÓ  Óà àPetitioner€next€claims€that€he€suffered€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏbecause€prior€counsel€incorrectly€informed€him€that€he€would€be€released€fromÏincarceration€after€serving€seven€and€one„half€to€eight€years€of€his€sentenceÏwith€good€behavior.€€As€noted€above,€Petitioner€was€sentenced€to€twenty„fiveÏyears€as€a€Range€I€offender.€€Eligibility€for€parole€arises€for€Range€I€offendersÏafter€completion€of€thirty€percent€of€the€actual€sentence€imposed.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„501(c)€(1990).€€Petitioner€testified€at€the€evidentiary€hearing€that€heÏwill€not€be€released€from€incarceration€until€after€service€of€eighteen€years.€à àÌà àAlthough€the€reason€for€prolonged€confinement€is€not€presented€inÏPetitionerððs€brief€or€his€testimony,€we€assume€it€results€from€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€ðð€40„35„503(c)€(1990),€which€reads:€ð ðNo€person€convicted€of€a€sexÏcrime€shall€be€released€on€parole€until€a€psychiatrist€or€licensed€clinicalÏpsychologist€has€examined€and€evaluated€such€inmate€and€certified€that,€to€aÏreasonable€medical€certainty,€the€inmate€does€not€pose€the€likelihood€ofÍcommitting€sexual€assaults€upon€release€from€confinement.ðð€€òòId.óó€€For€whateverÏreason,€there€are€two€distinct€issues€that€we€must€consider.€€Ìà àÌà àFirst,€did€counsel€promise€or€otherwise€misinform€Petitioner€regarding€theÏactual€date€he€would€be€released?€€The€trial€court€specifically€found€that€theyÏdid€not:€ð ð[T]he€Court€credits€the€witnesses€for€the€State,€or€credits€the€witnessesÏfor€the€State€in€that€no€promises€were€made€to€the€Defendant€that€he€would€beÏreleased,€guaranteed€at€a€particular€time.ðð€€Upon€examination€of€the€testimonyÏat€Petitionerððs€evidentiary€hearing,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€notÏpreponderate€against€this€finding.€€Both€Norton€and€Bramlett€testifiedÏunequivocally€they€did€not€guarantee€or€represent€to€Petitioner€that€he€would€beÏreleased€at€any€certain€time.€€Moreover,€they€testified€they€did€not€òòindicateóó€to€himÏthat€he€would€be€released€at€a€certain€time,€although€they€agreed€that€he€wasÏtold€he€would€be€ð ðeligible€for€paroleðð€after€serving€thirty€percent€of€his€sentence.€ÏFurthermore,€the€transcript€of€Petitionerððs€plea€acceptance€hearing€reflects€theÏfollowing€colloquy€between€the€trial€judge€and€Petitioner:ÌÓÓà8 àTHE€COURT:€Mr.€Rutledge,€has€anyone€made€any€threatsÏagainst€you,€other€than€to€prosecute€you,€to€make€you€pleadÏguilty?ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€No,€sir.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà8 àTHE€COURT:€Has€anyone€made€any€promises€to€you€other€thanÏthose€announced€in€court€today€to€make€you€plead€guilty?€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€No,€sir.€€I€just€asked€for€one€thing,€and€he€toldÏme€he€couldnððt€do€that.ÌÌà8 àTHE€COURT:€Pardon€me?€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€I€asked€him€for€one€thing,€and€he€said€heÏcouldnððt€do€that.€€I€wanted€one€more€thing€in€the€plea€bargain,€andÏhe€couldnððt€come€about€that.€€I€asked€him€„„€to€report€myself€in€afterÏthe€holidays€to€the€Bedford€County€Sheriffððs€Office€„„€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà8 àTHE€COURT:€Thatððs€a€decision€that€is€left€up€to€the€Court€and€notÏto€the€„„€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà8 àTHE€DEFENDANT:€„„€and€he€said€he€couldnððt€make€thatÏarrangement.€€Thatððs€the€only€thing.€€€€€€€€ÌÌÓÓBased€upon€this€evidence,€we€conclude€(1)€that€Petitioner€was€not€promised€orÏgiven€the€information€that€he€would€be€released€after€serving€seven€and€one„half€years€or€any€other€specific€length€of€his€sentence,€and€(2)€that€this€CourtÏhas€no€basis€upon€which€to€determine€the€information€provided€toÏPetitionerð"ðthat€he€would€be€ð ðeligible€for€releaseðð€after€serving€thirtyÏpercentð"ðwas€incorrect.× ƒ1 ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€second€question€to€consider€is:€Did€counselððs€failure€to€adviseÏPetitioner€that€he€would€òònotóó€be€released€after€serving€thirty€percent€of€hisÏsentence€constitute€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel?€€Initially,€we€note€thatÏPetitioner€has€failed€to€provide€evidence€other€than€his€own€testimony€ofÏinadmissible€hearsay€statements€by€Department€of€Correction€officers€to€showÏthat€he€will€indeed€not€be€released€after€having€served€thirty€percent€of€hisÏsentence,€although€the€trial€court€agreed€that€release€at€that€time€would€beÏhighly€unlikely.€€Next,€Petitioner€testified€he€was€òòactually€óóadvised€prior€toÏpleading€guilty€that€he€would€be€required€to€complete€a€sex€offendersðð€treatmentÏprogram€as€a€condition€of€his€parole.€€ÌÌà àThis€Court€has€previously€determined€that€ð ðsilence€by€counselðð€on€ð ðanyÏcollateral€consequences€of€a€pleaðð€does€not€ð ðfall€below€the€range€ofÏcompetence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.ðð€€òòAdkins€v.€Stateóó,€911ÏS.W.2d€334,€350€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Specifically,€failure€of€counsel€toÏdiscuss€parole€eligibility€or€the€parole€condition€of€successfully€completing€aÏsexual€offender€treatment€program€does€not€constitute€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel.€€òòWade€v.€Stateóó,€914€S.W.2d€97,€103„04€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);ÏòòWilson€v.€Stateóó,€899€S.W.2d€648,€652„53€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€In€light€ofÏthese€decisions,€we€cannot€conclude€that€counsel€had€a€duty€to€adviseÏPetitioner€of€consequences€even€òòmoreóó€collateral€and€certainly€indefiniteð"ðtheÍlength€of€time€it€could€take€to€fulfill€conditions€of€parole.€€We€conclude€thatÏPetitioner€has€not€suffered€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€based€uponÏmisadvice€or€failure€to€advise€regarding€conditions€of€parole€eligibility.€€€€€ÌÌà@ àII.€€VOLUNTARY€AND€INTELLIGENT€PLEAÌà àBecause€we€have€determined€that€Petitionerððs€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€claims€lack€merit,€because€ineffective€assistance€was€the€only€basisÏupon€which€he€claimed€his€plea€was€involuntary€or€unintelligent,€and€becauseÏwe€find€no€other€basis€to€conclude€that€his€plea€was€not€rendered€voluntarily,Ïwe€hold€€that€this€claim€must€also€fail.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€denying€the€Petitioner€post„conviction€relief€isÏaffirmed.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGE