ÿWPC” ..2¬…F sB¨¥f¦HHpôq!;º™J“۫שƒÞm%Wõv~›´°Ûwó<÷B4A-!0¾¯ ágš‡³¶þ Ö* Ô_ JN–%× Ùã€iß/YW^PL’¶%[$6Ãdîn:lÖÂnú¸q~ðå?g•(aH¶f€¹àÍúO2Û⟖ˆ1’ËY}¶:…ÿÆ6ô §¦#Æg÷ºíœÓyHz75T m@ ZW UN±U>ÿ 1u= 72²NäNæ 0³è-› 0ÅÈ 0ÑE^ 0­` 0§  0¡´ 0›Uð 0•ôôôN‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰‰ 1e‹‹‹‹ ð  p ††† 0D––– 0ÚÚÚ Bw˜\\IB01S08\KNOXCLERK3ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,Ô£ŒK1Þ óbï.xê:i¢×+003|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ SCARBROUGH P.J.JeffressNicholsCrabtreeRussfieldGagneElkinsBrykalskiHagoodKaseyBizakBizaksLedfordnobisLangdonCabanillasColacurciorelitigationPreslerintroduc[eLaFave JurPublgTrantBeatyMcGraww]henrelitigatingestoppedParklane AsheSwenson t]heC]ourtsSatchellconcealableBeltranCal.RptrCt.AppestopLonerganCal.AppUribeMajadoLevasseurrevdHiderKennellyArnettHarnage GossBonadeoBrickleyIngenitoKeiterKnollerMcGeorgeGuitierrez Rptr W]ePelullooutweigh[edW]hereRangelDottsKeirseySteyerGallardo(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularô\  `‹&Times New Roman3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)*88 ÿÿ(_15Ó  ÓÓ,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó,"¸ ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ ,ÓÓ  Ó #Ñ#€<2ÿÿd#Ñ*AA ÿÿ(_17Ó  ÓÓ5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó5+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ 5ÓÓ  Ó*GG ÿÿ(_16Ó ¨ý ÓÓ ° ÓÓ/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó/%` ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ /ÓÓ ¨ý ÓÓ ° Ó*55 ÿÿ(_14Ó ` ÓÓ) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó) hÀpÈ xÐ )ÓÓ ` Ó*22 ÿÿ(_13Ó ¸ ÓÓ&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó&hhÀpÈ xÐ &ÓÓ ¸ Ó*// ÿÿ(_12Ó  ÓÓ#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó#ÀÀpÈ xÐ #ÓÓ  Ó*,, ÿÿ(_11Ó h ÓÓ pÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€Ó pÈ xÐ ÓÓ h Ó úÝ ƒRkv$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô XòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€do€not€entirely€understand€this€argument,€but€assume€that,€while€the€defendant€is€suggesting€that,€at€theÐ ° Ðconclusion€of€the€trial,€the€court€might€advise€the€jury€that€he€previously€had€been€convicted€of€the€burglary€whichÐ tÄ Ðwas€the€predicate€offense€for€the€felony€murder,€he€was€not€waiving€his€right€to€object€to€this€instruction.*)) ÿÿ(_10Ó À ÓÓppÈ xÐ ÓÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€ÓppÈ xÐ ÓÓ À Ó ÿÿ35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.ÿÿSDU_4ÿÿStarPageÿÿciteas((Cite as: 2001 WL 775603, *2 (Tenn.Crim.App.))ÿÿSDU_5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(.G2kv$¤¤Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô XòXXÔ dÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  ÓÓÓÓÓÑ€ëÑà@ttìàÔ‡ XþhXXXÔÔ‡ îbîX XþhÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#† XþhXî îb¯#ÔÔ‡ ¼ ›»X XþhԈРÖ& ÐÓ  Óà @ àà @` àMay€18,€2004€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ#† XþhX» ¼ ›R#ÔÌò òÔ‡ îbîX XþhÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€DAVID€SCARBROUGHÔ#† XþhXî îbû#Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌÓ[ÓÓÓà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ  Z Ðà@@øøìàNo.€62279B€€€€€€Ray€L.€Jenkins,€JudgeÐ ö F ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€U) °°` d€÷E<¹` AßÐ º  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2003„02850„CCA„R9„CD€„€Filed€October€11,€Ô_Ô2004Ô_ÔÐ µ  ÐÌßA€U) °°` dE<Œ` AßÐ Ý  Ðó óÓ˜ÓÌÓ  ÓÔ#†XþhXX Xþh#ÔÓÓThe€defendant,€David€Scarbrough,€was€convicted€of€two€counts€of€first€degree€felony€murder,€twoÐ tÄ Ðcounts€of€theft,€and€aggravated€burglary€and€sentenced€to€a€term€of€life€imprisonment€with€theÐ `° Ðpossibility€of€parole€for€each€of€the€murders,€six€years€for€the€aggravated€burglary,€and€elevenÐ Lœ Ðmonths,€twenty„nine€days€for€each€of€the€thefts,€with€the€sentences€to€be€served€consecutively.€€OnÐ 8ˆ Ðdirect€appeal,€this€court€affirmed€the€aggravated€burglary€and€theft€convictions€but€reversed€theÐ $t Ðfelony€murder€convictions€because€the€trial€court€had€not€instructed€the€jury€as€to€facilitation€ofÐ ` Ðfelony€murder.€€òòSeeóóòò€òòóóState€v.€David€Leon€Scarbroughóó,€No.€E1998„00931„CCA„R3„CD,€2001€WLÐ üL Ð775603€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€July€11,€2001),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó€(Tenn.€Jan.€7,€2002)òòóó.€òòóó€On€remandÐ è8 Ðand€before€the€start€of€the€second€trial,€the€trial€court,€applying€the€doctrine€of€the€law€of€the€case,Ð Ô$ Ðgranted€the€Stateððs€motion€to€prevent€the€defendant€from€contesting€his€conviction€for€aggravatedÐ À Ðburglary;€and€the€defendant€was€granted€permission€to€file€this€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€RuleÐ ¬ü Ð9,€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.,€asserting€that€the€trial€courtððs€order€impinged€on€his€rights€to€a€jury€trial€and€toÐ ˜è Ðpresent€evidence€in€his€defense.€€Following€our€review,€we€reverse€the€order€of€the€trial€court.Ô‡ XþhXXXþhÔÐ „Ô ÐÓ£ÓÓÒÓò òÓÓÌTenn.€R.€App.€P.€9€Interlocutory€Appeal;€Judgment€of€the€Criminal€Court€Reversed€andÐ \ ¬ ÐRemandedó óÐ H!˜  ÐòòÓ  ÓAlan€E.€Glenn,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòGary€R.€Wade,€P.J.,óó€and€òòJoe€G.Ð 4"„! ÐRiley,€J.óó,€joined.Ð  #p" ÐÌLeslie€M.€Jeffress,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€David€Scarbrough.Ð ø$H $ ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Brent€C.€Cherry,€Assistant€Attorney€General;Ð Ð& "& ÐRandall€E.€Nichols,€District€Attorney€General;€and€William€H.€Crabtree,€Assistant€District€AttorneyÐ ¼' #' ÐGeneral,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.€Ð ¨(ø#( ÐÓ ÓÓx ÓÌÐ  l+¼&+ ÐÑëÑâ âÑ8€þhXdìdÈ8Ñâ âÑ  ÑÔ_Ôà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÐ ° ÐòòóóÓ  ÓÔ#†XþhXX Xþh #Ôò òòòÓ  ÓFACTSóóó óÐ ˆØ ÐÓˆÓÓÓà  àIn€the€direct€appeal,€this€court€set€out€the€facts€which€were€the€basis€for€the€defendantððsÐ `° Ðconvictions:Ô‡ô XòXXþhÔÔ‡ ô Xòòô XÔÐ L œ ÐÓ?+° °` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ °œX?ÓÌà8  àÔ#† XþhXò ô Xa#ÔÔ#†XþhXX Xþh€#ÔÔ‡ XþhXXXþhÔà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àShortly€before€5:00€p.m.€on€February€4,€1995,€LieutenantÐ ü L ÐDarrell€Johnson€of€the€Knox€County€Sheriff's€Department€wasÐ è 8 Ðdirected€to€investigate€a€double€homicide€at€the€residence€of€theÐ Ô $  Ðvictims,€Lester€and€Carol€Dotts,€on€Russfield€Drive€in€Knox€County.Ð À   ÐWhen€he€arrived€at€the€scene,€Lt.€Johnson€observed€multiple€gunshotÐ ¬ü  Ðwounds€to€each€of€the€bodies.€The€screen€door€to€the€porch€had€beenÐ ˜è  Ðcut,€a€window€pane€had€been€broken,€and€the€interior€of€the€house€hadÐ „Ô  Ðbeen€ransacked.€There€were€six€.9€mm€rounds€recovered€in€theÐ pÀ  Ðbedroom€where€Mr.€Dotts's€body€was€discovered.€Lt.€JohnsonÐ \¬  Ðtestified€that€one€.9€mm€round€was€recovered€from€Mr.€Dotts's€body,Ð H˜ Ðtwo€from€the€bed€rail€and€mattress,€and€two€from€underneath€theÐ 4„ Ðcarpet.€There€was€a€.9€mm€round€at€the€foot€of€the€bed€and€Ô% ‡I ÔÔ#†XþhXX XþhF#ÔÔ%†IaÔÔ‡ XþhXXXþhÔa€.38Ð  p Ðcaliber€bullet€on€the€floor.€In€the€den€area€where€Mrs.€Dotts's€bodyÐ  \ Ðwas€found,€police€recovered€a€.9€mm€round€from€the€hallway,€oneÐ øH Ðfrom€the€bathroom€scales,€and€one€from€the€hall€closet.€The€last€.9Ð ä4 Ðmm€round,€which€traveled€the€length€of€the€house,€was€found€in€theÐ Ð  Ðexercise/sewing€room.€Police€also€recovered€nine€shell€casings€fromÐ ¼  Ða€.9€mm€semiautomatic€weapon.€Lt.€Johnson€testified€that€six€shellÐ ¨ø Ðcasings€were€found€near€Mrs.€Dotts's€body€and€three€were€found€nearÐ ”ä ÐMr.€Dotts's€body.€During€the€course€of€the€investigation,€JohnsonÐ €Ð Ðcame€into€contact€with€13€year€old€Harley€Watts.€Watts,€who€hadÐ l¼ Ðbeen€arrested€for€stealing€cars,€gave€a€statement€to€police€whichÐ X¨ Ðimplicated€the€defendant€and€Thomas€Gagne€in€the€murders.ÐD”` x` x ÐÔ% ‡J ÔÔ#†XþhXX Xþh¢#ÔÔ%†J–ÔÔ% ‡K ÔÔ%†K×ÔÔ‡ XþhXXXþhÔÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àAt€trial,€Watts,€who€by€then€had€pled€guilty€in€juvenile€courtÐ !l Ðto€burglary€and€two€counts€of€murder,€testified€that€he€was€"ridingÐ "X  Ðaround"€Knoxville€late€at€night€with€Gagne€and€the€defendant,Ð ô"D! Ðlooking€to€break€into€parked€automobiles.€He€recalled€that€GagneÐ à#0" Ðdrove€to€a€"rich"€neighborhood,€stated€his€intention€to€burglarize€oneÐ Ì$ # Ðof€the€homes,€and€parked€his€vehicle€at€a€dead„end€street.€He€statedÐ ¸%!$ Ðthat€Gagne€and€the€defendant€left€the€vehicle€and€he€remained€inside.Ð ¤&ô!% ÐWhen€they€hurriedly€returned€to€the€car€about€30€minutes€later,€theÐ 'à"& Ðdefendant€was€carrying€a€.9€mm€semiautomatic€pistol,€which€heÐ |(Ì#' Ðhanded€to€Gagne€as€they€drove€away.€Gagne€then€remarked,Ð h)¸$( Ð"somebody€came€out€on€[me]€and€[I]€started€shooting."€According€toÐ T*¤%) ÐWatts,€Gagne€later€threw€something€out€the€window.Ð @+&* ÐÔ% ‡L ÔÔ#†XþhXX Xþhõ#ÔÔ%†L7ÔÐ,,|'+` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àDr.€Sandra€K.€Elkins,€Knox€County€Medical€Examiner,Ð ° Ðtestified€that€Mr.€Dotts€sustained€five€gunshot€wounds€and€Mrs.€DottsÐ œì Ðwas€shot€at€least€seven€times.€It€was€her€opinion€that€both€were€aliveÐ ˆØ Ðwhen€their€wounds€were€inflicted.Ð tÄ ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àRobert€Edward€Brykalski,€the€victims'€son„in„law,€testifiedÐ L œ Ðthat€when€he€inventoried€the€victims'€house€after€the€crime,€heÐ 8 ˆ Ðdiscovered€that€several€items€were€missing.€Mr.€Dotts's€billfold,€Mrs.Ð $ t ÐDotts's€purse,€and€some€200€to€300€blank€checks€could€not€be€found.Ð  ` ÐPolice€later€recovered€the€billfold€and€purse€a€short€distance€from€theÐ ü L  Ðvictims'€house.€Brykalski€also€testified€that€the€victims€were€planningÐ è 8  Ðto€go€out€to€a€restaurant€on€the€night€before€their€bodies€wereÐ Ô$  Ðdiscovered,€but€had€not€left€the€house€by€6:30€p.m.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àJohn€Raymond€Jacobs,€a€rebuttal€witness€for€the€state,Ð ˜è  Ðtestified€that€he€worked€with€the€defendant€at€U„Haul€truck€rentals€inÐ „Ô  Ðthe€summer€of€1996.€He€claimed€that€sometime€after€the€murders,€heÐ pÀ Ðand€some€other€employees€were€telling€"war€stories"€when€theÐ \¬ Ðdefendant€admitted€to€killing€a€couple€in€West€Knoxville.Ð H˜ ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àSome€five€days€after€the€crime,€police€arrested€the€defendantÐ  p Ðand€charged€him€with€possession€of€a€.9€mm€gun.€€While€the€weapon,Ð  \ Ðwhich€was€tested€by€the€FBI,€was€not€identified€as€the€gun€used€in€theÐ øH Ðhomicides,€the€defendant,€after€consulting€with€his€attorney€at€thatÐ ä4 Ðtime,€Jeff€Hagood,€provided€the€police€with€an€incriminatingÐ Ð  Ðstatement.м ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àIn€his€initial€statement€to€law€enforcement€officials,€theÐ ”ä Ðdefendant€acknowledged€that€he€was€with€Gagne€and€Watts€on€theÐ €Ð Ðnight€of€the€murders.€He€stated€that€Gagne€drove€to€the€victims'Ð l¼ Ðneighborhood€in€order€to€"pick€up€some€stuff"€for€his€father.€TheÐ X ¨ Ðdefendant,€who€said€he€was€smoking€marijuana€with€Gagne€at€theÐ D!” Ðtime,€speculated€that€they€were€looking€for€drugs.€He€claimed€thatÐ 0"€  ÐGagne,€who€had€a€nickel„plated€.9€mm€gun€between€the€seats,€stoppedÐ #l! Ðthe€car€near€the€victims'€residence€and€turned€off€the€lights.€TheÐ $X" Ðdefendant€stated€that€he€and€Watts€remained€in€the€vehicle€whileÐ ô$D # ÐGagne€stepped€outside€and€looked€around€for€about€five€minutes.€HeÐ à%0!$ Ðdescribed€Watts€as€the€"front€watchman"€who€stayed€in€the€car.€WhileÐ Ì&"% Ðacknowledging€that€he€and€Gagne€then€walked€to€the€rear€of€theÐ ¸'#& Ðvictims'€house,€the€defendant€maintained€that€he€stayed€outside€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðresidence€in€order€to€"watch"€the€backyard.€He€contended€that€he€didÐ )à$( Ðnot€see€how€Gagne€gained€entry.€The€defendant€recalled€that€some€15Ð |*Ì%) Ðminutes€later,€he€heard€a€gunshot€and€"took€off€running"€to€the€car.Ð h+¸&* ÐHe€suspected€that€Gagne€had€been€shot.€The€defendant€told€policeÐ ° Ðthat€he€heard€more€gunshots€as€he€ran€toward€the€car,€where€he€sat€forÐ œì Ð"a€minute."€Gagne,€he€claimed,€was€right€behind.€They€drove€awayÐ ˆØ Ðwithout€turning€on€the€lights.€The€defendant€recalled€that€GagneÐ tÄ Ðremarked,€"I€had€to€do€it."€According€to€the€defendant,€Gagne€droveÐ `° ÐWatts€to€his€residence,€removed€the€license€tag€from€the€car,€and,Ð L œ Ðpresumably,€added€another€in€its€place.€In€a€second€statement,€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðdefendant€admitted€that€he€was€in€possession€of€the€.9€mm€gun€whenÐ $ t Ðhe€left€the€vehicle.€He€claimed,€however,€that€he€gave€the€weapon€toÐ  ` ÐGagne€before€they€reached€the€victims'€house.Ðü L ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àAt€trial,€the€defendant€denied€any€participation€in€the€crime.Ð Ô$  ÐHe€testified€that€he€was€pressured€to€give€his€statements€to€policeÐ À  Ðbecause€attorney€Hagood€had€informed€him€that€he€would€not€beÐ ¬ü  Ðcharged€with€murder€if€he€cooperated.€He€explained€that€he€hadÐ ˜è  Ðlearned€the€details€he€reported€to€the€police€from€Watts's€statementÐ „Ô  Ðand€from€newspaper€articles.€He€testified€that€on€the€night€of€theÐ pÀ Ðmurders,€he€and€Kasey€Keirsey,€his€girlfriend,€were€visiting€hisÐ \¬ Ðcousin,€Michelle€Bizak,€and€her€husband€Phillip.€The€defendantÐ H˜ Ðcontended€that€he€arrived€at€the€Bizaks'€house€at€about€8:00€p.m.€andÐ 4„ Ðstayed€until€about€10:30€p.m.€He€claimed€that€he€met€Watts€for€theÐ  p Ðfirst€time€four€days€later.Ð  \ ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àMs.€Keirsey€testified€that€she€and€the€defendant€had€visitedÐ ä4 Ðthe€Bizaks,€but€she€could€not€remember€the€date.€On€cross„Ð Ð  Ðexamination,€however,€she€acknowledged€that€she€could€not€haveÐ ¼  Ðbeen€with€the€defendant€on€the€night€of€the€murders€because€aÐ ¨ø Ðcalendar€that€she€kept€at€that€time€indicated€that€she€had€gone€to€aÐ ”ä Ðschool€basketball€game€with€two€friends.€€Ð€Ð` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àChristy€Ledford,€one€of€Ms.€Keirsey's€friends,€confirmed€thatÐ X ¨ Ðthe€two€had€attended€a€school€basketball€game€together€on€the€nightÐ D!” Ðof€the€murder,€February€3,€1995.€She€testified€that€she€rememberedÐ 0"€  Ðthe€date€because€it€was€"Flannel€Night"€during€the€school's€Spirit€Week.Ð #l! ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àBoth€Phillip€and€Michelle€Bizak€testified€that€theyÐ ô$D # Ðremembered€Ms.€Keirsey€and€the€defendant€visiting€their€home.Ð à%0!$ ÐNeither€could€recall€if€the€visit€occurred€on€February€3,€a€FridayÐ Ì&"% Ðnight,€or€February€4,€a€Saturday€night.Ð ¸'#& ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€jury€returned€verdicts€of€guilt.€Afterward,€the€trial€courtÐ )à$( Ðdenied€a€motion€for€new€trial€and€the€defendant€filed€a€notice€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ðappeal.€Eleven€months€later,€the€defendant€petitioned€the€trial€courtÐ h+¸&* Ðfor€a€writ€of€error€coram€nobis€based€upon€the€statement€of€RobertÐ ° ÐManning,€a€Tennessee€inmate,€who€confessed€to€the€burglary€andÐ œì Ðmurder€of€the€victims.€In€his€statement,€Manning€also€implicated€EricÐ ˆØ ÐSteyer,€a€Michigan€inmate.€At€the€hearing,€however,€ManningÐ tÄ Ðdeclined€to€answer€any€questions€concerning€the€crimes.€Steyer,€whoÐ `° Ðwas€also€called€as€a€witness,€testified€that€he€had€never€committed€aÐ L œ Ðcriminal€offense€with€Manning.€Shannon€Langdon,€Steyer's€wife,Ð 8 ˆ Ðtestified€that€Steyer€had€informed€her€that€he€and€Manning€didÐ $ t Ðburglarize€and€murder€the€victims.€Steyer€denied€having€made€theÐ  ` Ðstatement.€The€trial€court€denied€the€writ€of€error€coram€nobis€and€theÐ ü L  Ðdefendant€appealed.€à h àÐè 8 ` x` x ÐòòÌId.óó€at€**1„3€(footnote€omitted)òòóó.à h àÐ À  ÐÌà  àOn€direct€appeal,€this€court€upheld€the€aggravated€burglary€and€theft€convictions€but€reversedÐ ˜è  Ðthe€felony€murder€convictions€because€the€jury€had€not€been€instructed€as€to€the€lesser„includedÐ „Ô  Ðoffense€of€facilitation€of€first€degree€murder.€€òòId.óó€at€*15.€€In€addition,€we€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÐ pÀ Ðdismissal€of€the€coram€nobis€claim.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àBefore€the€trial€court€and€on€appeal,€the€State€argued€that€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppelÐ 4„ Ðprevented€the€defendant€from€contesting€his€commission€of€the€burglary€and€theft€offenses€and€that,Ð  p Ðbecause€these€convictions€had€become€final,€the€law€of€the€case€doctrine€prevented€his€ð ðrevisitingððÐ  \ Ðthem.€€The€defendant€disputed€both€of€these€contentions.Ð øH ÐÌà  àIn€its€written€order,€following€the€hearing€on€the€Stateððs€motion,€the€trial€court,€while€notÐ Ð  Ðexplicitly€rejecting€the€Stateððs€collateral€estoppel€claims,€grounded€its€ruling€on€the€law€of€the€caseÐ ¼  Ðin€concluding€that€the€defendant€could€not€contest€at€the€retrial€his€burglary€conviction,€from€the€firstÐ ¨ø Ðtrial,€which€had€been€affirmed€on€appeal:Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àà8 ` àà ¸ àDefendant€appealed€a€conviction€for€double€felony€murderÐ l¼ Ðtogether€with€a€conviction€for€the€underlying€felony,€burglary.€€TheÐ X ¨ Ðmurder€convictions€were€reversed€and€remanded€for€retrial€for€theÐ D!” ÐTrial€Courtððs€omission€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€lesser€includedÐ 0"€  Ðoffense€of€facilitation€to€commit€felony€murder.€€The€conviction€ofÐ #l! Ðthe€underlying€felony,€burglary,€was€affirmed€and€has€become€final.Ð$X"` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€question€presented:€€the€underlying€felony,€having€beenÐ à%0!$ Ðproven,€affirmed€and€became€final,€is€the€State€required€to€offer€proofÐ Ì&"% Ðbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€of€the€defendantððs€guilt€of€that€felony€inÐ ¸'#& Ða€retrial€of€the€felony€murder?€€In€the€opinion€of€this€Court€the€answerÐ ¤(ô#' Ðis€ð ðNoðð.€.€.€.Ð)à$(` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àòòLaw€of€Case:óóÐh+¸&*` x` x Їà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àTennessee€law€is€contra€to€defendantððs€position.€€See€òòState€v.Ð ° ÐCarteróó,€Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€February€8,€2002,€citing€òòState€v.€Jeffersonóó,Ð œì Ð31€S.W.3d€558,€Tenn.,€2000.ЈØ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€Federal€system€has€considered€this€question€only€on€twoÐ `° Ðoccasions,€on€the€intermediate€appellate€level.ÐL œ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€Third€Circuit€and€the€Ninth€Circuit€have€reached€oppositeÐ $ t Ðresults€while€examining€the€proposition€under€an€estoppel€theory€and,Ð  ` Ðof€course,€until€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€unravels€this,€the€FederalÐ ü L  Ðstance€remains€in€limbo.€€These€decisions€are€persuasive€only€and€notÐ è 8  Ðcontrolling.€€See€òòPena„Cabanillas€v.€United€States€of€Americaóó,€394Ð Ô$  ÐF.2d€785€and€òòUnited€States€of€America€v.€Colacurcioóó,€514€F.2d€1.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€Court€is€satisfied€to€rest€this€decision€upon€TennesseeððsÐ ˜è  Ðsettled€rulings€of€ð ðLaw€of€the€Caseðð€as€above.Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àTherefore,€the€State€may€rely€upon€the€previous€conviction€ofÐ \¬ Ðburglary€in€defendantððs€retrial.ÐH˜` x` x Ðà  àÌà  àThis€order€grants€the€Stateððs€motion€solely€upon€application€of€the€law€of€the€case.€€However,Ð  p Ðsince€both€parties€argue€on€appeal€as€to€whether€either€collateral€estoppel€or€law€of€the€case€preventsÐ  \ Ðthe€defendant€from€contesting€at€his€second€trial€the€burglary€conviction€from€his€first,€we€willÐ øH Ðreview€both€of€these€doctrines.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà@òò&ìàò òòòANALYSISóóˆÐ ¼  Ðó óÌà  àThe€differences€in€the€two€doctrines€were€explained€in€Brett€T.€Parks,€òòMcDonald's€Corp.€v.Ð ”ä ÐHawkins€and€the€"Law€of€the€Case"€Doctrine€in€Arkansasóó,€50€Ark.€L.€Rev.€127€(1997):€Ð €Ð ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€law€of€the€case€and€collateral€estoppel€are€different€in€thatÐ X ¨ Ðcollateral€estoppel€prevents€the€relitigation€of€issues€in€successiveÐ D!” Ðsuits€between€the€same€parties;€the€law€of€the€case€preventsÐ 0"€  Ðrelitigation€of€the€same€issues€within€successive€stages€of€the€sameÐ #l! Ðsuit.€€Res€judicata€differs€from€the€law€of€the€case€in€that€it€settles€theÐ $X" Ðrights€of€the€parties€once€the€judgment€is€final.€€The€law€of€the€caseÐ ô$D # Ðdoes€not€settle€rights;€it€only€settles€the€law€to€be€applied€inÐ à%0!$ Ðdetermining€the€rights€of€the€parties.€Also,€many€courts€view€resÐ Ì&"% Ðjudicata€as€a€rule€of€law,€whereas€the€law€of€the€case€is€merely€aÐ ¸'#& Ðpractice€to€guide€the€court.€Ð¤(ô#'` x` x ÐÌòòId.óó€at€131€(footnotes€omitted).Ð |*Ì%) Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àÐh+¸&*` x` x Ðà  àHowever,€it€has€been€said€that,€as€to€commentators€who€explain€such€distinctions,€includingÐ ° Ðthe€authors€of€Wright,€Miller,€and€Cooper€in€18B€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€4478€(2002),€theyÐ œì Ðð ðappear€to€take€refuge€in€obscurity€in€attempting€to€describe€practicable€application€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðdistinction.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Presleróó,€731€A.2d€699,€704€n.3€(R.I.€1999).Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àWe€first€will€consider€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court€as€to€its€application€of€the€law€of€the€case.Ð L œ ÐÌÓ  Óà @ àò òI.€€Law€of€the€Caseà @ àà @h àà @À àà @ àà @p àà @È àà @  àà @x àà @Ð àó óÐ $ t ÐÓUVÓà  àÌà  àThe€Stateððs€motion,€resulting€in€the€order€which€is€the€basis€for€this€appeal,€asked€that€theÐ ü L  Ðdefendant€ð ðbe€prohibited€from€denying€or€collaterally€challenging€in€any€way€his€convictions€forÐ è 8  ÐAggravated€Burglary€as€charged€in€[the]€Fifth€Count€of€the€indictment,€or€Theft€of€Property€asÐ Ô$  Ðcharged€in€the€Sixth€Count€of€the€indictment€or€Theft€of€Property€as€charged€in€the€Seventh€CountÐ À  Ðof€the€indictment,ðð€leaving,€as€the€issue€in€the€second€trial,€ð ðwhether€[the€victims]€were€killed€duringÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€perpetration€of€the€aggravated€burglary€as€charged€in€the€Fifth€Count.ðð€€Ultimately,€the€courtÐ ˜è  Ðgranted€this€motion,€ordering,€as€we€have€set€out,€that€ð ðthe€State€may€rely€upon€the€previousÐ „Ô  Ðconviction€of€burglary€in€defendantððs€retrial.ðð€€However,€the€ruling€did€not€specify€whether€theÐ pÀ ÐStateððs€relying€on€this€conviction€meant€that€the€defendant€would€not€be€permitted€to€ð ðintroduc[e]Ð \¬ Ðevidence€before€the€jury€that€he€was€not€present€during€the€burglary.ðð€€As€to€the€ruling,€the€defendantÐ H˜ Ðsuggests€on€appeal€that€it€ð ðmight€allow€the€trial€court€to€instruct€the€jury€as€to€the€existence€of€theÐ 4„ Ðburglary€judgment€at€the€end€of€the€trial.ðð׃×Ý ƒO#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  p ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€argues€on€appeal€that€this€ruling€makes€ð ða€decision€on€a€matter€of€law€whichÐ øH Ðtriggers€the€ððlaw€of€the€caseðð€doctrine€and€then€only€if€the€facts€at€the€second€trial€are€substantiallyÐ ä4 Ðthe€same€as€those€offered€in€the€first€trial.ðð€€Since,€according€to€the€defendant,€he€intends€to€ð ðput€onÐ Ð  Ðnew€evidence€[at€the€second€trial]€suggesting€that€a€person€other€than€[him]€committed€the€crimes,ððÐ ¼  Ðthe€trial€court,€according€to€this€argument,€cannot€apply€the€law€of€the€case€to€prevent€his€contestingÐ ¨ø Ðwhether€he€was€present€when€the€crimes€were€committed,€but€can€determine€whether€it€should€beÐ ”ä Ðapplied€ð ðonly€after€the€trial.ðð€€The€State€responds€that,€applying€either€the€doctrine€of€collateralÐ €Ð Ðestoppel€or€the€law€of€the€case,€the€defendant€ð ðshould€not€be€permitted€a€renewed€opportunity€toÐ l¼ Ðavoid€responsibility€forðð€the€aggravated€burglary.€€We€will€review€these€arguments.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àò òó óThe€doctrine€of€the€law€of€the€case€permits€the€foreclosing€of€argument€on€an€issue€that€wasÐ 0"€  Ðpreviously€decided€in€an€appeal€of€the€same€case.€€òòSeeóó€3€Wayne€R.€LaFave€et€al.,€òòCriminal€ProcedureóóÐ #l! Ððð€10.6(c)€(2d€ed.€1999);€5€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòAppellate€Reviewóó€ðð€605€(1995).€€Our€supreme€court€explainedÐ $X" Ðin€detail€its€interpretation€of€this€doctrine€in€òòMemphis€Publððg.€Co.€v.€Tennessee€PetroleumÐ ô$D # ÐUnderground€Storage€Tank€Bd.óó,€975€S.W.2d€303€(Tenn.€1998):Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€phrase€"law€of€the€case"€refers€to€a€legal€doctrine€whichÐ ¸'#& Ðgenerally€prohibits€reconsideration€of€issues€that€have€already€beenÐ ° Ðdecided€in€a€prior€appeal€of€the€same€case.€€In€other€words,€under€theÐ œì Ðlaw€of€the€case€doctrine,€an€appellate€court's€decision€on€an€issue€ofÐ ˆØ Ðlaw€is€binding€in€later€trials€and€appeals€of€the€same€case€if€the€factsÐ tÄ Ðon€the€second€trial€or€appeal€are€substantially€the€same€as€the€facts€inÐ `° Ðthe€first€trial€or€appeal.€€The€doctrine€applies€to€issues€that€wereÐ L œ Ðactually€before€the€appellate€court€in€the€first€appeal€and€to€issues€thatÐ 8 ˆ Ðwere€necessarily€decided€by€implication.€€The€doctrine€does€not€applyÐ $ t Ðto€dicta.Ð `` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€law€of€the€case€doctrine€is€not€a€constitutional€mandateÐ è 8  Ðnor€a€limitation€on€the€power€of€a€court.€€Rather,€it€is€a€longstandingÐ Ô$  Ðdiscretionary€rule€of€judicial€practice€which€is€based€on€the€commonÐ À  Ðsense€recognition€that€issues€previously€litigated€and€decided€by€aÐ ¬ü  Ðcourt€of€competent€jurisdiction€ordinarily€need€not€be€revisited.€€ThisÐ ˜è  Ðrule€promotes€the€finality€and€efficiency€of€the€judicial€process,Ð „Ô  Ðavoids€indefinite€relitigation€of€the€same€issue,€fosters€consistentÐ pÀ Ðresults€in€the€same€litigation,€and€assures€the€obedience€of€lowerÐ \¬ Ðcourts€to€the€decisions€of€appellate€courts.ÐH˜` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àTherefore,€when€an€initial€appeal€results€in€a€remand€to€theÐ  p Ðtrial€court,€the€decision€of€the€appellate€court€establishes€the€law€ofÐ  \ Ðthe€case€which€generally€must€be€followed€upon€remand€by€the€trialÐ øH Ðcourt,€and€by€an€appellate€court€if€a€second€appeal€is€taken€from€theÐ ä4 Ðjudgment€of€the€trial€court€entered€after€remand.€€There€are€limitedÐ Ð  Ðcircumstances€which€may€justify€reconsideration€of€an€issue€whichÐ ¼  Ðwas€issue€decided€in€a€prior€appeal:€€(1)€the€evidence€offered€at€a€trialÐ ¨ø Ðor€hearing€after€remand€was€substantially€different€from€the€evidenceÐ ”ä Ðin€the€initial€proceeding;€(2)€the€prior€ruling€was€clearly€erroneousÐ €Ð Ðand€would€result€in€a€manifest€injustice€if€allowed€to€stand;€or€(3)€theÐ l¼ Ðprior€decision€is€contrary€to€a€change€in€the€controlling€law€which€hasÐ X ¨ Ðoccurred€between€the€first€and€second€appeal.òòóóÐD!”` x` x ÐòòÌId.óó€at€306€(citations€omitted).Ð #l! Ðà  àÌà  àòòóóThe€trial€courtððs€order€relies€on€two€decisions€of€our€supreme€court.€€The€law€of€the€caseÐ ô$D # Ðdoctrine€was€applied€in€òòState€v.€Jeffersonóó,€31€S.W.3d€558€(Tenn.€2000),€after€this€court€had€affirmedÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€defendantððs€conviction€for€premeditated€murder€but€remanded€the€matter€for€a€retrial€as€toÐ Ì&"% Ðpunishment.€€After€the€trial€court€had€denied€the€defendantððs€motion€that€he€be€retried€as€to€guilt€orÐ ¸'#& Ðinnocence€as€well,€the€jury€at€the€retrial€sentenced€him€to€life€imprisonment.€On€appeal,€this€courtÐ ¤(ô#' Ðconcluded€that€the€trial€court€had€been€bound€by€our€previous€opinion€affirming€the€defendantððsÐ )à$( Ðconviction€and€remanding€the€case€solely€for€resentencing.€€Our€supreme€court,€in€its€review€of€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðresult€at€retrial,€determined€that€the€only€exception€which€might€have€justified€not€applying€the€ð ðlawÐ h+¸&* Ðof€the€caseðð€from€the€first€appeal€was€if€ð ðððthe€prior€ruling€was€clearly€erroneous€and€would€result€inÐ ° Ða€manifest€injustice€if€allowed€to€stand.ðððð€€òòId.óó€at€561€(quoting€òòMemphis€Publððg€Co.óó,€975€S.W.2d€atÐ œì Ð306).€€The€court€further€determined€that€the€trial€court€had€erred€in€the€first€trial€by€instructing€theÐ ˆØ Ðjury€under€a€statute€previously€found€to€be€unconstitutional,€which€should€have€caused€this€court€toÐ tÄ Ðremand€for€a€new€trial€as€to€both€guilt€and€punishment.€€òòId.óó€€However,€since€two€previous€juries€hadÐ `° Ðfound€the€defendant€guilty€of€first€degree€murder,€based€on€ð ðoverwhelming€proof,ðð€the€courtÐ L œ Ðconcluded€that€no€rational€jury€would€convict€him€of€second€degree€murder,€as€he€argued€might€haveÐ 8 ˆ Ðoccurred.€€òòId.óó€at€562.€€Accordingly,€since€ð ðmanifest€injusticeðð€would€not€result€from€affirming€theÐ $ t Ðopinion€of€this€court€allowing€a€retrial€only€as€to€punishment,€application€of€the€finding€of€guilt€atÐ  ` Ðthe€first€trial,€as€the€law€of€the€case,€was€appropriate€at€the€retrial.€€òòId.óó€€€€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àIn€òòState€v.€Carteróó,€114€S.W.3d€895€(Tenn.€2003),€this€court€had€held€in€the€defendantððs€firstÐ Ô$  Ðappeal€that€the€trial€court€had€not€abused€its€discretion€in€admitting€photographs€of€the€bodies€of€theÐ À  Ðtwo€victims.€€Although€their€admissibility€subsequently€was€raised€as€an€issue€before€our€supremeÐ ¬ü  Ðcourt,€it€did€not€address€that€claim€but€reversed€and€remanded€for€resentencing€because€the€jury€hadÐ ˜è  Ðbeen€supplied€with€incorrect€verdict€forms.€€Following€a€resentencing€hearing,€the€defendant€againÐ „Ô  Ðwas€sentenced€to€death.€€On€appeal,€this€court€held€that,€under€the€law€of€the€case,€the€second€appealÐ pÀ Ðwas€governed€by€our€ruling€in€the€first,€which€had€upheld€the€trial€court's€admission€of€the€twoÐ \¬ Ðphotographs.€€Additionally,€we€concluded€that€a€third€photograph,€also€showing€the€body€of€one€ofÐ H˜ Ðthe€victims,€was€admissible€as€evidence€of€the€circumstances€of€the€crimes.€€The€defendant€argued,Ð 4„ Ðòòinter€aliaóó,€to€our€supreme€court€that€an€exception€to€the€law€of€the€case€doctrine€applied€because€thisÐ  p Ðcourt€had€erroneously€concluded€in€his€first€appeal€that€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€admitting€theÐ  \ Ðfirst€two€photographs.€€However,€the€supreme€court€rejected€the€claim€that€this€court€had€incorrectlyÐ øH Ðapplied€the€law€of€the€case:Ð ä4 ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àIn€the€first€appeal,€this€Court€neither€addressed€nor€decided€byÐ ¼  Ðimplication€the€issue€of€the€admission€of€the€photographs.€€Therefore,Ð ¨ø Ðthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€properly€applied€the€law€of€the€caseÐ ”ä Ðdoctrine€in€upholding€the€trial€court's€admission€of€the€first€twoÐ €Ð Ðphotographs,€even€though€this€Court€reversed€and€remanded€for€aÐ l¼ Ðnew€sentencing€hearing€on€another€ground.€€òòCf.óó€òòLadd€v.€Honda€MotorÐ X ¨ ÐCo.óó,€939€S.W.2d€83,€91€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996)€(holding€that€law€ofÐ D!” Ðthe€case€doctrine€does€not€apply€to€intermediate€appellate€courtÐ 0"€  Ðopinions€that€have€been€reversed€and€vacated).€€As€explained€below,Ð #l! ÐCarter€has€failed€to€show€that€the€prior€ruling€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÐ $X" ÐAppeals€was€clearly€erroneous.€€Therefore,€the€Court€of€CriminalÐ ô$D # ÐAppeals€did€not€err€in€applying€the€law€of€the€case€doctrine€to€theÐ à%0!$ Ðissue€of€the€admissibility€of€the€first€two€photographs.€€Because€thisÐ Ì&"% ÐCourt€previously€did€not€consider€the€admissibility€of€the€photographsÐ ¸'#& Ðand€did€not€decide€the€issue€by€implication,€the€law€of€the€caseÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdoctrine€does€not€control€our€review€of€the€issue.Ð)à$(` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àÐ ` x` x ÐòòId.óó€at€902.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThe€issue€presented€by€the€present€appeal€is€unlike€these€two€cases,€both€of€which€wereÐ ° Ðretrials€of€the€charge€tried€at€the€first€trial.€€However,€in€the€present€appeal,€the€retrial€is€not€of€theÐ œì Ðburglary,€the€conviction€which€was€the€basis€for€the€trial€courtððs€ruling,€but€of€the€felony€murder,€Ð ˆØ Ðand€it€is€at€the€retrial€of€that€charge€at€which€the€defendant€seeks€to€present€evidence€that€he€did€notÐ tÄ Ðcommit€the€burglary,€which€is€the€predicate€felony.€Ð `° ÐÌà  àAs€we€will€explain,€courts€considering€whether€a€criminal€defendant€may€be€collaterallyÐ 8 ˆ Ðestopped€from€presenting€evidence€in€a€retrial€have€concluded€that€such€limitations€areÐ $ t Ðconstitutionally€impermissible,€except€in€limited€circumstances.€€Accordingly,€because€of€theÐ  ` Ðconstitutional€implications€of€the€trial€courtððs€order,€we€must€determine€whether€collateral€estoppelÐ ü L  Ðcould€be€applied€to,€in€the€defendantððs€words,€ð ðprohibit€[him]€from€introducing€evidence€before€theÐ è 8  Ðjury€that€he€was€not€present€during€the€burglary.ððÐ Ô$  Ðò òó óà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àà  àÐ ` x` x ÐÓ  Óò òII.€€Collateral€Estoppeló óÐ ¬ü  ÐÓàˆÓÌà  àCollateral€estoppel,€also€called€ð ðissue€preclusion,ðð€is€a€doctrine€of€judicial€economy€utilizedÐ „Ô  Ðto€prevent€costly€relitigation€of€the€same€issues,€conserve€judicial€resources,€and€encourage€relianceÐ pÀ Ðon€judicial€conclusions.€€òòSeeòòóó€òòóóGibson€v.€Trantóó,€58€S.W.3d€103,€113€(Tenn.€2001);€òòBeaty€v.€McGrawóó,Ð \¬ Ð15€S.W.3d€819,€824€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998)òòóó.€€It€is€explained€that€ð ð[w]hen€an€issue€of€fact€or€law€isÐ H˜ Ðactually€litigated€and€determined€by€a€valid€and€final€judgment,€and€the€determination€is€essentialÐ 4„ Ðto€the€judgment,€the€determination€is€conclusive€in€a€subsequent€action€between€the€parties,€whetherÐ  p Ðon€the€same€or€a€different€claim.ðð€€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Judgmentsóó€ðð€27€(1982).€€It€is€applied€inÐ  \ Ðtwo€situations:€€ð ðoffensiveðð€collateral€estoppel,€where€the€plaintiff€prevents€the€defendant€fromÐ øH Ðrelitigating€a€previously€decided€issue,€and€the€converse,€ð ðdefensiveðð€collateral€estoppel,€where€theÐ ä4 Ðdefendant€prevents€the€plaintiff€from€doing€so.€€At€common€law,€both€the€party€seeking€estoppel€andÐ Ð  Ðthe€estopped€party€had€to€have€been€identical€to€or€in€privity€with€the€parties€to€the€original€actionÐ ¼  Ð(known€as€the€ð ðmutualityðð€requirement),€but€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€recognized€a€growingÐ ¨ø Ðchange€by€discarding€this€rule€in€both€offensive€and€defensive€collateral€estoppel.€€òòParklane€HosieryÐ ”ä ÐCo.,€Inc.€v.€Shoreóó,€439€U.S.€322,€327,€99€S.€Ct.€645,€649,€58€L.€Ed.€2d€552€(1979)€(allowing€non„Ð €Ð Ðmutual€offensive€collateral€estoppel€subject€to€the€judgeððs€discretion).òòóóÐ l¼ ÐÌà  àIn€òòBeatyóó,€15€S.W.3d€at€827,€the€court€of€appeals€permitted€the€use€of€mutual€offensiveÐ D!” Ðcollateral€estoppel,€if€the€party€seeking€to€utilize€it€demonstrates:Ð 0"€  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à1.€that€the€issue€sought€to€be€precluded€is€identical€to€the€issueÐ $X" Ðdecided€in€the€earlier€suit;€Ðô$D #` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à2.€that€the€issue€sought€to€be€precluded€was€actually€litigated€andÐ Ì&"% Ðdecided€on€its€merits€in€the€earlier€suit;и'#&` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à3.€that€the€judgment€in€the€earlier€suit€has€become€final;Ð)à$(` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à4.€that€the€party€against€whom€collateral€estoppel€is€asserted€was€aÐ h+¸&* Ðparty€or€is€in€privity€with€a€party€to€the€earlier€suit;€andа` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à5.€that€the€party€against€whom€collateral€estoppel€is€asserted€had€a€full€ÐˆØ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àand€fair€opportunity€in€the€earlier€suit€to€litigate€the€issue€now€soughtÐ tÄ Ðto€be€precluded.€€€Ð`°` x` x ÐÌòòId.óó€at€824„25€(footnotes€omitted);€òòsee€alsoòòóó€òòóóRestatement€(Second)€of€Judgmentsóó€ðððð€27,€28€(1982).€Ð 8 ˆ ÐòòóóAdditionally,€the€òòBeatyóó€court€endorsed€the€decision€in€òòParklaneóó€that€the€application€of€non„mutualÐ $ t Ðoffensive€collateral€estoppel€was€discretionary€with€the€trial€court:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àIn€exercising€its€discretion,€the€trial€court€may€consider€(1)€whetherÐ è 8  Ðthe€plaintiff€could€have€joined€the€former€suit€but€decided€instead€toÐ Ô$  Ðadopt€a€"wait€and€see"€attitude,€(2)€whether€the€defendant€had€anÐ À  Ðincentive€to€defend€the€former€suit€vigorously,€and€(3)€whether€theÐ ¬ü  Ðjudgment€on€which€the€plaintiff€seeks€to€rely€is€itself€inconsistentÐ ˜è  Ðwith€previous€judgments€against€the€defendant.€€€Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐòòóóÌ15€S.W.3d€at€826€(citing€òòParklaneóó,€439€U.S.€at€330-31,€99€S.€Ct.€at€651-52).€€On€the€issue€ofÐ \¬ Ðoffensive€collateral€estoppel€in€criminal€cases,€no€Tennessee€court€has€spoken.ò òó ó€€Further,€the€UnitedÐ H˜ ÐStates€Supreme€Court€has€not€ruled€directly€on€this€issue,€although€the€lower€courts€have€takenÐ 4„ Ðcertain€of€its€comments,€which€we€will€review,€as€guidance€to€how€it€might€rule€if€the€question€wereÐ  p Ðpresented.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àIn€òòAshe€v.€Swensonóó,€397€U.S.€436,€90€S.€Ct.€1189,€25€L.€Ed.€2d€469€(1970),€the€defendantÐ ä4 Ðwas€alleged€to€have€been€one€of€the€three€or€four€armed€men€who€robbed€six€victims€as€they€wereÐ Ð  Ðplaying€poker€at€one€of€the€victimððs€homes.€€The€defendant€was€tried€and€acquitted€on€one€count,€asÐ ¼  Ðto€the€robbery€of€one€of€the€victims,€the€juryððs€verdict€written€as€ð ðnot€guilty€due€to€insufficientÐ ¨ø Ðevidence.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€462,€90€S.€Ct.€at€1203.€€After€the€State€then€sought€to€prosecute€him€for€the€robberyÐ ”ä Ðof€another€of€the€poker€players,€he€filed€a€motion€arguing€that€his€acquittal€in€the€first€trial€barred€hisÐ €Ð Ðprosecution€for€robbing€any€of€the€other€victims.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€motion;€and,€at€theÐ l¼ Ðsubsequent€trial,€the€defendant€was€convicted.€€On€appeal,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€becauseÐ X ¨ Ðð ð[t]he€single€rationally€conceivable€issue€in€dispute€before€the€jury€was€whether€the€[defendant]€hadÐ D!” Ðbeen€one€of€the€robbersðð€and,€by€its€verdict,€the€jury€had€determined€that€he€was€not,€the€governmentÐ 0"€  Ðwas€collaterally€estopped€from€prosecuting€him€for€robbing€another€of€the€victims.€€òòId.óó€at€445,€90€S.Ð #l! ÐCt.€at€1195.€€Dissenting€from€the€holding€of€the€lead€opinion,€Chief€Justice€Burger€theorized€that,Ð $X" Ðhad€the€defendant€instead€been€convicted€at€the€first€trial,€he€still€could€have€contested,€in€a€later€trialÐ ô$D # Ðas€to€another€of€the€victims,€that€he€was€one€of€the€robbers:Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à[C]ourts€that€have€applied€the€collateral-estoppel€concept€to€criminalÐ ¸'#& Ðactions€would€certainly€not€apply€it€to€both€parties,€as€is€true€in€civilÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcases,€i.e.,€here,€if€Ashe€had€been€convicted€at€the€first€trial,Ð )à$( Ðpresumably€no€court€would€then€hold€that€he€was€thereby€foreclosedÐ |*Ì%) Ðfrom€litigating€the€identification€issue€at€the€second€trial.€Ðh+¸&*` x` x ÐòòId.óó€at€464„65,€90€S.€Ct.€at€1205€(footnote€omitted).Ð ° ÐÌà  àIt€is€this€language€that€has€been€relied€on€by€a€number€of€those€lower€courts€which€concludedÐ ˆØ Ðthat€collateral€estoppel€cannot€be€applied€against€a€defendant€in€a€criminal€case.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àFirst,€we€will€review€cases€in€which€collateral€estoppel€was€applied€against€a€criminalÐ L œ Ðdefendant.€€In€òòPeople€v.€Fordóó,€416€P.2d€132,€134€(Cal.€1966),€òòoverruled€in€part€byóó€òòPeople€v.€Satchellóó,Ð 8 ˆ Ð489€P.2d€1361€(Cal.€1971),€a€case€very€similar€to€the€present€appeal,€òòóóthe€defendant€was€convictedÐ $ t Ðat€his€initial€trial€of€first€degree€murder€and€various€other€felony€offenses€including€robbery€andÐ  ` Ðkidnapping,€but€the€murder€conviction€was€reversed€and€remanded€for€a€new€trial,€where€the€juryÐ ü L  Ðfound€him€guilty€of€felony€murder.€€òòóóAt€that€second€trial,€the€judge€instructed€the€jury,€according€toÐ è 8  Ðthe€defendantððs€description€on€appeal,€that€he€previously€ð ðhad€been€convicted€of€robbery,€kidnapingÐ Ô$  Ðand€possession€of€a€concealable€weapon€by€an€ex„felon,€and€reserved€for€the€jury€only€the€questionsÐ À  Ðwhether€the€homicide€was€perpetrated€during€the€commission€of€any€or€all€of€these€felonies,€andÐ ¬ü  Ðwhether€he€possessed€the€intent€requisite€€to€the€various€felonies€at€the€time€of€the€commission€ofÐ ˜è  Ðthe€homicide.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€137.€€However,€the€California€Supreme€Court€concluded€that€the€trial€court€hadÐ „Ô  Ðnot€erred€in€the€second€trial€by€explaining€to€the€jury€the€fact€that€the€defendant€previously€had€beenÐ pÀ Ðconvicted€of€robbery,€kidnapping€and€possession€of€a€concealable€weapon€and€instructing€that€ð ðifÐ \¬ Ðthey€found€that€defendantððs€commission€of€such€felonies€was€conjoined€with€his€commission€of€theÐ H˜ Ðhomicide,€they€might€predicate€their€verdict€on€the€felony„murder€rule[.]ðð€òòóó€òòId.óó€at€138.òò€óó€The€court€thenÐ 4„ Ðexplainedòò€óóthe€preclusive€effect€of€the€convictions€from€the€first€trial:òòÐ  p ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àóó[W]here€a€defendant€is€tried€on€multiple€counts€of€a€singleÐ øH Ðinformation,€each€count€being€considered€as€a€separate€and€distinctÐ ä4 Ðoffense,€the€doctrine€of€res€judicata€operates€to€preclude€theÐ Ð  Ðrelitigation€of€issues€finally€determined€upon€retrial€of€only€one€count.Ð ¼  Ð(See€òòPeople€v.€Beltranóó,€94€Cal.€App.€2d€197,€205,€210€P.2d€238,€andÐ ¨ø Ðcases€cited€and€discussed€therein.)€€It€follows€that€the€doctrine€of€resÐ ”ä Ðjudicata€justifies€instructions,€where€relevant,€that€a€defendant€hasÐ €Ð Ðbeen€found€guilty€of€crimes€finally€adjudicated€which€are€charged€asÐ l¼ Ðelements€in€another€charge€or€charges€then€in€the€process€of€beingÐ X ¨ Ðretried.€€à8` x` xàòòÐD!”ÈÈ ÐÌóóòòId.óóòòÐ #l! ÐÌà  àóóWhile€this€holding€would€certainly€be€helpful€to€the€State€in€the€present€appeal,€its€continuingÐ ô$D # Ðvalidity€òòóówas€questioned€in€òòGutierrez€v.€Superior€Courtóó,€29€Cal.€Rptr.€2d€376€(Cal.€Ct.€App.€1994),Ð à%0!$ Ðwherein€the€California€Court€of€Appeals€concluded€that€itòòóó€could€not€be€applied€to€bar€a€defendant,Ð Ì&"% Ðconvicted€of€attempted€murder,€from€continuing€to€argue€as€to€his€new€indictment€for€first€degreeÐ ¸'#& Ðmurder,€returned€after€the€same€victim€had€died€from€his€earlier€wounds,€that€he€had€been€mistakenlyÐ ¤(ô#' Ðidentified€in€his€first€trial€as€the€shooter:Ð )à$( ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€case€at€bar€is€distinguishable€from€òòFordóó€factually€andÐ h+¸&* Ðprocedurally.€€In€òòFordóó€it€is€also€significant€that€the€defendant€wasÐ ° Ðpermitted€to,€and€did,€litigate€on€retrial€the€issue€of€whether€he€hadÐ œì Ðthe€intent€requisite€to€the€various€felonies€at€the€time€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðcommission€of€the€homicide.€€In€fact,€there€is€no€indication€in€òòFordóóÐ tÄ Ðthat€the€jury€instruction€prevented€defendant€from€presenting€hisÐ `° Ðdefense€of€diminished€capacity€or€impaired€his€right€to€a€fair€trial€onÐ L œ Ðthe€homicide€charge.€€Thus,€òòFordóó€is€distinguishable€from€the€instantÐ 8 ˆ Ðcase€because€petitioner€here€asserted€a€mistaken€identity€defense€atÐ $ t Ðhis€attempted€murder€trial€and€would€be€precluded€from€presentingÐ  ` Ðthis€defense€under€the€challenged€court€order.€€Moreover,€petitionerÐ ü L  Ðis€not€only€asserting€the€claim€that€the€court€order€constitutesÐ è 8  Ðinstructional€error,€but€that€it€impairs€his€right€to€jury€trial€and€to€theÐ Ô$  Ðpresumption€of€innocence.€€These€are€issues€not€considered€in€òòFordóó.€Ð À  ÐA€decision€is€not€authority€for€issues€not€considered€therein.€€(òòPeopleÐ ¬ü  Ðv.€Lonerganóó€(1990)€219€Cal.€App.€3d€82,€93,€267€Cal.€Rptr.€887.)€€€ItÐ ˜è  Ðmust€also€be€remembered€that€òòFordóó€was€decided€before€òòAsheóó€andÐ „Ô  ÐòòSimpsonóó€[òòv.€Floridaóó,€403€U.S.€384,€91€S.€Ct.€1801€(1971)]€questionedÐ pÀ Ðthe€ability€of€the€prosecution€to€invoke€collateral€estoppel€against€aÐ \¬ Ðcriminal€defendant.ÐH˜` x` x ÐòòÌId.óó€at€385„86.ò òÐ  p Ðà  àòòóóà ` àó óÌÒû°Òà  àò òó óThus,€the€court€majority€agreed€with€Gutierrez's€argument€that€preventing€him€from€againÐ øH Ðclaiming,€this€time€at€the€retrial,€that€witnesses€had€mistakenly€identified€him€as€the€shooter€wouldÐ ä4 Ðdeprive€him€of€his€ð ðright€to€present€his€defense€to€the€jury.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€386.€€However,ò ò€ó óthe€dissentÐ Ð  Ðconcluded€that€allowing€the€defendant€to€claim€in€his€second€trial,€as€he€had€done€so€unsuccessfullyÐ À Ðin€his€first,€that€he€was€not€the€shooter€might€cause€ò òó óð ðoneò ò€ó ófair€jury€to€find€[the€defendant]€did€shootÐ ¬ü Ð[the€victim]€and€another€fair€jury€to€find€that€he€did€not.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€391.€€We€note€that€the€defendantÐ œì Ðin€the€present€appeal€argued€in€his€first€trial,€as€had€Gutierrez,€that€he€was€mistakenly€identified€asÐ ˆØ Ðbeing€present€at€the€shooting€scene€and€that€preventing€his€arguing€this€defense€at€his€second€trialòòóóÐ tÄ Ðwould€impinge€on€his€right€to€a€jury€trial€and€to€present€evidence€in€his€own€defense.Ð ` ° Ðò òÌà  àó óOffensive€collateral€estoppel€has€been€utilized€in€criminal€cases€where€the€issue€involvedÐ 8"ˆ  Ða€status€question€that€could€arise€in€future€actions.€€òòHernandez„Uribe€v.€United€Statesóó,€515€F.2d€20,Ð $#t! Ð22€(8th€Cir.€1975)€(preclusive€effect€given€to€prior€alienage€determination);€òòPena„Cabanillas€v.Ð $`" ÐUnited€Statesóó,€394€F.2d€785€(9th€Cir.€1968)€(also€involving€alienage€determination);€òòUnited€StatesÐ ü$L # Ðv.€Rangel„Perezóó,€179€F.€Supp.€619€(S.D.€Cal.€1959)€(also€an€alienage€question);€òòPeople€v.€Majadoóó,Ð è%8!$ Ð70€P.2d€1015€(Cal.€Dist.€Ct.€App.€1937)€(involving€paternity€status).€€However,€not€all€courts€haveÐ Ô&$"% Ðagreed€that€collateral€estoppel€is€applicable€in€alienage€cases.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Gallardo„Ð À'#& ÐMendezóó,€150€F.3d€1240€(10th€Cir.€1998)€(declining€to€give€preclusive€effect€to€a€prior€guilty€pleaÐ ¬(ü#' Ðin€an€illegal€entry€case).€€As€explained€by€òòRangel„Perez,óó€òòóóthe€rationale€for€applying€collateralÐ ˜)è$( Ðestoppel€in€alienage€cases€is€to€discourage€defendants€from€committing€an€offense€over€and€overÐ „*Ô%) Ðin€hopes€of€gaining€a€favorable€determination€that€would€foreclose€future€prosecutionsòòóó:Ð p+À&* Ѐ€Ð ° Ðà8  àà8` … … àà ¸ àIf€the€issue€of€alienage€were€to€be€tried€each€time€a€defendantÐ œì Ðmakes€an€entry€into€the€United€States,€after€once€having€been€foundÐ ˆØ Ðby€judicial€determination€to€be€an€alien,€there€would€be€less€to€deterÐ tÄ Ðfuture€entries€than€at€the€present.€Even€though€the€present€risk€ofÐ `° Ðprosecution€for€illegal€entry€would€remain€under€8€U.S.C.A.€ðð€1326,Ð L œ Ða€defendant€would€have€an€added€incentive€to€enter€again€and€again,Ð 8 ˆ Ðknowing€that€a€trial€de€novo€on€the€issue€of€alienage€would€beÐ $ t Ðforthcoming€and€that€such€trial€might,€on€one€occasion,€result€in€aÐ  ` Ðfavorable€verdict.€The€Government€would€be€estopped€by€anyÐ ü L  Ðunfavorable€verdict,€and€accomplishment€of€the€objectives€of€theÐ è 8  Ðimmigration€laws€to€discourage€and€effectively€control€the€alreadyÐ Ô$  Ðdifficult€problem€of€illegal€entries€into€this€country€would€thus€beÐ À  Ðweakened.Ьü ` -` - ÐÌ179€F.€Supp.€at€626;€òòseeóó€òòHernandez„Uribeóó,€515€F.2d€at€21„22;€òòPena„Cabanillasóó,€394€F.2d€at€787„88.€Ð „Ô  ÐòòóóÌà  àAdditionally,€prosecutors€have€used€offensive€collateral€estoppel€to€prevent€defendants€fromÐ \¬ Ðcontesting€motions€to€suppress€evidence€where€judges€in€prior€cases€had€determined€that€theÐ H˜ Ðevidence€was€admissible.€€òòSee,€e.góó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Levasseuróó,€699€F.€Supp.€965€(D.€Mass.),€òòrevððdÐ 4„ Ðon€other€groundsóó,€846€F.2d€786€(1st€Cir.€1988);€òòState€v.€Hideróó,€715€A.2d€942,€945€(Me.€1998)€(inÐ  p Ðsecond€trial,€after€reversal€of€first€conviction,€collateral€estoppel€doctrine€barred€defendant€fromÐ  \ Ðrelitigating€suppression€issue);€Richard€B.€Kennelly,€Jr.,€òòPrecluding€the€Accused:€OffensiveÐ øH ÐCollateral€Estoppel€in€Criminal€Casesóó,€80€Va.€L.€Rev.€1379,€1384„86€(1994).€€In€fact,€our€supremeÐ ä4 Ðcourt€has€suggested€that€such€applications€of€collateral€estoppel€might€be€acceptable:€€ð ðWhileÐ Ð  Ðcollateral€estoppel€likely€could€be€applied€in€this€circumstance€[to€give€preclusive€effect€to€a€priorÐ ¼  Ðsuppression€decision],€having€thoroughly€reviewed€the€entire€record,€we€choose€to€address€theÐ ¨ø Ðdefendant's€contention€on€its€merits.ðð€€òòState€v.€Flakeóó,€114€S.W.3d€487,€507€(Tenn.€2003).Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àOf€the€federal€circuit€courts,€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Ninth€Circuit€hasÐ l¼ Ðallowed€offensive€collateral€estoppel€to€be€utilized€the€most€broadly,€not€limiting€its€application€toÐ X ¨ Ðquestions€as€to€the€defendantððs€status.€€For€example,€as€noted€by€the€trial€court€in€the€present€appeal,Ð D!” Ðin€òòUnited€States€v.€Colacurcioóó,€514€F.2d€1,€5„6€(9th€Cir.€1975),€the€court€determined€that,€in€aÐ 0"€  Ðprosecution€for€tax€evasion,€the€defendant€was€collaterally€estopped€from€denying€that€he€hadÐ #l! Ðreceived€ð ðprotection€moneyðð€to€allow€illegal€bingo€games,€this€fact€being€ð ðmaterial€and€relevantððÐ $X" Ðto€his€earlier€conviction€for€conspiracy€to€use€facilities€of€interstate€commerce€to€carry€on€illegalÐ ô$D # Ðbingo€games.€€òòId.óó€at€6„7.€€However,€the€Department€of€Justice€appears€to€have€retreated€fromÐ à%0!$ Ðseeking€expanded€use€of€collateral€estoppel€in€the€Ninth€Circuit€against€criminal€defendants,€as€hadÐ Ì&"% Ðoccurred€in€cases€since€the€òòColacurcioóó€decision.€€In€òòUnited€States€v.€Arnettóó,€353€F.3d€765€(9th€Cir.Ð ¸'#& Ð2003),€an€òòen€bancóó€hearing€was€scheduled€to€review€an€earlier€determination€by€a€three„judge€panel€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðthat€the€defendant€was€estopped€from€presenting€expert€proof,€in€his€subsequent€bank€robbery€trials,Ð )à$( Ðthat€the€weapon€he€had€used€was€an€antique,€although€the€jury€in€the€first€of€his€series€of€bankÐ |*Ì%) Ðrobbery€trials€had€heard€defense€expert€proof€on€this€claim€and€rejected€it.€€Shortly€before€the€òòenÐ h+¸&* Ðbancóó€hearing,€the€prosecution€confessed€error€as€to€the€issue,€federal€prosecutors€advising€the€court:€Ð ° Ðð ðIn€federal€criminal€trials,€the€United€States€may€not€use€collateral€estoppel€to€establish,€as€a€matterÐ œì Ðof€law,€an€element€of€an€offense€or€to€conclusively€rebut€an€affirmative€defense€on€which€theÐ ˆØ ÐGovernment€bears€the€burden€of€proof€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€766.€€Accepting€thisÐ tÄ Ðchanged€position,€the€court€then€reversed€the€defendantððs€bank€robbery€convictions,€where€collateralÐ `° Ðestoppel€had€been€applied€as€to€the€weapon€used.€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àAside€from€the€òòFordóó€decision€in€1966€affirming€application€of€collateral€estoppel€in€aÐ $ t Ðsituation€like€that€of€the€present€appeal,€and€its€use€in€alienage,€status,€and€suppression€cases,€courtsÐ  ` Ðhave€not€allowed€collateral€estoppel€to€be€used€against€a€criminal€defendant.€€We€will€review€someÐ ü L  Ðof€these€determinations.€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àIn€òòUnited€States€v.€Pelulloóó,€14€F.3d€881,€885€(3rd€Cir.€1994)òòóó,€the€jury€convicted€Pelullo€ofÐ À  Ðforty„nine€counts€of€wire€fraud€and€one€count€of€racketeering€under€the€Racketeer€Influenced€andÐ ¬ü  ÐCorrupt€Organization€(ð ðRICOðð)€Act,€18€U.S.C.€ðð€1962(c).€òòóó€On€appeal,€all€but€one€of€the€wire€fraudÐ ˜è  Ðconvictions€were€reversed€and,€at€the€second€trial,€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€forty„eight€countsÐ „Ô  Ðof€wire€fraud€and€one€count€of€RICO.€€òòòòóóPelulloóó,€14€F.3d€at€887.€€Surveying€the€relatively€few€casesÐ pÀ Ðwhich€had€allowed€the€application€of€collateral€estoppel€against€a€defendant,€the€court€òòóóobserved€thatÐ \¬ Ðð ðthere€has€been€a€strong,€unelaborated€assumption€that€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€cannot€beÐ H˜ Ðinvoked€in€criminal€cases€against€the€defendant.€€Judges€have€stressed€in€dicta€that€unlike€in€civilÐ 4„ Ðcases,€the€collateral€estoppel€principle€should€not€be€applied€to€both€parties€in€criminal€cases.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ  p Ðat€€891.€€Rejecting€what€it€described€as€ð ðpublic€interest€concerns,ðð€sometimes€used€to€justify€the€useÐ  \ Ðof€collateral€estoppel€against€a€defendant,€the€court€concluded€that,€by€its€view,€such€interests€ð ðgiveÐ øH Ðway€to€the€need€of€a€criminal€defendant€to€defend€himself€effectively€in€criminal€proceedings.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ ä4 Ðat€893.€€The€court€explained€that€a€defendantððs€constitutional€rights€would€be€violated€by€applyingÐ Ð  Ðcollateral€estoppel€against€him:Ð ¼  ÐÌà8  àà8` … … à[W]e€believe€the€literal€language€of€the€Sixth€and€SeventhÐ ”ä ÐAmendments€supports€a€reading€that€the€right€to€a€jury€trial€in€everyÐ €Ð Ðcriminal€prosecution€is€absolute,€even€without€reference€to€the€thenÐ l¼ Ðexisting€common€law.€€Even€though€the€relevant€language€has€notÐ X ¨ Ðbeen€analyzed€by€courts€or€commentators€in€the€context€of€applyingÐ D!” Ðcollateral€estoppel€against€a€defendant€in€a€criminal€case,€the€actualÐ 0"€  Ðlanguage€provides€a€textual€anchor€for€the€position€against€applyingÐ #l! Ðcollateral€estoppel€against€an€accused.Ð$X"` -` - ÐÌòòId.óó€at€894.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àSubsequently,€this€holding€was€relied€on€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Gallardo-Mendezóó,€150€F.3dÐ ¸'#& Ð1240€(10th€Cir.€1998),€where€the€court€concluded€that€a€defendantððs€right€to€due€process€meant€thatÐ ¤(ô#' Ðð ðthe€government€may€not€use€a€judgment€following€a€plea€of€guilty€to€collaterally€estop€a€criminalÐ )à$( Ðdefendant€from€relitigating€[the€issue€of€alienage]€in€a€subsequent€criminal€proceeding.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1246Ð |*Ì%) Ð(footnote€omitted).Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThe€few€state€courts€considering€this€issue€have€concluded,€as€well,€that€collateral€estoppelÐ ° Ðcannot€be€applied€against€a€criminal€defendant.ò òó ó€€In€òòPeople€v.€Gossóó,€521€N.W.2d€312,€312€(Mich.Ð œì Ð1994),€the€defendant€had€been€convicted€of€armed€robbery€and€first€degree€felony€murder,€and,€asÐ ˆØ Ðin€the€present€appeal,€the€felony€murder€conviction€was€reversed,€but€the€predicate€felony€wasÐ tÄ Ðupheld.€€òòóóòòóóAfter€remand,€the€State€unsuccessfully€moved€in€the€trial€court€to€prevent€the€defendantÐ `° Ðfrom€relitigating€his€armed€robbery€conviction€and€then€appealed€that€order€denying€the€motion.€Ð L œ ÐòòId.óó€at€313.€€On€appeal,€the€court€described€the€contending€theories€as€to€the€felony€murder:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àà8` … … àà ¸ àThe€prosecutor's€theory€of€felony€murder,€once€again,€is€thatÐ  ` ÐGoss€forced€Bonadeo€and€the€Goers€brothers€to€lie€down€on€theÐ ü L  Ðground€and€then€summoned€Nelson€to€kill€them.€€Goss€does€not€denyÐ è 8  Ðthat€someone€forced€the€three€men€to€the€ground€and€held€them€thereÐ Ô$  Ðuntil€Nelson€arrived.€€Goss€argues€rather€that€the€witnesses€whoÐ À  Ðidentified€him€as€the€assailant€are€mistaken.Ьü ` -` - ÐÌòòId.óó€at€321.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àòòóóGiven€the€claim€of€Goss€that€he€had€been€misidentified€as€one€of€the€assailants,€the€leadÐ \¬ Ðopinion€concluded€that,€if€collateral€estoppel€were€applied€by€the€trial€court€to€his€earlier€convictionÐ H˜ Ðfor€armed€robbery,€it€would€ð ðprevent€the€second€jury€from€making€its€own€independent€evaluationÐ 4„ Ðof€the€armed€robbery„element€of€felony€murder,€and,€therefore,€would€be€the€equivalent€of€partiallyÐ  p Ðdirecting€a€verdict€against€him,ðð€and€would€be€ð ðan€invasion€of€the€fact„finding€and€ultimateÐ  \ Ðdecisional€functions€of€the€jury.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€316„17.€€The€concurring€opinion€disagreed€with€the€viewÐ øH Ðof€the€lead€opinion€that€applying€collateral€estoppel€against€the€defendant€would€violate€his€rightÐ ä4 Ðto€an€impartial€jury€but€agreed€that€to€do€so€would€violate€his€ð ðdue€process€right€to€a€fair€trialððÐ Ð  Ðwhich€ð ðoutweigh[ed]€any€interest€in€judicial€economy€and€efficiency.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€321.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àLikewise,€in€òòState€v.€Ingenitoóó,€432€A.2d€912,€913€(N.J.€1981),€the€defendant,€a€ð ðself„Ð ”ä Ðemployed€ððflea€market€dealer,ðððð€earlier€had€been€convicted€of€the€unlicensed€transfer€of€weaponsÐ €Ð Ðbut€found€not€guilty€of€receiving€stolen€property.€€At€his€subsequent€trial€on€the€severed€charge€ofÐ l¼ Ðpossession€of€a€firearm€by€a€convicted€felon,€the€prosecution€relied€upon€the€defendantððs€stipulationÐ X ¨ Ðas€to€two€earlier€felony€convictions€to€establish€that€he€was€a€convicted€felon€and€the€testimony€ofÐ D!” Ðthe€county€clerk€as€to€his€ð ðrecent€conviction€for€the€unlicensed€transfer€of€.€.€.€weapons,€being€theÐ 0"€  Ðsame€unlicensed€transfer€that€was€the€basis€for€the€charge€of€possession€in€the€ongoing€trial.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ #l! Ðat€913„14.€€The€defendant€objected€to€the€use€of€his€ð ðrecent€convictionðð€to€establish€that€heÐ $X" Ðpossessed€firearms,€arguing€that€it€amounted€to€collateral€estoppel,€which€violated€his€constitutionalÐ ô$D # Ðrights.€€òòId.óó€€On€appeal,€the€court€explained€the€rationale€for€using€the€clerkððs€testimony€to€prove€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€defendant€possessed€firearms:Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà8  àà8` … … àà ¸ àThe€affirmative€use€of€collateral€estoppel€against€a€defendantÐ ¤(ô#' Ðin€a€criminal€prosecution€is€not€predicated€upon€any€constitutionalÐ )à$( Ðmandate.€€In€this€case,€to€illustrate,€the€use€by€the€State€of€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðdefendant's€prior€conviction€was€offered€for€reasons€of€convenienceÐ h+¸&* Ðand€expediency.€€Its€approval€by€the€trial€court€was€based€narrowlyÐ ° Ðupon€notions€of€judicial€economy€and€the€belief€that€defendantÐ œì Ðwould€not€be€unfairly€treated€since€he€had€already€had€theÐ ˆØ Ðopportunity€fully€to€try€the€facts€in€issue€in€a€preceding€case€andÐ tÄ Ðcould€offer€additional€proofs€in€the€pending€trial.Ð`°` -` - ÐÌòòId.óó€at€915.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àHowever,€the€court€explained€that€this€procedure€violated€the€defendantððs€rights:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àà8` … … àà ¸ àAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€collateral€estoppel,€appliedÐ è 8  Ðaffirmatively€against€a€defendant€in€a€criminal€prosecution,€violatesÐ Ô$  Ðthe€right€to€trial€by€jury€in€that€not€only€does€it€seriously€hobble€theÐ À  Ðjury€in€its€quest€for€truth€by€removing€significant€facts€from€theÐ ¬ü  Ðdeliberative€process,€but€it€constitutes€a€strong,€perhaps€irresistible,Ð ˜è  Ðgravitational€pull€towards€a€guilty€verdict,€which€is€utterlyÐ „Ô  Ðinconsistent€with€the€requirement€that€a€jury€remain€free€andÐ pÀ Ðuntrammeled€in€its€deliberations.€€Hence,€the€collateral€estoppelÐ \¬ Ðdoctrine,€which€serves€to€establish€virtually€conclusive€evidence€ofÐ H˜ Ða€critical€element€of€criminal€guilt,€cripples€the€jury€in€the€dischargeÐ 4„ Ðof€its€essential€responsibilities€contrary€to€the€constitutionalÐ  p Ðguarantees€of€the€jury€right€in€a€criminal€trial.Ð \` -` - ÐÌòòId.óó€at€918„19€(footnote€omitted).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àWhile€the€trial€court€in€òòIngenitoóó€had€not€prohibited€the€defendant€from€presenting€evidenceÐ ¼  Ðto€question€this€previous€conviction,€the€court€concluded€that€providing€this€opportunity€did€notÐ ¨ø Ðavoid€the€prejudicial€effect€of€proving€the€conviction€solely€through€the€court€clerk:€€ð ðAlthough€theÐ ”ä Ðdefendant€may€have€been€theoretically€free€to€introduce€evidence€to€the€contrary,€that€did€notÐ €Ð Ðovercome€the€preclusive€and€conclusive€evidential€effects€of€the€prior€conviction.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€920.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àSome€courts€and€commentators€have€suggested€tests€to€avoid€the€potential€for€abuse€orÐ D!” Ðunfairness€which€might€result€from€applying€collateral€estoppel€as€to€a€criminal€defendant.€€òòSeeóóÐ 0"€  ÐRichard€B.€Kennelly,€Jr.,€òòPrecluding€the€Accused:€Offensive€Collateral€Estoppel€in€Criminal€Casesóó,Ð #l! Ð80€Va.€L.€Rev.€1379,€1384„86€(1994).€€The€test€proposed€by€Kennelly€seeks€to€avoid€the€problemsÐ $X" Ðnoticed€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€the€òòAsheóó€andòòòòóó€òòóóSimpsonóó€dicta,€namely€the€threat€of€sequential€orÐ ô$D # Ðpiecemeal€prosecution:€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà8  àà8` … … àà ¸ àIn€an€effort€to€harmonize€the€competing€values€of€efficiencyÐ ¸'#& Ðand€accuracy,€the€summary€below€briefly€identifies€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðrecommended€limitations€on€the€availability€of€issue€preclusion€ofÐ )à$( Ðthe€accused.€Preclusion€is€appropriate€where€(1)€the€issue€andÐ |*Ì%) Ðdefendant€are€both€identical€to€those€in€the€prior€proceeding;€(2)€theÐ h+¸&* Ðdefendant€had€a€full€and€fair€opportunity€to€litigate,€under€the€sameÐ ° Ðlaw€and€without€any€fewer€procedural€opportunities€at€the€first€trial;Ð œì Ð(3)€the€issue€was€essential€to€the€prior€litigation€and€was€actuallyÐ ˆØ Ðlitigated€(and€not€resolved€in€a€guilty€plea);€(4)€the€charge€was€aÐ tÄ Ðfelony€and€thus€sufficiently€serious€to€give€the€defendant€anÐ `° Ðincentive€to€litigate€vigorously;€(5)€the€sentence€was€sufficientlyÐ L œ Ðserious€to€provide€incentive€to€appeal;€(6)€no€other€inconsistentÐ 8 ˆ Ðdeterminations€exist€on€that€issue€with€that€defendant;€and€(7)€theÐ $ t Ðprosecutor€did€not€bring€separate€prosecutions€for€strategic€or€badÐ  ` Ðfaith€reasons.Ðü L ` -` - ÐòòÌId.óó€at€òòóó1423;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòLevasseuróó,€699€F.€Supp.€at€971€(offering€a€slightly€different€test).Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àò òòòóóòòóóó óThis€test,€although€intended€for€determining€whether€collateral€estoppel€should€be€appliedÐ ¬ü  Ðoffensively€in€a€criminal€case,€would€appear€to€satisfy,€as€well,€the€requirements€of€òòBeatyóó,€58Ð ˜è  ÐS.W.3d€at€113,€as€to€its€use€in€civil€cases.€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àWhile€cases,€in€other€than€the€limited€areas€we€have€discussed,€considering€whetherÐ \¬ Ðcollateral€estoppel€may€be€applied€against€a€criminal€defendant€are€not€numerous,€they€conclude€thatÐ H˜ Ðits€application€violates€one€or€more€of€a€defendantððs€constitutional€rights.€€Several€of€these€cases,Ð 4„ Ðas€we€have€noted,€have€forceful€and€lengthy€dissents,€and€a€few€law€review€articles,€as€well,Ð  p Ðdisagree€with€the€reasoning€of€the€majority€opinions.€€However,€the€fact€remains€that€the€majorityÐ  \ Ðopinions€considering€this€issue€conclude,€as€the€defendant€in€this€matter€argued,€his€right€to€a€juryÐ øH Ðtrial€and€to€present€evidence€in€his€defense€would€be€violated€if€he€could€not€attempt€to€show€thatÐ ä4 Ðhe€was€not€present€when€the€burglary€was€committed.€€We€agree€that€the€defendantððs€constitutionalÐ Ð  Ðright€to€a€jury€trial€would€be€violated€by€the€trial€courtððs€order€which,€as€the€parties€understand,Ð ¼  Ðprevents€him€from€presenting€proof€which€would€question€the€burglary€conviction.€€Thus,€just€asÐ ¨ø Ðhe€cannot€be€collaterally€estopped,€for€constitutional€reasons,€from€presenting€proof€as€to€theÐ ”ä Ðburglary€conviction,€he,€likewise,€cannot€be€barred,€by€application€of€the€law€of€the€case,€from€doingÐ €Ð Ðso.€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€the€order€of€the€trial€court€and€remand€with€instructions€that€theÐ l¼ Ðdefendant€not€be€barred€from€presenting€evidence€that€he€was€not€present€when€the€crimes€occurred.€Ð X ¨ ÐOf€course,€evidence€presented€in€this€regard€must€meet€the€admissibility€requirements€of€theÐ D!” ÐTennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€Further,€at€the€retrial,€a€determination€as€to€whether€the€defendantÐ 0"€  Ðmay€be€impeached€with€the€burglary€conviction,€which€is€the€predicate€felony,€should€be€done€inÐ #l! Ðaccord€with€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€609.€€Although€the€defendant€suggested€in€his€appellateÐ $X" Ðbrief€that€Tennessee€law€ð ðmight€allow€the€trial€court€to€instruct€the€jury€as€to€the€existence€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðburglary€judgment€at€the€end€of€the€trial,ðð€this€possible€procedure€was€not€briefed€by€the€parties€and,Ð à%0!$ Ðtherefore,€is€not€before€this€court.Ð Ì&"% Ѐ€Ð ¸'#& Ðò òó óà@  %Æàò òòòCONCLUSIONó óóóˆÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àBased€on€the€foregoing€authorities€and€reasoning,€we€reverse€the€order€of€the€trial€court.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* ЇÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð ˆØ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àALAN€E.€GLENN,€JUDGE