ÿWPCH …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 H 0JP 0Tš 0^î 0hL 0r´ 0|& 0†¢ 0( 1u¸ 0d- U>‘ U*Ï B)ù DC" AMe² BÂv~ßvÓ] D30 0@c AO£Æò 0D¸ D/ü B+˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- L UM UN UO UP UQ UR US UT UU Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|x^ 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌOctober€16,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€¥XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€#$"A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌMARCH€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9605„CC„00209Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àó óÌà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)à àCOFFEE€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€GERALD€L.€EWELL,€SR.,Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àJUDGEó óÌò òMARK€T.€SCISNEYà àà à)à àó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)à à(DUI€WHILE€DRIVING€ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àCOMMERCIAL€VEHICLE)Ìó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òROBERT€S.€PETERSà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUP€Ìó óSwafford,€Peters€&€Priestà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌ100€First€Avenue,€S.W.ÌWinchester,€TN€37398ò òà àà àà àDEBORAH€A.€TULLISÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òC.€MICHAEL€LAYNE€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òSTEPHEN€E.€WEITZMANó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à307€South€Woodland€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€147Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àManchester,€TN€€37355€ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€ °ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àà àA€Coffee€County€jury€found€Defendant€guilty€of€driving€under€theÏinfluence€while€operating€a€commercial€motor€vehicle€in€violation€of€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€section€55„50„408.€€He€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3,ÏTennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€In€a€two€(2)€prong€attack€upon€theÏsufficiency€of€the€evidence,€Defendant€argues€that€the€State€failed€to€prove€thatÏhis€blood€alcohol€concentration€was€.04€or€more,€and€also€argues€that€theÏevidence€was€insufficient€as€the€State€proved€his€ð ðalcohol€by€weightðð€ratherÏthan€his€blood€alcohol€concentration€as€required€by€the€statute.€€œThe›€judgment€ofÏthe€trial€œcourt€is€affirmed.›ÌÌà àà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convictingÏevidence,€the€standard€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€theÏessential€elements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.ÏVirginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319€(1979).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€theÏwitnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factualÏissues€raised€by€the€evidence,€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€ÏòòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóóÍòòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1987).€€Nor€may€this€court€reweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€ÏòòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Ì̛̜à àà àA€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€StateððsÏwitnesses€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493ÏS.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€inferences€therefrom.€€òòCabbageóó,€571ÏS.W.2d€at€835.€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€ofÏinnocence€and€replaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused€has€theÏburden€in€this€court€of€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€theÏverdict€returned€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.Ï1982);€òòGraceóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€476.ÌÌà àà àAt€approximately€1:00€a.m.€on€October€14,€1994,€Defendant€wasÏoperating€an€ð ð18„wheelerðð€truck€when€he€drove€through€the€weigh€station€on€theÏwestbound€side€of€Interstate€24€in€Coffee€County.€€Tim€Garner,€an€officer€withÏthe€Tennessee€Public€Service€Commission€at€the€time,€was€on€duty€andÏdecided€to€check€Defendant€for€his€driverððs€license,€log€book,€and€medicalÏcertificate.€€According€to€Officer€Garner,€such€random€checks€were€a€part€of€hisÏduties€and€responsibilities.€€Defendant€was€given€a€signal€to€drive€his€truckÍaround€to€the€back€of€the€checking€area.€€After€opening€the€door€to€DefendantððsÏvehicle,€Garner€immediately€smelled€the€odor€of€an€intoxicating€beverage.€ÏGarner€requested€his€partner,€Officer€Slatton,€to€come€and€confirm€the€odor,€andÏthen€to€administer€an€alcohol€breath€test€to€Defendant€using€the€IntoximeterÏ3000€€machine€located€at€the€weigh€station€complex.€€Garner€could€notÏadminister€the€test€because€he€was€not€certified€to€do€so,€but€Officer€SlattonÏwas€properly€certified€to€operate€the€Intoximeter€3000.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€record€reflects€that€the€Intoximeter€3000€test€was€properlyÏadministered€pursuant€to€the€requirements€of€òòState€v.€Sensingóó,€843€S.W.2d€412Ï(Tenn.€1992).€€The€test€result€œregistered›€by€the€machine€was€.04.€€The€only€otherÏproof€of€consumption€of€alcohol€by€Defendant€was€the€odor€of€an€intoxicantÏsmelled€by€the€officers€and€the€Defendantððs€statement€at€the€scene€that€he€hadÏconsumed€a€couple€of€ð ðtall€beersðð€in€Georgia€ð ðbefore€he€left.ððÌÌà àà àAt€trial,€the€State€produced€the€testimony€of€William€Heaney,€Jr.,Ïand€Officers€Garner€and€Slatton.€€Defendant€did€not€testify€and€offered€no€proof.€ÏMr.€Heaney€was€the€supervisor€of€the€breath€alcohol€program€for€the€State€ofÏTennessee€through€his€employment€in€the€Forensic€Services€Division€of€theÏTennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation.€€As€part€of€his€employment€duties,€HeaneyÏwas€required€to€regularly€check€and€monitor€the€accuracy€of€Intoximeter€3000Ímachines€throughout€the€state€which€are€monitored€by€the€T.B.I.,€including€theÏmachine€used€to€test€the€Defendant€on€the€night€of€his€arrest.€€According€toÏHeaney,€each€Intoximeter€3000€machine€has€a€deviation€rate€of€plus€or€minusÏ.005€or€plus€or€minus€five€(5%)€percent,€whichever€is€greater.€€€In€addition,ÏHeaney€noted€that€the€machine€is€programed€to€automatically€round€òòdownwardóóÏto€the€nearest€òòhundredthóó€after€it€has€interpreted€the€test.€€For€instance,€if€theÏmachine€interprets€€a€blood€concentration€by€weight€of€.049999,€it€would€print€outÏa€result€of€.04.ÌÌà àà àHeaney€testified€that€the€particular€machine€which€was€used€to€testÏDefendant€was€checked€on€July€21,€1994€and€again€on€October€25,€1994.€€TheÏaccuracy€of€the€machine€is€tested€by€taking€known€standards€and€ð ðblowingððÏthem€œÌinto›€the€machine€using€ð ða€simulator€of€known€alcohol€concentration.ðð€€During€theÏJuly€21,€1994€test,€a€known€sample€of€.025€was€used€and€the€machine€wasÏreading€high€and€gave€a€result€of€.0253.€€On€the€same€date,€the€machine€wasÏalso€reading€low€when€a€known€sample€of€€.100€gave€a€result€of€.0976.€€ÌÌà àà àDuring€the€October€25,€1994€test,€the€0.025€standard€was€runÏthrough€the€machine€and€it€gave€the€result€of€0.0262.€€When€the€.100€standardÏwas€submitted€to€the€machine€on€October€25,€1994,€it€gave€a€result€of€.0985.€ÍTherefore€during€the€two€regular€monitorings€of€the€machine,€before€and€afterÏDefendantððs€arrest,€the€machine€was€reading€both€high€and€low,€but€within€theÏacceptable€tolerance€of€plus€or€minus€.005.€€ÌÌà àà àFrom€the€proof€in€this€record,€we€discern€that€a€.04€reading€on€theÏIntoximeter€3000€can€result€from€actual€blood€alcohol€concentrations€ranging€fromÏ.035€to€.054.€€We€arrive€at€this€conclusion€from€the€following€analysis€of€theÏevidence.€€If€the€machine€is€reading€ð ðhighðð€.005,€a€.035€actual€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€would€be€interpreted€and€reported€as€a€.04€by€the€IntoximeterÏ3000.€€If€the€machine€were€reading€ð ðlowðð€.005,€an€actual€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€by€weight€of€.054€would€be€òòinterpretedóó€by€the€machine€as€.049Ïand€reported€as€a€.04€after€automatically€rounding€òòdownwardóó€to€the€nearestÏhundredth.€€It€is€not€clear€at€all€in€the€record€why€the€machine€gives€a€result€inÏthe€ten„thousandths€when€being€monitored,€but€only€in€the€hundredths€whenÏbeing€used€to€test€persons€suspected€of€being€under€the€influence€of€alcohol.ÌÌà àà àBased€on€the€record,€it€appears€that,€when€carried€to€theÏòòthousandthsóó,€a€.04€printout€could€be€the€result€of€twenty€(20)€different€bloodÏalcohol€concentrations.€€Five€(5)€of€those€(.035€„€.0359)€would€be€below€.04.€ÌÌà àà àDefendant€alleges€that€based€upon€the€proof€in€this€record,€theÏState€failed€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€he€was€guilty€of€the€crimeÏcharged€since€there€is€a€distinct€mathematical€possibility€that€his€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€was€less€than€.04.€€The€issue€presented€by€Defendant€isÏapparently€one€of€first€impression€in€Tennessee.€€Neither€the€State€nor€theÏDefendant€in€this€appeal€have€cited€or€relied€upon€any€cases€from€otherÏjurisdictions€which€address€this€precise€issue.ÌÌà àà àHowever,€we€have€been€able€to€find€cases€from€other€jurisdictionsÏwhich€have€dealt€with€the€issue.€€Some€of€these€cases€have€taken€the€positionÏurged€by€Defendant.€€In€òòState€v.€Boehmeróó,€1€Haw.€€App.€44,€613€P.2d€916Ï(1980),€two€(2)€separate€cases€were€consolidated€for€appeal.€€In€each€case,Ïthe€Defendant€was€arrested€for€driving€under€the€influence€and€given€aÏbreathalyzer€test.€€Defendant€Boehmerððs€test€showed€.11€weight€of€alcohol€andÏDefendant€Gogoððs€test€result€was€.10€weight€of€alcohol€in€the€blood.€€In€bothÏcases,€the€undisputed€proof€was€that€the€particular€breathalyzer€machine€had€aÏmargin€of€error€of€0.0165.€€The€statute€involved€was€not€a€ð ðper€seðð€statute€asÏfound€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€55„50„408,€but€rather€provided€thatÏif€a€defendant€had€.10€or€more€by€weight€of€alcohol€in€his€or€her€blood,€it€createdÏa€presumption€that€the€defendant€was€under€the€influence€of€intoxicating€liquor.€ÍThe€Hawaii€Court€of€Appeals€recognized€that€it€was€apparent€the€trial€judgeÏrelied€œÌupon›€the€breathalyzer€test€as€creating€a€presumption€of€each€defendantððs€stateÏof€intoxication.€€The€court€reversed€and€remanded€both€cases€and€specificallyÏœheld:›€ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€failure€of€the€prosecution€to€establish€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt€that€the€actual€weight€of€alcohol€in€defendantððs€blood€was€atÏleast€.10%€required€the€trial€judge€to€ignore€the€statutoryÏpresumption€in€its€determination.ÌÌÌòòBoehmeróó,€613€P.2d€at€918.ÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Bjornsenóó,€201€Neb.€709,€271€N.W.2d€839€(1978),€theÏdefendant€appealed€from€his€conviction€of€operating€a€motor€vehicle€whileÏhaving€.10€percent€alcohol€by€weight€in€this€blood.€€The€Nebraska€SupremeÏCourt€noted€that€there€was€no€evidence€of€the€defendantððs€intoxication€toÏsustain€a€conviction€other€than€the€results€of€the€blood€test.€€The€arresting€officerÏœobserved›€that€the€defendant€had€an€odor€of€alcohol€on€his€breath€and€that€thereÏwas€a€partially€filled€wine€bottle€found€at€the€scene.€€The€results€of€theÏdefendantððs€blood€test€was€.10€percent€of€alcohol€by€weight.€€The€expert€whoÏtestified€at€trial€stated€that€this€result€was€accurate€ð ðwithin€five€thousandthsÏ[.005]€of€a€percent.ðð€€The€Supreme€Court€of€Nebraska€reversed€the€convictionÏand€dismissed€the€case.€€In€doing€so,€the€court€œheld:›ÌÓÓÌà8 àWhile€the€Legislature€has€the€acknowledged€right€to€prescribeÏacceptable€methods€of€testing€for€alcohol€content€in€body€fluids€andÏperhaps€even€the€right€to€prescribe€that€such€evidence€isÏadmissible€in€a€court€of€law,€it€is€a€judicial€determination€as€toÏwhether€this€evidence€is€sufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction,€if€theÏevidence€is€believed.€€The€Legislature€has€selected€a€particularÏpercent€of€alcohol€to€be€a€criminal€offense€if€present€in€a€personÏoperating€a€Çœà8 àmotor›€vehicle.€€It€is€not€unreasonable€to€require€that€the€test,Ïdesigned€to€show€that€percent,€do€so€outside€of€any€error€orÏtolerance€inherent€in€the€testing€œprocess.›ÌòòÌÌBjornsenóó,€271€N.W.2d€at€710„11.ÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòHaynes€v.€State,€Department€of€Public€Safetyóó,€865€P.2d€753Ï(Alaska€1993),€the€Appellant€Haynesðð€œdriverððs›€license€was€revoked€underÏAlaska€law€because€following€his€arrest€for€driving€while€intoxicated,€the€result€ofÏan€Intoximeter€3000€test€showed€a€reading€of€.106€grams€of€alcohol€per€210Ïliters€of€breath.€€Alaska€statutes€permitted€revocation€of€a€driverððs€license€upon€aÏchemical€test€producing€a€result€of€.10€or€more.€€In€that€case,€the€testimony€atÏtrial€was€that€the€Intoximeter€3000€had€a€recognized€margin€of€error€of€.01€gramsÏper€210€liters€of€breath.€€The€Alaska€Supreme€Court€reversed€the€revocation€ofÏMr.€œHaynesðð€driverððs›€license.€€That€court€held€that€based€upon€the€AlaskaÏConstitution,€it€was€a€violation€of€due€process€to€revoke€a€personððs€driverððsÏlicense€when€the€inherent€margin€of€error€of€the€testing€device€was€not€applied€inÏfavor€of€the€person€subject€to€license€revocation.€€òòHaynesóó,€865€P.2d€at€756.ÌÌà àà àOther€jurisdictions€have€held€that€a€similar€margin€of€error€does€notÏrequire€a€conviction€to€be€reversed€based€upon€insufficiency€of€evidence.€€InÏòòState€v.€Lentinióó,€240€N.J.Super.€330,€573€A.2d€464€(1990),€the€Superior€Court€ofÏNew€Jersey,€Appellate€Division,€addressed€the€issue€wherein€the€defendantÍwas€given€two€(2)€breathalyzer€tests,€where€both€readings€were€exactly€.10.€€InÏNew€Jersey€at€the€time,€the€defendant€was€convicted€under€a€statute€whichÏmade€it€a€criminal€offense€to€operate€ð ða€motor€vehicle€with€a€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€of€0.10%€or€more€by€weight€of€alcohol€in€the€defendantððs€blood€.€.€.Ï.ðð€€Both€the€œÌdefendantððs›€expert€witness€and€the€trooper€who€arrested€the€defendant€testifiedÏthat€the€breathalyzer€had€an€accuracy€of€plus€or€minus€0.01%.€€The€court€notedÏthat€the€reading€of€0.10€reflected€a€blood€alcohol€concentration€anywhereÏbetween€.09€and€.11€percent.€€The€New€Jersey€Court€stated€that€the€preciseÏissue€was€whether€the€.10€reading€from€the€properly€operated€and€functioningÏmachine€was€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction€under€the€applicable€statute€inÏlight€of€the€0.01%€tolerance.€€That€court€deemed€the€issue€to€present€a€questionÏof€legislative€intent.€€It€analyzed€several€statutes€in€New€Jersey€which€areÏsimilar€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€55„10„408€(inference€which€canÏbe€raised€by€.10€percent€by€weight€of€alcohol€in€blood),€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€55„10„406€(implied€consent€law),€and€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€€55„10„405€(chemical€test€for€alcohol€content€may€includeÏspecimen€of€blood,€urine,€or€breath).€€The€New€Jersey€Court€rejected€theÏdefendantððs€argument€that€the€inherent€margin€of€error€of€the€breathalyzerÏmachine,€where€the€result€reported€was€.10,€prevented€the€State€from€provingÏthe€offense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€The€New€Jersey€Court€held:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà àIn€the€present€case,€defendant€seeks€to€blunt€theÏœLegislatureððs›€resolve€by€giving€new€vigor€to€the€probative€value€ofÏexpert€testimony€in€the€interest€of€eliminating€a€possible€deviation€ofÏ1/100€of€a€percent.€€If€defendantððs€contention€is€adopted,€theÏpresumptions€established€by€N.J.S.A.€39:450.1(1)€and€(2),€(seeÏfootnote€one,€supra)€as€well€as€the€òòperóó€òòseóó€bright€line€of€0.10%Ïwould€have€to€be€adjusted€in€derogation€of€the€statutesðð€objectiveÏœstandards.›€€The€adjustment€would€have€to€be€made€on€a€case„by„case€basis€depending€on€the€expert€testimony€introduced€inÏeach€case.€€No€expert€is€bound€by€the€opinion€evidence€in€theÏpresent€case€regarding€any€breathalyzerððs€margin€of€deviation.€ÏThus,€the€carefully€construed€regulatory€scheme€will€in€many€casesÏagain€become€a€battle€of€the€experts.€€As€€Tischio€[òòState€v.€Tischioóó,Ï107€N.J.€504,€527€A.2d€388€(1987)]€demonstrated,€that€would€beÏinconsistent€with€the€Legislatureððs€intent.Ì̛̜à8 àà àMoreover,€if€it€cannot€be€determined,€as€appears€to€be€theÏcase,€whether€the€tolerance€is€to€be€added€to€or€subtracted€fromÏthe€breathalyzer€reading,€then,€contrary€to€the€statute,€a€0.11%Ïreading€will€be€required€to€establish€the€per€se€violation.ÌÌÌòòLentinióó,€573€A.2d€at€467.ÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòKing€v.€Commonwealthóó,€875€S.W.2d€902€(Ky.€App.€1993),€theÏdefendant€was€convicted€for€a€ð ðper€se€DUI.ðð€€The€Intoxilyzer€5000€machine€wasÏused€to€test€the€defendantððs€blood€alcohol€concentration€and€gave€a€result€ofÏ.100.€€There€was€uncontradicted€evidence€at€trial€that€the€particular€machineððsÏmargin€of€error€was€plus€or€minus€.005.€€In€the€appeal,€the€defendant€allegedÏthat€his€rights€to€due€process€of€law€were€violated€when€he€was€denied€aÍdirected€verdict€for€acquittal€given€the€fact€that€the€results€admitted€into€evidenceÏwere€within€the€margin€of€error.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€Kentucky€Court€of€Appeals€stated€the€issue€to€œbe:ÌÓÓÌà8 à[I]s›€an€Intoxilyzer€5000€reading€of€.100€sufficient,€probative€evidenceÏto€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€a€person€has€anÏððalcohol€concentration€in€his€blood€or€breath€of€.10€or€moreðð€asÏrequired€by€KRS€189A.010(1)(a)€when€the€intoxilyzer€machine€inÏquestion€has€a€margin€of€error€of€plus/minus€.005?€€We€think€that€itÏis€and€affirm€the€Circuit€œCourt.ÌÌÌòòKingóó,›€875€S.W.2d€at€902.ÌÓÓÌà àà àThe€Kentucky€Court€of€Appeals€noted€that€in€our€imperfect€world,Ïany€machine,€including€intoxilyzers,€would€have€a€margin€of€error.€€The€court€thenÏaddressed€the€question€of€how€much€of€a€margin€of€error€would€be€tolerated€œÌbefore›€a€reading€would€no€longer€be€credible€or€be€of€any€probative€value.€ÏWhile€œÌagreeing›€that€the€margin€of€error€of€the€machine€should€be€considered€inÏdetermining€the€probative€value€of€the€machineððs€results,€the€court€noted€that€theÏadmissibility€of€the€evidence€based€upon€the€reliability€of€the€machine€was€an€Ïissue€for€the€trial€judge.€€In€reaching€its€conclusion,€the€Kentucky€Court€ofÏAppeals€held,ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€.005€margin€of€error€leaves€the€possibility€of€the€absolute€trueÏreading€to€fall€within€the€range€of€.095€to€.105.€€That€is€a€possibilityÏof€five€thousandths€above€or€below€a€true€reading.€€òòWhere€theÏLegislature€speaks€in€terms€of€an€alcohol€concentration€of€.10,€theyÏmerely€went€into€the€hundredthsóó€.€.€œ.€.€›€œTo›€exclude€a€reading€with€aÏpossible€error€of€five€thousandths€would€be€requiring€theÏCommonwealth€to€prove€in€the€realm€of€beyond€ð ðanyðð€doubt€[asÏopposed€to€proving€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt].€ÌÌÌòòKingóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€903€(emphasis€added).ÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Ruckeróó,€297€A.2d€400€(Del.€Super.€Ct.€1972),€the€trialÏcourt€in€Delaware€reversed€the€dismissal€of€the€defendantððs€DUI€case€by€theÏDelaware€Court€of€Common€Pleas.€€The€pertinent€statute,€as€quoted€in€theÏopinion€states€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àAny€person€who€drives,€operates,€or€has€in€actual€physical€controlÏa€motor€vehicle€while€such€personððs€blood€has€reached€a€bloodÏalcohol€concentration€of€1/10€of€1%€or€more,€by€weight,€as€shownÏby€a€chemical€analysis€of€a€blood,€breath,€or€urine€sample€takenÏwithin€four€(4)€hours€of€the€alleged€offense,€shall€be€guilty€under€thisÏsection.€€òòÌÌÌRuckeróó,€297€A.2d€at€402.€€ÌÓÓÌà àà àThe€Delaware€Court€of€Common€Pleas€found€that€the€DefendantððsÏreading€from€the€ð ðMobatðð€machine€was€0.104.€€With€a€margin€of€error€of€asÏmuch€as€0.009,€the€possibility€was€that€the€Defendant€had€an€actual€bloodÏalcohol€œÌconcentration›€of€0.095.€€On€this€basis,€the€lower€court€dismissed€the€case.€€InÏreversing,€the€trial€court€in€Delaware€held:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà àUnder€the€terms€of€the€statute,€the€trier€of€fact€must€determineÏwhether€the€test€results€show€the€required€percentage€of€alcohol€inÏthe€blood.€€òòThe€trier€of€fact€is€not€free€to€disregard€the€mandate€ofÏthe€statute€or€to€question€the€wisdom€of€the€General€Assembly€inÏproviding€that€test€results€constitute€proof€of€that€element€of€theÏcrimeóó.€ÌÌà8 àà àThe€possible€variance€in€results€between€various€types€ofÏtests€and€the€possible€€variances€in€readings€between€tests€takenÏwhile€the€accused€was€driving€and€those€taken€afterwards€mayÏbe€an€inherent€weakness€of€the€statutory€provisions.€€The€GeneralÏAssembly€could€have€considered€these€possible€variances€when€itÏenacted€the€legislation,€but€the€legislation€is€so€worded€as€toÏpreclude€these€factors€from€being€considered€as€issues€of€fact.€€ÌÌÌòòRuckeróó,€297€A.2d€at€œ402„03›€(emphasis€added)ÌÓÓÌà àà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€55„50„408€provides€asÏfollows:Ìò òÓÓÌà8 àDriving€under€the€influenceó 󀄄€For€purposes€of€this€chapter€and€ððÏ55„10„401,€any€person€who€drives,€operates€or€exercises€physicalÏcontrol€of€a€commercial€motor€vehicle€with€a€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€of€point€zero€four€(.04)€or€more€commits€the€offense€ofÏdriving€while€under€the€influence€of€alcohol,€in€violation€of€€ðð€55„50„405.ÌÓÓÌà àà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€55„10„406(a)(1)€provides€inÏpart,€ð ð[a]ny€person€who€drives€any€motor€vehicle€in€the€State€of€TennesseeÍshall€be€deemed€to€have€given€consent€to€a€test€for€the€purpose€of€determiningÏthe€alcoholic€or€drug€content€of€that€personððs€blood;ðð€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€55„10„405(5)€provides€that€ð ððð[t]estðð€means€any€chemical€testÏdesigned€to€determine€the€alcoholic€or€drug€content€of€the€blood.€€The€specimenÏto€be€used€for€such€test€shall€include€blood,€urine€or€breath.ððÌÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Snyderóó,€835€S.W.2d€30€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),€theÏdefendant€was€convicted€of€a€violation€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sectionÏ55„50„408.€€He€was€operating€a€tractor€trailer€rig€and€was€stopped€by€an€officerÏof€the€Tennessee€Public€Service€Commission€for€a€routine€safety€inspection.€ÏDetecting€an€odor€of€alcohol€and€bloodshot€eyes,€as€well€as€two€(2)€emptyÏbeer€cans€and€a€partially€full€can€of€beer€in€the€cab€of€the€truck€(a€passengerÏwas€also€inside),€the€officer€administered€an€Intoximeter€3000€test€on€theÏdefendant.€€The€test€was€given€twice€and€each€time€registered€.04.€€AllÏwitnesses€concurred€that€the€defendantððs€ability€to€drive€was€not€visiblyÏimpaired.€€In€fact,€that€case€reflects€that€the€Public€Service€Commission€officerÏordered€the€defendant€to€drive€from€the€scene€of€the€inspection€to€the€CarterÏCounty€Courthouse€for€administration€of€the€intoximeter€test.€€In€overruling€theÏdefendantððs€issue€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€charging€the€jury€that€it€had€toÏfind€him€actually€physically€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€to€return€a€guiltyÏverdict,€our€court€œheld:›ÌÓÓÌà8 àà àBy€enacting€T.C.A.€ðð€55„50„408,€the€legislature€made€it€aÏcrime€to€operate€a€commercial€motor€vehicle€with€a€blood€alcoholÏconcentration€of€point€zero€four€(.04)€or€more.€€Neither€the€need€toÏprove€impairment€nor€the€rebuttable€presumption€contained€inÏT.C.A.€ðð€55„10„408€applies€in€such€cases.€€The€language€of€theÏstatute€is€clear€and€references€to€the€other€DUI€provisions€in€theÏcode€indicate€that€the€legislature€intended€to€create€a€higherÏstandard€of€care€for€those€who€drive€commercial€motor€vehicles.ÌÌÌòòSnyderóó,€835€S.W.2d€at€32.ÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Sensingóó,€843€S.W.2d€412€(Tenn.€1992),€our€supremeÏcourt€set€forth€new€standards€for€a€breath€test€to€be€admissible€in€court.€€InÏdoing€so,€the€court€specifically€discussed€the€Intoximeter€3000€and€noted€that€itÏhad€a€systematic€error€of€plus€or€minus€five€(5%)€percent€or€0.005€percentÏweight€to€œÌvolume,›€whichever€is€greater.€€While€acknowledging€in€the€context€of€DUI€casesÏ(which€are€not€ð ðper€seðð€DUI€cases)€that€the€scientific€tests€are€corroborativeÏevidence€which€may€exonerate€as€well€as€convict€an€accused€person€œin›€aÏclose€case,€the€supreme€court€further€stated,ÌÓÓÌà8 àIndeed€the€purpose€of€all€the€testing€is€to€provide€objective€scientificÏdata€to€eliminate€guesswork€and€speculation€and€to€supplementÏthe€fallible€observations€of€humans.ÌÌÌòòSensingóó,€843€S.W.2d€at€417.ÌÓÓÌà àà àœI›€œam€inclined›€to€accept€the€reasoning€of€the€courts€in€òòState€v.ÏLentinióó,€240€N.J.Super.€330,€573€A.2d€464€(1990),€òòKing€v.€Commonwealthóó,€875ÏS.W.2d€902€œ(Ky.›€œApp.›€œ1993),›€and€òòState€v.€Ruckeróó,€297€A.2d€400€(Del.€Super.ÏCt.€1972),€in€light€of€the€above„quoted€provisions€of€our€statutory€law€and€underÏthe€reasoning€expressed€in€the€Tennessee€cases€of€òòSensingóó€and€òòSnyderóó.€ÌÌà àà àSimilar€to€New€Jersey,€our€legislature€has€enacted€statutes€whichÏreflect€the€importance€placed€upon€curbing€the€problem€of€drivers€operatingÏvehicles€while€under€the€influence€of€intoxicants.€€Specifically,€any€driver€inÏTennessee€has€given€his€or€her€implied€consent€to€be€tested€by€blood,€urine,€orÏbreath€specimen€when€suspected€of€operating€a€vehicle€under€the€influence€ofÏintoxicants.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€55„10„405€„€406.€€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€55„50„408€is€a€ð ðper€seðð€driving€under€the€influence€statute€similar€to€theÏstatutes€in€New€Jersey,€Kentucky,€and€Delaware.€€Our€supreme€court€inÏòòSensingóó€has€approved€the€admissibility€into€evidence€of€the€Intoximeter€3000Ïresult€when€a€proper€foundation€has€been€laid.€€Our€court€in€òòSnyderóó€hasÏalready€recognized€œÌthe›€legislative€intent€to€create€a€higher€standard€of€care€for€those€who€driveÏcommercial€motor€vehicles.€€As€in€Kentucky,€our€legislature€has€spoken€in€termsÏof€an€alcohol€concentration€in€the€hundredths,€rather€than€in€the€thousandths.€ÏSimilar€to€the€situation€addressed€by€the€Kentucky€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòKingóó,€theÍmargin€of€error€of€the€Intoximeter€3000€is€in€the€thousandths€rather€than€theÏhundredths.€€When€read€òòinóó€òòparióó€òòmateriaóó,€our€statutes€show€a€legislative€intentÏthat€the€properly€taken€test€results€of€a€specimen€of€breath€constitute€proof€ofÏthe€necessary€element€of€blood€alcohol€concentration.€€œTherefore,›€œin›€this€caseÏœthere›€was€sufficient€evidence€to€sustain€Defendantððs€conviction€upon€anÏIntoximeter€3000€reading€of€.04.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€other€attack€upon€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€DefendantÏargues€that€the€conviction€should€be€reversed€because€the€statute€speaks€inÏterms€of€blood€alcohol€concentration€of€.04€or€more,€and€the€Intoximeter€3000Ïmachine€gives€the€result€by€ð ðweight€of€alcohol€for€every€100€ccððs€or€100€millilitersÏof€blood.ðð€€Mr.€Heaney,€the€supervisor€of€the€blood€alcohol€program€forÏTennessee,€testified€that€the€Intoximeter€3000€measures€the€weight€of€alcohol€inÏthe€subjectððs€blood,€i.e.€it€is€the€weight€of€alcohol€for€every€100€cubic€centimetersÏof€blood.€€He€further€testified€that€ð ðblood€alcohol€concentrationðð€is€a€general€termÏthat€can€mean€either€volume€of€alcohol€in€the€blood€or€weight€of€alcohol€in€theÏblood.ÌÌ€à àà àIn€a€footnote€to€òòSensingóó,€our€supreme€court€recognized€that€the€termÏblood€alcohol€concentration€is€expressed€in€a€percentage€of€weight€by€volumeÏbased€upon€the€grams€of€alcohol€per€100€cubic€centimeters€of€blood.€€œÌSpecifically,›€the€court€stated€ð ða€BAC€(blood€alcohol€concentration)€of€0.10%€w/vÏmeans€0.10€grams€of€alcohol€per€100€cubic€centimeters€of€blood€or€0.10€gramsÏof€alcohol€per€every€210€liters€of€breath.ðð€€òòSensingóó,€843€S.W.2d€at€415,€n.€2.ÌÌà àà àUnder€òòSensingóó,€the€Defendantððs€argument€that€this€case€should€beÏdismissed€because€there€was€not€proof€of€ð ðblood€alcohol€concentrationðð€isÏwithout€merit.ÌÌà àà àHaving€found€Defendantððs€issues€to€be€without€merit,€we€affirm€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court.Ìà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓÓ  Óà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JudgeÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€G.€RILEY,€JudgeÌ