ÿWPCR `'È…>³*Ò>‹¤ˆÉqæ`õÝLsÝ-ï-_Q]‹ë$#†ÔØ!Mžö6E±CÏ<¯‡r»ØÃë yœ¶OQFÌ<ö>Åž7 „u0IGÑ ãç 9u9¦s}c,ÿyG;!g7LAüpâVçP׬ÁÉ}¥U‘#/õ1uxW6¡þ"[YÅåLv›ÊsPÙ:e–Tþ)}â—o™`|$M’Ht‹â¤ ”X O2 ¶¸SBMà3?”u™8WØ1˜Î›¡YŽ&nÕïÖ8 CÔ—™ft£$ØäËÿr´¥mQÐGì¸4ðó_Â^Å’ªBø£\=ˆ9YœŸe m¯©ñÒñûjŽä’(yJ²0¾Ø×ºC²ôä„™FAÉîÀM^tÂÊ3`Vç‹Iàø0Á­2LY ðÚóñÉš<›Ÿg©Àc&sC£‚s\ó*¯ÇQ ë½QåW+{C“Õš#`v|Ä­žž¿@ù&;TPšÅþëAÐK´ãްmSÖeLÕª}#ð—XQ’~ ÃÇžƒgID—:7ÑÆ )—p\wk¸Ò¬óÏÞH;Ò‡5E–´«YbŸûÖ “ñª³ AÜ ê ‚ƒe·v6h|¾b#Á\ % 0D# 0ˆg UNï N= ? zG ÒÁ 0D“ z× ÒQ ^ # Æ/ Æõ Æ»ÆwGNK4MaEpr mttttttttttttttttttttttb‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹ 0ë““““ B~~ 0¤› D3? D-r 0KŸŸ ASêÆ= 0¤ A«§˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0»($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptEœ-s Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 53j1,bk1ˆ£3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ- ù-(|G2ˆY$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€M}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôâåò»»Ô d(|3ƒ$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€M}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_XYEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ƒ$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€M}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€M}»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼M}»»»ÔÑ8€‘XXdì»»d8ÑÓ  Óà@@ttìàÔ‡îKlM}ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ ° Ðà@@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼M}»îîKl#ÔÐ Ö& ÐAssigned€on€Briefs€à @ àà @h àJanuary€23,€2002Ð üL ÐÔ‡X‘X»¼M}ÔÌò òÔ#†¼M}»XX‘#ÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€IVAN€RAY€SHIRKòòóóÔ‡X‘X»¼M}Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@r r ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@M M ìàNo.€59857€€€€€€Richard€R.€Ô_ÔBaumgartnerÔ_Ô,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@¼¼ìàNo.€E2001„00460„CCA„R3„CD€Ð ¥õ  ÐAugust€21,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ‘á  ÐßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÓúÓÌThe€defendant,€Ivan€Ray€ShirkÔ#†¼M}»XX‘•#ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}Ô,€appeals€from€the€Knox€County€Criminal€CourtððsÔ#†¼M}»XX‘3#ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}Ô€denial€of€his€motionÐ xÈ  Ðto€declare€void€the€judgmentÔ#†¼M}»XX‘§#ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}Ô€proclaiming€him€to€be€a€habitual€offender€pursuant€to€the€MotorÐ d´ ÐVehicle€Habitual€Offenders€(MVHO)€Act.€€He€contends€that€the€MVHO€judgment€is€void€becauseÐ P  Ðthe€trial€court€improperly€entered€it€nunc€pro€tunc€before€entry€of€the€judgments€on€two€of€the€threeÐ <Œ Ðqualifying€offensesÔ#†¼M}»XX‘/#ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}Ô.€We€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€void€the€MVHOÐ (x Ðjudgment.Ô#†¼M}»XX‘Â#ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}ԀРd ÐÌò òÓ  ÓTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Criminal€Court€Affirmedó óÐ ì< ÐÓ°ÓÌòòÔ#†¼M}»àX‘w#ÔÔ‡X‘X.¼M}ÔJoseph€M.€Tipton,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòGary€R.€Wade,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,óó€and€òòJamesÐ Ä ÐCurwood€Witt,€Jr.,€J.óó,€joined.Ð ° ÐÌMark€E.€Stephens,€District€Public€Defender;€Paula€R.€Voss€and€John€Halstead,€Assistant€PublicÐ ˆØ ÐDefenders,€for€the€appellant,€Ivan€Ray€Shirk.Ð tÄ ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Thomas€E.€Williams,€III,€Assistant€AttorneyÐ L œ ÐGeneral;€Randall€E.€Nichols,€District€Attorney€General;€and€Philip€H.€Morton,€Assistant€DistrictÐ 8!ˆ  ÐAttorney€General,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð $"t! ÐÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼M}»XX‘Y #ÔÔ‡X‘X»¼M}ԈРü#L# ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼M}»XX‘y #ÔÔ€X‘X»¼M}Ôà  àOn€January€19,€1996,€the€defendant€pled€guilty€to€two€counts€of€driving€on€a€revoked€licenseÐ Ô%$!% Ð(DRL),€a€Class€B€misdemeanor,€for€offenses€occurring€on€October€2,€1994,€and€February€19,€1995.€Ð À&"& ÐAt€the€submission€hearing,€the€state€presented€a€petition€to€have€the€defendant€declared€a€habitualÐ ¬'ü"' Ðmotor€vehicle€offender.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„601€et€seq.€€In€addition€to€the€two€DRLÐ ˜(è#( Ðoffenses,€the€state€listed€a€February€20,€1992€conviction€for€driving€under€the€influence€of€anÐ „)Ô$) Ðintoxicant€(DUI)€as€the€qualifying€convictions.€€The€state€asserted€that€the€defendant€had€agreed€toÐ p*À%* Ðconcede€that€he€was€a€habitual€offender€and€that€it€had€agreed€that€the€judgment€on€the€MVHOÐ \+¬&+ Ðconviction€would€be€entered€nunc€pro€tunc€to€take€effect€October€2,€1994.€€The€trial€court€found€theÐ H,˜', Ðdefendant€to€be€a€habitual€offender€under€the€MVHO€Act€because€he€had€been€convicted€of€threeÐ 4-„(-ýà Ðtraffic€offenses€within€a€five„year€period.€€It€entered€a€judgment€nunc€pro€tunc€to€October€2,€1994,Ð ° Ðordering€him€to€surrender€his€driverððs€license€and€prohibiting€him€from€having€a€driverððs€license€forÐ œì Ðthree€years.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àOn€November€7,€2000,€the€defendant€moved€the€trial€court€to€declare€the€MVHO€judgmentÐ `° Ðvoid€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P,€because€the€judgments€for€his€DRL€convictions€wereÐ L œ Ðnot€entered€until€May€17,€1996,€which€was€after€the€entry€of€the€MVHO€judgment.€€At€the€hearingÐ 8 ˆ Ðon€this€motion,€the€trial€court€found€that€it€had€reserved€judgment€on€the€DRL€cases€until€May€17,Ð $ t Ð1996,€in€order€to€give€the€defendant€a€chance€to€pay€his€costs€on€those€cases.€€It€observed€that€theÐ  ` Ðdefendant€had€agreed€to€be€declared€a€habitual€offender€in€exchange€for€the€stateððs€agreement€thatÐ ü L  Ðthe€judgment€be€ordered€nunc€pro€tunc€to€October€2,€1994.€€It€found€that,€thereby,€the€defendantÐ è 8  Ðreceived€the€benefit€of€the€opportunity€to€obtain€a€driverððs€license€three€years€after€October€2,€1994,Ð Ô$  Ðrather€than€January€19,€1996.€€It€concluded€that€while€the€MVHO€judgment€might€be€voidable,€it€wasÐ À  Ðnot€void,€noting€that€it€had€jurisdiction€over€the€defendant,€who€was€present€and€had€signed€theÐ ¬ü  Ðjudgment.€€It€also€determined€that€the€defendant€had€waived€any€irregularities€in€the€judgmentÐ ˜è  Ðbecause€he€waited€an€unreasonable€length€of€time€before€seeking€to€set€it€aside.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€MVHO€judgment€is€void€because€(1)€the€nunc€pro€tunc€entryÐ \¬ Ðdid€not€reflect€an€earlier€judgment€and€(2)€it€was€entered€before€the€judgments€of€conviction€on€twoÐ H˜ Ðof€the€underlying€offenses.€€The€state€contends€that€the€defendantððs€lengthy€delay€in€challenging€theÐ 4„ ÐMVHO€judgment€is€unreasonable€under€Rule€60.02,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€€Although€it€concedes€that€theÐ  p Ðtrial€court€lacked€the€authority€to€enter€the€judgment€nunc€pro€tunc€to€1994,€it€argues€that€this€courtÐ  \ Ðshould€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€defendant€is€a€habitual€offender€and€remand€the€caseÐ øH Ðfor€proper€entry€of€the€MVHO€judgment.€€We€agree€with€the€defendant€that€the€nunc€pro€tunc€entryÐ ä4 Ðof€the€judgment€is€erroneous€but€conclude€that€it€does€not€render€the€MVHO€judgment€void.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àTennessee€case€law€has€firmly€established€that€a€proceeding€under€the€MVHO€Act€is€civilÐ ¨ø Ðin€nature€and€governed€by€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Maladyóó,€952€S.W.2dÐ ”ä Ð440,€444€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996);€òòEverhart€v.€Stateóó,€563€S.W.2d€795,€797€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€Ð €Ð ÐIn€the€present€case,€the€defendant€seeks€relief€from€the€judgment€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02,€whichÐ l¼ Ðprovides,€in€pertinent€part,€ð ðOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€partyÐ X ¨ Ðor€the€partyððs€legal€representative€from€a€final€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€the€followingÐ D!” Ðreasons:€€.€.€.€(3)€the€judgment€is€void€.€.€.€.€€The€motion€shall€be€made€within€a€reasonable€time€.€.Ð 0"€  Ð.€.ðð€€òòóóThe€burden€of€proof€is€on€the€one€seeking€relief€from€a€judgment€under€Rule€60.02€to€show€theÐ #l! Ðfacts€giving€rise€to€the€relief.€€òòBanks€v.€Dement€Const.€Co.óó,€817€S.W.2d€16,€18€(Tenn.€1991).€€ThisÐ $X" Ðburden€must€be€met€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€òòHoward€v.€Howardóó,€991€S.W.2d€251,€255Ð ô$D # Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999);€òòDuncan€v.€Duncanóó,€789€S.W.2d€557,€563€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€Ð à%0!$ ÐFurthermore,€a€trial€courtððs€denial€of€a€motion€for€relief€based€on€Rule€60€is€subject€to€reversal€onlyÐ Ì&"% Ðupon€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnderwood€v.€Zurich€Ins.€Co.óó,€854€S.W.2d€94,€97€(Tenn.€1993).Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àInitially,€we€examine€the€stateððs€contention€that€the€defendantððs€claims€must€fail€because€heÐ )à$( Ðhas€not€moved€to€vacate€the€MVHO€judgment€within€a€reasonable€time€under€Rule€60.02.€€It€arguesÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€the€trial€court€properly€found€that€the€defendantððs€near€four„year,€ten„month€delay€in€challengingÐ h+¸&* Ðthe€MVHO€judgment€was€unreasonable.€€Generally,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€a€four„year,Ð ° Ðten„month€delay€is€an€unreasonable€time€in€which€to€bring€a€Rule€60.02€challenge.€€The€broad€powerÐ œì Ðgranted€by€Rule€60.02€is€not€to€be€used€to€relieve€a€party€from€free,€calculated,€and€deliberateÐ ˆØ Ðchoices.€€òòSeeóó€òòBanksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€19€(construing€Rule€60.02(5)).€€Although€the€defendant€did€notÐ tÄ Ðattempt€to€explain€the€delay€at€the€hearing€on€his€motion€to€declare€the€MVHO€judgment€void,€theÐ `° Ðtrial€court€observed€that€ð ðapparently€there€was€some€driving€violation€that€occurred,€which€gave€riseÐ L œ Ðthen€to€your€motion€to€set€this€aside.ðð€€The€defendant€waited€almost€four€years,€ten€months€beforeÐ 8 ˆ Ðhe€challenged€the€MVHO€judgment€and€only€did€so€when€he€was€faced€with€the€potentialÐ $ t Ðramifications€of€violating€it.€€ð ðThe€defendant€cannot€use€this€court€to€benefit€from€his€neglect€afterÐ  ` Ðthe€judgment€was€rendered.ðð€€€òòState€v.€Ronald€D.€Correll,€Jr.óó,€Nos.€03C01„9707„CC„00295,€03C01„Ð ü L  Ð9801„CC„00014,€Blount€County,€slip€op.€at€4€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Oct.€21,€1998),€òòapp.€deniedóó€(Tenn.Ð è 8  ÐApr.€5,€1999)€(holding€that€the€defendantððs€unjustified,€twenty„month€delay€in€challenging€hisÐ Ô$  ÐMVHO€judgment€was€unreasonable€under€Rule€60.02);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòDay€v.€Dayóó,€931€S.W.2d€936,Ð À  Ð939-40€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996)€(holding€that€a€petition€challenging€a€divorce€decree€filed€fourteenÐ ¬ü  Ðmonths€after€the€decree€became€final€was€untimely€when€the€petitioner€made€a€free€and€deliberateÐ ˜è  Ðchoice€not€to€appeal€from€the€final€decree).€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€contends€that€òòRonald€D.€Correll,€Jr.óó€is€distinct€from€the€present€case€becauseÐ \¬ Ðthe€defects€in€the€judgment€in€òòCorrellóó€were€technical€in€nature€and,€notwithstanding€the€untimelinessÐ H˜ Ðof€the€defendantððs€challenge,€this€court€determined€that€the€defects€did€not€render€the€judgment€void.€Ð 4„ ÐHe€argues€that€in€the€present€case,€the€error€renders€the€Ô_ÔjudgmentÔ_Ô€void,€and€a€void€judgment€can€beÐ  p Ðchallenged€at€any€time.€€He€cites€to€òòPittman€v.€Pittmanóó,€which€holds€that€ð ðexcept€for€exceptionalÐ  \ Ðcircumstances€that€might€require€a€different€rule,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02ððs€reasonable€time€limitationÐ øH Ðdoes€not€place€a€time€limit€on€the€right€to€challenge€a€judgment€on€the€ground€that€it€is€void.ðð€€No.Ð ä4 Ð01„A„01„9301„CH„00014,€Maury€County,€slip€op.€at€5€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Aug.€24,€1994)€(analyzingÐ Ð  Ðhusbandððs€Rule€60.02(3)€challenge€to€divorce€decree€five€years€after€its€entry).€€Even€taking€theÐ ¼  Ðdefendantððs€contention€regarding€Rule€60.02ððs€time€limit€as€true,€the€judgment€is€not€void.€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€state€concedes€that€the€trial€court€erroneously€entered€the€MVHO€judgment€nunc€proÐ €Ð Ðtunc€to€be€effective€as€of€October€2,€1994.€€ð ðA€nunc€pro€tunc€order€is€not€permitted€to€antedate€andÐ l¼ Ðbelatedly€enter€of€record€a€judgment€never€in€fact€previously€pronounced€by€the€Court.ðð€€òòState€v.Ð X ¨ ÐMorrisóó,€788€S.W.2d€820,€824€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990);€òòseeóó€òòThomas€v.€Stateóó,€206€Tenn.€633,€639,Ð D!” Ð337€S.W.2d€1,€4€(1960)€(observing€that€ð ðwhere€a€judgment€is€pronounced€but€not€entered,€it€may€beÐ 0"€  Ðlater€entered€nunc€pro€tunc,€as€of€the€date€of€its€pronouncement,€provided€the€requisite€facts€appearÐ #l! Ðof€record€to€justify€its€entryðð).€€Here,€the€trial€court€rendered€no€Ô_ÔMVHOÔ_Ô€judgment€as€of€October€2,Ð $X" Ð1994,€and,€indeed,€any€such€judgment€would€have€been€before€the€defendant€committed€the€thirdÐ ô$D # Ðqualifying€offense.€€In€light€of€this€error,€the€state€argues€that€we€should€remand€the€case€for€the€trialÐ à%0!$ Ðcourt€to€reenter€the€MVHO€judgment,€presumably€as€of€January€19,€1996,€the€date€it€was€rendered.€Ð Ì&"% ÐThe€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€entry€nunc€pro€tunc€of€a€Ô_ÔjudgmentÔ_Ô€never€before€renderedÐ ¸'#& Ðmakes€the€MVHO€judgment€void.€€€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àÌà  àWe€begin€by€noting€that€a€judgment€is€void€if€imposed€by€a€court€lacking€in€jurisdiction€overÐ |*Ì%) Ðeither€the€subject€matter€or€the€parties.€€€òòNolan€v.€Cameronóó,€77€Tenn.€234,€237€(1882);€òòsee€alsoóó€€Ð h+¸&* ÐòòMagnavox€€Co.€v.€Boles€&€Ô_ÔHiteÔ_Ô€Constr.€Co.óó,€583€S.W.2d€611,€613€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1979)€(discussingÐ ° ÐRule€60.02(3)).€€ò òó óIf€a€judgment€meets€all€the€requirements€to€make€it€valid€and€the€objectionableÐ œì Ðportion€of€the€judgment€adds€nothing€to€its€force€and€the€exclusion€of€the€objectionable€portion€doesÐ ˆØ Ðnot€change€the€operation€or€effect€of€the€judgment,€then€the€objectionable€portion€can€be€treated€asÐ tÄ Ðsurplusage.€€òòFanning€v.€Flyóó,€42€Tenn.€486,€489„90€(1865);€16€Tenn.€Jur.€òòJudgments€and€Decreesóó€ððÐ `° Ð82€(1998);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòTorilla€v.€Alexanderóó,€104€Tenn.€453,€454,€58€S.W.124,€125€(1900)€(holding€theÐ L œ Ðobjectionable€words€stating€that€the€damages€were€subject€to€all€credits€were€surplusage€and€did€notÐ 8 ˆ Ðprevent€the€valid€judgment€from€being€final).€€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àOur€supreme€court€has€stated€in€dicta€that€a€judgment€actually€previously€rendered€and€laterÐ ü L  Ðentered€nunc€pro€tunc€to€a€day€preceding€the€date€of€rendition€ð ðwould€not€be€void,€but€onlyÐ è 8  Ðerroneous,€and€could€[be]€corrected€upon€appeal.ðð€€òòCollins€v.€Williamsóó,€162€Tenn.€262,€266,€36Ð Ô$  ÐS.W.2d€93,€95€(1931).€€In€òòLowder€v.€Andersonóó,€the€court€of€civil€appeals€struck€the€nunc€pro€tuncÐ À  Ðlanguage€in€the€probate€courtððs€order€because€the€court€had€not€made€the€order€on€the€date€to€whichÐ ¬ü  Ðit€was€entered€nunc€pro€tunc.€4€Hig.€620,€630€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1914).€€The€court€deemed€the€orderÐ ˜è  Ðto€be€proper€on€the€day€that€it€was€actually€made€and€regarded€the€nunc€pro€tunc€language€asÐ „Ô  Ðsurplusage,€noting€it€to€be€ð ðuseless€and€of€no€effect.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€rendered€an€MVHO€judgment€on€January€19,€1996.€Ð H˜ ÐFollowing€the€above€precedents,€the€nunc€pro€tunc€language€in€the€MVHO€judgment€is€surplusage,Ð 4„ Ðprovided€the€judgment€is€otherwise€valid.€€The€defendant€contends€that€the€MVHO€judgment€is€stillÐ  p Ðvoid€if€deemed€effective€as€of€its€actual€date€of€entry€on€January€19,€1996,€because€this€date€precedesÐ  \ Ðthe€entry€of€the€judgments€of€conviction€on€two€of€the€qualifying€offenses.€€He€also€argues€that€thisÐ øH Ðcourt€should€not€affirm€the€judgment€in€the€absence€of€the€nunc€pro€tunc€language€because€the€nuncÐ ä4 Ðpro€tunc€status€of€the€judgment€was€an€integral€part€of€his€agreement€to€concede€his€status€as€aÐ Ð  Ðhabitual€offender.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àAs€noted€above,€a€judgment€must€be€rendered€by€a€court€with€jurisdiction€over€the€subjectÐ ”ä Ðmatter€and€the€parties€to€be€valid.€€òòóóIn€the€present€case,€the€Knox€County€Criminal€Court,€as€a€courtÐ €Ð Ðof€general€criminal€jurisdiction,€had€jurisdiction€over€the€determination€of€the€defendantððs€MVHOÐ l¼ Ðstatus.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„606(a);€òòsee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€16„10„102€(granting€theÐ X ¨ Ðcircuit€courts€original€jurisdiction€over€all€crimes).€€Furthermore,€the€trial€court€expressly€found€thatÐ D!” Ðit€had€personal€jurisdiction€over€the€defendant,€who€was€present€at€the€submission€hearing.€€TheÐ 0"€  ÐMVHO€Act€requires€that€ð ðif€the€court€finds€that€such€defendant€is€an€habitual€offender,€the€courtÐ #l! Ðshall€make€an€order€directing€that€such€person€shall€not€operate€a€motor€vehicle€on€the€highways€ofÐ $X" Ðthis€state.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„613(a).€€The€present€MVHO€judgment€declares€the€defendantÐ ô$D # Ðto€be€a€habitual€offender€and€orders€that€he€may€not€have€a€driverððs€license€for€three€years.€€WeÐ à%0!$ Ðconclude€that€the€fact€that€the€DRL€convictions€were€not€entered€until€after€the€MVHO€judgment,Ð Ì&"% Ðeven€if€erroneous,€does€not€render€the€judgment€void.€€Furthermore,€we€deem€the€defendantððsÐ ¸'#& Ðcontention€regarding€the€nunc€pro€tunc€language€being€integral€to€his€concession€to€habitual€offenderÐ ¤(ô#' Ðstatus€to€relate€to€the€voluntariness€of€the€concession.€€Similarly,€an€involuntary€guilty€plea€rendersÐ )à$( Ðâ âthe€resulting€judgment€voidable,€not€void.€€òòArcher€v.€Stateóó,€851€S.W.2d€157,€164€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€Ð |*Ì%) Ðdefendantððs€claims€regarding€the€voluntariness€of€his€concession€do€not€render€the€MVHO€judgmentÐ ° Ðvoid.€€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àBased€upon€the€foregoing€and€the€record€as€a€whole,€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€theÐ tÄ Ðdefendantððs€motion€to€declare€the€MVHO€judgment€void.€€€€ò òó óÐ `° ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð  ` Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGE