ÿWPCÃ; H# UN  %Y 0P_U:¯4éý 0 Ò  0cÞU:AU:{ 0Jµ 0Tÿ 0^S 0h± 0r 0|‹ U. 0†5 0» 1uK 0dÀ w@$ Bd  U >‰ B)Ç AQð ÆA 0D 0@K 0D‹ D/Ï BþDC D3^ AM‘XÞÙ6%C4ÝwÑT"%#CG(ìŠ+v-/“0°Â2v~r4vÓð5˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(( ××  ×ó óÌà àThe€defendant€maintains€that€two€prospective€jurors,€Matthew€DupreeÏand€Melissa€Adams,€were€impermissibly€excused€for€cause€because€of€their€perceivedÏviews€on€capital€punishment.€€The€applicable€standard€for€determining€whether€a€jurorÏwas€properly€excused€for€cause€because€of€his€beliefs€on€the€death€penalty€isÏdelineated€in€òòWainwright€v.€Wittóó,€469€U.S.€412,€424,€105€S.€Ct.€844,€852€(1985),€and€isÏas€follows:€€"whether€the€juror's€views€would€'prevent€or€substantially€impair€theÏperformance€of€his€duties€as€a€juror€in€accordance€with€his€instructions€and€his€oath.'"€ÏThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€also€held€that€"this€standard€does€not€require€that€aÏjuror's€bias€be€proved€with€'unmistakable€clarity.'"€€òòIdóó.€€It€further€noted€that€"deferenceÏmust€be€paid€to€the€trial€judge€who€sees€and€hears€the€jurors."€€òòIdóó.€at€426,€105€S.€Ct.€atÏ853.ÌÌà àThe€state,€the€defense€and€the€trial€court€all€questioned€these€twoÏprospective€jurors.€€At€various€stages€of€the€questioning,€both€individuals€indicated€thatÏthey€could€in€no€way€vote€for€the€death€penalty.€€ÌÌà àWhen€Mr.€Dupree€was€asked€by€the€court€if€he€could€consider€theÏimposition€of€the€death€penalty€if€the€statutory€aggravating€circumstances€were€provenÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€and€there€were€no€mitigators,€Mr.€Dupree€stated,€"No,€IÏcouldn't€consider€a€death€penalty."€€Though€at€times€Mr.€Dupree€indicated€that€heÏwould€have€to€hear€all€the€facts€of€the€case€before€deciding€about€the€death€penalty,Íand€that€his€general€feelings€concerning€the€death€penalty€would€have€no€influenceÏover€his€verdict€of€guilt€or€innocence,€when€asked€by€the€trial€court€directly€about€theÏimposition€of€the€death€penalty,€he€stated€he€could€not€vote€for€it.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€asked€Mr.€Dupree€two€times€whether€he€could€impose€theÏdeath€penalty.€€The€first€time€he€said€that€he€did€not€"think€so,"€and€the€second€time€heÏsaid€"no."€€It€can€be€inferred€that€his€answer,€that€he€could€not€vote€for€the€deathÏpenalty,€"would€'prevent€or€substantially€impair€[his]€performance€of€his€duties€as€aÏjuror€in€accordance€with€his€instructions€and€his€oath.'"€€òòWainwrightóó,€469€U.S.€at€424,Ï105€S.€Ct.€at€852;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€893€S.W.2d€908,€915„16€(Tenn.€1994).€ÏAlthough€this€determination€might€not€be€certain,€it€need€not€be.€€It€can€be€said,Ïhowever,€that€it€is€evident€that€Mr.€Dupree's€performance€of€his€duties€would€haveÏbeen€impaired.€€Moreover,€as€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€stated,€greatÏdeference€should€be€given€to€the€trial€court,€who€is€"left€with€the€definite€impressionÏthat€a€prospective€juror€would€be€unable€to€faithfully€and€impartially€apply€the€law."€ÏòòWainwrightóó,€469€U.S.€at€426,€105€S.€Ct.€at€853.ÌÌà àMs.€Adams€also€expressed€sincere€reservations€about€the€death€penalty.€ÏShe€œstated€that›€œshe›€could€follow€the€law€but€that€she€was€opposed€to€the€death€penaltyÏbecause€of€her€religious€beliefs.€€Her€opposition€to€the€death€penalty€was€unequivocal.€ÏThe€defendant€contends,€however,€that€excusing€Ms.€Adams€because€of€her€religiousÍbeliefs€interferes€with€the€defendant's€constitutional€rights.€€Our€supreme€court€hasÏruled€that€because€a€juror's€"'views€on€capital€punishment€may€have€had€a€religiousÏfoundation€does€not€necessarily€transform€the€test€mandated€by€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€in€[òòWainwright€v.€Wittóó]€into€religious€tests€for€.€.€.€[constitutionalÏpurposes].'"€€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€789€S.W.2d€545,€547€(Tenn.€1990)€(quoting€òòState€v.€Boboóó,Ï727€S.W.2d€945,€949€(Tenn.€œ1987)).›€€Accordingly,€Ms.€Adams'€unmistakably€clearÏopposition€to€the€death€penalty,€though€based€on€religion,€could€render€her€unfit€as€aÏjuror.ÌÌà àWe€conclude€the€trial€court€appropriately€excused€jurors€Matthew€DupreeÏand€Melissa€Adams€for€cause€because€of€their€perceived€views€on€capital€punishment.€ÏThis€issue,€therefore,€is€without€merit.ÌÌò òà@ àòòGUILT€PHASEóóÌà@ àSufficiency€of€the€Evidenceó óÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€theÏconviction€of€murder€and€robbery.€€Mainly,€he€contends€that€the€state€offered€no€proof,Ïapart€from€the€uncorroborated€statement€of€the€defendant,€that€a€robbery€in€factÏoccurred.ÌÌà àIn€Tennessee,€great€weight€is€given€to€the€result€reached€by€the€jury€in€aÏcriminal€trial.€€A€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€court€accredits€the€state's€witnessesÏand€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€state.€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410Ï(Tenn.€1983).€€On€appeal,€the€state€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏevidence€and€all€reasonable€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.ÏCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€In€reviewing€the€sufficiency€of€theÏevidence,€the€relevant€question€is€whether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€T.R.A.P.€13(e);€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,Ï443€U.S.€307,€319,€99€S.€Ct.€2781,€2789€(1979);€òòState€v.€Duncanóó,€698€S.W.2d€63,€67Ï(Tenn.€1985).€ÌÌà àWe€hold€that€there€is€sufficient€evidence€to€support€the€defendant'sÏconvictions.€€Darrell€Hubbard,€one€of€the€residents€of€the€apartment€complex,€testifiedÏthat€he€heard€several€gunshots€and€saw€a€person€wearing€a€long€black€coat€runningÏdown€the€alley€behind€the€apartment€building.€€He€further€testified€that€he€saw€theÏvictim€lying€on€his€back€with€his€pockets€turned€inside€out.€€Clifford€Anderson,€anotherÏresident,€testified€that€he€heard€several€gunshots€and€saw€a€man€in€a€long€black€coatÏrunning€down€the€alley.€€Mr.€Anderson€also€testified€that€shortly€after€he€saw€the€manÏrunning€down€the€alley,€he€saw€two€to€three€individuals€drive€away€in€a€blue€Buick.€ÏThis€was€the€same€type€of€car€the€defendant€and€his€cohorts€drove€that€night.€€ÌÌà àKimberly€Farmer€testified€that€the€defendant€carried€a€gun€and€wasÏwearing€a€long€black€coat€the€evening€of€the€murder.€€Officer€Palmer€testified€that€sheÏsaw€the€victim's€pockets€turned€inside€out.€€Both€officers€on€the€scene€also€testified€thatÏthe€personal€belongings€of€the€victim,€such€as€his€wallet,€were€scattered€on€theÏground.€€This€evidence,€taken€in€conjunction€with€the€defendant's€statement,€isÏsufficient€for€a€reasonable€trier€of€fact€to€find€the€essential€elements€of€the€crimesÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌò òà@ àEvidence€of€Victimððs€Family€and€Lifestyleó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€prosecution's€introduction€of€evidenceÏat€the€guilt€phase€by€the€victimððs€nephew€concerning€the€victim's€employment€history,Ïage,€health,€living€conditions,€funeral,€and€the€size€and€members€of€the€victim's€family,Ïwere€not€relevant€to€any€aspect€of€the€defendant's€guilt,€and€was€highly€inflammatory.€ÏWe€note€that€the€defendant€did€not€object€to€the€nephewððs€testimony.€€The€defendantÏalso€asserts€that€references€to€these€factors€by€the€prosecutor€in€closing€argumentsÏwere€equally€prejudicial.€€The€state€argues€that€òòPayne€v.€Tennesseeóó,€501€U.S.€808,Ï111€S.€Ct.€2597€(1991)€and€òòBrimmer€v.€Stateóó,€876€S.W.2d€75€(Tenn.€1994),€areÏdispositive€of€this€issue.€€The€defendant€responds€that€òòPayneóó€and€òòBrimmeróó€only€holdÏthat€the€introduction€of€such€evidence€is€not€òòperóó€òòseóó€inadmissible€at€the€sentencingÏphase,€not€at€the€guilt€phase.ÌÌà à"A€State€may€legitimately€conclude€that€evidence€about€the€victim€andÏabout€the€impact€of€the€murder€on€the€victim's€family€is€relevant€to€the€jury's€decisionÏas€to€whether€or€not€the€death€penalty€should€be€imposed."€€òòPayneóó,€501€U.S.€at€827,Ï111€S.€Ct.€at€2609.€€Thus,€contrary€to€the€state's€claim,€òòPayneóó€is€not€directly€applicableÏto€the€guilt€phase.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€provides€a€list€of€cases€from€other€states€that€indicates€thatÏevidence€about€the€victim's€family€and€personal€life€is€irrelevant€to€the€determination€ofÏguilt€and€highly€inflammatory,€and€therefore€inadmissible€at€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial.€ÏWe€agree€that€it€was€irrelevant€at€the€guilt€phase€and€should€not€have€been€admitted€atÏthat€point.€€However,€we€question€its€harm€given€the€other€evidence€in€the€case.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Bigbeeóó,€885€S.W.2d€797€(Tenn.€1994),€the€defendant€arguedÏthat€testimony€from€two€different€witnesses€concerning€the€victim's€family€andÏemployment€history€had€no€bearing€on€the€issues€at€the€trial.€€The€victim's€daughterÏtestified€about€the€victim's€family,€and€a€store€manager€testified€about€the€victim's€job,Ïwages,€and€employee€status.€€Our€supreme€court€stated€that€the€testimony,€though€not€Ïrelevant,€"was€brief€and€straightforward,€and€any€error€in€its€admission€was€harmless."€ÏòòIdóó.€at€808.€€The€court€also€mentioned€that€the€defendant's€failure€to€object€to€theÏtestimony€at€trial€prevented€any€determination€of€its€relevancy.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àSimilarly,€in€òòState€v.€Hensleyóó,€656€S.W.2d€410€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983),Ïthis€court€held€that€testimony€from€the€victim's€widow€about€the€victim's€personalÏcharacteristics€and€the€consequences€of€his€death€on€her€was€"irrelevant€andÏobviously€designed€to€raise€sympathy€for€the€deceased€victim€and€his€family."€€òòIdóó.€atÏ414.€€Because€the€testimony€was€brief€and€straightforward,€the€evidence€against€theÏdefendant€was€overwhelming,€and€the€jury€imposed€a€lesser€penalty,€the€courtÏdecided€that€the€testimony€more€probably€than€not€did€not€affect€the€jury's€verdict.€€òòIdóó.€ÏThe€court€cautioned,€however,€"against€the€use€of€such€testimony€in€the€future."€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àThe€testimony€at€issue€in€the€present€case€was€offered€by€the€victim'sÏnephew€and€includes€information€about€the€victim's€age,€health,€employment€history,Ïrelatives,€family€size,€telephone€conversations,€and€his€funeral.€€As€with€the€testimonyÏin€€òòBigbeeóó€and€òòHensleyóó,€the€nephew's€testimony€was€relatively€brief€andÏstraightforward.€€Moreover,€the€evidence€of€guilt€in€the€present€case€wasÏoverwhelming,€which€evidence€included€the€defendant's€own€confession€to€the€police.€ÏWhen€viewed€in€light€of€the€other€evidence€against€the€defendant,€the€admission€of€thisÏtestimony€was€harmless€error.€€€€€€ÌÌà àWe€note,€as€well,€that€the€defense€did€not€object€to€the€nephewððsÏtestimony€about€the€victimððs€background.€€Ordinarily,€this€results€in€no€recordÍdevelopment€about€the€potential€relevance€of€such€evidence€and€constitutes€a€waiver.€ÏHowever,€we€caution€the€state€that€the€social€and€family€background€of€a€victim€isÏnormally€so€irrelevant€to€the€issue€of€a€defendantððs€guilt€and€the€law€is€so€well€settledÏregarding€such€evidence€being€inadmissible€that€its€continued€use€may€constituteÏplain€error€involving€prejudice€to€the€integrity€of€the€judicial€process€in€Tennessee.Ìò òÌÇà@ àUse€of€Opinion€Evidenceó óÌà@ àò ò(A)ó óÌà àThe€defendant€claims€that€Dr.€Smithððs€testimony€about€the€distance€fromÏwhich€the€gun€was€fired,€the€manners€in€which€revolvers€leave€powder€burns,€and€theÏbullet€track€in€the€victim's€leg,€was€outside€the€scope€of€his€expertise.€€Dr.€Smith€wasÏqualified€as€an€expert€in€the€field€of€anatomical,€clinical,€and€forensic€pathology,€withÏan€extensive€educational€and€practical€background.€€He€testified€that€as€part€of€hisÏtraining€in€forensic€pathology,€he€has€examined€the€various€patterns€that€are€causedÏby€powder€burns.ÌÓÓÌÓ  Óà8 àà àIt€is€a€well„established€rule€of€law€that€the€allowanceÏof€expert€testimony,€the€qualifications€of€the€expert€witness,Ïthe€relevancy€and€competency€of€expert€testimony,€theÏtrustworthiness€of€the€facts€and€data€forming€the€basis€of€theÏexpert€witness's€opinion,€and€whether€the€facts€and€dataÏare€the€type€reasonably€used€by€experts€in€the€same€field€inÏforming€opinions€are€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trialÏcourt.œ× ƒ? ××  ×›€This€Court€will€not€interfere€with€the€exercise€of€thisÏdiscretion€unless€clear€abuse€in€exercising€this€discretionÏappears€on€the€face€of€the€record.€òòÓÓÓ  ÓState€v.€Henry€EugeneÏHodgesóó,€No.€01C01„9212„CR„00382,€Davidson€County,Íslip€op.€at€35€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€May€18,€1995)€(citationsÏomitted)€(footnote€added).ÌÌà àDr.€Smith's€testimony€concerning€the€distance€of€the€victim€from€theÏshooter€and€the€pattern€of€the€powder€burns€are€well€within€the€field€of€his€expertise.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Wrightóó,€756€S.W.2d€669,€673€(Tenn.€1988)€(Court€stated€that€medicalÏexaminer's€testimony€about€distance€from€which€gun€was€fired€was€"obviously€withinÏthe€range€of€his€expertise.");€òòState€v.€Van€Tranóó,€864€S.W.2d€465,€470€(Tenn.€1993)€Ï(uncontroverted€testimony€of€Dr.€Smith,€the€medical€examiner€in€the€present€case,Ïdescribing€distance€of€victim€from€shooter).ÌÌà àThe€state€contends€that€Dr.€Smith's€testimony€that€the€bullet€track€throughÏthe€victim's€leg€was€consistent€with€the€theory€that€the€victim€was€running€was€proper.€ÏThe€state€suggests€that€the€witness€was€not€testifying€that€the€victim€was€in€fact€runningÏwhen€he€was€shot,€but€rather€that€the€bullet€track€through€the€leg€was€compatible€withÏa€person€who€had€been€running.€€The€defendant€argues,€however,€that€the€witnessÏpossessed€no€expert€training€in€this€area€which€would€substantially€assist€the€jury€onÏthis€matter.€€The€state€asserts€the€defendant€has€proffered€no€authority€stating€that€theÏstudy€of€gunshot€wound€tracks€is€outside€the€field€of€forensic€pathology.ÌÌà àDr.€Smith's€testimony€about€the€wound€track€in€the€victim's€leg€is€withinÏthe€scope€of€his€expertise.€€Dr.€Smith€testified€that€the€wound€track€indicates€the€angleÏthrough€which€the€bullet€passed€through€the€body.€€He€stated€this€particular€track€couldÏbe€consistent€with€the€victim's€leg€being€in€a€position€where€the€upper€leg€was€raised,Ïi.e.,€as€in€a€running€position.€€He€further€testified,€though,€that€this€"would€have€to€beÏcorrelated€with€the€circumstances€as€were€known€at€the€time€of€the€incident."€€And€onÏcross„examination,€Dr.€Smith€testified€that€the€wound€track€caused€by€the€bullet€wasÏalso€consistent€with€the€theory€that€the€victim€was€on€a€higher€plane€than€the€shooter.ÌBecause€the€testimony€is€based€on€information€Dr.€Smith€obtained€from€his€area€ofÏexpertise€and€such€expertise€could€substantially€assist€the€jury€in€understanding€theÏevidence,€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Smith€was€appropriate.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Caughronóó,€855ÏS.W.2d€526,€537€œ(Tenn.€1993),›€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€702.€€Moreover,€because€the€testimonyÏdid€not€establish€a€definite€theory€of€the€wound€tract,€the€defendant€was€able€to€elicitÏtestimony€from€Dr.€Smith€that€his€theory€of€the€shooting€was€feasible.ÌÌÇà@ àò ò(B)ó óÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€testimony€of€Officer€Dana€Stine€that€"it€kindÏof€appeared€like€[the€victim]€had€to€clean€out€his€pockets€or€something€like€that,"€wasÏan€improper€opinion€which€inappropriately€suggested€to€the€jury€that€the€victim€hadÏbeen€robbed.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€701(a).€€Particularly,€the€defendant€contends€that€theÏwitness€could€"readily€and€with€equal€accuracy€and€adequacy€communicate€what€[he]Ïperceived€[about€the€crime€scene]€to€the€trier€of€fact€without€testifying€in€terms€ofÏopinions€or€inferences."€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€701(a)(2).€€The€defendant€also€argues€thatÏgiven€that€a€defendant's€statement€must€be€corroborated€by€extrinsic€evidence€toÏsupport€a€conviction,€allowing€Officer€Stine's€improper€testimony€prevents€the€stateÏfrom€demonstrating€that€the€testimony€did€not€contribute€to€the€jury's€finding€that€theÏdefendant€robbed€the€victim.€€The€state€contends€that€the€testimony€was€permissible,Ïbut€even€if€it€were€error,€it€would€be€harmless€error.ÌÌà àOur€supreme€court€has€addressed€a€similar€issue.€€In€òòState€v.ÏMiddlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992),€the€officer€testified€that€a€bloody€T„shirtÏfound€around€the€victim's€neck€had€been€used€as€a€gag.€€The€defense€objected€to€thisÏtestimony€as€inadmissible€lay€opinion,€but€the€trial€court€allowed€it€anyway.€€TheÏsupreme€court€held€that€the€testimony€was€an€inadmissible€lay€opinion€and€stated:ÌÓÓÌÓ  Óà8 àà àA€non„expert€must€ordinarily€confine€his€testimony€toÏa€narration€of€facts€based€on€first„hand€knowledge€andÍavoid€stating€mere€personal€opinions.€€òòBlackburn€v.€Murphyóó,Ï737€S.W.2d€529,€531€(Tenn.€1987).€€The€purpose€of€thisÏrule€is€"to€preserve€the€primary€fact„finding€role€of€the€jury,Ïsince€'[i]t€is€the€function€of€the€witness€to€state€evidentiaryÏfacts€and€the€function€of€the€jury€to€draw€such€conclusionsÏas€the€facts€warrant.'"€€òòIdóó.€(quoting€òòWilson€v.€Nashville,ÏChattanooga€&€St.€Louis€Ry.óó,€16€Tenn.€App.€695,€705,€65ÏS.W.2d€637,€643€(1933)).ÌÌà8 àà àNevertheless,€there€are€exceptions€to€the€generalÏrule.€€"Non„expert€opinion€testimony€can€be€admissibleÏwhen€'such€testimony€describes€observed€facts€in€the€onlyÏway€in€which€they€can€be€clearly€described.'"€€òòIdóó.,€737ÏS.W.2d€at€532€(quoting€òòNational€Life€&€Accident€Ins.€Co.€v.ÏFollettóó,€168€Tenn.€647,€662,€80€S.W.2d€92,€98€(1935)).ÌÓ  ÓòòÌIdóó.€at€330„31.€€AlthoughÓÓ€the€court€stated€that€the€question€of€admissibility€of€theÏtestimony€was€close,€it€concluded€that€it€would€be€harmless€error€even€if€it€wereÏinadmissible.€€The€court€explained€that€because€the€defendant€had€admitted€toÏgagging€the€victim,€the€officer's€testimony€was€harmless.ÌÌà àWe€view€the€opinion€testimony€in€the€present€case€to€be€improper,€but€asÏin€òòMiddlebrooksóó,€its€admission€is€harmless€error.€€There€is€sufficient€evidenceÏelsewhere€in€the€record€that€corroborates€the€defendant's€statement€that€he€robbed€theÏvictim.€€Darrell€Hubbard,€one€of€the€residents€of€the€apartment€complex,€testified€thatÏhe€saw€the€victim€lying€on€his€back€with€his€pockets€turned€inside€out.€€Officer€Palmer€€€€€€€€Ïtestified€that€she€saw€the€victim's€pockets€turned€inside€out.€€Both€officers€testified€thatÏthe€personal€belongings€of€the€victim,€such€as€his€wallet,€were€scattered€on€theÏground.€€In€fact,€under€this€evidence€and€the€defendantððs€statement,€Officer€StineððsÍopinion€borders€on€stating€the€obvious.€€Accordingly,€his€opinion€testimony€wasÏharmless€error.Ìò òÌà@ àChain€of€Custody€of€Tangible€Evidenceó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€a€juvenile€court€badge€found€at€the€sceneÏwas€improperly€introduced€into€evidence.€€The€defendant€argues€that€the€state€failed€toÏestablish€a€proper€chain€of€custody€with€respect€to€the€badge.€€In€his€testimony,€OfficerÏStine€stated€that€he€placed€all€of€the€victim's€personal€items€into€one€envelope€forÏinventory€purposes.€€At€the€trial,€however,€it€was€revealed€that€the€badge€had€beenÏremoved€and€placed€into€another€envelope€by€another€member€of€the€policeÏdepartment.€€The€defendant€contends€that€because€the€state€could€not€establish€whoÏremoved€the€badge,€that€its€introduction€was€inappropriate.€€The€state€argues€itsÏintroduction€was€proper€given€that€the€badge€was€a€particular€object€that€Officer€StineÏidentified€as€an€item€he€recovered€from€the€scene.ÌÌà àThe€case€upon€which€the€defendant€relies€tends€to€discount€hisÏargument.€€In€òòState€v.€Goodmanóó,€643€S.W.2d€375,€381€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982),€thisÏcourt€held:€€"As€a€condition€precedent€to€the€introduction€of€tangible€evidence,€aÏwitness€must€be€able€to€identify€the€evidence€òòoróó€establish€an€unbroken€chain€ofÏcustody."€€(Emphasis€added).€€€"In€determining€the€admissibility€of€tangible€evidence,Ïthe€law€does€not€require€absolute€certainty€of€identification.€€It€is€sufficient€if€the€factsÍestablish€a€reasonable€assurance€of€identity€of€the€evidence."€€òòState€v.€Larry€G.€Hartóó,ÏNo.€02C01„9406„CC„00111,€Hardin€County,€slip€op.€at€6„7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€June€28,Ï1995).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Phillip€Bransonóó,€03C01„9305„CR„00148,€Roane€County,€slipÏop.€at€13€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Dec.€9,€1994).€€After€reviewing€the€record,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€introduction€of€the€badge€was€proper.Ìò òÌó óà@ àò òòòINSTRUCTIONSóóó óÌò òà@ àWitness€Credibilityó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€courtððs€instruction€on€theÏassessment€of€witness€credibility€went€beyond€the€bare€"presumption€of€truthfulness"Ïand€general€methods€for€assessing€credibility€upheld€in€òòCupp€v.€Naughtenóó,€414€U.S.Ï141,€94€S.€Ct.€396€(1973).€€The€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€in€this€case€as€follows:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àYou€will€take€all€of€the€evidence€adduced€in€the€caseÏby€the€State€and€the€defendant€and€give€it€a€full,€fair€andÏimpartial€consideration.€€If€there€are€any€conflicts€in€theÏstatements€of€the€different€witnesses,€it€is€your€duty€toÏreconcile€them,€if€you€can,€for€the€law€presumes€that€everyÏwitness€has€sworn€to€the€truth;€but,€if€you€cannot,€the€lawÏmakes€you€the€sole€and€exclusive€judges€of€the€credibility€ofÏthe€witnesses€and€the€weight€to€be€given€their€testimony.€€InÏforming€your€opinion€as€to€the€credibility€of€a€witness,€youÏmay€look€to€the€proof,€if€any,€of€his€general€character,€theÏmanner€and€demeanor€of€the€witness,€the€consistency€orÏinconsistency€of€his€statements,€their€probability€orÏimprobability,€his€ability€and€willingness€to€speak€the€truth,Ïhis€intelligence€and€means€of€knowledge,€his€motive€toÏspeak€the€truth€or€swear€to€a€falsehood,€his€interest€or€lackÏof€interest€in€the€outcome€of€the€trial.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓThe€defendant€argues€that€the€instruction€is€a€comment€on€the€evidence€andÏimproperly€provides€limited€rules€for€the€jury€to€determine€credibility€issues€of€fact.à0 àÌÌà àWe€believe€that€the€instruction€is€within€the€confines€of€òòNaughtenóó.€€TheÏinstruction€in€òòNaughtenóó,€like€the€instruction€in€this€case,€informed€the€jury€"to€considerÏthe€manner€of€the€witness,€the€nature€of€the€testimony,€and€any€other€matter€relating€toÏthe€witness'€possible€motivation€to€speak€falsely.€€[The€jury]€thus€remained€free€toÏexercise€its€collective€judgment€to€reject€what€it€did€not€find€trustworthy€or€plausible."€Ï414€U.S.€at€419,€94€S.€Ct.€at€401.€€Moreover,€as€emphasized€in€the€above€instruction,Ïthe€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€that€it€òòmayóó€consider€the€enumerated€guidelines.€€WeÏbelieve€that€the€instruction€adequately€guides€the€jurors€in€their€consideration€ofÏwitness€credibility€while€leaving€them€free€of€undue€constraints€on€their€evaluations.€ÏAs€such,€the€instruction€does€not€amount€to€a€comment€on€the€evidence,€but€is€an€aidÏto€the€jurors€if€they€find€irreconcilable€conflicts€in€the€testimony.ÌÌò òà@ à€"Intentional"ó óà@ àÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court's€definition€of€intentional,Ïwhen€instructing€the€jury€that€they€must€find€that€the€defendant€intended€to€commit€theÏespecially€aggravated€robbery,€was€improper.€€Specifically,€the€defendant€claims€thatÏthe€trial€courtððs€instruction€defined€"general€intent,"€and€the€crime€of€aggravatedÏrobbery€is€a€specific€intent€crime€requiring€a€finding€of€"specific€intent."€€The€defendantÍoffers€no€authority€in€support€of€his€claim.€€The€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€that€"aÏperson€acts€'intentionally'€when€that€person€acts€with€a€conscious€objective€either:€(1)Ïto€cause€a€particular€result;€or€(2)€to€engage€in€particular€conduct."€€As€the€stateÏasserts,€this€definition€is€in€conformity€with€the€statute.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„302(a)Ï(1991).€€Accordingly,€we€can€find€no€error€in€the€trial€court's€instruction.ÌÌò òà@ àReasonable€Doubtó óÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€instructions€on€reasonable€doubt€did€notÏlend€content€to€the€words€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€used€by€the€trial€court.€€The€trial€courtÏinstructed€the€jury€in€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial€as€follows:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,Ïafter€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€upon€theÏcertainty€of€guilt.€€Reasonable€doubt€does€not€mean€a€doubtÏthat€may€arise€from€possibility.€€Absolute€certainty€of€guilt€isÏnot€demanded€by€the€law€to€convict€of€any€criminal€charge,Ïbut€moral€certainty€is€required€and€this€certainty€is€requiredÏas€to€every€proposition€of€proof€requisite€to€constitute€theÏoffense.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓThe€trial€court€gave€the€following€instruction€during€the€penalty€phase:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,Ïafter€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€upon€theÏcertainty€of€your€verdict.€€Reasonable€doubt€does€not€meanÏa€doubt€that€may€arise€from€possibility.€€Absolute€certainty€ofÏguilt€is€not€demanded€by€the€law€to€convict€of€any€criminalÏcharge,€but€moral€certainty€is€required€and€this€certainty€isÏrequired€as€to€every€proposition€of€proof€requisite€toÏconstitute€the€verdict.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€phrases€"inability,€after€suchÏinvestigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€upon€the€certainty€of€guilt"€and€"arise€fromÏpossibility,"€when€used€to€explain€moral€certainty,€violate€due€process€and€allow€theÏjury€to€convict€upon€a€standard€lower€than€that€set€forth€in€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó,€511€U.S.Ï1,€114€S.€Ct.€1239€(1994).€€In€òòVictoróó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€ruled€that€theÏphrase€"moral€certainty"€may€have€lost€its€historical€meaning€and€that€modern€juries,Ïunaware€of€the€historical€meaning,€might€understand€"moral€certainty,ðð€in€the€abstract,Ïto€mean€something€less€than€the€high€level€of€determination€constitutionally€requiredÏin€criminal€cases.€€òòIdóó.€at€13„14,€114€S.€Ct.€at€1246„47.€€Although€the€Court€stated€that€itÏdid€not€condone€the€use€of€the€"moral€certainty"€phrase,€the€Court€held€that€the€phraseÏcould€pass€constitutional€muster€if€used€in€conjunction€with€a€modifying€instruction€thatÏlent€meaning€to€the€phrase.€€òòIdóó.€at€15,€114€S.€Ct.€at€1248.€€In€order€to€meet€theÏrequirements€of€due€process,€the€jury€instructions€must€be€examined€as€a€whole,Ïwithout€considering€particular€phrases€out€of€context.€€òòIdóó.€at€5,€114€S.€Ct.€at€1243ÌÌà àThe€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€"grave€uncertainty"€and€"actualÏsubstantial€doubt,"€when€modifying€moral€certainty,€did€not€meaningfully€convey€theÏdefinition€of€reasonable€doubt€and€thus€violated€the€due€process€clause.€€òòCage€v.ÏLouisianaóó,€498€U.S.€39,€41,€111€S.€Ct.€328,€329€(1990).€€Neither€of€these€phrases,Ïthough,€were€used€in€the€instructions€in€the€present€case.€€In€òòVictoróó,€the€Court,€thoughÍsatisfied€with€the€modifying€"abiding€conviction"€language€used€by€the€trial€court,€heldÏthat€the€constitution€does€not€require€the€use€of€any€specific€terminology€in€definingÏreasonable€doubt.€€òòIdóó.€at€14„15,€114€S.€Ct.€at€1243,€1247.€€It€did€suggest,€however,€thatÏthe€phrase€"moral€certainty"€by€itself€would€be€insufficient€to€convey€the€appropriateÏmeaning€of€reasonable€doubt.€€òòIdóó.€at€15,€114€S.€Ct.€at€1247.€€€ÌÌà àThe€primary€question,€therefore,€is€whether€the€phrase€"moral€certainty,"Ïwhen€used€in€conjunction€with€"let€the€mind€rest€easily"€and€"arise€from€possibility,"Ïcorrectly€conveyed€to€the€jury€the€concept€of€reasonable€doubt.€€Though€neither€ofÏthese€phrases€have€been€before€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€our€courts€haveÏconsistently€upheld€the€constitutionality€of€similar€instructions€which€included€theÏphrases€"let€the€mind€rest€easily"€and€"arise€from€possibility."€€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877ÏS.W.2d€722,€734€(Tenn.€1994);€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364,€365„66€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1994).€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€jury€instructions€on€reasonableÏdoubt€in€the€present€case€did€not€violate€the€defendant's€rights€under€the€United€StatesÏor€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà@ àò òòòSENTENCING€PHASEÌóóà@ àUse€of€Prior€Convictions€as€Aggravating€Circumstanceó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€using€his€prior€convictions€for€later„occurring€offenses€as€an€aggravating€circumstance€violates€the€defendant'sÍconstitutional€rights.€€The€state€argues€that€the€use€of€this€aggravator€is€prescribed€byÏlaw.€€Under€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„204(i)(2),€a€prior€conviction€of€a€felony,€"other€than€theÏpresent€charge,€whose€statutory€elements€involve€the€use€of€violence€to€the€person"Ïcan€be€used€as€an€aggravating€circumstance€for€the€imposition€of€the€death€penalty.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€chronological€order€ofÏthe€commission€of€the€offenses€is€not€relevant€for€sentencing€purposes.€€Whether€theÏconviction€was€entered€before€the€sentencing€phase€at€which€it€is€introduced€is€theÏdetermining€factor€when€using€a€prior€conviction€under€the€statute.€€òòBigbeeóó,€885ÏS.W.2d€at€œ817;€›òòNicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€at€736.€€Thus,€even€though€the€prior€conviction€forÏthe€aggravated€robbery€is€based€upon€an€offense€committed€by€the€defendant€after€theÏoffenses€in€the€present€case,€the€convictions€were€returned€before€the€sentencingÏphase€in€the€present€case.€€It€is€the€fact€of€the€prior€convictions€for€a€violent€offense€thatÏremains€relevant€to€capital€sentencing,€not€its€timing.× ƒ@ ××  ×Ìò òòòÌóóó óà@ àò òUnderlying€Facts€of€Previous€Convictionsó ó€Ìà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€introduction€of€evidence€concerning€theÏspecific€facts€of€the€prior€convictions€used€as€an€aggravating€circumstance€wasÏimproper.€€During€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial€and€over€the€defendantððs€objection,Ïthe€state€called€Gary€Yochum,€one€of€the€victims€of€the€later€robberies,€to€testify€aboutÏthe€facts€of€that€event.€€Before€Mr.€Yochum€testified,€however,€the€keeper€of€the€recordsÏfor€the€Shelby€County€Clerk's€Office€testified€on€behalf€of€the€state€that€two€convictionsÏfor€aggravated€robbery€had€been€returned€against€the€defendant€relative€to€theÏYochums.€€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€testimony€of€the€clerk€was€sufficient€toÏestablish€the€prior€violent€conviction,€and€that€the€testimony€of€Mr.€Yochum€wasÏcumulative€and€served€no€purpose€other€than€to€inflame€the€passions€and€theÏprejudices€of€the€jury.€€The€state,€however,€asserts€that€the€defendant€introduced€aÏtheory€that€the€shooting€in€the€present€case€was€accidental€and€that€the€testimony€ofÏMr.€Yochum€was€necessary€for€rebuttal€purposes.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Bigbeeóó,€885€S.W.2d€797€(Tenn.€1994),€our€supreme€Ìcourt€held:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àEvidence€of€facts€regarding€a€previous€conviction€toÏshow€that€it€in€fact€involved€violence€or€the€threat€of€violenceÏto€the€person€is€admissible€at€a€sentencing€hearing€in€orderÍto€establish€the€aggravating€circumstance.€€òòState€v.€Batesóó,Ï804€S.W.2d€868,€879€(Tenn.€1983);€òòState€v.€Mooreóó,€614ÏS.W.2d€348,€351€(Tenn.€1981).€€However,€it€is€notÏappropriate€to€admit€evidence€regarding€specific€facts€of€theÏcrime€resulting€in€the€previous€conviction,€when€theÏconviction€on€its€face€shows€that€it€involved€violence€or€theÏthreat€of€violence€to€the€person.€€òòId.óóÌòòÌÓ  ÓÓÓIdóó.€at€811;× ƒA ××  ×€òòseeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„204(i)(2).€€In€òòBigbeeóó,€the€state€solicited€testimony€from€aÏpolice€detective€about€the€facts€surrounding€a€prior€murder€and€the€character€of€theÏvictim.€€Also,€the€stateððs€closing€argument€referred€to€the€detectiveððs€testimonyÏconcerning€the€prior€crime€and€to€the€sentence€imposed€for€that€conviction.€€The€courtÏruled€that€the€detective's€testimony€and€the€state's€arguments€were€inadmissible€andÏimproper.€€885€S.W.2d€at€812.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€facts€in€the€present€case€are€essentiallyÏindistinguishable€from€those€in€òòBigbeeóó.€€Because€testimony€establishing€the€identity€ofÏthe€prior€violent€offenses€and€the€existence€of€the€convictions€was€already€introduced,Ïthe€defendant€argues,€any€additional€evidence€about€the€underlying€facts€was€merelyÏcumulative€and€prejudicial.€€The€defendant€asserts€that€the€convictions€œfor›€the€offensesÍœof›€aggravated€robbery€establish€the€aggravating€circumstance€of€a€prior€violentÏconviction.× ƒB ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€state,€however,€argues€that€òòBigbeeóó€is€distinguishable€in€two€aspects.€ÏFirst,€the€sentences€for€the€prior€convictions€were€not€mentioned€by€the€state€in€theÏpresent€case.€€The€state€implies€that€the€ruling€in€òòBigbeeóó€would€have€been€differentÏhad€the€state€not€mentioned€the€prior€sentences.€€As€the€supreme€court€stated€inÏòòBigbeeóó,€€however,€the€error€was€merely€"compounded"€by€the€reference€to€theÏprevious€sentences.€€òòIdóó.€at€811.ÌÌà àSecond,€the€state€submits€that€unlike€the€evidence€in€òòBigbeeóó,€theÏtestimony€of€Mr.€Yochum€was€required€to€rebut€the€defendant's€theory€that€theÏshootings€were€accidental.€€The€primary€question€for€this€court,€therefore,€is€whetherÏthe€testimony€of€Mr.€Yochum€was€proper€rebuttal€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€òòCozzolino€v.€Stateóó,Ï584€S.W.2d€765,€767„68€(Tenn.€1979).ÌÌà àReferring€to€the€present€crime,€the€defendant€stated€to€the€police€that€theÏgun€just€"went€off."€€It€is€the€state's€position€that€this€represented€the€defendant's€theoryÏthat€the€shooting€in€the€present€case€was€accidental,€and,€thus,€in€order€to€rebut€thisÍtheory,€the€specific€facts€of€the€Yochum€robbery€needed€to€be€introduced.€€TheÏdefendant€robbed€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Yochum€at€gunpoint.€€A€shot€was€fired€during€thatÏrobbery,€but€no€one€was€injured.€€During€the€cross„examination€of€the€defendant€in€theÏsentencing€phase€of€the€present€case,€the€defendant€testified€that€he€was€not€shootingÏat€the€Yochum's,€but€that€the€gun€just€"went€off."€€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€asserts€that€his€statement€to€the€police€suggested€thatÏonly€the€first€shot€was€accidental€and€that€the€other€four€shots€were€fired€intentionally.€ÏHe€argues€that€he€was€not€suggesting€that€all€the€shots€were€fired€accidentally.€€If€theÏstate€was€indeed€trying€to€rebut€the€defendant's€statement,€the€defendant€respondsÏthat€the€state€was€rebutting€its€own€proof€because€the€state€introduced€the€defendant'sÏstatement€into€evidence.€€Furthermore,€the€defendant's€testimony€concerning€theÏgunshot€in€the€Yochum€robbery€was€solicited€during€cross„examination€by€the€state.€ÏFinally,€the€defendant€contends€that€if€the€state€was€sincerely€interested€in€rebutting€aÏtheory€of€an€accidental€shooting,€it€would€have€introduced€testimony€to€that€effectÏduring€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial,€rather€than€at€the€sentencing€phase.ÌÌà àThe€testimony€of€Mr.€Yochum€and€the€state's€reference€to€it€in€argumentÏfor€the€purpose€of€establishing€the€prior€conviction€are€improper€and€prejudicial€underÏthe€òòBigbeeóó€ruling.€€We€must€now€decide€if€this€evidence€and€argument€is€appropriateÏunder€the€state's€rebuttal€contention.€€The€state€admits€that€the€jury€apparently€rejectedÍthe€theory€that€the€shooting€was€accidental€when€it€returned€its€verdict€in€the€guiltÏphase.€€The€state€argues,€however,€that€the€evidence€of€the€prior€conviction€tended€toÏrebut€the€mitigator€presented€in€the€sentencing€phase,€i.e.,€that€the€shooting€wasÏaccidental.€€As€the€defendant€points€out,€though,€the€only€witness€who€testified€for€theÏdefendant€during€the€sentencing€phase€was€the€defendant€himself.€€Moreover,€theÏdefendant€asserts€that€his€theory€was€that€the€shootings€were€intentional,€but€that€theÏkilling€was€accidental.€€This€is€to€be€an€accurate€assessment€of€the€theory€presented€toÏthe€jury.€€The€stateððs€introduction€of€the€evidence€for€the€purpose€of€rebutting€theÏdefendantððs€claim€that€the€shootings€were€accidental€does€not,€in€fact,€rebut€theÏdefendantððs€evidence€because€the€defendant€conceded€that€the€shootings€in€theÏpresent€case€were€intentional.ÌÌà àThe€state€argues€that€if€the€introduction€and€argument€of€such€evidence€isÏerror,€it€is€no€more€than€harmless€error.€€The€state€suggests€that€Mr.€Yochum'sÏtestimony€was€rather€straightforward€and€not€so€inflammatory,€and€simply€reiteratedÏthe€testimony€of€the€keeper€of€the€records€of€the€Shelby€County€Clerk's€Office.€€We€doÏnot€agree.€€The€testimony€of€Mr.€Yochum€described€the€specific€details€of€the€priorÏcrimes.€€In€its€argument€to€the€jury,€the€state€relied€heavily€upon€those€details,€includingÏthe€former€victimððs€continued€fear,€in€order€to€increase€the€seriousness€of€the€priorÏconvictions€as€an€aggravating€circumstance.€€With€that€aggravating€circumstanceÏbeing€the€only€one€that€the€jury€found€to€exist,€we€believe€that€the€evidence€of€theÍdetails€of€the€prior€crimes€more€probably€than€not€affected€the€juryððs€verdict.€€Thus,Ïunder€existing€law,€reversible€error€occurred.€€€€Ìò òÌà@ àExclusion€of€Mitigating€Evidenceó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€should€have€allowed€œMr.€Carl›ÏNelson€to€testify€at€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial€as€an€expert€witness€concerningÏthe€defendant's€remorsefulness.€€He€also€contends€that€even€if€the€court€did€not€allowÏMr.€Nelson€to€testify€as€an€expert,€it€should€have€permitted€him€to€testify€as€a€layÏwitness.€€The€state€counters€that€the€defendant€failed€to€qualify€Mr.€Nelson€as€an€expertÏin€the€field€of€psychology.€€It€also€asserts€that€the€court€afforded€Mr.€Nelson€ampleÏopportunity€to€testify€as€a€lay€witness,€but€that€Mr.€Nelson,€by€his€absence,€deprived€theÏdefendant€of€the€benefit€of€his€testimony.€€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€proffered€Mr.€Nelson€as€an€expert€in€psychology.€€At€theÏtime€of€the€trial,€Mr.€Nelson€was€employed€by€the€state€as€a€Psychological€Chaplain€II.€ÏHe€has€a€bachelor's€degree€in€social€psychology€and€a€master's€degree€in€pastoralÏcounseling.€€Mr.€Nelson€testified€that€he€had€performed€thousands€of€psychologicalÏevaluations€on€inmates€in€Tennessee€over€the€previous€eight€years€using€a€test€heÏhad€developed€himself.€€The€trial€court,€however,€was€not€satisfied€with€Mr.€Nelson'sÏqualifications€as€an€expert€in€the€field€of€psychology€relative€to€his€testing€procedures.€ÏThe€trial€court€ultimately€ruled€that€Mr.€Nelson€could€testify€as€a€pastoral€counselorÍabout€his€observations€from€the€interviews€and€counseling€he€had€with€the€defendant,Ïbut€that€he€could€not€give€an€expert€opinion€about€the€defendant's€remorsefulness.€€ÌÌà àMr.€Nelson,€however,€never€testified€before€the€jury.€€The€defendantÏasserts€that€the€trial€court€refused€to€allow€any€of€Mr.€Nelson's€testimony,€even€theÏtestimony€the€court€was€ultimately€willing€to€permit€regarding€his€observations,€andÏexcused€him€from€the€courtroom.€€The€record€reflects€that€during€the€questioning€of€Mr.ÏNelson,€he€and€the€trial€court€engaged€in€some€heated€exchanges€regarding€Mr.ÏNelsonððs€explanatory€answers€to€some€questions€and€his€method€of€answering.€€AfterÏseveral€more€exchanges€between€the€trial€court€and€the€witness,€the€trial€courtÏexcused€Mr.€Nelson€from€the€courtroom€and€ruled€that€he€would€not€allow€him€toÏtestify.€€Immediately€after€Mr.€Nelson€left€the€courtroom,€the€trial€court€continued€the€trialÏuntil€the€following€day.€€On€the€following€day,€the€trial€court€informed€the€defense€thatÏMr.€Nelson€could€testify€about€his€interviews€and€counseling€with€the€defendant.€€ItÏgranted€the€defendant€several€recesses€that€morning€for€the€purpose€of€contacting€Mr.ÏNelson,€but€the€defendant€was€unsuccessful.€€Consequently,€Mr.€Nelson€neverÏtestified.€€ÌÌà àFirst,€we€believe€that€under€the€evidence€presented,€the€trial€court€wasÏwithin€its€discretion€to€hold€that€Mr.€Nelson€did€not€qualify€to€render€an€opinion€as€anÏexpert€witness.€€Although€the€defendant€presented€evidence€that€could€support€anÍinference€that€Mr.€Nelson€had€substantial€experience€and€training€relative€toÏcounseling€and€evaluating€prison€inmates,€the€trial€court€questioned€the€basis€of€hisÏevaluation€techniques€and€the€scientific€nature€of€his€conclusions.€€There€is€materialÏevidence€in€the€record€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€doubts.€€Ultimately,€the€trial€courtÏconcluded€that€Mr.€Nelson€did€not€possess€the€expertise€for€rendering€an€expertÏopinion€as€to€the€defendantððs€remorsefulness.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€702.€€The€allowanceÏof€expert€testimony€is€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Ballardóó,€855ÏS.W.2d€557,€562€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àHowever,€the€real€concern€in€this€case€is€the€manner€in€which€the€trialÏcourtððs€actions€were€a€cause€of€the€defendantððs€losing€a€potentially€material€witness€forÏthe€sentencing€phase.€€Contrary€to€the€stateððs€implied€assertion,€the€record€before€usÏdoes€not€cast€fault€upon€the€defendant€for€the€failure€of€Mr.€Nelson€to€appear€as€aÏwitness.€€By€refusing€to€allow€Mr.€Nelson€to€testify,€the€trial€court€effectively€excusedÏhim€from€any€obligation€or€expectation€to€appear€and€testify€thereafter.€€He€had€no€dutyÏto€remain€available.€€Also,€nothing€in€the€record€reflects€that,€after€the€trial€courtÏrelented€the€next€morning,€the€defense€made€anything€but€a€good€faith€effort€toÏreobtain€Mr.€Nelson€as€a€witness.€€ÌÌà àIn€this€capital€case,€the€defendant€was€entitled€to€present€evidenceÏrelevant€to€punishment€concerning€his€character,€background€history,€or€physicalÍcondition,€and€any€other€evidence€tending€to€establish€any€mitigating€factors.€€òòSeeóóÏT.C.A.€ðð€39„13„204(c).€€Our€supreme€court€has€acknowledged€the€importance€of€thisÏstatutory€provision.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€27„28€(Tenn.€1996)Ï(defendantððs€details€of€history€given€to€psychologist€during€interview€admissibleÏdespite€hearsay€quality).€€In€fact,€it€is€the€defendantððs€constitutional€right€to€presentÏsuch€matters.€€ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 à[T]he€Eighth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€require€that€theÏsentencer,€and€all€but€the€rarest€kind€of€capital€case,€not€beÏprecluded€from€considering,€as€a€mitigating€factor,€anyÏaspect€of€a€defendantððs€character€or€record€and€any€of€theÏcircumstances€of€the€offense€that€the€defendant€proffers€asÏa€basis€for€a€sentence€less€than€death.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòLockett€v.€Ohioóó,€438€U.S.€586,€604,€98€S.€Ct.€2954,€2964„65€(1978);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMcKoy€v.ÏNorth€Carolinaóó,€494€U.S.€433,€442„43,€110€S.€Ct.€1227,€1233€(1990);€òòPenry€v.ÏLynaughóó,€492€U.S.€302,€317„18,€109€S.€Ct.€2934,€2946„47€(1989).ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€acknowledged€the€competency€of€Mr.€NelsonÏto€testify€about€his€counseling€with€and€observations€of€the€defendant.€€AlthoughÏrelatively€limited,€Mr.€Nelsonððs€jury„out€testimony€indicated€that€he€had€interviewed€theÏdefendant,€obtaining€background€information€regarding€him,€and€had€observed€theÏdefendant€in€his€prison€environment.€€This€was€the€only€witness€proffered€by€theÏdefendant,€other€than€himself,€to€present€to€the€jury€a€picture€of€the€defendantððsÏcharacter€and€background€history,€including€the€time€during€his€imprisonment.€€WeÍalso€note€that€Mr.€Nelson€indicated€that€the€defendant€did€not€easily€disclose€his€realÏfeelings.€€ÌÌà àIn€the€context€of€the€state€assailing€the€sincerity€of€the€defendantððsÏstatement€of€regret,€through€his€demeanor,€and€the€limited€nature€of€the€informationÏprovided€by€the€defendantððs€testimony,€we€believe€that€Mr.€Nelsonððs€testimony€wouldÏhave€been€material€to€the€defendantððs€cause€in€the€sentencing€phase.€€Certainly,€theÏrecord€reflects€that€he€was€better€able€to€articulate€the€defendantððs€background€historyÏto€the€jury€than€was€the€defendant.€ÌÌà àIn€òòSkipper€v.€South€Carolinaóó,€476€U.S.€1,€8,€106€S.€Ct.€1669,€1673Ï(1986),€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€error€in€excluding€evidence€is€not€harmless€if€theÏexclusion€of€the€evidence€ð ðmay€have€affected€the€juryððs€decision€to€impose€the€deathÏsentence.ððÌGiven€the€singular€nature€of€the€evidence€presented€by€the€state€for€its€one€provenÏaggravating€circumstance€and€the€otherwise€limited€evidence€presented€by€theÏdefendant€in€mitigation,€we€believe€that€the€loss€of€Mr.€Nelson€as€a€witness€may€haveÏhad€such€an€effect.€€The€refusal€to€allow€Mr.€Nelson€to€testify€under€the€circumstancesÏin€this€case€constitutes€reversible€trial€error.ÌÌÇà@ àò òòòIMPROPER€ARGUMENTóóó óÌà@ àòòò òCaldwellóó€Violationó óÌà àThe€defendant€claims€that€the€prosecutor's€closing€argument€in€theÏsentencing€phase€of€the€trial€violated€the€constitutional€principles€set€forth€in€òòCaldwellÏv.€Mississippióó,€472€U.S.€320,€105€S.€Ct.€2633€(1985).€€In€closing€argument,€theÏprosecutor€made€the€following€statements:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àThere's€not€one€thing€to€mitigate€except€the€oldÏdefense€lawyer€guilt€trip€of€you're€to€give€him€the€electricÏchair.€€You're€not€to€give€anybody€anything.€€You€don't€giveÏhim€the€death€penalty.€€You€don't€do€that.€€You€do€your€duty.€ÏYou€can't€give€someone€the€death€penalty.€€If€he€gets€it,€heÏordered€it€up€himself.€€So€don't€let€the€defense€put€a€guiltÏtrip€on€you.€€You're€here€to€do€a€duty.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àÌà àIn€òòCaldwellóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€"it€isÏconstitutionally€impermissible€to€rest€a€death€sentence€on€a€determination€made€by€aÏsentencer€who€has€been€led€to€believe€that€the€responsibility€for€determining€theÏappropriateness€of€the€defendant's€death€rests€elsewhere."€€òòIdóó.€at€328„29,€105€S.€Ct.€atÏ2639.€€The€argument€made€by€the€prosecutor€in€the€òòCaldwellóó€case€contained€phrasesÏsuch€as€"your€decision€is€not€the€final€decision,"€"your€job€is€reviewable,"€and€"theÏdecision€you€render€is€automatically€reviewable€by€the€Supreme€Court."€€òòIdóó.€at€325„26,Ï105€S.€Ct.€at€2637„38.€€Although€the€defense€objected€to€these€statements,€the€trialÏjudge€overruled€the€objection€and€instructed€the€prosecutor€to€inform€the€jury€that€theirÏdecision€was€automatically€reviewable.€€The€Supreme€Court€ruled€that€the€argumentÍwas€improper€and€in€violation€of€the€constitution.€€In€the€later€case€of€òòRomano€v.ÏOklahomaóó,€512€U.S.€1,€œ9,›€114€S.€Ct.€2004,€2010€(1994),€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€noted€that€it€has€ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àsince€read€òòCaldwellóó€as€"relevant€only€to€certain€types€ofÏcomment€„€those€that€mislead€the€jury€as€to€its€role€in€theÏsentencing€process€in€a€way€that€allows€the€jury€to€feel€lessÏresponsible€than€it€should€for€the€sentencing€decision."€ÏòòDarden€v.€Wainwrightóó,€477€U.S.€168,€184,€n.15,€106€S.Ct.Ï2464,€2473,€n.15€(1986).€€Thus,€"[t]o€establish€a€òòCaldwellóóÏviolation,€a€defendant€necessarily€must€show€that€theÏremarks€to€the€jury€improperly€described€the€role€assignedÏto€the€jury€by€local€law."€€òòDugger€v.€Adamsóó,€489€U.S.€401,Ï407,€109€S.€Ct.€1211,€1215€(1989).ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àWe€believe€that€the€statements€made€by€the€prosecutor€in€this€case€couldÏarguably€be€read€as€an€attempt€to€diminish€in€the€eyes€of€the€jury€its€responsibility€inÏimposing€the€death€penalty.€€Statements€such€as€"keep€in€mind,€you€don't€impose€theÏsentence,€the€law€provides€the€sentence,"€òòState€v.€Westóó,€767€S.W.2d€387,€399€(Tenn.Ï1989),€and€"she€is€responsible€for€her€death,€no€one€else,"€and€"it€is€she,€theÏdefendant,€that€has€signed€her€own€death€warrant,"€òòButtrum€v.€Blackóó,€721€F.€Supp.Ï1268,€1316€n.11€(N.D.€Ga.€1989),€òòaffððdóó,€908€F.2d€695€(11th€Cir.€1990),€have€beenÏconstrued€as€minimizing€in€the€jury's€eyes€its€role€in€imposing€the€death€penalty.€€ÌÌà à€The€ultimate€question,€though,€is€whether€the€argument€had€anÏintolerable€risk€of€affecting€the€sentencing€decision.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Irickóó,€762€S.W.2dÍ121,€131€(Tenn.€1988).€€Factors€that€we€can€consider€in€making€this€review€include€theÏfollowing:€€whether€the€trial€court€endorsed€the€improper€remarks;€the€extent€and€theÏspecificity€of€the€statements€given€the€context€of€the€argument€as€a€whole;€whetherÏother€portions€of€the€prosecutor's€argument€properly€set€forth€the€jury's€role;€andÏwhether€the€court€properly€instructed€the€jury€as€to€its€role€under€the€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòWestóó,Ï767€S.W.2d€at€399.ÌÌà àWe€note€that€the€defense€in€this€case€did€not€object€to€the€prosecutor'sÏargument.€€Also,€the€trial€court€did€not€endorse€the€improper€remarks,€and€it€properlyÏinstructed€the€jury€about€its€role€according€to€the€law.€€Moreover,€the€prosecutor€did€notÏrefer€the€jury€to€another€authority€as€having€the€final€say€in€the€death€sentence.€ÏAlthough€the€prosecutor€did€not€subsequently€set€forth€the€jury's€role,€he€did€impressÏupon€the€jury€later€to€"do€[its]€duty."€€Under€these€circumstances,€we€do€not€believe€thatÏthe€prosecutorððs€argument€presented€an€intolerable€risk€that€the€juryððs€sentencingÏdecision€was€unreliable.€€ÌÌà@ àò òProsecutorial€Misconductó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€several€arguments€made€by€the€prosecutorÏduring€the€sentencing€phase€were€improper€so€that€his€sentence€should€be€reversed.€ÏThe€state€asserts€that€its€arguments€to€the€jury€were€proper€and€that€even€if€one€or€twoÍof€the€statements€should€have€been€avoided,€the€argument,€when€viewed€as€a€whole,Ïwas€appropriate.ÌÌà àWhen€claiming€prosecutorial€misconduct€in€argument,€the€defendant€isÏrequired€to€show€that€the€argument€was€so€inflammatory€or€the€conduct€so€improperÏthat€it€affected€the€verdict€to€his€detriment.€€òòHarrington€v.€Stateóó,€385€S.W.2d€758,€759Ï(Tenn.€1965).€€In€review,€this€Court€should€consider€several€factors,€including€the€intentÏof€the€prosecutor,€the€curative€measures€which€were€undertaken€by€the€court,€theÏimproper€conduct€viewed€in€context€and€in€light€of€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€theÏcase,€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€remarks€with€any€other€errors€in€the€record,€and€theÏrelative€strength€or€weakness€of€the€case.€€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340,€344€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1976).€€The€trial€court€has€wide€discretion€in€controlling€the€argument€ofÏcounsel.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€527€S.W.2d€737,€739€(Tenn.€1975).ÌÌà àThe€statements€of€concern€to€the€defendant€in€this€appeal€are€as€follows:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àLadies€and€gentleman,€this€old€city€here€is€violent,Ïand€this€man€is€violent.€€And€we€who€pass€the€age€of€fifty,Ïwe€can€see€ourselves.€€We€are€victims.€€We€are€prey.€€NeverÏthought€I'd€be€looking€at€myself€like€that€back€when€I€wasÏplaying€football.€€I€thought€I€was€a€pretty€tough€guy.€€But,Ïhey,€I'm€fifty€now,€and,€hey,€my€gait€is€going€to€halt€andÏthings€like€that,€and€I'm€going€to€be€like€Mr.€Harris€one€ofÏthese€days.€€Pause€for€thought.€€ÌÌà8 àà àMr.€Harris'€life€was€not€a€joke.€€It€was€not€flippant.€€HeÏtook€care€of€his€mother,€1988,€moves€off.€€He's€sixty„fourÍyears,€in€an€apartment,€working,€minding€his€own€business,Ïmight€have€been€an€okay€guy.€€Two€nephews€from€Atlanta,ÏGeorgia,€come€down€here.€€They€cared€enough€aboutÌà8 àhim€.€.€.€We're€not€asking€much€of€Mr.€Johnny€Harris.€€All€heÏwanted€in€life€was€to€go€to€Mega€Market,€work,€go€home.€ÏHe€didn't€want€to€live€in€Graceland€or€anything€like€that.€€HeÏwasn't€asking€for€a€big€house€in€Germantown.€€He's€got€aÏlittle€old€two„bedroom€apartment€off€Union.€€That's€all.€€HisÏlife€was€serious.€€It€was€simple,€but€it€was€serious.€€And€he'sÏgot€a€right€to€live€that€life.ÌÌà8 àà àLadies€and€gentlemen,€the€State's€proven€it€to€you.€ÏYou're€at€the€point€where€the€state€has€proven€to€youÏaggravating€circumstances.€€The€State€needs€one.€€We'veÏgot€two.€€And€ladies€and€gentlemen,€those€two€outweigh€theÏmitigating€because€there€isn't€any.€€The€only€verdict,€ladiesÏand€gentlemen,€that€you€can€return€in€this€case,€the€verdictÏthat€truth€dictates€and€justice€demands,€in€fact€justiceÏscreams€for,€is€death.ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àAs€an€initial€concern€to€our€review,€we€note€that€the€defendant€did€notÏobject€to€this€argument.€€Needless€to€say,€neither€the€trial€court€nor€the€state€was€madeÏaware€of€any€need€to€stop€the€argument,€alter€the€argument€or€give€curativeÏinstructions.€€Under€these€circumstances,€it€would€only€be€error€so€plain€and€materialÏto€the€cause€that€the€trial€court€should€have€corrected€it€without€prompting€that€wouldÏwarrant€our€granting€relief.€€ÌÌà àA€portion€of€this€argument€addresses€the€personal€characteristics€andÏlifestyle€of€the€victim,€as€well€as€referring€to€the€victim's€family€members.€€As€previouslyÍnoted,€victim€impact€argument€has€been€held€to€be€constitutionally€proper€in€anÏappropriate€case.€€òòPayne€v.€Tennesseeóó,€501€U.S.€at€827,€111€S.€Ct.€at€2609.€€However,Ïthis€does€not€mean€that€such€argument€is€otherwise€relevant€and€admissible€underÏTennessee€law.€€That€is,€the€only€evidence€that€is€relevant€during€the€sentencingÏphase€of€Tennesseeððs€capital€sentencing€scheme€is€that€tending€to€establish€orÏdisprove€the€existence€of€aggravating€circumstances€or€mitigating€factors.€€òòSeeóóÏòòCozzolino€v.€Stateóó,€584€S.W.2d€765,€768€(Tenn.€1979).€€Any€evidence€that€does€not€goÏto€the€proof€of€one€or€the€other€of€these€issues€is€irrelevant€to€the€juryððs€deliberation.€€òòIdóó.€ÏRecently,€this€court€has€concluded€that€victim€impact€evidence€is€irrelevant€in€theÏcontext€of€our€capital€sentencing€scheme.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Clarence€C.€Nesbitóó,€No.Ï02C01„9510„CR„00293,€Shelby€County,€slip€op.€at€31„33€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Apr.€22,Ï1997).€Ìà àHowever,€we€cannot€say€that€the€argument€constituted€plain€error€orÏresulted€in€real€prejudice.€€In€the€context€of€the€total€argument€by€the€prosecutors,€theÏpart€involving€victim€impact€was€insignificant.€€Therefore,€we€believe€no€plain€errorÏexists.€€ÌÌ€€à àAs€to€the€portion€of€the€argument€that€the€defendant€suggests€improperlyÏcomments€on€the€absence€of€any€mitigating€factors,€our€supreme€court€has€held€thatÏsuch€statements€by€the€prosecutor€do€little€more€than€"set€out€the€State's€interpretationÍof€the€proof."€€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€85€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€defendant'sÏcontention€in€this€respect,€therefore,€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€also€argues€that€the€argument€by€the€prosecutor€tendingÏto€illustrate€a€bleak€picture€of€"growing€old€in€the€city"€served€no€other€purpose€thanÏplacing€fear€in€the€minds€of€the€jury.€€We€note€that€this€court€has€held€that€argumentÏthat€the€jury€is€the€voice€of€the€community€is€not€misconduct.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€JohnnieÏLamont€Daltonóó,€No.€01C01„9408„CR„00291,€Davidson€County,€slip€op.€at€5„6€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€July€11,€1995).€€Obviously,€though,€argument€that€inflames€the€passionsÏand€fears€of€the€jurors,€tending€to€influence€a€sentencing€decision€with€irrelevantÏconsiderations,€can€be€cause€for€reversal.€€òòSeeóó€òòBigbeeóó,€885€S.W.€2d€at€809.€€However,Ïin€considering€the€argument€in€this€case,€made€without€objection,€in€the€context€of€theÏstateððs€total€argument,€we€do€not€believe€that€it€constitutes€plain€error€that€affected€theÏverdict.€€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€also€claims€references€by€the€state€to€the€defendant'sÏstatements€that€he€threatened€to€kill€his€codefendants€were€blatantly€improper.€ÏImmediately€after€the€statements€were€made,€however,€the€defendant€successfullyÏobjected,€and€the€court€admonished€the€prosecutor€from€making€such€comments.€ÏMoreover,€as€the€state€suggests,€the€testimony€of€Kimberly€Farmer€did€in€fact€state€thatÏthe€defendant€had€made€similar€comments€in€her€presence.€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€also€contends€that€comments€in€the€state's€closingÏargument€during€the€sentencing€phase€concerning€the€victims€of€the€defendantððs€priorÏcrime€were€improper.€€We€have€already€concluded€this€type€of€argument€was€improperÏunder€the€circumstances€of€this€case€and€existing€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòBigbeeóó,€885€S.W.2d€atÏ812.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€also€asserts€that€the€prosecutor€improperly€commented€onÏthe€defendant's€failure€to€testify.€€òòGriffin€v.€Californiaóó,€380€U.S.€609,€85€S.€Ct.€1229Ï(1965).€€After€reviewing€the€record,€we€conclude€that€this€claim€is€unfounded.€€ThoughÏthe€defendant€did€not€testify€in€the€guilt€phase,€he€did€take€the€stand€in€the€sentencingÏphase.€€The€comments€of€the€prosecutor€during€the€sentencing€phase€did€not€suggestÏthat€the€defendant€did€not€testify,€but€rather€that€he€said€he€was€sad€rather€than€sorryÏthat€the€killing€happened.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€prosecutor's€criticism€of€theÏdefendant's€demeanor€and€the€prosecutor's€use€of€sarcasm€while€alluding€to€theÏdefendant€were€improper.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Schuleróó,€813€F.2d€978,€982€(9th€Cir.Ï1987);€òòUnited€States€v.€Doeóó,€860€F.2d€488,€492€(1st€Cir.€1988);€òòLindsey€v.€Smithóó,€820ÏF.2d€1137,€1155€(11th€Cir.€1987).€€However,€we€see€no€problem€with€the€prosecutorððsÏargument.€€Demeanor€is€a€relevant€consideration€in€the€context€of€the€defendantððsÍclaim€of€remorse.€€Likewise,€attorneys€are€allowed€to€engage€in€ð ðoratorical€emphasis€inÏarguing€their€respective€positions,ðð€and€jury€argument€is€given€wide€latitude€within€theÏtrial€courtððs€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Princeóó,€713€S.W.2d€914,€918€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986);ÏòòState€v.€Suttonóó,€562€S.W.2d€820,€823€(Tenn.€1978).€€This€would€include€the€use€ofÏirony€and€sarcasm€for€the€purpose€of€making€relevant€points.€€We€believe€that€theÏprosecutorððs€argument€about€which€the€defendant€complains€was€based€upon€relevantÏconsiderations.€€Ìà@ àÌà@ àò òòòINSTRUCTIONSóóó óÌò òà@ àNonunanimous€Verdictó óÌà àThe€defendant€argues€that€the€jury€was€unconstitutionally€instructed€thatÏa€life€verdict€had€to€be€unanimous,€was€not€instructed€of€the€effect€of€a€nonunanimousÏverdict,€and€was€unconstitutionally€given€instructions€that€precluded€the€fullÏconsideration€of€mitigating€evidence.€€The€defendant's€arguments€under€similarÏcircumstances€have€been€repeatedly€rejected€by€our€supreme€court.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€82„83,€87€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,Ï267„68€(Tenn.€1994),€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€17,€21„23€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.ÍBarberóó,€753€S.W.2d€659,€670„71€(Tenn.€1988).× ƒC ××  ×€€Accordingly,€this€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òParole€Eligibilityó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€should€have€instructed€theÏjury€on€the€particular€dates€of€the€defendant's€parole€eligibility.€€The€defendant€claimsÏthat€had€the€jury€known€that€the€defendant€would€not€have€been€eligible€for€parole€forÏat€least€forty„eight€(48)€years,€it€could€have€made€a€more€informed€decision€about€theÏœdefendant's›€sentence.× ƒD ××  ×€€Our€supreme€court€has€addressed€the€defendantððsÏcontention:€€œà8 àÌÓÓà8 àà àNeither›€the€Tennessee€Constitution€nor€the€FederalÏconstitution€prohibits€or€requires€informing€a€capitalÏsentencing€jury€of€relevant€and€accurate€sentencingÏinformation.€.€.€.€€We€are€of€the€opinion€that€to€provide€a€juryÏwith€the€sort€of€information€requested€by€the€[defendant]Ïcould€result€in€œÇà8 àsentences›€of€death€based€on€sheer€speculation€and€onÏfactors€other€than€those€enumerated€in€[the€statute]€andÏsanctioned€under€either€Constitution.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòœ›œSmithóó,›€857€S.W.2d€at€11€(citations€omitted).€€ð ðA€greater€defect€in€such€instructionsÏstems€from€the€fact€that€jurors€tend€to€attempt€to€compensate€for€future€clemency€byÏimposing€harsher€sentences,€which€is€certainly€a€matter€of€prejudice€to€a€defendant."€ÏòòIdóó.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌò òòòœ›à@ àCONSTITUTIONALITY€OF€DEATH€PENALTYó ó€ò òSTATUTESÌœ›à@ àAND€THEIR€APPLICATIONóóó óÌà àThe€defendant€makes€myriad€attacks€upon€the€constitutionality€of€theÏdeath€penalty€and€the€Tennessee€statutes€providing€for€it,€and€its€application€in€thisÏcase.€€We€need€not€itemize€all€of€them€in€this€opinion.€€Our€supreme€court€has€rejectedÏall€of€his€claims€regarding€the€death€penalty€and€how€our€statutes€and€proceduresÏallow€for€its€imposition.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€178„79,€85„91Ï(Tenn.€1991);€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€88€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875ÏS.W.2d€253,€270„71€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Van€Tranóó,€864€S.W.2d€465,€481„82€(Tenn.Ï1993);€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€23€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€768€S.W.2dÏ239,€252€(Tenn.€1989);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Cribbsóó,€òòsupraóó,€slip€op.€at€24„25.ÌÌà àAs€for€the€issue€of€the€death€penalty€being€properly€applied€to€theÏdefendant,€our€review€of€the€record€and€other€similar€cases€leads€us€to€conclude€thatÍthe€nature€of€the€crime€and€the€defendant€adequately€justify€the€sentence€imposed€byÏthe€jury.€€The€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€state€supports€a€conclusionÏthat€the€defendant€intended€to€kill€the€victim€and€that€his€denial€was€less€than€candid.€ÏSuch€a€repeat€violent€offender,€for€whom€almost€no€mitigating€circumstances€areÏshown€in€the€record,€would€typically€fall€within€the€class€of€felony€murderers€whoÏreceive€the€death€penalty€in€this€state.€€òòCfóó.€òòState€v.€Branamóó,€855€S.W.2d€563,€570„71Ï(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌò òòòœ›à@ àENHANCEMENT€FACTORS€FOR€ROBBERYóóó óÌà àThe€defendant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€improperly€considered€Ïenhancement€factors€that€were€essential€elements€of€the€offense€when€it€sentencedÏhim€to€twenty€years€for€especially€aggravated€robbery.€€The€state€concedes€as€much,Ïalthough€not€identifying€which€ones€it€concedes.€€In€reviewing€the€sentence€imposedÏby€the€trial€court,€we€are€to€conduct€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€review€on€the€record,€and€such€reviewÏ"shall€be€conducted€with€a€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€the€court€fromÏwhich€the€appeal€is€taken€are€correct."€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€However,€"[i]f€the€trialÏcourt€applies€inappropriate€factors€or€otherwise€fails€to€follow€the€1989€Sentencing€Act,Ïthe€presumption€of€correctness€falls."€€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€116,€123€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€applied€the€following€seven€enhancement€factors€as€theyÏare€provided€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 à(1)€The€defendant€has€a€history€of€criminal€convictions€orÏbehavior.ÌÌà8 à(2)€The€defendant€was€a€leader€of€others€in€the€commissionÏof€the€offense.ÌÌà8 à(6)€The€defendant€inflicted€particularly€great€personalÏinjuries€upon€the€victim.ÌÌà8 à(9)€The€defendant€employed€a€firearm€during€the€offense.ÌÌà8 à(10)€The€defendant€had€no€hesitation€in€committing€a€crimeÏinvolving€a€high€risk€to€life.ÌÌà8 à(12)€The€defendant€willfully€inflicted€bodily€injury€uponÏanother€person.ÌÌà8 à(16)€The€defendant€committed€the€offense€underÏcircumstances€showing€a€great€potential€for€bodily€injury€toÏthe€victim.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓAs€a€general€rule,€factors€that€are€elements€of€a€crime€or€are€inherent€in€the€crimeÏcannot€be€used.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114;€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€597,€599„600Ï(Tenn.€1994).€ÌÌà àThus,€to€the€extent€that€an€especially€aggravated€robbery€requires€theÏuse€of€violence€or€fear€of€violence,€the€use€of€a€deadly€weapon,€and€the€infliction€ofÏserious€bodily€injury,€òòseeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€39„13„403,€those€circumstances€are€inapplicable€forÏenhancement€purposes.€€This€means€that€the€use€of€a€deadly€weapon,€the€infliction€ofÍparticularly€great€injuries,€the€risk€to€life,€and€the€existence€of€a€great€potential€forÏbodily€injury€„„€as€they€exist€in€all€especially€aggravated€robberies€„„€cannot€enhanceÏpunishment€for€the€especially€aggravated€robbery€in€this€case.€€ÌÌà àHowever,€to€the€extent€the€circumstances€of€the€crime€reflect€a€greaterÏrange€of€risk€or€greater€culpability€relative€to€certain€factors,€they€may€apply€in€aÏparticular€case.€€òòSeeóó€œòòJonesóó,›€883€S.W.2d€at€603.€€In€this€respect,€the€evidence€of€theÏshootings€occurring€near€to€and€into€occupied€dwellings€would€allow€the€use€of€factorÏ(10)€relative€to€involving€the€high€risk€to€life€presented€to€persons€other€than€the€victim.€ÏLikewise,€because€an€especially€aggravated€robbery€does€not€require€the€òòwillfulóóÏinfliction€of€bodily€injury€upon€another€person,€factor€(12)€applies.ÌÌà àIn€any€event,€the€fact€that€factors€(6),€(9)€and€(16)€do€not€apply€does€notÏnecessarily€translate€into€a€reduction€in€the€sentence€imposed€by€the€trial€court.€€TheÏburden€remains€upon€the€defendant€to€show€that€the€sentence€imposed€wasÏunjustified.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€860€S.W.2d€53,€60€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€TheÏdefendant€was€previously€convicted€of€similar€crimes€and€acted€in€concert€with€othersÏto€aid€in€his€commission€of€the€offense€and€his€leaving€the€scene.€€With€no€applicableÏmitigating€factors,€we€hold€that€these€circumstances€give€weight€to€the€remainingÍfactors€so€as€to€justify€the€midrange€sentence€of€twenty€years€for€the€Class€A€felonyÏinvolved.× ƒE ××  ×€€The€sentence€is€affirmed.ÌÌÇà@ àò òòòCONSECUTIVE€SENTENCESóóó óÌà àThe€defendant€contends€that€the€imposition€of€consecutive€sentencesÏwas€improper€in€this€case€because:€(1)€the€term€"extensive"€when€used€to€modifyÏcriminal€history€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„115€is€unconstitutionally€vague;€(2)€the€defendantÏdoes€not€have€any€prior€juvenile€convictions;€(3)€the€use€of€juvenile€criminal€activity€inÏconsidering€the€imposition€of€consecutive€sentences€is€improper;€and€(4)€theÏdefendant€is€not€a€danger€to€society.€ÌÌà àThe€predicate€factors€for€determining€whether€to€impose€consecutiveÏsentences€are€provided€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„115.€The€trial€court€found€that€the€defendantÏhad€an€extensive€history€of€criminal€activity€and€that€he€was€a€dangerous€offenderÏwhose€behavior€indicates€little€or€no€respect€for€human€life.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(2)€and€(4).€€The€defendant's€contentions€as€to€the€impropriety€of€these€findingsÏare€without€merit.€€The€defendant€cites€no€authority€in€support€of€his€proposition€thatÏthe€term€"extensive"€is€unconstitutionally€vague.€€The€trial€court€properly€consideredÏthe€defendant's€prior€criminal€activity€as€being€extensive.€€Though€the€defendant€mayÏnot€have€any€prior€juvenile€convictions,€the€statute€does€not€state€that€there€must€be€aÏconviction,€just€prior€criminal€activity.€€Furthermore,€òòState€v.€Stocktonóó,€733€S.W.2d€111,Ï112„13€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986),€suggests€that€the€trial€court€can€review€juvenileÏrecords€when€making€a€sentencing€determination.€€Finally,€the€defendant€was€properlyÍclassified€as€a€dangerous€offender.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Wilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€933,€935„39Ï(Tenn.€1995).€€Accordingly,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àIn€consideration€of€the€foregoing€and€the€record€as€a€whole,€we€hold€thatÏthe€first€degree€murder€conviction€is€affirmed€but€that€the€sentence€is€reversed.€€WeÏaffirm€the€judgment€of€conviction€for€the€especially€aggravated€robbery.€€The€case€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€new€sentencing€hearing€for€the€first€degree€murderÏand€the€entry€of€a€judgment€of€conviction€under€count€two€of€Case€No.€92„04081.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_________________________ÌJoe€B.€Jones,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÌ_________________________ÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€Judge