ÿWPCu 2# ÌU:× % 0(w@?4“¢U.ª 0”Ø 0Dl 0J° 0Tú 0^N 0h¬ 0r 0|† 0† 0ˆ 1u 0d 0@ñ D31 Bd B) DCª AMí ñ: AQ+ Æ| 0DB 0D† D/Ê Bù v~$vÓ¢˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡ þDÿDDeÓ€B\J#úÿÿú, ú3|x%ä2¼A`ArialTT(D(2´¤$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd* &Cþÿ << Gÿÿ çÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òOctober€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWhen€a€member€of€this€panel€asked€the€attorney€arguing€the€merits€of€theÏpetitionersðð€case€if€evidence€had€been€presented€regarding€Woffordððs€desire€to€waiveÏany€potential€or€actual€conflict€of€interest€that€might€exist,€counsel€stated€evidence€hadÏbeen€presented€at€the€hearing.€€The€record,€as€previously€noted,€does€not€containÏevidence€of€this€fact.€€The€statements€of€counsel€do€not€constitute€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€òòDelkÏv.€Stateóó,€590€S.W.2d€435,€440€(Tenn.€1979);€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€255Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1990).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑœÞ ÞÌIN›€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌ̜ـ*ÙßR€'(&A1-j|€ÿâ` Å `€€@ÿRß›AT€JACKSONÌÌSEPTEMBER€1996€SESSIONÌÓ  Ó€€€€€ÌÌÌSHANNON€L.€SMITH,€KEITH€VERSIE,à àà à)ÌAND€MICHAEL€L.€WOFFORD,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àAPPELLANTS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02„C„01„9508„CR„00241Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àShelby€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àW.€Fred€Axley,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Extraordinary€Appeal)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà à€€€€APPELLEE.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌRichard€B.€Fieldsà àà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€WalkupÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌ699€Jefferson€Avenueà àà àà àà à500€Charlotte€AvenueÌMemphis,€TN€38105à àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0497ÌÌGeorge€Kendricksà àà àà àà àà àMichael€J.€Fahey,€IIÌL.€Song€Richardsonà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌAttorneys€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌ99€Hudson€Street,€Suite€1601à àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌNew€York,€NY€10013à àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€L.€GibbonsÌSteven€W.€Hawkinsà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€Avenue,€Suite€3„01Ì918€F€Street,€N.W.,€Suite€601à àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌWashington,€DC€20004Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€W.€CampbellÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€Avenue,€Suite€3„01Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:_______________________________ÌÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDED€FOR€FURTHER€PROCEEDINGSÌÌÌJoe€B.€Jones,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÑ7€§»XXdæXXdæ7ÑØØÓ  Óò òÔ€ „ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÓ  ÓÔ€ XÔÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€issue€this€Court€must€resolve€in€this€extraordinary€appeal€is€whether€theÏtrial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€disqualifying€counsel€in€this€post„convictionÏproceeding€based€upon€a€conflict€of€interest€amongst€the€petitioners.€€After€a€thoroughÏreview€of€the€record,€the€briefs€of€the€parties,€and€the€law€governing€the€issueÏpresented€for€review,€it€is€the€opinion€of€this€Court€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€shouldÏbe€reversed€and€this€action€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€opinion.Ìà àOn€the€evening€of€June€24,€1991,€at€approximately€9:12€p.m.,€three€African„American€males€approached€Terry€and€Elizabeth€Wilbanks€and€attempted€to€rob€them.€ÏWhen€the€couple€attempted€to€flee,€Terry€Wilbanks€was€shot.€€He€died€as€a€result€ofÏthis€gunshot€wound.€€Elizabeth€Wilbanks€was€shot€in€the€hip.€€She€survived€theÏgunshot€wound.Ìà àThe€petitioners€were€arrested€at€a€fast€food€outlet€approximately€two€blocks€fromÏthe€situs€of€the€robbery.€€The€petitioners€entered€the€following€guilty€pleas€pursuant€toÏa€plea€bargain€agreement:Ìà à1.)€€Shannon€L.€Smith:€murder€in€the€perpetration€of€a€robbery,€confinement€forÏlife€in€the€Department€of€Correction;€especially€aggravated€robbery,€confinement€forÏtwenty„five€(25)€years€in€the€Department€of€Correction;€aggravated€assault,Ïconfinement€for€six€(6)€years€in€the€Department€of€Correction;Ìà à2.)€€Keith€Versie:€murder€in€the€perpetration€of€a€robbery,€confinement€for€life€inÏthe€Department€of€Correction;€especially€aggravated€robbery,€confinement€for€twenty„five€(25)€years€in€the€Department€of€Correction;€aggravated€assault,€confinement€for€sixÏ(6)€years€in€the€Department€of€Correction;€andÌà à3.)€€Michael€A.€Wofford:€facilitation€to€commit€murder€in€the€perpetration€of€aÏrobbery,€confinement€for€twenty„five€(25)€years€in€the€Department€of€Correction;Ïespecially€aggravated€robbery,€confinement€for€twenty„five€(25)€years€in€theÏDepartment€of€Correction;€aggravated€assault,€confinement€for€six€(6)€years€in€theÏDepartment€of€Correction.Ìà àThe€petitioners€filed€a€joint€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€on€April€20,€1995,€inÏthe€Criminal€Court€for€the€Thirtieth€Judicial€District.€€The€petition€alleged€the€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€and€the€entrance€of€involuntary€pleas€of€guilty.€€The€state€filedÌ€an€answer€on€May€3,€1995.Ìà àOn€or€about€the€30th€day€of€May,€1995,€the€state€filed€a€pleading€entitledÏð ðMotion€to€Remove€Counsel€Due€to€Conflict€of€Interest.ðð€€The€motion€alleged€that€(a)ÏWofford€will€be€subject€to€a€life€sentence€if€his€convictions€are€set€aside,€(b)€counselÍwill€use€Wofford€to€benefit€Smith€and€Versie,€and€(c)€Wofford€should€be€advised€of€theÏconsequences€of€€his€actions€in€seeking€to€set€aside€his€convictions.€€Based€uponÏthese€concepts,€the€state€asserted€there€was€a€conflict€of€interest€between€Smith€andÏVersie€on€the€one€hand€and€Wofford€on€the€other€hand.€€Both€the€state€and€theÏpetitioners€rely€upon€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution,€Article€I,€ððÏ9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€and€the€Code€of€Professional€Conduct,€Tenn.€Sup.ÏCt.€R.€8.€€Ìà àOn€July€27,€1995,€Alan€E.€Glenn,€a€former€assistant€district€attorney€andÏpresently€in€the€private€practice€of€law,€entered€a€limited€appearance€on€behalf€ofÏWofford.€€On€this€same€date,€Mr.€Glenn,€a€person€of€sterling€character,€advised€the€trialÏcourt€he€had€talked€to€Wofford€and€Woffordððs€mother€regarding€the€proceedingsÏpending€before€the€trial€court.€€He€explained€to€Wofford€the€potential€for€a€conflict€ofÏinterest€and€what€may€occur€if€his€convictions€were€set€aside.€Wofford€advised€GlennÏhe€wished€to€waive€any€conflict€of€interest€and€proceed€with€the€suit€for€post„convictionÏrelief€with€his€two€former€co„defendants.Ìà àThe€trial€court€subsequently€entered€an€order€disqualifying€counsel€of€recordÏfrom€representing€any€of€the€petitioners.€€The€order€recites€that€Wofford€had€waivedÏany€conflict€of€interest.€€However,€the€trial€court€ruled€this€waiver€was€not€binding€uponÏthe€court.€€€According€to€the€trial€court,€whether€to€permit€the€waiver€of€a€conflict€ofÏinterest€rests€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àSince€the€creation€of€the€Post„Conviction€Act,€the€appellate€courts€of€€thisÏjurisdiction€€have€been€unable€to€determine€whether€suits€brought€pursuant€to€the€ActÏare€civil€or€criminal€in€nature.€€The€courts€have€referred€to€such€proceedings€asÏð ðcriminal,ðð€ð ðquasi„criminal,ðð€and€a€ð ðhybrid€affair.ððÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Scalesóó,€767€S.W.2d€157,€158€(Tenn.€1989),€the€issue€before€theÏsupreme€€court€was€whether€the€waiver€of€the€notice€of€appeal€provision€contained€inÏRule€(4)(a),€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.,€could€be€applied€in€a€post„conviction€relief€proceeding.€ÏThe€supreme€court,€stating€ð ðpost„conviction€proceedings€are€criminal€in€nature,ðð€heldÏthe€waiver€provision€was€applicable€in€post„conviction€suits.Ìà àIn€òòState€v.€Ronnie€C.€Stylesóó,€Cocke€County€No.€03„S„01„9108„CR„00067Ï(Tenn.,€Knoxville,€January€25,€1993),€Styles€was€indicted€for€committing€perjury€in€aÏpost„conviction€proceeding€brought€by€Ronald€Cassity.€€The€question€arose€regardingÏthe€difference€in€the€statute€of€limitations€between€criminal€and€civil€cases.€€The€courtÏsaid€in€ruling:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ X ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌNeither€party,€as€defense€counsel€has€pointed€out€in€theÏdefense€brief,€have€been€able€to€discover€a€case€in€thisÏjurisdiction€directly€pointing€out€whether€a€post„convictionÏproceeding€is€a€civil€matter€or€a€criminal€matter.ÌÌWe€agree€there€has€been€a€blur€in€the€definition€betweenÏcivil€and€criminal€cases€heard€under€the€provisions€of€theÏPost„Conviction€Procedure€Act.€€In€this€jurisdiction€suchÏproceedings€have€variously€been€referred€to€as€quasi€civilÏor€quasi€criminal.€In€òòMitchell€v.€Stateóó,€512€S.W.2d€661,€663Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1974),€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€heldÏa€petition€for€habeas€corpus€and€a€post„conviction€petitionÏto€be€òòparióó€òòcausaóó€when€the€relief€and€procedure€authorizedÏby€the€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€appears€adequateÏand€€appropriate.€€We€find€the€comment€of€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€in€òòSmith€v.€Bennettóó,€365€U.S.€708,€81€S.Ct.Í895,€897,€6€L.Ed.2d€39€(1961),€to€be€relevant€in€this€case.€ÏIn€òòSmithóó€the€court€said:€ð ðWe€shall€not€quibble€as€to€whetherÏin€this€context€it€be€called€a€civil€or€criminal€act.€.€.€.€€TheÏavailability€of€a€procedure€to€regain€liberty€lost€throughÏcriminal€process€cannot€be€made€contingent€upon€a€choiceÏof€labels.ðð€ÌÌÓ  Ó*€*€*€*ÌÌÓ  ÓA€post„conviction€proceeding€is€a€hybrid€affair,€involving€anÏappeal€from€a€criminal€prosecution€which€is€consideredÏunder€civil€rules€of€procedure.€ÌÌà àà àà àà à*€*€*€*ÌÌThe€procedural€characteristics€of€the€post„convictionÏremedy€should€be€appropriate€to€the€purposes€of€theÏremedy.€€While€the€€post„conviction€proceeding€is€separateÏfrom€the€original€prosecution€proceeding,€the€post„conviction€stage€is€an€extension€of€the€original€proceedingÏand€should€be€related€to€it€insofar€as€feasible.ÌÌPost„conviction€review€has€become€an€established€part€ofÏthe€criminal€process.€€In€formulating€a€rule€we€recognizeÏthat€the€post„conviction€proceeding€is€procedurally€separateÏand€apart€from€the€original€criminal€prosecution.€.€.€.€€It€seeksÏnot€to€convict,€but€to€set€aside€a€conviction€which€is€void€orÏvoidable€because€of€the€abridgement€of€constitutionalÏrights.€€The€base€root€of€the€proceeding€is€criminal.€€TheÏpost„conviction€stage€of€a€criminal€trial€is€an€extension€ofÏthe€original€proceeding.€€The€procedure€by€which€a€criminalÏconviction€may€be€set€aside€is€civil€in€nature,€therefore,€it€isÏtried€under€the€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€and€less€stringentÏevidentiary€rules€apply.€€€€€€ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓÓòòStylesóó,€slip€op.€at€6„9.€€In€òòWatkins€v.€Stateóó,€903€S.W.2d€302,€305€(Tenn.€1995),€theÏsupreme€court€€essentially€adopted€the€holding€in€òòStylesóó€without€making€reference€toÏthe€case.Ìà àThe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Post„Conviction€Procedure,€created€by€the€supremeÍcourt,€add€another€dimension€to€this€dilemma.€€Section€3(B)€states€ð ð[n]either€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€nor€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€ProcedureÏapply€to€post„conviction€proceedings.€.€.€.ððÌà àWhile€the€supreme€court€has€made€an€effort€to€clarify€the€nature€of€post„conviction€proceedings,€the€distinction€remains€blurred.€€After€stating€in€òòStylesóó€andÏòòWatkinsóó€the€proceedings€are€civil€in€nature€and€are€governed€by€the€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure,€the€supreme€court€has€formulated€a€rule€which€states€that€neither€the€civilÏor€criminal€rules€apply€in€these€proceedings€unless€specifically€designated€by€aÏparticular€provision€of€the€rules.€€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€28€ðð€3(B).ÌÌò òÓ  ÓII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àIt€has€long€been€established€that€the€right€to€counsel€provisions€embodied€in€theÏSixth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€extend€through€the€first€appeal€as€of€right.€òòPennsylvania€v.€Finleyóó,€481ÏU.S.€551,€554„55,€107€S.Ct.€1990,€1993,€95€L.Ed.2d€539,€545„46€(1987);€òòHouse€v.ÏStateóó,€911€S.W.2d€705,€712„13€(Tenn.€1995),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€____€U.S.€____,€116€S.Ct.Ï1685,€134€L.Ed.2d€787€(1996).€€In€other€words,€there€is€no€constitutional€right€to€theÏassistance€of€counsel€in€post„conviction€proceedings.€€òòCarruthers€v.€Stateóó,€814€S.W.2dÏ64,€69€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1991).€€As€the€supreme€court€said€inÏòòHouseóó,€ð ðthe€federal€constitution€does€not€require€that€states€provide€an€attorney€to€anÏindigent€post„conviction€petitioner.€.€.€.ðð€€911€S.W.2d€at€712.Ìà àThe€petitioner€in€a€post„conviction€proceeding€has€a€statutory€right€to€theÍappointment€of€counsel€when€the€petition€alleges€a€colorable€claim€that€has€not€beenÏwaived,€previously€determined,€or€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„207(b)(1)€(formerly€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„107).€€The€supreme€courtÏhas€also€Ô&  Ôprovided€for€the€appointment€of€counsel€in€post„conviction€cases.€€Tenn.€Sup.ÏCt.€R.€13€ðð€1.Ô'  ÔÌà àThe€appellate€courts€of€this€state€have€zealously€guarded€a€petitionerððs€right€toÏcounsel€in€post„conviction€cases.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòAllen€v.€Stateóó,€854€S.W.2d€873,€876Ï(Tenn.€€1993);€òòSwanson€v.€Stateóó,€749€S.W.2d€731,€734„35€(Tenn.€1988);€òòMartucci€v.ÏStateóó,€872€S.W.2d€947,€948€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòState€v.€Clarkóó,€774€S.W.2d€634,Ï636€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989);€òòState€v.€Mullinsóó,€767€S.W.2d€668,€670€(Tenn.€€Crim.€App.Ï1988),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1989);€òòChildress€v.€Stateóó,€695€S.W.2d€541,€543€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1985);€òòMayes€v.€Stateóó,€671€S.W.2d€857,€859€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984);ÏòòHaynes€v.€Stateóó,€637€S.W.2d€467,€468€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€The€number€ofÏunreported€cases€which€have€€reversed€the€trial€court€for€the€failure€to€appoint€counselÏare€legion.€€In€òòState€v.€Butleróó,€670€S.W.2d€241,€243€(Tenn.€Crim.€€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.Ïòòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1984),€€this€Court€said€ð ðthe€assistance€of€counsel€is€necessary€to€aidÏboth€the€petitioner€and€the€courts€in€bringing€this€matter€to€a€proper€conclusion.ðð€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€precise€question€this€Court€must€resolve€is€whether€(a)€the€petitioner€isÏentitled€to€be€represented€by€private€counsel€of€his€or€her€choice,€(b)€there€is€a€conflictÏof€interest€in€this€case,€and,€if€so,€whether€(c)€the€petitioner€has€a€right€to€waive€aÍconflict€of€interest€created€by€joint€representation.€€The€appellate€courts€of€this€stateÏhave€not€addressed€these€issues.Ìà àA€petitioner€in€a€post„conviction€action€has€a€qualified€right€to€be€represented€byÏretained€private€counsel€of€his€or€her€choice.€€For€instance,€retained€private€counselÏmust€be€licensed€to€practice€law€in€Tennessee€and€be€in€good€standing€with€theÏappropriate€agencies.€€Counsel€licensed€in€another€state€may€represent€the€petitionerÏif€counsel€complies€with€the€òòproóó€òòhacóó€òòviceóó€requirements€contained€in€the€SupremeÏCourt€Rules.€€Of€course,€there€are€numerous€other€factors€that€could€affect€this€qualifiedÏright.Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€facts€do€not€create€a€conflict€of€interest.€€All€three€petitionersÏwere€convicted€for€engaging€in€the€same€criminal€conduct€after€they€entered€theirÏrespective€pleas€of€guilty.€€The€grounds€raised€in€the€petition€are€common€to€all€threeÏpetitioners.€€If€each€petitioner€was€granted€a€separate€evidentiary€hearing,€or€eachÏgranted€a€separate€lawyer,€the€same€evidence€would€be€adduced€at€each€hearing€orÏby€each€lawyer.€€In€short,€whether€or€not€there€may€be€disparity€in€sentencing€if€theÏpetitioners€are€granted€a€new€trial€and€are€convicted€does€not€create€a€conflict€ofÏinterest€in€this€proceeding.€€However,€separate€counsel€may€be€required€to€representÏthe€petitioners€if€a€new€trial€is€granted.Ìà àAssuming€òòarguendoóó€there€is€a€conflict€of€interest€based€upon€multipleÏrepresentation€in€a€post„conviction€action,€the€parties€should€be€given€the€opportunityÏto€waive€the€conflict€in€order€to€be€represented€by€the€same€lawyer.€€Here,€the€stateÏalleged€Michael€Wofford€presented€a€conflict€of€interest,€and€private€counsel€should€beÏbarred€from€representing€any€of€the€petitioners.€€Separate€counsel€conferred€withÍWofford€and€his€mother€and€announced€to€the€trial€court€Wofford€understood€theÏpossibility€of€a€conflict€of€interest.€€However,€he€was€willing€to€waive€the€conflict€to€beÏrepresented€by€private€counsel€filing€the€petition€on€his€behalf.Ìà àThe€statements€of€counsel€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€constitute€aÏwaiver€of€a€potential€conflict€of€interest.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€The€petitioner€must€be€present€in€open€court.€ÏThe€parties€and€the€trial€court€should€explain€to€the€petitioner€how€an€actual€orÏpotential€conflict€may€affect€him€and€that€the€petitioner€has€a€right€to€be€represented€byÏseparate€counsel.€€The€petitioner€must€be€questioned€under€oath€by€the€parties€andÏthe€trial€court€to€determine€if€the€petitioner€understands€the€actual€or€potential€conflict.€ÏThe€petitioner€must€state€under€oath€whether€he€desires€to€waive€the€actual€orÏpotential€conflict.€€If€the€petitioner€states€he€is€willing€to€waive€any€actual€or€potentialÏconflict€of€interest,€the€trial€court€shall€permit€the€petitioner€to€be€represented€by€privateÏcounsel€absent€a€compelling€reason€to€the€contrary.€€In€short,€a€trial€court€should€notÏoverrule€the€informed€decision€of€the€petitioner€who€knowingly€and€intelligently€waivesÏeither€a€potential€or€actual€conflict€of€interest,€decides€to€be€represented€by€hisÏretained€counsel€of€choice,€and€agrees€to€accept€the€consequences€of€his€decision.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Parrottóó,€919€S.W.2d€60,€62€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€Ìà àWhile€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€44(c)€is€not€applicable€in€post„conviction€actions,€theÍrule€serves€as€a€guideline€as€to€how€a€trial€court€should€proceed€when€a€party€assertsÏor€it€is€readily€recognized€that€an€actual€or€potential€conflict€of€interest€may€exist.€€SuchÏa€procedure€will€preserve€the€right€to€counsel€in€post„conviction€actions€prescribed€byÏstatute€and€rule.Ìà àThis€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€withÏthis€opinion.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€JOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ______________________________________Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€DAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ______________________________________Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€JERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGE