ÿWPC  ÅCñ#nL¿ºpT­‡” ;$¯3sîsµ5!ªgòš+Ão¬rHˆj͹z>RÅÆ0Ç«TÚꓞu9 ÔÂ7Pn»Â¡± æ9ß&j¶% ¿’­¿ 9(»b࣪ÁÆ.W«øS4]Zh™Kß-ŒÈçKÙ”&°ä7~Š'4ãe¡{iV–³t%luå­“i"C‘oÅk»>¼á8³ôq™Y¿h˜}b‡Ú¿A<ÀC%UâØyÏ7'p"1o 4…ó/p+‡AÈÉ«vÒFÃ=þíR ÖÂ'“‘®5LOÀ©øVa…Ò¢@À§¯{Øè¥÷ö,åܨMÖoF¬|”Ã_¡:뫎’x"V¸ÔÇ»aêv³´j z“LªdiÂvwÊ9Þ-–ʬp¸y^‚¤$¯–(—uÕ.ƒÀVRyÏRˆ9svÄÆªÜf 8*…ó¼—ö=?)ýî¤3×R÷ªÿµØúV Ñj¸Z$”kåá 9ž3Q®¥Ô´à¾ýg¾2kÊ.NY/¤b?OHÞÿX¢ÿOûãŸÇŒiBí}eõD·î  PPe =…ÂÜ¥&d縔Á^‘F?ö$áÿd ‹-Î5EáçÕk Yíq ºx)# >U:I %ƒ 0‰w@4ÍáU8ðU8(` 0Hï 0D7 U8{ U8³ (ë U:MU8UUUUUUUUUUUUU AQÆÞ 0D¤ 0Dè 0D, Bp D/ B¼ D3Ù˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(Üg$¡¡Ñ°ÑÑ€°ÑÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€YXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñ ‘’D“”E•–D—˜E™šÓ€n~<$3|x¥,—óAZ‹ Arial Italic,—óAZ‹ Arial Italic …Ý ƒ ¢$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô`•ôXXÔAppellantððs€petition€states€that€he€filed€a€motion€to€proceed€Ô‡ ô(ôôô`•Ôpro€seÔ#†ô`•ôô ô(¿#Ô,€which€qualifies€as€a€writtenÐ  Ðwaiver.€€òòState€v.€Goodwinóó,€909€S.W.2d€35,€39€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).(ø(3V2$¤¤Ý ƒg!ÝѰÑÑ€°ÑÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ŸéXXdædæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,ÍûAZ‹ Arial Italic,—óAZ‹ Arial Italic Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XŸàXXXÔÔ€¸yXXŸàÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XŸàX¸yÔÐ  ÐÌò òNovember€4,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ô÷ ôXXŸàÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular,—óAZ‹ Arial Italic !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó d'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒg!ÝѰÑÑ€°ÑÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ŸàXXdæXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýñšññšññšñ›ñšññšñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@E  ` ttx$Xð Õrß›ñšñà@ €àòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  ÐóóÌà@îî+€àòòAT€JACKSON€óóˆÐ ÔÌ ÐÌà@PP&€à€€APRIL€1998€SESSIONˆÌÌÌÌÌCEDRIC€STAMPLEY,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€02C01„9707„CR„00288€Ð   Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àœAppellñ’ñantñ’ññ–ññ“ñeeñ“ññ–ññ—ñantñ—ññ”ññ“ñ.ñ“ññ”ññ•ñ,ñ•ñ›à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à€Ð êâ  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àSHELBY€COUNTYÐ ÐÈ  ÐV.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð ¶®  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHON.€JOHN€P.€COLTON,€JR.,Ð œ”  ÐSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àJUDGEÐ ‚z  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àœAppellñ˜ñantñ˜ññ™ñeeñ™ñ.›à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à(Post„Conviction)Ð NF Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)ÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellant:óóà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àòòFor€the€Appellee:óóÐ ÌÄ ÐÌCedric€œStampley,€òòProóó€òòSeóó›à à àà 8 àà  àà è àœJohn›€Knox€WalkupÐ ˜ Ð4018€Mountain€Terraceà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ ~v ÐMemphis,€TN€38127à à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àÐ d\ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àPeter€M.€CoughlanÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à425€Fifth€Avenue€NorthÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àWilliam€L.€GibbonsÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àC.€Alanda€HorneÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à201€Poplar€Street,€Suite€301Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€___________________ÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Special€JudgeÐ  3,1S Ðà@ÙÙ-€àò òOPINIONó óˆÐ  ÐÌÌÓÓà Ø àThe€appellant,€Cedric€Stampley,€appeals€as€of€right€the€denial€in€the€ShelbyÏCounty€Criminal€Court€of€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€The€trial€courtÏdismissed€appellantððs€Ô‡ X’ÈXXXÔpro€seÔ#†XŸàXX X’È{#Ô€petition€without€the€appointment€of€counsel€and€withoutÐ X P Ðan€evidentiary€hearing.€€On€appeal,€appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏsummarily€dismissing€his€petition.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.Ìà Ø àAppellant€was€convicted€of€attempted€first€degree€murder€in€1994€and€receivedÏa€sentence€of€23€years.€€On€direct€appeal,€this€Court€affirmed€his€conviction€andÏsentence.€€òòState€v.€Cedric€Stampleyóó,€No.€02C01„9409„CR„00208€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€atÐ XP ÐJackson,€August€16,€1996),€òòperm.óó€òòapp.óó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1997).€€Appellant€filed€theÐ $ Ðinstant€petition€on€April€8,€1997.€€He€alleged€four€grounds€for€relief:€(1)€denial€ofÏassistance€of€counsel€by€the€trial€court€in€permitting€him€to€proceed€Ô‡X’ÈXXXŸàÔpro€seÔ#†XŸàXXX’ÈÜ#Ô€at€trial€andÐ ¼´ Ðon€appeal€without€ensuring€a€voluntary€and€knowing€waiver€of€counsel;€(2)€a€defectiveÏindictment€for€failure€to€contain€sufficient€factual€allegations;€(3)€denial€of€due€processÏby€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€instruct€the€jury€on€lesser€included€offenses;€and€(4)€anÏexcessive€sentence€given€the€evidence€and€law.Ìà Ø àThe€post„conviction€court€entered€a€preliminary€order€and€denied€the€petitionÏwithout€holding€an€evidentiary€hearing.€€Before€dismissing€the€petition,€however,€theÏtrial€court€reviewed€the€transcript€of€the€hearing€on€defendantððs€motion€to€proceed€Ô‡X’ÈXXXŸàÔproÐ T(L!% ÐseÔ#†XŸàXXX’È‹#Ô€and€found€that€appellant€was€properly€advised€of€his€right€to€waive€counsel.€€InÐ $*#' Ðaddition,€tœhe€post„conviction€court€held€that€the€appellant€had€waived€any€claims€forÏrelief€based€upon€defects€in€the€indictment€and€errors€in€failing€to€charge€on€lesserÏoffenses€by€not€raising€those€issues€on€appeal.€€Nevertheless,€it€concluded€that€theÏindictment€properly€informed€the€defendant€of€the€nature€and€cause€of€the€accusationÏagainst€him.€€Finally,€the€post„conviction€court€found€that€instructions€on€the€lesserÏoffenses€of€voluntary€manslaughter€and€criminally€negligent€homicide€were€notÏwarranted€by€the€proof€at€trial.€Ð ¼6´/5 Ðà Ø àWe€are€unpersuaded€by€much€of€appellantððs€authority€because€it€relates€toÏprocedure€under€the€now„repealed€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÐ ÔÌ ÐAnn.€ðððð40„30„101€„€124€(repealed€1995).€€In€contrast,€the€current€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act€contains€more€stringent€standards€and€requires€closer€scrutiny€of€post„¼conviction€petitions€by€the€trial€court.€€òòBlair€v.€Stateóó,€969€S.W.2d€423,€425€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð 80 ÐApp.€1997),€òòperm.óó€òòapp.óó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1998).€€Ð ü  Ðà Ø àUnder€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„206,€the€trial€court€is€requiredÏto€preliminarily€review€the€factual€allegations€in€a€post„conviction€petition€along€with€allÏfiles,€records,€transcripts,€and€correspondence€relating€to€the€judgment€under€attack.€ÏIf€the€claims€have€been€waived€or€previously€determined,€or€if€the€facts€alleged€fail€toÏshow€that€appellant€is€entitled€to€relief,€the€petition€Ô‡XRÜXXX_™ÔmustÔ#†X_™XXXRÜ‚#Ô€be€dismissed.€€Tenn.€CodeÐ ø ÐAnn.€ðð40„30„206(f)€(1997)€(emphasis€added).Ìà Ø àThe€post„conviction€court€properly€determined€that€appellantððs€claim€regardingÏthe€failure€to€charge€lesser€offenses€was€waived€for€failing€to€raise€it€on€direct€appeal.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð40„30„206(g)€(1997).€€Although€not€addressed€by€the€trialÐ 4 , Ðcourt,€appellantððs€challenge€to€his€sentence€has€been€previously€determined€becauseÏit€was€raised€on€direct€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð40„30„206(h)€(1997).€€AnyÐ Ì#Ä  Ðadditional€grounds€in€that€regard€upon€which€appellant€now€seeks€to€challenge€theÏsentence€have€been€waived.€€Because€appellantððs€petition€failed€to€assert€facts€toÏdemonstrate€why€these€claims€are€not€waived€or€previously€determined,€dismissal€wasÏappropriate.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€28,€ðð5(F).Ð ü*ô#( Ðà Ø àWe€disagree,€however,€with€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€appellantÏñˆñhadÏñˆñwaived€his€claim€for€relief€based€upon€a€defective€indictment€by€not€raising€the€issueÏon€direct€appeal.€€Since€the€sufficiency€of€an€indictment€is€jurisdictional€in€nature,€theÏissue€was€not€untimely€raised€in€the€post„conviction€petition.€€òòSeeóó€òòDennis€Dykes€v.Ð ,2$+0 ÐBilly€Compton,€Wardenóó,€No.€02S01„9711„CC„00105€(Tenn.€at€Jackson,€SeptemberÐ ø3ð,2 Ð21,€1998)€(holding€that€sufficiency€of€an€indictment€may€be€raised€in€habeas€corpusÐ Ä5¼.4 Ðpetition).€€Nevertheless,€we€find,€as€did€the€trial€court,€that€the€indictment€in€this€caseÏdid€contain€sufficient€facts€so€as€to€adequately€inform€the€appellant€of€the€nature€andÏcause€of€the€accusation€against€him.€€The€appellant€is€not€entitled€to€post„convictionÏrelief€on€this€ground.€Ìà Ø àWith€regard€to€appellantððs€waiver€of€counsel,€the€record€demonstrates€that€theÏtrial€court€followed€the€proper€procedure€in€allowing€the€appellant€to€waive€counsel€andÏrepresent€himself.€€Before€a€trial€court€may€accept€a€written€waiver€of€counsel,׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€theÐ ÐÈ  Ðtrial€court€must€advise€the€accused€of€the€right€to€counsel€at€every€stage€of€theÏproceedings.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€44(a).€€In€determining€whether€there€has€been€aÏcompetent€and€intelligent€waiver,€the€trial€court€must€inquire€into€the€background,Ïexperience,€and€conduct€of€the€accused.€€òòId.óó€Ð ø Ðà Ø àThe€transcript€in€the€record€before€us€reflects€that€the€trial€court€determined€Ïthat€appellant€completed€high€school€and€also€some€courses€at€broadcasting€school.ÏAppellant€stated€he€could€read€and€write€without€difficulty.€€He€affirmed€that€he€hadÏreviewed€the€rules€of€procedure€and€the€law€relative€to€the€charge€pending€againstÏhim.€€Appellant€stated€that€he€understood€the€charge€against€him€and€knew€that€heÏwas€bound€by€the€same€procedural€rules€as€a€lawyer.€€Appellant€had€no€questionsÏabout€representing€himself€and€disregarded€the€trial€courtððs€recommendation€to€keepÏhis€court„appointed€lawyer.€€The€trial€court€found€that€appellant€was€literate,Ïcompetent,€and€aware€of€the€charge€and€what€he€was€facing.€€Therefore,€it€ruled€thatÏappellant€freely€and€voluntarily€waived€his€right€to€counsel.€€Ìà Ø àAlthough€the€trial€court€granted€appellantððs€request€to€represent€himself,€itÏrequired€court„appointed€counsel€to€remain€as€elbow€counsel€and€ensured€thatÏappellant€had€access€to€an€investigator€from€the€public€defenderððs€office.€€ñŠñTñŠññ‰ñAs€a€result,Ïwe€agree€with€the€post„conviction€court€that€tñ‰ñhe€trialÏâ âcourt€took€ñ‹ñmore€than€ñ‹ñthe€necessary€steps€to€ensure€that€appellant€knowingly€andÐ (2 +0 Ðintelligently€waived€his€right€to€counsel€at€the€trial€level.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Goodwinóó,€909Ð  ÐS.W.2d€35,€41€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€Ìâ âà Ø àAppellant€also€argues€that€the€record€does€not€contain€a€waiver€of€his€right€toÏappellate€counsel.€€According€to€appellant,€at€the€conclusion€of€the€sentencingÏhearing,€the€trial€court€inquired€as€to€whether€appellant€wanted€to€continueÏrepresenting€himself.€€Appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€did€not€again€make€theÏnecessary€inquiries€to€ensure€his€waiver€was€knowing€and€intelligent.€€However,Ïappellant€asserts€no€facts€in€the€petition€to€demonstrate€that€his€circumstances€hadÏchanged€so€that€the€earlier€waiver€had€become€invalid.€€òòCf.óó€òòState€v.€Gillespieóó,€898Ð h` ÐS.W.2d€738,€741„42€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994)€(remanding€appeal€for€appointment€ofÏcounsel€where€record€failed€to€demonstrate€that€trial€court€made€the€required€inquiryÏfor€waiver€of€counsel).€€In€the€absence€of€specific€factual€allegations,€it€is€proper€forÏthe€post„conviction€court€to€dismiss€the€claim.€€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.€28,€ðð5(F).€€Ìà Ø àOur€review€of€the€record€indicates€that€the€post„conviction€courtððs€findings€wereÏcorrect.€€It€is€clear€from€the€record€that€an€evidentiary€hearing€was€unnecessary€toÏresolve€appellantððs€claims.€€We€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€summarily€dismissingÏappellantððs€petition.€ÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à_______________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àWilliam€M.€Barker,€ñŒñSpecial€ñŒñJudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌññJoseph€M.€Tipton,€Judgeñññ‘ñDavid€G.€Hayes,€Judge€ñ‘ñÌÌÌ____________________________ÌñŽñDavid€G.€Hayes,€Judge€ñŽñññJoe€G.€Riley,€Judgeññ