ÿWPC3* …UBV %˜U.žÌnXÜ 0 44 4h | 1m„ 0cñ w@T 0x” 0D 0JP 0Tš î ô 0^ü 0hZ 0r B4 0|Q 0†Í 0S 1uã 0dX D3¼ 0@ïU6/B)eDCŽ AMÑ9ØL:$ê^/HwЇv~WvÓÕ 0w¨# 0Š$ 0 ©$ 0´I% 0Çý% 0ÛÄ& 0ïŸ' AOŽ(ÆÝ( 0D£) D/ç) B*<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX%ä2¼A`ArialTT3|Xà«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@%ä2¼A`ArialTTt10cpiXXXä2¼P±ŠQXP( ¤T$¡¡Ó  ÓÚƒç"þ6 tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;s˜$´´Ô2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à רÙDÚÛ ÜeÝDÞÓ€ß"Uà!î(((3Þ $¤¤Ý ƒ¤T!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(-Ã$òòÚ  Ú5Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔH2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô !" ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òDecember€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÒ D ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€defendants€were€convicted€under€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„411.Ô€/ÔÌ ÎÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóLee€Ester€Crumbley€was€tried€along€with€the€defendants.€€The€jury€convicted€her€of€theÏoffenses€with€which€she€was€charged:€one€count€of€harboring€a€fugitive€and€one€count€of€providing€aidÏto€a€fugitive.€€She€is€not€a€part€of€the€appeal€before€this€Court.Ô€/ÔÌ 0Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóEvidence€did€show€that€another€small€house€was€located€near€Stanleyððs€and€CrumbleyððsÏhouse.Ô€/ÔÌ àÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó"The€names€of€the€jurors€are€written€on€separate€scrolls,€and€placed€in€a€box€or€otherÏreceptacle,€and€drawn€out€by€a€child€under€ten€(10)€years€of€age,€by€the€judge,€or€some€person€agreedÏupon€by€the€district€attorney€general€and€the€defendant.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„18„104.Ô€/ÔÌ %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÔ€ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóWe€note€that€this€case€is€quite€distinguishable€from€òòState€v.€Lynnóó,€924€S.W.2d€892€(Tenn.Ï1996).€€In€that€case,€the€actual€jury€that€heard€the€case€was€not€selected€in€accordance€with€the€statutoryÏrequirements.€€The€case€before€us€now€does€not€rise€to€the€level€of€error€in€òòLynnóó.€€Thus,€a€harmless€errorÏanalysis€is€appropriate.Ô€/Ô€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òDecember€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÆÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝA€crawl€space€led€from€this€bathroom€into€the€attic.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò(OÞ{$µµà0  àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(b²D$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xÓñ$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒÆ‚$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿù…$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³¶4$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Ǫ»$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÑ X Ñ›Ñ7€2`XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ ` ÑÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓ  ÓԀԜـ€ÙßR€231A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà àà àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÓ  Óà@ àSEPTEMBER€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌÌó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà àò òC.C.A.€NO.€ó ó€ò ò03C01„9704„CR„00123ó óÌà àà àAppellee,à àò ò€€€€€à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àCOCKE€COUNTYó óÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€WILLIAM€R.€HOLT,€JR.,ÌWANDA€STANLEY€andà àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌJEFF€LILLARD,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àAppellants.à àà àà àò ò)ó óà à(Harboring€a€Fugitive€andÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà à€Providing€Aid€to€a€Fugitive)ÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTS:óóà àà àà à€€€€€òòà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌÌò òCARL€R.€OGLE,€JR.ó óà àò òà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPó óÌP.O.€Box€129à àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌJefferson€City,€TN€€37760Ìò òà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMICHAEL€J.€FAHEY,€IIó óà àà àà àà àà àà àò òà àó óà àà àAsst.ÏAttorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€Pkwy.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òAL€C.€SCHMUTZER,€JR.ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òRICHARD€VANCEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à339A€East€Main€St.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNewport,€TN€€37821à àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;ÌREMANDED€FOR€RESENTENCINGó óÌÌÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,ÌJudgeÑ Ü ÑÓ  Óà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÌÌÌà àà àÌÓÓà àà àIn€the€spring€of€1995,€the€defendants€were€indicted€by€presentment€onÏcharges€relating€to€assisting€two€escaped€felons.€€Wanda€Stanley€was€indicted€onÏtwo€counts€of€harboring€a€fugitive€and€two€counts€of€providing€aid€to€a€fugitive.€€HerÏboyfriend,€Jeff€Lillard,€was€also€indicted€on€two€counts€of€providing€aid€to€a€fugitive.× ƒ4 ××  ×€ÏA€jury€found€both€defendants€guilty€of€each€charge.€€After€a€hearing,€both€defendantsÏreceived€two€year€sentences€on€each€conviction.€€The€trial€court€ordered€theÏdefendants€to€eighteen€months€incarceration€in€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏCorrection€and€six€months€of€supervised€probation€for€each€conviction.€€TheÍsentences€were€ordered€to€run€concurrently.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€In€this€appeal€of€right,€the€defendantsÏraise€the€following€issues:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓI.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€hearing€the€StateððsÏmotion€to€consolidate€despite€the€fact€that€the€motion€wasÏnot€filed€in€compliance€with€the€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏCriminal€Procedure.ÌÌII.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€the€StateððsÏmotion€to€consolidate.ÌÌIII.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€failure€to€swearÏthe€jury€prior€to€questioning€during€voir€dire.ÌÌIV.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€selectÏpotential€alternate€jurors€in€compliance€with€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure.ÌÌV.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€dismissÏcertain€jurors€for€cause.ÌÌVI.à àWhether€the€State€should€have€been€allowed€toÏmake€references€to€the€death€of€one€deputy€and€theÏwounding€of€another.ÌÌVII.à àWhether€the€State€made€improper€references€to€theÏdefendantsðð€failure€to€testify.ÌÌVIII.à àWhether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€support€aÏfinding€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌIX.à àWhether€the€defendantsðð€sentences€are€excessive.ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÌÓÓAfter€a€review€of€the€record€and€applicable€law,€we€reverse€and€dismiss€defendantÏStanleyððs€convictions€for€harboring€a€fugitive.€€However,€we€affirm€her€remainingÏconvictions€as€well€as€the€convictions€of€defendant€Lillard.€€This€cause€is€to€beÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€resentencing€of€both€defendants€on€all€convictions.ÌÌÓ  Óò òBACKGROUND€FACTSó óÌÓ  Óà àà àConvicted€felons€Curtis€Eugene€ð ðPickleðð€Jones€and€Donald€L.€NolanÏescaped€from€Turney€Center€on€October€5,€1994.€€Prison€officials€did€not€discoverÏthat€the€pair€had€escaped€until€the€next€day€when€an€emergency€count€wasÏperformed.€€The€proper€authorities€were€notified€and€a€search€ensued.€€On€OctoberÏ11,€1994,€an€anonymous€caller€told€TBI€officers€that€the€fugitives€could€likely€beÏfound€at€one€of€two€particular€residences€in€Cocke€County.€€The€homes€wereÏidentified€as€belonging€to€Lee€Ester€Crumbley€and€defendant€Wanda€Stanley.€Ïð ðPickleðð€Jones€was€Crumbleyððs€nephew€and€Stanleyððs€cousin.€€Stanley€is€CrumbleyððsÏniece.€€ÌÌà àà àTBI€Special€Agent€Steve€Richardson€testified€that€he€had€driven€by€theÏtwo€homes€on€the€morning€of€October€11.€€Stanleyððs€home,€located€at€544€JonesÏCircle,€and€Crumbleyððs€home,€located€at€569€Woodlawn€Avenue,€had€adjoining€backÍlots.€€After€driving€by€the€homes,€Richardson€decided€to€place€an€agent€in€the€fieldÏnear€the€two€homes€for€surveillance€purposes.€€When€driving€back€by€StanleyððsÏhouse,€Richardson€testified€that€he€had€seen€Stanleyððs€Jeep€Cherokee€parked€in€herÏdriveway.€€Richardson€decided€to€set€up€further€surveillance€and€a€short€time€laterÏobserved€Crumbley€arrive€in€a€white€Toyota€at€the€Stanley€home.€€RichardsonÏtestified€that€when€Stanley€left€the€house,€he€and€other€agents€followed€her.€€WhenÏStanley€arrived€at€the€Newport€Print€Shop,€Richardson€testified€that€he€and€otherÏagents€questioned€Stanley€and€Lillard,€who€was€also€at€the€Print€Shop.ÌÌà àà àRichardson€testified€that€Stanley€had€agreed€to€return€to€her€house€andÏlet€TBI€agents€search€the€home.€€While€at€her€home,€agents€discovered€a€crawlÏspace€that€led€from€an€upstairs€bathroom€to€the€attic.€€They€also€discovered€freshÏinsulation€on€the€bathroom€floor€near€the€entrance€to€the€crawl€space.€€In€the€attic,Ïagents€found€a€piece€of€cardboard€lying€across€the€attic€beams€and€two€beer€bottles.€ÏAgents€also€located€a€duffle€bag€containing€canned€foods€and€a€flashlight€in€one€ofÏthe€upstairs€bedrooms.€€No€identifiable€fingerprints€were€found€on€the€beer€bottles.€€ÌÌà àà àRichardson€testified€that€when€the€search€had€been€completed,€heÏasked€Stanley€about€the€house€directly€behind€her,€meaning€Crumbleyððs€house.€ÏStanley€said€she€thought€no€one€was€home€and€that€a€woman€named€Shirley€livedÍthere.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€Richardson€then€asked€Stanley€about€the€elderly€woman€he€had€seen€enterÏher€home€earlier€that€day.€€Stanley€told€him€that€the€woman€was€Crumbley€and€thatÏher€car€had€broken€down€and€someone€had€picked€her€up€from€Stanleyððs€house.€ÏHowever,€Richardson€testified€that€during€the€time€he€had€been€watching€the€house,Ïhe€had€not€seen€Crumbley€leave.€€Richardson€testified€that€at€this€point€he€then€leftÏStanleyððs€home€in€order€to€pursue€another€tip€about€the€fugitivesðð€whereabouts.€€HeÏdid€not€return€to€the€area€until€he€heard€calls€for€assistance€on€his€radio.ÌÌà àà àTBI€Assistant€Special€Agent€Rick€Morrell€testified€that€he€had€been€theÏagent€in€the€field€doing€surveillance€on€the€two€homes.€€He€further€testified€that€whenÏagents€made€the€decision€to€approach€Crumbleyððs€home,€he€knocked€on€the€doorÏand€attempted€to€look€in€windows.€€He€also€stated€that€several€telephone€calls€wereÏmade€to€the€house,€but€no€one€answered.€€Morrell€further€stated€that€he€had€askedÏdefendant€Stanley€whether€she€could€provide€the€agents€with€consent€to€search€theÏCrumbley€house€and€she€said€that€she€could.ÌÌà àà àAfter€some€time€had€passed€and€no€movement€had€been€detectedÏinside€the€house,€Morrell€and€other€agents€decided€to€forcibly€enter€the€home.€ÍMorrell€was€able€to€gain€entry€through€the€door€to€the€kitchen€and€he€then€openedÏthe€back€door€to€allow€other€officers€to€enter€the€home.€€As€the€officers€were€makingÏtheir€way€through€the€house,€shots€erupted€and€the€officers€began€to€retreat.€€MorrellÏtestified€that€Officer€Scott€Miller€had€been€fatally€wounded€by€at€least€one€of€theÏshots.€€ÌÌà àà àTBI€Special€Agent€David€Davenport€testified€that€officers€continued€toÏtry€to€make€contact€with€the€fugitives.€€He€and€Officer€Richard€Caldwell€had€attemptedÏto€enter€the€home€through€the€front€door€when€the€door€started€to€open€and€moreÏshots€were€fired.€€Caldwell€was€injured€by€one€of€the€shots.€€Davenport€furtherÏtestified€that€defendant€Stanley€had€used€a€bullhorn€to€try€and€coax€the€fugitives€fromÏthe€home€but€that€the€fugitives€made€no€response.€€Ultimately,€tear€gas€was€pumpedÏinto€the€house€causing€the€house€to€catch€fire.€€Shortly€before€the€house€caught€fire,ÏCrumbley€crawled€out€of€the€house€by€way€of€the€front€door.€€At€that€time,€otherÏofficers€were€able€to€retrieve€the€slain€body€of€Officer€Miller.€€The€escaped€felons€diedÏin€the€fire.ÌÌà àà àAt€the€investigation€following€the€fire,€TBI€Agent€Steve€Scott€discoveredÏthe€bodies€of€the€fugitives.€€He€testified€that€Nolan€had€been€found€just€inside€theÏfront€door€on€the€floor€and€that€Jones€had€been€found€in€one€of€the€homeððsÍbedrooms.€€Scott,€who€is€an€expert€in€firearms€identification,€also€discovered€threeÏhandguns€in€the€home.€€One€was€found€at€the€foot€of€Nolanððs€body.€€This€gunÏmatched€the€serial€number€of€the€backup€pistol€carried€by€Officer€Miller.€€A€secondÏgun€was€found€in€the€bedroom€underneath€Jonesððs€body.€€This€gun€was€a€TaurusÏmanufactured€357€Magnum€revolver.€€The€third€gun€was€also€retrieved€from€theÏbedroom.€€This€gun€was€identified€as€Officer€Millerððs€duty€weapon.€€ÌÌà àà àAgent€Scott€further€testified€that€he€had€searched€Stanleyððs€JeepÏCherokee€and€had€discovered€a€spent€cartridge€on€a€shelf€underneath€the€gloveÏcompartment.€€He€determined€that€the€cartridge€had€been€fired€by€the€357€MagnumÏfound€near€Jonesðð€body.€€Scott€further€determined€that€the€bullet€that€killed€OfficerÏMiller€had€been€fired€from€the€same€weapon.€€The€pathology€report€revealed€that€theÏbullet€had€hit€Miller€just€under€his€eye.ÌÌà àà à€€€€Leslie€Johnson,€an€employee€at€a€pawn€shop€in€Greeneville,€SouthÏCarolina,€testified€that€she€had€sold€a€Taurus€357€with€the€same€serial€number€asÏthat€found€at€the€crime€scene€to€Tracy€Eugene€Clark.€€Clark€then€testified€that€he€hadÏin€fact€bought€the€gun€but€that€he€sold€it€to€his€uncle,€Tommy€Clark,€in€either€late€1992Ïor€early€1993.€€Tommy€Clark€then€testified€that€he€had€pawned€the€gun€to€defendantÏLillard€for€one€hundred€dollars€($100).€€However,€TBI€Agent€David€DavenportÍtestified€that€in€December€1994€he€had€questioned€defendant€Lillard€about€the€gunÏand€Lillard€had€said€he€did€not€buy€a€gun€in€June€of€1994€and€that€he€did€not€give€aÏgun€to€ð ðPickleðð€Jones.ÌÌà àà àAmy€Stanley,€daughter€of€defendant€Stanley,€was€the€only€witness€toÏtestify€on€the€behalf€of€the€defendants.€€She€testified€that€she€had€lived€with€herÏmother€off€and€on€during€the€time€of€this€incident.€€She€further€testified€that€she€hadÏbeen€in€the€process€of€moving€back€to€her€motherððs€house€when€the€police€searchedÏthe€home.€€Amy€Stanley€also€claimed€ownership€of€the€duffle€bag€and€canned€foodÏthat€had€been€found€in€one€of€the€bedrooms.€€She€explained€that€the€bag€had€beenÏleft€over€from€some€camping€trips€she€had€taken€earlier€in€the€year.€€Additionally,ÏAmy€Stanley€offered€an€explanation€for€the€beer€bottles€found€in€defendant€StanleyððsÏattic.€€Amy€Stanley€testified€that€she€had€thrown€the€beer€bottles€in€the€attic€a€coupleÏof€years€ago€so€that€her€mother€would€not€catch€her€drinking.ÌÌà àà àFollowing€this€testimony,€the€defendants€rested€and€the€jury€began€itsÏdeliberations.€€The€defendants€were€ultimately€found€guilty€on€all€charges.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.€€SUFFICIENCYó óÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€defendants€contend€that€the€evidence€was€insufficient€to€support€aÍfinding€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Though€this€is€not€the€defendantsðð€firstÏlisted€issue,€we€have€chosen€to€address€it€first€as€we€have€just€above€recited€the€factsÏof€the€case.€€Furthermore,€should€this€issue€be€decided€in€favor€of€the€defendants,Ïthere€is€little€need€to€discuss€the€remaining€issues€in€depth.ÌÌà àà àA€defendant€challenging€the€sufficiency€of€the€proof€has€the€burden€ofÏillustrating€to€this€Court€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdictÏreturned€by€the€trier€of€fact€in€his€or€her€case.€€This€Court€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€ofÏguilt€for€lack€of€sufficient€evidence€unless€the€facts€contained€in€the€record€and€anyÏinferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€the€facts€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€forÏa€rational€trier€of€fact€to€find€the€defendant€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.ÏTuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).ÌÌà àà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convictingÏevidence,€we€must€review€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€prosecutionÏin€determining€whether€ð ðòòanyóó€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.Ï307,€319,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€61€L.Ed.2d€560€(1979).€€We€do€not€reweigh€or€re„evaluateÏthe€evidence€and€are€required€to€afford€the€State€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏproof€contained€in€the€record€as€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€infer‚encesÍwhich€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.Ï1978).€ÌÌà àà àQuestions€concerning€the€credibility€of€witnesses,€the€weight€and€valueÏto€be€given€to€the€evidence,€as€well€as€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€areÏresolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€Court.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835.€€A€guiltyÏverdict€rendered€by€the€jury€and€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€testimonyÏof€the€witnesses€for€the€State,€and€a€presumption€of€guilt€replaces€the€presumption€ofÏinnocence.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973).ÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€contend€that€the€evidence€was€insufficient€to€sustainÏtheir€convictions.€€Defendant€Stanley€was€convicted€of€providing€aid€to€the€fugitivesÏas€well€as€harboring€the€fugitives.€€Defendant€Lillard€was€convicted€of€providing€aidÏonly.€€The€statute€under€which€they€were€convicted€provides:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓA€person€is€an€accessory€after€the€fact€who,€after€theÏcommission€of€a€felony,€with€knowledge€or€reasonableÏground€to€believe€that€the€offender€has€committed€theÏfelony,€and€with€the€intent€to€hinder€the€arrest,€trial,Ïconviction€or€punishment€of€the€offender:ÌÌ(1)€€Harbors€or€conceals€the€offender;ÌÌ(2)€€Provides€or€aids€in€providing€the€offender€with€anyÏmeans€of€avoiding€arrest,€trial,€conviction€or€punishment;ÍorÌÌ(3)€€Warns€the€offender€of€impending€apprehension€orÏdiscovery.ÌÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€39„11„411.ÌÌà àà àFirst,€defendant€Stanley€was€charged€with€and€convicted€of€two€countsÏof€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„411(a)(1).€€The€State€offered€proof€that€Stanley€was€a€cousin€toÏescaped€felon€ð ðPickleðð€Jones€and€that€when€police€searched€her€home,€theyÏdiscovered€a€crawl€space€leading€to€the€attic,€two€Coors€Light€beer€bottles€in€the€attic,Ïand€a€piece€of€cardboard€lying€across€the€attic€rafters.€€Police€also€discovered€aÏduffle€bag€containing€canned€goods€and€a€flashlight.€€Stanley€had€given€the€policeÏconsent€to€search€her€home.€€TBI€agents€had€gotten€a€tip€from€an€anonymousÏinformer€that€Stanley€had€been€hiding€the€two€fugitives.€€€€ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€evidence€of€the€defendantððs€guilt€is€circumstantial€inÏnature,€it€is€a€well€established€principle€of€law€in€this€state€that€circumstantialÏevidence€alone€may€be€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction.€€òòState€v.€Buttreyóó,€756ÏS.W.2d€718,€721€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€However,€in€order€for€this€to€occur,€theÏcircumstantial€evidence€ð ðmust€be€not€only€consistent€with€the€guilt€of€the€accused€butÏit€must€also€be€inconsistent€with€his€[or€her]€innocence€and€must€exclude€every€otherÍreasonable€theory€or€hypothesis€except€that€of€guilt.ðð€€òòState€v.€Tharpeóó,€726€S.W.2dÏ896,€900€(Tenn.€1987).€€In€addition,€ð ðit€must€establish€such€a€certainty€of€guilt€of€theÏaccused€as€to€convince€the€mind€beyond€a€rea‚sonable€doubt€that€[the€defendant]€isÏthe€one€who€committed€the€crime.ðð€€òòTharpeóó,€726€S.W.2d€at€896.€€Moral€certainty€as€toÏeach€element€of€the€offense€is€required,€but€absolute€certainty€is€not.€€òòTharpeóó,€726ÏS.W.2d€at€896.ÌÌà àà àWhile€following€the€above€guidelines,€this€Court€must€remember€thatÏthe€jury€decides€the€weight€to€be€given€to€circumstantial€evidence€and€that€ð ð[t]heÏinferences€to€be€drawn€from€such€evidence,€and€the€extent€to€which€the€cirƒcumstances€are€consistent€with€guilt€and€inconsistent€with€innocence€are€questionsÏprimarily€for€the€jury.ðð€€òòMarable€v.€Stateóó,€313€S.W.2d€451,€457€(Tenn.€1958);€òòState€v.ÏCouryóó,€697€S.W.2d€373,€377€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985);€òòPruitt€v.€Stateóó,€460€S.W.2dÏ385,€391€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1970).ÌÌà àà àHere,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€the€circumstantial€evidenceÏpresented€by€the€State€ð ðexclude[s]€every€other€reasonable€theory€or€hypothesisÏexcept€that€of€guilt.ðð€€òòState€v.€Tharpeóó,€726€S.W.2d€896,€900€(Tenn.€1987).€€EvidenceÏthat€Stanley€had€a€crawl€space€in€her€house,€two€beer€bottles€in€the€attic,€and€a€duffleÏbag€of€canned€food€in€an€upstairs€bedroom€is€simply€not€enough€to€sustain€aÍconviction€for€harboring€fugitives.€€Giving€the€State€the€strongest€legitimate€view€ofÏproof€and€even€disregarding€the€proof€offered€by€the€defendants,€we€cannot€upholdÏthis€conviction.€€We€recognize€that€drawing€inferences€from€the€offered€proof€is€theÏprovidence€of€the€jury,€but€in€this€case,€such€an€inference€is€not€adequatelyÏsupported€by€the€proof.€€Thus,€we€reverse€and€dismiss€Stanleyððs€convictions€forÏharboring€the€two€fugitives.€€ÌÌà àà àStanley€was€also€charged€with€and€convicted€of€two€counts€of€T.C.A.€Ìðð€39„11„411(a)(2).€€As€to€these€charges,€the€State€offered€proof€that€when€policeÏasked€Stanley€if€anyone€were€at€home€at€the€Crumbley€house,€she€responded€thatÏno€one€was€home€but€that€a€lady€named€Shirley€lived€there.€€It€was€not€until€muchÏlater€at€Crumbleyððs€house€that€Stanley€told€officers€her€aunt€was€probably€in€theÏhouse.€€She€even€called€to€the€fugitives€with€a€bullhorn€that€police€had€provided.€ÏFollowing€the€whole€incident,€TBI€Agent€Richardson€confronted€Stanley€and€told€herÏthat€had€she€told€the€truth€in€the€first€place,€the€entire€incident€could€have€beenÏavoided.€€Richardson€testified€that€Stanley€had€not€responded€but€had€merelyÏdropped€her€head.ÌÌà àà àFrom€this€proof,€a€rational€trier€of€fact€could€conclude€that€Stanley€knewÏthe€escaped€fugitives€were€hiding€at€the€Crumbley€home€and€that€Stanley€aidedÍthem€by€not€telling€police€that€they€were€in€fact€there.€€Thus,€as€to€StanleyððsÏconvictions€for€aiding€the€fugitives,€we€find€the€evidence€sufficient€to€support€herÏconvictions€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Here,€Stanley€failed€to€carry€her€burden€ofÏillustrating€to€this€Court€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict.ÌÌà àà àWe€turn€now€to€defendant€Lillard€who€was€charged€with€and€convictedÏof€two€counts€of€aiding€fugitives.€€T.C.A.€ðð€39„11„411(a)(2).€€Here,€the€State€offeredÏproof€that€Lillard€had€purchased€a€Taurus€manufactured€357€revolver€from€a€manÏnamed€Tommy€Clark.€€The€State€then€showed€that€this€same€gun€was€the€one€usedÏto€shoot€and€kill€Officer€Miller€and€that€it€was€the€gun€found€underneath€the€body€ofÏð ðPickleðð€Jones.€€From€these€facts,€it€is€completely€permissible€for€the€jury€to€draw€theÏinference€that€Lillard€had€aided€the€fugitives€by€providing€the€weapon€which€theyÏused€in€their€attack€against€the€police.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that€this€evidence€wasÏsufficient€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€to€convict€Lillard€of€these€two€offenses.€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à€€€€ÌÓ  Óò òII.€€MOTION€TO€CONSOLIDATEó óÌÓ  Óà àà àTurning€now€to€the€first€listed€issue€in€the€defendantsðð€brief,€theÏdefendants€contend€that€the€motion€to€consolidate€their€case€with€that€of€Lee€EsterÏCrumbley€was€not€filed€in€compliance€with€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CriminalÏProcedure.€€Specifically,€they€contend€that€the€motion€was€improperly€servedÍbecause€it€was€faxed€to€the€defendantsðð€attorney€rather€than€being€actually€deliveredÏor€mailed.€€They€further€contend€that€the€motion€was€not€timely€filed€and€should€haveÏbeen€decided€prior€to€trial€as€is€required€by€Rule€12€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏCriminal€Procedure.ÌÌA.€€€Merits€of€the€MotionÌà àà àSince€the€defendants€also€attack€the€merits€of€the€motion€toÏconsolidate,€we€choose€to€address€this€issue€before€addressing€the€technicalÏaspects€of€the€motion.€€Under€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€13(a),€the€trial€court€may€orderÏconsolidation€of€two€or€more€indictments€for€trial€if€the€offenses€and€all€defendantsÏcould€have€been€joined€in€a€single€indictment€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€8.€€€ThisÏlatter€rule€provides€that€two€or€more€defendants€may€be€joinedÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓ[e]ven€if€conspiracy€is€not€charged€and€all€of€theÏdefendants€are€not€charged€in€each€count,€if€the€severalÏoffenses€charged:ÌÌ(i)€Were€part€of€a€common€scheme€or€plan;€or€ÌÌ(ii)€Were€so€closely€connected€in€respect€to€time,€place,Ïand€occasion€that€it€would€be€difficult€to€separate€proof€ofÏone€charge€from€proof€of€the€others.ÌÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€8(c)(3).€€The€decision€to€consolidate€defendants€is€left€to€the€soundÌÌdiscretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€Absent€a€showing€of€prejudice,€this€Court€may€not€ÌÌoverturn€the€trial€courtððs€determination.€€òòState€v.€Gayloróó,€862€S.W.2d€546,€555€(Tenn.€ÌÌCrim.€App.€1992).€ÌÓÓÌà àà àConsolidation€should€not€be€granted€where€separate€trials€areÏð ðnecessary€to€achieve€a€fair€determinationðð€of€guilt€or€innocence.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.Ï14(d).€€However,€we€note€that€the€Supreme€Court€has€stated:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓIt€may€have€been€to€the€interest€of€each€that€he€be€triedÏalone,€but€the€orders€of€the€court€are€molded€to€protectÏrights,€and€not€merely€the€interests,€of€persons€accused€ofÏcrime.€€The€state,€as€well€as€the€persons€accused,€isÏentitled€to€have€its€rights€protected,€and,€when€severalÏpersons€are€charged€jointly€with€a€single€crime,€we€thinkÏthe€state€is€entitled€to€have€the€fact€of€guilt€determined€andÏpunishment€assessed€in€a€single€trial,€unless€to€do€soÏwould€unfairly€prejudice€the€rights€of€the€defendants.ÌÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓòòWoodruff€v.€Stateóó,€51€S.W.2d€843,€845€(1932).ÌÌà àà àTurning€now€to€the€case€before€this€Court,€the€defendants€claim€thatÏconsolidation€was€improper€because€it€caused€evidence€to€be€introduced€againstÏcertain€defendants€that€would€not€have€been€admissible€in€separate€trials,€becauseÏneither€a€common€scheme€nor€a€close€connection€in€respect€to€time,€place€andÏoccasion€existed,€and€because€defendant€Lillard€was€prejudiced€in€that€CrumbleyÏdid€not€testify€in€his€behalf,€which€she€allegedly€would€have€done€had€the€two€beenÏtried€separately.€€€à àà àÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€claim€that€evidence€of€the€ultimate€location€of€theÏfugitives€and€of€subsequent€events€at€Crumbley's€house€had€no€relevance€on€theÏalleged€crimes€of€the€defendants.€€In€a€proper€case,€the€disparity€of€evidenceÏbetween€co„defendants€may€be€grounds€for€severance.€€However,€ð ððða€strongÏshowing€of€prejudiceðð€is€required€before€a€severance€will€be€granted€on€this€ground.€ÏThe€prejudice€requirement€is€not€established€ððsimply€because€much€of€the€evidenceÏpresented€at€trial€is€applicable€only€to€his€co„defendants.ðððð€€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794ÏS.W.2d€752,€758€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990)(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àà àAs€to€defendant€Lillard,€he€argues€that€the€evidence€regardingÏCrumbleyððs€part€in€aiding€the€fugitives€and€the€subsequent€events€at€her€houseÏwould€have€been€inadmissible€in€a€separate€trial.€€We€disagree.€€Lillard€was€chargedÏwith€two€counts€of€aiding€a€fugitive€because€he€supplied€the€gun€used€by€theÏfugitives.€€Thus,€the€State€had€to€show€that€the€gun€was€in€the€possession€of€theÏfugitives€and€that€they€had€used€it€in€an€effort€to€avoid€being€apprehended.€Thus,€theÏState€needed€to€show€that€the€gun€was€ultimately€found€under€the€body€of€fugitiveÏJones.€€Further,€the€State€offered€evidence€of€the€shooting€death€of€Officer€Miller€toÏshow€that€the€fugitives€had€actually€used€the€gun€supplied€by€the€defendant.€€We€findÏno€clear€showing€of€prejudice€that€Lillard€should€have€been€tried€separately€becauseÍevidence€relating€to€the€later€events€at€Crumbleyððs€house€was€admitted.ÌÌà àà àAs€to€defendant€Stanley,€the€later€events€at€Crumbleyððs€house€are€lessÏrelevant,€but€relevant€nonetheless€to€her€conviction€for€aiding€the€fugitives.€€StanleyÏprovided€aid€to€the€fugitives€by€telling€officers€she€thought€no€one€was€in€theÏCrumbley€house.€€Again,€we€do€not€find€a€clear€showing€of€prejudice€simply€becauseÏevidence€of€events€at€Crumbleyððs€house€was€introduced.€€As€we€noted€above,€theÏfact€that€some€of€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€was€applicable€only€to€her€co„defendants€is€not€a€sufficient€ground€for€severance€absent€a€clear€showing€ofÏprejudice.€€òòSeeóó€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€ÏFurthermore,€we€note€that€the€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€to€ð ðconsider€any€proof€inÏevidence€only€as€to€any€defendant€it€relates€to.€€If€it€does€„„„€if€it€relates€to€oneÏdefendant,€you€consider€it€to€that€defendant;€if€it€relates€to€all,€you€relate€it€to€all.€€YouÏmake€that€determination.€.€.€.€€[D]onððt€penalize€a€defendant€who€[the€evidence]€doesÏnot€relate€to€as€we€proceed€through€this€trial.€€And€I€will€instruct€you€from€time€to€timeÏabout€that.ðð€€The€jury€is€presumed€to€have€followed€these€instructions.€€òòState€v.ÏNewsomeóó,€744€S.W.2d€911,€915€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€ÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€next€contend€that€the€consolidation€was€improperÏbecause€there€was€no€evidence€of€a€common€scheme€nor€a€close€connection€inÍrespect€to€time,€place,€and€occasion.€€From€the€evidence€offered€at€trial,€it€is€clear€thatÏthe€offense€with€which€the€defendants€were€charged€had€a€close€connection.€ÏStanley€aided€the€fugitives€by€not€telling€the€police€that€the€two€were€in€CrumbleyððsÏhouse.€€Meanwhile,€Crumbley€was€inside€her€house€with€the€two€fugitives.€€A€shortÏtime€thereafter,€the€shoot„out€began€in€which€the€fugitives€used€the€gun€supplied€byÏLillard.€€All€the€events€occurred€at€the€Crumbley€house,€which€is€adjacent€to€the€lot€onÏwhich€Stanleyððs€house€sits.€€Furthermore,€the€incident€happened€in€a€continuousÏmanner,€all€during€a€few€hours€on€October€11,€1994.€€Thus,€we€conclude€thatÏconsolidation€was€proper€because€adequate€proof€demonstrated€a€close€connectionÏwith€respect€to€time,€place,€and€occasion.€€ÌÌà àà àDefendant€Lillard€makes€a€final€contention€that€he€was€prejudiced€byÏthe€consolidation€because€without€it,€Crumbley€would€have€testified€in€his€behalf.€€InÏfact,€at€Lillardððs€sentencing€hearing,€Crumbley€told€the€court€that€in€August€of€1994,Ïshe€œhad€had›€some€disturbances€near€her€house€and€was€afraid€because€she€livedÏalone.€€She€said€one€night€in€August€she€had€become€afraid€and€had€asked€theÏdefendants€to€come€over.€€She€said€that€when€Lillard€had€arrived,€he€gave€a€gun€toÏher€for€protection.€€She€then€testified€that€she€had€put€the€gun€in€a€dresser€drawerÏand€never€saw€it€again.€€On€cross„examination,€however,€Crumbley€admitted€that€sheÏhad€never€told€the€police€this€story.ÌÌà àà àWe€cannot€conclude€that€Crumbleyððs€testimony€at€the€sentencingÏhearing€is€proof€that€she€would€have€testified€at€Lillardððs€trial€had€the€cases€beenÏsevered.€€Lillard€has€failed€to€prove€that€had€the€cases€been€severed€Crumbley,Ïwhose€case€would€have€also€been€pending,€would€have€testified€rather€than€electingÏto€exercise€her€right€to€remain€silent€under€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Hicksóó,€835€S.W.2d€32,€37„38€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€ÏThus,€we€conclude€that€the€defendants€have€failed€to€show€that€the€trial€court€abusedÏits€discretion€in€consolidating€the€defendantsðð€case€with€Crumbleyððs€case.ÌÌB.€€Method€of€ServiceÌà àà àHaving€addressed€the€motion€on€its€merits,€we€now€turn€to€theÏprocedural€aspects€of€the€motion.€€The€defendants€argue€that€the€motion€wasÏimproperly€served€because€it€was€faxed€to€the€defendantsðð€attorney€rather€than€beingÏactually€delivered€or€mailed.€€They€further€contend€that€the€motion€was€not€timelyÏfiled€and€should€have€been€decided€prior€to€trial€as€is€required€by€Rule€12€of€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure.ÌÌà àà àFirst,€the€defendants€argue€that€faxing€the€motion€to€the€defenseÏattorney€was€not€in€compliance€with€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€49.€€That€rule€provides€thatÍwhen€serving€an€attorney€with€a€written€motion,€the€service€ð ðshall€be€made€byÏdelivering€to€that€person€a€copy€of€the€document€to€be€served,€or€by€mailing€it€to€thatÏperson€at€his€or€her€last€known€address,€or€if€no€address€is€known,€by€leaving€theÏcopy€with€the€clerk€of€the€court.ðð€€The€defendants€contend€that€a€facsimile€does€notÏfall€within€the€parameters€of€the€rule.ÌÌà àà àThe€Supreme€Court€has€twice€addressed€the€issue€of€filing€by€facsimile.€ÏBoth€times,€the€cases€were€civil€cases€where€the€notice€of€appeal€had€been€filed€byÏfacsimile.€€In€òòCruse€v.€City€of€Columbiaóó,€922€S.W.2d€492€(Tenn.€1996),€the€Court€heldÏthat€the€notice€was€sufficient€to€allow€the€appeal€to€proceed.€€However,€in€a€footnoteÏthe€Court€stated,€ð ð[c]ounsel€should€be€specifically€aware€that€facsimile€service€is€notÏallowed€for€the€service€of€pleadings€and€other€documents€on€parties€to€a€lawsuit.ðð€ÏòòCruseóó,€922€S.W.2d€at€493.€€The€Court€further€pointed€out€that€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.02Ïspecifically€defines€the€service€methods€for€pleadings.€€Additionally,€the€AdvisoryÏCommission€Comments€provide€that€the€rule€does€not€permit€service€by€facsimileÏtransmission.€€Because€the€language€of€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€49€is€virtually€identical€toÏthat€in€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.02,€we€can€only€conclude€that€service€by€facsimile€is€notÏpermitted€under€Rule€49€either.ÌÌà àà àThus,€having€concluded€that€it€was€error€for€the€State€to€have€sent€theÍdefendants€the€motion€by€facsimile,€we€must€assess€the€effect€of€that€error.€€First,€theÏdefendants€do€not€contend€that€they€did€not€have€notice€of€the€Stateððs€motion.€€In€fact,Ïthe€defendantsðð€attorney€filed€a€response€to€the€motion€two€days€later€on€the€day€theÏtrial€was€set€to€begin.€€Second,€the€defendants€have€failed€to€demonstrate€how€theyÏwere€prejudiced€by€the€fact€that€the€motion€was€served€by€facsimile€rather€than€mail.€ÏAs€such,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€Stateððs€error€in€faxing€the€motion€warrants€aÏnew€trial.€€We€do,€however,€recommend€that€the€district€attorneyððs€office€review€theÏrules€of€procedure€and€comply€accordingly.ÌÌC.€€Timing€of€MotionÌà àà àThe€defendantsðð€final€contention€with€regard€to€the€motion€toÏconsolidate€is€that€the€motion€was€not€filed€in€a€timely€fashion.€€The€record€shows€thatÏthe€motion€was€filed€on€the€afternoon€of€Tuesday,€September€24,€1996.€€The€trial€wasÏset€to€begin€Thursday,€September€26,€1996.€€A€hearing€was€held€on€the€motion€theÏmorning€before€the€trial€began.€€The€defendants€claim€that€in€filing€the€motion€soÏclose€to€the€date€of€trial,€the€State€violated€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12(c)€which€provides€inÏpart:€€ð ðA€motion€made€before€trial€shall€be€determined€before€trial€unless€the€court,€forÏgood€cause,€orders€that€it€be€deferred€for€determination€at€the€trial€of€the€generalÏissue€or€until€after€verdict,€but€no€such€determination€shall€be€deferred€if€a€partyððsÏright€to€appeal€is€adversely€affected.ðð€€The€defendants€further€contend€that€the€StateÍalso€failed€to€comply€with€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€45(e)€which,€in€part,€states€that€ð ð[a]€writtenÏmotion,€other€than€one€which€may€be€heard€ððex€parte,ðð€and€notice€of€the€hearingÏthereof€shall€be€served€not€later€than€5€days€before€the€time€specified€for€the€hearingÏunless€a€different€period€is€fixed€by€rule€or€order€of€the€court.ðð€€Here,€the€defendantsÏreceived€the€motion€only€two€days€prior€to€the€trial.ÌÌà àà àClearly,€the€State€failed€to€comply€with€Rule€45€when€it€filed€its€motionÏonly€two€days€prior€to€trial.€€This€delay€then€caused€the€trial€court€to€be€unable€to€hearÏthe€motion€ð ðbefore€trialðð€as€is€required€by€Rule€12(e).€€This€Court€has€before€statedÏthat€ð ðthe€phrase€ððbefore€trial,ðð€as€used€in€[Rule€12],€means€sometime€earlier€than€theÏday€the€trial€is€to€commence.ðð€€òòState€v.€Aucoinóó,€756€S.W.2d€705,€709€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1988).€€In€that€case,€the€defendant€filed€a€motion€to€suppress€but€did€not€requestÏa€hearing€on€the€motion€until€the€day€of€trial.€€The€trial€court€selected€the€jury,Ïconducted€a€hearing€on€the€motion,€and€then€denied€the€motion.€€On€appeal,€thisÏCourt€stated€that€the€defendantððs€failure€to€bring€the€motion€to€the€attention€of€the€trialÏjudge€and€have€the€trial€judge€rule€upon€the€motion€prior€to€trial,€resulted€in€a€waiverÏof€the€issues€raised€in€the€motion.€€òòAucoinóó,€756€S.W.2d€at€709.€€However,€the€CourtÏthen€addressed€the€merits€of€the€motion€and€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€theÏmotion.ÌÌà àà àGenerally,€the€reason€such€motions€are€to€be€determined€prior€to€trial€isÏto€prevent€the€disruption€of€juries€and€to€ensure€the€right€of€the€State€to€appeal€anÏadverse€ruling€by€the€trial€judge€without€placing€the€defendant€twice€in€jeopardy.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Randolphóó,€692€S.W.2d€37€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985);€òòState€v.€Davidsonóó,Ï606€S.W.2d€293€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€In€the€case€now€before€this€Court,€neitherÏof€the€above€cited€concerns€are€present.€€The€motion€to€consolidate€was€heard€priorÏto€the€jury€being€selected,€thus,€not€causing€any€disruption€to€the€juryððs€hearing€of€theÏcase.€€Also,€had€the€Stateððs€motion€been€denied,€the€Stateððs€right€to€appeal€wouldÏnot€have€been€adversely€affected€as€it€is€with€motions€to€suppress€decided€after€theÏjury€is€sworn.€€Therefore,€we€find€that€the€Stateððs€failure€to€file€the€motion€on€time,Ïwhile€certainly€an€error,€does€not€arbitrarily€result€in€a€reversal.€€ÌÌà àà àThus,€having€concluded€that€it€was€error€for€the€State€to€have€filed€theÏmotion€only€two€days€before€trial,€we€must€assess€the€effect€of€that€error.€€At€theÏhearing€on€the€motion,€the€trial€court€judge€expressed€œsurprise›€that€such€a€motionÏwas€necessary.€€He€stated€that€it€had€been€his€understanding€that€the€cases€wereÏalready€consolidated€and€that€the€cases€had€been€previously€set€together€on€theÏdocket.€€The€court€further€noted€that€previous€motions€had€been€filed€and€jointlyÏheard.€€Additionally,€the€court€noted€that€when€one€of€the€original€defense€attorneysÏinvolved€in€the€case€was€called€to€active€duty€with€the€military,€all€the€cases€wereÍcontinued,€not€just€the€one€involving€that€particular€attorney.€€The€State€pointed€out€toÏthe€court€that€the€attorney€for€the€defendants€at€the€criminal€trial€was€also€serving€asÏCrumbleyððs€attorney€in€a€civil€suit€involving€the€same€facts.€€Thus,€the€defendantsððÏattorney€can€hardly€complain€that€he€was€uninformed€about€the€entire€circumstancesÏof€the€incident€involving€Crumbley€and€the€defendants.€€From€the€above€weÏconclude,€as€did€the€trial€court,€that€the€defendants€were€not€prejudiced€by€theÏStateððs€late€filing€of€the€motion.€€The€defendants€have€failed€to€show€that€their€courseÏof€action€would€have€been€different€had€the€cases€not€been€consolidated.ÌÌà àà àIn€conclusion,€the€defendants€suffered€no€prejudice€by€the€faxed€motionÏor€the€late€filing.€€Furthermore,€as€we€determined€in€the€discussion€of€the€merits€of€theÏmotion,€consolidation€was€properly€granted.€€Thus,€we€find€that€the€errors€by€theÏState€are€harmless.€€However,€we€by€no€means€condone€the€Stateððs€failure€to€followÏthe€rules.€€We€simply€have€determined€that€in€this€case€alone€that€failure€to€do€so€wasÏharmless.€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÓ  Óò òIV.€€FAILURE€TO€SWEAR€JURY€PANELó óÌÓ  Óà àà àIn€this€issue,€the€defendants€contend€that€the€trial€court€erred€prior€toÏvoir€dire€when€it€failed€to€have€the€prospective€jurors€swear€to€answer€all€questionsÏtruthfully.€€Apparently,€the€trial€court€had€determined€that€individual€voir€dire€wasÏnecessary€due€to€the€amount€of€pre„trial€publicity.€€The€court€then€began€questioningÍthe€jurors€individually€without€swearing€them€to€tell€the€truth.€€Once€the€jury€selectionÏwas€complete€and€the€trial€was€about€to€begin,€the€jury€was€sworn€in€and€the€trialÏjudge€then€realized€that€during€voir€dire€he€had€not€asked€the€jurors€to€swear€thatÏthey€were€answering€truthfully.€€He€then€asked€the€jury,€ð ðAlso,€members€of€the€jury,Ïdo€you€and€each€of€you€solemnly€swear€that€the€answers€you€have€given€to€theÏquestions€that€have€been€asked€of€you€by€the€Court€and€by€the€attorneys€earlier,€isÏthat€the€truth,€the€whole€truth€and€nothing€but€the€truth?ðð€€The€jurors€all€answered€inÏthe€affirmative.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€contend€that€they€should€be€granted€a€new€trialÏbecause€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€24(a)€mandates€that€ð ð[t]he€court€òòshallóó€cause€theÏprospective€jurors€to€be€sworn€or€affirmed€to€answer€truthfully€the€questions€they€willÏbe€asked€during€the€selection€process€.€.€.€.ðð€(emphasis€added).€€Clearly,€the€trialÏcourt€did€err€by€failing€to€swear€the€prospective€jurors€to€tell€the€truth€prior€to€theirÏbeing€questioned.€€However,€in€considering€the€entire€record€in€this€cause,€we€areÏsatisfied€that€this€error€was€harmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€T.R.A.P.€36(b);ÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).€€The€defendants€make€no€allegation€that€the€jury€that€heardÏtheir€case€was€not€fair€and€impartial.€€€€€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òV.€€SELECTION€OF€ALTERNATE€JURORSó óÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€defendants€next€argue€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€selectingÏalternate€jurors€in€a€manner€that€complied€with€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€24.€€Alternates€areÏto€be€selected€for€service€in€the€same€manner€as€regular€jurors€which€is€provided€forÏin€T.C.A.€€ðð€40„18„104.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€Furthermore,€if€the€required€number€of€jurors€cannot€beÏobtained€from€the€original€venire,€T.C.A.€ðð€22„2„308(a)(2)€provides€the€method€forÏselecting€more€prospective€jurors.€€This€statute€provides€that€if€the€venire€isÏexhausted,ÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓthe€clerk€of€the€court€shall€produce€in€open€court€the€juryÏbox,€and€the€box€shall€be€opened€by€the€court€and€thereÏshall€be€drawn€therefrom,€as€directed€by€the€court,€theÏnumber€of€names€deemed€by€the€judge€sufficient€toÏcomplete€the€juries.€€This€process€shall,€if€necessary,Ïcontinue€until€the€grand€and€petit€juries€are€completed;€butÏthe€judge€of€the€court€instead€of€following€the€lastÏmentioned€procedure€may,€if€the€judge€shall€deem€proper,Ïfurnish€a€sufficient€number€of€names€of€persons€to€beÏsummoned€to€the€sheriff,€or€the€judge€may,€if€the€judgeÏthinks€proper,€direct€the€sheriff€to€summon€a€sufficientÏnumber€to€complete€the€juries.ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓÌà àà àIn€this€case,€when€the€original€venire€was€exhausted,€the€courtÏinstructed€the€court€clerk€to€have€twenty€potential€jurors€at€the€courthouse€the€nextÏmorning.€€The€clerk€informed€the€court€that€the€sheriffððs€office€was€already€closed€forÍthe€day.€€The€court€responded,€ð ðDo€what€we€can€do.€€Iððm€afraid€to€go€without€anyÏalternates.ðð€€ÌÌà àà àThe€following€day,€the€new€potential€jurors€arrived.€€Prior€to€the€voir€direÏof€the€jurors,€the€defendants€objected€to€the€way€the€potential€alternates€wereÏchosen.€€Evidently,€the€jurors€were€selected€through€telephone€calls€made€by€theÏsheriffððs€office.€€The€trial€court€noted€the€objection€and€continued€with€the€selection€ofÏthe€alternates.€€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€a€hearing€on€the€issue€of€selecting€theÏjurors€was€held.€€Sheriff€Tunney€Moore€told€the€court€that€he€was€simply€told€by€theÏclerk€to€have€twenty€more€jurors€at€the€courthouse€the€next€day.€€He€was€providedÏwith€no€further€instruction.€€He€said€he€simply€started€calling€people€by€running€hisÏfinger€through€the€phone€book.€€He€said€he€also€instructed€some€of€his€officers€toÏmake€some€phone€calls.€€Moore€further€stated€that€some€of€the€calls€he€made€were€toÏpeople€that€he€knew,€specifically€to€people€he€knew€that€were€retired€and€might€haveÏtime€to€serve.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€argued€that€the€selection€of€potential€alternates€failedÏto€comply€with€the€statutory€requirements.€€They€also€objected€because€some€of€theÏofficers€in€the€sheriffððs€department€had€been€named€as€defendants€in€a€civil€caseÏinvolving€the€same€facts€as€the€present€criminal€case.€€€€€à àà à€€€€ÌÌà àà àWhile€the€method€of€selecting€the€alternate€jurors€may€not€haveÏcomplied€with€the€selection€statutes,€we€see€no€reason€to€further€examine€theÏselection€process.€€The€alternate€jurors€were€not€needed€and€were€dismissed€prior€toÏthe€juryððs€deliberation.€€The€defendants€argue€that€the€alternates€were€with€the€juryÏduring€the€course€of€the€trial€and€may€have€influenced€the€jury.€€However,€the€courtÏinstructed€the€jurors€and€alternates€throughout€the€trial€that€they€were€not€to€discussÏthe€case€until€deliberations€began.€€The€jury€is€presumed€to€have€followed€theseÏinstructions.€€òòState€v.€Newsomeóó,€744€S.W.2d€911,€915€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€ÏThus,€we€conclude€that€any€errors€which€may€have€occurred€in€selecting€theÏpotential€alternates€were€harmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.× ƒ8 ××  ×€ÌÌÓ  Óò òVI.€€DISMISSAL€OF€JURORSó óÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€defendants€next€complain€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€refusedÏto€dismiss€certain€jurors€for€cause€based€on€their€exposure€to€pre„trial€publicity.€€TheÏdefendants€allege€that€they€were€forced€to€use€all€their€peremptory€challengesÏbecause€the€trial€court€refused€to€dismiss€for€cause€jurors€Doyle€Dennis,€BlancheÍHolt,€Robert€Williamson,€and€Loretta€Roberts.€€Each€of€these€potential€jurors€saidÏsomething€to€the€effect€that€they€had€heard€about€the€case€but€that€they€had€not€reallyÏformed€any€opinions.€€In€a€confusing€line€of€questions,€some€of€the€jurors€said€thatÏthey€needed€to€be€shown€some€proof€that€the€defendants€were€not€guilty.€€However,Ïthey€all€said€they€would€be€able€to€put€aside€any€opinions€that€they€may€have€formedÏand€would€base€their€decisions€on€the€proof€offered€in€court.€€The€defendantsÏchallenged€all€four€jurors€and€the€trial€court€refused€to€dismiss€any€of€them.€€All€fourÏwere€later€dismissed€when€the€defendants€exercised€their€peremptory€challenges.ÌÌà àà àSince€none€of€these€people€served€on€the€jury,€ð ðany€error€in€refusing€toÏexcuse€[them]€for€cause€in€and€of€itself€does€not€entitle€the€defendant[s]€to€a€new€trialÏunless€the€jury€that€ultimately€heard€the€case€was€not€fair€and€impartial.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏHowellóó,€868€S.W.2d€238,€249€(Tenn.€1993)(citation€omitted).€€The€defendants€makeÏno€argument€that€any€of€the€subsequent€jurors€they€were€ð ðforcedðð€to€accept€were€inÏany€way€incompetent.€€Without€such€an€allegation,€we€are€unable€to€say€that€theÏdefendants€suffered€any€prejudice€because€their€peremptory€challenges€had€beenÏexhausted.€€In€order€for€this€Court€to€find€a€prejudicial€error,€the€defendants€shouldÏhave€offered€proof€that€the€actual€jury€that€heard€their€case€was€in€some€way€not€fairÏand€impartial.€€Failing€to€do€so,€we€find€no€merit€to€this€issue.Ì€ÌÓ  Óò òVII.€€EVIDENCE€OF€DEATH€OF€OFFICERó óÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€defendants€next€contend€that€the€State€made€improper€andÏirrelevant€references€to€the€death€of€one€police€officer€and€the€wounding€of€another.€ÏThe€defendants€claim€that€such€improperly€admitted€evidence€was€highly€prejudicialÏand€therefore,€constitutes€reversible€error.€€This€evidence€was€the€subject€of€aÏdefense€pretrial€motion€which€the€trial€court€denied.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendants€argue€that€the€Stateððs€references€to€Officer€MillerððsÏdeath€and€to€the€shooting€of€Officer€Caldwell€were€irrelevant€to€a€determination€of€theÏdefendantsðð€guilt€for€the€crimes€with€which€they€were€charged.€€The€defendants€citeÏthe€following€references€as€improper:€TBI€agentððs€testimony€that€he€received€a€reportÏof€an€officer€having€been€shot€at€Crumbleyððs€house;€reference€to€Officer€CaldwellÏbleeding;€reference€to€the€retrieval€of€Officer€Millerððs€body€before€the€house€becameÏengulfed€in€flames;€a€poster€depicting€Officer€Millerððs€wounds;€and€other€generalÏreferences€to€the€standoff€and€its€consequences.€€The€defendants€contend€that€thisÏevidence€is€irrelevant€because€the€crimes€with€which€they€were€charged€had€beenÏcompleted€prior€to€the€activities€at€Crumbleyððs€house.ÌÌà àà àTennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€401€provides€that€ð ððð[r]elevant€evidenceððÏmeans€evidence€having€any€tendency€to€make€the€existence€of€any€fact€that€is€ofÍconsequence€to€the€determination€of€the€action€more€probable€or€less€probable€thanÏit€would€be€without€the€evidence.ðð€€The€determination€of€whether€any€evidence€isÏrelevant€is€left€to€the€broad€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€This€determination€will€not€beÏdisturbed€on€appeal€absent€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Hillóó,€885€S.W.2d€357,Ï361(€Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€Ô€&Ô€€Ô€XÔÌÌà àà àAs€we€concluded€in€the€discussion€above€about€the€motion€toÏconsolidate,€evidence€of€the€escaped€felonsðð€use€of€the€weapon€was€relevant€toÏshow€that€defendant€Lillard€had€aided€the€felons€by€supplying€the€weapon€thatÏhelped€the€felons€stave€off€officers.€€The€defendants€have€failed€to€demonstrate€howÏthe€admission€of€such€evidence€was€so€prejudicial€as€to€warrant€a€reversal.€€We€findÏno€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trial€court.€€€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òVIII.€€CLOSING€ARGUMENTSó óÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€defendants€next€contend€that€during€closing€arguments,€the€StateÏmade€impermissible€references€to€the€defendantsðð€failure€to€testify.€€At€trial,€theÏdefendantsðð€only€witness€was€Amy€Stanley,€daughter€of€defendant€Stanley.€€DuringÏclosing€argument,€the€State€told€the€jury:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ \ ÒÓÓYou€donððt€lie€if€youððre€not€guilty€of€anything.€€Youððre€notÏafraid€of€the€truth€if€the€truth€doesnððt€hurt€you.€€Why€is€it€thatÍ[Jeff€Lillard]€couldnððt€have€just€„„„„€he€wanted€to€come€upÏwith€some€„„„„€going€to€come€up€here€with€Amy,€going€toÏtry€to€hide€behind€Amy.€€Amy€doesnððt€talk€about€thatÏweapon.€€She€didnððt€know€anything€about€that€weapon.ÌÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓÌà àà àA€defendantððs€right€not€to€testify€is€clearly€protected€under€TennesseeÏlaw.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Constitution,€Article€I,€Section€9;€T.C.A.€ðð€40„17„103.€€It€is€also€clearÏthat€any€adverse€comment€by€the€State€upon€the€failure€of€the€defendant€to€testifyÏconstitutes€reversible€error,€if€an€objection€is€made,€and€if€the€ð ðtrial€judge€does€notÏpromptly€require€counsel€to€desist€and€does€not€properly€instruct€the€juryÏaccordingly.ðð€€òòState€v.€Haleóó,€672€S.W.2d€201,€202€(Tenn.€1984).ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€the€defendant€made€no€objection€when€the€State€made€itsÏcomments€about€ð ðhiding€behind€Amy.ðð€€The€failure€of€defense€counsel€to€make€aÏcontemporaneous€objection€waives€consideration€by€the€Court€of€the€issue€onÏappeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2d€228,€235€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988);ÏT.R.A.P.€36(a).€€The€defendantsðð€attorney,€recognizing€the€effect€of€his€failure€toÏobject,€now€argues€that€this€Court€should€address€the€issue€under€a€plain€errorÏanalysis.€€In€order€for€the€Stateððs€comments€to€amount€to€plain€error,€the€commentsÏmust€have€affected€ð ðthe€substantial€rights€of€an€accused.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(b).€ÏThis€Court€may€take€notice€of€such€an€error€at€any€time€ð ðwhere€necessary€to€doÍsubstantial€justice.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(b).ÌÌà àà àThe€above€quoted€passage€from€the€Stateððs€closing€argument€is€not€anÏimproper€comment€on€the€defendantsðð€failure€to€testify.€€ð ðThe€prosecutor€made€noÏdirect€allusion€to€the€defendant[sðð]€failure€to€testify,€nor€did€he€argue€to€the€juryÏdirectly€or€indirectly€that€the€omission€to€testify€should€be€taken€by€them€as€anÏinference€of€guilt.€€Such€an€argument,€if€made,€clearly€would€have€been€improper.ðð€ÏòòTaylor€v.€Stateóó,€582€S.W.2d€98,€100€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1979).€€Furthermore,€the€trialÏcourt€instructed€the€jury€that€the€defendantsðð€ð ðfailure€to€testify€may€not€be€consideredÏas€an€admission€of€guilt[,]€as€evidence€against€them,€or€that€the€charges€could€not€beÏanswered.€€For€they€are€presumed€innocent€and€they€are€not€required€to€prove€thatÏthey€are€innocent.ðð€€Such€an€instruction€ð ðdissipated€any€prejudicial€effect€which€mightÏhave€emanated€from€the€comment€in€question.ðð€€òòTayloróó,€582€S.W.2d€at€100.€€Thus,Ïwe€find€no€merit€to€this€issue.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òIX.€€SENTENCINGó óÓ  Óà àà àAs€their€final€issue,€the€defendants€contend€thatÏtheir€sentences€were€excessive.€€Each€defendant€received€an€effective€sentence€ofÏtwo€years.€€Each€is€to€serve€eighteen€months€in€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏCorrection€with€the€remaining€six€months€of€the€sentence€to€be€served€on€supervisedÏprobation.ÌÌà àà àWhen€a€defendant€complains€of€his€or€her€sentence,€we€must€conduct€aÏòòdeóó€òònovoóó€review€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€TheÏburden€of€showing€that€the€sentence€is€improper€is€upon€the€appealing€party.€€T.C.A.€Ìðð€40„35„401(d)€Sentencing€Commission€Comments.€€This€presumption,€however,€ð ðisÏconditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€court€consideredÏthe€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,Ï823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÓ ` ¸ ŒX¸)ÓÌÒ  ÒÒ ¢ Òà àà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„210€provides€that€the€minimumÏsentence€within€the€range€is€the€presumptive€sentence.€€If€there€are€enhanc‚ing€andÏmitigating€factors,€the€court€must€start€at€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€range€andÏenhance€the€sentence€as€appropriate€for€the€enhancement€factors€and€then€reduceÏthe€sen‚tence€within€the€range€as€appropriate€for€the€mitigating€factors.€€If€there€are€noÏmitigating€factors,€the€court€may€set€the€sentence€above€the€minimum€in€that€rangeÏbut€still€within€the€range.€€The€weight€to€be€given€each€factor€is€left€to€the€discretion€ofÏthe€trial€judge.€€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€116,€123€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àà àThe€Act€further€provides€that€ð ð[w]henever€the€court€imposes€a€sentence,Ïit€òòshall€place€on€the€recordóó€either€orally€or€in€writing,€what€enhance‚ment€or€mitigatingÍfactors€it€found,€if€any,€as€well€as€findings€of€fact€as€required€by€ðð€40„35„209.ðð€€T.C.A.€Ìðð€40„35„210(f)€(emphasis€added).€€Because€of€the€importance€of€enhancing€andÏmitigating€factors€under€the€sentencing€guide‚lines,€even€the€absence€of€these€factorsÏmust€be€recorded€if€none€are€found.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210€comment.€€These€findings€byÏthe€trial€judge€must€be€recorded€in€order€to€allow€an€adequate€review€on€appeal.à àÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€applied€enhancement€factor€10€to€bothÏdefendants€for€each€of€their€convictions.€€Factor€10€is€applied€if€the€ð ðdefendant€had€noÏhesitation€about€committing€a€crime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€high.ðð€€T.C.A.€Ìðð€€40„35„114(10).€€The€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€focus€in€determining€to€applyÏthis€factor€should€be€whether€ð ðthe€risk€to€human€life€was€highðð€and€that€little,€if€any,Ïemphasis€is€to€be€placed€on€whether€the€defendant€ð ðhesitatedðð€before€committing€theÏcrime.€€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€883€S.W.2d€597,€602€(Tenn.€1994).€€ÌÌà àà àHere,€Lillard€aided€escaped€fugitives€by€providing€them€with€a€weaponÏwhich€they€ultimately€used€in€an€effort€to€avoid€apprehension.€€Stanley€also€assistedÏthe€fugitives€by€not€telling€the€police€that€the€fugitives€were€armed€and€hiding€inÏCrumbleyððs€home.€€Under€these€circumstances,€the€risk€to€human€life€was€certainlyÏhigh.€€The€actions€of€the€defendants€placed€all€officers€investigating€the€fugitivesððÏescape€in€grave€danger.€€As€stated€in€the€facts€of€the€case,€one€officer€was€indeedÍkilled€while€another€was€wounded.€€The€defendants€created€a€high€risk€to€the€lives€ofÏall€the€officers€at€Crumbleyððs€house€on€October€11,€1994.€€Thus,€we€conclude€the€trialÏcourt€was€not€in€error€when€it€applied€factor€10€to€both€of€the€defendants.ÌÌà àà àAs€to€mitigating€factors,€the€trial€court€failed€to€state€on€the€record€theÏabsence€of€any€mitigators.€€The€defendants€now€argue€that€mitigating€factor€1€shouldÏhave€been€applied.€€That€factor€provides€that€ð ðthe€defendantððs€criminal€conductÏneither€caused€nor€threatened€serious€bodily€injury.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„113(1).€€AsÏdiscussed€immediately€above,€the€defendantsðð€conduct€did€threaten€serious€bodilyÏinjury.€€The€defendantsðð€assistance€to€the€fugitives€essentially€led€unsuspecting€policeÏinto€an€extremely€dangerous€situation€in€which€not€only€serious€bodily€harm€wasÏthreatened€but€also€death.€€This€mitigating€factor€does€not€apply.ÌÌà àà àThe€sentencing€range€for€the€defendantsðð€convictions€is€one€to€twoÏyears.€€Starting€at€the€mid„range€of€the€sentence,€the€trial€court€then€had€the€discretionÏto€lengthen€the€sentence€according€to€the€application€of€any€enhancement€factors.€ÏAccordingly,€the€trial€judge€here€set€the€defendantsðð€sentences€at€the€top€of€the€range.€ÏIt€was€within€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€to€sentence€the€defendants€to€two€years€onÏeach€of€their€convictions,€thus,€we€find€no€reason€to€disturb€this€aspect€of€theÏsentence.€€€€ÌÌà àà àDetermining€that€the€trial€court€was€not€in€error€when€it€sentenced€theÏdefendants€to€the€top€of€the€range€does€not€end€the€inquiry€as€to€the€appropriatenessÏof€their€sentences.€€The€defendants€also€claim€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€refusedÏtheir€requests€for€straight€probation.€€We€first€point€out€that€the€defendants€wereÏconvicted€of€Class€E€felonies,€thus€they€are€presumed€to€be€eligible€for€alternativeÏsentencing€in€absence€of€evidence€to€the€contrary.€€It€appears€that€the€trial€court€wasÏattempting€to€fashion€an€alternative€sentence€when€it€ordered€the€defendants€to€someÏincarceration€in€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Corrections€followed€by€probation.€ÏHowever,€there€is€no€statutory€authority€for€such€a€sentence.€€A€defendantððs€sentenceÏcannot€include€both€time€in€the€penitentiary€and€time€spent€on€probation.€€A€sentenceÏcan,€however,€include€incarceration€in€the€local€jail€followed€by€probation.€€In€thatÏcase,€the€time€of€incarceration€in€the€local€jail€cannot€exceed€one€year.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ððÏ40„35„306.€€Thus,€the€trial€judge€erred€in€sentencing€these€defendants.€€A€remand€isÏnecessary€for€the€trial€judge€to€appropriately€sentence€the€defendants.ÌÌà àà àOn€remand,€the€trial€judge€must€also€consider€the€defendants€asÏcandidates€for€straight€probation.€€The€defendants€have€the€burden€of€proof€ofÏestablishing€suitability€for€full€probation€and€as€such€must€demonstrate€to€the€courtÏthat€ð ðprobation€will€ððsubserve€the€ends€of€justice€and€the€best€interest€of€both€theÍpublic€and€the€defendant[s].ðððð€€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€259€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1990)(citation€omitted).ÌÌà àà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„103€sets€out€sentencingÏconsiderations€which€are€guidelines€for€determining€whether€or€not€a€defendantÏshould€be€incarcerated.€€These€include€the€need€ð ðto€protect€society€by€restraining€aÏdefendant€who€has€a€long€history€of€criminal€conduct,ðð€the€need€ð ðto€avoidÏdepreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense,ðð€the€determination€that€ð ðconfinement€isÏparticularly€suited€to€provide€an€effective€deterrence€to€others€likely€to€commit€similarÏoffenses,ðð€or€the€determination€that€ð ðmeasures€less€restrictive€than€confinement€haveÏfrequently€or€recently€been€applied€unsuccessfully€to€the€defendant.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„103(1).ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€judge€denied€the€defendantsðð€request€for€straight€probation,€butÏhe€failed€to€adequately€state€his€reasons€for€doing€so.€€Thus,€on€remand,€inÏreconsidering€the€defendantsðð€sentence,€the€trial€judge€should€also€reconsider€theÏdefendantsðð€requests€for€full€probation.€€Should€a€denial€of€full€probation€beÏappropriate,€the€trial€judge€shall€place€in€the€record€the€reason€for€such€a€denial.ÌÌà àà àIn€conclusion,€we€find€that€defendant€Stanleyððs€two€convictions€forÍharboring€a€fugitive€should€be€reversed€and€dismissed.€€We€affirm€her€two€remainingÏconvictions€as€well€as€Lillardððs€two€convictions.€€We€find€that€the€errors€addressedÏabove€committed€by€the€State€and€the€trial€court€were€harmless€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt€and€have€no€bearing€upon€the€defendantsðð€convictions.€€We€further€find€that€theÏtrial€judge€erred€in€sentencing€and€that€this€cause€should€be€remanded€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€resentencing€of€both€defendants.Ô% € ÔÌÌÓÓòòà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€à àJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óó€€€ÌWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€Judge€€€€€€ÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ v Òò òßJ€29;+'b|` Å `€@ÿJß›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌà@ àSEPTEMBER€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9704„CR„00123Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àCOCKE€COUNTYÌvs.à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€William€R.€Holt,€Jr.,€JudgeÌWANDA€STANLEY€and,à àà à)ÌJEFF€LIPPARD,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Harboring€a€Fugitive€andÌà àAppellantsà àà àà à)à àProviding€Aid€to€a€FugitiveÌÌó óÌà àà àò òÌà@ àCONCURRING€IN€PART;€DISSENTING€IN€PARTó óÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€majority€opinion€affirms€the€appellant€Stanley's€convictions€for€providing€aidÏto€avoid€arrest€and€vacates€her€two€convictions€for€harboring€fugitives.€€I€am€unable€toÏjoin€in€this€result:€€I€would€affirm€Stanley's€two€convictions€for€harboring€and€vacate€herÏtwo€convictions€for€providing€aid€to€the€fugitives.€€My€reasons€for€reversal€of€the€latterÏoffenses€are€two„fold.€€First,€the€majority€opines€that€Stanley's€convictions€for€providingÏaid€to€the€two€fugitives€are€supported€by€the€fact€that,€when€asked€by€law€enforcementÏagents€if€anyone€was€at€the€Crumby€house,€she€responded€that€no€one€was€at€home€andÏthat€she€failed€to€tell€the€truth€in€the€first€place.€€Thus,€the€question€for€our€inquiry€isÏwhether€failing€to€tell€the€truth€to€a€police€officer€or€a€false€response€to€the€officer€isÏsufficient€to€establish€that€the€appellant€"provided€aid"€to€the€fugitives.ÌÌà àIt€is€clear€from€the€plain€language€of€the€statute€that€the€element€of€the€offenseÏ"provides€or€aids€in€providing"€proscribes€an€affirmative€act€and€not€the€omission€orÏfailure€to€act€which€the€proof€establishes€occurred€in€the€present€case.€€òòCfóó.€€òòState€v.ÍLevandowskióó,€No.€03S01„9611„CR„000116€(Tenn.€at€Knoxville,€Oct.€6,€1997)€(òòforÏpublicationóó).€€Other€jurisdictions€are€in€accord€with€this€position€as€is€the€òòmodel€penal€codeóóÏfrom€which€our€accessory€after€the€fact€offense€is€patterned.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòState€v.ÏBrandstetteróó,€908€P.2d€578€(Idaho€App.€1995);€òòState€v.€DððAddarioóó,€482€A.2d€961€(N.J.ÏSuper.€1984);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Neckeraueróó,€617€A.2d€1281€(Pa.€Super.€1992).€€PassiveÏfailure€to€report€the€commission€of€a€crime€should€not€make€the€actor€guilty€of€hinderingÏan€arrest,€although€such€conduct€may€fall€within€the€common€law€offense€of€misprision.€Ïòòmodel€penal€codeóó€Section€242.3€(1980)€(ð ðMere€failure€to€report€crime€is€not€proscribed€byÏthis€section.€€Neither€is€giving€misleading€or€even€false€answers€to€inquiries€initiated€byÏthe€police.€.€.€.[T]his€offense€proscribes€only€the€borderline€case€of€òòvolunteeredóóÏmisinformation€to€the€police,€which€is€not€covered€elsewhere.ðð).ÌÌà àSecond,€I€conclude,€from€a€reading€of€the€statute€before€us,€that€accessory€afterÏthe€fact€is€an€ongoing€or€continuous€criminal€enterprise€which,€although€committed€byÏdifferent€forms€or€by€different€means,€it€nevertheless€remains€a€single€crime.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„13„206.€€A€single€offense€may€not€be€divided€into€separate€parts.€ÏGenerally,€a€single€wrongful€act€may€not€furnish€the€basis€for€more€than€one€criminalÏprosecution.€€òòState€v.€Phillipsóó,€424€S.W.2d€662,€665€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€fact€remains€that,Ïalthough€the€appellant's€actions€may€have€been€committed€by€different€forms€andÏmeans,€Stanley€acted€with€the€single€"intent€to€hinder€the€arrest€.€.€.€of€the€offenders."€€€ÌÌà àIn€this€context,€although€the€majority€concludes€that€ð ð[e]vidence€that€Stanley€had€aÏcrawl€space€in€her€house,€two€beer€bottles€in€the€attic,€and€a€duffle€bag€of€canned€food€inÏan€upstairs€bedroom€is€.€.€.€not€enough€to€sustain€a€conviction€for€harboring€fugitives,ðð€IÏfind€the€proof€sufficient€to€support€the€appellant€Stanley's€convictions€under€theÏrespective€counts€for€harboring€or€concealing€the€two€fugitives.€€A€consensual€search€ofÏStanleyððs€home€revealed€òòfreshóó€insulation€on€the€bathroom€floor,€two€beer€bottles€in€theÏattic,€and€a€duffle€bag€containing€canned€food€and€a€flashlight.× ƒ: ××  ×€€Stanleyððs€daughterÏattempted€to€explain€the€presence€of€these€items€in€the€house.€€Specifically,€she€claimedÏownership€of€the€duffle€bag€and€its€contents.€€She€also€admitted€that€she€had€placed€theÏbeer€bottles€in€the€attic€ð ða€couple€of€yearsðð€prior€to€the€search.€€Stanleyððs€daughterððsÏtestimony€explaining€the€presence€of€the€beer€bottles€contradicts€the€evidence€that€òòfreshóóÏinsulation€was€found€on€the€bathroom€floor.€€Moreover,€Wanda€Stanleyððs€false€andÏmisleading€statements€to€law€enforcement€officers€supplies€further€evidence€of€her€guilt.€ÏAs€stated€by€the€majority,€circumstantial€evidence€alone€may€be€sufficient€to€support€aÏconviction.€€òòState€v.€Gilliamóó,€No.€01C01„9603„CC„00105€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Nashville,ÏMay€7,€1997)€(òòfor€publicationóó)€(citation€omitted).€€€When€reviewing€the€convictingÏevidence,€this€Court€must€remember€that€the€jury€decides€the€weight€to€be€given€toÍcircumstantial€evidence€and€that€ð ð[t]he€inferences€to€be€drawn€from€such€evidence,€andÏthe€extent€to€which€the€circumstances€are€consistent€with€guilt€and€inconsistent€withÏinnocence€are€questions€primarily€for€the€jury.ðð€€òòIdóó.€(citations€omitted).€€Thus,€I€concludeÏthat€the€fruits€of€the€consensual€search€in€conjunction€with€Stanleyððs€subsequent€actionsÏpermit€a€rational€jury€to€find€that€the€circumstantial€evidence€is€consistent€with€StanleyððsÏguilt€and€inonsistent€with€her€innocence.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Tharpeóó,€726€S.W.2d€896,€900Ï(Tenn.€1987).€€Accordingly,€I€would€vacate€Stanleyððs€two€sentences€for€providing€aid€toÏthe€two€fugitives€and€would€affirm€her€convictions€for€harboring€the€two€fugitives.ÌÓÓà8 àÌÌÌœà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œ____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGE›œÔ€ÔÔ€Ô›