ÿWPC· 8#  UN+ %y 0DbÃw@Ë4 . 0ˆ6 0D¾ 0JÆL 0T 0^f 0hÄ 0r, 0|ž 0† 0  1u0 0d¥ 0@ D3I U>| AQº B 0D( 0Dl D/° Bß U *ü B)& DCO AM’ Mß ,$Bv~fvÓä˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ñþ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°Ò- ù- ó!ô!Dõ!Dö!D÷!þ!Eÿ!Õ"Ó€ ""B\J#3|x"(8(3I¸$¤¤Ý ƒñþ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò****'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ d(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd 1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ CÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òNovemberÏ20,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ôÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„14„403;€39„14„103;€39„14„105(3).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ôÔ€The€Defendant€also€argues€that€evidence€of€his€prior€convictions€should€have€beenÏexcluded€because€its€probative€value€was€substantially€outweighed€by€the€danger€of€unfair€prejudice.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€403.€€Having€already€concluded€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€determining€thatÏthe€probative€value€of€the€limited€impeachment€evidence€on€credibility€outweighed€any€unfairÏprejudicial€effect€on€the€substantive€issues,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€probative€value€wasÏsubstantially€outweighed€by€the€danger€of€unfair€prejudice.€€The€Defendantððs€argument€lacks€merit.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÔ€(ŠÔÔ€/ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€†(XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò ò›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÙ€ÙœßR€231A1-j|Y` à. `€€@ÿRß›AT€œJACKSON›ÌÌœSEPTEMBER›€SESSION,€œ1997›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,›à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ02C01„9611„CR„00424›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœSHELBY›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œJAMES€C.€BEASLEY,€JR.ó ó›Ìò òœRAY€L.€TAYLOR,ó ó›à àà àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Aggravated€Burglary€&€Theft)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌÓ  Óò òON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCRIMINAL›€COURT€OF€œSHELBY€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœA.C.€WHARTON›à àà àà àœà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌPublic€Defenderà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌÌTONY€N.€BRAYTONà àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ201€Poplar,€Suite€2„01à àà àà à425€5th€Avenue€NorthÌMemphis,€TN€38103à àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€W.€PIEROTTIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€R.€KITCHENÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€Complex,€Suite€301Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€/°Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€/ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€Defendant,€Ray€L.€Taylor,€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€He€was€convicted€by€a€ShelbyÏCounty€jury€of€one€count€of€aggravated€burglary€and€one€count€of€theft€ofÏproperty€valued€in€excess€of€one€thousand€dollars€($1000)€but€less€than€tenÏthousand€dollars€($10,000).œ× ƒ4 ××  ×›€€The€trial€court€sentenced€him€as€a€Range€IIIÏpersistent€offender€to€twelve€years€imprisonment€with€the€Department€ofÏCorrection€on€each€count,€with€the€sentences€to€run€concurrently.€€In€this€appeal,Ïthe€Defendant€argues€that€the€evidence€was€legally€insufficient€to€support€theÏverdicts€and€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€that€his€prior€convictions€wereÏadmissible€for€impeachment€purposes.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àWe€begin€with€a€summary€of€the€pertinent€facts.€€On€the€morning€ofÏMarch€2,€1995,€Pamela€Mosley€left€her€home,€located€at€4578€Gailwood€inÏMemphis,€Tennessee,€and€went€to€work.€€She€later€received€a€telephone€call€atÏwork€informing€her€that€her€house€had€been€burglarized.€€She€then€returnedÏhome€to€find€that€several€items€which€had€been€in€the€home€when€she€left€thatÏmorning€were€missing.€€The€front€door€to€her€home€had€been€pried€open€and€herÍbedroom€had€been€ransacked.€€Among€the€missing€items€were€jewelry€boxesÏcontaining€a€large€amount€of€jewelry,€a€coin€collection,€several€handguns,€aÏflashlight€and€a€blue€duffel€bag.€€She€estimated€the€value€of€the€missing€itemsÏat€seven€thousand€dollars€($7000).ÌÌà àTwo€of€Mosleyððs€neighbors,€Deborah€Christine€Roberts€and€MarthaÏSherwood,€noticed€an€unfamiliar€individual€approach€Mosleyððs€home€on€theÏmorning€of€March€2,€1995.€€Both€Roberts€and€Sherwood€later€identified€theÏDefendant€as€this€individual.€€The€Defendant€was€driving€an€older„modelÏCadillac.€€He€parked€the€car€next€to€Mosleyððs€house,€left€the€car€running,€andÏapproached€Mosleyððs€front€door.€€He€did€not€appear€to€be€carrying€anything€asÏhe€approached€the€house.€€He€knocked€on€the€front€door,€turned€œaround,›€andÏlooked€up€and€down€the€street.€€Martha€Sherwood€testified€that€the€DefendantÏthen€turned€toward€the€door,€the€door€opened,€and€the€Defendant€entered€theÏhome.€€After€approximately€ten€to€fifteen€minutes,€the€Defendant€exited€the€homeÏcarrying€a€blue€duffel€bag€and€a€brown€box€resembling€a€briefcase.€€He€tossedÏthese€items€into€the€Cadillac€and€drove€away.ÌÌà àDuring€the€time€the€Defendant€was€in€Mosleyððs€home,€both€Roberts€andÏSherwood€gained€more€information€about€his€car.€€Sherwood€drove€around€theÏblock€and€noted€that€the€Cadillac€had€a€Lauderdale€County€license€plate.€ÍRoberts€sent€an€individual€from€her€home€to€write€down€the€license€plateÏnumber€of€the€Cadillac.€€After€the€departure€of€the€Defendant,€the€witnessesÏcalled€911.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€was€arrested€on€the€following€day,€March€3,€1995.€€At€theÏtime€of€his€arrest,€he€was€driving€an€older„model€Cadillac€matching€theÏdescription€of€the€Cadillac€given€by€Sherwood€and€Roberts.€€The€Cadillac€hadÏa€Lauderdale€County€license€plate€with€a€tag€number€matching€the€œnumberÏRoberts€had€taken›€from€the€car€parked€in€front€of€Mosleyððs€home€the€previousÏday.ÌÌà àNone€of€the€items€missing€from€Mosleyððs€home€were€discovered€in€theÏDefendantððs€vehicle.€€In€fact,€the€items€missing€from€Mosleyððs€home€were€neverÏrecovered.€€In€addition,€Elton€Smith,€an€investigator€with€the€Burglary€Bureau€ofÏthe€Memphis€Police€Department,€testified€that€the€crime€scene€officer€did€notÏcheck€Mosleyððs€home€for€fingerprints.€€As€such,€the€Defendantððs€fingerprintsÏwere€not€linked€to€the€scene€of€the€crime.ÌÌà àOn€May€30,€1995,€the€Defendant€was€indicted€on€charges€of€aggravatedÏburglary€and€theft€of€property.€€He€was€tried€from€February€20€to€February€22,Í1996.€€After€considering€the€proof€presented€at€trial,€the€jury€found€the€DefendantÏguilty€as€charged.ÌÌà àIn€his€first€issue€on€appeal,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€evidence€wasÏlegally€insufficient€to€support€the€verdicts.€€In€particular,€he€contends€that€theÏproof€was€not€sufficient€to€establish€his€identity€as€the€perpetrator.€€He€assertsÏthat€eyewitness€identification€testimony€is€inherently€untrustworthy,€citing€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Wadeóó,€388€U.S.€218,€87€S.Ct.€1926,€18€L.Ed.2d€1149€(1967).€€HeÏpoints€out€that€none€of€the€victimððs€property€was€recovered€from€his€vehicle€andÏno€scientific€fingerprint€evidence€linked€him€to€the€scene€of€the€crime.€€Thus,€givenÏthat€it€was€eyewitness€testimony€that€linked€him€to€the€crime,€he€argues€that€theÏeyewitness€testimony€offered€at€trial€was€insufficient€to€justify€a€rational€trier€ofÏfact€in€finding€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,Ïthe€standard€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorableÏto€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443ÏU.S.€307,€319€(1979).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€theÏweight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raisedÏby€the€evidence,€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.ÍPappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€Nor€may€this€courtÏreweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835Ï(Tenn.€1978).€€ÌÌà àA€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€Stateððs€witnessesÏand€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,Ï476€(Tenn.€1973).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimateÏview€of€the€evidence€and€all€inferences€therefrom.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€atÏ835.€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€andÏreplaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused€has€the€burden€in€this€courtÏof€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€byÏthe€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982);€òòGraceóó,€493ÏS.W.2d€at€476.ÌÌà àApplying€these€principles€to€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€we€believe€that€theÏevidence€was€legally€sufficient€to€support€the€verdicts.€€The€Defendant€wasÏpositively€identified€by€two€eyewitnesses€as€the€individual€who€entered€theÏvictimððs€home€on€March€2,€1995.€€He€approached€the€home€carrying€nothing€butÏreturned€to€his€car€carrying€a€blue€duffel€bag€and€a€brown€box€resembling€aÏbriefcase.€€The€victim€returned€home€shortly€after€the€Defendantððs€departure€toÏfind€that€her€front€door€had€been€pried€open€and€her€bedroom€ransacked.€ÍAmong€the€numerous€items€missing€from€the€home€was€a€blue€duffel€bag.€€TheÏvictim€estimated€the€value€of€the€missing€items€at€seven€thousand€dollarsÏ($7000).€€The€Defendant€was€arrested€the€following€day.€€At€the€time€of€hisÏarrest,€he€was€driving€a€car€matching€the€general€description€given€by€theÏwitnesses.€€Moreover,€the€license€plate€number€matched€the€one€taken€from€theÏcar€at€the€scene€of€the€crime.ÌÌà àIt€is€well„established€in€Tennessee€that€the€identity€of€the€accused€as€theÏperpetrator€of€the€offense€charged€is€a€question€of€fact€for€the€determination€ofÏthe€jury.€€òòState€v.€Shelleyóó,€628€S.W.2d€436,€438€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981);€òòStateÏv.€Livingstonóó,€607€S.W.2d€489,€491€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€After€consideringÏthe€record,€we€can€only€conclude€that€there€was€sufficient€proof€for€the€jury€toÏhave€found€the€elements€of€aggravated€burglary€and€theft€of€property€beyond€aÏreasonable€œdoubt.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„14„403(a),€39„14„103.›€ÏFurthermore,€there€was€sufficient€proof€to€establish€that€the€Defendant€was€theÏperpetrator€of€the€offenses.€€The€Defendantððs€first€issue€œtherefore›€lacks€merit.ÌÌà àIn€his€second€issue€on€appeal,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€ruling€that€his€prior€convictions€were€admissible€for€impeachmentÏpurposes.€€It€appears€from€the€record€that€the€Defendant€had€a€prior€convictionÏfor€petit€larceny€and€several€prior€convictions€for€burglary.€€Prior€to€trial,€theÍDefendant€moved€the€trial€court€to€exclude€his€prior€convictions€for€impeachmentÏpurposes.€€The€trial€court€initially€granted€the€Defendantððs€motion,€finding€that€theÏprejudicial€effect€of€the€prior€convictions,€given€their€similarity€to€the€offensesÏcharged,€outweighed€their€probative€value.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€609(a)(3).€€OnÏthe€following€day,€the€prosecutor€presented€research€on€the€issue€andÏrequested€that€the€trial€judge€reconsider€his€ruling.€€After€considering€the€researchÏoffered€by€the€prosecutor,€the€trial€judge€qualified€his€ruling,€stating€that€he€wouldÏallow€the€prosecutor€to€impeach€the€Defendant€by€asking€him€if€he€had€beenÏconvicted€of€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty.ðð€€The€specific€nature€of€the€priorÏconvictions€would€not€be€revealed.€€The€trial€court€based€the€ruling€on€òòState€v.ÏSummerallóó,€926€S.W.2d€272€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995),€and€òòState€v.€Ross€Jonesóó,ÏC.C.A.€No.€01C01„9405„CR„00175,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏNashville,€Feb.€8,€1995),€òòperm.€to€appeal€denied€concurring€in€results€onlyóó€(Tenn.Ï1995).€€In€the€wake€of€this€ruling,€the€Defendant€elected€not€to€testify€at€trial.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€thatÏhis€prior€convictions€were€admissible€for€impeachment€purposes.€€He€assertsÏœthat›€given€the€similarity€between€the€prior€convictions€and€the€offenses€charged,Ïthe€admission€of€the€prior€convictions€would€result€in€undue€prejudiceÏoutweighing€their€probative€value.€€Furthermore,€he€argues€that€the€trial€courtððsÏattempt€to€minimize€the€prejudicial€effect€by€limiting€referral€to€the€prior€convictionsÍonly€as€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonestyðð€was€improper.€€Citing€òòState€v.€Barnardóó,Ï899€S.W.2d€617,€622€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€he€alleges€that€the€use€ofÏð ðgeneric€feloniesðð€for€impeachment€purposes€is€misleading€and€promotesÏconfusion€in€that€it€invites€speculation€on€the€part€of€the€jury€as€to€the€nature€ofÏthe€prior€convictions.ÌÌà àOf€course,€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€do€provide€that€the€StateÏmay€use€a€judgment€of€conviction€to€impeach€the€testimony€of€the€defendant.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€609.€€Rule€609,€however,€sets€forth€several€conditions€whichÏmust€be€satisfied€to€allow€for€such€impeachment.€€Among€these€conditions€areÏthe€following:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà à(2)€The€crime€must€be€punishable€by€death€or€imprisonment€inÏexcess€of€one€year€under€the€law€under€which€the€witness€wasÏconvicted€or,€if€not€so€punishable,€the€crime€must€have€involvedÏdishonesty€or€false€statement.Ìà à(3)€If€the€witness€to€be€impeached€is€the€accused€in€a€criminalÏprosecution,€the€State€must€give€the€accused€reasonable€writtenÏnotice€of€the€impeaching€conviction€before€trial,€and€the€court€uponÏrequest€must€determine€that€the€convictionððs€probative€value€onÏcredibility€outweighs€its€unfair€prejudicial€effect€on€the€substantiveÏissues.€€The€court€may€rule€on€the€admissibility€of€such€proof€prior€toÏthe€trial€but€in€any€event€shall€rule€prior€to€the€testimony€of€theÏaccused.€€If€the€court€makes€a€final€determination€that€such€proof€isÏadmissible€for€impeachment€purposes,€the€accused€need€not€actuallyÏtestify€at€the€trial€to€later€challenge€the€propriety€of€the€determination.ÌÌÒ ° ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓTenn.€R.€Evid.€609(a)(2)€„€(3).€€In€determining€whether€the€probative€value€of€a€priorÏconviction€on€the€issue€of€credibility€outweighs€its€unfair€prejudicial€effect€on€theÍsubstantive€issues,€a€trial€court€should€(a)€ð ðassess€the€similarity€between€the€crimeÏon€trial€and€the€crime€underlying€the€impeaching€convictionðð€and€(b)€ð ðanalyze€theÏrelevance€the€impeaching€conviction€has€to€the€issue€of€credibility.ðð€€òòState€v.€Farmeróó,Ï841€S.W.2d€837,€839€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992);€Neil€P.€Cohen€et€al.,€òòTennesseeÏLaw€of€Evidenceóó€ðð€609.9,€at€376€(3d€ed.€1995).ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€trial€court€determined€œthat›œ€because€of›€œthe›€similarityÏbetween€the€charged€offenses€and€the€Defendantððs€prior€convictions,€the€probativeÏvalue€of€the€prior€convictions€on€credibility€did€not€outweigh€the€unfair€prejudicialÏeffect€on€the€substantive€issues.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€ruled€that€the€State€could€notÏimpeach€the€Defendant€with€reference€to€the€specific€nature€of€his€prior€convictions.€ÏWe€believe€the€trial€judge€was€correct€in€this€determination.€€The€trial€court€did,Ïhowever,€rule€that€the€State€could€impeach€the€Defendant€with€reference€to€hisÏconvictions€œas›€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty.ððÌÌà àSuch€a€procedure€was€followed€in€a€very€similar€case€recently€beforeÏanother€panel€of€this€Court.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Ross€Jonesóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01C01„9405„CR„00175,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Feb.€8,€1995),€òòperm.€toÏappeal€denied€concurring€in€results€onlyóó€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€òòJonesóó,€the€defendantÏwas€charged€with€aggravated€burglary.€€œòòId.ó󛀜at›€2.€€He€had€six€prior€burglaryÏconvictions.€€òòId.óó€at€8.€€The€trial€court€ruled€that€the€State€could€not€refer€to€the€specificÍnature€of€the€prior€convictions€when€impeaching€the€defendant,€but€could€ask€him€ifÏhe€had€been€convicted€of€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty.ðð€€òòId.óó€€On€appeal,€thisÏCourt€stated€that€although€ð ðthis€method€of€identifying€the€convictions€forÏimpeachment€purposes€is€not€specifically€provided€for€by€Rule€609€of€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Evidence,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€this€actionÏconstitutes€error€under€the€circumstances€of€this€case.ðð€€òòId.óóÌÌà àThe€Defendant€nevertheless€contends€that€allowing€the€State€to€impeachÏhim€with€reference€to€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonestyðð€was€improper.€€Citing€òòState€v.ÏBarnardóó,€899€S.W.2d€617,€622€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€he€argues€that€the€use€ofÏð ðgeneric€feloniesðð€for€impeachment€purposes€is€misleading€to€the€jury€and€promotesÏconfusion€of€the€issues€at€trial€because€it€invites€the€jury€to€speculate€as€to€theÏnature€of€the€impeaching€felonies.€€In€òòBarnardóó,€the€defendant€was€found€guilty€ofÏfirst€degree€murder,€aggravated€robbery€and€aggravated€sexual€battery.€€òòId.óó€at€620.€ÏAt€trial,€the€State€was€permitted€to€impeach€the€defendant€based€on€his€convictionÏfor€sexual€battery€in€California.€€The€trial€court€allowed€the€State€to€elicit€the€fact€ofÏthe€conviction€without€referring€to€the€specific€nature€of€the€offense.€€òòId.óó€at€621.€€OnÏappeal,€a€panel€of€this€Court€concluded€that€the€limited€admission€of€the€fact€thatÏthe€defendant€had€a€prior€felony€conviction€was€error.€€òòId.óó€at€622.€€This€CourtÏcommented€as€follows:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà àAlthough€we€agree€that€the€trial€court€minimized€the€prejudicialÏimpact€by€limiting€impeachment€evidence€to€the€mere€fact€thatÏappellant€had€a€prior€felony€conviction,€we€believe€admission€in€thisÏinstance€was€error.€€As€previously€noted,€the€probative€value€ofÏappellantððs€prior€conviction€on€the€issue€of€credibility€was€slight.€ÏMoreover,€the€prejudicial€effect,€while€mitigated,€could€have€allowed€theÏjury€to€unnecessarily€speculate€as€to€the€type€of€felony€actuallyÏcommitted.€€As€such,€the€unfair€prejudicial€effect€of€the€prior€convictionÏoutweighed€its€probative€value.ÌÌÒ ° ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓòòId.óóÌÌà àòòBarnardóó€was€decided€shortly€before€the€filing€of€œòòJonesóó.›€€Shortly€after€the€filingÏof€òòJonesóó,€another€panel€of€this€Court€confronted€a€situation€similar€to€òòBarnardóó.€€òòSeeóóÏòòState€v.€Summerallóó,€926€S.W.2d€272€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€In€òòSummerallóó,€theÏdefendant€was€indicted€for€first€degree€murder€and€convicted€of€second€degreeÏmurder.€€òòId.óó€at€274.€€At€trial,€the€State€was€permitted€to€impeach€the€defendantÏbased€on€a€prior€conviction€for€second€degree€murder.€€òòId.óó€at€276.€€The€trial€courtÏallowed€the€State€to€ask€the€defendant€on€cross„examination€if€he€was€ð ðthe€sameÏRonald€Summerall€who€was€convicted€in€Indictment€number€89„06732,€FebruaryÏ23,€1990,€for€a€felony.ðð€€òòId.óó€€On€appeal,€the€òòSummerallóó€court€noted€the€priorÏdecisions€in€both€òòBarnardóó€and€òòJonesóó,€pointing€out€that€the€case€before€them€wasÏð ðmore€closely€aligned€with€the€facts€in€òòBarnardóóðð€because€the€impeaching€convictionÏdid€not€involve€dishonesty.€€òòId.óó€at€277.€€Based€on€the€analysis€of€òòBarnardóó€andÏòòJonesóó,€the€òòSummerallóó€court€went€on€to€state€that€ð ðit€would€appear€that€a€ððgenericððÏfelony€provides€inadequate€information€for€the€jury€to€properly€weigh€its€probativeÍvalue.€€While€this€is€a€close€case,€the€ruling€in€òòBarnardóó,€which€bears€the€approvalÏof€our€supreme€court,€is€the€more€persuasive€authority.ðð€€òòId.óó€€As€a€result,€theÏòòSummerallóó€court€concluded€that€it€was€error€for€the€State€to€impeach€the€defendantÏwith€reference€to€his€conviction€ð ðfor€a€felony.ðð€€òòId.óóÌÌà àApplying€the€principles€from€òòBarnardóó,€òòJonesóó€and€òòSummerallóó€to€the€case€òòsubóóÏòòjudiceóó,€we€believe€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€permitting€the€State€to€impeach€theÏDefendant€with€reference€to€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty.ðð€€The€case€at€bar,€likeÏòòJonesóó,€is€distinct€from€òòBarnardóó€and€òòSummerallóó.€€In€both€òòBarnardóó€and€òòSummerallóó,€theÏimpeaching€conviction€did€not€involve€dishonesty€and,€as€a€result,€was€of€minimalÏprobative€value€on€the€issue€of€credibility.€€òòSummerallóó,€926€S.W.2d€at€276„277;ÏòòBarnardóó,€899€S.W.2d€at€622.€€In€the€present€case,€as€in€òòJonesóó,€the€impeachingÏconvictions€do€involve€dishonesty.€€òòJonesóó,€C.C.A.€No.€€01C01„9405„CR„00175,€slipÏop.€at€8;€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Milleróó,€737€S.W.2d€556,€559€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987)€(statingÏthat€burglary€is€a€crime€involving€dishonesty€for€impeachment€purposes).€ÏObviously,€the€probative€value€of€a€prior€conviction€involving€dishonesty€on€theÏissue€of€credibility€is€significant.ÌÌà àFurthermore,€in€both€òòBarnardóó€and€òòSummerallóó,€the€State€was€permitted€toÏimpeach€the€defendant€with€reference€œonly€to›€ð ða€felony.ðð€€òòSummerallóó,€926€S.W.2d€atÏœ276„77;›€òòBarnardóó,€899€S.W.2d€at€œ621„22.›€€In€the€present€case,€as€in€òòJonesóó,€theÍDefendant€was€œto€be€impeached›€by€reference€to€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty.ðð€ÏòòJonesóó,€C.C.A.€No.€€01C01„9405„CR„00175,€slip€op.€at€8.€€We€believe€that€thisÏmethod€of€impeachment€not€only€minimizes€unfair€prejudicial€impact€by€concealingÏthe€specific€nature€of€prior€convictions€similar€to€the€charged€offense,€but€alsoÏminimizes€the€possibility€of€speculation€by€the€jury€as€to€the€nature€of€the€priorÏconviction.€€Impeachment€with€reference€to€ð ðfelonies€òòinvolvingóó€òòdishonestyóóðð€ratherÏthan€simply€ð ðfeloniesðð€focuses€the€juryððs€attention€on€the€relevant€issue,€namely€theÏcredibility€of€the€witness,€rather€than€on€the€mere€fact€that€the€witness€has€a€priorÏconviction.€€Coupled€with€a€general€jury€instruction€that€such€impeachment€evidenceÏmay€be€considered€only€on€the€issue€of€credibility€and€not€as€substantive€evidenceÏof€guilt,€we€believe€that€the€impeaching€evidenceððs€potential€for€an€unfair€prejudicialÏeffect€on€the€substantive€issues€is€slight.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€impeaching€convictions,€although€similar€to€theÏcharged€offenses,€were€highly€relevant€to€the€issue€of€credibility€because€they€wereÏcrimes€involving€dishonesty.€€The€trial€court€determined€œthat›€under€the€restrictionsÏgoverning€the€use€of€œthe€Defendantððs›€prior€convictions€for€impeachment,€theirÏprobative€value€on€the€issue€of€credibility€outweighed€their€unfair€prejudicial€effect€onÏthe€substantive€issues.€€We€cannot€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€itsÍdiscretion€in€ruling€that€the€prior€convictions€would€be€admissible,€in€a€limitedÏmanner,€for€the€purpose€of€impeachment€if€the€Defendant€chose€to€testify.œ× ƒ5 ××  ×›ÌÌà àMoreover,€even€if€we€were€to€conclude€that€it€was€error€to€permit€the€State€toÏimpeach€the€Defendant€with€reference€to€ð ðfelonies€involving€dishonesty,ðð€the€error€isÏharmless€under€the€circumstances€of€this€case.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(b);€Tenn.ÏR.€Crim.€P.€52(a).€€The€proof€of€the€Defendantððs€guilt€œis€quite›€œstrong.€€In›€addition,€theÏDefendant€did€not€make€an€offer€of€proof€as€to€his€proposed€trial€testimony.€€AsÏsuch,€we€are€unable€to€assess€the€full€impact€of€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€that€his€priorÏconvictions€were€admissible€for€impeachment€purposes.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€AbrahamÏGalmoreóó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9607„CR„00230,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏJackson,€Sept.€9,€1997).ÌÌà àFor€the€reasons€set€forth€in€the€discussion€above,€we€conclude€that€theÏDefendantððs€issues€on€appeal€lack€merit.€€We€therefore€affirm€the€judgment€of€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óà àÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGE