ÿWPC/ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU:Ýb w@ 4_ s 0l‚ 0Dî 0J2 0T| 0^Ð 0h. 0r– 0| 0†„ B L T 0Z 1uê 0d_ BÃU>àU*B)HDCq D3´ AMç4 0@O`/ïv~9vÓ· AOŠÆÙ 0DŸ D/ã B˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù- 24U5U68U9:P;Ó€<U=îÚƒç"3|x=((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôc:\wpwin60\template\aopinion.wptH2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd$$$$'ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌò òDecember€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€'ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò VÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€It€is€the€policy€of€this€Court€to€refrain€from€referring€by€name€to€minor€victims€of€sex€offenses.€€The€à0 àvictim€will€be€referred€to€by€her€initials.Ô€&ÔÌ %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€€Appellant€also€alleges€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€comply€with€Rule€50€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€à0 àCriminal€Procedure,€requiring€that€defendants€in€custody€be€given€preference€over€other€criminal€cases.€ÏThe€record,€however,€is€devoid€of€any€underlying€support€for€such€an€allegation.€€Because€the€record€failsÏto€substantiate€Appellantððs€claim,€we€find€it€without€merit.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌò òDecember€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€'ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€'ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€VlXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€+,)A1-j| ` Å `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌOCTOBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9603„CC„00109Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àSEVIER€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€REX€HENRY€OGLEó óÌò òJERRY€LYNN€WALDE,ó óà àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à à(Aggravated€Sexual€Battery„DirectÏà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌLU€ANN€BALLEWà àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌAssistant€Public€Defenderà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌP.€O.€Box€416ÌDandridge,€TN€€37725„0416à àà àTIMOTHY€F.€BEHANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAL€SCHMUTZER,€JR.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJAMES€L.€GASSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.€O.€Box€70Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àDandridge,€TN€€37725„0070ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓòòÔ€'„Ôò òOPINIONóóó óÔ€'ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àÔ€'XÔA€Sevier€County€Circuit€Court€jury€found€Appellant€Jerry€Lynn€Walde€guiltyÏof€three€counts€of€aggravated€sexual€battery.€€As€a€Range€I€standard€offender,€heÏreceived€a€sentence€of€eleven€years€for€each€count.€€The€trial€court€ordered€two€ofÏthe€sentences€served€concurrently€but€the€third€served€consecutively,€for€anÏeffective€sentence€of€twenty„two€years€in€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Correction.€ÏIn€this€direct€appeal,€Appellant€presents€the€following€issues€for€review:€(1)€whetherÏthe€State€failed€to€timely€present€his€case€to€a€grand€jury;€(2)€whether€the€StateÏviolated€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial;€(3)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€hisÏstatement€to€authorities€in€its€entirety;€(4)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€limitingÏdefense€counselððs€voir€dire€of€the€jury;€(5)€whether€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€isÏlegally€sufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction€for€the€January€9,€1995€aggravated€sexualÏbattery;€(6)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€require€the€State€to€make€anÏelection€as€to€the€set€of€facts€relied€upon€for€each€charged€offense;€and€(7)€whetherÏthe€sentence€is€excessive.ÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.€€FACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óÌÓ  Óà àAs€accredited€by€the€juryððs€verdict,€the€proof€shows€that,€during€the€first€twoÏweeks€of€January,€1995,€J.H.,× ƒ. ××  ×€a€ten„year„old€female,€was€sexually€abused€onÏthree€separate€occasions€by€Appellant,€an€uncle€with€whom€she€lived.€€On€JanuaryÏ12,€1995,€J.H.€reported€the€abuse€to€Penny€Inman€of€the€Jefferson€CountyÏDepartment€of€Human€Services.€€€Referring€to€the€area€covered€by€her€underwearÏas€her€ð ðdowner€part,ðð€J.H.€stated€that€Appellant€touched€her€ð ðdowner€partðð€with€hisÏhands,€his€mouth,€and€his€ð ðdowner€part.ðð€€€Later€that€day,€Ms.€Inman€informed€J.H.ððsÏaunt,€Appellantððs€wife,€of€the€allegations.€€€Appellantððs€wife€in€turn€informedÏAppellant.€ÌÌà àThat€evening,€Appellant€proceeded€to€the€Jefferson€County€Sheriffððs€OfficeÏand€met€with€Detective€Bud€McCoig.€€According€to€Detective€McCoig,€AppellantÏstated€that€he€had€sexually€abused€a€girl€and€was€there€to€pay€for€it.€€HavingÏwaived€his€rights,€Appellant€gave€the€following€statement:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àAbout€two€weeks€ago,€me,€[J.H.],€and€[J.H.ððs€sister]Ïwere€at€home€watching€movies.€[J.H.ððs€sister]€was€in€herÏroom€playing€with€Barbie€dolls€or€something.€€Me€and€[J.H.],Ïage€10,€was€sitting€on€the€couch.€€She€was€in€herÏnightgown.€€I€put€my€hand€over€her.€€I€started€feeling€herÏprivate€part€on€top€of€her€clothes.€€A€day€or€two€later,€I€touchÏher€again€in€her€private€parts.€€Three€or€four€days€later,€IÏtook€my€clothes€off.€€I€pulled€my€pants€down€and€she,€[J.H.],Ïpulled€her€pants€down.€€I€had€an€erection;€she€just€touchedÍmy€penis€and€I€touched€her€vagina.€€I€just€rubbed€on€theÏoutside€of€her€vagina.€€This€happened€over€a€period€of€twoÏweeks.€€I€done€a€stupid€thing€and€now€I€got€to€pay€for€it.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌà àThe€Jefferson€County€Grand€Jury€indicted€Appellant€on€three€counts€ofÏaggravated€sexual€battery€in€violation€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€39„13„504(a)(4).€€However,€during€the€investigation€of€the€case,€the€State€discoveredÏthat€the€offenses€had€actually€been€committed€in€Sevier€County.€€On€June€28,Ï1995,€Appellant€was€properly€indicted€in€Sevier€County€and€the€charges€inÏJefferson€County€were€dismissedò ò€€ó óAccording€to€the€indictment,€AppellantÏcommitted€aggravated€sexual€battery€on€January€7€and€9€and€on€one€otherÏunspecified€date€in€JanuaryÌÌà àOn€September€28,€1995,€Appellant€was€tried€before€a€jury€in€the€SevierÏCounty€Circuit€Court.€€At€trial,€Appellant€testified€that€he€had€never€sought€sexualÏgratification€from€contact€with€J.H.ò ò€ó óbut€admitted€that€he€had€wrestled€with€J.H.,€thatÏhe€had€once€awoken€from€a€nap€with€his€hand€between€J.H.ððs€legs,€and€that€J.H.Ïhad€once€made€incidental€contact€with€his€erect€penis€while€they€were€watchingÏtelevision€in€bed.€€Appellant€further€testified€that€he€did€not€read€the€statement€takenÏby€Detective€McCoig€before€he€signed€it€and€that€the€statement€failed€to€accuratelyÏreflect€what€he€told€the€detective.€€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€the€jury€foundÍAppellant€guilty€of€three€counts€of€aggravated€sexual€battery.€€€Following€aÏsentencing€hearing€on€November€6,€1995,€the€trial€court€imposed€an€effectiveÏsentence€of€twenty„two€years.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.€€PRESENTMENTó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€first€alleges€that€the€State€failed€to€timely€present€his€case€to€aÏgrand€jury.€€According€to€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€ð ð[i]f€there€isÏunnecessary€delay€in€presenting€the€charge€to€a€grand€jury€against€a€defendantÏwho€has€been€held€to€answer€to€the€trial€court€.€.€.€,€the€court€may€dismiss€theÏindictment€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(b).€€€In€reviewing€a€motion€to€dismiss€forÏfailure€to€timely€present,€the€trial€court€must€consider€(1)€the€length€of€the€delay,€(2)Ïthe€reasons€for€the€delay,€(3)€the€prejudice€to€the€defendant,€and€(4)€waiver€by€theÏdefendant.€€òòState€v.€Bennóó,€713€S.W.2d€308,€311€(Tenn.€1986).€€The€decision€ofÏwhether€to€grant€or€deny€such€a€motion€lies€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€ÏòòId.óó€€To€establish€a€violation€of€due€process€rights,€the€evidence€must€show€thatÏthere€was€a€delay,€that€the€defendant€was€prejudiced,€and€that€the€StateÏintentionally€delayed€the€prosecution€in€order€to€gain€a€tactical€advantage.€€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€Marionóó,€404€U.S.€307,€324€(1971);€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352,€354Ï(Tenn.€1981);€€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€255„56€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).ÌÌà àMindful€of€the€factors€delineated€in€òòBennóó€and€the€dictates€set€out€in€òòMarionóó,ÏòòBakeróó,€and€òòDykesóó,€we€look€to€the€circumstances€surrounding€Appellantððs€case.€€TheÏperiod€of€time€between€Appellantððs€arrest€and€the€presentment€of€his€case€to€theÏappropriate€grand€jury€was€approximately€five€and€a€half€months.€€The€reason€forÏthe€delay€is€uncontested:€the€State€mistakenly€believed€that€Appellant,€who€livedÏvery€near€the€county€line,€committed€the€offenses€in€Jefferson€County.€€Once€theÏerror€was€discovered,€the€State€presented€Appellantððs€case€to€the€Sevier€CountyÏGrand€Jury€and€dismissed€the€charges€in€Jefferson€County.€€Appellant€concedesÏthat€the€delay€was€unintentional€but€argues€that,€due€to€his€extended€period€ofÏincarceration,€he€was€unable€to€effectively€prepare€a€defense.€€Appellant€assertedÏhis€right€to€timely€presentment€by€filing€a€motion€to€dismiss€on€July€26,€1995.ÌÌà àFirst€and€foremost,€there€is€no€evidence€whatsoever€that€the€StateÏintentionally€delayed€Appellantððs€prosecution€in€order€to€gain€a€tactical€advantage,Ïa€point€conceded€by€Appellant.€€òòSeeóó€òòMarionóó,€404€U.S.€at€324;€òòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€atÏ354;€€òòDykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€at€255„56.€€Moreover,€Appellant€fails€to€adequatelyÏdemonstrate€prejudice.€€òòSeeóó€òòBennóó,€713€S.W.2d€at€311.€€The€record€does€not€reflectÏnor€does€Appellant€allege€that€defense€witnesses€died€or€moved€away€during€theÏtime€period€between€his€arrest€and€the€presentment€of€his€case€to€the€SevierÏCounty€Grand€Jury.€€Furthermore,€Appellant€fails€to€specify€how€his€incarcerationÍprecluded€preparation€of€an€effective€defense.€€We€thus€conclude€that€the€trial€courtÏproperly€denied€Appellantððs€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€timely€present€theÏcharges€to€the€grand€jury.ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òIII.€€SPEEDY€TRIALó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€next€alleges€that€the€State€violated€his€constitutional€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€Both€the€United€States€and€the€Tennessee€Constitutions€guaranteeÏthe€right€to€a€speedy€trial.€€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.€amend.€VI;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€9.€€ThisÏright€arises€only€after€formal€accusation,€either€by€arrest€or€by€grand€jury€action.€ÏòòState€v.€Woodóó,€924€S.W.2d€342,€345€(Tenn.€1996).€€To€determine€if€a€defendant'sÏright€to€a€speedy€trial€has€been€violated,€a€reviewing€court€must€consider€theÏfollowing€four€factors:€€(1)€the€length€of€the€delay;€(2)€the€reason€for€the€delay;€(3)Ïwhether€the€defendant€asserted€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial;€and€(4)€whether€theÏdefendant€was€prejudiced€by€the€delay.€€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,€407€U.S.€514,€530Ï(1972);€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81,€83„84€(Tenn.€1973).ÌÌà àThe€first€factor,€length€of€the€delay,€serves€as€a€triggering€mechanism,Ïnecessitating€consideration€of€the€other€three€factors.€€òòBarkeróó,€407€S.W.2d€at€530.€ÏThe€reasonableness€of€the€delay€depends€upon€the€complexity€of€the€case.€€òòId.óó€atÏ530„31.€€This€Court€has€held€that€a€delay€of€as€long€as€two€years,€standing€alone,Ïwill€not€support€the€finding€of€a€speedy€trial€violation.€€òòState€v.€Vanceóó,€888€S.W.2dÏ776,€778€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Here,€the€length€of€delay€between€AppellantððsÏarrest€and€his€trial€was€approximately€eight€and€a€half€months.€€While€we€do€notÏfind€this€delay€egregious€under€the€circumstances,€we€will,€for€the€purpose€ofÏreview,€consider€the€remaining€factors.€ÌÌà àThe€second€factor,€reason€for€the€delay,€generally€falls€into€one€of€fourÏcategories:€(1)€intentional€delay€to€gain€a€tactical€advantage€over€the€defense€orÏdelay€designed€to€harass€the€defendant;€(2)€bureaucratic€indifference€orÏnegligence;€(3)€delay€necessary€to€the€fair€and€effective€prosecution€of€the€case;Ïand€(4)€delay€caused,€or€acquiesced€in,€by€the€defense.€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€346„47.€€Both€the€State€and€Appellant€agree€that€there€were€two€reasons€for€the€delay.€ÏFirst,€as€discussed€previously,€the€State€originally€indicted€Appellant€in€the€wrongÏcounty.€€Second,€the€victim€was€taken€to€California€by€her€mother€and€had€to€beÏlegally€compelled€to€return€to€Tennessee€to€testify€at€trial.€€We€believe€that€the€firstÍreason,€although€understandable€given€Appellantððs€residence€near€the€county€line,Ïfalls€into€the€second€category€described€in€òòWoodóó€and€weighs€against€the€StateÏalthough€not€as€heavily€as€deliberate€delay.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€€The€second€reason,€however,Ïfalls€into€the€third€category€and€does€not€weigh€against€either€party.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€€€ÌÌà àThe€third€factor,€the€defendant's€assertion€of€the€speedy€trial€right,€is€entitledÏto€strong€evidentiary€weight€in€determining€whether€the€right€has€been€denied,€andÏfailure€to€assert€the€right€will€make€it€difficult€to€prove€it€was€denied.€€òòBarkeróó,€407ÏS.W.2d€at€531„32;€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€85.€€Appellant€first€asserted€his€speedyÏtrial€right€in€Jefferson€County€on€June€16,€1995€and€then€again€in€Sevier€County€onÏJuly€12,€1995.€€This€factor€weighs€in€favor€of€Appellant.ÌÌà àThe€fourth€factor,€whether€the€defendant€was€prejudiced€by€the€delay,€is€theÏmost€important€factor.€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€348.€€Three€interests€of€the€defendantÏare€to€be€considered:€(1)€preventing€oppressive€pretrial€confinement;€(2)Ïminimizing€anxiety€and€concern€that€accompanies€prosecution;€and€(3)€limiting€theÏpossibility€that€a€defense€will€be€impaired.€€òòBarkeróó,€407€U.S.€at€532.€€As€discussedÏpreviously,€Appellant€fails€to€assert€any€specific€impairment€to€his€defense.€ÏMoreover,€in€response€to€Appellantððs€motion€for€a€speedy€trial,€the€trial€court,€in€anÏeffort€to€prevent€oppressive€pretrial€confinement,€reduced€his€bond€to€one€thousandÍdollars€and€ordered€the€case€set€for€trial€on€September€25€or€27,€1995.€€We€findÏthat€this€factor€weighs€heavily€in€favor€of€the€State.€€ÌÌà àIn€light€of€the€minimal€length€of€the€delay,€the€justifiable€reasons€for€theÏdelay,€and,€most€importantly,€the€lack€of€any€particularized€prejudice€to€Appellant,Ïwe€conclude€that€the€trial€court€properly€denied€Appellantððs€motion€to€dismiss€forÏfailure€to€provide€a€speedy€trial.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òIV.€€APPELLANTððS€STATEMENT€TO€AUTHORITIESó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€also€alleges€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€his€statement€toÏauthorities€in€its€entirety.€€Relying€upon€the€approximate€dates€given€in€hisÏstatement€as€compared€to€the€dates€set€out€in€the€indictment,€Appellant€argues€thatÏthe€statement€included€references€to€uncharged€conduct€and€that€its€admissionÏviolates€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€404(b)€and€òòState€v.€Rickmanóó,€876€S.W.2dÏ824€(Tenn.€1994).€ÌÌà àRule€404(b)€states€as€follows:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à(b)€Other€Crimes,€Wrongs,€or€Acts.„„Evidence€of€otherÏcrimes,€wrongs,€or€acts€is€not€admissible€to€prove€theÏcharacter€of€a€person€in€order€to€show€action€in€conformityÏwith€the€character€trait.€€€It€may,€however,€be€admissible€forÏother€purposes.€€€The€conditions€which€must€be€satisfiedÏbefore€allowing€such€evidence€are:Ìà à(1)€The€court€upon€request€must€hold€a€hearingÏoutside€the€jury's€presence;Ìà à(2)€The€court€must€determine€that€a€material€issueÏexists€other€than€conduct€conforming€with€a€character€traitÏand€must€upon€request€state€on€the€record€the€materialÏissue,€the€ruling,€and€the€reasons€for€admitting€theÏevidence;€€andÌà à(3)€The€court€must€exclude€the€evidence€if€itsÏprobative€value€is€outweighed€by€the€danger€of€unfairÏprejudice.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓTenn.€R.€Evid.€404(b).ÌÌà àIn€òòRickmanóó,€the€defendant€was€indicted€for€one€count€of€statutory€rape€andÏone€count€of€incest,€both€charges€arising€from€the€same€incident€in€August€of€1991.€Ï876€S.W.2d€at€826€n.1.€€In€a€statement€to€authorities,€the€defendant€admitted€that€heÏhad€engaged€in€various€forms€of€sexual€contact€with€the€victim€over€a€period€ofÏapproximately€six€years.€€òòId.óó€at€826.€€The€trial€court€excluded€that€portion€of€theÏstatement€in€which€the€defendant€discussed€sexual€contact€with€the€victim€beforeÏthe€August€incident€charged€in€the€indictment.€€òòId.óó€€However,€during€the€State'sÏcase„in„chief,€the€trial€court€did€allow€the€victim€to€testify€about€prior€sexual€contactÏwith€the€defendant€for€the€purpose€of€corroboration.€€òòId.óó€€The€victim€testified€that€theÏsexual€contact€had€begun€when€she€was€about€seven€years€old€and€hadÏeventually€progressed€to€full€sexual€intercourse.€€òòId.óó€€The€victim€estimated€that€sheÏhad€engaged€in€sexual€intercourse€with€the€defendant€between€twenty€and€thirtyÍtimes.€€òòId.óó€€On€appeal,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that,€under€Rule€404(b),Ïevidence€of€the€defendant's€sexual€misconduct€not€charged€in€the€indictment€andÏnot€connected€to€any€of€the€charges€in€the€indictment€was€inadmissible€in€theÏStateððs€case„in„chief€as€irrelevant€and€prejudicial.€€òòId.óó€at€829.€€This€rule€was€basedÏupon€ð ðthe€recognition€that€such€evidence€easily€results€in€a€jury€improperlyÏconvicting€a€defendant€for€his€or€her€bad€character€or€apparent€propensity€orÏdisposition€to€commit€a€crime€regardless€of€the€strength€of€the€evidence€concerningÏthe€offense€on€trial.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€828.ÌÌà à€Appellantððs€statement€was€given€to€authorities€on€January€12.€€It€begins€withÏthe€reference€ð ðabout€two€weeks€agoðð€and€goes€on€to€describe€in€general€termsÏthree€incidents€of€sexual€contact€with€the€victim€over€a€period€of€four€to€six€days.€ÏThe€indictment€alleges€unlawful€sexual€contact€on€January€7€and€9€and€on€oneÏother€unspecified€date€in€January.€€We€first€note€that€the€inconsistency€betweenÏAppellantððs€statement€and€the€indictment€with€regard€to€the€dates€of€the€unlawfulÏcontact€is€immaterial.€€This€Court€has€previously€held€that€the€actual€date€of€theÏcommission€of€an€offense€may€be€different€than€that€charged€in€the€indictment€soÏlong€as€the€proof€establishes€that€the€offense€occurred€prior€to€the€finding€andÏreturning€of€the€indictment.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Chanceóó,€778€S.W.2d€457,€462€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1989);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Perryóó,€No.€03C01„9401„CR„00016,€1995€WLÍ433319,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€July€24,€1995),€òòperm€app.€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Dec.€28,Ï1995).€€It€is€undisputed€that€the€offenses€discussed€in€Appellantððs€statementÏoccurred€prior€to€the€finding€and€returning€of€the€indictment.€€Moreover,€unlike€inÏòòRickmanóó,€where€there€was€evidence€of€a€long„term€history€of€abuse,€AppellantððsÏstatement€is€limited€to€the€same€number€of€incidents€as€set€out€in€the€indictmentÏand€in€no€way€reflects€a€pattern€of€abuse€from€which€the€jury€might€improperlyÏconvict€him€for€his€bad€character€or€his€apparent€propensity€to€commit€a€crime.€€òòSeeóóÏòòRickmanóó,€876€S.W.2d€at€828.€€In€our€opinion,€Appellantððs€statement€did€notÏconstitute€evidence€of€uncharged€sexual€misconduct,€as€prohibited€by€òòRickmanóó,€butÏinstead€constituted€evidence€of€the€exact€misconduct€for€which€Appellant€was€onÏtrial.€€Any€inconsistencies€between€Appellantððs€statement€and€the€Stateððs€theory€ofÏthe€case€then€become€questions€for€reconciliation€by€the€jury€as€the€exclusive€trierÏof€fact.€€We€distinguish€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó€from€òòRickmanóó€for€the€foregoing€reasonsÏand€find€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€admitting€Appellantððs€statement€in€itsÏentirety.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òV.€€VOIR€DIREó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€alleges€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€limiting€defense€counselððs€voirÏdire€of€the€jury.€€He€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€prohibited€open„endedÏquestions€designed€to€elicit€the€prospective€jurorsðð€attitudes,€feelings,€biases,€andÍprejudices€as€they€related€to€the€case,€thereby€compromising€his€right€to€a€trial€byÏan€impartial€jury.ÌÌà àDuring€voir€dire,€the€following€exchange€took€place:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€[Y]ou€will€hear€[the€victim]Ïsay€that€[Appellant]€touched€her€in€some€of€thoseÏinappropriate€places.€€You€will€also€hear€her€say€that€heÏmade€her€touch€him€in€an€inappropriate€place€on€his€body.Ìà à[Prospective€Juror],€knowing€that€thatððs€what€you€areÏprobably€going€to€hear€from€this€ten„year„old€girl€as€part€ofÏthe€Stateððs€proof,€how€do€you€feel€about€that€at€this€point?ÌÌà àPROSPECTIVE€JUROR:€€Well,€Iððll€just€have€to€hearÏher€testimony€and€you€know,€all€the€testimony€thatððs€given,Ïthen€decide€for€myself.ÌÌà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€Okay.€€Iððm€not€sure€what€youÏmean€exactly€by€ð ðIððll€just€have€to€hear€all€the€testimony.ðð€ÏCould€you€go€a€little€bit€farther€into€that?ÌÌà àTHE€STATE:€€If€it€please€the€Court,€I€guess€Iððm€goingÏto€interpose€an€objection€at€least€with€regard€to€.€.€.€theÏjurors€expressed,€I€think€the€standard€is€can€they€be€fair€andÏimpartial.ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€Approach€the€bench,€counsel,€for€justÏa€moment.ÌÌ[Whereupon,€a€bench€conference€was€held€on€the€record€inÏthe€presence€of€the€prospective€jurors€but€out€of€the€hearingÏof€the€prospective€jurors.]ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€I€think€the€nature€of€your€open„endedÏquestions€sort€of€leaves€them€uncertain€about€what€youððreÏasking.€€You€know,€how€do€you€feel€about€that.€€I€donððt€thinkÍthat€you€can€seek€commitments€from€them€as€to€how€theyððllÏvote€based€on€that.€€I€think€it€would€probably€be€best€if€youÏwould,€you€know,€at€least€as€to€that€particular€question,€IÏbelieve€you€asked€them€how€they€would€react€to€that€orÏwhatever,€and€so€he€told€you€that€he€would€just€have€toÏhear€all€the€proof.€€I€donððt€know€what€more€he€could€say.€€SoÏdonððt€ask€them€open„ended€questions.€€I€believe€thatððs€.€.€.ÌÌà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€Is€that€not€permissible?ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€It€may€be€.€.€.€ÌÌà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€What€Iððm€trying€to€do€is€elicitÏtheir€personal€opinion€and€itððs€kind€of€hard€.€.€.ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€About€what?ÌÌà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€About€the€burden€of€proof,Ïabout€bias,€you€know,€whether€they€automatically€assumeÏthat€heððs€.€.€.€ÌÌà àTHE€COURT:€€Ask€them€that,€ask€them€that€instead€ofÏthe€open„ended€questions,€because€they€donððt€know€whatÏyouððre€asking.ÌÌà àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€€Okay.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌà àAccording€to€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€the€trial€courtÏð ðshall€permit€questioning€by€the€parties€for€the€purpose€of€discovering€bases€forÏchallenge€for€cause€and€enabling€an€intelligent€exercise€of€peremptoryÏchallenges.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€24(a).€€The€supervision€of€voir€dire€rests€within€theÏsound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€262€(Tenn.Í1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€115€S.€Ct.€743€(1995).€€As€a€result,€this€Court€must€uphold€theÏruling€of€the€trial€court€unless€the€defendant€establishes€the€existence€of€a€clearÏabuse€of€that€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Raspberryóó,€875€S.W.2d€678,€681€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1993).ÌÌà àHere,€the€trial€court€expressed€concern€that€the€open„ended€questionsÏposed€by€defense€counsel€left€the€prospective€jurors€uncertain€as€to€how€toÏrespond.€€It€appears€from€our€reading€of€the€record€that€this€concern€centered€onÏthe€manner€in€which€the€questions€were€asked,€not€the€information€the€questionsÏwere€designed€to€elicit.€€Requiring€defense€counsel€to€ask€clearer,€more„pointedÏand€understandable€questions€is€not€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€We€do€not€believeÏthat€the€trial€court€limited€defense€counselððs€ability€to€conduct€an€effective€voir€dire.ÌÌÓ  Óò òVI.€€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€alleges€that€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€is€legally€insufficient€toÏsustain€a€conviction€for€the€January€9,€1995€aggravated€sexual€battery.€€He€arguesÏthat€neither€the€victimððs€testimony€nor€his€statement€to€authorities€establishes€thatÏany€unlawful€sexual€contact€occurred€on€January€9.€ÌÌà àWhen€an€appeal€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€the€standard€ofÏreview€is€whether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÏState,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crimeÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€318€(1979);€òòStateÏv.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€190„91€(Tenn.€1992);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€OnÏappeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€allÏreasonable€or€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.ÏCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€This€Court€will€not€reweigh€theÏevidence,€re„evaluate€the€evidence,€or€substitute€its€evidentiary€inferences€forÏthose€reached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Careyóó,€914€S.W.2d€93,€95€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1995).€€Furthermore,€in€a€criminal€trial,€great€weight€is€given€to€the€result€reachedÏby€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€910€S.W.2d€897,€899€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àOnce€approved€by€the€trial€court,€a€jury€verdict€accredits€the€witnessesÏpresented€by€the€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.ÏWilliamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€credibility€of€witnesses,€theÏweight€to€be€given€their€testimony,€and€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€proof€areÏmatters€entrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,€676ÏS.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984).€€A€juryððs€guilty€verdict€removes€the€presumption€ofÏinnocence€enjoyed€by€the€defendant€at€trial€and€raises€a€presumption€of€guilt.€ÍòòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€The€defendant€then€bears€theÏburden€of€overcoming€this€presumption€of€guilt€on€appeal.€€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815ÏS.W.2d€166,€175€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àAccording€to€the€indictment,€Appellant€committed€three€acts€of€aggravatedÏsexual€battery€upon€the€victim,€one€of€which€occurred€on€January€9.€€As€AppellantÏcorrectly€points€out,€not€only€did€the€State€fail€to€offer€sufficient€evidence€to€supportÏits€theory€that€Appellant€committed€aggravated€sexual€battery€on€January€9,€but€theÏvictim€actually€testified€during€direct€examination€that€no€sexual€contact€occurredÏafter€January€7.€€However,€as€stated€previously,€the€actual€date€of€the€commissionÏof€an€offense€may€be€different€than€that€charged€in€the€indictment€so€long€as€theÏproof€establishes€that€the€offense€occurred€prior€to€the€finding€and€returning€of€theÏindictment.€€òòSeeóó€òòChanceóó,€778€S.W.2d€at€462;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòPerryóó,€1995€WL€433319,€atÏ*3.€€During€her€testimony,€the€victim€detailed€three€forms€of€sexual€contact:€(1)ÏAppellant€touched€her€ð ðdowner€partðð€with€his€hands;€(2)€Appellant€touched€herÏð ðdowner€partðð€with€his€mouth;€and€(3)€Appellant€touched€her€ð ðdowner€partðð€with€hisÏð ðdowner€part.ðð€€The€indictment€sets€out€only€these€three€incidents€of€unlawfulÏconduct.€€The€fact€that€there€is€an€inconsistency€between€the€victimððs€testimony€andÏthe€indictment€with€regard€to€the€January€9€battery€is€immaterial€under€the€priorÏholdings€of€this€Court.€€Therefore,€we€find€that,€when€viewed€in€a€light€mostÍfavorable€to€the€State,€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€sustain€all€three€convictions€forÏaggravated€sexual€battery.ÌÌÓ  Óò òVII.€€ELECTIONó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€alleges€that€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€require€the€State€to€makeÏan€election€as€to€the€set€of€facts€relied€upon€for€each€charged€offense.€€He€arguesÏthat€J.H.ððs€testimony€established€more€than€the€three€instances€of€unlawful€sexualÏcontact€charged€in€the€indictment.ÌÌà àUnder€Tennessee€law,€a€defendant€has€a€fundamental€constitutional€right€toÏa€unanimous€verdict€before€a€conviction€for€a€criminal€offense€may€be€imposed.€ÏòòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€134,€134€(Tenn.€1993);€€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€823€S.W.2dÏ576,€583€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Protection€of€this€right€often€requires€"specialÏprecautions€[by€the€court]€to€ensure€that€the€jury€deliberates€over€the€particularÏcharged€offense,€instead€of€creating€a€'patchwork€verdict'€based€on€differentÏoffenses€in€evidence."€€òòSheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€at€134.€€Where€there€is€evidence€ofÏmultiple€offenses,€the€precaution€is€the€doctrine€of€election,€requiring€the€State€toÏelect€and€identify€at€the€end€of€its€case„in„chief€the€exact€offense€for€which€it€seeksÏconviction.€€òòId.óó;€òòBurlison€v.€Stateóó,€501€S.W.2d€801,€804€(Tenn.€1973).€€TheÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€has€made€the€following€observation:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓWe€appreciate€the€difficulties€involved€in€prosecuting€casesÏof€sexual€abuse€committed€against€small€children.€€€In€suchÏcases,€the€rules€of€evidence€and€the€rules€of€procedureÏhave€been€relaxed€to€some€extent€to€accommodate€veryÏyoung€witnesses.€€€Nevertheless,€the€constitutionalÏprotections€guaranteed€a€criminal€defendant,€who€isÏpresumed€by€law€to€be€innocent€until€proven€guilty,€cannotÏbe€suspended€altogether€because€of€the€victim's€age€orÏrelative€inability€to€testify.€€€In€cases€such€as€this€one,€theÏstate€must€either€limit€the€testimony€of€prosecutingÏwitnesses€to€a€single€event,€or€prepare€the€case€so€that€anÏelection€can€be€made€before€the€matter€is€submitted€to€theÏjury€to€decide.€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòSheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€at€139.ÌÌà àHere,€the€State€limited€the€testimony€of€the€victim€to€three€specific€incidentsÏof€unlawful€sexual€conduct.€€The€victim€testified€that€Appellant€touched€her€ð ðdownerÏpartðð€with€his€hands,€his€mouth,€and€his€ð ðdowner€part.ðð€€With€the€exception€of€theÏexact€timing€of€the€incidents€and€the€specific€description€of€the€contact,€all€evidenceÏpresented€to€the€jury,€including€Appellantððs€own€statement€and€testimony,€remainedÏconsistent€with€the€Stateððs€theory.€€Because€the€evidence€established€only€oneÏunlawful€incident€for€each€count€in€the€indictment,€a€ð ðpatchwork€verdictðð€was€notÏpossible€and€election€was€therefore€not€necessary.€€òòSeeóó€òòSheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€atÏ136.ÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òVIII.€€SENTENCINGó óÌÓ  Óà àFinally,€Appellant€alleges€that€his€sentence€is€excessive.€€Specifically,ÏAppellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€the€length€of€his€sentenceÏand€in€imposing€consecutive€sentences.ÌÌà àWhen€an€appeal€challenges€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€aÏsentence,€this€Court€conducts€a€òòde€novoóó€review€with€a€presumption€that€theÏdetermination€of€the€trial€court€was€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€ÏHowever,€this€presumption€of€correctness€is€ð ðconditioned€upon€the€affirmativeÏshowing€that€the€trial€court€in€the€record€considered€the€sentencing€principles€andÏall€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.Ï1991).€€In€the€event€that€the€record€fails€to€demonstrate€such€consideration,€reviewÏof€the€sentence€is€purely€òòde€novoóó.€€òòId.óó€€If€appellate€review€reflects€that€the€trial€courtÏproperly€considered€all€relevant€factors€and€its€findings€of€fact€are€adequatelyÏsupported€by€the€record,€this€Court€must€affirm€the€sentence.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805ÏS.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€In€conducting€a€review,€this€Court€mustÏconsider€the€evidence,€the€presentence€report,€the€sentencing€principles,€theÏarguments€of€counsel,€the€nature€and€character€of€the€offense,€mitigating€andÏenhancement€factors,€any€statements€made€by€the€defendant,€and€the€potential€forÍrehabilitation€or€treatment.€€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€860€S.W.2d€53,€60€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1993).€€The€defendant€bears€the€burden€of€showing€the€impropriety€of€the€sentenceÏimposed.€€òòState€v.€Gregoryóó,€862€S.W.2d€574,€578€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àAppellant€was€convicted€of€three€counts€of€aggravated€sexual€battery,€aÏClass€B€felony.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„504(b).€€As€a€Range€I€standardÏoffender€convicted€of€a€Class€B€felony,€Appellantððs€statutory€sentencing€range€forÏeach€conviction€was€eight€to€twelve€years.€€òòSee€id.óó€ðð€40„35„112(a)(2).€€The€trialÏcourt€found€the€following€enhancement€factors€applicable€to€each€conviction:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓ(1)€the€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminalÏconvictions€or€criminal€behavior€in€addition€to€thoseÏnecessary€to€establish€the€appropriate€range;€andÌÌ(2)€the€defendant€abused€a€position€of€public€or€privateÏtrust.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€40„35„114(1),€(15).€€The€trial€court€found€the€following€mitigating€factorÏapplicable€to€each€conviction€but€gave€it€little€weight:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓ(1)€the€defendantððs€criminal€conduct€neither€caused€norÏthreatened€serious€bodily€injury.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€40„35„113(1).€€The€trial€court€then€imposed€a€mid„range€sentence€of€elevenÏyears€for€each€offense,€ordering€two€of€the€sentences€served€concurrently€but€theÏthird€served€consecutively,€for€an€effective€sentence€of€twenty„two€years.€€We€willÏaddress€each€of€Appellantððs€sentencing€arguments€in€turn.ÌÌÓ  Óò òA.€€LENGTH€OF€SENTENCEó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€first€maintains€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€the€length€ofÏhis€sentence€by€improperly€applying€certain€enhancement€factors€and€failing€toÏapply€certain€mitigating€factors.ÌÌà àIn€the€absence€of€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors,€the€presumptiveÏlength€of€sentence€for€a€Class€B,€C,€D,€and€E€felony€is€the€minimum€sentence€in€theÏstatutory€range€while€the€presumptive€length€of€sentence€for€a€Class€A€felony€is€theÏmidpoint€in€the€statutory€range.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(c).€€Where€one€orÏmore€enhancement€factors€apply€but€no€mitigating€factors€exist,€the€trial€court€mayÏsentence€above€the€presumptive€sentence€but€still€within€the€range.€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(d).€€Where€both€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors€apply,€the€trial€court€mustÏstart€at€the€minimum€sentence,€enhance€the€sentence€within€the€range€asÏappropriate€to€the€enhancement€factors,€and€then€reduce€the€sentence€within€theÏrange€as€appropriate€to€the€mitigating€factors.€€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(e).€€The€weightÏafforded€an€enhancement€or€mitigating€factor€is€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€courtÏso€long€as€the€trial€court€complies€with€the€purposes€and€principles€of€theÏTennessee€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€and€its€findings€are€supportedÏby€the€record.€€òòState€v.€Hayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€175,€185€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌÓ  Óò ò1.€€PREVIOUS€CRIMINAL€HISTORYó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€applied€enhancement€factorÏ(1),€concerning€his€previous€criminal€history.€€Appellant€concedes€that€his€pre„sentence€report€reveals€two€convictions€for€driving€under€the€influence€of€anÏintoxicant,€a€conviction€for€driving€with€a€suspended€license,€and€a€conviction€forÏspeeding€but€argues€that€these€offenses€cannot€be€considered€underÏenhancement€factor€(1)€because€they€are€dissimilar€to€his€current€offenses.€ÏHowever,€nothing€in€the€Sentencing€Act€requires€that€prior€convictions€be€similar€inÏnature€to€the€conviction€in€question.€€Moreover,€this€Court€has€previously€allowedÏconsideration€of€such€driving„related€offenses€when€applying€enhancement€factorÏ(1).€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Ruaneóó,€912€S.W.2d€766,€784€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1995)(driving€with€a€revoked€license);€€òòState€v.€Milleróó,€No.€01C01„9309„CR„00329,Ï1994€WL€236014,€at€*6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€June€2,€1994),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.ÏSept.€12,€1994)(driving€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€and€driving€with€aÏrevoked€license);€€òòState€v.€Upmanóó,€No.€03C01„9402„CR„00052,€1994€WL€396355,Ïat€*5€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Aug.€2,€1994)(speeding);€€òòState€v.€Hurtóó,€No.Ï01C01„9306„CC„00189,€1993€WL€503713,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Dec.€9,Ï1993)(speeding);€€òòState€v.€Boswellóó,€No.€2,€1991€WL€2866,€at€*1€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.ÍJan.€16,€1991)(driving€with€a€suspended€license€and€speeding).€€Thus,€weÏconclude€that€the€trial€courtððs€application€of€enhancement€factor€(1)€was€proper.€ÌÌÓ  Óò ò2.€€NEITHER€CAUSED€NOR€THREATENED€SERIOUS€BODILY€HARMó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€should€have€applied€mitigating€factor€(1),Ïproviding€that€ð ð[t]he€defendantððs€conduct€neither€caused€nor€threatened€seriousÏbodily€injury.ðð€€€It€is€apparent€from€the€record€that€the€trial€court€did€apply€thisÏmitigating€factor€but€chose€to€give€it€little€weight,€stating€ð ðserious€bodily€injury€didÏnot€occur€here.€€Thereððs€no€doubt€about€that.€€You€know,€I€will€give€him€someÏbenefit€.€.€.€.ðð€€ò ò€€ó óAs€stated€previously,€the€weight€afforded€a€mitigating€factor€is€left€toÏthe€discretion€of€the€trial€court€so€long€as€it€complies€with€the€purposes€andÏprinciples€of€the€Sentencing€Act€and€its€findings€are€supported€by€the€record.€€òòSeeóóÏòòHayesóó,€899€S.W.2d€at€185.€€We€do€not€believe€that€the€trial€court€has€abused€itsÏdiscretion€in€this€area€and€thus€decline€to€afford€any€more€weight€to€this€mitigatingÏfactor.ÌÌÓ  Óò ò3.€€NON„STATUTORY€MITIGATING€FACTORSó óÓ  Óà àFinally,€Appellant€argues€thatÏthe€trial€court€should€have€considered€other€non„statutory€mitigating€factorsÏpursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„35„113(13).€€Specifically,ÏAppellant€points€to€the€fact€that€he€turned€himself€in€and€gave€a€statement€to€theÍauthorities.€€While€Appellant€did€voluntarily€make€a€statement€to€authorities,€heÏsubsequently€denied€its€accuracy€and€moved€to€exclude€it€from€evidence.€€We€doÏnot€believe€that€Appellantððs€actions€warrant€consideration€as€a€mitigating€factor.€ÏEven€if€given€some€marginal€weight,€we€do€not€believe€that€such€actions€justify€aÏreduction€in€his€mid„range€sentence.ÌÌÓ  Óò òB.€€CONSECUTIVE€SENTENCINGó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€also€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€imposing€consecutiveÏsentences.€€When€imposing€sentences€for€multiple€offenses,€the€trial€court€has€theÏdiscretion€to€order€the€sentences€served€concurrently€or€consecutively.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„20„111(a).€€The€imposition€of€consecutive€sentences€is€appropriateÏif€the€defendant€has€been€convicted€of€more€than€one€offense€and€the€trial€courtÏfinds,€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€one€or€more€of€the€following€criteria:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à(1)€The€defendant€is€a€professional€criminal€who€hasÏknowingly€devoted€himself€to€criminal€acts€as€a€majorÏsource€of€livelihood;€Ìà à(2)€The€defendant€is€an€offender€whose€record€ofÏcriminal€activity€is€extensive;€Ìà à(3)€The€defendant€is€a€dangerous€mentally€abnormalÏperson€so€declared€by€a€competent€psychiatrist€whoÏconcludes€as€a€result€of€an€investigation€prior€to€sentencingÏthat€the€defendant's€criminal€conduct€has€beenÏcharacterized€by€a€pattern€of€repetitive€or€compulsiveÏbehavior€with€heedless€indifference€to€consequences;€Ìà à(4)€The€defendant€is€a€dangerous€offender€whoseÏbehavior€indicates€little€or€no€regard€for€human€life,€and€noÍhesitation€about€committing€a€crime€in€which€the€risk€toÏhuman€life€is€high;€Ìà à(5)€The€defendant€is€convicted€of€two€(2)€or€moreÏstatutory€offenses€involving€sexual€abuse€of€a€minor€withÏconsideration€of€the€aggravating€circumstances€arising€fromÏthe€relationship€between€the€defendant€and€victim€orÏvictims,€the€time€span€of€defendantððs€undetected€sexualÏactivity,€the€nature€and€scope€of€the€sexual€acts€and€theÏextent€of€the€residual,€physical€and€mental€damage€to€theÏvictim€or€victims;Ìà à(6)€The€defendant€is€sentenced€for€an€offenseÏcommitted€while€on€probation;€or€Ìà à(7)€The€defendant€is€sentenced€for€criminal€contempt.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„115(b).ÌÌà àHere,€the€trial€court€relied€upon€subsection€(5)€in€ordering€consecutiveÏsentences.€€Appellant€argues€that€this€reliance€is€misplaced€because€of€the€short„term€nature€of€the€abuse.€€However,€the€time„span€of€the€undetected€unlawfulÏconduct€is€but€one€consideration€under€subsection€(5).€€The€remainingÏconsiderations€include€the€relationship€between€the€defendant€and€the€victim,€theÏnature€and€scope€of€the€sexual€acts,€and€the€extent€of€the€residual,€physical€andÏmental€damage€to€the€victim.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(5).€€InÏaccordance€with€the€statute,€the€trial€court€made€the€following€findings:€(1)ÏAppellant€was€the€victimððs€uncle,€resided€with€her,€and,€along€with€his€wife,€wasÏresponsible€for€her€care;€(2)€the€offenses€involved€three€different€forms€of€unlawfulÏcontact,€including€an€incident€where€Appellant€lay€nude€in€the€bed€with€the€victim;Íand€(3)€the€victim€suffers€from€some€residual€mental€problems.€€€€In€light€of€theseÏfindings,€most€significantly€the€relationship€between€Appellant€and€the€victim,€weÏdo€not€believe€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€imposing€consecutiveÏsentences.€€We€further€believe€that€consecutive€sentences€are€necessary€to€protectÏthe€public€from€Appellantððs€possible€future€criminal€conduct€and€that€the€aggregateÏsentence€is€reasonably€related€to€the€severity€of€Appellantððs€present€offenses.€€òòSeeóóÏòòState€v.€Woodcockóó,€922€S.W.2d€904,€915€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÓÓÔ€'ŠÔà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ Ü ÑÑ7€VlXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑßJ€+0;+'b| ` Å `€@ÿJß›à@ àòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEóóÌÌà@ àòòAT€KNOXVILLEóóÌÌà@ àOCTOBER€1996€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à*à àC.C.A.€#€03C01„9603„CC„00109ÌÌà àAppellee,à àà àà à*à àSEVIER€COUNTYÌÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à*à àHon.€Rex€Henry€Ogle,€JudgeÌÌJERRY€LYNN€WALDE,à àà à*à à(Aggravated€Sexual€Battery„3€Counts)ÌÌà àAppellant.à àà àà à*ÌÔ€&ÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€'Ôòòò òDISSENTING€OPINIONÓ  Óó óóóÌÓÓà àà àI€concur€with€the€results€as€to€the€defendant's€first,€second,€fourth,Ïfifth€and€seventh€issues.€€I€agree€with€the€resolution€of€the€third€issue€(SectionÏIV),€but€disagree€as€to€the€rationale.€€I€dissent,€however,€based€upon€the€court'sÏresolution€of€the€sixth€issue.€ÌÌà@ àI.Ìà àà àIn€his€third€issue,€the€defendant€argued€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏnot€permitting€him€to€redact€his€statement€prior€to€its€admission€in€evidence.€€TheÏmajority€distinguishes€this€case€from€òòState€v.€Rickmanóó,€876€S.W.2d€824€(Tenn.Ï1994),€to€conclude€that€the€defendant's€statement€is€admissible€in€its€entirety.€€IÏagree€that€the€statement€is€admissible€in€its€entirety,€but€see€no€reason€toÏdistinguish€òòRickmanóó€from€the€facts€here,€particularly€as€to€whether€theseÏincidents€showed€a€pattern€of€abuse€that€would€lead€a€jury€to€improperlyÏconvict€the€defendant.€€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòRickmanóó,€the€indictment€charged€unlawful€contact€on€August€11.€ÏRickman's€statement€as€to€unlawful€contact€before€August€11€was€redactedÏbecause€it€was€"wholly€independent€from€the€sex€crime€for€which€the€defendantÏwas€indicted."€€The€supreme€court€cited€to€òòBunch€v.€Stateóó,€605€S.W.2d€227,€229Ï(Tenn.€1980),€for€the€general€rule:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIt€is€well€established,€of€course,€that€in€a€criminal€trialÏevidence€that€the€defendant€has€committed€someÏother€crime€òòwholly€independentóó€of€that€for€which€he€isÏcharged,€even€though€it€is€a€crime€of€the€sameÏcharacter,€is€usually€not€admissible€because€it€isÏirrelevant.ÓÓÌòòId.óó,€876€S.W.2d€at€827€(emphasis€added).€€The€court€in€òòRickmanóó€affirmed€theÏspecial€rule€articulated€in€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€134€(Tenn.€1993),€whichÏallowed€evidence€of€other€sex€crimes€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àwhen€[the]€indictment€is€not€time€specific€and€when€theÏevidence€relates€to€sex€crimes€that€allegedly€occurredÏduring€the€time€as€charged€in€the€indictment.€€In€suchÏcases,€the€State€must€elect€at€the€close€of€its€proof„in„chief€as€to€the€particular€incident€for€which€a€convictionÏis€being€sought.ÌÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€829.€ÌÌà àà àRecently,€our€supreme€court,€after€review€of€Rules€401,€402,€andÏ404(b),€Tenn.€R.€Evid.,€determined€that€the€standard€of€appellate€review,€afterÏthe€trial€court€had€allowed€evidence€of€relevant€œprior›€bad€acts,€is€abuse€ofÏdiscretion€so€long€as€the€trial€court€complied€with€the€procedural€requirements€ofÏthe€œrules.€›€òòState€v.€œJames€DuBoseóó,›€No.€01S01„9602„CC„00029,€slip€op.€at€7Ï(Tenn.,€at€Nashville,€Sept.€29,€œ1997).€€Here,›€the€trial€judge€heard€argumentsÏoutside€the€presence€of€the€jury€on€the€defendant's€pre„trial€motion€to€redact€hisÏstatement.€The€following€appears€in€the€record:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àTHE€COURT:€Well,€he€says€here€that€this€happenedÏover€a€period€of€two€weeks.€So€I€think€in€all€candorÏwith€you€that€that€will€have€to€be€admissible.€YouÏknow,€if€he's€not€clear€on€the€time€frame€and€as€IÏunderstand€the€case€law€in€regards€to€the€testimony€ofÏunderage€victims,€the€appellate€courts€have€given€aÏlot€greater€leeway€on€those€types€of€cases€and€thoseÏtypes€of€victims€obviously€than€they€have€otherÏcases.€€And€in€fact,€as€we€know€on€other€cases,Ïyou've€got€to€be€pretty€doggoned€specific.€€But€I€don'tÏthink,€at€least€based€on€his€own€statement,€he's€clearÏas€to€the€time€frame.€ÌÌà8 àà8 àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€It's€not€clear,€but€the€phraseÏ"about€two€weeks€ago"€could€mean€as€early€asÏDecember€29th.ÌÌà8 àà8 àTHE€COURT:€It€very€well€could€be.ÌÌà8 àà8 àDEFENSE€COUNSEL:€...or€possibly€a€day€or€twoÏearlier.ÌÌà8 àà8 àTHE€COURT:€And€so€after€I€hear€the€proof,€youÏknow,€it€may€be€such€that€as€to€at€least€one€of€theÏcounts€it€may€not€fly,€I€don't€know.€€You€know,€we'llÏsee€about€that€as€it€comes€in,€but€in€regards€to€hisÏstatement,€because€it€is€not€clear,€you€know,€I€don'tÏthink€it€can€be€redacted.ÓÓÌThus,€the€trial€court€ruled€that€the€incidents€included€in€the€defendant's€statementÏcould€have€been€the€same€incidents€for€which€he€was€indicted€and€not,Ïtherefore,€prior€acts.€€Under€the€appropriate€standard€of€review,€that€decision,€inÏmy€view,€should€be€upheld.€€The€incidents€in€the€defendant's€statement€are€notÏ"wholly€independent"€of€the€pending€charges,€and€Rule€404(b),€Tenn.€R.€Evid.,Ídoes€not€exclude€the€incidents€as€irrelevant€and€unduly€prejudicial€prior€badÏacts.ÌÌà@ àII.Ìà àà àAs€to€the€defendant's€sixth€issue€on€election,€I€disagree€with€theÏmajority€of€this€court€as€to€both€the€rationale€and€the€result.€€The€law€on€electionÏhas€been€primarily€framed€by€three€major€cases.€€òòBurlison€v.€Stateóó,€501€S.W.2dÏ801€(Tenn.€1973);€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€134€(Tenn.€1993);€and€òòTidwellÏv.€Stateóó,€922€S.W.2d€497€(Tenn.€1996).€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòBurlisonóó€our€supreme€court€considered€a€number€of€cases€forÏguidance€in€its€ruling,€including€òòJamison€v.€Stateóó,€94€S.W.€675€(Tenn.€1906).€€InÏòòJamisonóó,€where€the€indictment€charged€unlawful€sexual€contact€on€a€particularÏday,€the€state€introduced€proof€of€several€acts€of€unlawful€contact;€€the€trial€courtÏdenied€defendant's€motion€for€election.€On€appeal€the€state€argued€that€violationÏof€the€age€of€consent€law€was€a€continuous€offense.€The€supreme€court€œheld›Ïas€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]he€State€could€be€required€to€elect€the€specificÏoffense€upon€which€a€verdict€of€guilty€would€beÏdemanded,€for€three€fundamental€reasons.€€First,€toÏenable€the€defendant€to€prepare€for€and€make€hisÏdefense€to€the€specific€charge;€second,€to€protect€himÏfrom€double€jeopardy€by€individualization€of€the€issue,Íand€third,€so€that€the€jury's€verdict€may€not€be€a€matterÏof€choice€between€offenses,€some€jurors€convicting€onÏone€offense€and€others,€another.ÌÌÓÓòòœBurlisonóó,€501€S.W.2d›€at€803€œ(discussing€the€ruling€in€òòJamisonóó,€which€has›€beenÏdistinguished€and€partially€overruled€by€œòòRickmanóó€on€an€unrelated€issue).ÌÌà àà àThe›€court€in€òòBurlisonóó€next€cited€òòVinson€v.€Stateóó,€203€S.W.€338Ï(Tenn.€1918),€€and€òòCox€v.€Stateóó,€270€S.W.2d€182€(Tenn.€1954).€€In€òòVinsonóó,€€theÏdefendant€was€indicted€for€violating€the€age€of€consent€law€in€the€month€ofÏSeptember.€€At€trial,€the€state€offered€proof€of€violations€in€July,€September,€andÏDecember.€€The€defense€request€for€an€election€was€denied.€€The€supremeÏcourt€reversed€because€œthe›€"error€committed€immediately€touched€theÏconstitutional€rights€of€the€defendant€.€.€.€."€òòId.óó€€In€òòCoxóó,€the€supreme€court€hadÏruled€that€the€purpose€of€election€is€so€the€"jury€will€then€know€for€which€offenseÏthe€State€seeks€a€conviction,€and€will€all€vote€upon€guilt€or€innocence€for€thatÏparticular€offense."€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àà àAfter€examining€the€rulings€on€each€of€these€cases,€the€court€inÏòòBurlisonóó€held€as€follows:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[I]t€was€the€duty€of€the€trial€judge€to€require€the€State,Ïat€the€close€of€its€proof„in„chief,€to€elect€the€particularÏoffense€of€carnal€knowledge€upon€which€it€would€relyÏfor€conviction,€and€to€properly€instruct€the€jury€so€thatÍthe€verdict€of€every€juror€would€be€united€on€the€oneÏoffense.ÓÓÌòòId.óó€at€804.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòSheltonóó,€the€indictment€charged€unlawful€sexual€penetration€ofÏone€victim€and€unlawful€sexual€contact€of€two€other€victims€on€or€about€the€___Ïday€of€___,€1989.€€The€time€was€narrowed€to€April€through€September€of€thatÏyear.€€In€lieu€of€election,€the€trial€court€gave€a€specific€instruction€to€the€jury:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àYou€cannot€in€your€verdict€find€that€the€defendantÏcommitted€more€than€one€offense€against€eachÏalleged€victim.€The€law€requires€that€every€juror€beÏunited€on€the€one€alleged€offense€in€each€count€in€theÏindictment.€If€you€find€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€thatÏthere€has€been€more€than€one€alleged€offense€to€anÏalleged€victim€you€must€isolate€your€verdict€on€the€firstÏalleged€occurrence€after€April€7,€1989€and€beforeÏSeptember€6,€1989,€as€to€each€victim.ÓÓÌòòSheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€at€136.€€The€supreme€court€held€that€this€instruction€wasÏan€inadequate€substitute€for€election.€òòId.óó€€Citing€to€the€three€basic€reasons€forÏelection,€as€confirmed€in€òòBurlisonóó,€the€court€concluded€that€although€the€"state€isÏnot€required€to€identify€the€particular€date€of€the€chosen€offense€...€the€state€mustÏeither€limit€the€testimony€of€prosecuting€witnesses€to€a€single€event,€or€prepareÏthe€case€so€that€an€election€can€be€made€before€the€matter€is€submitted€to€theÏjury€to€decide.€òòId.óó€at€137,€139.€€ÌÌà àà àElection€is€particularly€important€in€sexual€abuse€trials€whereÏchildren€testify.€€The€supreme€court€discussed€these€special€problems€in€itsÏòòSheltonóó€opinion:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIf,€for€example,€the€evidence€indicates€various€types€ofÏabuse,€the€prosecution€may€identify€a€particular€typeÏof€abuse€and€elect€that€offense.€Moreover,€whenÏrecalling€an€assault,€a€child€may€be€able€to€describeÏunique€surroundings€or€circumstances€that€help€toÏidentify€an€incident.€€The€child€may€be€able€to€identifyÏan€assault€with€reference€to€a€meaningful€event€in€hisÏor€her€life,€such€as€the€beginning€of€school,€a€birthday,Ïor€a€relative's€visit.€€Any€description€that€will€identify€theÏprosecuted€offense€for€the€jury€is€sufficient.€€In€fulfillingÏits€obligation€under€òòBurlisonóó€to€ensure€that€an€electionÏoccurs,€the€trial€court€should€bear€in€mind€that€theÏpurpose€of€election€is€to€ensure€that€each€juror€isÏconsidering€the€same€occurrence.€€If€the€prosecutionÏcannot€identify€an€event€for€which€to€ask€a€conviction,Ïthen€the€court€cannot€be€assured€of€a€unanimousÏdecision.ÓÓÌòòId.óó€at€138.ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€right€to€a€unanimous€verdict€is€fundamental,€the€failureÏto€elect€may€be€classified€as€harmless,€depending€on€the€circumstances.€€InÏòòSheltonóó,€one€of€three€victims€testified€to€a€single€instance€of€partial€intercourse€onÏher€birthday.€€There€were€multiple€indictments,€but€only€one€charging€rape.€€TheÏjury€returned€a€guilty€verdict€only€as€to€one€count€of€aggravated€rape€for€thatÏvictim.€€The€court€concluded€that€the€"jurors€must€have€considered€the€evidenceÍof€this€particular€incident€in€convicting€the€defendant...[and]€therefore,€the€òòBurlisonóóÏerror...€was€harmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€œ...."€›€òòÔ% € ÔId.óó€at€138.€€As€to€theÏsecond€€victim,€however,€the€court€found€the€failure€to€elect€was€not€harmlessÏand€reversed€the€conviction.€€The€second€victim€had€testified€to€severalÏoccasions€of€digital€fondling€and€did€not€differentiate€the€events.€€The€juryÏreturned€a€guilty€verdict€to€aggravated€sexual€battery.€The€court€ruled€that€theÏconviction€could€not€be€upheld€due€to€the€"nature€of€the€evidence€presented€onÏthis€charge€and€the€òòBurlisonóó€error€resulting€from€the€state's€failure€to€elect.€..."€€òòId.óóÏat€139.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòTidwellóó,€the€supreme€court€stated€that€lack€of€certainty€regardingÏthe€unanimity€of€the€jury's€verdict€was€the€more€troublesome€aspect€of€failure€toÏelect:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€indictments€as€returned€contain€fifty„six€counts„„fourteen€each€of€aggravated€rape,€statutory€rape,Ïincest,€and€contributing€to€the€delinquency€of€a€minor.ÏEach€count€charges€the€commission€of€an€offense€onÏthe€"___"€day€of€a€named€month.€€Thus,€it€is€quiteÏevident€that€there€is€no€apparent€means€to€differentiateÏamong€various€counts€of€the€same€offense.ÏAdditionally,€the€indictments€provide€no€means€toÏenable€a€fact„finder€to€match€a€specific€conduct€to€aÏspecific€count.Ìà@ à***Ìà8 àà8 àThus,€a€defendant's€right€to€a€unanimous€verdictÏbefore€imposition€of€conviction€requires€that€trial€court€toÏtake€precautions€to€ensure€that€the€jury€deliberatesÍover€the€particular€charged€offense,€instead€ofÏassembling€a€"patchwork€verdict"€based€on€theÏdifferent€offenses€in€evidence.€ÓÓà8 àÌòòId.óó€at€500„01.€€€€ÌÌà àà àHere,€the€three€indictments€charge€one€count€each€of€aggravatedÏsexual€battery€on€January€7,€9€and€"___",€1995.€€The€victim€testified€to€moreÏthan€three€incidents€of€such€unlawful€contact:ÌÓÓà8 à1.à0 à"He€[defendant]€put€his€downer€part€on€mine€[sometimesÏwhile€defendant€was€wearing€clothes]."€œ€(Tr.›€œ44).›ÌÌà8 à2.à0 à"He€[defendant]€put€his€downer€part€on€mine€[sometimesÏwhile€defendant€was€not€wearing€clothes]."€œ€(Tr.›€œ44„45).€€›ÌÌà8 à3.à0 àDefendant€touched€victim€on€her€"downer€part"€with€"hisÏhands"€...€on€top€of€her€clothes.€œ€(Tr.›€œ45„46)›œ.›ÌÌà8 à4.€à0 àDefendant€touched€victim€on€her€"downer€part"€with€"hisÏhands"€...€underneath€her€clothes.€œ€(Tr.›€œ45„46)›œ.€€›ÌÌà8 à5.à0 àDefendant€touched€victim's€"lower€part"€with€"[h]is€mouth."€œÏ(Tr.›€œ51).›ÌÌÓÓMore€troublesome€is€that€the€defendant€acknowledged€several€incidents€ofÏunlawful€sexual€contact€in€either€his€confession€or€his€trial€testimony.€€TheÏstatement€of€the€defendant€encompassed€four€instances€of€sexual€misconduct:ÌÓÓà8 à1.€à0 à"I€put€my€hand€over€her.€I€started€fe[e]ling€her€private€part€onÏtop€of€her€clothes."ÌÌà8 à2.à0 à"A€day€or€two€la[]ter,€I€touch[ed]€her€again€in€her€privateÏparts."ÌÌà8 à3.à0 à"Ô  ÔThree€or€four€days€la[]ter€I€took€my€clothes€off€...€she€justÏtouched€my€pe[]nis."ÌÌà8 à4.à0 à"I€touched€her€v[a]gina...€I€just€rubbed€on€the€outside€of€herÏv[a]gina."ÌÌÓÓ(òòSeeóó€Exhibit€#2,€Tr.€137).€The€majority€found€that€the€state€limited€the€testimonyÏof€the€victim€to€three€specific€incidents€of€unlawful€sexual€conduct,€and€therefore,Ïelection€was€not€required.€€I€cannot€agree.€€While€the€victim€testified€as€to€threeÏòòtypesóó€of€sexual€contact,€her€testimony€encompassed€at€least€five€incidents€ofÏunlawful€touching.€€Moreover,€because€the€victim's€testimony€and€theÏdefendant's€confession€differ,€there€were€other€incidents€the€jury€could€have€usedÏto€convict,€if€they€indeed€accredited€his€confession.€€These€facts€are€analogousÏto€those€in€òòTidwellóó€and€as€to€the€second€victim€in€òòSheltonóó€in€that€there€is€no€wayÏto€associate€a€particular€event€of€unlawful€contact€with€a€specific€indictment.ÌÌà àà àThis€error€was€not€harmless.€At€both€the€close€of€the€state's€proofÏand€the€close€of€all€the€proof,€the€defendant€requested€that€the€state€make€anÏelection€as€to€the€offenses.€€Neither€the€jury€instructions€nor€the€state's€closingÏargument€were€curative.€The€trial€judge€did€not€specifically€instruct€the€jury€as€toÏthe€requirements€for€a€unanimous€verdict.€He€merely€instructed,€"your€verdict,Ïwhether€'guilty'€or€'not€guilty'€must€be€unanimous."€€In€addition,€during€its€closingÏargument,€the€œstate›€did€not€limit€their€recitation€of€the€proof€to€any€three€specificÍinstances.€€Rather,€the€state€suggested€that€the€jury€believe€both€theÏdefendant's€confession€and€the€victim's€testimony€as€well.ÌÌà àà àOn€this€basis,€I€would€ordinarily€remand€to€the€trial€court€for€a€newÏtrial.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeœÔ€ÔÔ€Ô