ÿWPC2& …# VU:a %› 04¡4Õéøw@ 0x@ 0D¸ 0Jü 0TF 0^š 0hø 0r` 0|Ò 0†N 0Ô 1ud U,Ù 0d BiU,†U *²B)ÜDC AMH D3•#ÈÞë 0@É( C1Ètv~<vÓº AO$ÆÜ$ 0D¢% D/æ% B&˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀäÌÀÀÌÀä0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Óà~| tÔôÔô3|xó ÆEÇÈeÉUÊÕ×áçèÓ€(((3ÝÙ$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ$$$$'ÿÿdxd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òApril€22,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÔÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒWe€did€not€hold,€however,€that€the€custodial€parent€òòalwaysóó€had€theÏburden€of€proving€that€the€move€would€be€in€the€best€interests€of€the€child€ifÏthe€divorce€decree€was€silent€on€removal.€€Rather,€we€held€that€the€custodialÏparent€would€bear€the€burden€of€proof€òòonlyóó€if€he€or€she€filed€a€petition€seekingÏpermission€to€move.€€òòSeeóó€òòNichols€v.€Nicholsóó,€792€S.W.2d€713,€715€(Tenn.Ï1990)€(Court€of€Appeals€erred€in€concluding€that€the€custodial€parent€failed€toÏprove€that€removal€was€in€childrenððs€best€interests€because€custodial€parentÏdid€not€file€a€petition€seeking€to€move).€€Thus,€we€left€open€the€question€ofÏwhether€the€custodial€parent€was€required€to€seek€a€courtððs€permission€forÏremoval€òòat€allóó€if€the€decree€was€silent€on€the€issue.€€Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒSituations€that€could€pose€a€ð ðspecific,€serious€threat€of€harmðð€to€theÏchild€are,€for€€example,€if€the€parent€wished€to€take€a€child€with€a€seriousÏmedical€problem€to€an€area€where€no€adequate€treatment€was€readilyÏavailable;€if€the€parent€wished€to€take€a€child€with€special€educationalÏrequirements€to€an€area€with€no€acceptable€educational€facilities;€or€if€theÏparent€wished€to€move€and€take€up€residence€with€a€person€with€a€confirmedÏhistory€of€child€abuse.€€This€list€is€merely€intended€as€illustrative;€it€does€notÏpurport€to€be€an€exhaustive€list€of€situations€that€would€qualify.€Ì 9Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒIf€the€court€finds€that€the€proposed€move€is€of€such€a€limited€physicalÏdistance€that€a€revision€is€unnecessary,€it€may€simply€reapprove€the€existingÏschedule.€€Otherwise,€the€trial€court€will€need€to€fashion€a€revised€schedule.€ÏOf€course,€if€the€parties€can€agree€to€a€€visitation€schedule,€then€there€is€noÏneed€for€the€custodial€parent€to€file€a€petition€at€all.€Ì ¾Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒThe€visitation€issue€in€the€initial€proceedings€is€controlled€by€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€36„6„301,€which€provides,€in€part,€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àAfter€making€an€award€of€custody,€the€court€shall,Ïupon€request€of€the€non„custodial€parent,€grantÏsuch€rights€of€visitation€as€will€enable€the€child€andÏthe€non„custodial€parent€to€maintain€a€parent„childÏrelationship€unless€the€court€finds,€after€a€hearing,Ïthat€visitation€is€likely€to€endanger€the€childððsÏphysical€or€emotional€health€...€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€%%X„d&ÓÑ#€%%Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ , ÑÑ ` Ñ›Ñ7€§­XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑØ ØÓ&€X°d&Ӝـ€ÙßL€)+(;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURTÏOF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLE€ÌÌÌÌÌGENE€V.€AABY,à àà àà àà à)à àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà àà à)à àà àFiled:€April€22,€1996Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àKNOX€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌJUDY€E.€AABY€STRANGEà àà à)à à€€€€Hon.€Frederick€D.€McDonald,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€à à€€€€€€€ChancellorÌà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€No.€03S01„9507„CH„00073ÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:ÌÌGeorge€F.€Leggà àà àà àà àSarah€Y.€SheppeardÌBecky€H.€Halseyà àà àà àà àWilliam€A.€MynattÌStone€&€Hinds,€P.C.à àà àà àSheppeard€&€Swanson,€P.C.ÌKnoxville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€&„ÔÌÌà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€&XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED.à àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.ÌÌÓÓ€€à àIn€this€child€custody€dispute,€Judy€E.€Strange,€the€custodial€parent,Ïappeals€from€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€affirmance€of€the€trial€courtððs€order€denyingÏher€permission€to€move€out„of„state€with€her€child.€The€sole€issue€for€ourÏdetermination€is€whether€the€lower€courts€properly€interpreted€the€principlesÏenunciated€in€òòTaylor€€v.€Tayloróó,€849€S.W.2d€319€(Tenn.€1993)€in€deciding€thisÏcase.€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€below,€we€conclude€that€the€lower€courts€did€notÏdo€so;€therefore,€we€reverse€the€judgment.€ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òFACTS€AND€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àJudy€E.€Strange€and€Gene€V.€Aaby€were€divorced€on€June€6,€1990,€byÏfinal€judgment€entered€in€the€Knox€County€Chancery€Court.€€This€judgmentÏincorporated€a€marital€dissolution€agreement,€which,€among€other€things,Ïawarded€custody€of€the€partiesðð€then„three€year€old€son,€Brandon,€to€the€mother.€ÏThe€order€granted€the€father€visitation€on€alternate€weekends;€it€also€provided€forÏcertain€summer€and€vacation€visitation.€€The€judgment€contained€no€prohibitionÏagainst€the€custodial€parent€moving€out„of„state€with€Brandon.ÌÌà àThis€dispute€began€in€June€1992€when€the€father€filed€a€petitionÏrequesting€that€his€child€support€obligation€be€decreased.€The€mother,€inÏresponse,€filed€a€petition€opposing€the€decrease.€€Her€petition€also€included€aÏð ðcounterclaim,ðð€in€which€the€mother€requested€permission€to€move€with€BrandonÏto€Bardstown,€Kentucky.€€The€motherððs€stated€reason€for€wishing€to€move€wasÏthat€she€had€remarried,€and€that€her€new€husband,€Kendall€Strange,€had€familyÏin€the€Bardstown€area.€€She€also€stated€that€she€had€received€a€suitable€offer€ofÏemployment€in€Bardstown.€€The€father€answered€the€counterclaim€by€assertingÍthat€a€move€to€Kentucky€would€not€be€in€the€best€interests€of€the€child;€the€fatherÏsought€to€have€custody€changed€to€him€if€the€mother€took€Brandon€to€Kentucky.ÌÌà àAt€the€initial€hearing€in€January€1993€on€the€custody€issues,€the€motherÏtestified€that€she€wished€to€move€to€Bardstown€because€of€the€reasons€stated€inÏher€petition.€€The€father,€on€the€other€hand,€offered€expert€psychological€andÏpsychiatric€proof€which€tended€to€show€that€removal€would€not€be€in€BrandonððsÏbest€interests.€€The€experts€based€these€conclusions,€in€part,€on€the€relationshipsÏBrandon€had€formed€with€his€father€and€the€fatherððs€extended€family.€€At€theÏconclusion€of€the€proof,€the€trial€court€ruled€that€the€mother€had€failed€to€proveÏthat€she€should€be€allowed€to€move€to€Kentucky€with€the€child.€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àIn€March€1993€the€mother€then€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend€theÏjudgment,€arguing€that€the€ruling€violated€the€principles€set€forth€in€òòTayloróó,€òòsupraóó,Ïwhich€had€just€been€released€by€this€Court.€€The€trial€court€agreed€to€reopen€theÏproof,€and€after€hearing€additional€evidence€and€considering€the€case€in€light€ofÏòòTayloróó,€ruled€that€the€mother€would€be€allowed€to€move€to€Kentucky.€€TheÏNovember€1993€memorandum€opinion€issued€by€the€trial€court€provides,€in€part,Íthat:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€motherððs€fundamental€reason€for€wanting€to€move€fromÏKnoxville€to€Bardstown€is€her€desire€to€locate€in€a€smallerÏcommunity,€which€she€believes€will€provide€a€better€place€in€whichÏto€live.€€The€testimony€is€convincing€that€the€mother€herself€will€feelÏmuch€better€living€in€a€smaller€community€than€Knoxville.€€She€grewÏup€in€a€smaller€community.€€She€believes€a€smaller€community€willÏbe€a€better€place€to€raise€Brandon.€€It€cannot€be€found€that€herÏdesire€to€move€is€wrong,€notwithstanding€testimony€that€it€will€haveÏsome€disruptive€effect€on€the€boy.€€Indeed,€under€òòTayloróó€the€effectÏon€the€child€is€generally€to€be€given€lesser€consideration.€€In€anyÏevent€there€is€testimony€that€Brandon€will€be€able€to€adjust€to€theÏmove.ÌÌà8 àIn€the€absence€of€convincing€evidence€that€the€child€will€be€harmedÏthe€Court€should€be€very€hesitant€to€substitute€its€opinion€for€theÏmotherððs€decision,€which€is€one€of€the€many€a€custodial€parent€mustÏmake€that€will€affect€a€child.€€Bardstown€has€a€good€school€system,Ïand€her€present€husband€has€relatives€there.€€While€the€move€is€notÏmade€in€order€for€either€the€mother€or€her€present€husband€toÏimprove€their€employment€opportunities,€it€appears€that€they€willÏhave€reasonable€opportunities€for€employment€there€...€The€motherÏhas€expressed€a€valid€reason€for€moving,€although€her€reason€mayÏwell€be€viewed€by€others€as€insufficient.€€It€also€appears€that€in€aÏmoment€of€anger€the€mother€spoke€[to€Brandonððs€teacher]€of€takingÏBrandon€to€Kentucky€without€allowing€the€father€to€see€BrandonÏagain.€€It€is€not€concluded,€however,€that€the€motherððs€motivation€forÏthe€move€is€to€deny€or€deter€the€fatherððs€visitation.€€It€is€accordinglyÏconcluded€from€the€evidence€and€in€light€of€òòTayloróó€...€that€the€motherÏshould€be,€and€accordingly€is,€granted€permission€to€take€BrandonÍto€Bardstown.ÌÌÌÌÓÓThe€trial€court€also€ordered€a€revised€visitation€schedule,€in€which€the€father€wasÏgranted€additional€summer€and€vacation€visitation.€€€Finally,€the€trial€court€deniedÏthe€fatherððs€petition€for€a€change€of€custody€based€on€the€proposed€move.à àÌÌà àIn€December€1993€the€father€filed€a€motion€to€alter€or€amend,€arguing€thatÏthe€November€1993€judgment€conflicted€with€an€unpublished€opinion€of€theÏEastern€Section€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€that€had€just€been€released.€€AfterÏreviewing€its€decision€in€light€of€this€opinion,€the€trial€court€reverted€to€its€originalÏdetermination,€holding€that€the€mother€had€not€proven€that€the€move€would€be€inÏBrandonððs€best€interest.€€€The€mother€resigned€from€her€new€job€in€Kentucky€andÏmoved€back€to€Knoxville€after€learning€of€the€ruling.Ì€Ìà àThe€mother€appealed€from€this€decision€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€whichÏaffirmed€the€decision.€€After€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€decision€was€handed€down,€theÏmother€and€Kendall€Strange€separated;€and€she€has€since€filed€for€divorce.€ÍBecause€the€trial€courtððs€vacillating€course€of€action€in€this€case€obviouslyÏindicates€the€presence€of€confusion€in€the€law€of€removal,€we€granted€theÏmotherððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€for€the€purpose€of€clarifying€thisÏlaw.ÌÌÓ  Óò òBACKGROUND€OF€THE€LAW€OF€REMOVALÌÌA.€Pre„òòTayloróó€law€ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€the€not€too€distant€past,€Tennessee€law€conferred€upon€the€custodialÏparent€sole€responsibility€for€making€decisions€regarding€the€place€of€the€childððsÏresidence.€€For€example,€in€òòThomas€v.€Thomasóó,€206€Tenn.€584,€335€S.W.2d€827Ï(1960),€the€non„custodial€parent,€the€father,€requested€that€he€be€relieved€of€hisÏduty€to€provide€child€support€because€the€mother€had€deprived€him€of€hisÏvisitation€rights€by€remarrying€and€moving€to€Texas€with€the€children.€€WeÏrejected€that€argument,€holding€that€ð ðthe€mother€had€the€right€to€control€the€childððsÏwhereabouts€and€the€father€had€no€voice€where€the€child€should€reside€andÍcould€not€make€his€duty€to€support€the€child€depend€upon€the€place€of€the€childððsÏabode.ðð€€òòThomasóó,€335€S.W.2d€at€828.€€We€further€stated€that€ð ðthe€mere€fact€thatÏthe€decree€grants€the€other€parent€the€right€of€visitation€does€not€implicitly€prohibitÏthe€removal€of€the€child€from€the€jurisdiction.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòEvans€v.€Evansóó,€125ÏTenn.€112,€140€S.W.745,€746€(1911)€(ð ðThe€custody€of€this€child€was€entrusted€toÏher€mother.€[The€father]€has€no€voice€as€to€where€she€shall€reside;€but,€by€decreeÏof€the€court,€the€mother€is€made€the€arbiter€of€such€matters.ðð)€ÌÌà àSubsequently,€however,€Tennessee€courts€began€moving€away€from€theÏposition€that€the€non„custodial€parent€had€no€say€whatsoever€in€the€removalÏdecision.€€Instead,€the€Court€of€Appeals€twice€held€that€if€the€non„custodial€parentÏwished€to€prevent€the€move,€he€or€she€would€be€required€to€prove€that€removalÏwould€not€be€in€the€ð ðbest€interests€of€the€child.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòArnold€v.€Gouvistaóó,€735ÏS.W.2d€458,€463€(Tenn.€App.€1987)€(custodial€parent€may€not€be€held€inÏcontempt€of€court€for€leaving€the€state€with€child€if€divorce€decree€contains€noÏprovision€prohibiting€movement;€burden€rests€upon€non„custodial€parent€to€proveÏthat€move€is€not€in€the€best€interests€of€the€child);€òòWalker€v.€Walkeróó,€656€S.W.2dÍ11€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983)€(where€divorce€decree€prohibits€custodial€parent€fromÏremoving€the€child€from€state,€that€parent€bears€burden€of€proving€that€move€is€inÏbest€interests€of€the€child;€however,€where€divorce€decree€contains€no€suchÏprovision,€burden€is€on€noncustodial€parent€seeking€to€prevent€the€move).€€€€ÌÌà àThese€rules€granting€the€custodial€parent€substantial€autonomy€ofÏmovement€were,€however,€undermined€in€1988€by€this€Court€in€òòSeessel€v.ÏSeesselóó,€748€S.W.2d€422€(Tenn.€1988).€€In€that€case,€the€custodial€parent€filed€aÏpetition€to€remove€the€child€to€Colorado;€and€the€non„custodial€parent€filed€aÏcounter„petition€seeking€a€change€of€custody.€€Although€there€was€apparently€noÏprovision€in€the€divorce€decree€prohibiting€removal,€the€trial€court€neverthelessÏruled€that€the€custodial€parent€had€failed€to€prove€that€the€move€was€in€the€childððsÏbest€interest.€€The€Court€of€Appeals,€citing€òòWalkeróó,€reversed€that€judgment,Ïholding€that€the€non„custodial€parent€had€not€adduced€any€evidence€that€theÏmove€would€be€adverse€to€the€childððs€best€interests.€€€Ìà àWe€reversed€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals.€€In€so€doing,€we€quotedÏthe€following€treatise€passage€with€approval:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àA€court€which€grants€a€divorce€or€separation€may€expresslyÏauthorize€the€removal€of€a€minor€child€from€the€jurisdiction.€ÏSimilarly,€the€court€has€the€power€to€award€custody€...€to€one€whoÏcontemplates€an€immediate€removal€of€the€child€from€theÏjurisdiction€....€€€It€has€accordingly€been€stated€that€it€is€against€theÏpolicy€of€the€law€to€permit€the€removal€of€a€minor€child€from€the€stateÏunless€the€applicant€shows€that€the€best€interests€of€the€child€will€beÏbetter€served€by€its€removal.€€Ìà8 àThe€question€whether€the€court€shall€permit€or€prohibit€the€removalÏof€the€child€rests€within€its€sound€judicial€discretion.€€The€generalÏrule€that€in€matters€affecting€the€custody€of€a€child€the€court€will€beÏgoverned€primarily€by€the€welfare€and€best€interests€of€the€childÏapplies€in€determining€whether€to€permit€or€prohibit€removal€of€theÏchild€from€the€jurisdiction.ÌÌÓÓòòÌSeesselóó,€748€S.W.2d€at€424,€quoting€24€Am.€Jur.€2d,€òòDivorce€and€Separationóó,€ððÏ798€(1966).€€We€also€stated€that€generally€the€party€filing€a€petition€with€the€courtÏbears€the€burden€of€proof€on€that€petition;€and€we€concluded€that€because€theÏcustodial€parent€had€filed€a€petition€seeking€permission€for€removal,€the€burdenÏrested€upon€her€to€prove€that€removal€was€in€the€childððs€best€interests.€€ÌÌà àBecause€it€required€the€custodial€parent€to€establish€that€the€move€wouldÍbenefit€the€child,œ× ƒ, ××  ×›€òòSeesselóó€represented€a€substantial€curtailment€of€the€traditional€œÌlegal›€freedom€afforded€the€custodial€parent€to€make€decisions€as€to€the€childððsÏresidence.€€Nor€was€the€burden€of€proof€issue€the€only€way€in€which€òòSeesselóóÏserved€to€limit€this€freedom.€€By€explicitly€endorsing€the€use€of€the€best€interestsÏof€the€child€standard€in€removal€cases€„„€a€first€for€this€Court€„„€and€declining€toÏset€forth€any€specific€principles€for€determining€the€best€interests,€we€conferredÏenormous€discretion€upon€trial€courts€in€deciding€the€removal€issue.€€Indeed,€weÏrecognized€the€open„endedness€of€the€best€interests€test€in€òòRogero€v.€Pittóó,€759ÏS.W.2d€109,€112€(Tenn.€1988),€where€we€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThere€are€few€legal€formulae€or€invariable€principles€to€guide€theÏcourts€€in€decisions€of€this€nature.€€Such€decisions€are€primarilyÍfactual,€not€legal.€€Attempts€to€reduce€to€legal€doctrine€the€resolutionÏof€cases€such€as€this€usually€have€little€significance.€€The€bestÏinterests€of€the€children€under€all€the€circumstances,€which,€ofÏcourse,€include€their€relationships€with€their€parents,€must€be€theÏconcern€of€the€courts.€€ÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òB.€òòTaylor€v.€Tayloró óóó€ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓÓà àIt€was€not€long€before€the€approach€taken€in€òòSeesselóó,€òòRogeroóó,€and€òòNicholsÏv.€Nicholsóó,€792€S.W.2d€713€(Tenn.€1990),€began€to€cause€problems.€€In€1993€weÏnoted€that€ð ðalthough€there€was€little€or€no€litigation€in€this€area€of€domesticÏrelations€prior€to€our€opinion€in€òòSeesselóó,€the€trial€and€intermediate€courts€haveÏexperienced€a€significant€increase€in€the€number€of€removal€cases€filed€sinceÏòòSeesselóó€was€announced.ðð€€òòTayloróó,€849€S.W.2d€at€326.€€Therefore,€whenÏpresented€with€the€opportunity€in€òòTayloróó€to€establish€some€concrete€standards€toÏguide€the€courts€in€determining€the€best€interest€of€the€child,€we€attempted€toÏprovide€such€guidance.€€ÌÌà àIn€that€case,€Deborah€and€Steve€Taylor€became€divorced€in€May€1989;€theÍdivorce€decree€provided€that€the€mother€was€to€have€custody€of€their€daughterÏBrittney,€and€the€father€was€granted€visitation€rights.€ÌÌà àThere€was€nothing€in€the€divorce€decree€that€prohibited€the€mother€fromÏremoving€the€child€from€the€state.€€Nevertheless,€several€months€later€the€motherÏfiled€a€petition€requesting€the€court€to€ð ðmodify€visitationðð€so€that€she€and€BrittneyÏcould€move€from€Memphis€to€Montana.€€The€mother€planned€to€live€with€herÏparents€and€attend€school€in€that€state.€€The€trial€court€denied€this€request.€€ÌÌà àSeveral€months€later€Ms.€Taylor€remarried€and€made€plans€to€move€toÏDavenport,€Iowa,€where€her€new€husband€was€enrolled€in€school.€€The€newÏhusband,€Mark€Mitten,€had€established€a€good€relationship€with€Brittney€duringÏprevious€visits€to€Memphis,€and€Ms.€Taylor€had€secured€suitable€employment€inÏIowa.€€€Furthermore,€the€couple€had€rented€an€apartment€in€Davenport,€and€hadÏmade€day„care€arrangements€for€Brittney.€€Although€the€parties€attempted€to€workÏout€a€revised€visitation€schedule€among€themselves,€the€father€ultimately€refusedÏto€allow€Brittney€to€be€taken€to€Iowa.€€ÌÌà àSubsequently€the€mother€filed€a€petition€requesting€that€the€trial€courtÏmodify€its€previous€order€and€allow€her€to€move€to€Davenport€with€Brittney.€ÏAlthough€the€mother€denied€any€intent€to€defeat€the€fatherððs€visitation€rights,€andÏexpressed€a€willingness€to€allow€greater€summer€and€vacation€visitation€toÏcompensate€for€the€lessened€regular€visitation€that€the€move€would€entail,€theÏtrial€court€denied€permission€to€move.€€The€trial€court€found€that€the€move€was€notÏin€the€best€interests€of€Brittney€because€she€had€considerable€extended€family€inÏthe€Memphis€area,€with€which€she€had€frequent€contact.€€The€Court€of€AppealsÏaffirmed€this€judgment,€and€we€granted€the€motherððs€application€for€permission€toÏappeal.Ìà àÌà àWe€began€our€analysis€by€criticizing€the€open„endedness€of€the€bestÏinterests€standard€generally,€stating€that€ð ðthe€absence€of€standards€for€itsÏdetermination€threatens€to€render€the€concept€of€ððbest€interestðð€so€vague€that€itÏdefies€analysis,€invites€decision€by€guesswork,€and€evades€any€sort€ofÏmeaningful€review€on€appeal.ðð€€òòTayloróó,€849€S.W.2d€at€326.€€We€then€narrowedÍour€focus,€noting€that€the€best€interests€determination€in€the€removal€context€isÏnot€equivalent€to€the€original€custody€decision€and€that,€therefore,€relocationÏwould€not,€standing€alone,€constitute€a€basis€for€a€change€of€custody.€€We€stated:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThese€cases,€and€others€like€them,€reflect€the€collective€wisdom€ofÏboth€the€courts€and€child€psychologists€that€children,€especiallyÏthose€subjected€to€the€trauma€of€divorce,€need€stability€andÏcontinuity€in€relationships€most€of€all.€This€recognition€had€led€to€aÏstrong€presumption€in€favor€of€continuity€of€placement,€which€isÏreflected€in€the€well„established€rule€that€courts€will€not€entertainÏpetitions€for€change€of€custody€unless€there€has€been€some€changeÏin€circumstances€that€has€rendered€the€custodial€parent€unfit€or€hasÏexposed€the€child€to€some€form€of€risk.ÌÌòòIdóó.€at€328.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€next€turned€to€the€best€interests€determination€itself.€€After€surveyingÏthe€law€of€other€jurisdictions,€we€determined€that€the€custodial€parentððsÏhappiness€and€well„being€are€crucial€to€the€childððs€interests€because€theÏcustodial€parent€has€the€responsibility€of€caring€for€the€child€on€a€daily€basis.€ÏTherefore,€we€stated,€ð ðthe€childððs€best€interests€are€fundamentally€interrelatedÏwith€those€of€the€custodial€parent,ðð€òòidóó.,€and€the€removal€decision€should€be€madeÍwith€this€in€mind.ÌÌà àWe€concluded€our€discussion€of€the€best€interests€determination€byÏmaking€two€observations:€(1)€that€while€non„custodial€parents€have€the€right€toÏmaintain€their€relationships€with€their€children,€visitation€is€nevertheless€a€flexibleÏarrangement€that€may€be€altered;€and€(2)€that€because€the€non„custodial€parentððsÏfreedom€of€movement€is€not€limited€by€custody€considerations,€fairness€demandsÏthat€the€custodial€parent€have€a€commensurate€amount€of€freedom,€even€thoughÏthis€may€require€revision€of€the€visitation€schedule.€€€We€summarized€ourÏdiscussion€by€enunciating€the€following€list€of€factors€to€be€considered€in€theÏremoval€decision:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€factors€to€be€considered€in€a€removal€dispute€...€include€(but€areÏnot€limited€to)€a€recognition€that€in€removal€cases,€the€question€ofÏcustody€is€not€subject€to€de€novo€review,€unless€the€petition€citesÏreasons€other€than€removal€as€grounds€for€custody;€that€there€is€aÏstrong€presumption€in€favor€of€continuity€of€the€original€custodyÏaward;€that€the€welfare€of€the€child€is€affected€by€the€welfare€of€theÏcustodial€parent,€and€that€the€best€interest€of€the€child€must€beÏreviewed€in€order€to€determine€the€advantages€of€the€move€to€theÏchild;€that€removal€of€the€child€from€the€jurisdiction€may€requireÍrescheduling€of€the€non„custodial€parentððs€visitation,€but€thatÏremoval€is€not,€in€and€of€itself,€a€change€of€circumstance€sufficient€toÏjustify€modification€of€the€custody€order;€that€the€courts€must€beÏsensitive€to€the€non„custodial€parentððs€efforts€to€maintain€his€or€herÏrelationship€with€the€children,€and€that€visitation€should€be€arrangedÏin€a€manner€most€likely€to€enhance€that€relationship;€and€finally,€thatÏthe€motives€of€the€custodial€parent€in€making€the€move€must€appearÏto€be€valid,€that€is,€not€intended€to€defeat€or€deter€visitation€by€theÏnon„custodial€parent.€€These€factors,€and€any€related€circumstancesÏfound€by€the€court€to€be€significant€in€a€given€situation,€must€beÏweighed€individually€and€collectively.ÌÌòòIdóó.€at€332.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€also€addressed€the€procedural€aspects€of€the€removal€petition,€andÏconcluded€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àIf€there€is€no€outstanding€order€restricting€movement€of€the€child€orÏchildren,€and€the€parties€can€agree€to€a€revised€visitation€schedule,Ïthe€custodial€parent€is€free€to€move€without€seeking€further€courtÏauthorization.€€Likewise,€if€the€non„custodial€parent€consents€to€theÏremoval€and€the€parties€can€agree€on€a€revised€visitationÏarrangement,€a€prior€order€of€restriction€may€be€modified€byÏagreement€on€motion€to€the€court€having€jurisdiction€of€that€orderÏand€subject€to€the€approval€of€that€court.ÌÌà8 àIf€agreement€cannot€be€reached,€under€the€procedural€ruleÏannounced€in€òòSeesselóó€and€òòNicholsóó,€the€burden€of€proof€falls€on€theÍparty€seeking€relief.€€In€order€to€discharge€that€burden,€the€non„custodial€parent€who€seeks€to€prevent€removal€must€show€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€that€removal€is€adverse€to€the€bestÏinterest€of€the€child€or€children€involved.€€If,€on€the€other€hand,€theÏcustodial€parent€files€for€relief,€seeking€to€lift€a€prior€prohibition€onÏremoval€or€asking€the€courtððs€permission€to€move€from€theÏjurisdiction,€or€both,€the€custodial€parent€has€the€burden€of€provingÏthat€removal€is€in€the€childððs€best€interest.€€That€burden€can€beÏshifted€by€a€prima€facie€showing€of€a€sincere,€good„faith€reason€forÏthe€move€and€a€prima€facie€showing€that€the€move€is€consistent€withÏthe€childððs€best€interest.ÌÌòòIdóó.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àFinally,€we€applied€these€rules€to€that€case€and€reversed€the€judgment.€ÏWe€explained€that:ÌÌÓÓà8 à[The€custodial€parent]€has€shown€that€removal€is€warranted€in€thisÏcase,€based€on€a€well„established€reason€for€the€move€„„€herÏremarriage€to€someone€who€was€living,€for€an€equally€good€reason,Ïsome€distance€from€Memphis.€€There€is€no€suggestion€in€the€recordÏthat€Deborah€Mitten€is€anything€other€than€a€wholly€fit€person€toÏhave€custody€of€Brittney€„„€indeed,€the€trial€court€has€now€made€thatÏfinding€on€three€separate€occasions.€€There€is€no€showing€that€theÏmove€will€have€adverse€consequences€to€Brittneyððs€health€or€well„being.€€In€fact,€the€record€reflects€that€the€Mittens€have€gone€out€ofÏtheir€way€to€make€the€move€from€Memphis€to€Davenport€a€smoothÏone€for€Brittney,€attempting€in€every€way€to€reduce€the€impact€of€theÍtransition€on€her€and€looking€at€all€times€to€her€welfare.ÌÌà8 àIt€is€obvious€that€the€previously€established€schedule€of€visitationÏwill€have€to€be€altered.€€There€is€no€proof€that€this€cannot€beÏsuccessfully€accomplished€to€accommodate€the€interests€of€bothÏparents,€as€well€as€the€childððs€interest.€€There€is€nothing€in€theÏrecord€to€indicate€that€Deborah€Mittenððs€conduct€has€been€vindictiveÏor€that€in€proposing€to€move€to€Davenport,€she€intended€to€depriveÏSteve€Taylor€of€his€visitation€rights€or€to€interfere€with€his€closeÏrelationship€with€his€child.ÌÌòòTayloróó,€849€S.W.2d€at€333„34.ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓò òAPPLICATION€OF€THE€LAW€OF€REMOVAL€ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€parties€here€construe€òòTayloróó€in€very€different€ways.€€The€mother€insistsÏthat€the€case€is€a€complete€recasting€of€Tennesseeððs€law€of€removal€because€theÏòòTayloróó€court€accepted€the€proposition€that€the€interests€of€the€child€and€theÏcustodial€parent€are€fundamentally€bound€up€with€one€another€€„„€a€propositionÏwhich,€she€says,€is€inherently€at€odds€with€the€traditional€best€interests€test.€€TheÏmother€urges€that€under€òòTayloróó€the€court€should€not€judge€the€wisdom€of€theÏcustodial€parentððs€decision€to€relocate.€€Rather,€she€states,€the€proper€inquiry€isÍlimited€to€determining€whether€the€custodial€parent's€motives€for€moving€areÏð ðvalid,€that€is,€not€intended€to€deter€or€defeat€visitation€by€the€non„custodialÏparent.ðð€€òòTayloróó,€849€S.W.2d€at€332.€€Because€the€lower€courts€correctly€foundÏthat€she€was€not€attempting€to€defeat€or€deter€the€fatherððs€visitation€rights€byÏwishing€to€move,€the€mother€argues,€she€should€be€allowed€to€relocate€withÏBrandon.€€€ÌÌà àThe€father€argues,€on€the€other€hand,€that€òòTayloróó€did€not€change€theÏtraditional€best€interests€test,€but€simply€sought€to€make€it€clear€that€the€well„being€of€the€custodial€parent€is€to€be€considered€by€the€courts€in€reviewing€theseÏdisputes.€€He€cites€as€support€for€this€assertion€the€fact€that€we€stated€that€ð ðtheÏbest€interest€of€the€child€must€be€reviewed€in€order€to€determine€the€advantagesÏof€the€move€to€the€child."€òò€Idóó.€at€332.€€He€also€relies€upon€our€statement€thatÏð ðmuch€of€what€we€held€in€the€òòSeesselóó„òòRogeroóó„òòNicholsóó€trilogy€remains€good€lawÏin€Tennessee.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€331.€€Because€òòTayloróó€merely€revised€the€best€interestsÏstandard,€he€concludes,€the€lower€courts€were€correct€in€considering€all€theÏcircumstances€and€determining€that€Brandonððs€best€interests€would€not€beÍserved€by€moving.ÌÌ€à àThe€ultimate€message€to€be€gleaned€from€òòTayloróó€is€admittedly€obscure.€ÏThis€is€evidenced€by€the€fact€that€both€of€these€arguments€find€support€in€the€textÏof€the€opinion,€and€by€the€trial€courtððs€obvious€confusion€as€to€its€meaning.ÏBecause€we€have€failed€to€ð ðmake€determinate€an€area€of€law€that€has€becomeÏincreasingly€unsettled,ðð€€òòidóó.€at€326,€we€must€dispel€the€ambiguity€of€òòTayloróó€andÏclarify€its€impact€on€the€law€of€removal.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€it€drew€upon€authority€from€many€other€jurisdictions€and€dealtÏwith€a€number€of€specific€sub„issues,€òòTayloróó€was€fundamentally€concerned€withÏfurthering€two€overarching€goals€in€the€law€of€removal:€(1)€ð ðòòlimiting€judicialÏintervention€in€post„divorce€family€decision„making,€and€(2)€making€disputesÏeasier€of€resolution€if€they€must€be€litigatedóó.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€at€331€(emphasis€added).€€WeÏcontinue€to€believe€that€these€goals€must€determine€the€law.€€Moreover,€weÏbelieve€that€the€traditional€best€interests€of€the€child€test,€for€the€reasonsÏenunciated€in€òòTayloróó,€makes€these€goals€difficult€or€impossible€to€achieve.€€AndÍwe€are€convinced,€again€for€the€reasons€stated€in€òòTayloróó,€that€the€interests€of€theÏcustodial€parent€and€the€interests€of€the€child€are€basically€interrelated,€even€ifÏthey€are€not€always€precisely€the€same.€€Therefore,€we€conclude,€as€the€motherÏinsists,€that€a€custodial€parent€will€be€allowed€to€remove€the€child€from€theÏjurisdiction€unless€the€non„custodial€parent€can€show,€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence,€that€the€custodial€parentððs€motives€for€moving€are€vindictive€„„€that€is,Ïintended€to€defeat€or€deter€the€visitation€rights€of€the€non„custodial€parent.€Ìà àÌà àThis€conclusion€does€not€mean,€however,€that€a€non„custodial€parentððsÏhands€are€tied€where€removal€could€pose€a€specific,€serious€threat€of€harm€to€theÏchild.€€€In€€these€situations,œ× ƒ. ××  ×›€the€non„custodial€parent€may€file€a€petition€forÏchange€of€custody€based€on€a€material€change€of€circumstances.€€The€petitionÍwould€state,€in€effect,€that€the€proposed€move€evidences€such€bad€judgment€andÏis€so€potentially€harmful€to€the€child€that€custody€should€be€changed€to€theÏpetitioner.€€Because€Tennessee€law€allows€custody€to€be€changed€if€the€behaviorÏof€the€custodial€parent€clearly€€posits€a€danger€to€the€physical,€mental€orÏemotional€well„being€of€the€child,€òòMusselman€v.€Acuffóó,€826€S.W.2d€920€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1991),€such€a€petition€would€not€violate€òòTayloró󀄄€which€only€prohibits€aÏchange€of€custody€based€òòsolely€on€the€fact€of€the€moveóó.€€However,€expertÏpsychological€and/or€psychiatric€testimony€that€removal€could€be€generallyÏdetrimental€to€the€child€will€usually€not€suffice€to€establish€an€injury€that€is€specificÏand€serious€enough€to€justify€a€change€of€custody.€€€A€move€in€any€childððs€life,Ïwhether€he€or€she€is€raised€in€the€context€of€a€one€or€two€parent€home,€carriesÏwith€it€the€potential€of€disruption;€such€common€phenomena€„„€both€the€fact€ofÏmoving€and€the€accompanying€distress€„„€cannot€constitute€a€basis€for€the€drasticÏmeasure€of€a€change€of€custody.€ÌÌà àWith€regard€to€procedure,€we€conclude€that€if€the€parties€cannot€agree€onÏan€acceptable€visitation€schedule,€the€custodial€parent€seeking€to€remove€mustÍfile€a€petition€with€the€court€to€reapprove€or€revise,€as€the€case€may€require,€theÏexisting€visitation€schedule.œ× ƒ/ ××  ×›€€In€the€hearing€on€the€petition,€the€non„custodialÏparent€may,€if€he€or€she€wishes,€present€evidence€that€the€custodial€parentððsÏmotives€for€moving€are€vindictive;€also,€any€petition€for€a€change€of€custodyÏbased€on€the€above„discussed€grounds€shall€be€heard€at€this€time.€€If€the€non„custodial€parent€does€not€wish€to€raise€either€of€these€issues,€the€sole€issue€atÏthe€hearing€shall€be€the€revision€of€the€visitation€schedule.€€As€is€the€case€in€theÏinitial€proceedings,€neither€party€shall€bear€the€burden€of€proof€on€the€visitationÏissue;€rather,€the€trial€court€shall,€in€its€sound€discretion,€fashion€an€acceptableÏrevised€visitation€arrangement.œ× ƒ0 ××  ×›€€Any€prior€law€inconsistent€with€theseÍconclusions€is€expressly€overruled.€€Ìà àÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€expressly€found€that€the€motherððs€motive€forÏmoving€was€not€vindictive.€€We€find€that€the€record€supports€this€conclusion.€ÏFurthermore,€although€the€father€presented€psychological€and€psychiatricÏevidence€that€Brandon€could€be€harmed€by€the€move,€we€find€that€this€evidenceÏdoes€not€illustrate€a€harm€that€is€specific€and€serious€enough€to€justify€a€changeÏof€custody.€ÌÌà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€isÏreversed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÌÌConcur:€ÌÌAnderson,€C.€J.ÌReid,€Birch,€JJ.ÌÌWhite,€J.€„€Dissenting€„€see€separate€dissenting€opinion.