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D/C" Br"˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý xPyDzD{|D}~D€Ó€Œà~| xˆ¬<À( 3|xŽ&@FÐZ ‹8CaslonOpnface BT Regular(8(3ß«$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ,,,,'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Monaco d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New ÄÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌÓ` °‚X.h—XÓ% Line 7 d11117Border 1dd€-2Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial :Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€4ÔÔ€4ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€4XÔÌÌò òAprilÏ8,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€4ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ùÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔIn€a€dissent,€Judge€Herschel€Franks€agreed€that€theÏstatutes€now€"vest"€the€executor€"with€discretion€to€sell€orÏdistribute€in€kind€personal€property€where€there€can€beÏequality€of€division."€€However,€noting€that€the€equalÏdivision€of€stock€in€the€closely€held€corporation€wouldÏdisadvantage€the€appellant,€Judge€Franks€found€that€theÏpersonal€representative's€division€of€the€stock€resulted€in€anÏ"unfair€distribution€of€the€distributees'€interests€in€theÏcorporation"€and€consequently,€was€an€"abuse€of€discretion"€byÏthe€personal€representative.Ì ÔÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔòòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€Robert€Pritchard,€òòPritchardóó€ðð€760€(1894);ÏRobert€Pritchard,€òòPritchardóó€ðð€760€(2d€ed.€1928);€2€HarryÏPhillips,€òòPritchardóó€ðð€760€(3d€ed.€1955);€2€Harry€Phillips€&ÏJack€W.€Robinson,€òòPritchardóó€ðð€809€(4th€ed.€l983);€€òòPritchardóóÏis€"an€authority€recognized€by€both€the€bench€and€the€bar€ofÏthis€state,"€and€has€been€cited€innumerable€times€by€TennesseeÏcourts.€€òòAmerican€Nat'l.€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€v.€Manderóó,€36€Tenn.ÏApp.€220,€253€S.W.2d€994,€999€(l952).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÓ&€++X„d&ÓÑ#€++Xd#ÑÔ€.ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÑ , ÑÔ€/ÔÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€š\XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÖ€0Öœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àApril€8,Ï1996›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àœòòà àà àà àFOR›€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURTÏOF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÙ€€ÙœßL€352;+'h|` à. `€€Lß›ÌÌÌÌÌIN€RE:à àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌESTATE€OF€MARY€T.€AUSTIN,à à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDeceased,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌELIZABETH€T.€AUSTIN,à àà à(€€GreeneÏChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àBeneficiary„Appellant,à à(€€Hon.ÏDennis€H.€Inman,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€ÏChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌÒ € ÒÒ h Òà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€AppealÏNo.€03S01„9410„PB„00092Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€ÌCHRISTY€N.€AUSTIN€AND€ROBERTà à(ÌC.€AUSTIN,€JR.,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àBeneficiaries„Appellees.à à(ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Beneficiary„Appellantóó:à à€à àòòForÍBeneficiaries„Appelleesóó:ÌÌCraig€V.€Gabbert,€Jr.à àà àà àJohn€A.€Walker,€Jr.ÌL.€Glenn€Worleyà àà àà àà àWalker€&€Walker,€P.C.ÌHarwell,€Howard,€Hyne,€Gabbertà àKnoxvilleÌà à&€Manner,€P.C.ÌNashvilleà àà àà àà àà àà àBernard€E.€BernsteinÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJames€W.€ParrisÌJack€W.€Robinson,€Sr.à àà àà àBernstein,€Stair€&€McAdamsÌGullett,€Sanford,€Robinsonà àà àKnoxvilleÌà à&€MartinÌNashvilleÌÌœ›ÌÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌÌà@ àòòò òÔ€/RÔÔ€ ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€/ÔÔ€/XÔóóó óÌÌÌÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€TRIAL€COURT€ANDÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED.à àà àà àà àREID,€J.ÇÓ` °‚X.h—XÓÓÓà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€decision€of€theÏprobate€court,€affirmed€by€the€Court€of€Appeals,€that€theÏpersonal€representative€in€this€case€may,€in€his€discretion,Ïdistribute€certain€corporate€stock€in€kind€rather€than€sellÏthe€stock€and€distribute€the€proceeds.€€The€decisionÏmisconstrues€applicable€law€and€is€reversed.ÌÌà àThe€parties,€Elizabeth€T.€Austin,€appellant,€andÏChristy€N.€Austin€and€Robert€C.€Austin,€Jr.,€appellees,€areÏthe€children€and€only€descendants€of€the€decedent,€MaryÏElizabeth€Timmons€Austin,€who€by€her€last€will€and€testamentÏwilled€her€entire€estate€to€her€husband,€Robert€C.€Austin,€Sr.€ÏPursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€31„1„103€(Supp.€1995),€theÏhusband€disclaimed€certain€property,€including€382€shares€ofÏstock€in€Rolich€Corporation.€€Pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ32„3„105€(Supp.€1995),€the€disclaimed€property€passed€to€theÏtestatrix's€children,€equally.ÌÌà àDuring€the€administration€of€the€estate,€theÏappellees€filed€a€motion€œrequesting›€that€the€Rolich€stock€beÏdistributed€in€kind€to€the€children€equally.€€The€appellantÍopposed€the€motion€and€insisted€that€the€stock€be€sold€and€theÏproceeds€distributed€to€the€parties€equally.€€The€probateÏcourt€granted€the€appellees'€motion€and€ordered€that€the€stockÏbe€divided€in€kind.€€In€arriving€at€that€decision,€the€courtÏnoted€that€"the€authorities€that€[the€appellant]€has€citedÏappear€to€require€the€personal€representative€to€liquidate€theÏentire€personal€estate€to€cash,"€but€concluded€that,€since€theÏstock€was€"capable€of€division€and€allocation€much€in€the€sameÏway€as€money,"€it€would€be€distributed€in€kind,€even€thoughÏthe€appellant's€stock€"will€be€virtually€worthless."€€TheÏstock€was€valued€at€$467,000€at€the€time€of€the€decedent'sÏdeath.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€concurred€with€the€probateÏcourt's€analysis.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€After€reviewing€the€statutory€history€ofÍthe€applicable€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„303€(Supp.Ï1995),€the€Court€of€Appeals€concluded€that€the€substitution€ofÏthe€word€"may"€for€"shall"€in€the€1932€revision€of€the€statuteÏrelieved€personal€representatives€of€the€obligation€underÏprior€law€to€convert€personalty€to€cash,€and€authorized€theÏdistribution€of€personalty€in€kind,€in€the€discretion€of€theÏpersonal€representative.€€ÌÌà àThe€issue€presented€is€a€question€of€law;Ïconsequently,€the€scope€of€review€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€with€noÏpresumption€of€correctness.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòUnionÏCarbide€Corp.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€87,€91€(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà àIt€is€the€conclusion€of€this€Court€that€the€focus€ofÏthe€present€statute,€and€also€its€precursors,€is€on€the€òòmanneróóÏin€which€the€sale€may€be€made€rather€than€the€obligation€toÏsell.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€the€certain€origin€of€the€rule€has€not€beenÏdisclosed€by€the€authorities€relied€upon€by€counsel€or€theÏCourt's€research,€historically,€a€personal€representative€wasÍrequired€to€convert€personalty€to€cash€prior€to€distribution,Ïunless€relieved€of€that€duty€by€the€provisions€of€a€will€orÏthe€consent€of€òòsuióó€òòjurisóó€beneficiaries.€€The€most€ancientÏtreatise€conveniently€available€to€the€Court€is€òò€A€Treatise€onÏthe€Law€of€Executors€and€Administratorsóó,€originally€publishedÏin€1883.€€The€following€are€excepts€from€that€work:ÌÌÓÓà8 àðð€339.€€ò òRepresentative's€Power€toÏdispose€of€Assets.„„ó óFor€the€sake€of€anÏefficient€administration€of€the€estateÏwhich€he€represents,€the€absolute€controlÏof€the€personal€property€of€the€decedent,Ïfor€purposes€of€his€trust,€is€vested€byÏlaw€in€the€executor€or€administrator,€andÏhe€has€the€legal€power€to€dispose€of€anyÏand€all€of€such€property€at€discretion.€ÏThis€rule,€as€we€have€seen,€prevailsÏwhere€no€statute€opposes€restraints;€andÏwhile€òòit€is€the€representative's€duty€toÏuse€reasonable€diligence€in€convertingÏassets€into€cashóó,€for€the€generalÏpurposes€of€his€trust,€the€law€permitsÏhim,€within€certain€limits,€to€exercise€aÏreasonable€discretion€as€to€the€time€whenÏhe€shall€make€a€transfer€of€assets,€andÏthe€manner€in€which€his€right€ofÏdisposition€shall€be€exercised..€.€.ÌÌà8 à.€.€.ÌÌà8 àðð€34l.€ò òWhether€Assets€should€be€soldÏat€Public€or€Private€Sale.„„ó óTheÏgeneral€rule€is€that€the€representative'sÏsale€of€his€decedent's€personal€propertyÏmay€be€either€at€private€or€public€sale,Íprovided€the€sale€be€reasonably€prudentÏand€honest.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 à.€.€.ÌÌà8 àðð€506.€€ò òWhether€Distribution€may€beÏof€Specific€Chattels€not€reduced€toÏCash.„„ó óIn€order€to€distribute€strictlyÏunder€a€decree€of€distribution,€òòtheÏreduction€of€the€surplus€to€cash€wouldÏseem€to€be€necessaryóó.€€But€such€a€courseÏmust€sometimes€be€highly€disadvantageous,Ïin€these€times,€especially€where€theÏestate€is€a€large€one;€and€it€isÏpreferable€wherever€the€distributees€canÏbe€brought€into€accord,€to€make€aÏdivision€specifically€or€in€kind,€save€soÏfar€as€a€sale€may€have€been€necessary€forÏthe€security€and€benefit€of€the€estate€inÏcourse€of€administration.ÌÌÌÌÓÓJames€Schouler,€òòA€Treatise€on€the€Law€of€Executors€andÏAdministratorsóó€ðððð€339,€34l,€506€(2d€ed.€1889)€(emphasisÏadded).€€Another€respected€author€has€commented:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àHistorically€it€was€the€function€of€anÏexecutor€to€òòliquidate€and€distributeóó€theÏassets€of€the€estate€not€specificallyÏdisposed€of€by€the€will,€and,€exceptÏwhere€a€statute€permits€him€to€do€so,€itÏwould€seem€doubtful€that€an€executor€mayÏcompel€a€general€or€residuary€legatee€toÏtake€distribution€in€kind€unless€the€willÏcontains€an€express€provision€permittingÏsuch€distribution.€€In€some€states,Ïhowever,€the€historical€rule€has€beenÍreversed€by€statute,€in€that€an€executorÏis€without€power€to€liquidate€assetsÏotherwise€than€as€necessary€to€meet€cashÏrequirements.€€Except€for€assets€that,Ïunder€the€will€or€under€such€a€statute,Ïor€by€consent€of€the€beneficiaries,€areÏto€be€distributed€in€kind,€the€principlesÏmentioned€in€the€last€preceding€sectionÏòòrequire€the€executor€to€liquidateÏpromptlyóó,€lest€he€be€surcharged€for€aÏdecline€in€values€before€liquidation€isÏactually€made.ÌÌÌÌÓÓEustace€W.€Tomlinson,€òòAdministration€of€Decedents'€Estatesóó€ððÏ7.6„2€(1972)€(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà àThe€court€has€not€been€referred€to€a€Tennessee€caseÏwhich€addresses€the€issue€directly.€€However,€severalÏTennessee€cases€acknowledge€the€duty€of€the€personalÏrepresentative€to€liquidate€estate€personalty.€€In€òòUnionÏPlanters€œNat'l›€Bank€&€Trust€Co.€v.€Beeleróó,€172€Tenn.€317,€112ÏS.W.2d€11€(1938),€this€Court,€in€response€to€the€non„residentÏbeneficiaries'€contention€that€the€income€from€stock€held€byÏthe€administrator€was€not€subject€to€the€Tennessee€income€tax,Ïobserved€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 à[The€distributees]€are€only€entitled€toÍthe€residue€of€the€general€estate€afterÏthe€personal€representative€has€reducedÏit€to€money€and€has€paid€the€decedent'sÏdebts.€€Having€only€an€inchoate€right€inÏthe€surplus€assets€of€the€estate,€theÏheirs,€whether€resident€or€nonresident,Ïare€not€subject€to€the€tax€upon€theÏincome€from€securities€belonging€to€theÏpersonal€representative€.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€12€(citations€omitted).€€ÓÓÌÌà àIn€òòBoulton€v.€Cochranóó,€41€Tenn.€App.€43,€292€S.W.2dÏ511,€519€(1954)€œthe›€œcourt›€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€The€testatrix€did€not€have€toÏauthorize€the€executor€to€reduce€to€moneyÏher€residuary€estate.€€Normally€he€wouldÏhave€been€required€to€do€so.€€AssumingÏthat€she€knew€what€her€executor€wouldÏnormally€and€legally€do€it€appears€to€us,Ïand€we€so€hold,€that€the€above€residuaryÏclause€was€correctly€interpreted€by€theÏChancellor.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓÌà àIn€òòBradshaw€v.€Cruiseóó,€51€Tenn.€260€(1871),€in€anÏaction€challenging€the€terms€of€the€sale€of€the€decedent'sÏpersonal€estate,€this€Court€stated€that€it€was€theÏadministrator's€"duty€to€sell€the€property,€and€so€to€sell€asÍto€secure€the€best€price€for€the€benefit€of€the€creditors€andÏdistributees.€€In€this€matter€he€must€necessarily€exercise€aÏdiscretion,€but€in€doing€so,€he€must€risk€the€consequences€ofÏan€unwise€or€rash€exercise€of€that€discretion."€€òòId.óó€at€263.€ÌThe€discretion€discussed€obviously€relates€to€the€manner€ofÏsale,€time,€place,€œand€terms.›ÌÌà àThe€statute,€throughout€its€evolution,€has€addressedÏòòhowóó€the€sale€is€to€be€made€and€assumes€the€necessity€of€aÏsale.€€The€following€provisions€of€Chapter€7€of€the€Acts€ofÏ1797€support€this€conclusion.€€ÌÌÓÓà8 à4.€€òòBe€it€enactedóó,€That€so€much€of€theÏlaws€which€are€in€force€and€use€in€thisÏstate€as€puts€it€in€the€power€of€theÏsheriffs€to€sell€estates,€eitherÏintestate€or€otherwise,€is€herebyÏrepealed€and€made€void€to€all€intents€andÏpurposes.ÌÌà8 à5.€€òòBe€it€enactedóó,€That€executors€orÏadministrators,€are€hereby€authorized€andÏempowered€to€employ€any€person€onÏreasonable€terms€to€make€sale€of€suchÏestates,€agreeable€to€law,€for€the€use€ofÏthe€legatees,€any€law,€usage€or€custom€toÏthe€contrary€notwithstanding.ÌÌÌÌÓÓ1€Edward€Scott,€òòLaws€of€the€State€of€Tennesseeóó€596€(1821).€ÏThat€statute€revoked€the€power€of€sheriffs€to€make€the€sales,Ïbestowed€that€power€on€executors€and€administrators,€andÏallowed€them€to€employ€private€persons€to€conduct€the€sales.€ÏThese€sections€were€included€as€sections€œ2241›€through€2245€inÏthe€Tennessee€Code€of€1858,€Title€3,€Chapter€2,€Article€VIIIÏunder€the€caption,€"Inventory€and€Account€of€Sales."€ÌÌà àThe€appellees€rely€upon€one€of€several€changes€madeÏin€the€1932€Code€of€Tennessee.€€Section€2243€of€the€1858€codeÏbecame€Section€8191€of€the€1932€code€and€was€re„titled€"SaleÏof€Decedent's€Effects,€Time€and€Place."€€That€sectionÏprovided:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€executor€or€administrator€may€makeÏsale€of€the€goods€and€chattels€of€theÏdeceased€to€the€highest€bidder,€on€tenÏdays€written€notice€of€the€time€and€placeÏof€sale,€which€place€shall€be€the€usualÏresidence€of€the€deceased,€or€other€placeÏdeemed€more€convenient€by€the€executor€orÏadministrator.ÌÌÌÌÓÓIn€this€enactment,€"may€make€sale"€was€substituted€for€"shallÏmake€sale."€€In€1977,€this€section€became€Section€30„503€ofÍthe€Tennessee€Code€Annotated.€€The€current€version€of€theÏstatute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„303,€was€enacted€asÏChapter140€of€the€Public€Acts€of€1985,€and€reads€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€Unless€otherwise€directed€by€theÏwill€and€unless€the€specific€personalÏproperty€is€the€subject€of€a€bequest,€theÏpersonal€representative€of€a€testate€orÏintestate€estate€may,€in€the€personalÏrepresentative's€discretion,€sell€theÏpersonal€property€of€the€decedent€atÏpublic€or€private€sale,€for€cash€or€onÏterms,€in€such€manner€and€for€such€pricesÏas€the€personal€representative€may€deemÏadvisable;€but€the€personalÏrepresentative€shall€not€make€a€privateÏsale€to€the€personal€representative,€toÏbusiness€associates,€to€members€of€theÏpersonal€representative's€immediateÏfamily€or€to€their€agents€without€courtÏapproval€or€the€written€consent€of€allÏresiduary€distributees€of€the€estate.€ÏThe€personal€representative€may€employÏpersons€or€firms€to€conduct€the€sale€andÏshall€receive€credit€for€all€reasonableÏexpenses€of€the€sale€in€the€finalÏaccounting.ÌÌÌÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„303€(Supp.€1995).ÌÓÓÌÌà àThe€language€and€structure€of€this€provision€compelÏthe€conclusion€that€the€discretion€granted€to€the€personalÍrepresentative€relates€to€the€procedure€for€selling€theÏdecedent's€personal€property,€not€whether€to€sell.€€TheÏpersonal€representative€may€sell€at€public€or€private€sale,Ïthe€personal€representative€may€demand€cash€or€allow€terms€ofÏpayment,€the€personal€representative€may€decide€the€manner€ofÏsale€and€determine€the€prices.€€There€is€no€language€in€thisÏsection€suggesting€that€the€discretion€given€to€the€personalÏrepresentative€relates€to€his€authority€to€distribute€in€kindÏor€in€cash.€€Nor€is€there€language€that€would€guide€theÏpersonal€representative€in€exercising€such€discretion.ÌÌà àTreatises€on€the€administration€of€estates€inÏTennessee€support€the€view€that,€unless€relieved€by€theÏprovisions€of€a€will€or€the€consent€of€òòsuióó€òòjurisóóÏbeneficiaries,€the€personal€representative€of€an€estate€isÏobligated€to€convert€personalty€into€cash€during€theÏadministration€of€the€estate.€€òòPritchardóó,€recognized€for€manyÏyears€as€a€reliable€authority,€explains€the€current€law€asÏfollows:ÌÌÓÓà8 à...€the€law€does€not€contemplate€theÏdivision€of€personal€property€òòinóó€òòspecieóó,Íbut€provides€for€reducing€it€to€cash,€soÏthat€equal€distribution€may€be€made€ofÏthe€surplus€funds.€€However,€if€allÏpersons€interested€are€òòsuióó€òòjurisóó€andÏagree€to€a€division€in€kind€of€propertyÏleft€after€payment€of€debts,€or€notÏneeded€for€that€purpose,€such€a€course€isÏnot€objectionable,€if€equality€can€beÏattained€and€the€administrator€standsÏimpartial.€€But€the€legal€method€ofÏdischarging€distributive€shares€is€byÏpaying€distributees€the€amounts€to€whichÏthey€severally€are€entitled€in€lawfulÏcurrency,€and€taking€their€receiptsÏtherefor.€€This€mode€is€to€be€insistedÏupon€in€every€case,€and€unless€allÏdistributees€otherwise€agree€to€aÏdivision€in€kind,€a€departure€from€it€canÏonly€be€justified€where€it€is€manifestÏthat€its€adoption€will€work€extraordinaryÏhardships€and€equally€clear€that€specificÏdivision€of€the€chattels€will€not€produceÏinequalities,€complications€and€futureÏlitigation.ÌÌÌÌÓÓJack€W.€Robinson€œ&›€Jeff€Mobley,€òòPritchard€on€the€Law€of€WillsÏand€Administration€of€Estatesóó€ðð829€(5th€ed.€1994).œ× ƒ7 ××  ×›ÌAnother€authority€œo›œn›€Tennessee€probate€law€has€written:ÌÌÓÓà8 àA€personal€representative€becomes€by€lawÏvested€with€the€whole€personal€estate€ofÏhis€decedent€to€such€extent€as€that€heÏmay€sell€the€same€and€transfer€a€goodÏtitle€to€purchaser.€€Unless€prohibited€orÏdirected€by€the€provision€of€a€will€aÏpersonal€representative€is€underÏòòobligationóó€to€convert€the€personalÏestate,€that€is€chattels€and€the€like,Ïinto€money€by€a€sale€either€publicly€orÏprivately.ÌÌÌÌÓÓJoseph€Higgins,€òòAdministration€of€Estates€in€Tennesseeóó€ðð€932Ï(1943)€(emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà àThis€substantial€authority€prevails€over€theÏappellees'€reliance€on€the€substitution€of€"may"€for€"shall"Ïin€the€antecedent€statute.ÌÌà àThe€decision€that€the€discretion€granted€to€theÏpersonal€representative€under€the€statute€relates€to€theÏmanner€in€which€the€sale€may€be€made€and€not€to€whether€a€saleÏwill€be€made,€renders€unnecessary€an€examination€of€the€basisÏon€which€the€personal€representative€decided€to€makeÏdistribution€of€the€Rolich€stock€in€kind,€even€though,Íaccording€to€the€trial€court,€that€decision€would€haveÏrendered€the€appellant's€stock€in€the€corporation€worthless.€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òConclusionóóó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€erred€inÏdeciding€that€the€personal€representative€could,€in€hisÏdiscretion,€distribute€the€stock€in€kind.€€The€personalÏrepresentative€is€required€to€sell€the€stock,€pursuant€to€theÏprovisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€30„2„303,€and€distribute€theÏproceeds€among€the€beneficiaries€equally.ÌÌà àCosts€are€taxed€against€the€appellees,€Christy€N.ÏAustin€and€Robert€C.€Austin,€Jr.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à___________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌÌÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Birch,Ì€€€and€White,€JJ.