ÿWPC2 ¯%}DðL¹™ `0~C¸rLîW6bá™(*ù4/}¶½ú;—ÿ¦O $OfB®Ôa³ö§éýŸ!ëÍcqy…oצ(q=ì22±ó,TÒ d"]þ,ZÇø‡ê€Î4/!&?nüaœºmŸ¯ÙüÁ2D°ëÔAlZ†ˆÖ¹my,fãï.š(4çJÜÂ8»a£®ÍÞ"ÆÅ&ü'è9€¸GY›ˆ„[}ÞÜ~¦¾Õ!$¦MWk•›igbEh(‡æPY¥Öêk@0â{Qü[`Œä½Qé:nŒí–¸ï°Ž—}¬Œyh ‰½gÌá%–1§$Óß  txú 2þûÿT4O2½u0¢ÏKt\²í›ÎžƒT4Æ—šÓ–‘„¹[Õç¬î ,O¶"´“º)ÈG>ë õ¡Eq›§×*yuâ5ÇÖ¹nÊõ߸äOxV[¹ ÷]šyò;ÄÕ¥Zü4Q]õ¡Å䑽œÎ(ßÜi#W£Dø#ýŠ©¼(Î¥¢‘Ò:O|¬—žxdéúz£a600c­(æ-·cŽûŽB­ÕTü±àÖè€þPádoáâkÉ1/$xË\¶6Š\Ðm"}p7Óuš£LQ;# :U:E % 0ú…Lw@Ë4  . Ð6 0 D J 8N̆BR`”ô:ôU:.ûhÄc! B'#SD#—*U:š+Ô+U:×,×,×,×,×, AQ-Æb- 0D(. 0Dl. 0D°.°. D/ô.ô. B#/ D3@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/@/bs/s/ 0 >{/ 0L¹1˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øð AZ"Arial RegularX(ÒûÖ$¡¡Ñ7€ËMXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  ÓÑTRY3Ø' LetterY3Ø' Letter 3Ø' Letter 3Ø' LetterTÑC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT ¾D¿PÀ{ÁDÂÃÄÅÓ€ÏÒÖ~-&‹"Ar3|xÒ ÆÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€It€should€be€noted,€however,€that€the€Georgia€workersðð€compensation€statuteÐ ° Ðcontains€a€provision€stating€that€the€statute€ð ðshall€not€include€injury€caused€by€theÏwillful€act€of€a€third€person€directed€against€an€employee€for€reasons€personal€toÏsuch€employee€.€.€.€.ðð€€Ga.€Code€Ann.€ðð€34„9„1(4).(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó úÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Before€resolving€whether€the€alleged€injury€arose€out€of€the€claimantððsÐ ° Ðemployment,€the€commission€first€considered€the€following€Virginia€statutoryÏprovision:Ìà8 Ø àAny€employee€who,€in€the€course€of€employment,€is€sexually€assaulted,Ï.€.€.€and€promptly€reports€the€assault€to€the€appropriate€law„¼enforcement€authority,€òòwhere€the€nature€of€such€employmentÐ 0 €  Ðsubstantially€increases€the€risk€of€such€assaultóó,€.€.€.€shall€be€deemedÐ X  Ðto€have€suffered€an€injury€arising€out€of€the€employment€and€shall€haveÏa€valid€claim€for€workersðð€compensation€benefits.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐVa.€Code€Ann.€ðð€65.2„301(A)€(emphasis€added).€€The€commission€concluded€that€theÏprovision€did€not€apply€since€the€employment€at€issue€was€not€of€such€nature€as€toÏincrease€the€risk€of€a€sexual€assault.€€òòCarróó,€422€S.E.2d€at€418.€€ .Ý ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€For€a€discussion€of€the€differing€causation€standards,€òòseeóó€1€Larson,€ðððð€6.00,Ð ° Ð6.20€„.60,€at€3„1,€3„4€thru€„11;€òòBellóó,€597€S.W.2d€at€734.€€ ÂÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€According€to€one€commentator:Ð ° ÐÌà8 Ø àSexual€harassment€is€not€an€increased€risk€of€employment.€€WomenÏmay€be€exposed€to€sexual€harassment€in€public,€at€home,€or€at€work.€ÏThere€is€no€increased€risk€of€sexual€harassment€on€the€job.€€SexualÏharassment€is€typically€the€result€of€purely€personal€motivations€and€isÏusually€not€related€to€a€dispute€at€work.€€A€causal€connection€betweenÏthe€harassment€injury€and€the€employment€is€tenuous€at€best.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌVance,€11€Hofstra€Lab.€L.€J.€at€189„90;€òòseeóóòòalsoóóKorn,€67€Tul.€L.€Rev.€at€1384Ð à Ð(ð ðSexual€harassment,€although€it€occurs€frequently,€should€not,€as€a€matter€of€publicÏpolicy,€be€viewed€as€a€risk€inherent€in€the€workplace€and,€therefore,€should€beÏoutside€the€scope€of€workersðð€compensation€statutes.ðð)€€ 8Ý ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€As€noted€in€this€opinion,€several€courts€have€painstakingly€attempted€toÐ ° Ðcreate€a€bifurcated€system€in€which€a€sexual€harassment€victim€may€recover€eitherÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits€or€human€rights€act€damages€depending€upon€theÏnature€of€the€injury.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€527;€òòRichardson„Ð € Ð ÐGreenshieldsóó,€552€So.2d€at€1103„04.€€We€find€such€a€distinction€to€be€illusory€in€theÐ X ¨ Ðcontext€of€our€human€rights€act.€€The€remedies€provision€of€the€THRA€is€designed€toÏprovide€a€sexual€harassment€victim€with€a€full€recovery,€which€includes€damages€forÏhumiliation€and€embarrassment€as€well€as€damages€for€economic€loss.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð à0  ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€4„21„306(a)(7)&(8).€€Thus,€there€are€no€damages€that€a€sexualÏharassment€victim€could€recover€under€the€workersðð€compensation€scheme€that€heÏor€she€could€not€recover€under€the€THRA.€ VÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€It€is€presumed€that€the€General€Assembly€was€aware€of€the€state€of€the€lawÐ ° Ðat€the€time€that€it€passes€legislation.€€òòFletcher€v.€Stateóó,€951€S.W.2d€378,€382€(Tenn.Ð Ð  Ð1997).€ 0Ý ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€In€this€comment,€the€author€maintains€that€ð ðit€is€difficult€to€consider€sexualÐ ° Ðharassment€actions€incident€to€the€work€of€most€occupations€or€employmentÏpositions.€€There€is€no€logical€nexus€between€sexual€harassment€and€the€jobÏdescription€or€job€duties€of€most€occupations.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€569.€€The€commentator€notesÐ € Ð J Ðthat€the€òòCoxóó€Court€left€open€the€possibility€that€sexual€harassment€injuries€may€beÐ ° Ðcompensable€under€the€workersðð€compensation€statute€in€the€event€that€the€employerÏignored€or€tolerated€the€harassing€behavior€or€in€the€event€that€the€employerÏcommitted€negligent€hiring.€€òòIdóó.€at€571.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ñÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€Florida€Supreme€Court,€however,€left€open€the€possibility€that€certainÐ ° Ðsexual€harassment€injuries€may€be€compensable:Ð Ð   Їà8 Ø àWorkersðð€compensation€addresses€purely€economic€injury;€sexualÏharassment€laws€are€concerned€with€a€much€more€intangible€injury€toÏpersonal€rights.€€To€the€extent€these€injuries€are€separable,€we€believeÏthat€they€both€should€be,€and€can€be,€enforced€separately.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòIdóó.;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMoniz€v.€Reitano€Enter.,€Inc.óó,€709€So.2d€150,€153€(ð ðIn€the€context€of€aÐ è 8  Ðchoice€between€workersðð€compensation€and€tort€remedies€or€Title€VII€remedies€forÏsexual€harassment,€where€they€address€separable€injuries,€then€they€can€co„existÏand€no€election€is€necessary.€€Where€they€address€the€same€injury,€then€there€canÏbe€an€election€of€remedies.ðð).€ ºÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Under€this€exception€to€workersðð€compensation€coverage,€an€assault€ð ð(1)Ð ° Ðmust€be€intended€to€injure€the€victim€because€of€personal€reasons,€and€(2)€must€notÏbe€directed€against€the€employee€as€an€employee.ðð€€òòIdóó.€(construing€Minn.€Stat.€ððÐ ¨ø Ð176.011(16)€(1990)).üÿP Pd IÝ ƒ9BÀ$ÝÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  Óà Ø àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€In€òòIn›€re€Tolbertóó€the€perpetrator€did€not€specifically€target€the€plaintiff€as€aÐ ° Ðvictim.€€Subsequent€to€òòIn€re€Tolbertóó,€the€Colorado€Court€of€Appeals€has€used€this€factÐ ˆØ Ðto€distinguish€the€case€from€other€circumstances,€thus€limiting€the€scope€of€òòIn€reÐ `° ÐTolbertóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòStamper€v.€Hiteshewóó,€797€P.2d€784,€786€(Col.€App.€1990)€(ð ðHere,€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðevidence€strongly€supports€a€finding€that€[the€perpetratorððs]€acts€were€specificallyÏtargeted€at€plaintiff€and€not€neutral€in€nature.€€Under€the€circumstances,€her€claimsÏcould€not€be€characterized€as€having€arisen€out€of€her€employment.€€Thus,€thereÏexists€a€genuine€factual€controversy€regarding€the€requisite€degree€of€job€relatednessÏfor€workmenððs€compensation€coverage,€and€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissingÏplaintiffððs€state€claims.ðð);€òòPatel€v.€Thomasóó,€793€P.2d€632,€637€(Col.€App.€1990)Ð H˜ Ð(ð ðHere,€unlike€the€circumstances€in€[òòIn€re€Tolbertóó],€in€which€the€parties€agreed€thatÐ  p Ðthere€was€not€private€motivation€for€the€attack,€the€complaint€implies€that€[theÏsupervisor€perpetrator]€specifically€chose€[the€plaintiff]€as€his€victim€and€that€both€heÏand€[another€supervisor]€may€have€mistreated€her€because€some€two€yearsÏpreviously€[this€second€supervisor]€had€successfully€initiated€a€private€sexualÏrelationship€with€[the€plaintiff].€€In€light€of€these€factual€circumstances,€we€cannotÏœconclude›€as€a€matter€of€law€that€[the€plaintiffððs]€injuries€arose€out€of€her€employmentÏnor,€therefore,€that€she€can€prove€no€set€of€facts€to€exempt€her€from€the€exclusivityÏprovisions€of€the€Workmenððs€Compensation€Act.ðð). ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XË¢XXXÔÔ€ñSXXË¢ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XË¢XñSÔÐ  ÐÌJanuary€27,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XË¢XXXÔÔ€ñSXXË¢ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XË¢XñSÔÐ  ÐÌJanuary€25,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'÷ÿ dxd d(((('ÿÿdxd- ù-(î(3I $¤¤Ý ƒûÖ!ÝÑ7€{:XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  ÓÑTRY 3Ø' Letter3Ø'3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó>c$"Small Circleð"ðà0 àÝ ƒûÖ!ÝÑ7€{:XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÓ  ÓÑTRY 3Ø' Letter3Ø'3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  ÝñÅñ›ñÅñÑ€7ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ LegalY 3Ø' Letter AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' LetterTÑÔ‡XË¢XXXÔÓÓÓ=€{:XÐXdÐd=ÓñÏññÅñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E»±` 8ttxPó°ð  rßñÅññÏññÒññÏñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E»±` 8ttxPó°ð  rßñÏññÒññÒññÒññÅñ›ñÅñà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð à€€€€€€€ÌñÒñœßt€ )>.*jx×ÿÞ` `€€@Et` 8ttxPǬð È tß›ñÒñÌà@Ø Ø Ìàò òIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ |Ì Ðà@HH)ÌàAT€JACKSONó óˆÐ h¸ ÐÌÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÐ ì < ÐÌBERNICE€ANDERSON,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àœò òFiled:ó ó€January€25,€1999›Ð ¸   Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff,à ˆ àà à àà 8 à€€€€€€€€€€€)à è àSHELBY€COUNTY€Ð ŠÚ  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHon.€Floyd€Peeteà ð àà H! àà  # àÐ V¦  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àChancellorÐ <Œ  ÐSAVE„A„LOT,€LTD.,€a€SUPERVALUEà  à)Ð "r ÐCOMPANY,€d/b/a€SAVE„A„LOT€à 8 àà  à)Ð X ÐFOODS,€and€LIBERTY€MUTUALà 8 àà  à)à è àSupreme€CourtÐ î> ÐINSURANCE€COMPANYà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€02„S01„9610„CH„00093Ð Ô$ Ðà Ø àDefendants„Appellantsà 8 àà  à)Ð º  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àÌÌòòÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌFOR€PLAINTIFFà ˆ àóóà à àà 8 àà  àòòà è àFOR€DEFENDANTóóÐ &P!% ÐÌErich€M.€Shultzà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àœÔ#†X{:XXXË¢[#ÔÔ‡XË¢XXX{:ÔJack€A.€Childers,€Jr.›à H! àà  # àÐ Ì'#' ÐMemphis,€œñÀñTNñÀññÀñTñÀññÃñennesseeñÃññÃññÀñENNESSEEñÀññÃñ›à à àà 8 àœñ¾ñà 8 àñ¾ññÀñ›ñÀññ¿ñà  àñ¿ññÁñ›à è à›à è àñÁññÃñ›ñÃññÂñ€€€€€€€€ñÂññÂñ›ñÂñ€€€Bateman,€Gibson›€&€ChildersÐ ²($( Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àMemphis,€œTñÄñennesseeñÄññÄñN›€ñÄñ›Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àÌÔ‡„˜9„XXË¢ÔÌÌÌÔ#†XË¢X„„˜9E#ÔÔ‡„˜9„XXË¢Ôà@VV(Ìàò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ#†XË¢X„„˜9Š#ԈР 3Z.2 ÐÌÌÌœÌTRIAL›€COURT€œAFFIRMED›à 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àDROWOTA,€J.Ô#†X{:XXXË¢g #ÔÐ  8V37( Ðà@%%+Ìàò òòòOPINIONó óóóˆÐ ° ÐÓzÓÌà Ø àIn€this€workersðð€compensation€case,€we€consider€for€the€first€time€whether€anÏemployee€who€has€been€sexually€harassed€by€a€supervisor€in€the€course€ofÏemployment€may€recover€workersðð€compensation€benefits€from€the€employer.€ÏFinding€that€the€plaintiffððs€alleged€injury€did€not€arise€out€of€her€employment,€theÏChancery€Court€of€Shelby€County€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€employer€andÏits€insurance€carrier,€the€defendants.€€The€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€AppealsÏPanel,€upon€reference€for€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)€(Supp.€1998),€reversed€and€remanded€the€caseÏfor€a€determination€of€factual€issues.€€For€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€affirm€theÏdecision€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€to€the€defendants.€ÌÌÌà@õõÌàò òI.€€FACTS€&€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYˆÐ P Ðó óÌà Ø àSince€this€case€is€presented€to€us€on€summary€judgment,€we€summarize€theÏevidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiff,€the€non„moving€party.€€òòByrd€v.Ð  #ð! ÐHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210„11€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€record€demonstrates€that€theÐ €%Ð # Ðplaintiff,€Bernice€Anderson€(ð ðAndersonðð),€was€employed€by€defendant€Save„A„LotÏFoods€as€a€co„assistant€manager€of€a€grocery€store€in€Memphis.€€Anderson€testifiedÏin€a€deposition€that€she€was€repeatedly€sexually€harassed€on€a€daily€basis€by€herÏimmediate€supervisor,€Kenneth€Bush€(ð ðBushðð),€during€the€course€of€her€employment.€ÏAndersonððs€relationship€with€Bush€began€when€Anderson€worked€for€a€Save„A„LotÏstore€on€Jackson€Avenue.€€Bush,€an€assistant€manager€at€the€time,€worked€at€theÏJackson€Avenue€store€for€two€or€three€months€while€he€trained€to€be€a€manager.€ÏAnderson€stated€that€although€Bush€did€not€make€any€sexually€inappropriate€remarksÏduring€this€time€period,€he€told€Anderson€that€he€did€not€like€her€and€that€he€did€notÏlike€the€fact€that€he€had€to€ask€her€to€show€him€how€to€perform€certain€tasks.€€€€€ÌÐ  :p59 Ðà Ø àAfter€Bush€was€promoted€to€manager,€he€was€eventually€transferred€to€aÏSave„A„Lot€store€on€Frayser€Boulevard.€€Subsequently,€Bush€asked€the€manager€ofÏthe€Jackson€Avenue€store€to€transfer€Anderson€to€the€Frayser€Boulevard€store.€€NotÏrealizing€that€Bush€was€the€manager€of€the€Frayser€store,€Anderson€agreed€to€beÏtransferred€to€the€Frayser€store,€where€she€worked€for€approximately€one€year.€ÏWhen€Anderson€first€started€working€in€the€Frayser€store,€Bush€approached€her,Ïstating€that€he€ð ðknew€how€I€got€my€job€and€what€I€had€been€doing€with€the€otherÏmanagers,€[and]€that€he€wanted€the€same€thing.ðð€€Anderson€testified€that€BushÏroutinely€followed€her€around€the€store,€making€lewd€gestures€and€remarks€to€her.€ÏFor€instance,€it€is€alleged€that€Bush€repeatedly€made€graphic€sexual€comments€aboutÏher€body,€requested€that€Anderson€engage€in€sexual€relations€with€him€and€accusedÏher€of€having€sex€with€co„workers.€€Bush€would€often€grab€Andersonððs€hand€or€bumpÏup€against€her€when€he€made€these€remarks.€€Anderson€also€alleged€encounters€inÏwhich€Bush€would€ð ðliterally€run€up€to€me€and€get€as€close€as€he€could€to€me€andÏstare€me€up€and€down€and€then€bust€out€laughing.ðð€€In€addition,€on€numerousÏoccasions€Bush,€in€the€presence€of€Anderson,€made€inappropriate€remarks€about€theÏbody€parts€of€the€cashiers€in€the€store.ÌÌà Ø àAnderson€explained€that€she€feared€notifying€other€Save„A„Lot€supervisors€ofÏBushððs€conduct,€because€Bush€threatened€to€fire€her€and€even€stated€that€he€knewÏwhere€she€lived€and€that€he€would€kill€her€if€she€told€anyone€about€the€harassment.€ÏWary€of€losing€her€job€if€she€reported€Bushððs€behavior,€Anderson€explained:€€ð ðI€triedÏto€hold€onto€my€job,€keep€my€job,€because€I€need€my€job.ðð€€Ultimately,€after€AndersonÏreported€the€incidents€to€other€management€employees,€an€investigation€wasÏconducted,€and€Anderson€was€transferred€to€another€store.€€Anderson€alleges€thatÏas€a€result€of€Bushððs€harassing€conduct,€she€suffers€from€post„traumatic€stressÏdisorder€and€depression€and,€consequently,€has€incurred€medical€expenses€and€hasÏbeen€unable€to€work.€€A€psychiatrist€who€examined€Anderson€gave€her€a€sixty€(60%)Ïpercent€permanent€psychiatric€impairment€rating.ÌÐ (:x5: Ðà Ø àAnderson€filed€this€Complaint€for€Workersðð€Compensation,€seekingÏreimbursement€for€her€medical€expenses€and€lost€earnings.€€In€addition,€AndersonÏfiled€a€complaint€in€federal€court€alleging€violations€of€the€Tennessee€Human€RightsÏAct€and€Title€VII€of€the€Civil€Rights€Act€of€1964.€€After€considering€the€depositionÏtestimony€proffered€by€the€plaintiff,€the€trial€court€in€the€present€case€grantedÏsummary€judgment€to€the€defendants.€€It€is€unclear€from€the€record€whether€the€trialÏcourt€found€that€a€plaintiff€may€not€recover€workersðð€compensation€benefits€for€sexualÏharassment€injuries€as€a€matter€of€law,€or€whether€the€trial€court€found€that€AndersonÏfailed€to€demonstrate€in€this€particular€instance€that€she€suffered€an€injury€that€aroseÏout€of€her€employment.€€In€an€opinion€written€by€Judge€Don€Ash,€the€SpecialÏWorkersðð€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€reversed€the€decision€of€the€trial€court.€ÏConcluding€that€Andersonððs€injury€arose€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€her€employment,Ïthe€Panel€found€that€Anderson€would€not€have€suffered€an€injury€ð ðbut€forðð€herÏemployment.ÌÌÌÌà@RR(Ìàò òII.€€ANALYSISˆÐ $X" ÐÌà@#ÌàA.€€Standard€of€ReviewˆÌó óà Ø àSummary€judgment€is€appropriate€if€the€movants,€the€defendants,€demonstrateÐ À)%( Ðthat€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€exist€and€that€the€defendants€are€entitled€toÏa€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.€€We€must€take€the€strongestÏview€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€Anderson,€allowing€allÏreasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€Anderson€and€discarding€all€countervailingÏevidence.€€òòShadrick€v.€Cokeróó,€963€S.W.2d€726,€731€(Tenn.€1998)€(citing€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,Ð ø2H.2 Ð847€S.W.2d€at€210„11).€€Since€our€review€concerns€only€questions€of€law,€the€trialÏcourtððs€judgment€is€not€presumed€correct,€and€our€review€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€on€the€recordÐ ¨6ø16 Ðbefore€this€Court.€€òòWarren€v.€Estate€of€Kirkóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€723€(Tenn.€1997);€òòBainÐ €8Ð38 Ðv.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).Ð ° ÐÌà@HH&Ìàò òB.€€Tennessee€Lawó óˆÐ `° Ðà Ø àTennesseeððs€Workersðð€Compensation€Law,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€50„6„101€òòetóóÐ H ˜ Ðòòseqóó.€(1991€Repl.€&€Supp.€1998),€applies€to€covered€employees€who€suffer€fromÐ  p Ðð ðpersonal€injury€or€death€by€accident€arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employmentÏwithout€regard€to€fault€as€a€cause€of€the€injury€or€death.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„¼103(a)€(1991€Repl.);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòidóó.€ðð€50„6„102(a)(5)€(Supp.€1998).€€Under€this€two„Ð ¨ø  Ðpronged€test,€a€plaintiff€must€prove€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that:€(1)€theÏinjury€arose€out€of€her€employment;€and€(2)€the€injury€occurred€during€the€course€ofÏher€employment.€€€òòHill€v.€Eagle€Bend€Mfg.,€Inc.óó,€942€S.W.2d€483,€487€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð 0€ ÐÌà Ø àThere€is€no€dispute€in€this€case€that€the€alleged€injury€occurred€in€the€courseÏof€Andersonððs€employment€with€Save„A„Lot.€€Viewing€the€ð ðtime,€place€andÏcircumstancesðð€surrounding€the€alleged€harassment,€it€is€clear€that€such€incidentsÏoccurred€while€Anderson€was€on€the€premises€of€Save„A„Lot,€performing€duties€onÏbehalf€of€her€employer.€€òòIdóó.;€òòFink€v.€Caudleóó,€856€S.W.2d€952,€958€(Tenn.€1993).€€TheÐ @"  Ðcrucial€inquiry€in€this€case€concerns€whether€the€alleged€injury€arose€out€ofÏAndersonððs€employment.€€For€years€this€Court€has€avoided€applying€ð ðartificial€labelsððÏby€advocating€a€steadfast€test€to€determine€when€an€injury€arises€out€of€employment.€ÏòòHall€v.€Mason€Dixon€Lines,€Inc.óó,€743€S.W.2d€148€(Tenn.€1987).€€This€struggle€thatÐ  )ð$( Ðhas€confronted€our€courts€was€discussed€in€òòBell€v.€Kelso€Oil€Co.óó,€597€S.W.2d€731Ð x+È&* Ð(Tenn.€1980):ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà 0 àThis€Court€and€others€over€the€years€have€attempted,€with€littleÏsuccess,€to€wring€more€certainty€and€specificity€from€the€terse€wordsÏ"arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€employment."€€This€has€resulted€inÏvarious€judicial€"tests"€and€"doctrines,"€such€as,€the€"positionalÏdoctrine,"€the€"peculiar€hazard€doctrine,"€the€"foreseeability"€test,€theÏ"street-risk€doctrine,"€and€others.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àIt€is€difficult,€perhaps€impossible,€to€compose€a€formula€whichÏwill€clearly€define€the€line€between€accidents€and€injuries€which€ariseÏout€of€and€in€the€course€of€employment€to€those€which€do€not;€hence,Ïin€determining€whether€an€accident€arose€out€of€and€in€the€course€ofÏthe€employment,€each€case€must€be€decided€with€respect€to€its€ownÏattendant€circumstances€and€not€by€resort€to€some€formula.€€òòSeeóó:€99Ð 8:ˆ5: ÐC.J.S.€òòWorkmen's€Compensationóó€ðð€209€(1958).Ð°Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àIn€this€endeavor,€the€relation€of€the€employment€to€the€injury€isÏthe€essential€point€of€inquiry.€.€.€.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àGenerally,€an€injury€arises€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€theÏemployment€if€it€has€a€rational€causal€connection€to€the€work€andÏoccurs€while€the€employee€is€engaged€in€the€duties€of€his€employment;Ïand,€any€reasonable€doubt€as€to€whether€an€injury€"arose€out€of€theÏemployment"€is€to€be€resolved€in€favor€of€the€employee.€€òòGreatÐ ü L  ÐAmerican€Indemnity€Company€v.€Friddellóó,€198€Tenn.€360,€280€S.W.2dÐ è 8  Ð908€(1955);€òòTapp€v.€Tappóó,€192€Tenn.€1,€236€S.W.2d€977€(1951).ÐÔ$ Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àThe€observation€of€this€Court€inòò€Travelers€Insurance€CompanyÐ ¬ü  Ðv.€Googeóó,€217€Tenn.€272,€279,€397€S.W.2d€368,€371€(1966),€isÐ ˜è  Ðpertinent€here:Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø À!Ø À!à"The€phrase,€'in€the€course€of,'€refers€to€time€and€place,Ïand€'arising€out€of,'€to€cause€or€origin;€and€an€injury€byÏaccident€to€an€employee€is€'in€the€course€of'€employmentÏif€it€occurred€while€he€was€performing€a€duty€he€wasÏemployed€to€do;€and€it€is€an€injury€'arising€out€of'Ïemployment€if€caused€by€a€hazard€incident€to€suchÏemployment."Ð 0 h0 h ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àWe€have€said€that€an€injury€arises€out€of€the€employment€"whenÏthere€is€apparent€to€the€rational€mind,€upon€consideration€of€all€theÏcircumstances,€a€causal€connection€between€the€conditions€underÏwhich€the€work€[was]€required€to€be€performed€and€the€resulting€injury."€ÏòòT.€J.€Moss€Tie€Co.€v.€Rollinsóó,€191€Tenn.€577,€235€S.W.2d€585€(1951).Ðl¼Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòBellóó,€597€S.W.2d€at€733„34;€òòseeóóòòalsoóó€òòHillóó,€942€S.W.2d€at€487;€òòReeser€v.€YellowÐ D!” ÐFreight€System,€Inc.óó,€938€S.W.2d€690,€692€(Tenn.€1997);òòFinkóó,€856€S.W.2d€at€958.Ð #l! ÐÌà Ø àThe€defendants€contend€that€claims€for€sexual€harassment€are€properlyÏbrought€pursuant€to€federal€and€state€civil€rights€statutes,€as€well€as€tort€suits,€andÏdo€not€fall€within€the€ambit€of€Tennesseeððs€Workersðð€Compensation€Law.€€TheÏdefendants€assert€that€Andersonððs€alleged€injury€was€not€due€to€a€risk€inherent€to€herÏemployment€or€a€risk€that€is€a€normal€component€of€the€employment€relationship.€ÏBecause€Save„A„Lot€did€not€have€policies€facilitating€or€condoning€the€allegedÏharassment€and€because€the€alleged€incidents€were€not€motivated€by€a€desire€toÏfurther€the€business€of€the€employer,€the€defendants€argue€that€the€injury€did€notÏarise€from€Andersonððs€employment€but,€instead,€was€personal€to€œKenneth›€Bush.€ÏThus,€they€contend€that,€as€a€matter€of€law,€summary€judgment€was€properly€grantedÏto€the€defendants.Ð <9Œ49 Їà Ø àIt€is€well„settled€that€an€employee€may€recover€workersðð€compensation€benefitsÏfor€emotional€injuries,€such€as€stress,€arising€out€of€employment€so€long€as€theÏmental€disorder€can€be€traced€to€an€ð ðidentifiable,€stressful,€work„related€eventÏproducing€a€sudden€mental€stimulus€such€as€fright,€shock€or€excessive€unexpectedÏanxiety.ðð€€òòHillóó,€942€S.W.2d€at€488;€òòBatson€v.€Cigna€Property€&€Cas.€Companiesóó,€874Ð  ` ÐS.W.2d€566,€570€(Tenn.€1994);€òòGatlin€v.€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€822€S.W.2d€587,€591„92Ð è 8  Ð(Tenn.€1991).€€This€is€the€first€occasion,€however,€in€which€this€Court€has€consideredÏwhether€an€employee€may€recover€workersðð€compensation€benefits€for€œemotionalÏinjuries›€resulting€from€sexual€harassment€by€a€œsupervisor.›€Ì€€€€œÌà Ø àIn€prior€cases,€we€have€identified€factors€which€aid€a€court€in€determiningÏwhether€emotional€injuries€arose€out€of€employment.€€In›€òòJesse€v.€Savings€Productsóó,Ð øH Ð772€S.W.2d€425€(Tenn.€1989),€a€convenience€market€clerk€sought€to€recoverÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits€for€injuries€suffered€after€she€was€raped€by€aÏcustomer€on€the€premises€of€the€market.€€The€employer€argued€that€the€injury€wasÏnot€compensable€because€the€injury€arose€from€a€personal€motive€and€not€anÏemployment„related€motive.€€Dismissing€this€argument,€we€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà 0 àThe€motive€of€the€assailant€is€only€one€of€the€circumstances€toÏbe€considered€in€determining€whether€the€injury€arises€out€of€theÏemployment,€and€its€weight€depends€on€the€strength€of€otherÏinferences€raised€by€the€proof.€€Thus,€we€have€held€that€a€clear€animusÏtoward€the€workplace€supported€coverage€when€other€factors€appearedÏambiguous€or€neutral.€€òòSeeóó€òòBell€v.€Kelso€Oil€Companyóó,€597€S.W.2dÐ ¤(ô#' Ð731€(Tenn.1980)€and€òòWhaley€v.€Patent€Button€Companyóó,€184€Tenn.Ð )à$( Ð700,€202€S.W.2d€649€(Tenn.1947).€€We€have€also€held€that€a€motiveÏpurely€personal€to€the€injured€employee,€inflicted€by€an€acquaintance,Ïcan€be€sufficient€to€preclude€coverage.€€òòE.g.óó,€òòWhite€v.€WhitewayÐ T,¤'+ ÐPharmacy,óó€210€Tenn.€449,€360€S.W.2d€12€(1962).€€€When€the€motivesÐ @-(, Ðwere€both€personal€and€employment-related,€we€resolved€the€issue€inÏfavor€of€coverage.€€òòDeBow€v.€First€Investment€Propertyóó,€623€S.W.2dÐ /h*. Ð273,€275€(Tenn.1981).Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àBut€this€is€not€to€say€that€the€assailant's€motive€is€alwaysÏdeterminative€or€that€an€injured€employee€must€always€establish€aÏstranger's€motivation€in€order€to€connect€the€assault€with€theÏemployment.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòJesseóó,€772€S.W.2d€at€427.€€Acknowledging€that€the€motive€of€the€attacker€couldÐ x6È16 Ðnever€be€known,€we€found€that€the€ð ðthe€Plaintiff's€indiscriminate€exposure€to€theÏgeneral€public€is€one€of€the€conditions€under€which€her€work€was€required€to€beÐ (:x5: Ðperformed,€and€the€actions€of€those€persons€on€the€premises€are€reasonablyÏconsidered€hazards€of€the€employment.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Accordingly,€we€held€that€the€plaintiffÐ ˆØ Ðwas€entitled€to€workersðð€compensation€benefits€since€the€injury€arose€out€of€theÏplaintiffððs€employment.ÌÌà Ø àIn€òòBeck€v.€Stateóó,€779€S.W.2d€367€(Tenn.€1989),€a€driverððs€license€examinerÐ è 8  Ðsuffered€emotional€injuries€after€she€was€sexually€accosted€by€an€unknown€manÏduring€the€course€of€her€employment.€€Finding€that€the€injury€arose€out€of€herÏemployment,€we€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àWhile€there€is€no€evidence€that€the€assailant€was€there€for€anyÏbusiness€reason,€the€evidence€shows€that€the€assailant€attackedÏPlaintiff€after€she,€as€a€duty€of€her€employment,€asked€the€assailant€toÏmove€his€improperly€parked€car.€€Just€as€no€one€could€ever€know€theÏfull€intent€of€the€assailant€in€òòJesseóó,€no€one€will€ever€know€the€full€intentÐ øH Ðof€Plaintiff's€assailant.€€But,€as€in€òòJesseóó,€Plaintiff's€indiscriminateÐ ä4 Ðexposure€to€the€general€public€was€one€of€the€conditions€under€whichÏher€work€was€required€to€be€performed,€and€the€actions€of€persons€onÏthose€premises€can€be€considered€a€hazard€of€the€employment.€€WeÏtherefore€find€a€causal€relationship€existed€between€Plaintiff'sÏemployment€and€the€August€7,€1987€assault,€and€that€Plaintiff€sufferedÏa€compensable€accidental€injury€within€the€statutory€definition€of€theÏTennessee€Workers'€Compensation€Laws.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓBeckóó,€779€S.W.2d€at€371;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòWoods€v.€Harry€B.€Woods€Plumbing€Co.óó,€967Ð 0"€  ÐS.W.2d€768€(Tenn.€1998).ÌÌà Ø àCiting€òòBrimhall€v.€Home€Ins.€Co.óó,€694€S.W.2d€931€(Tenn.€1985),€and€€òòHarmanÐ ¸'#& Ðv.€Mooreððs€Quality€Snack€Foodsóó,€815€S.W.2d€519€(Tenn.€App.€1991),€the€defendantsÐ )à$( Ðcontend€that€any€injuries€suffered€by€the€plaintiff€did€not€arise€out€of€her€employmentÏsince€œthey›€resulted€from€conduct€that€was€purely€personal€between€the€plaintiff€andÏher€supervisor.€€In€òòBrimhallóó,€the€plaintiff,€an€auto€mechanic,€witnessed€a€co„workerÐ /h*. Ðappropriating€a€substantial€amount€of€hand€cleaner€from€the€plaintiffððs€personalÏcontainer.€€The€plaintiff€was€injured€in€an€altercation€which€eventually€ensued€afterÏthe€co„worker€refused€to€pay€for€the€hand€cleaner.€€Finding€that€the€injury€did€notÏarise€out€of€the€employment€since€the€dispute€was€a€ð ðpersonal€matter,ðð€we€quoted€theÏfollowing€proposition:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àIt€is€the€general€rule€that€"an€injury€arising€from€an€assault€on€anÐ (:x5: Ðemployee€committed€solely€to€gratify€his€personal€ill-will,€anger,€orÏhatred,€or€òòan€injury€received€in€a€fight€purely€personal€in€nature€with€aÐ œì Ðfellow€employeeóó,€does€not€arise€out€of€the€employment€within€theÐ ˆØ Ðmeaning€of€the€workmen's€compensation€acts."€€82€Am.Jur.2dÏWorkmen's€Compensation€ðð€330,€at€128€(1976)€(emphasis€added).€€€€Ï€Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÓÓòòBrimhallóó,€694€S.W.2d€at€932.€€The€defendants€in€the€instant€case€argue€that€sinceÐ 8 ˆ ÐKenneth€Bushððs€alleged€conduct€was€ð ðpurely€personal€in€nature,ðð€the€plaintiff€can€notÏrecover€workersðð€compensation€benefits.€€òòIdóó.€œñ°ñ€Thus,€the€defendants€contend€that€theÐ  ð Ðcircumstances€in€this€case€fit€within€the€ð ðinherently€privateðð€classification€of€òòWoodsóó.€Ð €Ð ÐòòSeeóóòòWoodsóó,€967€S.W.2d€at€771.€€ñ°ñ›Ð è 8  ÐÌà Ø àIn€òòHarmanóó,€the€plaintiff€employee€and€her€husband€brought€a€suit€against€herÐ ˜è  Ðemployer€pursuant€to€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€and€the€Federal€Civil€RightsÏAct.€€Among€other€contentions,€the€employee€claimed€that€she€was€sexually€harassedÏby€her€supervisor.€€The€employer€argued€that€the€suit€should€be€barred€because€theÏemployeeððs€claim€fell€within€the€Tennessee€Workersðð€Compensation€Law€and,€thus,Ïthe€exclusive€remedy€provision€prohibits€any€other€law€suits.ÌÌà Ø àThe€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòHarmanóófirst€discussed€the€distinction€betweenÐ €Ð Ðremedies€provided€by€the€Workersðð€Compensation€Law€and€civil€rights€laws:€workersððÏcompensation€is€intended€to€compensate€employees€for€economic€loss€resulting€fromÏtangible€injuries€suffered€on„the„job,€whereas€civil€rights€laws€seek€to€redress€injuriesÏto€an€employeeððs€dignity€and€self„respect.€€òòSeeóó€òòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€523„27.€€TheÐ à%0!$ ÐCourt€quoted€the€Supreme€Court€of€Floridaððs€decision€in€òòByrd€v.€Richardson„Ð ¸'#& ÐGreenshields€Sec.,€Inc.óó,€552€So.2d€1099€(Fla.€1989),€in€which€the€Court€stated€thatÐ )à$( Ðð ðas€a€matter€of€public€policy,€sexual€harassment€should€not€and€cannot€beÏrecognized€as€a€ððriskðð€inherent€in€any€work€environment.ðð€€òòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€atÐ @-(, Ð527€(quoting€òòRichardson„Greenshieldsóó,€552€So.2d€at€1104€n.7).€€Finding€that€trialÐ /h*. Ðcourts€must€decide€whether€a€particular€claim€falls€within€the€ambit€of€workersððÏcompensation€or€civil€rights€laws,€the€òòHarmanóó€Court€stated:Ð È2.2 ÐÓÓà8 Ø àThere€are€too€many€variables€in€this€issue€to€lay€down€a€hard€and€fastÏmechanical€formula€into€which€trial€courts€may€plug€certain€facts€andÏcome€out€with€a€specific€answer.€€€The€trial€courts€of€this€state€areÏgoing€to€be€called€upon€from€time€to€time€to€determine€whether€anÏemployee's€claim€is€based€upon€real€discrimination€or€arises€fromÏemployer€misconduct€that€is€a€normal€part€of€the€employmentÏrelationship.Ð(:x5:Ø À!Ø À! ЇÓÓòòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€527.€€The€defendants€assert€that€the€alleged€harassingÐ ° Ðconduct€in€the€instant€case€can€not€be€characterized€as€a€ð ðnormal€part€of€theÏemployment€relationship,ðð€and,€thus,€the€plaintiff€may€not€recover€under€the€WorkersððÏCompensation€Law.à à à€€€€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@šš#Ìàò òC.€€Other€Jurisdictionsó óˆÐ è 8  Ðà Ø àAlthough€this€issue€has€been€addressed€in€other€jurisdictions,€in€most€of€theseÏcases,€as€in€òòHarmanóó,€the€employee€plaintiffs€were€seeking€to€recover€under€tortÐ ¨ø  Ðtheories€or€pursuant€to€civil€rights€legislation.€€The€focal€inquiry€in€such€casesÏaddressed€the€employer€defendantsðð€argument€that€the€claims€were€preempted€byÏthe€exclusive€remedy€provisions€in€workersðð€compensation€statutes.€€Therefore,€inÏcontrast€to€the€present€case,€the€employee€plaintiffs€often€argued€that€workersððÏcompensation€acts€did€òònotóó€apply€to€their€claims€so€that€the€exclusive€remedyÐ à0 Ðprovisions€were€inapplicable.€€òòSeeóóòògenerallyóóAnnotation,€52€A.L.R.€4th€731€(1987€&Ð ¸ ÐSupp.€1998);€2A€Arthur€Larson€&€Lex€K.€Larson,€òòThe€Law€of€WorkmenððsÐ à ÐCompensationóó€ðð€68.34(d)€(1995);€Jane€Byeff€Korn,€òòThe€Fungible€Woman€and€OtherÐ h ¸ ÐMyths€of€Sexual€Harassmentóó,€67€Tul.€L.€Rev.€1363€(1993);€Ruth€C.€Vance,€òòWorkersððÐ @"  ÐCompensation€and€Sexual€Harassment€in€the€Workplace:€A€Remedy€for€Employees,Ïor€a€Shield€for€Employers?óó,€11€Hofstra€Lab.€L.J.€141€(1993);€Steven€G.€Biddle€andÐ ð%@!$ ÐMary€Jo€Foster,€òòWhen€is€Workersðð€Compensation€the€Exclusive€Remedy€in€SexualÐ È'#& ÐHarassment€Cases?óó,€Ariz.€Atty.,€Dec.€1996,€at€25.€€Although€the€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€prongÐ  )ð$( Ðis€uniformly€prevalent€in€workersðð€compensation€statutes€throughout€this€country,Ïmany€of€these€cases€are€not€necessarily€dispositive€since€they€often€involve€slightlyÏdifferent€statutory€schemes€and€often€apply€differing€causation€standards€with€regardÏto€the€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€prong.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð 1P,0 ÐÌòòà Ø àóóOur€research€indicates€that€relatively€few€courts€have€considered€cases€inÐ °404 Ðwhich€an€employee€seeks€workersðð€compensation€benefits€for€injuries€resulting€fromÏsexual€harassment€by€a€co„worker.€€In€òòPhillips€v.€Arkansas€State€Hwy.€&€Transp.Ð ˆØ МDepððtóó,›€916€S.W.2d€128€(Ark.€App.€1996),€the€claimant,€a€state€employee,€alleged€thatÐ `° Ðher€supervisor€sexually€harassed€her,€causing€her€to€suffer€from€post„traumaticÏstress€syndrome.€€Ruling€that€the€injury€could€not€arise€out€of€the€claimantððsÏemployment€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€administrative€law€judge€and€the€ArkansasÏWorkersðð€Compensation€Commission€found€that€the€alleged€injury€resulted€from€anÏð ðintentional€personal€ac[t]ðð€by€the€perpetrator€and€that€the€injury€was€not€a€riskÏassociated€with€employment€since€the€employee€could€be€equally€exposed€to€suchÏconduct€outside€of€her€employment.€€òòIdóó.€at€129.€€€€On€appeal,€the€Arkansas€Court€ofÐ H˜ ÐAppeals€noted€that,€under€Arkansas€law,€the€ð ðarises€out€ofðð€component€is€satisfiedÏif€the€risk€of€an€injury€is€ð ðincreased€by€the€nature€or€setting€of€the€work.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€130.€Ð øH ÐReversing€the€commissionððs€finding,€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àWhether€sexual€harassment€is€a€risk€to€which€an€employee€is€exposedÏbecause€of€the€nature€of€the€work€environment€is€a€fact€that€should€beÏdecided€on€a€case„by„case€basis,€and€it€was€error€for€the€CommissionÏto€find€that€it€did€not€have€jurisdiction€because€sexual€harassmentÏcould€never€arise€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€the€employment.Ð Ø À!Ø À! Ðà8 Ø àÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐòòÓÓIdóó.;€òòbutóóòòseeóó€Gina€Cothern,€Survey,€òòWorkersðð€Compensationóó,€19€U.€Ark.€Little€RockÐ 0"€  ÐL.J.€793,€794€(1997)€(ð ðHowever,€because€the€òòPhillipsóó€decision€was€not€construing€theÐ $X" Ð1993€amendments€[to€the€Arkansas€workersðð€compensation€statute],€the€future€ofÏsexual€harassment€claims€as€compensable€workersðð€compensation€claims€inÏArkansas€is€still€unknown.ðð).ÌÌà Ø àThe€New€Mexico€Court€of€Appeals€also€considered€this€issue€in€òòCox€v.€ChinoÐ @-(, ÐMines/Phelps€Dodgeóó,€850€P.2d€1038€(N.M.€App.€1993).€€The€claimant€in€òòCoxóó€soughtÐ /h*. Ðworkersðð€compensation€benefits€for€emotional€injuries€suffered€after€two€co„workersÏand€a€supervisor€sexually€harassed€her€and€made€vulgar€comments€in€her€presence.€ÏThe€employer,€which€had€a€written€policy€prohibiting€sexual€harassment,€hadÏpreviously€disciplined€one€perpetrator€of€the€harassment.€€Rejecting€the€claimantððsÏargument€that€her€injury€arose€out€of€her€employment,€the€Court€reasoned:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà 0 àHere,€the€incidents€involving€Claimant€were€isolated€and€wereÐ (:x5: Ðnot€part€of€the€conditions€of€employment.€.€.€.€Claimantððs€claim€failsÏbecause€sexual€harassment€was€not€a€regular€incident€of€theÏemployment€and€Employer€had€specific€policies€in€place€prohibitingÏsexual€harassment.€€In€this€regard,€[one€of€the€perpetrators€of€theÏharassment]€was€warned€to€stop€his€conduct€or€he€would€beÏdischarged.€€Thereafter,€the€sexual€harassment€incidents€stopped.€ÏThus,€sexual€harassment€was€not€a€peculiar€risk€at€this€workplace.€€InÏfact,€Claimant€admits€in€her€testimony€that€she€had€experienced€noÏincidents€of€sexual€harassment€in€approximately€nine€years€of€previousÏemployment€with€Employer€and€that€she€was€unaware€of€any€otherÏfemale€employee€who€had€previously€been€sexually€harassed€at€thisÏworkplace.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àBy€virtue€of€the€Employerððs€written€policy€on€sexual€harassmentÏand€its€action€in€reprimanding€its€employee€.€.€.€it€is€clear€that€EmployerÏneither€authorized€nor€tolerated€the€sexual€harassment€incidents.€ÏThus,€although€Claimantððs€injury€may€have€been€causally€related€to€herÏemployment,€we€hold€that€on€the€facts€in€this€case,€the€[WorkersððÏCompensation€Judge]€properly€concluded,€as€a€matter€of€law,€thatÏClaimant€did€not€sustain€an€accident€arising€out€of€her€employment.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€1041.€€In€addition,€the€Court€responded€to€the€claimantððs€argument€that€the€NewÐ  \ ÐMexico€workersðð€compensation€statute€should€cover€sexual€harassment€injuries€asÏa€matter€of€public€policy.€€After€noting€that€federal€and€state€civil€rights€statutes€wereÏpromulgated€to€provide€a€remedy€for€sexual€harassment€injuries,€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àWe€are€more€persuaded€.€.€.€that€the€concerns€addressed€by€theseÏstatutes€are€quite€different€from€those€addressed€by€the€workersððÏcompensation€laws€and€that€the€way€to€maintain€public€policies€againstÏsexual€harassment€on€the€job€is€to€pursue€the€common„law€or€statutoryÏremedies€available€to€promote€these€policies€and€not€to€engraft€thoseÏpolicies€on€to€a€very€different€legislative€scheme€such€as€the€WorkersððÏCompensation€Act.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€at€1041„42;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Comment,€òòThe€Sexual€Harassment€Claim€Quandary:Ð Ì&"% ÐWorkersðð€Compensation€as€an€Inadequate€and€Unavailable€Remedy:€Cox€v.€ChinoÏMines/Phelps€Dodgeóó,€24€N.M.€L.€Rev.€565,€572€(1994)€(ð ðAnother€important€distinctionÐ |*Ì%) Ðis€that€sexual€harassment€is€a€behavior€rather€than€an€ððaccident.ðð€.€.€.€The€remediesÏprescribed€by€the€Workersðð€Compensation€Act,€which€are€corrective€in€nature€andÏresult€in€modest€awards,€are€inadequate€to€help€further€policy€which€aims€atÏeradicating€sexual€harassment.ðð).€×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€€€€€Ð Ü1,-1 Їà Ø àIn€òòCarr€v.€City€of€Norfolkóó,€422€S.E.2d€417€(Va.€App.€1992),€the€employee,€aÐ ° Ðdesk€officer€with€the€Norfolk€police€department,€filed€for€workersðð€compensationÏbenefits,€alleging€that€she€suffered€emotional€injuries€from€a€sexual€assault€byÏanother€police€officer€during€a€shift€change.€€The€fact„finding€commission€concludedÏthat€the€injury€did€not€ð ðarise€out€ofðð€her€employment€since€the€assault€was€ð ðof€aÏpersonal€natureðð€and€not€motivated€to€further€the€employerððs€business.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòIdóó.€at€418.€Ð è 8  ÐOn€appeal,€the€Virginia€Court€of€Appeals€stated€that€courts€ð ðon€a€case„by„case€basisððÏmust€determine€whether€a€ð ðcausal€connection€[exists]€between€the€claimantððs€injuryÏand€the€conditions€under€which€the€employer€requires€the€work€to€be€performedðð€soÏas€to€find€that€the€injury€arose€out€of€employment.€€òòIdóó.€€Noting€that€ð ðit€is€factuallyÐ H˜ Ðdifficult€to€separate€a€purely€personal€sexual€assault€from€one€that€is€only€directedÏagainst€the€victim€as€an€employee€or€because€of€the€employment,ðð€the€Court€affirmedÏthe€commissionððs€finding€that€the€injury€did€not€arise€out€of€the€plaintiffððs€employment.€ÏòòIdóó.€at€419;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòIn€re€Goodman„Herron€v.€SAIF€Corp.óó,€950€P.2d€932€(Ore.€App.Ð ¨ø Ð1997);€òòRamada€Inn€Surfside€v.€Swansonóó,€560€So.2d€300€(Fla.€App.€1990)€(findingÐ ° Ðthat€a€sexual€harassment€injury€arose€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€the€claimantððsÏemployment)€;€òòIn€re€Brown€v.€Alos€Micrographics€Corp.óó,€540€N.Y.S.2d€911€(N.Y.€App.Ð `° ÐDiv.€1989)€(affirming€workersðð€compensation€boardððs€finding€that€employee€couldÏrecover€for€emotional€injury€suffered€as€a€result€of€sexual€harassment);€òòcfóó.€òòCityÐ  ` ÐMarket,€Inc.v.€Industrial€Claims€Appeals€Officeóó,€800€P.2d€1335€(Col.€App.€1990)Ð è 8  Ð(workersðð€compensation€case€in€which€the€employer€conceded€that€the€employeeððsÏinjury€from€sexual€harassment€arose€out€of€her€employment).ÌÌà Ø àIn€the€context€of€employers€asserting€that€a€civil€rights€and/or€tort€suit€is€barredÏby€a€workersðð€compensation€exclusive€remedy€provision,€there€is€a€split€of€authorityÏamong€courts€concerning€whether€a€sexual€harassment€injury€arose€out€ofÏemployment.€€òòSeeóó€œòògenerallyóó€Annotation,›€52€A.L.R.€4th€731.€€The€defendants€urge€usÐ Ð  Ðto€follow€the€approach€taken€by€the€Georgia€Court€of€Appeals€in€òòMurphy€v.€ARAÐ ¨ø ÐServices,€Inc.óó,€298€S.E.2d€528€(Ga.€App.€1982).€€In€òòMurphyóó,€the€plaintiff,€who€wasÐ €Ð Ðemployed€in€a€cafeteria€owned€by€the€defendant,€brought€a€tort€suit€in€which€sheÏsought€damages€emanating€from€sexual€harassment€by€her€supervisor.€€Among€otherÏallegations,€the€employee€claimed€that€her€supervisor€threatened€to€fire€her€unlessÏshe€consented€to€œengaging›€in€sexual€intercourse€with€him.€€The€trial€court€grantedÏsummary€judgment€to€the€employer,€finding€that€the€suit€was€barred€by€GeorgiaððsÏworkersðð€compensation€exclusive€remedy€provision.€€In€Georgia€the€test€for€whetherÏan€injury€ð ðarises€out€ofðð€employment€is€essentially€the€same€as€in€Tennessee.œ×ƒ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€òòSeeóóÐ h+¸&* Ðòòidóó.€at€530.€€The€Georgia€Court€of€Appeals€reasoned:Ð @-(, ÐÓÓà8 Ø à[T]here€is€no€evidence€that€the€ongoing€misconduct€of€the€supervisorÏwas€directed€to€[the€employee]€because€of€any€work„related€dispute€orÏaltercation€arising€from€the€performance€of€her€duties€for€[theÏemployer].€€Conversely,€the€[harassing€conduct]€could€only€have€beenÏentirely€in€furtherance€of€the€supervisorððs€own€very€personal€reasons.€Ð È2.2 ÐIt€would€be€absurd€to€think€that€any€of€the€foregoing€acts€of€misconductÏalleged€by€[the€employee]€were€done€by€the€supervisor€either€inÏfulfillment€of€his€duties€or€to€benefit€[the€employerððs]€business€ofÏcafeteria€food€services.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓIdóó.€at€531.€€Concluding€that€the€employee€would€not€have€been€able€to€recoverÐ L œ Ðworkersðð€compensation€benefits,€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà 0 àIn€the€case€sub€judice€[the€employeeððs]€employment€with€ARAÏplaced€her€in€the€working€environment€of€the€cafeteria€where€she€wasÏexposed€to€the€òòpresenceóó€of€her€supervisor.€€However,€exposure€to€theÐ Ô$  Ðperson€of€the€supervisor€in€his€capacity€as€her€supervisor€is€notÏdispositive.€€The€risk€or€causative€danger€of€the€injury€of€the€type€[theÏemployee]€claims€must€be€reasonably€incidental€to€the€character€of€herÏemployment€as€a€cafeteria€worker.€€We€refuse€to€say€that€the€risk€ofÏverbal€and€physical€abuse€of€a€sexual€nature€alleged€by€[the€employee]Ïbelongs€to€or€is€any€way€connected€with€what€[the€employee]€had€to€doÏin€fulfilling€her€responsibilities€of€employment€with€ARA.€€On€theÏcontrary,€the€risk€of€the€offensive€conduct€alleged€by€[the€employee]€is,Ïunfortunately,€a€hazard€to€which€she€would€be€equally€exposed€asideÏfrom€her€employment.€€€€€€€€Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓIdóó.€œ(emphasis›€in€original).Ð ä4 ÐÌà Ø àIn€another€Georgia€Court€of€Appeals€decision,€òòKennedy€v.€Pineland€StateÐ ”ä ÐBankóó,€439€S.E.2d€106€(Ga.€App.€1993),€the€defendant€employer€argued€that€theÐ l¼ Мemployeeððs›€action€was€barred€by€the€workersðð€compensation€exclusivity€provision.€ÏThe€suit€arose€after€the€employee,€a€bank€employee,€allegedly€was€accosted€by€aÏmember€of€the€bankððs€board€of€directors.€€Concluding€that€her€claim€would€not€beÏcovered€by€Georgiaððs€workersðð€compensation€statute,€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø à[T]here€is€no€question€that€[the€employee]€(as€other€members€ofÏsociety)€was€equally€exposed€to€the€hazard€of€sexual€assault€apartÏfrom€her€employment€at€the€bank.€€However,€[the€employeeððs]Ïemployment€at€the€bank€exposed€her€to€the€presence€of€[the€allegedÏperpetrator]€and€to€[the€alleged€perpetratorððs]€alleged€deviant€sexualÏpropensities.€€Nevertheless,€ð ð[w]e€refuse€to€say€that€the€risk€of€.€.€.Ïphysical€abuse€of€a€sexual€nature€alleged€by€[the€employee]€belongsÏto€or€is€in€any€way€connected€with€what€[the€employee]€had€to€do€inÏfulfilling€her€responsibilities€of€employment.ððÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€107€(quoting€òòMurphyóó,€298€S.E.2d€at€531);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòSimon€v.€Morehouse€SchoolÐ Ü1,-1 Ðof€Medicineóó,€908€F.€Supp.€959,€971€(N.D.€Ga.€1995).€€Ð ´3/3 ÐÌà Ø àA€few€other€jurisdictions€have€reached€similar€conclusions.€€For€instance,€inÐ d7´27 ÐòòDunn€v.€Warholóó,€778€F.€Supp.€242€(E.D.€Pa.€1991),€the€plaintiff,€a€pathologist,Ð <9Œ49 Ðbrought€suit€pursuant€to€Title€VII€and€common€law€tort€after€she€was€subjected€toÏunwanted€sexual€touching€and€harassment€by€her€supervisor.€€After€considering€theÏemployerððs€argument€that€the€employeeððs€suit€was€barred€by€the€exclusive€remedyÏprovision€of€the€Pennsylvania€Workmenððs€Compensation€Act,€the€federal€courtÏstated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àIt€does€not€follow€.€.€.€that€sexual€harassment€by€a€supervisor€who€alsoÏhappens€to€be€the€victimððs€employer€is€related€to€the€scope€of€herÏemployment.€€The€court€cannot€conceive€of€an€instance€of€sexualÏharassment€of€an€employee€by€an€employer€or€others€in€the€workplaceÏwhich€properly€could€be€characterized€as€employment€related.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓIdóó.€at€244.€€Thus,€the€court€held€that€the€plaintiffððs€suit€should€not€be€dismissed€sinceÐ pÀ Ðthe€workersðð€compensation€statute€did€not€apply€to€her€alleged€injury.€€òòIdóó.;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÐ H˜ ÐòòArnold€v.€Kimberly€Quality€Care€Nursingóó,€762€F.€Supp.€1182,€1184€(M.D.€Pa.€1991);Ð  p ÐòòSchweitzer€v.€Rockwell€Intððlóó,€586€A.2d€383,€391€(Pa.€Super.€Ct.€1990)€(ð ðIn€the€presentÐ øH Ðcase,€the€alleged€emotional€distress€arose€from€harassment€personal€in€nature€andÏnot€part€of€the€proper€employer/employee€relationship.ðð)ÌÌà Ø àIn€òòCarr€v.€U€S€West€Direct€Co.óó,€779€P.2d€154€(Ore.€App.€1989),€the€plaintiff,Ð X ¨ Ða€sales€representative,€brought€a€tort€action€against€her€employer€after€she€wasÏsexually€harassed,€assaulted€and,€ultimately,€raped€by€her€supervisor.€€RespondingÏto€the€employerððs€argument€that€the€injury€arose€out€of€her€employment€and,€thus,Ïwas€compensable€only€under€Oregonððs€workersðð€compensation€statute,€the€CourtÏreasoned:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àHere€the€connection€to€the€work€is€weak.€€The€source€of€the€injuryÏbears€little€or€no€relationship€to€the€employment.€€There€is€no€evidenceÏthat€the€assaults€were€provoked€by€anything€related€to€the€work.€€ThereÏis€no€evidence€that€the€nature€of€the€job€or€the€job€environment€createdÏor€enhanced€the€risk€of€assault.€€The€fact€that€the€employment€placedÏplaintiff€and€[the€supervisor]€together€is€not,€in€itself,€enough.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€156€(citations€omitted);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòRichardson„Greenshieldsóó,€552€So.2d€at€1104Ð Ü1,-1 Ðn.7€(ð ðWe€conclude€that,€as€a€matter€of€public€policy,€sexual€harassment€should€notÏand€cannot€be€recognized€as€a€ððriskðð€inherent€in€any€work€environment.ðð)œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›;€€òòBennettÐ Œ5Ü05 Ðv.€Furrððs€Cafeterias,€Inc.óó,€549€F.€Supp.€887,€890€(D.€Colo.€1982)€(in€a€Title€VII€and€tortÐ ° Ðsuit€brought€by€a€management€trainee€who€allegedly€was€harassed€and€assaultedÏby€her€supervisor,€held€that€ð ð[i]ndeed,€it€would€appear€to€lie€outside€the€bounds€ofÏreason€to€propose€that€the€sort€of€sexual€assault€and€harassment€heretoforeÏdescribed€and€the€emotional€trauma€alleged€to€have€been€caused€thereby€result€fromÏrisks€inherent€to€the€position€of€a€ððmanagement€trainee.ðððð).ÌÌà Ø àOn€the€other€hand,€other€courts€that€have€considered€an€employerððsÏcontention€that€a€sexually€harassed€employeeððs€claims€are€subject€to€the€workersððÏcompensation€exclusivity€provision€have€found€that€such€injuries€arose€out€of€theÏclaimantððs€employment.€€For€instance,€in€òòFernandez€v.€Ramsey€Countyóó,€495€N.W.2dÐ  p Ð859€(Minn.€App.€1993),€the€plaintiff€brought€a€tort€and€civil€rights€suit,€contending€thatÏtwo€of€her€supervisors€sexually€harassed€her.€€In€Minnesota,€the€causal€requirementÏin€the€ð ðarising€out€ofðð€prong€is€considered:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àa€factor€of€source€or€contribution€rather€than€cause€in€the€sense€ofÏbeing€proximate€or€direct.€€Because€of€the€intervening€wrongful€act€ofÏthird€parties€or€some€such€extrinsic€contribution,€the€employment€mayÏnot€be€the€proximate€cause.€€But€it€may€be€nonetheless€so€muchÏsource€of€the€event€that€the€latter€in€a€very€real€and€decisive€senseÏarises€out€of€the€employment.€.€.€.€€So€it€is€enough€that€injury€follows€ð ðasÏa€natural€incident€of€the€work€.€.€.€as€a€result€of€the€exposureÏoccasioned€by€the€nature€of€the€employment.ððÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓIdóó.€at€861€(quoting€òòFoley€v.€Honeywell,€Inc.óó,€488€N.W.2d€268,€271€(Minn.€1992)).€Ð Ì&"% ÐApplying€the€law€to€the€facts,€the€Minnesota€Court€of€Appeals€found:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àThe€actions€alleged€by€[the€employee]€occurred€entirely€while€she€wasÏat€work,€and€the€alleged€perpetrators€are€coworkers.€€Under€theÏstandard€stated€in€òòFoleyóó,€the€undisputed€facts€satisfy€the€[ððarising€outÐ `° Ðofðð]€coverage€factor.€[The€employeeððs]€injuries,€if€proved,€arise€from€herÏemployment.€Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌòòÓÓFernandezóó,€495€N.W.2d€at€861.€€The€Court,€however,€remanded€the€case€to€the€trialÐ  ` Ðcourt€for€a€determination€of€whether€the€circumstances€fall€within€MinnesotaððsÏð ðassault€exceptionðð׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€so€that€the€injury€would€be€non„compensable€under€the€workersððÐ À  Ðcompensation€statute.€€ÌÌà Ø àSeveral€other€courts€that€have€addressed€workersðð€compensation€exclusivityÏprovisions€have€also€suggested€that€sexual€harassment€injuries€may€be€compensableÏunder€workersðð€compensation€schemes.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòByers€v.€Labor€&€Indus.€ReviewÐ øH ÐCommððnóó,€561€N.W.2d€378€(Wis.€1997)€(indicating€that€it€is€possible€for€a€sexualÐ Ð  Ðharassment€injury€to€be€covered€under€Wisconsinððs€workersðð€compensation€statuteÏas€well€as€under€the€state€discrimination€statute);€òòKonstantopoulos€v.€WestvacoÐ €Ð ÐCorp.óó,€690€A.2d€936€(Del.€1996)€œ(ð ðpersonal›€dispute€exceptionðð€in€Delawareððs€workerððsÐ X ¨ Ðcompensation€statute€did€not€apply€to€injury€suffered€from€sexual€harassment€by€co„¼workers€and,€thus,€the€exclusivity€provision€precludes€state€law€claims);€òòGreen€v.Ð $X" ÐWyman„Gordon€Co.óó,€664€N.E.2d€808€(Mass.€1996);€òòDoe€v.€Purity€Supreme,€Inc.óó,€664Ð à%0!$ ÐN.E.2d€815€(Mass.€1996)€(finding€that€sexual€assault€arose€out€of€the€employmentÏand,€thus,€that€common€law€claims€are€barred€by€the€workersðð€compensationÏexclusivity€provision);€òòDickert€v.€Metropolitan€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€428€S.E.2d€700€(S.C.Ð h+¸&* Ð1992)€œ(South›€Carolinaððs€workersðð€compensation€exclusivity€provision€bars€commonÏlaw€suit€against€employer€for€alleged€sexual€harassment€committed€by€the€plaintiffððsÏsupervisor);€òòKerans€v.€Porter€Paint€Co.óó,€575€N.E.2d€428€(Ohio€1991)€œ(Ohioððs›€workersððÐ ð0@,0 Ðcompensation€scheme€does€not€provide€the€exclusive€remedy€for€sexual€harassmentÐ È2.2 Ðinjuries);€òòIn€re€Tolbert€v.€Martin€Marietta€Corp.óó,€759€P.2d€17€(Col.€1988)€(finding€thatÐ ° Ðthe€rape€of€the€plaintiff€by€a€coworker€arose€out€of€the€employment€and,€thus,€theÏworkersðð€compensation€scheme€is€the€exclusive€remedy)œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›;€òòKnox€v.€Combined€Ins.€Co.Ð `° Ðof€Am.óó,€542€A.2d€363€(Me.€1988)€œ(it›€is€possible€for€sexual€harassment€injuries€to€ariseÐ 8 ˆ Ðout€of€employment,€so€that€such€injuries€would€be€compensable€under€MaineððsÏworkersðð€compensation€act€and€subject€to€its€exclusivity€provision);€òòBaker€v.€WendyððsÐ è 8  Ðof€Montana,€Inc.óó,€687€P.2d€885€(Wy.€1984)€œ(since›€employeeððs€alleged€injury€sufferedÐ À  Ðas€a€result€of€harassment€by€her€supervisor€arose€out€of€her€employment,€it€wasÏcompensable€under€Wyomingððs€workerððs€compensation€statute€and,€thus,€her€tortÏclaims€were€barred€by€the€exclusive€remedy€provision);€òòDowner€v.€Detroit€ReceivingÐ H˜ ÐHosp.óó,€477€N.W.2d€146€(Mich.€App.€1991)€œ(employeeððs›€claim€against€her€employerÐ ° Ðfor€negligently€hiring€an€alleged€sexual€harasser€is€barred€by€the€Michigan€workersððÏcompensation€exclusivity€of€remedies€provision);€òòIrvin€Investors,€Inc.€v.€Superior€Ct.óó,Ð `° Ð800€P.2d€979€(Ariz.€App.€1990)€œ(Arizonaððs›€workerððs€compensation€exclusivity€clauseÏapplied€since€the€employee€could€have€recovered€workersðð€compensation€benefitsÏfor€an€injury€suffered€after€she€was€sexually€molested€by€a€coworker);€òòCrofts€v.Ð è 8  ÐHarrisonóó,€772€S.W.2d€901€(Mo.€App.€1989)€œ(finding€that›€a€supervisorððs€sexual€assaultÐ À  Ðon€the€plaintiff€was€an€ð ðirrational€.€.€.ððneutral,ðð€unprovoked€assault,ðð€and,€therefore,€theÏinjury€therefrom€arose€out€of€the€employment€so€that€Missouriððs€workerððsÏcompensation€exclusivity€provision€applied);€òòJuarez€v.€Ameritech€MobileÐ H˜ ÐCommunications,€Inc.óó,€957€F.2d€317,€323„24€(7th€Cir.€1992)€œ(under›€Illinois€law,€ð ð[a]Ð  p Ðsexually€harassing€co„employee€is€similarly€a€ððrisk€inherent€in€employment.ðð€.€.€.ÏUnder€such€circumstances,€the€harassment„prone€co„employee€clearly€is€ððas€muchÏa€part€of€the€victimððs€work€environment€as€a€defective€tool€might€œbe.ðððð)€(internalÏcitations€omitted)ñµñòòóóñµñ;›€òòZabkowicz€v.€West€Bend€Co.óó,€789€F.2d€540€(7th€Cir.€1986)€œ(tort›Ð €Ð Мclaims›€against€the€employer€for€alleged€injuries€from€sexual€harassment€are€barredÏby€Wisconsinððs€workersðð€compensation€exclusivity€provision);€òòCremen€v.€HarrahððsÐ 0"€  ÐMarina€Hotel€Casinoóó,€680€F.€Supp.€150,€154€(D.€N.J.€1988)€œ(plaintiffððs›€injuries€fromÐ $X" Ðalleged€sexual€harassment€and€assault€were€ð ðfully€compensable€under€the€provisionsÏof€the€New€Jersey€Workersðð€Compensation€Actðð€and,€thus,€the€exclusive€remedyÏprovision€bars€certain€common€law€tort€actions);€òòLui€v.€Intercontinental€Hotels€Corp.óó,Ð )à$( Ð634€F.€Supp.€684€(D.€Haw.€1986)€œ(plaintiffððs›€assault€and€battery€claim€against€herÏemployer€for€sexual€assault€by€her€supervisor€was€barred€by€Hawaiiððs€workersððÏcompensation€exclusivity€provision).€€ÌÌÌà@ŒŒ&Ìàò òIII.€€CONCLUSIONˆÐ  4ð/4 Ðó óÌà Ø àœAfter€carefully€considering€the€rationale€of€these€decisions€and€the€facts€of€thisÏcase,€we›€œconclude›€that€Anderson€has€failed€to€demonstrate€that€her€alleged€injuryÐ 8:ˆ5: Ðarose€out€of€her€employment.€€Although€we€recognize€that€Bushððs€full€intent€mayÏnever€be€known,€òòseeóó€òòBeckóó,€779€S.W.2d€at€371,€we€can€make€certain€reasonableÐ ˆØ Ðinferences€from€Andersonððs€testimony,€which€we€construe€in€her€favor.€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,Ð `° Ð847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€On€one€hand,€it€is€logical€to€construe€Bushððs€purportedÏactivity€as€seeking€to€further€a€personal€perverse€sexual€desire.€€It€is€equally€logicalÏto€interpret€Bushððs€conduct€as€being€motivated€by€a€demented€animosity€againstÏAnderson€in€which€he€seeks€to€control€and€humiliate€her.€€Under€any€interpretation,Ïwe€find€that€it€would€be€unreasonable€to€characterize€Bushððs€motivation€as€anythingÏother€than€ð ðpurely€personal€in€natureðð€and€not€related€to€furthering€the€business€ofÏthe€employer.€€òòBrimhallóó,€694€S.W.2d€at€932;€òòseeóóòòalsoóó€òòCity€of€Norfolkóó,€422€S.E.2d€atÐ H˜ Ð418„19;€òòMurphyóó,€298€S.E.2d€at€531;€òòU€S€Westóó,€779€P.2d€at€156.€€Anderson€has€notÐ  p Ðmade€any€allegation€suggesting€that€Bush€was€provoked€to€act€in€the€best€interestÏof€Save„A„Lot,€nor€does€the€record€support€such€an€inference.ÌÌà Ø àFurthermore,€there€is€no€indication€that€the€nature€of€Save„A„Lotððs€businessÏwas€such€that€the€risk€of€harassment€was€a€ð ðreasonably€considered€hazar[d]ðð€so€thatÏit€was€a€normal€component€of€Andersonððs€employment€relationship.€€òòJesseóó,€772Ð 0"€  ÐS.W.2d€at€427;€òòseeóóòòalsoóóòòBeckóó,€779€S.W.2d€at€371;€òòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€œ527.€Ð $X" ÐThere€is€no€allegation€that€Save„A„Lot€requires€or€encourages€employees€to€engageÏin€any€practice€or€dress€in€any€manner€that€may€invite€sexual€advances.€€Moreover,›Ïthere€is€no€suggestion€of€an€established€policy€or€systematic€behavior€by€theÏemployer€in€which€sexual€harassment€is€condoned.€€In€fact,€Anderson€testified€œthatÏto€her€knowledge›€Bush€was€the€only€Save„A„Lot€employee€œwho›€œengaged›€inÏinappropriate€harassing€conduct.€€òòCfóó.€òòCoxóó,€850€P.2d€at€1041.€€Ð /h*. ÐÌà Ø àœThe€record€strongly€indicates€that›€the€alleged€harassment€had€absolutely€noÏð ðconnect[ion]€with€what€[Anderson]€had€to€do€in€fulfilling€her€responsibilities€ofÏemploymentðð€with€Save„A„Lot.€€òòMurphyóó,€298€S.E.2d€at€531;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòKennedyóó,€439Ð x6È16 ÐS.E.2d€at€107.€€It€is€clear€under€Tennessee€law€that€the€fact€that€Anderson€wasÏexposed€to€Bush€during€the€course€of€her€employment€is€not€dispositive.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,Ð (:x5: ÐòòBrimhallóó,€694€S.W.2d€at€932;€òòseeóóòòalsoóó€òòMurphyóó,€298€S.E.2d€at€531;€òòU€S€Westóó,€779Ð ° ÐP.2d€at€156;€òòcfóó.€òòFernandezóó,€495€N.W.2d€at€861.€€The€record€simply€does€notÐ ˆØ Ðdemonstrate€that€sexual€harassment€was€an€inherent€risk€to€which€Anderson€wasÏexposed€when€she€accepted€employment€with€Save„A„Lot.€€òòSeeóó€òòFord€v.€Revlonóó,€734Ð 8 ˆ ÐP.2d€580,€591€(Ariz.€1987)€(Feldman,€J.,€concurring)€(ð ðBy€law,€exposure€to€sexualÏharassment€is€not€an€inherent€or€necessary€risk€of€employment,€even€though€it€mayÏbe€or€may€have€been€endemic.ðð);€òòCremenóó,€680€F.€Supp.€at€158€(ð ðIn€every€case€ofÐ À  Ðwhich€we€are€aware,€courts€that€have€grappled€with€the€troubling€issue€of€sexualÏharassment€in€the€workplace€have€refused€to€accept€it€as€ðða€fact€of€life€of€industrialÏemployment.ðððð)׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×.€€œTo€the€contrary,›€œthe›€alleged€harassment€was€an€unanticipated€riskÐ H˜ Ðthat€was€not€a€condition€of€Andersonððs€employment.€€€Accordingly,€we€find€thatÏAndersonððs€alleged€injury€is€not€compensable€under€the€Tennessee€WorkersððÏCompensation€Law.€€ÌÌà Ø àOur€holding€is€supported€by€public€policy€justifications.€€The€TennesseeÏWorkersðð€Compensation€Law€was€enacted€to€ð ðprovide€compensation€for€loss€ofÏearning€power€or€capacity€sustained€by€workmen€through€injuries€in€industry.ðð€€òòSmithÐ 0"€  Ðv.€Lincoln€Mem.€Univ.óó,€304€S.W.2d€70,€73€(Tenn.€1957);€òòMathis€v.€J.L.€Forrest€&Ð ° ÐSonsóó,€216€S.W.2d€967€(Tenn.€1949);€òòHarmanóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€524;€òòseeóóòògenerallyóóÐ ˆØ ÐJoseph€H.€King,€Jr.,€òòThe€Exclusiveness€of€an€Employeeððs€Workersðð€CompensationÐ `° ÐRemedy€Against€His€Employeróó,€55€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€405€(1988).€€We€question€whetherÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€drafters€ever€contemplated€that€the€statute€would€cover€injuries€suffered€as€aÏresult€of€sexual€harassment.€€As€one€commentator€has€noted:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àThe€risks€contemplated€.€.€.€as€the€purpose€behind€workersððÏcompensation€are€ð ð[a]ll€things€that€can€go€wrong€around€a€modernÏfactory,€mill,€mine,€transportation€system,€or€construction€project€„„Ïmachine€breaking,€objects€falling,€explosives€exploding,€tractorsÏtipping,€fingers€getting€caught€in€gears€.€.€.€.ðð€€In€passing€workersððÏcompensation€statutes,€legislatures€viewed€these€accidents€ð ðas€theÏinevitable€accompaniment€of€industrial€production.ððÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌà8 Ø àà 0 àIn€contrast,€sexual€harassment€is€not€an€ð ðinevitableÏaccompaniment€of€industrial€production.ðð€€Sexual€harassment€is€not€theÏequivalent€of€ð ðmachinery€breaking,€objects€falling,€explosivesÏexploding,€tractors€tippingðð€or€ð ðfingers€getting€caught€in€gears.ðð€€It€doesÏnot€happen€to€every€worker€„„€it€happens€disproportionately€to€women.Ï.€.€.€Although€sexual€harassment€is€commonplace,€we€need€not€acceptÏit€as€a€risk€inherent€in€the€workplace.€€It€can,€unlike€true€industrialÏaccidents,€be€eliminated.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓKorn,€67€Tul.€L.€Rev.€at€1385„86€(citing€òòFordóó,€734€P.2d€at€590€(Feldman,€J.,Ð l¼ Ðconcurring);€Larson€ðð€7.10;€Note,€òòException€to€the€Exclusive€Remedy€RequirementsÐ D!” Ðof€Workersðð€Compensation€Statutesóó,€96€Harv.€L.€Rev.€1641,€1642€(1983));€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÐ #l! ÐòòRichardson„Greenshieldsóó,€552€So.2d€at€526€(ð ð[W]e€cannot€find€that€acts€constitutingÐ ô$D # Ðsexual€harassment€were€ever€meant€to€fall€under€workersðð€compensation.ðð);€òòBennettóó,Ð Ì&"% Ð549€F.€Supp.€at€891€(ð ðI€cannot€credit€the€suggestion€that€the€Colorado€GeneralÏAssembly€intended€to€permit€licentious€behavior€under€the€rubric€of€workmenððsÏcompensation.ðð);€Darryll€M.€Halcomb€Lewis,€òòSexual€Harassment€Under€WorkersððÐ T,¤'+ ÐCompensation€Lawóó,€44€Labor€L.€J.€297,€305„06€(1993)€(ð ðSexual€harassment€claimsÐ ,.|)- Ðsimply€have€no€place€in€a€workersðð€compensation€court.€€As€was€stated€in€òòByrd€v.Ð 0T+/ ÐRichardsonóó,€it€was€never€intended€that€these€types€of€claims€be€under€the€provinceÐ Ü1,-1 Ðof€workersðð€compensation€courts.ðð);€Vance,€11€Hofstra€Labor€L.€J.€at€158€(ð ðIt€is€lessÏclear€that€providing€workersðð€compensation€coverage€for€sexual€harassment€on€theÏjob€fulfills€the€goal€of€redressing€industrial€injuries.€€Indeed,€one€might€ask€whetherÏsexual€harassment€is€an€industrial€injury.€€Sexual€harassment,€an€injury€occasionedÐ <9Œ49 Ðby€intentional€actions€in€the€workplace,€is€not€a€normal€risk€of€employment.ðð).€€FromÏa€practical€standpoint,€since€sexual€harassment€victims€ordinarily€œdo›€not€sufferÏtangible€economic€loss,€calculating€damages€under€the€workersðð€compensationÏscheme€may€often€be€cumbersome€and€arbitrary.€€òòSeeóó€òòKeransóó,€575€N.E.2d€at€489Ð 8 ˆ Ð(ð ð[A]side€from€expenses€which€they€may€incur€for€psychiatric€care,€victims€of€sexualÏharassment€generally€do€not€suffer€economic€loss.€€Their€injuries€are€much€lessÏtangible€and€often€are€not€susceptible€to€a€neat€compensatory€formula.€€Thus,€.€.€.Ïmost€victims€would€not€obtain€appropriate€or€sufficient€relief.ðð).€€€ÌÌà Ø àIn€fact,€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€4„21„101€òòetóóÐ H˜ Ðòòseqóó.€(1998€Repl.)€(ð ðTHRAðð),€was€enacted€to€provide€a€remedy€for€the€type€of€injuriesÐ  p Ðthat€the€plaintiff€alleges.œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€The€remedies€provision€of€the€THRA,€as€well€as€its€federalÐ øH Ðcounterpart,€Title€VII€of€the€Civil€Rights€Act€of€1964,€42€U.S.C.€2000e€òòetóó€òòseq.óó,€isÐ Ð  Ðdesigned€to€fully€compensate€victims€of€sexual€harassment€in€the€workplace.œ×ƒt×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€òòSeeóóÐ ¨ø ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„306.€€Moreover,€it€is€conceivable€that€a€contrary€ruling€wouldÏthwart€the€intent€of€the€framers€of€the€THRA€to€provide€sexual€harassment€victimsÐ X ¨ Ðwith€a€full€recovery,€since€employer€defendants€would€argue€that€THRA€suits€broughtÏby€employee€plaintiffs€are€barred€by€the€Tennessee€workersðð€compensationÏexclusivity€of€remedies€provision.€€According€to€one€commentator:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àSexual€harassment€€was€probably€never€contemplated€by€the€originalÏauthors€of€workersðð€compensation€systems€because€women€did€notÏhave€a€strong€presence€in€the€workplace.€€Furthermore,€public€policyÏagainst€sexual€discrimination€œhad›€not€been€formulated€and€translatedÏinto€statutory€law.€€Therefore,€sexual€harassment€is€completely€outsideÏthe€contemplation€of€the€workersðð€compensation€scheme,€andÏemployers€should€not€be€allowed€to€use€the€exclusive€remedy€provisionÏas€a€shield€to€avoid€liability€for€permitting€sexual€harassment€to€occurÏin€the€workplace.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÓVance,€11€Hofstra€Lab.€L.€J.€at€192;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Deborah€A.€Ballam,€òòThe€WorkersððÐ pÀ ÐCompensation€Exclusivity€Doctrine:€A€Threat€to€Workersðð€Rights€Under€StateÏEmployment€Discrimination€Statutesóó,€27€Am.€Bus.€L.€J.€95€(1989).€€Accordingly,€theÐ  p ÐTHRA€is€the€appropriate€avenue€of€relief€for€plaintiffs€who€suffer€injuries€as€a€resultÏof€sexual€harassment.€€òòSeeóó€Lewis,€44€Labor€L.€J.€at€306€(ð ðExcept€for€the€convenienceÐ Ð  Ðof€employers€and€the€flimsy€benefit€the€victims€of€sexual€harassment€might€achieveÏby€quicker,€but€much€smaller€awards,€it€is€difficult€to€conjure€a€reason€for€workersððÏcompensation€courts€handling€sexual„harassment€cases.ðð).ÌÌà Ø àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€to€the€defendantsÏis€hereby€affirmed.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€plaintiff.ÌÌÌÔ‡X^ÈXXX^ÈÔÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à_____________________________________Ð h+¸&* Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àFrank€F.€Drowota,€III,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àJusticeÌÔ#†X^ÈXXX^È/ð#ÔÌÌœñ¬ñPanel:›Ìñ¬ññµñ›ñµññ­ñò òñ­ññ¯ñÌñ¯ññ®ñCONCUR:Ìñ®ññ­ñó óñ­ñ›ÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌBirch,€Barker,€J.J.ÌHayes,€S.J.ÌHolder,€J.,€not€participating