ÿWPC”# 0# ° %» 0 (Á4éU:ý7 0JF 0è 0DxU:¼ 0Tö 0^J 0h¨ 0DT 0r\w@Î 0| 0†Š 0 1u  U, 0dA 1m¥ 0c U,u U*¡ fË I1 bz  ‚ U:‹ßÅ ¤ BDYa‰ºv~CvÓÁ˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 (X($¡¡ `Î ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular3|xå2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô(•+2„m$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑÀ°ÑÑ̰ÑÒ4°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€(òÁíòX(XÔÔ€ òÁíòò(òÁíÔò òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóó ó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó-kû¤AZ‹"Arial Regular2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô Ü/Ý/Þ+ß+à+áDâãzeä«å2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ#=e37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;3Ã$´´Ô2=eÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ?Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€Chancellor€Allisandratos€recused€himself€from€the€case.Ì- ù- ÿÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€We€need€not€discuss€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€24.01€regarding€intervention€as€of€right,€since€weÏhold€that€the€trial€court€properly€exercised€its€discretion€in€allowing€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€to€interveneÏpursuant€to€the€provisions€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€24.02.Ì,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€òòCf.óó€òòState€v.€Drakeóó,€701€S.W.2d€604€(Tenn.€1985);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó,€òòState€v.€Jamesóó,€902€S.W.2dÏ911€(Tenn.€1995)(allowing€media€intervention€to€contest€the€closure€of€a€criminal€trial).Ì –Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€The€fact€that€the€parties€reliance€becomes€relevant€later€on€illustrates€how€important€it€isÏfor€courts€to€initially€conduct€a€proper€balancing€analysis€to€determine€whether€a€protective€orderÏshould€be€granted.€€òòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€789,€note€23.€€In€any€event,€reliance€upon€a€protectiveÏorder€that€is€improvidently€granted€in€the€first€instance€will€not€insulate€that€order€from€subsequentÏmodification.€€Where€it€is€apparent€that€a€trial€court€did€not€engage€in€proper€balancing€to€initiallyÏdetermine€that€good€cause€supported€issuance€of€the€protective€order,€modification€is€proper.€€òòIdóó.€Ïat€790.Ô€#XÔÌÔ€#ôÔ d OÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€We€recognize€that€we€have€previously€held€that€pretrial€depositions€taken€byÏgovernmental€agencies€are€"public€records"€within€the€meaning€of€the€public€records€law.€ÏòòMemphis€Publishing€Co.€v.€City€of€€Memphis,óó€871€S.W.2d€681€(Tenn.€1994).€€€In€that€case,€weÏspecifically€rejected€the€argument€that€the€depositions€were€exempt,€because€they€were€not€filedÏwith€the€Court.€€In€òòMemphis€Publishing€Co.óó,€however,€we€were€not€construing€court€records,€butÏwere€determining€whether€the€records€were€public,€because€they€were€records€of€a€state,€county,Ïor€municipal€government.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€#ôÔÔ€#Ôò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€We€note€that€this€ruling€does€not€offend€First€Amendment€considerations.€€In€òòSeattleÏTimes€Co.€v.€Rhinehartóó,€òòsupraóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€protective€ordersÏentered€upon€a€showing€of€good€cause,€limited€to€the€context€of€pretrial€civil€discovery€and€whichÏdo€not€restrict€the€dissemination€of€the€information€if€gained€from€other€sources,€do€not€offend€theÏFirst€Amendment.€€Moreover,€the€common€law€right€of€access€to€public€records€is€not€absolute.€ÏThe€Court€retains€its€supervisory€power€over€its€files€and€records.€€òòNixon€v.€WarnerÏCommunications,€Inc.€óó€435€U.S.€at€598,€98€S.€Ct.€at€1309.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ X ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€~°XXdìXXdì7Ñ›Ñ  ÑØ ØÓ&€XÐd&Óà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEE̛̜à@ àAT€JACKSON̛̜ÌÌœÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€ò òòòFOR€PUBLICATIONó óóó›ÌELSIE€M.€œBALLARD›,à àà àà àœ)›ÌœCOL.›€LEWIS€P.€BOONE,€JR.,à àà àœ)à à€€€€€ò òòòFiled:€€June€10,€1996ó óóó›ÌUSAF€(Ret.),€OTIS€N.€FUSSELL,€&à à)ÌEDGAR€JOHNSON,€individually€andà à)Ìon€behalf€of€all€others€similarly€à àà àœ)›Ìsituated,€residents€of€Psalms,€Inc.,à àœ)à à€€€€€SHELBY€CHANCERY›à àÌa€Tennessee€non„profit€corporation,à à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìœà à›à àPlaintiff„Appellants,à àœà à)›à àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)à à€€€HON.€FLOYD€PEETE,€Jr.,€›ÌœVs.›à àà àà àà àà àà à)€œà à€€€€€€€€€€CHANCELLOR›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌRUDOLF€œHERZKE,›à àà àà àà à)ÌCHARLES€S.€TRAMMEL,€JR.,à àà à)ÌRETIREMENT€COMMUNITIES€OFà àœ)à à€€NO.€02S01„9501„CH„00005›ÌAMERICA€„€TENNESSEE,€INC.,€à àà à)ÌPSALMS,€INC.,€œand›€RETIREMENTà à)ÌCOMMUNITIES€OF€AMERICA,€INC.,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìœà à›à àœDefendants„Appellees.›à à)ÌÌÌÌÓ` °ˆXœ ’XÓòòò òFor€Plaintiffsóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€œDefendant,›€Palms,€Inc.:ó óÌóóœC.›€Barry€Wardà àà àà àà àà àW.€J.€Michael€CodyÌPaul€R.€Lawlerà àà àà àà àà àJohn€W.€Chandler,€Jr.ÌGlankler€Brownà àà àà àà àà àDouglas€F.€HalijanÌMemphis,€œTennessee›à àà àà àà àBurch,€Porter€&€JohnsonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€œTennessee›ÌÌòòò òFor€œIntervenors,›à àóóà àà àà àà àòòFor€œDefendant,›€Rudolf€œHerzke:óó›ó óÌòòò òThe€Tennessean€and€ó óóóà àà àœà àà àHal€Gerber›Ìòòò òThe€Society€of€Professionaló óóóà àà àà àœLewie€R.€Polk,€III›Ìòòò òJournalistsóó:ó óà àà àà àà àà àà àœGerber›€Law€OfficesÌœWilliam€R.€Willisà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌAlfred›€H.€Knightà àà àà àà àà àÌAlan€D.€JohnsonòòÌóóWillis€&€Knightòòà àÌóóNashville,€œTennesseeòò›à àà àà àà àò òFor€œDefendant,›€CharlesÏœTrammell,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJr.›€œand›€RetirementÏCommunities€œà àà àà àà àà àà àà àof›€œAmerica›€œ„Tennessee,›€œInc.:ó ó›Ìóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJ.€Alan€HanoverÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJames€R.€Newsom,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHanover,€œWalsh,€Jalenak€&€Blair›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€œTennessee›ÌÌÌò òÔ€# ÔœÌÌà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€#XÔÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED›€AND€REMANDEDà€ àANDERSON,€C.€œJ.›ÓÓÇÑ ` ÑÑ ° ÑÑ€&ÑÑ7€~°XXdìXXdì7Ñà àIn€this€appeal€we€are€asked€to€determine€whether€the€Chancery€CourtÏabused€its€discretion€by€modifying€a€protective€order€to€allow€access€toÏdiscovery€materials€previously€protected€by€the€order€and€by€allowing€mediaÏintervention.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€the€Chancery€Court,€finding€anÏabuse€of€discretion€and€reinstated€the€protective€order€which€denied€access€toÏthe€discovery€materials.ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€Chancery€Court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€eitherÏby€modifying€the€protective€order€or€by€allowing€intervention.€€The€judgment€ofÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€is,€therefore,€reversed€and€the€Chancery€Courtððs€judgmentÏmodifying€the€protective€order€is€reinstated.€ÌÌà@ àòòò òFACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àThis€case€began€on€July€18,€1989,€when€the€plaintiffs,€residents€of€KirbyÏPines€Estates,€a€life€care€retirement€community€in€Memphis,€Tennessee,Ïbrought€suit€in€Shelby€County€Chancery€Court€against€the€defendants,€Psalms,ÏInc.,€a€non„profit€corporation€which€owns€Kirby€Pines;€Rudolf€Herzke,€theÏchairman€of€the€Board€of€Directors€of€Psalms,€Inc.;€€Retirement€Communities€ofÏAmerica€„€Tennessee,€Inc.€("RCA"),€the€management€company€that€operatesÏKirby€Pines;€and€Charles€S.€Trammell,€the€President€of€RCA.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiffs€and€the€other€residents€of€Kirby€Pines€entered€into€a€writtenÏcontract€with€Psalms.€€The€contract€requires€residents€to€pay€an€entrance€feeÏand€a€monthly€maintenance€fee,€and€in€exchange,€Psalms€is€obligated€toÏprovide€the€residents€with€care€for€life,€including€care€in€the€nursing€facility€ifÏnecessary,€at€no€additional€charge.€Ì€Ìà à€Plaintiffs€alleged€in€their€complaint€that€the€defendants€had€violated€theirÏfiduciary€duties€to€the€residents€of€Kirby€Pines€and€had€engaged€in€a€conspiracyÏand€outrageous€conduct€by€denying€the€residents€access€to€information€aboutÏthe€operation€of€Kirby€Pines;€harassing€the€residents€when€they€complainedÏabout€the€operation€of€the€facility;€paying€an€excessive€management€fee€toÏdefendant€RCA;€and€making€improper€loans,€all€of€which€the€defendantsÏdenied.ÌÌà àDiscovery€proceeded€in€the€case,€with€the€plaintiffs€requesting€productionÏof€documents€and€propounding€written€interrogatories.€€The€documentsÏrequested€related€to€the€financial€affairs€of€Kirby€Pines,€while€the€writtenÏinterrogatories€inquired€into€a€wide€range€of€topics,€including€the€managementÏof€the€facility;€loans€received€by€the€defendants;€information€about€residents;Íinformation€about€policies€and€procedures;€and€information€about€€theÏdefendantsðð€personal€income€and€income€tax€returns€for€various€years.€ÏClaiming€confidentiality,€the€defendants€objected€to€many€of€the€interrogatoriesÏand€requests€for€production.ÌÌà àOn€July€27,€1990,€Chancellor€D.€J.€Alissandratos€considered€severalÏmotions€filed€by€both€sides€concerning€the€scope€and€conduct€of€discovery.€ÏFollowing€oral€argument,€he€concluded€that€the€plaintiffsðð€motion€to€compelÏdiscovery€should€be€granted,€and€the€defendants€were€given€twenty€days€toÏfully€respond€to€the€interrogatories€and€produce€the€documents.€€In€addition,Ïhowever,€without€being€requested€to€do€so,€the€court,€òòsuaóó€òòsponteóó,€imposed€aÏprotective€order€to€ð ðprotect[]€the€privacy€of€the€defendants,ðð€while€ð ðat€the€sameÏtime€giving€counsel€and€counselððs€experts€an€opportunity€.€.€.€€to€reviewÏdocuments.ðð€€The€court€ordered€ÌÓÓà8 àÌà8 àthat€all€responses€by€Defendants€to€discovery€shall€be€held€by€theÏClerk€of€this€Court€under€seal,€and€neither€the€documentsÏproduced,€nor€the€responses€to€Interrogatories€provided,€nor€anyÏother€responses€to€discovery€shall€be€disclosed€in€any€mannerÏexcept€to€Plaintiffs'€counsel,€including€counsel's€staff€andÏparalegals€who€are€involved€in€this€litigation€(all€of€whom€shall€beÏinstructed€to€keep€such€information€confidential)€or€Plaintiffs'Ïexperts€(such€as€certified€public€accountants€who€shall€€beÏinstructed€to€keep€such€information€confidential)€and€shall€not€beÍdisclosed€to€Plaintiffs€themselves,€absent€an€Order€of€the€Court€orÏan€agreement€of€counsel.ÌÌÌÌÓÓWith€the€Chancellorððs€permission,€the€plaintiffs€sought€an€interlocutory€appeal€ofÏthe€protective€order,€which€was€denied€by€the€Court€of€Appeals.€€The€discoveryÏresponses€were€thereafter€filed€with€the€Chancery€Court€Clerk,€who€held€theÏmaterials€under€seal€pursuant€to€the€protective€order.€€The€defendants€objectedÏto€the€scope€and€relevancy€of€much€of€the€plaintiffsðð€discovery,€but€theÏChancellor€overruled€the€objections,€citing€the€protections€afforded€by€theÏprotective€order.ÌÌà àOn€at€least€two€later€occasions,€plaintiffs€moved€to€modify€or€dissolve€theÏprotective€order,€but€Chancellor€Alissandratos€denied€both€motions.€€TheÏplaintiffsðð€second€motion€requested€modification€of€the€protective€order€to€allowÏdisclosure€of€financial€information€to€certain€residents€of€Kirby€Pines€familiarÏwith€banking,€business,€and€financial€practices.€€Thereafter,€the€plaintiffsÏrequested,€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€granted,€an€extraordinary€appeal€on€thatÏissue.€€After€a€hearing,€the€Court€of€Appeals€modified€the€protective€order€toÏallow€disclosure€of€the€financial€information€to€the€named€plaintiffsÌÓÓÌà8 àso€as€to€allow€counsel€freely€to€confer,€advise,€and€discuss€withÏtheir€clients€all€matters€developed€through€discovery;€provided,Íhowever,€that€such€named€plaintiffs€shall€themselves€be€subject€toÏthe€protective€order€to€the€same€extent€as€provided€therein€forÏplaintiffs'€attorneys€and€they€shall€not€disclose€discoveredÏinformation€to€others€unless€and€until€such€time€as€directed€orÏpermitted€by€the€trial€court.Ñ€$ÑÇÓÓAs€modified€by€the€Court€of€Appeals,€the€protective€order€was€to€remain€in€effectÏuntil€and€"unless€it€is€altered€in€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court."ÌÌà àThereafter,€the€State,€on€relation€of€the€plaintiffs€herein,€filed€a€separateÏaction€in€Shelby€County€Circuit€Court€against€certain€present€and€formerÏdirectors€of€Psalms,€Inc.,€alleging,€among€other€things,€an€action€in€òòquoÏwarrantoóó,€which€is€an€action€prosecuted€in€the€name€of€the€State€for€the€benefitÏof€the€corporation€to€hold€directors€accountable€for€their€management€of€theÏcorporation.€€The€circuit€court€dismissed€that€action.€€The€Court€of€AppealsÏreversed€the€circuit€courtððs€dismissal€of€the€òòquo€warrantoóó€action,€and€this€CourtÏaffirmed€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgment€in€òòState,€ex€rel.€Boone€v.€Sundquistóó,Ï884€S.W.2d€438€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àFollowing€release€of€our€decision€in€that€case,€the€plaintiffs€again€movedÏto€dissolve€or€modify€the€protective€order,€asserting€that€it€impeded€their€trialÏpreparation€by€precluding€conferences€with€unnamed€plaintiffs.€€òòTheÏTennessean,€óóa€Nashville€Tennessee€newspaper,€and€the€Society€ofÏProfessional€Journalists,€(hereafter€collectivelyòò€ð ðThe€Tennesseanóóðð),€filed€aÏmotion€to€intervene€for€the€purpose€of€requesting€that€the€Chancery€CourtÏrescind€its€protective€order€so€that€all€proceedings€and€records€would€be€openÍto€the€press€and€the€public.€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€asserted€that€the€protective€orderÏadversely€impacted€the€publicððs€right€of€access€and€the€mediaððs€common€law,Ïstatutory,€and€constitutionally€guaranteed€right€of€access€to€information€of€publicÏinterest€and€importance.ÌÌà àConcluding€that€circumstances€had€changed€since€the€entry€of€theÏprotective€order,€on€October€28,€1994,€Chancellor€Floyd€Peete,€Jr.,× ƒ% ××  ×€granted€theÏplaintiffsðð€motion€to€modify€the€protective€order,€and€allowed€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€toÏintervene.€€The€Chancellor€modified€the€protective€order€so€that€only€theÏdiscovery€materials€relating€to€the€defendantsðð€personal€income€and€personalÏtaxes€would€remain€sealed.€€Specifically,€the€Chancellor€found€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà à[T]he€Court€will€note€there€are€changed€circumstances€sinceÏthe€entry€of€the€protective€order.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏin€its€opinion€on€August€29th,€1994,€allowed€the€Circuit€Court€suitÏbrought€by€the€plaintiffs€to€be€prosecuted€in€the€name€of€the€StateÏwith€the€consent€of€the€District€Attorney€General€as€a€òòquo€warrantoóóÏaction€for€the€benefit€of€the€corporation€to€allow€that€the€directorsÏshould€be€held€accountable€for€their€management€of€theÏcorporation.€ÌÌà8 àà àThe€District€Attorney€General€has€indicated€his€plans€toÏactively€pursue€this€matter€and€prosecute€this€matter.€€Further,€theÏlawsuit€itself€has€become€a€public€issue€and€a€public€controversyÏcreating€what€this€Court€suspects€are€damaging€rumors€andÏspeculations€and€other€unnamed€events€and€damages.€€ÌÌà8 àà àIn€view€of€the€changed€circumstances,€I€am€of€the€opinionÏthat€the€protective€order€should€be€modified€and€that€the€sealÏshould€be€lifted€and€all€records€should€be€open€except€theÏpersonal€income€tax€returns€of€the€defendants,€sources€of€incomeÏand€amounts€of€income€of€the€defendants€generated€in€mattersÏunrelated€to€this€litigation.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€Court€will€also€listen€to€counsel€as€to€other€limitationsÏwhich€may€be€acceptable€to€this€Court.ÌÓÓÌÌà àThe€Chancellor€also€permitted€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€to€intervene€and€heldÏthat€those€discovery€materials€filed€with€the€Chancery€Court€Clerkððs€office,€noÏlonger€subject€to€the€protective€order,€were€ð ðpublic€records€and€should€beÏopen.ðð€€ÌÌà àOn€October€28,€1994,€the€defendants€requested,€and€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€granted,€a€motion€for€an€extraordinary€appeal,€and€stayed€theÏChancellor's€modification€of€the€protective€order.€€Following€oral€argument€onÏOctober€31,1994,€a€three„judge€panel€of€the€Court€of€Appeals,€took€the€caseÏunder€advisement€and€ordered€that€the€stay€remain€in€effect€pending€theirÏdecision.€€On€November€2,€1994,€this€Court€declined€to€grant€a€motion€toÏassume€jurisdiction€of€the€case€pursuant€to€the€"reach„down"€provisions€ofÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€16„3„201(d).€€The€Court€of€Appeals€then€rendered€itsÍdecision€on€December€22,€1994,€holding€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretionÏwhen€it€modified€the€protective€order€and€when€it€permitted€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€toÏintervene.€€Finding€that€the€defendants€had€relied€upon€the€protective€order€inÏanswering€the€discovery€requests,€the€intermediate€court€concluded€that€toÏpermit€the€protective€order€to€be€dissolved€"could€permit€the€distribution€ofÏdiscovery€data€that€might€otherwise€not€have€been€discovered€and€theÏconcomitant€danger€of€the€dissemination€of€non„relevant€discovered€informationÏwithout€any€explanation."€€The€Court€of€Appeals€also€concluded€that€the€sealedÏdiscovery€responses€were€not€subject€to€the€Tennessee€Public€Records€Act.€€ÌÌà àThereafter,€we€granted€permission€to€appeal€to€clarify€these€importantÏissues€relating€to€media€intervention,€discovery,€and€public€records.ÌÌÓ  Óò òòòMEDIA€INTERVENTIONóóó óÌÓ  Óà àòòThe€Tennessean,óó€in€this€Court,€argues€that€the€Court€of€Appeals€erred€inÏdenying€it€permission€to€intervene.€€The€defendants€respond€that€intervention€isÏnot€necessary€because€the€plaintiffsðð€adequately€represent€the€interests€of€theÏmedia.€€We€disagree.ÌÌà àPermissive€intervention× ƒ' ××  ×€is€governed€by€Tennessee€Rule€of€CivilÏProcedure€24.02,€which€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:€ÌÓÓÌà8 àUpon€timely€application€anyone€may€be€permitted€to€intervene€inÏan€action:€(1)€when€a€statute€confers€a€conditional€right€toÏintervene;€or€(2)€when€an€applicant's€claim€or€defense€and€theÏmain€action€have€a€question€of€law€or€fact€in€common.€€InÏexercising€discretion€the€court€shall€consider€whether€or€not€theÏintervention€will€unduly€delay€or€prejudice€the€adjudication€of€theÏrights€of€the€original€parties.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIf€the€would„be€intervenorððs€claim€or€defense€contains€a€question€of€lawÏor€fact€that€is€also€raised€by€the€main€action€then€the€requirement€of€the€rule€hasÏbeen€satisfied€€and€the€trial€court€is€afforded€discretion€to€permit€intervention.€ÏWright,€Miller€&€Kane,€7C€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedure€Civil€2dóó,€ðð€1911,€pp.€Ï358„63€(West€1986).€ÌÌà àWhile€our€research€has€revealed€no€authority€directly€on€point€in€thisÏjurisdiction,× ƒ) ××  ×€we€agree€with€those€federal€and€state€courts€in€other€jurisdictionsÏwhich€have€routinely€found€that€third€parties,€including€media€entities,€should€beÍallowed€to€intervene€to€seek€modification€of€protective€orders€to€obtain€access€toÏjudicial€proceedings€or€records.€€òòSeeóó€òòPansy€v.€Borough€of€Stroudsburgóó,€23€F.3dÏ772,€778€(3rd€Cir.€1994);€òòGrove€Fresh€Distributors,€Inc.€v.€Everfresh€Juice€Coóó.,Ï24€F.3d€893,€898€(7th€Cir.€1994)(press€should€be€allowed€to€challenge€aÏprotective€order€for€abuse€or€impropriety);€òòNorthern€States€Power€Co.€v.ÏWestinghouse€Elec.€Corpóó.,€156€F.R.D.€168€(D.€Minn.€1994)(intervention€is€theÏproper€procedure€for€media€challenge€to€protective€order);€òòCity€of€Hartford€v.ÏChaseóó,€733€F.€Supp.€533€(D.€Conn.€1990),€òòrev'd€on€other€groundsóó,€942€F.2dÏ130€(2nd€Cir.€1991)(media€allowed€to€intervene€to€challenge€sealing€ofÏdocument);€òòCourier„Journal€v.€Peersóó,€747€S.W.2d€125€(Ky.€1988)(hearingÏallowed€to€determine€whether€public's€right€of€access€was€outweighed€by€theÏlitigant's€right€of€privacy);€òòseeóó€òògenerallyóó€8€òòFederal€Practice€&€Procedure€Civil€2dóó,Ïðð€2044.1,€p.€€576„77.€ÌÌà àIn€such€circumstances,€intervention€"is€not€dependent€on,€nor€is€itÏdetermined€by,€the€status€or€identification€of€the€parties€nor€the€nature€of€theÏdispute."€€òòIdóó.€€Moreover,€the€question€of€intervention€is€collateral€to,€and€does€notÏhave€any€bearing€on,€the€primary€issue€„„€modification€of€the€protective€order.€€ÏWhat€is€necessary€is€that€the€proposed€intervenor€demonstrate€that€its€claimsÏhave€"a€question€of€law€or€fact€in€common"€with€the€main€action.€ÌÌà àHere,€as€in€all€such€cases,€by€virtue€of€the€fact€that€the€media€entitiesÏchallenge€the€validity€of€the€protective€order€entered€in€the€main€action,€theyÏmeet€the€requirement€of€Rule€24.02,€that€their€claim€have€ð ða€question€of€law€orÏfact€in€commonðð€with€the€main€action.€€Nonetheless,€the€interest€of€the€plaintiffsÏand€the€intervenors€is€not€identical.€€The€plaintiffs€seek€access€to€enhance€theirÏability€to€prepare€for€trial.€€They€are€not€attempting€to€gain€access€for€publicÏdissemination.€€Were€the€plaintiffs€to€settle€this€case,€their€interest€in€modifyingÏthe€protective€order€would€end.€€By€contrast,€the€intervenors€seek€to€gain€accessÏon€behalf€of€the€general€public€in€order€to€disseminate€the€information€throughÏthe€media.€€Therefore,€though€the€basic€interest€is€the€same,€that€of€overturningÏthe€protective€order,€the€interests€are€not€identical,€and€intervention€isÏappropriate.ÌÌà àWhere,€as€here,€a€common€question€of€law€or€fact€is€established,€theÏdecision€to€allow€intervention€is€a€matter€entrusted€to€the€trial€courtððs€discretion,Ïand€the€decision€should€not€be€reversed€by€an€appellate€court€absent€aÏshowing€of€abuse€of€discretion.€€Nothing€in€this€record€reveals€that€the€ChanceryÏCourt€abused€its€discretion€in€allowing€intervention.€€We€hold€that€theÏChancellor€properly€exercised€his€discretion€in€allowing€òòThe€Tennesseanóó€toÍintervene.€€Accordingly,€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgment€denying€intervention€isÏreversed.€€We€must€next€consider€whether€the€Chancellor€abused€his€discretionÏin€modifying€the€protective€order.ò òÌÌà@ àòòMODIFICATION€OF€THE€PROTECTIVE€ORDERó óóóÌà àBoth€the€plaintiffs€and€the€intervenors€argue€that€the€Chancery€CourtððsÏmodification€of€the€protective€order€was€a€proper€exercise€of€its€discretionaryÏauthority€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.03.€€€On€the€other€hand,€the€defendantsÏcontend€the€Court€of€Appeals€was€correct€in€reversing€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,Ïbecause€the€Chancellor€failed€to€consider€that€the€defendants€fully€respondedÏto€the€discovery€requests€in€reliance€on€the€protective€order.€€€A€proper€analysisÏof€this€issue€requires€that€we€review€the€standards€governing€the€issuance€of€aÏprotective€order,€and€those€governing€modification€of€an€already„existingÏprotective€order.ÌÌà àUnder€Rule€26.03,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€upon€motion€by€any€party€and€forÏgood€cause€shown,€a€trial€court€has€the€authority€to€make€any€order€ð ðto€protect€aÏparty€or€person€from€annoyance,€embarrassment,€oppression,€or€undue€burdenÏor€expense,€including€.€.€.ðð€ordering€that€the€discovery€responses€be€filed€underÏseal,€as€was€done€in€this€case.€€Protective€orders€are€intended€to€offer€litigants€aÍmeasure€of€privacy,€while€balancing€against€this€privacy€interest€the€publicððsÏright€to€obtain€information€concerning€judicial€proceedings.€€In€addition,Ïprotective€orders€are€often€used€by€courts€as€a€device€to€aid€the€progression€ofÏlitigation€and€to€facilitate€settlements.€€Protective€orders€strike€a€balance,Ïtherefore,€between€public€and€private€concerns.€€òòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€786.€ÌÌà àTo€establish€ð ðgood€causeðð€under€Rule€26(c),€the€moving€party€must€showÏthat€disclosure€will€result€in€a€clearly€defined€injury€to€the€party€seeking€closure.€Ïð ðBroad€allegations€of€harm,€unsubstantiated€by€specific€examples€or€articulatedÏreasoning,ðð€do€not€amount€to€a€showing€of€good€cause.€€òòCipollone€v.€€LiggettÏGroup,€Inc.óó,€785€F.2d€1108,€1121€(3d€Cir.€€1986).€€Mere€conclusory€allegationsÏare€insufficient.€€The€burden€of€justifying€the€confidentiality€of€each€and€everyÏdocument€sought€to€be€covered€by€a€protective€order€is€on€the€party€seeking€theÏorder.€€òòIdóó.;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòLoveall€v.€American€Honda€Motor€Co.óó,€694€S.W.2d€937,€939Ï(Tenn.€1985).ÌÌà àIn€determining€whether€good€cause€has€been€established€for€a€protectiveÏorder,€it€is€important€that€trial€courts€balance€one€partyððs€need€for€informationÏagainst€the€injury€that€would€allegedly€result€if€disclosure€is€compelled.€€ArthurÏR.€€Miller,€òòConfidentiality,€Protective€Orders,€and€Public€Access€to€the€Courtsóó,Í105€Harv.€L.€Rev.€427,€433„35€(1991).€€Factors€in€the€balance€weighing€againstÏa€finding€of€good€cause€include:€(1)€the€party€benefitting€from€the€protectiveÏorder€is€a€œpublic›€entity€or€official;€(2)€the€information€sought€to€be€sealed€relatesÏto€a€matter€of€public€concern;€and€(3)€the€information€sought€to€be€sealed€isÏrelevant€to€other€litigation€and€sharing€it€would€promote€fairness€and€efficiency.€ÏòòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€787.€€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€factors€in€the€balance€weighing€in€favor€of€a€finding€ofÏgood€cause€include:€(1)€the€litigation€involves€private€litigants;€(2)€the€litigationÏconcerns€matters€of€private€concern€or€of€little€legitimate€public€interest;€and€(3)Ïdisclosure€would€result€in€serious€embarrassment€or€other€specific€harm.€€òòSeeóóÏòòSeattle€Times€Co.€v.€Rhinehartóó,€467€U.S.€20,€34„36,€104€S.€Ct.€€2199,€2208„09,Ï81€L.€Ed.€2d€17€(1984);€òòCipolloneóó,€785€F.2d€at€1121.€€No€particular€weight€isÏassigned€to€any€factor,€and€the€balancing€test€allows€trial€courts€to€evaluate€theÏcompeting€considerations€in€light€of€the€facts€of€each€individual€case.€€Miller,Ï105€Harv.€L.€Rev.€at€492.€€The€ultimate€decision€as€to€whether€or€not€a€protectiveÏorder€should€issue€is€entrusted€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€and€itÏwill€not€be€reversed€on€appeal,€absent€a€showing€of€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏòòLoveallóó,€694€S.W.2d€at€939.€€The€burden€of€establishing€abuse€of€discretion€isÏon€the€party€seeking€to€overturn€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€on€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòRachelsÍv.€Steeleóó,€633€S.W.2d€473,€475€(Tenn.€Ct€.€App.€1981).€€To€facilitate€effectiveÏappellate€review,€trial€courts€should€articulate€on€the€record€findings€supportingÏits€decision.€€òòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€789.€€In€appropriate€cases,€the€trial€court€mayÏdeem€it€necessary€to€seal€that€portion€of€the€record€which€contains€its€findings,Ïfor€in€some€circumstances,€the€courtððs€open€articulation€of€its€findings€wouldÏcompromise€the€protective€order.€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àOnce€entered,€protective€orders€need€not€remain€in€place€permanently,Ïhowever,€and€their€terms€are€not€immutable.€€€It€is€well„settled€that€a€trial€courtÏretains€the€power€to€modify€or€lift€a€protective€order€that€it€has€entered.€€òòPoliquinÏv.€Garden€Way,€Inc.€v.€Liggett€Group,€Inc.óó,€989€F.2d€527,€535€(1st€Cir.€1993);ÏòòBeckman€Industries,€Inc.€v.€International€Ins.€Co.óó,€966€F.2d€470,€472€(9th€Cir.€Ï1992);€òòUnited€Nuclear€Corp.€v.€Cranford€Ins.€Co.óó,€905€F.2d€1424,€1427€(10th€Cir.€Ï1990);€òòseeóó€òògenerallyóó€8€òòFederal€Practice€&€Procedure€Civil€2dóó€ðð€2044.1,€p.€576,Ïn.€8€(citing€cases).€ÌÌà àThere€is€disagreement€among€courts,€however,€as€to€the€standard€thatÏgoverns€a€trial€courtððs€decision€on€requests€for€modification.€€Emphasizing€theÏneed€to€foster€use€of€protective€orders€as€a€means€of€facilitating€discovery,€andÏreasoning€that€allowing€modification€lessens€the€reliability€of€protective€ordersÍas€a€facilitation€device,€a€few€courts€have€adopted€a€restrictive€attitude€towardÏmodification.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòPalmieri€v.€New€Yorkóó,€779€F.2d€861,€864„66€(2d€Cir.€Ï1985);€òòFederal€Deposit€Ins.€Corp.€v.€Ernst€&€Ernstóó,€677€F.2d€230,€232€(2d€Cir.€Ï1982);€òòUnited€States€v.€Kentucky€Utils.€Co.óó,€927€F.2d€252,€255€(6th€Cir.€1991);Ïòòbutóó€òòseeóó€òòMeyer€Goldberg,€Inc.€of€Lorain€v.€Fisher€Foods,€Inc.óó,€823€F.2d€159,€163„64€(6th€Cir.€€987).€€Courts€adopting€the€restrictive€standard,€pioneered€by€theÏSecond€Circuit,€do€not€allow€modification,€absent€a€showing€of€improvidence€inÏthe€grant€of€the€initial€protective€order,€or€some€extraordinary€circumstance,€orÏsome€compelling€need.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àMost€courts€have€rejected€the€stringent€standard,€and€in€determiningÏwhether€modification€is€warranted,€apply€a€derivative€of€the€standard€governingÏthe€ð ðgood€causeðð€analysis.€€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€791;€òòBeckman€Indus.,ÏInc.óó,€966€F.2d.€at€475„76;€òòUnited€Nuclear€Corp.óó,€905€F.2d€at€1428;€òòPublic€CitizenÏv.€Liggett€Group,€Inc.óó,€858€F.2d€775,€791€(1st€Cir.€1988);€òòIowa€Beef€Processors,ÏInc.€v.€Bagleyóó,€601€F.2d€949,€954€(8th€Cir.€1979).€€We€agree€that€the€restrictiveÏstandard€adopted€by€the€Second€Circuit€is€too€stringent,€and€adopt€the€ThirdÏCircuitððs€approach€which€utilizes€the€balancing€test€for€determining€whether€toÏimpose€a€protective€order€in€the€first€instance,€with€consideration€given€to€oneÏadditional€factor€„„€the€reliance€by€the€original€parties€on€the€protective€order.€ÍòòPansyóó,€23€F.3d€at€790.€€While€this€approach€recognizes€the€importance€ofÏfostering€reliance€on€and€confidence€in€protective€orders,€that€singleÏconsideration€is€not€outcome€determinative,€as€it€is€under€the€Second€CircuitððsÏstandard.€€The€partiesðð€reliance€is€but€one€factor€a€court€should€consider€in€theÏbalance€when€determining€whether€modification€of€a€protective€order€isÏappropriate.× ƒ* ××  ×€€òòIdóó.;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€8€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedure€Civil€2dóó,€ðð2044.1,Ïp.€583.ÌÌà àð ðThe€extent€to€which€a€party€can€rely€on€a€protective€order€should€dependÏon€the€extent€to€which€the€order€induced€the€party€to€allow€discovery....ððÏòòBeckman€Indus.,€Inc.óó,€966€F.2d€at€475„76€(citation€omitted).€€In€that€respect,€trialÏcourts€must€consider€whether€reliance€is€real€and€reasonable€or€is€only€an€effortÏby€litigants€to€avoid€later€modification.€€Although€reasonable€cooperation€isÏsome€evidence€of€reliance,€it€is€not€determinative.€€For€example,€blanketÏprotective€orders,€are€particularly€useful€in€effecting€cooperation€and€expeditingÏthe€flow€of€pretrial€discovery;€however,€they€are€also,€by€nature,€over€inclusive,Íless€likely€to€induce€reasonable€reliance,€and€therefore,€peculiarly€subject€toÏlater€modification.€€òòIdóó.;€òòaccordóó€òòPublic€Citizenóó,€858€F.2d€at€790.€€Accordingly,Ïreliance€on€a€blanket€protective€order€ordinarily€weighs€little€in€the€balanceÏagainst€modification.€€The€appropriate€procedure,€following€delivery€ofÏdocuments€under€a€blanket€protective€order,€is€to€allow€the€party€seeking€toÏmaintain€confidentiality€an€opportunity€to€indicate€precisely€which€documentsÏare€allegedly€confidential.€€The€party€seeking€to€maintain€the€seal€then€has€theÏburden€of€establishing€good€cause€with€respect€to€those€documents.€€òòCipolloneóó,Ï785€F.2d€at€1122.Ìà àÌà àIn€sum,€once€a€party€moves€to€modify€a€protective€order,€a€trial€court€must€Ïbalance€the€factors€initially€considered€when€determining€good€cause,€and€inÏaddition,€€consider€the€reliance€of€the€original€parties€to€the€order,€to€determineÏwhether€good€cause€òòstillóó€exists€for€the€order.€€As€previously€explained,€if€accessÏto€protected€materials€can€be€granted€without€causing€harm€to€legitimate€privacyÏinterests,€access€should€be€granted.€€Unless€the€motion€seeks€to€modify€aÏblanket€protective€order,€the€movant€has€the€burden€of€establishing€that€theÏneed€for€access€to€the€materials€outweighs€the€privacy€concerns.€€òòPansyóó,€23ÏF.3d€at€790.€€When€modification€of€a€blanket€protective€order€is€sought,€the€partyÏseeking€to€maintain€confidentiality€must€designate€the€documents€alleged€to€beÍconfidential€and€then€establish€that€good€cause€exists€with€respect€to€thoseÏdocuments.ÌÌà àApplying€the€above€principles€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€erred€in€reversing€the€Chancellorððs€judgment€modifying€theÏprotective€order.€€Here,€the€first€blanket€protective€order€was€initially€enteredÏupon€the€òòcourtððsóó€own€motion.€€The€defendants€were€not€required,€therefore,€toÏmuster€a€good€cause€showing€as€to€why€the€order€should€be€granted,€and€theÏonly€basis€for€the€protective€order€reflected€by€the€record€is€the€ChancellorððsÏstatement€that€it€was€an€effort€to€ð ðprotect€the€privacy€of€the€defendants€whileÏgiving€the€plaintiffs'€counsel€and€their€experts€an€opportunity€to€reviewÏdocuments.ðð€€Later,€Chancellor€Allisandratos€said€the€protective€order€wasÏgiven€in€exchange€for€the€ð ðfishing€licenseðð€afforded€the€plaintiffs.€€At€no€time,Ïhowever,€did€Chancellor€Allisandratos€lead€the€defendants€to€believe€that€theÏprotective€order€would€forever€prevent€disclosure.€€Indeed,€he€emphasized€hisÏconcern€was€with€òòpremature€disclosureóó.€€This,€therefore,€was€a€blanketÏprotective€order€meant€to€facilitate€discovery€and€is,€therefore,€peculiarly€subjectÏto€modification.ÌÌà àIn€ruling€upon€the€plaintiffsðð€motion€to€modify,€Chancellor€PeeteÏconsidered€the€following€factors€favoring€modification:€(1)€the€fact€that€theÏlitigation€involves€a€matter€of€public€concern;€and€(2)€the€existence€of€otherÏrelated€ongoing€litigation.€€Both€of€these€are€appropriate€factors€forÏconsideration.€€To€protect€the€privacy€interests€of€the€defendants,€ChancellorÏPeete€maintained€the€seal€of€the€protective€order€on€the€records€pertaining€toÏtheir€personal€income€and€taxes.€€In€consideration€of€the€defendants€relianceÏinterest,€he€offered€them€an€opportunity€to€suggest€other€limitations,€which€is€theÏappropriate€procedure,€as€previously€stated,€when€modification€of€a€blanketÏprotective€order€is€sought.€€Here,€the€record€reflects€that€the€defendants€did€notÏraise€any€further€specific€objections.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€Chancellor€Peeteððs€decision€primarilyÏbecause€it€held€the€defendantsðð€reliance€on€the€protective€order€precludedÏmodification.€€However,€as€we€have€previously€noted,€reliance€is€only€one€factorÏto€be€considered€in€the€balancing€test.€€Here,€the€reliance€interest€is€not€soÏstrong€as€to€preclude€modification.€€From€the€time€of€entry€of€the€protectiveÏorder,€eventual€disclosure€has€been€inevitable.€€Moreover,€we€emphasize€thatÏthe€trial€court€is€in€the€best€position€to€weigh€fairly€the€competing€needs€andÏinterests€of€the€parties.€€òòSeattle€Times€Co.óó,€467€U.S.€at€36,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2209.€ÍUnless€a€trial€court€has€applied€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€or€it€affirmativelyÏappears€on€the€record€that€a€trial€court€abused€its€discretion,€appellate€reversalÏis€not€warranted.€€Discretion€denotes€the€absence€of€a€hard€and€fast€rule.€€WhenÏinvoked€as€a€guide€for€judicial€action,€it€requires€that€the€trial€court€view€theÏfactual€circumstances€in€light€of€the€relevant€legal€principles€and€exercise€Ïconsidered€discretion€before€reaching€a€conclusion.€€Discretion€should€not€beÏarbitrarily€exercised.€€The€applicable€facts€and€law€must€be€given€dueÏconsideration.€€òòLangnes€v.€Greenóó,€282€U.S.€531,€541,€51€S.Ct.€243,€247,€75ÏL.Ed.€520,€526€(1931).€€An€appellate€court€should€not€reverse€for€ð ðabuse€ofÏdiscretionðð€a€discretionary€judgment€of€a€trial€court€unless€it€affirmativelyÏappears€that€the€trial€courtððs€decision€was€against€logic€or€reasoning,€andÏcaused€an€injustice€or€injury€to€the€party€complaining.€€òòDouglas€v.€Estate€ofÏRobertsonóó,€876€S.W.2d€95,€97€(Tenn.€1994);€òòFoster€v.€Amcon€Internóó.,€621ÏS.W.2d€142,€145€(Tenn.€1981).€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€hold€that€Chancellor€Peete€properly€exercised€hisÏdiscretion€in€modifying€the€protective€order€and€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgmentÏis,€therefore,€reversed.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òTENNESSEE€PUBLIC€RECORDS€ACTóóó óÌà àThe€intervenors€argue€that€all€the€discovery€responses,€including€thoseÏitems€which€remain€subject€to€the€protective€order,€are€"public€records"€withinÏthe€meaning€of€the€Tennessee€Public€Records€Act€and€therefore€must€be€madeÏavailable€for€inspection.ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€by€acknowledging€that€it€is€beyond€dispute€thatÏthere€exists€in€this€country€a€general€right€to€inspect€and€copy€public€recordsÏand€documents,€including€judicial€records€and€documents.€€òòCfóó.€òòNixon€v.€WarnerÏCommunications,€Inc.óó,€435€U.S.€589,€98€S.€Ct.€1306,€55€L.€Ed.€2d€570€(1978).€ÏThe€public's€right€to€access€provides€public€scrutiny€over€the€court€system€whichÏserves€to€(1)€promote€community€respect€for€the€rule€of€law,€(2)€provide€a€checkÏon€the€activities€of€judges€and€litigants,€and€(3)€foster€more€accurate€fact€finding.€ÏòòGrove€Fresh€Distributors,€Inc.óó,€24€F.3d€at€898.€€The€right€of€access€to€judicialÏproceedings€and€records€was€originally€justified€by€common€law€traditionsÏpredating€the€enactment€of€the€federal€Constitution.€€The€common€law€right€ofÏaccess€establishes€that€court€files€and€documents€should€be€open,€unless€theÏcourt€finds€that€the€records€are€being€used€for€improper€purposes.€€òòId.óó€ÏMoreover,€the€First€Amendment€to€the€Constitution€presumes€that€there€is€a€rightÏof€access€to€proceedings€and€documents€which€have€"historically€been€open€toÍthe€public"€and€€which€disclosure€would€serve€a€significant€role€in€theÏfunctioning€of€the€process.€€Id.ÌÌà àThe€public€records€law€is€essentially€a€codification€of€the€public€accessÏdoctrine.€€That€law€designates€certain€judicial€records€as€"public€records."€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€10„7„101("records....shall€be€construed€to€mean€any€recordsÏof€the€Chancery€Court.");€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€10„7„403€("public€records"€meansÏ"the€pleadings,€documents,€and€other€papers€òòfiledóó€with€the€Clerks€of€all€courts")Ï(emphasis€added).€€Although€pretrial€depositions× ƒ, ××  ×€and€interrogatories€generallyÏare€not€considered€to€be€public€components€of€a€civil€trial,€òòSeattle€Times€Co.óó,Ï467€U.S.€at€33,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2207,€in€Tennessee,€discovery€responses€areÏrequired,€absent€a€trial€court€order€or€local€rule,€to€be€filed€with€the€clerk€of€theÏCourt.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€5.05.€€Although€some€courts€have€promulgated€localÏrules€exempting€discovery€responses€from€the€filing€requirement,€òòseeóó,€òòe.góó.,ÏDavidson€County€Local€Rule€of€Practice€9.01,€the€Shelby€County€ChanceryÏCourt€has€no€such€local€rule€and€the€record€reveals€no€order€exempting€theÍparties€in€this€case€from€the€filing€requirement.€€Consequently,€it€is€abundantlyÏclear€that€discovery€responses€filed€with€the€Clerk€of€the€court,€are€"publicÏrecords"€within€the€meaning€of€the€law.ÌÌà àHowever,€that€conclusion€does€not€end€the€inquiry€because€some€of€theÏdiscovery€responses€in€this€case€are€still€subject€to€a€protective€order€that€wasÏentered€in€accordance€with€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€TennÏCode€Ann.€ðð€10„7„503(a)€provides€that€governmental€records€shall€be€subject€toÏpublic€access,€"unless€otherwise€provided€by€State€law."€€In€òòAppman€v.ÏWorthingtonóó,€746€S.W.2d€165€(Tenn.€1987),€we€held€that€the€Public€Records€ActÏdoes€not€authorize€public€inspection€of€documents€in€a€criminal€case€that€areÏexempt€from€discovery€by€Rule€16,€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure.€ÏWe€reasoned€that€the€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure€are€€the€law€of€this€State,€andÏtherefore,€are€encompassed€within€the€phrase,€ð ðunless€otherwise€provided€byÏState€law.ðð€€Accordingly,€we€concluded€that€materials€exempt€from€discovery€byÏthe€rules€of€criminal€procedure€are€not€subject€to€inspection€under€theÏTennessee€Public€Records€Act.ÌÌà à€The€same€reasoning€applies€in€this€case.€€The€Rules€of€Civil€ProcedureÏare€the€"law"€of€this€state.€€òòTennessee€Department€of€Human€Services€v.ÍVaughnóó,€595€S.W.2d€62€(Tenn.€1980).€€The€protective€order€therefore€wasÏentered€pursuant€to€"State€law."€€Accordingly,€documents€sealed€by€theÏprotective€order€are€not€subject€to€inspection€under€the€Tennessee€PublicÏRecords€Act.× ƒ- ××  ×ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àBecause€we€conclude€that€the€Chancery€Court€did€not€abuse€itsÏdiscretion€either€by€modifying€the€protective€order€or€by€allowing€intervention,Ïthe€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€is€reversed.€€The€judgment€of€theÏChancellor€modifying€the€protective€order€is€reinstated,€and€this€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€Chancery€Court€for€further€proceedings.€€Costs€on€appeal€areÏtaxed€to€the€defendants.ÌÌÓÓà àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà0 àà àà0 àà0 àà0 àRILEY€ANDERSON,€CHIEF€JUSTICEÌÌÌò òCONCUR:ó óÌÌDrowota,€Reid,€White,€and€Birch,€JJ.