ÿWPCª% …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µU:Ýw@ 4W k 0Dz 0J¾ 0T 0^\ 0hº 0r" 0|” 0† 0– 1u& 0d› ÿ U>U*EU*oB)™ BÂDCß AM"o¢Šû, D3'ƒZ™Ý 0@v¶v~ÊvÓHb# 0â## AO$ÆT$ 0D% D/^% B%˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular 47U57«67Ae77r‚87?r‚97[:7D;7<7Ó€H7ƒo!#3|xH7(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d d####7Border 1dd€-%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òDecember€23,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ˜Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝProsecution€of€this€contempt€proceeding€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€CriminalÏProcedure€42(b)€indicates€that€the€trial€judge€did€not€directly€witness€Blountððs€behavior.Ì ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòCastellio€v.€Stateóó,€238€S.E.2d€746€(Ga.€Ct.€App.€1977)(Holding€that€defendantððsÏconduct€could€not€have€obstructed€or€impaired€the€administration€of€justice€because€ð ðthe€trial€hadÏterminated€and€the€jury€had€been€discharged.ðð)Ì$$$$'ÿÿdxd yÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòYoungóó€also€held€that€an€attorney€representing€a€partyÏin€a€legal€proceeding€from€which€contempt€charges€arise€may€not€be€appointed€to€prosecute€theÏcontempt€charges.€€Black€did€not€represent€any€of€the€parties€in€the€action€from€which€theseÏcontempt€charges€arose.€€Therefore,€we€reserve€decision€on€that€issue€for€a€case€in€which€it€isÏsquarely€presented.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThat€statute€provides€as€follows:Ìà8 à(a)€The€punishment€for€contempt€may€be€by€fine€or€by€imprisonment,€or€both.ÌÌà8 à(b)€Where€not€otherwise€specially€provided,€the€circuit,€chancery,€and€appellateÏcourts€are€limited€to€a€fine€of€fifty€dollars€($50.00),€and€imprisonment€not€exceedingÏten€(10)€days,€and,€except€as€provided€in€ðð€29„9„108,€all€other€courts€are€limited€to€aÏfine€of€ten€dollars€($10.00).Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝBecause€we€conclude€that€attorneyððs€fees€are€recoverable€in€this€case€under€òòFergusonóó,Ïwe€need€not€decide€whether€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„25„104€(1990€Repl.)€and€29„9„103€(1980ÏRepl.€&€1996€Supp.)€allow€taxing€of€attorneyððs€fees€as€costs€in€criminal€contempt€proceedings.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò- ù-(’(2Û$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑȰÑÑÚ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X½XXXÔÔ€ôÂ…ôXX½Ôà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  Ý›Ò € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€!ÔÑ€1ÑÑ7€vXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€""X°d&Óœ›Þ ÞÌà@ àÔ€!¼ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÔ€!XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌSTEVAN€L.€BLACK,€as€òòAmicus€Curiae,óóà àà à)à àò òFiled:ó ó€December€23,€1996Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellantà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€DððArmy€Bailey,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àJudgeÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌJAMES€E.€BLOUNT,€III,à àà àà àà à)à àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSupreme€CourtÌà àRespondent/Appellee.à àà àà à)à àNo.€02„S01„9604„CV„00044̜ـ€ÙßR€&'%A1-j|S` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòÌÌÌÌFOR€PETITIONER/APPELLANTà àà àFOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEE:óóÌStevan€L.€Blackà àà àà àà àRobert€L.€Green,ÌBlack,€Bobango€&€Morganà àà àà àÔ€!&ÔNeely,€Green,€Fargarson,€Brooke€&€SummersÏÔ€!XÔMemphis,€Tennesseeà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWilbur€RulemanÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€Tennesseeà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€!„Ôà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€!XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌTRIAL€COURT€AFFIRMED;ÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED;ÌCASE€REMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.€ÌÓÓà àIn€this€criminal€contempt€action,€Stevan€L.€Black,€appointed€by€the€trialÏÑ , ÑÑ ` Ñcourt€as€òòamicus€curiae,óó€appeals€from€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€decision€that€theÏevidence€is€insufficient€as€a€matter€of€law€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€judgmentÏfinding€the€appellee,€James€E.€Blount,€III,€guilty€of€two€counts€of€criminalÏcontempt,€and€ordering€him€to€pay€as€costs€$5,000€in€attorneyððs€fees€to€Black.€ÏAfter€carefully€considering€the€record€in€this€case,€we€conclude€that€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€erred,€both€in€finding€the€evidence€insufficient€to€support€the€contemptÏconvictions€and€also€in€concluding€that€the€trial€judge€lacked€authority€to€orderÏpayment€of€attorneyððs€fees.€Accordingly,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÍAppeals,€reinstate€the€criminal€contempt€convictions,€€and€remand€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€calculation€of€reasonable€attorneyððs€fees.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àAppellee,€James€E.€Blount,€III,€represented€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Jackson€in€aÏpersonal€injury€action€involving€the€consolidated€cases€of€òòAshford€v.€BenjaminóóÏand€òòJackson€v.€Benjaminóó.€€Attorney€Stuart€Breakstone€represented€theÏdefendants.€€The€trial€judge€directed€a€verdict€in€favor€of€the€Jacksons€on€theÏissue€of€liability€and€the€case€was€tried€to€the€jury€on€the€issue€of€damages€only.€ÏThe€jury€returned€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Mrs.€Jackson€in€the€amount€of€$35,000.€€ÌÌà àAfter€the€jury€verdict€as€to€Mrs.€Jackson€was€read,€Blount€directed€aÏð ðthumbs€downðð€gesture€to€the€jury€and€muttered€words€to€the€effect€that€the€verdictÏas€to€his€client€was€unjust€and€unfair.€€Before€rendition€of€all€the€verdicts€and€priorÏto€the€trial€court€excusing€either€the€participants€or€the€jurors,€Blount€exited€theÏcourtroom€in€an€abrupt€manner.€€According€to€one€witness,€as€he€exited,€BlountÍð ðhad€his€hands€in€the€air€and€.€.€.€€said€this€is€a€travesty€of€justice.ðð€€Blount,Ïhowever,€returned€to€the€courtroom€and€was€present€when€the€jury€foremanÏreceived€his€certificate€of€service.ÌÌà àAfter€the€jury€was€discharged,€Breakstone€and€some€of€the€jurors€wereÏconversing€in€the€hallway€outside€the€courtroom€when€Blount€approached€and,€inÏa€raised€voice,€angrily€expressed€his€dissatisfaction€with€the€verdict.€€Blount€toldÏthe€jurors€that€ð ðhe€hoped€they€could€live€with€themselves€for€what€they€did,€thatÏwhat€they€did€was€a€travesty€of€justice€and€they€must€not€have€been€at€the€sameÏtrial€that€he€was€.€.€.€because€they€would€have€given€his€clients€more€money€.€.€.Ïthat€he€hoped€that€if€an€accident€ever€happened€like€this€.€.€.€to€them€.€.€.€or€theirÏfamily€members,€that€they€would€have€the€same€damn€injuries€and€the€sameÏjury.ððÌ€€Ìà àWhen€Blount€walked€away,€Breakstone€began€apologizing€to€the€jurors€forÏBlountððs€conduct.€€Overhearing€the€apology,€Blount€returned€and€told€Breakstone,Ïð ðdonððt€you€apologize€for€me.€€Youððre€the€most€unethical€attorney€I€know,€youÍdefrauded€the€Court€and€jury€throughout€this€entire€trial€and€you€lied€to€the€CourtÏand€jury€throughout€the€trial.ðð€€While€making€those€statements,€Blount€wasÏpushing€and€jabbing€Breakstoneððs€shoulder.ÌÌà àFollowing€an€in„chambers€meeting€with€both€attorneys,€which€was€initiatedÏby€Breakstone,€the€trial€judge€entered€an€order€appointing€Stevan€L.€Black€asÏòòamicus€curiaeóó€to€the€court€ð ðto€investigate,€initiate€and€prosecute€a€contemptÏcitationðð€against€Blount.× ƒ( ××  ×€€The€petition€for€criminal€contempt€alleged€that€BlountÏviolated€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€29„9„102(1),€(2)€and€(4)€(1981€Repl.),€whichÏprovides:ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€power€of€the€several€courts€to€issue€attachments,€and€inflictÏpunishments€for€contempts€of€court,€shall€not€be€construed€toÏextend€to€any€except€the€following€cases:ÌÌà8 àà à(1)€The€willful€misbehavior€of€any€person€in€the€presence€ofÏthe€court,€or€so€near€thereto€as€to€obstruct€the€administration€ofÏjustice.ÌÌà8 àà à(2)€The€willful€misbehavior€of€any€of€the€officers€of€saidÍcourts,€in€their€official€transactions.ÌÌà@ à*€€*€€*€€*ÌÌà8 àà à(4)€Abuse€of,€or€unlawful€interference€with,€the€process€orÏproceedings€of€the€court.ÌÌÓÓÌà àPrior€to€trial,€Blount€moved€for€recusal,€relying€upon€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.ÏCrim.€P,€.€which€provides€that€unless€the€defendant€consents,€a€judge€isÏdisqualified€from€presiding€at€the€hearing€of€a€contempt€charge€that€ð ðinvolvesÏdisrespect€to€or€criticism€of€a€judge.ððÌÓÓÌÌÓÓà àThe€trial€court€denied€the€recusal€motion€and€found€Blount€guilty€of€twoÏcounts€of€criminal€contempt,€based€upon€Blountððs€conduct€inside€the€courtroomÏwhile€the€verdicts€were€being€delivered€and€upon€his€conduct€in€the€hall€outsideÏthe€courtroom,€and€explicitly€characterized€Blountððs€conduct€as€ð ðoutrageous€andÏwillful.ðð€€On€each€count€Blount€was€fined€$50€and€sentenced€to€serve€10€days€inÏjail.€€In€addition,€Blount€was€ordered€to€pay€costs€of€the€proceeding€includingÏattorneyððs€fees€to€Black€in€the€amount€of€$5,000.ÌÌà àBlount€appealed,€contending€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€(1)€denying€hisÏmotion€to€recuse;€(2)€appointing€Black€to€prosecute€the€contempt€charges;€(3)Ïfinding€him€guilty€of€criminal€contempt;€and€(4)€ordering€him€to€pay€attorneyððs€feesÏas€part€of€the€costs.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€did€not€address€the€first€two€issuesÏraised,€but,€instead,€found€the€evidence€insufficient€as€a€matter€of€law€to€sustainÏthe€contempt€convictions,€reversed€the€trial€court,€and€dismissed€the€cause.€ÏCiting€the€principle€that€attorneyððs€fees€are€not€recoverable€in€the€absence€of€aÏstatute,€contractual€provision,€or€a€recognized€ground€of€equity,€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€also€concluded€that€the€trial€court€had€no€authority€to€order€Blount€to€payÏattorneyððs€fees.ÌÌà àThereafter€we€granted€Blackððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€and,€forÏthe€reasons€that€follow,€now€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONTEMPTó óóóÌà àThe€power€of€courts€to€punish€contempts€can€be€traced€back€as€far€asÍtwelfth€century€England.€€òòSeeóó€Ronald€L.€Goldfarb,€òòThe€Contempt€Poweróó€at€p.€9Ï(1963).€€Contempt€was€firmly€established€as€a€legal€concept€by€the€fourteenthÏcentury€and€it€was€a€principle€adopted€and€incorporated€into€AmericanÏjurisprudence€by€the€colonists.€€òòIdóó.€at€19.€€Therefore,€€the€inherent€power€of€courtsÏto€punish€contemptuous€conduct€has€long€been€regarded€as€essential€to€theÏprotection€and€existence€of€the€courts.€€òòState€v.€Gallowayóó,€45€Tenn.€326,€331Ï(1868).€€Indeed,€at€common€law,€the€power€of€courts€to€punish€contempts€wasÏvast€and€undefined.€€òòIdóó.€at€330.€€Because€unlimited,€undefined€discretionaryÏpower€carried€with€it€the€potential€for€abuse,€specific€statutory€provisions€wereÏadopted€to€limit€and€define€the€conduct€punishable€by€contempt.€€òòIdóó.€at€540„44;€òòInÏRe€Hickeyóó,€149€Tenn.€344,€258€S.W.€417€(1924).Ì€òòÌóóà àConduct€punishable€as€contempt€in€Tennessee€now€is€delineated€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€29„9„102€(1980€Repl.)€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€power€of€the€several€courts€to€issue€attachments,€and€inflictÏpunishments€for€contempts€of€court,€shall€not€be€construed€toÏextend€to€any€except€the€following€cases:ÌÌà8 àà à(1)€The€willful€misbehavior€of€any€person€in€the€presence€ofÍthe€court,€or€so€near€thereto€as€to€obstruct€the€administration€ofÏjustice.ÌÌà8 àà à(2)€The€willful€misbehavior€of€any€of€the€officers€of€saidÏcourts,€in€their€official€transactions.ÌÌà8 àà à(3)€The€willful€disobedience€or€resistance€of€any€officer€of€theÏsaid€courts,€party,€juror,€witness,€or€any€other€person,€to€any€lawfulÏwrit,€process,€order,€rule,€decree,€or€command€of€said€courts.Ìà8 àÌà8 àà à(4)€Abuse€of,€or€unlawful€interference€with,€the€process€orÏproceedings€of€the€court.€ÌÌà8 àà à(5)€Willfully€conversing€with€jurors€in€relation€to€the€merits€ofÏthe€cause€in€the€trial€of€which€they€are€engaged,€or€otherwiseÏtampering€with€them.ÌÌà8 àà à(6)€Any€other€act€or€omission€declared€a€contempt€by€law.€ÌÓÓÌà àContempts€may€be€either€criminal€or€civil€in€nature.€€Civil€contempt€occursÏwhen€a€person€refuses€or€fails€to€comply€with€a€court€order€and€a€contempt€actionÏis€brought€to€enforce€private€rights.€€òòRobinson€v.€Air€Draulics€Engineering€Co.óó,Ï214€Tenn.€30,€37,€377€S.W.2d€908,€911€(1964).€€If€imprisonment€is€ordered€in€aÏcivil€contempt€case,€it€is€remedial€and€coercive€in€character,€designed€to€compelÏthe€contemnor€to€comply€with€the€courtððs€order.€€Compliance€will€result€inÏimmediate€release€from€prison.€€Therefore,€it€has€often€been€said€that€in€a€civilÍcontempt€case,€the€contemnor€ð ðcarries€the€keys€to€his€prison€in€his€own€pocket.€.€.Ï.ðð€€òòState€ex€rel.€Anderson€v.€Daughertyóó,€137€Tenn.€125,€127,€191€S.W.€974€(1917)Ï(internal€citations€and€quotations€omitted);€€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Turneróó,€914€S.W.2dÏ951,€955€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àCriminal€contempts,€on€the€other€hand,€are€intended€to€preserve€the€powerÏand€vindicate€the€dignity€and€authority€of€the€law,€and€the€court€as€an€organ€ofÏsociety.€€òòDaughertyóó,€137,€Tenn.€at€127,€191€S.W.€at€974;€òòGunn€v.€Southern€BellÏTel.€&€Tel.€Co.óó,€201€Tenn.€38,€41„42,€296€S.W.2d€843,€844„45€(1956).€€Therefore,Ïsanctions€for€criminal€contempt€are€generally€both€punitive€and€unconditional€inÏnature.€€òòIdóó.€€While€criminal€contempts€may€arise€in€the€course€of€private€civilÏlitigation,€such€proceedings,€ð ðin€a€very€true€sense€raise€an€issue€between€theÏpublic€and€the€accused.€€òòDaughertyóó,€191€S.W.€at€974€(internal€citations€andÏquotations€omitted).€€In€the€trial€of€a€criminal€contempt€case,€therefore,€guilt€of€theÏaccused€must€be€established€by€proof€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòRobinsonóó,Ï377€S.W.2d€at€912.€ÌÌà àOur€review€of€this€case€is€also€influenced€by€two€further€classifications€ofÏcontempt,€direct€and€indirect,€which€differ,€among€other€ways,€in€the€minimalÏprocedure€that€will€satisfy€the€requirements€of€due€process€in€each€case.€€DirectÏcontempt€is€based€upon€acts€committed€in€the€presence€of€the€court,€and€may€beÏpunished€summarily.€€Indirect€contempt€is€based€upon€acts€not€committed€in€theÏpresence€of€the€court,€and€may€be€punished€only€after€the€accused€has€beenÏgiven€notice€and€an€opportunity€to€respond€to€the€charges€at€a€hearing.€€òòState€v.ÏMadduxóó,€571€S.W.2d€819,€821€(Tenn.€1978)€(citing€cases).ÌÌà àThe€procedures€governing€prosecutions€of€indirect€criminal€contempt,Ïsuch€as€this€case,€are€outlined€in€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€which€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àA€criminal€contempt€except€as€provided€in€subdivision€(a)€of€thisÏrule€[direct€contempt]€shall€be€prosecuted€on€notice.€€The€noticeÏshall€state€the€time€and€place€of€hearing,€allowing€a€reasonableÏtime€for€the€preparation€of€the€defense,€and€shall€state€the€essentialÏfacts€constituting€the€criminal€contempt€charged€and€describe€it€asÏsuch.€€The€notice€shall€be€given€orally€by€the€judge€in€open€court€inÏthe€presence€of€the€defendant€or,€on€application€of€the€districtÏattorney€general€or€of€an€attorney€appointed€by€the€court€for€thatÏpurpose,€by€an€order€to€show€cause€or€an€order€of€arrest.€€TheÏdefendant€is€entitled€to€admission€to€bail€as€provided€in€these€rules.€ÏIf€the€contempt€charged€involves€disrespect€to€or€criticism€of€aÍjudge,€that€judge€is€disqualified€from€presiding€at€the€hearing€exceptÏwith€the€defendantððs€consent.€€Upon€a€verdict€of€finding€of€guilt€theÏcourt€shall€enter€an€order€fixing€the€punishment.€€ÌÓÓÌWe€apply€these€general€background€principles€to€resolve€the€specific€issues€inÏthis€appeal.ÌÌà@ àÔ€!¼Ôò òA.Ô€!XÔ€Sufficiency€of€the€Evidenceó óÌà àIn€this€Court,€Black€challenges€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€conclusion€that€theÏevidence€is€insufficient€to€sustain€the€convictions€for€criminal€contempt.€When€theÏsufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence€is€raised€as€an€issue€on€appeal,€this€CourtÏmust€review€the€record€to€determine€if€the€proof€adduced€at€trial€supports€theÏfindings€of€the€trier€of€fact€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï13(e).€€We€do€not€reweigh€the€proof.€€The€defendant€has€the€burden€of€illustratingÏto€this€Court€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict.€€A€guiltyÏverdict€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€and€it€is€replaced€with€aÏpresumption€of€guilt.€We€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€for€lack€of€sufficientÏevidence€unless€the€facts€contained€in€the€record€and€any€inferences€which€mayÍbe€drawn€from€the€facts€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€for€a€rational€trier€ofÏfact€to€find€the€defendant€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòDaughertyóó,€137ÏTenn.€at€127,€191€S.W.€at€974;€òòCreasyóó,€885€S.W.2d€at€831.€€Applying€thatÏstandard€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€we€conclude€that€the€Court€of€Appeals€erred€inÏholding€the€evidence€insufficient€to€support€Blountððs€convictions€for€contempt.ÌÌà àWhile,€to€some€extent,€the€trial€court€relied€upon€all€three€statutory€groundsÏcharged€in€finding€Blount€guilty€of€contempt,€primary€reliance€was€placed€uponÏthe€first€statutory€section€which€allows€a€finding€of€contempt€for€the€ð ðwillfulÏmisbehavior€of€any€person€in€the€presence€of€the€court,€or€so€near€thereto€as€toÏobstruct€the€administration€of€justice.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„9„102(1)€(1981ÏRepl.).€€In€holding€the€evidence€insufficient€to€sustain€the€convictions€on€thatÏstatutory€basis,€the€Court€of€Appeals€interpreted€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòWinfreeÏv.€Stateóó,€135€S.W.2d€454€(Tenn.€1940),€to€require€proof€of€an€actual€interruption,Ïhindrance,€delay€or€obstruction€of€the€proceeding€from€which€the€charge€of€willfulÏmisbehavior€arises.€€Since€Blountððs€conduct€did€not€disrupt€the€trial,€and€indeed,Ïlargely€transpired€following€the€trialððs€conclusion,€the€Court€of€Appeals€found€theÍevidence€insufficient€to€establish€that€Blountððs€conduct€ð ðobstructed€theÏadministration€of€justice.ðð€€Black€argues€that€the€Court€of€Appeals€interpreted€theÏòòWinfreeóó€decision€too€narrowly€and€applied€an€incorrect€legal€standard€when€itÏevaluated€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence.€€We€agree.ÌÌà àIn€describing€conduct€constituting€contempt,€the€òòWinfreeóó€Court€stated€thatÌð ð[t]he€most€familiar€forms€of€contempt€are€found€in€acts€which€hinder,€delay,€andÏobstruct€the€administration€of€justice,€which€are€usually€committed€in€the€courseÏof€the€adjudication€of€some€cause€or€the€execution€of€its€judgment.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€135ÏS.W.2d€at€455.€€We€do€not€interpret€that€statement€as€a€definitive€pronouncementÏintended€to€narrow€the€contempt€power€of€the€courts€to€encompass€òòonlyóó€theÏfamiliar€and€usual€forms€of€contemptuous€conduct.€€In€fact,€the€òòWinfreeóó€CourtÏacknowledged€that€ð ðacts€constituting€contempt€cover€a€wide€range.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àIndeed,€criminal€contempt€of€court€that€obstructs€the€administration€ofÏjustice€has€generally€been€defined€as€any€willful€misconduct€which€embarrasses,Ïhinders,€or€obstructs€a€court€in€its€administration€of€justice€or€derogates€theÍcourtððs€authority€or€dignity,€thereby€bringing€the€administration€of€law€intoÏdisrepute.€€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó,€òòBlackððs€Law€Dictionaryóó€319€(6th€ed.€1990);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÏòòPeople€v.€Javarasóó,€281€œN.E.2d›€670€(Ill.€1972);€òòHirschfeld€v.€Superior€Courtóó,€908ÏP.2d€22€(Ariz.€Ct.€App€1995).€€Courts€applying€that€definition€have€foundÏmisconduct€similar€to€that€displayed€by€Blount€contemptuous€under€statutesÏeither€identical€or€very€similar€to€the€statute€at€issue€in€this€case.ÌÌà àFor€example,€in€òòTanner€v.€United€Statesóó,€62€F.2d€601€(10th€Cir.€1932),€Ïfollowing€a€jury€trial€in€a€civil€case,€Tanner,€an€attorney€who€represented€a€partyÏin€the€suit,€encountered€a€juror€who€had€served€in€the€trial€and€ð ðproceed€toÏabuseðð€the€juror€because€of€the€small€amount€of€damages€awarded€his€client.€€òòIdóó.€ÏThe€juror€complained€to€the€court,€and€Tanner€was€tried€under€a€statute€whichÏallowedÌcourts€to€punish€as€contempt€ð ðthe€misbehavior€of€any€person€in€their€presence,Ï[courts],€or€so€near€thereto€as€to€obstruct€the€administration€of€justice,€theÏmisbehavior€of€any€of€the€officers€of€said€courts€in€their€official€transactions,€andÏthe€disobedience€or€resistance€by€any€such€officer,€or€by€any€party,€juror,€witness,Íor€other€person€to€any€lawful€writ,€process,€order,€rule,€decree,€or€command€of€theÏsaid€courts.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€602.€€Tanner€was€convicted€of€criminal€contempt.€€On€appealÏhe€argued€that€since€the€case€in€which€the€juror€had€served€was€concluded€whenÏthe€incident€occurred,€he€was€not€subject€to€punishment€for€contempt€under€theÏstatute.€€The€Tenth€Circuit€strongly€rejected€Tannerððs€argumentÌÓÓà8 àà àWhile€the€jury€had€returned€a€verdict€in€the€Woody€Case€inÏwhich€the€juror€had€sat,€he€was€still€an€officer€of€the€court€and€wouldÏbe€called€in€subsequent€cases.€€Appellant€also€was€an€officer€of€theÏcourt.€€The€attack€having€been€made€by€one€officer€of€the€court€uponÏanother€because€of€the€subject„matter€of€a€trial€concluded€only€soÏfar€as€the€return€of€a€verdict€by€the€jury,€we€are€of€the€opinion€whileÏthe€attack€was€made€outside€of€the€courtroom€and€after€the€jury€hadÏreturned€its€verdict,€yet€the€case€was€still€pending,€and€it€was€notÏonly€the€right€but€the€duty€of€the€court€to€deal€with€the€same.€€It€isÏunthinkable€a€court€should€be€so€weak€or€supine,€so€wanting€inÏconstitutional€power,€as€to€not€be€able€to€protect€its€officers€in€theÏproper€discharge€of€their€sworn€duty.€€That€a€juror,€acting€under€hisÏsworn€duty€in€the€administration€of€justice€in€one€of€our€nationalÏcourts,€should€be€so€basely€accused€and€humiliated€by€anÏinterested€officer€of€the€court,€cannot€be€thought€not€to€be€includedÏin€the€statutory€law€above€quoted.€€No€doubt€jurors,€if€such€conductÏas€is€found€in€this€record€should€go€unpunished,€would€fear€to€doÏtheir€sworn€duty€in€an€honest,€impartial€manner,€as€must€be€done€inÏthe€administration€of€justice€in€our€courts.Ìà àÌÌòòIdóó.€at€602.ÌÌÌÓÓà àLikewise,€in€òòHirschfeldóó€the€Arizona€Court€of€Appeals€refused€to€accept€theÏargument€that€a€court€may€not€punish€an€attorney€by€contempt€when€theÏmisconduct€does€not€occur€in€the€course€of€a€proceeding.€€There€Hirschfeld,€anÏattorney€representing€the€father€in€a€child€custody€proceeding€followed€theÏmother€€around€the€courthouse€after€a€meeting€in€the€judgeððs€chambersÏdemanding€to€know€the€location€of€the€child€and€instructing€a€deputy€to€arrest€herÏfor€custodial€interference.€€The€trial€judge€cited€Hirschfeld€for€contempt€of€court,Ïand€following€a€hearing€before€a€different€judge,€Hirschfeld€was€convicted€€ofÏengaging€in€ð ðwillfully€contumacious€conduct€which€obstructs€the€administration€ofÏjustice,€or€which€lessens€the€dignity€and€authority€of€the€court.ðð€€908€P.2d€at€25.€ÏHirschfeld€challenged€the€conviction€on€appeal€on€the€basis€that€his€conduct€didÏnot€occur€during€a€trial€proceeding.€€In€rejecting€that€argument,€the€Arizona€courtÏstated:ÌÌÓÓà8 àWe€conclude€that€such€behavior€is€a€contempt€of€court€for€the€veryÏreason€expressed€by€the€trial€judge„„that€the€court€has€the€right€andÏthe€duty€to€protect€litigants,€witnesses,€attorneys€and€jurors€fromÏmisbehavior€and€harassment€while€they€are€in€or€near€theÍcourtroom,€whether€they€are€arriving,€waiting,€or€departing.€ÏConduct€like€Hirschfeldððs,€because€it€impinges€on€that€right€andÏduty,€lessens€the€dignity€and€authority€of€the€court.ÌÌÌòòÓÓIdóó.€at€25„26.€ÌÌà à€The€court€in€òòHirschfeldóó,€relied€upon€òòUnited€State€v.€Pattersonóó,€26€F.€509Ï(W.D.Tenn.€1886)€as€support€for€its€holding.€€There,€a€man€named€Patterson,Ïbelieved€that€a€lawyer€had€insulted€his€father.€€Patterson€went€to€the€courthouseÏwhere€the€lawyer€was€trying€a€case,€waited€until€court€adjourned,€entered€theÏcourtroom,€and€struck€the€lawyer€with€his€hand.€€When€the€incident€occurred,€theÏjudge€had€left€the€bench€but€was€still€in€the€courtroom,€although€Patterson€did€notÏrealize€that€at€the€time€he€acted.€€Patterson€was€cited€for€contempt€and€defendedÏon€the€grounds€that€he€had€intended€no€contempt,€having€waited€until€heÏbelieved€the€judge€had€left€the€room.€€òòIdóó.€at€511.€€Rejecting€Pattersonððs€defenseÏon€two€separate€and€distinct€grounds,€the€court€first€stated€that€the€ð ðcourt€wouldÏdeserve€the€contempt€of€public€opinion€if€it€permitted€so€narrow€a€view€of€itsÏprerogatives€to€prevail,€and€could€not€complain,€if,€during€its€recess,€theÍcourtroom€should€be€used€for€a€cock„pit€or€a€convenient€place€to€erect€a€prizeÏring.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Moreover,€the€òòPattersonóó€court€emphasized€that€courts€have€theÏauthority€and€the€duty€to€protect€ð ðall€who€are€engaged€in€and€about€theÏproceedings€of€the€court.€.€.€.ðð€€€òòIdóó.€€This€rule,€according€to€the€court,€protectsÏparties,€jurors,€witnesses€and€officers€of€the€court,€and€anyone€else€engaged€inÏand€about€the€business€of€the€court.€€òòIdóó.€€€Without€such€a€rule,€ð ðattorneys€might€beÏdriven€from€court,€or€deterred€from€coming€to€it,€or€be€held€in€bodily€fear€while€inÏattendance,€and€thereby€the€administration€of€justice€be€obstructed.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àWhile€some€courts€have€accepted€the€proposition€that€only€conduct€whichÏactually€interferes€with€a€pending€proceeding€is€punishable€as€contempt€whichÏð ðobstructs€the€administration€of€justice,ðð× ƒ) ××  ×€we€agree€with€the€cases€aboveÏdiscussed€that€such€a€limited€interpretation€of€the€phrase€ð ðadministration€ofÏjusticeðð€is€both€unwarranted€and€unwise.€€As€the€òòTanneróó€court€recognized€ð ð[i]t€isÏunthinkable€a€court€should€be€so€weak€or€supine,€so€wanting€in€constitutionalÍpower,€as€to€not€be€able€to€protect€its€officers€in€the€proper€discharge€of€theirÏsworn€duty.ðð€€62€F.2d€at€602.ÌÌà àTherefore,€we€explicitly€hold€that€criminal€contempt€of€court€whichÏobstructs€the€administration€of€justice€includes€all€willful€misconduct€whichÏembarrasses,€hinders,€or€obstructs€a€court€in€its€administration€of€justice€orÏderogates€the€courtððs€authority€or€dignity,€thereby€bringing€the€administration€ofÏlaw€into€disrepute.€€We€also€emphasize€that€disrespectful€conduct€by€an€attorneyÏhas€a€greater€impact€upon€the€dignity€of€a€court€than€does€disrespectful€conductÏof€a€lay€person.€€Public€respect€for€the€law€derives€in€large€measure€from€theÏimage€which€the€administration€of€justice€presents.€€Lawyers€play€an€integral€roleÏin€the€administration€of€justice€and,€as€such,€their€conduct€can€have€a€greatÏinfluence€upon€the€extent€to€which€the€proceedings€are€perceived€as€fair€andÏdignified€by€jurors,€defendants,€witnesses,€and€spectators.€€Accordingly,€aÏlawyerððs€allegations€of€inequity€and€unfairness€are€uniquely€denigrating€to€theÏdignity€of€the€proceedings.€€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó€òòMatter€of€Campolongoóó,€435€A.2d€581Ï(Pa.€1981).ÌÌà àApplying€these€standards€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€find€the€evidenceÏsufficient€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€Blountððs€gestures€and€commentsÏto€the€jury€as€the€verdicts€were€being€read€and€his€comments€and€conductÏoutside€the€courtroom€toward€the€jurors€and€opposing€counsel,€constitute€willfulÏmisbehavior€so€near€to€the€presence€of€the€court€that€it€obstructs€theÏadministration€of€justice.€€Accordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€isÏreversed,€and€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€finding€Blount€guilty€of€two€counts€ofÏcontempt€is€reinstated.ÌÌÌà@ àÔ€!¼Ôò òB.Ô€!XÔ€Disqualification€and€Recusaló óÌà àIn€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Blount€argued€that€the€trial€judge€was€disqualifiedÏfrom€presiding€by€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€and€should€have€recused€himselfÏbecause€the€contempt€charges€involved€ð ðdisrespect€to€or€criticism€of€a€judge.ðð€ÏBecause€of€its€disposition€of€the€case,€the€Court€of€Appeals€did€not€address€thatÏissue.€€Though€it€is€not€pressed€in€this€Court,€it€is€a€threshold€matter€which€mustÍbe€resolved€since€we€have€reversed€the€intermediate€courtððs€finding€ofÏinsufficient€evidence.€€ÌÌà àThe€contempt€charged€in€this€case€does€not,€on€its€face,€involve€disrespectÏor€criticism€of€the€trial€judge.€€In€òòTaylor€v.€Hayesóó,€418€U.S.€488,€501,€94€S.Ct.Ï2697,€2704,€41€L.Ed.2d€897€(1974),€however,€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏrecognized€that€conduct€short€of€a€personal€attack€may€still€provoke€a€trial€judgeÏand€so€embroil€him€or€her€in€controversy€that€it€would€be€difficult€to€maintain€theÏcalm€detachment€necessary€for€fair€adjudication.€€òòState€v.€Greenóó,€708€S.W.2dÏ424,€426„27€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986).€€In€determining€whether€contempt€chargesÏshould€have€been€heard€by€a€judge€other€than€the€one€who€initiated€theÏproceeding,€the€appropriate€question€is€not€only€whether€there€was€actual€biasÏon€the€judgeððs€part,€but€also€whether€there€was€such€a€likelihood€of€bias,€or€anÏappearance€of€bias,€that€the€judge€was€unable€to€hold€the€balance€betweenÏvindicating€the€interest€of€the€court€and€the€interest€of€the€accused.€€òòTayloróó,€418ÏU.S.€at€501,€94€S.Ct.€at€2704;€òòGreenóó,€708€S.W.2d€at€427.ÌÌà àUtilizing€that€inquiry,€it€is€clear€that€in€this€case€the€trial€judge€was€notÏdisqualified€under€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€€The€trial€judge€directed€a€verdictÏin€favor€of€Blountððs€clients€on€the€issue€of€liability.€€Moreover,€Blountððs€angryÏcomments€and€conduct€were€entirely€directed€toward€the€jury€and€opposingÏcounsel,€not€the€trial€judge.€€This€record€is€devoid€of€evidence€of€actual€orÏpotential€bias.€€The€trial€judge€did€not€err€by€denying€Blountððs€recusal€motion.ÌÌà0 àà àà@ àò òÔ€!¼ÔC.Ô€!XÔ€Appointment€and€Compensation€of€Counseló óÌà àBlount€asserted€for€the€first€time€in€the€Court€of€Appeals€that€the€trial€courtÏerred€by€appointing€Black€as€òòamicus€curiaeóó.€€He€repeats€that€argument€in€thisÏCourt€and€says€that€once€notice€is€given€pursuant€to€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.ÏP.,€actual€prosecution€of€contempt€charges€may€be€conducted€only€by€the€districtÏattorney€general.€€In€Tennessee,€Blount€says,€district€attorney€generals€have€aÏduty€ð ðto€attend€the€circuit€courts€in€the€district,€and€every€other€court€thereinÏhaving€criminal€jurisdiction,€and€prosecute€on€behalf€of€the€state€in€every€case€inÏwhich€the€state€is€a€party,€or€in€any€wise€interested.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„7„103(1)€(1993€Repl.€&€1996€Supp.).€€Therefore,€Blount€argues€that€the€districtÍattorney€general€was€legally€required€to€conduct€the€prosecution€of€this€criminalÏcontempt€proceeding€and€the€trial€court€erred€by€appointing€a€private€attorney.ÌÌà àWhile€we€agree€that€criminal€contempt€is€generally€regarded€as€a€crime,Ïòòseeóó€òòBloom€v.€Illinoisóó,€391€U.S.€201,€88€S.Ct.€1477,€20€L.Ed.2d€522€(1968),Ïprosecutions€of€criminal€contemptÌÓÓà8 àare€not€intended€to€punish€conduct€proscribed€as€harmful€by€theÏgeneral€criminal€laws.€€Rather,€they€are€designed€to€serve€theÏlimited€purpose€of€vindicating€the€authority€of€the€court.€€InÏpunishing€contempt,€the€Judiciary€is€sanctioning€conduct€thatÏviolates€specific€duties€imposed€by€the€court€itself,€arising€directlyÏfrom€the€partiesðð€participation€in€judicial€proceedings.€ÌÓÓÌòòYoung€v.€United€States€ex€rel.€Vuitton€et€Fils€S.A.óó,€481€U.S.€787,€800,€107€S.Ct.Ï2124,€2134,€95€L.Ed.2d€740€(1987).€€In€our€view,€Tennessee€law€only€òòrequiresóóÏdistrict€attorney€generals€to€conduct€prosecutions€for€ð ðconduct€proscribed€asÏharmful€by€the€general€criminal€laws.ðð€€Therefore,€district€attorney€generals€inÏTennessee€have€no€mandatory€statutory€duty€to€prosecute€criminal€contempts.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Op.€Atty.€Gen.€No.€92„25.ÌÌà àBlountððs€argument€ignores€the€fact€that€the€contempt€power€of€the€court€isÏessential€to€the€survival€of€an€independent€judiciary.€€Indeed,€to€hold€that€a€trialÏjudge€may€appoint€only€the€district€attorney€general€to€investigate€and€prosecuteÏcontempts€places€the€court€at€the€mercy€of€another€constitutional€officer€who€is€aÏmember€of€another€independent€branch€of€government.€€òòSeeóó€òòDearborne€v.€Stateóó,Ï575€S.W.2d€259,€264€(Tenn.€1978)€(district€attorney€general€is€a€member€of€the€Ïexecutive€branch€of€government).€€The€ability€to€appoint€a€private€attorney€toÏprosecute€a€contempt€action€satisfies€the€need€of€the€court€for€an€independentÏmeans€of€protecting€the€administration€of€justice€and€the€court€as€an€organ€ofÏsociety.€€òòYoungóó,€481€U.S.€at€796,€107€S.Ct.€at€2132.× ƒ+ ××  ×ÌÌà àMoreover,€Rule€42(b),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€clearly€indicates€that€a€trial€courtÏmay€appoint€an€attorney€other€than€the€district€attorney€general€to€prosecuteÏindirect€criminal€contempts.€€(ð ðThe€notice€shall€be€given€orally€by€the€judge€inÍopen€court€in€the€presence€of€the€defendant€or,€on€application€of€the€districtÏattorney€general€òòor€of€an€attorney€appointed€by€the€court€for€that€purposeóó,€by€anÏorder€to€show€cause€or€an€order€of€arrestðð)€(emphasis€added).€€Though€the€ruleÏdoes€not€provide€specific€authorization€for€appointment€of€a€private€attorney,€itÏacknowledges€the€well„settled€proposition€that€courts€possess€inherent€authorityÏto€initiate€contempt€proceedings€and€the€concomitant€authority€to€appoint€privateÏattorneys€to€prosecute€such€contempts.€€òòYoungóó,€481€U.S.€at€794„95€107€S.Ct.€atÏ2130„31.€€Ìà àÌà àHaving€concluded€that€district€attorney€generals€have€no€mandatoryÏstatutory€duty€to€prosecute€criminal€contempts,€we€emphasize€that€they€are€notÏòòprohibitedóó€from€prosecuting€such€cases.€€Indeed,€we€agree€with€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€that€the€better€practice€is€for€a€trial€court€to€first€ask€the€districtÏattorney€to€prosecute€contempt€actions,€and€should€appoint€a€private€prosecutorÏonly€if€that€request€is€denied.€€òòYoungóó,€481€U.S.€at€801,€107€S.Ct.€at€2134,€95ÏL.Ed.2d€at€755;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Op.€Atty.€Gen.€No.€92„25.Ìà à€Ìà àBlount€speculates€that€had€the€trial€court€in€this€case€first€asked€the€districtÏattorney€to€prosecute€the€contempt€action,€payment€of€attorneyððs€fees€would€notÏbe€an€issue€since€the€district€attorney€is€not€entitled€to€receive€attorneyððs€fees€inÏsuch€cases.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„25„105€(1990€Repl.)(ð ðNo€prosecutor€in€aÏmisdemeanor€is€entitled€to€any€compensation€for€his€services€as€prosecutor,€orÏfor€his€attendance€as€a€witness€on€behalf€of€the€state.ðð)€€Blount€says€he€shouldÏnot€be€required€to€pay€attorneyððs€fees€that€were€incurred€as€a€result€of€the€trialÏcourtððs€mistake.€€In€the€alternative€Blount€argues€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„9„103€(1980€Repl.€&€1996€Supp.)× ƒ, ××  ×,€delineates€the€exclusive€punishment€forÏcontempt€and€does€not€include€ordering€payment€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€Therefore,ÏBlount€says€the€trial€court€was€without€authority€to€order€payment€of€attorneyððsÏfees€under€general€Tennessee€law€which€allows€taxing€of€attorneyððs€fees€onlyÏwhen€authorized€by€statute,€contract€or€a€recognized€ground€of€equity.€€ÌÌà àUnder€Tennessee€law,€issues€raised€for€the€first€time€on€appeal€areÏwaived.€Blount€first€challenged€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€appoint€Black€in€theÏCourt€of€Appeals.€€Blount€may€not€now€use€his€own€failure€to€act€to€obtain€a€moreÏfavorable€decision€on€appeal.ÌÌà àBlountððs€second€argument€ignores€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòFerguson€v.ÏPaycheckóó,€672€S.W.2d€746€(Tenn.€1984),€in€which€the€following€rule€concerningÏa€trial€courtððs€authority€to€appoint€and€order€compensation€of€counsel€wasÏadopted:ÌÓÓà8 à[t]here€must€exist€a€necessity€for€the€services€of€a€member€of€the€barÏto€serve€the€court€in€reaching€a€proper€resolution€of€questions€orÏissues€presented€and€pending€before€the€court,€in€which€case€theÏcourt€may€award€compensation€to€be€paid€by€the€party€or€partiesÏresponsible€for€the€situation€that€prompted€the€court€to€make€theÏappointment.€€The€rule€excludes€the€appointment€of€counsel€toÏserve€the€interests€of€litigants,€witnesses,€or€any€other€privateÏparties.€€ÌÓÓÌà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€appointed€Black€to€ð ðinvestigate,€initiate,€andÏprosecute€a€contempt€citationðð€against€Blount.€€Unlike€the€attorney€in€òòFergusonóó,Íwho€had€been€appointed€to€represent€certain€witnesses,€Black€was€appointed€toÏperform€necessary€services€for€the€trial€court.€€Black€assisted€the€trial€court€inÏproperly€resolving€questions€and€issues€presented€by€the€contempt€proceeding.€ÏSince€Blount€is€the€party€responsible€for€creating€the€situation€which€promptedÏBlackððs€appointment,€based€on€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòFergusonóó,€the€trial€courtÏwas€authorized€to€order€Blount€to€pay€attorneyððs€fees.× ƒ. ××  ×ÌÌà àBlount€claims€that€Blackððs€services€were€not€necessary€because€the€districtÏattorney€general€was€avaiable€to€prosecute€the€action.€€As€previously€explained,Ïany€challenge€to€Blackððs€appointment€on€that€basis€should€have€been€raised€inÏthe€trial€court€and€has€been€waived.€ÌÌà àAlthough€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€order€Blount€to€payÏattorneyððs€fees,€we€note€that€there€is€little€evidence€in€this€record€to€establish€theÏreasonableness€of€the€fees€awarded.€€Therefore,€in€the€interest€of€justice,€weÍremand€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€to€calculate€reasonableÏattorneyððs€fees€in€accordance€with€òòConnors€v.€Connorsóó,€594€S.W.2d€672€(Tenn.Ï1980€),€and€Disciplinary€Rule€2„106€of€the€Code€of€Professional€ResponsibilityÏwhich€is€a€part€of€Supreme€Court€Rule€8.€€One€of€the€factors€relevant€to€thatÏdetermination€is€the€fee€customarily€charged€in€the€locality€for€similar€legalÏservices.€€òòConnorsóó,€594€S.W.2d€at€676.€€œThe›€trial€court€shall€consider€the€feesÏpaid€to€court„appointed€counsel€in€other€contexts€when€applying€that€factor€toÏdetermine€reasonable€attorneyððs€fees€for€the€services€rendered€by€Black€in€thisÏcase.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àAfter€carefully€considering€the€record€in€this€case,€we€have€determined€thatÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€erred,€both€in€finding€the€evidence€insufficient€to€support€theÏcontempt€convictions€and€also€in€concluding€that€the€trial€judge€lacked€authorityÏto€order€payment€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€We€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals,€reinstate€the€criminal€contempt€convictions,€€and€remand€to€the€trialÍcourt€for€calculation€of€reasonable€attorneyððs€fees.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxedÏto€the€appellee,€James€E.€Blount,€III,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.à àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________Ïà àà àà àà àà àFrank€F.€Drowota,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àJusticeÌÓÓÌÌÌÓÓConcur:ÌÌBirch,€C.€J.,€ÌAnderson,€Reid,€JJ,ÌÓÓ