ÿWPC, …# V %a 0 Pgw@·4÷ 1m 0”x 0D P _ UHg 0d¯ 0J 0T] 0^± 0h 0rw 0|é 0†e 0ë 1u{U,ð 0d B€U,U6ÉB)ÿDC( D3k AMžU*ë 0@NUE£NèÀ6yö1o} v~vÓ› 0n% 0Šý% 0 ‡& 0´'' 0ÇÛ' 0Û¢( 0ï}) AOl*Æ»* 0D+ D/Å+ Bô+˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 X((mª$¡¡Ò°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Ó DDDUDÓ€à~| tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(D(3L$¤¤Ý ƒmª!ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó3|x*<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd$$$$'ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò DÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌò òMayÏ13,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€,ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ;Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€the€Maryland€commission€found€otherwise,€at€thisÏpoint€we€assume€the€truth€of€Bradshawððs€allegations.Ì DÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAs€far€as€we€can€determine,€this€hearing€compares€to€a€fullÏevidentiary€workersðð€compensation€trial€in€our€trial€court.Ì ¶Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€also€held€that€the€employee€was€not€entitled€to€benefitsÏunder€Tennessee€law€because€the€employment€was€not€principallyÏlocalized€in€Tennessee€and€the€contract€of€hire€was€not€made€inÏthis€state.€€òòPerkinsóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€216„17.Ì oÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝReceipt€of€benefits€is,€by€definition,€an€element€of€theÏsecond€factor:€€whether€the€employee€made€a€knowing€and€voluntaryÏacceptance€of€benefits€from€another€state.Ì 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€there€is€language€in€òòGrayóó€that€could€be€interpretedÏas€requiring€actual€receipt€of€benefits,€òòGrayóó€should€not€be€soÏinterpreted;€as€we€stated,€ð ð[u]nder›€certain€circumstances,€theÏpursuit€of€a€compensation€claim€in€another€jurisdiction€mayÏpreclude€the€filing€of€the€same€claim€in€the€courts€of€Tennessee,Ïespecially€where€it€results€in€an€award€or€an€approvedÏsettlement.ðð€€òòGrayóó,€834€S.W.2d€at€282.€€This€quotation€makes€itÏclear€that€actual€receipt€of€benefits€is€a€factor€to€beÏconsidered,€but€is€not€required€before€the€doctrine€of€election€ofÏremedies€will€be€applied.Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€addition€to€arguing€that€the€employee€made€a€bindingÏelection€of€remedies€in€this€case,€the€employer€also€argues€thatÏthe€decision€of€the€Maryland€commission€is€entitled€to€full€faithÏand€credit€under€Art.€IV,€ðð€1,€of€the€United€States€Constitution.€ÏòòButóó€òòseeóó€òòTrueóó,€584€S.W.2d€at€798.€€Because€the€election€of€remediesÏissue€is€dispositive€here,€we€do€not€reach€the€Full€Faith€andÏCredit€Clause€issue.€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€&&X„d&ÓÑ#€&&Xd#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€®XdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßL€+.);+'h|` ‚- `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌMICHAEL€D.€BRADSHAW,à àà à)€€€€For€Publication€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à)à àœFiled:€€May€13,Ï1996›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€No.€03„S„01„9501„CH„00008Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌOLD€REPUBLIC€INSURANCE€€€€€€€à à)€à àHon.€H.ÏDavid€œCate›,€ÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà àà à)à à€ÏChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)à àKnoxÏChanceryÌÌÌòòÌÌÌÌÌÌóóÌòòFor€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àà àForÏDefendant/Appelleeóó:ÌÌDonald€R.€œCoffey›€€€€€Ïà àà àà àà àSteven€B.€JohnsonÌKnoxville,ÏTNà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TNÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌà@ àòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÌÌÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àÌAFFIRMEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBIRCH,€J.ÌÓ` °‚X˜XÓÓÓà àIn€this€cause,€we€œmust€determine€whether€a€TennesseeÏemployee€who€pursued€benefits€in€the€foreign€state€in€which›€theÏinjury€occurred€is€barred€from€pursuing€benefits€in€Tennessee€forÏthe€same€œinjury.›€œ€The›€œtrial€court€determined›€that€the€doctrine€ofÏelection€of€remedies€barred€the€claim.€€We€agree€with€the€œtrialÏcourtððs›€ruling.ÌÌà àThe€issue€before€us€is€one€of€law.€€Therefore,€ourÏstandard€of€review€is€òòde€novoóó€without€a€presumption€ofÏcorrectness.€€òòRidings€v.€Ralph€M.€Parsons€Co.óó,€914€S.W.2d€79,€80Ï(Tenn.€1996);€€òòUnion€Carbide€Corp.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€87,Ï91€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àThe€record€reveals€that€at€œall€the›€œpertinent€times,ÏMichael€D.€Bradshaw,€the€employee,€was€a€citizen€and€resident€ofÏTennessee.€€He€was€employed€by€Nu„Car€Carriers,€Inc.,€a€Tennessee„based€corporation.€€His€duties€included€the€long„haulÏtransportation€and€unloading€of€new€vehicles.ÌÌà àBradshaw€sustained€an€injury€while€in€Maryland€on€hisÏemployerððs€business.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€He€made€minimal€efforts€to€obtain€TennesseeÏbenefits,€but€he€was€not€successful.€€He€consulted€a€KnoxvilleÏattorney€who€informed€him:€(1)€his€claim€could€be€filed€either€inÏMaryland€or€Tennessee;€(2)€Maryland€paid€higher€benefits€thanÏTennessee;€and€(3)€if€unsuccessful€in€obtaining€benefits€fromÏMaryland,€he€could€still€pursue€Tennessee€benefits.ÌÌà àRelying,€apparently,€on€this€information,€Bradshaw€filedÏan€action€in€Maryland€for€benefits.€€The€Maryland€WorkersððÏCompensation€Commission€conducted€a€hearing€on€this€claim€onÍAugust€20,€1990,€and€Bradshaw€appeared€in€person.× ƒ0 ××  ×€€On€August€23,Ï1990,€the€Commission€made€the€following€findings:€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àThe€Commission€finds€on€the€issuesÏpresented€that€the€claimant€did€notÏsustain€an€accidental€injury€arisingÏout€of€and€in€the€course€ofÏemployment€as€alleged€to€haveÏoccurred€on€February€21,€1990,€andÏfinds€that€the€disability€of€theÏclaimant€is€not€the€result€of€theÏalleged€accidental€injury,€and€theÏCommission€will€disallow€the€claimÏfiled€herein.ÌÓÓÌà àBradshaw,€on€August€29,€1990,€filed€a€claim€for€workersððÏcompensation€benefits€under€Tennessee€law.€€After€a€full€hearing,Ïthe€Chancery€Court€of€Knox€County€determined€that€Bradshaw€ð ðknewÏhe€had€a€choice€and€made€a€conscious€and€voluntary€decision€toÏfile€in€Maryland€upon€advice€that€he€could€get€more€money€inÏMaryland€than€in€Tennessee.ðð€€The€trial€court€concluded€thatÏBradshawððs€claim€forÌTennessee€benefits€was€barred€under€the€election€of€remediesÏdoctrine€because€he€had€pursued€his€claim€to€a€conclusion€on€theÏmerits€in€the€state€of€Maryland.ÌÌà àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€50„6„115€(1991)€provides:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àIf€an€employee,€while€workingÏoutside€the€territorial€limits€ofÏthis€state,€suffers€an€injury€onÏaccount€of€which€such€employee€.€.€.Ïwould€have€been€entitled€to€theÏbenefits€provided€by€this€chapterÏhad€such€injury€occurred€within€thisÏstate,€such€employee€.€.€.€shall€beÏentitled€to€the€benefits€provided€byÏthis€chapter;€provided,€that€at€theÏtime€of€such€injury:€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à(1)€€The€employment€wasÏprincipally€localized€within€thisÏstate;€orÌÌà8 àà8 àà à(2)€€The€contract€of€hire€wasÏmade€in€this€state.€ÌÓÓÌà àThe€fact€that€the€ð ðcontract€of€hireðð€was€made€inÏTennessee€is€undisputed.€€Assuming€that€Bradshaw€could€establishÏthe€other€necessary€elements€of€his€claim,€the€above„quotedÏstatute€would,€under€ordinary€circumstances,€entitle€him€toÏbenefits.€€The€circumstances€here,€however,€are€not€ð ðordinary,ððÏespecially€in€light€of€Bradshawððs€having€pursued€benefits€inÏMaryland.ÌÌà àAn€employee€who€sustains€an€otherwise€compensable€injuryÏin€another€state€may€be€barred€from€Tennessee€benefits€throughÏoperation€of€the€doctrine€of€election€of€remedies.€€Hence,€theÏissue€we€address€is€whether€Bradshawððs€pursuit€of€MarylandÏbenefits€was€a€clear€renunciation€of€those€benefits€available€toÏhim€in€Tennessee€and,€thus,€constituted€an€election€of€remedies.ÌÌà àThe€doctrine€of€election€of€remedies€in€inter„jurisdictional€workersðð€compensation€cases€was€established€inÏòòTidwell€v.€Chattanooga€Boiler€and€Tank€Companyóó,€43€S.W.2d€221Ï(Tenn.€1931).€€Tidwell,€the€employee,€was€killed€in€an€on„the„jobÏaccident€in€Ohio.€€His€widow€applied€for€and€received€deathÏbenefits€under€Ohio€workersðð€compensation€law.€€She€later€soughtÏbenefits€under€Tennessee€law.€€In€affirming€the€trial€courtððsÏdismissal€of€the€complaint,€we€held€that€the€rights€and€remediesÏgranted€under€Tennessee€workersðð€compensation€laws€are€exclusiveÏand€that€this€exclusivity€provision€is€a€part€of€the€employmentÏcontract.€€We€found€that€Tidwellððs€institution€of€proceedings€inÏOhio€was€a€òòclearóó€renunciation€or€disaffirmance€of€the€TennesseeÏcontract€and€constituted€an€irrevocable€election€of€remedies.€€TheÏCourt€stated€ð ð[t]he›€obligations€of€the€contract€cannot€beÍrepudiated€in€one€suit€and€benefits€of€that€contract€be€claimed€inÏa€subsequent€suit.ðð€€43€S.W.2d€at€223.ÌÌà àWe€clarified€the€òòTidwellóó€holding€in€òòThomas€v.€TransportÏInsurance€Companyóó,€532€S.W.2d€263€(Tenn.€1976).€€Thomas,€theÏemployee,€was€injured€while€working€in€Memphis€for€an€ArkansasÏemployer.€€The€employer€began€paying€temporary€total€disabilityÏbenefits€under€the€Arkansas€workersðð€compensation€law.€€TheseÏpayments€were,€however,€terminated€at€the€employeeððs€request.ÌÌà àThomas€pursued€benefits€under€Tennessee€workersððÏcompensation€law€and,€in€an€apparent€effort€to€avoid€the€thrust€ofÏòòTidwellóó,€alleged€that€the€employer€had€ð ðwrongfullyðð€commencedÏpayment€of€benefits€under€Arkansas€law.€€The€employer€soughtÏdismissal€of€the€action€based€upon€the€doctrine€of€election€ofÏremedies€as€established€in€òòTidwellóó;€the€trial€court€granted€theÏmotion€and€dismissed€the€cause.ÌÌà àWe€reversed,€holding€that€the€circumstances€of€ThomasððÏreceipt€of€Arkansas€benefits€were€in€dispute.€€Until€the€factualÏdispute€was€resolved,€the€Court€could€not€accurately€determineÍwhether€Thomas€had€made€a€ð ðbindingðð€election€to€accept€ArkansasÏbenefits.ÌÌà àAlthough€òòThomasóó€was€not€decided€on€the€merits,€it€isÏparticularly€significant€because€of€its€holding€that€the€questionÏwhether€an€employee€has€made€a€binding€election€must€be€determinedÏfrom€a€careful€examination€of€the€facts.€€Justice€Harbison,Ïwriting€for€the€Court,€used€the€phrase€ð ðaffirmative€actionðð€toÏdefine€the€effort€an€employee€must€exert€to€support€the€conclusionÏthat€the€election€is€ð ðbinding.ðð€€Also,€if€an€employee€voluntarily,Ïdeliberately,€and€with€full€knowledge€of€options€accept€benefitsÏunder€the€laws€of€another€state,€he€may€be€precluded€by€hisÏelection€and€may€not€be€entitled€to€proceed€in€Tennessee€forÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits.ÌÌà àThe€òòTidwell„Thomasóó€rationale€was€expressly€reaffirmed€inÏòòTrue€v.€Amerail€Corporationóó,€584€S.W.2d€794€(Tenn.€1979).€€InÏòòTrueóó,€the€employee€was€a€Tennessee€resident€whose€contractÏrequired€him€to€work€in€Virginia.€€The€injury€occurred€inÏVirginia,€and€True€applied€for€and€received€benefits€underÏVirginiaððs€workersðð€compensation€law.€€True€subsequently€pursuedÍTennessee€benefits,€and€we€found€that€he€had€made€a€bindingÏelection€to€proceed€under€Virginia€law.€€We€held,€accordingly,Ïthat€he€was€barred€from€proceeding€in€Tennessee;€by€affirmativeÏaction,€knowingly€taken,€True€had€clearly€renunciated€TennesseeÏbenefits.ÌÌà àOf€special€interest€here€is€the€ð ðinvitationðð€extended€toÏthe€Court€by€Trueððs€counsel€to€retreat€from€the€òòTidwellóó€holding.€ÏNot€only€did€the€Court€decline€the€invitation,€it€also€seized€theÏopportunity€to€express€its€continued€adherence€to€the€òòTidwell„Thomasóó€doctrine.€€The€Court€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àThese€authorities€are€appealing;Ïhowever,€we€are€not€persuaded€toÏsanction€a€course€of€conduct€thatÏwould€result€in€what€is€essentiallyÏa€single€cause€of€action€being€madeÏthe€subject€of€lawsuits€in€twoÏstates,€absent€compellingÏconsiderations€such€as€thoseÏenumerated€in€òòThomasóó.€€We€areÏpersuaded€that€the€òòTidwellóó€ruleÏrepresents€a€fair€approach€in€thoseÏcases€wherein€the€injured€workmanÏhas€made€a€binding€election€asÏindicated€by€affirmatively€seekingÏand€accepting€benefits€in€anotherÏstate.ÌÓÓÌòòTrueóó,€584€S.W.2d€at€797„98€(citation€omitted).ÌÌà àThe€òòTidwellóó€rationale€was€again€affirmed€in€òòPerkins€v.€ÏBE€&€K,€Incorporatedóó,€802€S.W.2d€215€(Tenn.€1990).€€Perkins,€aÏTennessee€resident,€sustained€an€on„the„job€injury€in€Virginia.€ÏHe€executed€an€ð ðAgreement€for€Compensationðð€with€the€insuranceÏcarrier,€and€the€state€of€Virginia€paid€disability€benefits€andÏmedical€expenses€to€Perkins.€€Subsequently,€Perkins€soughtÏbenefits€under€the€Tennessee€workersðð€compensation€law.€€We€heldÏthat€Perkins,€by€executing€the€agreement€and€accepting€benefits,Ïhad€made€a€binding€election€to€be€compensated€under€Virginia€lawÏand€was,€thereby,€precluded€from€claiming€benefits€under€TennesseeÏlaw.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€In€òòPerkinsóó,€we€said:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[T]he€circumstances€of€each€caseÏmust€be€considered€in€determiningÏwhether€the€employee€has€made€aÏbinding€election.€€€The€mereÏacceptance€of€benefits€from€anotherÏstate€does€not€constitute€anÏelection,€but€affirmative€action€toÏobtain€benefits€or€knowing€andÏvoluntary€acceptance€of€benefitsÏfrom€another€state€will€beÍsufficient€to€establish€a€bindingÏelection.ÌÓÓÌòòPerkinsóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€217.ÌÌà àAlthough€continuing€to€adhere€to€the€òòTidwell„ThomasóóÏholdings,€the€Court€has€signaled€a€readiness€to€mitigate€theÏsomewhat€harsh€effect€of€òòTidwell„Thomasóó€when€the€facts€warrant€it.€ÏIllustrative€of€this€ð ðreadinessðð€œis€this€Courtððs€reasoning€in›€òòGrayÏv.€€Holloway€Construction€Companyóó,€834€S.W.2d€277€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àIn€òòGrayóó,€the€employee€suffered€a€work„related€injury€œat›Ïthe€employerððs€Texas€work„site.€€He€received€temporary€disabilityÏbenefits€from€the€employerððs€insurance€carrier,€National€UnionÏFire€Insurance€Company.€€Gray€subsequently€filed€a€notice€of€claimÏwith€the€Texas€Industrial€Accident€Board.€€National€Union€paid€hisÏmedical€bills€and€temporary€disability€benefits.€€ÌÌà àAfter€Gray€returned€to€work,€his€employer€sent€him€to€aÏTennessee€work„site.€€While€in€Tennessee,€the€employee€suffered€aÏsecond€work„related€injury;€he€notified€his€employer€and€beganÏreceiving€temporary€disability€benefits€from€National€Union.€ÍNational€Union€continued€making€payments€until€the€employee€filedÏa€second€claim€with€the€Texas€board.€€National€Union€thenÏdiscovered€that€the€second€injury€had€actually€occurred€inÏTennessee.€€Because€it€did€not€cover€the€Tennessee€work„site,ÏNational€Union€stopped€making€payments.€€ÌÌà àGrayððs€Texas€attorney€began€negotiating€a€settlement€ofÏthe€claim€on€the€first€œinjury;›€but€because€the€second€claim€wasÏimproperly€filed€against€National€Union,€she€referred€it€to€aÏTennessee€law€firm,€which€filed€the€claim€in€Tennessee.€€After€theÏtrial€of€the€Tennessee€case,€the€trial€court€awarded€disabilityÏbenefits€and€medical€expenses.€ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€we€rejected€the€employerððs€argument€that€theÏemployee€had€made€a€binding€election.€€The€filing€of€the€secondÏclaim€with€the€Texas€board€was€ð ðlegally€baselessðð€because€it€wasÏfiled€against€the€wrong€party;€thus,€no€election€of€remediesÏoccurred.€€We€emphasized€that€ð ðin€affirming€this€judgment,€we€doÏnot€retreat€from€the€sound€principles€recognized€in€.€.€.€òòPerkinsÏv.€BE€&€K,€Inc.óóðð€€òòGrayóó,€834€S.W.2d€at€279€(citation€omitted).€€InÏreviewing€the€election€of€remedies€cases,€we€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àThe€common€thread€in€òòPerkinsóó€andÏòòTidwellóó„„cases€in€which€recovery€inÏTennessee€was€held€to€be€precludedÏ„„is€the€fact€that€workers€injuredÏin€other€jurisdictions€had€bothÏfiled€out„of„state€claims€andÏreceived€awards€in€those€courts€orÏentered€into€settlements€approved€byÏindustrial€commissions€in€thoseÏstates.€€The€common€thread€in€òòThomasóóÏand€òòHaleóó„„opinions€in€which€we€heldÏthat€recovery€was€not€precluded„„isÏthe€fact€that€the€workers€in€thoseÏcases€had€done€no€more€than€acceptÏbenefits€tendered€by€theirÏemployers'€insurance€carriers€uponÏnotice€of€injury,€at€a€time€whenÏthey€had€too€little€knowledge€toÏmake€an€"informed€choice"€aboutÏwhich€of€two€remedies€they€wished€toÏpursue,€and€in€what€forum.ÌÓÓÌòòGrayóó,€834€S.W.2d€at€280€(citation€omitted)(footnote€omitted).€€TheÏCourt€concluded:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àWe€adhere€to€our€admonition€inÏòòThomasóó€and€òòPerkinsóó:€€Under€certainÏcircumstances,€the€pursuit€of€aÏcompensation€claim€in€anotherÏjurisdiction€may€preclude€the€filingÏof€the€same€claim€in€the€courts€ofÏTennessee,€especially€where€itÏresults€in€an€award€or€an€approvedÏsettlement.€€Despite€the€tendency€ofÏthe€Tennessee€cases€to€resort€to€theÏ"election€of€remedies"€doctrineÏ...€òòthe€more€defensible€policyÏbasis€for€this€rule€is€theÍprevention€of€vexations€[sic]Ïlitigation,€of€forum€shopping,€andÏof€double€recoveries€for€the€sameÏinjuryóó.€€In€this€case,€however,€theÏrecord€shows€that€the€plaintiff'sÏinitial€claim€was€mistakenly€filedÏagainst€the€wrong€party,€NationalÏUnion,€in€the€wrong€jurisdiction,ÏTexas.€€It€is€thus€wholly€unlike€theÏsituation€in€òòPerkinsóó,€where€theÏinitial€claim€was€deliberately€filedÏagainst€an€appropriate€party,€BE€&ÏK,€Inc.,€in€the€"right"Ïjurisdiction,€Virginia.€ÌÌà@ à*€*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€We€conclude€with€this€finalÏobservation:€€The€palpable€ifÏunspoken€principle€underlying€ourÏdecision€in€òòPerkinsóó€was€òòa€perceivedÏneed€to€guard€against€unfairÏmanipulation€of€the€Tennessee€legalÏsystemóó€and€a€possible€doubleÏrecovery€by€an€injured€worker€whoÏhas€already€secured€an€adequateÏcompensation€award€in€anotherÏjurisdiction.€€That€concern€remainsÏa€valid€one.€€Nevertheless,€toÏinvoke€the€rule€applied€in€òòPerkinsóóÏto€Walter€Gray's€case€would€produceÏjust€the€opposite€result„„instead€ofÏa€double€recovery,€there€would€be€noÏrecovery€at€all.€€Clearly,€thatÏresult€would€constitute€a€perversionÏof€the€otherwise€sound€policyÏdeveloped€in€the€line€of€casesÏculminating€in€òòPerkinsóó.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€In€this€regard,€we€echo€the€wordsÏof€the€Iowa€Supreme€Court:ÌÌà8 àà8 à€à8 àThis€doctrine€[ofÏelection]€is€not€intendedÏeither€as€a€trap€or€as€aÏpenalty€for€a€mereÏmistake.€€If€a€litigant,Ïwithout€adequateÏknowledge€of€the€factsÏaffecting€his€rights,Ïmistakenly€œselect[s›]€aÏremedy€to€his€dis„advantage€he€may€uponÏtimely€discovery€abandonÏit€and€pursue€another.ÌÌà8 àà8 àòòSackett€v.€Farmersðð€State€Bankóó,€209ÏIowa€487,€228€N.W.51,€54€(1929).ÌÓÓÌòòGrayóó,€834€S.W.2d€at€282€(emphasis€added).€€We€now€apply€theseÏprinciples€to€the€facts€of€the€case€before€us.ÌÌà àBradshaw€seeks€here€to€avoid€the€effect€of€òòTidwellóó.€€HeÏcontends€that€because€his€claim€in€Maryland€was€denied€and€becauseÏhe€received€no€benefits€under€Maryland€law,€the€òòTidwellóó€line€ofÏcases€is€distinguishable€and€that€he,€like€the€employee€in€òòGrayóó,Ïœshould,€therefore,›€not€be€precluded€from€receiving€benefits€underÏTennessee€law.€€Further,€he€asserts€that€the€stated€purpose€of€theÏdoctrine€of€election€of€remedies€is€to€prevent€double€redress€forÏa€single€wrong.€€Because€he€has€yet€to€be€redressed€at€all,€saysÍBradshaw,€he€cannot€possibly€recover€twice.€€We€disagree€withÏBradshawððs€basic€premise.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€òòTidwellóó,€òòTrueóó,€and€òòPerkinsóó€each€involveÏemployees€who€affirmatively€sought€and€received€workersððÏcompensation€benefits€in€another€state€before€seeking€benefits€inÏTennessee,€we€do€not€hold€that€receipt€of€benefits€from€theÏforeign€state€is€a€prerequisite€for€the€doctrine€of€election€ofÏremedies€to€apply.€€In€fact,€we€particularly€emphasize€that€in€ourÏdecisions€we€have€never€held€the€actual€receipt€of€benefits€as€aÏprerequisite€to€preclusion€where€an€employee€has€affirmativelyÏacted€to€obtain€out„of„state€benefits.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€òòSeeóó€òòGrayóó,€834€S.W.2d€atÏ282;× ƒ3 ××  ×€òòHale€v.€Fraleyððs€Inc.óó,€825€S.W.2d€690,€691€(Tenn.€1992);€ÍòòPerkinsóó,€802€S.W.2d€at€217;€òòTrueóó,€584€S.W.2d€at€797;€òòThomasóó,€532ÏS.W.2d€at€267.€€In€our€decisions,€we€have€stated€the€general€ruleÏthat€an€employee€is€precluded€from€receiving€Tennessee€benefitsÏif,€prior€to€filing€that€claim,€he€or€she:€(a)€affirmatively€actedÏto€obtain€benefits€in€another€state;€or€(b)€knowingly€andÏvoluntarily€accepted€benefits€under€the€law€of€another€state.€ÌÌà àWhile€the€actual€receipt€of€benefits€may€be€consideredÏas€included€in€the€first€factor,€it€is€not€dispositive.€€Three€ofÏthe€policy€reasons€noted€in€òòGrayóó€as€bases€for€the€rule€ofÏpreclusion„„(1)€the€prevention€of€vexatious€litigation;€(2)€theÏprevention€of€forum„shopping;€and€(3)€the€ð ðneed€to€guard€againstÏunfair€manipulation€of€the€Tennessee€legal€systemðð„„are€valid€evenÏthough€the€employee€actually€receives€benefits€under€the€law€ofÏthe€other€state.€€For€these€reasons,€the€present€case€isÏdistinguishable€from€òòGrayóó.€€It€is€clear€that€Bradshaw€œwas,›€œindeed,›Ïforum„shopping€to€obtain€the€highest€benefits€possible.€€While€anÏemployee€is€not€to€be€criticized€for€seeking€the€highest€benefitsÏto€which€he€or€she€is€legally€entitled,€Tennessee€law€does€notÏprovide€the€employee€an€alternative€if€he€or€she€affirmativelyÍseeks€benefits€in€another€forum€and€pursues€the€cause€to€aÏdecision€on€the€merits„„albeit€an€unfavorable€one.ÌÌà àWe€find€that€the€facts€here€preclude€relief€by€virtue€ofÏthe€operation€of€the€doctrine€of€election€of€remedies.€€BradshawÏaffirmatively€acted€to€obtain€benefits€under€Maryland€law.€€HeÏknew€that€he€could€file€his€claim€in€Tennessee€but€decided,Ïinstead,€to€file€it€in€Maryland€because€he€believed,€afterÏconsulting€an€attorney,€that€he€would€receive€higher€benefits.€ÏThe€fact€that€the€Maryland€claim€was€denied€on€the€merits€does€notÏprotect€him€from€the€application€of€the€òòTidwellóó€doctrine.€ÏAccordingly,€we€hold€that€Bradshawððs€affirmative€action€to€obtainÏbenefits€in€Maryland€constituted€a€binding€election€œthat›€precludesÏhim€from€claiming€benefits€under€Tennessee€law.× ƒ4 ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€The€costsÏon€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€plaintiff/appellant.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€JusticeÌÌÌCONCUR:€€€€€€€ÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Reid,€JJ.ÌÌWhite,€J.,€not€participatingÌÓÓ