ÿWPC] ’mw ÿwÜd@Áj ×Þ¦1]»Bl@šð ŒÁ;R¢÷3ýX/%zZ·ôH#ˆXe[¬åë;ä–å7D’ŽØJêªãˆr#Ò–œ—CN¬¿÷¶;²“ðN[è­KØŒ$˜zsÖÏJ KTœ Âe Ò i$<ÖŒL™Ö‘6‹©F‡è-A g?OÒùìFÀr¼UoÀÀþ-ú¢ÓpS!aq½ÀU6 jjV~Z1@1tœJ"çÛ\-.¥·¨A¹52Ý’9*NRÔ‡AÔ”DíÑ\>a _³“Ý1^Ú2”PÉ^K‡,Ù&`åG¥~ùßV&@¸j½ÇÆkrgªÓQ‘RŠÔpŸ¹[³"&–9ʧ²K h/öÉ“ yÞdÀE—À¯´â%4xY¦ý’xzͱu‚uŸ$Ø=2G+æò‰ÉRÂÕtø¾!­"6ŒÙÝ:G¬‹c.‰êBD민<üqG1>Ô[yCÜVº1$sp¦^ ¡ëVƒÕõ¿f=,žóBgæÄMN8ê©c¹®¬ø[gd1”ƒ:i8’E;ƒÉ¡Ës±z†óZ#MõZPt!,øgÿ/ÓLkù‹=O$$ÊÕßi¾Ä÷=ƒTޤ>>>>000000 AQ8Ɖ 0DO 0D“ B×× D/ôô B# D3@@@@@@@@bs 0â{˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ýÆDþÆDÿÆÇDÇÇÇEÇDÇÓ€ÇkDJ&#3|xÇ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó EÝ ƒ2D$ÝÑ@ȰÑÑ@Ú°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X]ùXXXÔÔ€ô¢ÖôXX]ùÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝAccording€to€the€brief€filed€on€behalf€of€appellee€William€Bell,€the€Florida€court€did€not€stayÐ ,  Ðthe€lawsuit€in€Florida.€ ¢Ý ƒ2D$ÝÑ@ȰÑÑ@Ú°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X]ùXXXÔÔ€ô¢ÖôXX]ùÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝFlorida€Statutes€Annotated€ðð€709.08(c)(1)€(West€1997)€provides€in€pertinent€part:€ð ðIf€anyÐ ,  Ðperson€or€entity€initiates€proceedings€in€any€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€to€determine€theÏprincipalððs€incapacity,€the€authority€granted€under€the€durable€power€of€attorney€is€suspended€untilÏthe€petition€is€dismissed€or€withdrawn.€€Notice€of€the€petition€must€be€served€upon€all€attorneys€inÏfact€named€in€any€power€of€attorney€which€is€known€to€the€petitioner.ðð øÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XËXXXÔÔ€[AXXËÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XËX[AÔÐ  ÐÌMarch€1,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó, øð AZ"Arial Regular Ñ ° ÑÑ ° Ñ Ñ ` ÑÑ , Ñ óÝ ƒ2´¡$ÝÑ@ȰÑÑ@Ú°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€XËXXXÔÔ€ô¡ôXXËÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòEzell€v.€Cockrellóó,€902€S.W.2d€394,€396€(Tenn.€1995). Ñ  Ñ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular èÝ ƒ2D$ÝÑ@ȰÑÑ@Ú°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X]ùXXXÔÔ€ô¢ÖôXX]ùÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€34„11„101(4)€(1996€Repl.).!"# &Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxd- ù-(’(2´¡$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑȰÑÑÚ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€XËXXXÔÔ€ô¡ôXXËÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ݛҀ°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€XËXXXÔÑ€1ÑÑ7€ÆhXXdìXXdð7ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ  ÑÑ€©>Ñò òÓ=€ÆhX°XdÐd=ÓœñÇññÇññÇññÇñœñÇñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E»±` 8ttxPó°ð  rßñÇññÇññÇññÇñßt€ )>.*jxíþô` `€€@E¥¤` 8ttxPÝÜð È tß›ñÇñà@ž ž ÌàÔ‡¼>¼XXËÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEó óˆÐ ° Ðò òà@(ÌàAT€KNOXVILLEó óÔ#†XËX¼¼>|#ÔˆÐ Ä ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àò ò€ó óÐ ¾ Ðò òà Ø àó óà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONóóó óÐ ªú ÐÌœFRANCES›€MILLER€BELL€byà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àò òFiled:€œñÇñMarch€1,€1999ñÇññÇññÇñ9ñÇññÇñmñÇñFebruary›€22,€œ1999›€ñÇñó óÐ | Ì ÐJANET€SNYDER›,€Conservator€&à 8 àà  àà è à)Ð h ¸ ÐAttorney„In„Fact,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ð N ž Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ à€Ð 4 „  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff„Appellant,à à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àHon.€€Wheeler€œRosenbalm›,Ð P  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àJudgeÐ æ6  ÐV.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ð Ì  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àKNOX€CIRCUITÐ ²  МICARD›,€MERRILL,€œCULLIS›,€œTIMM›,€€à  àà è à)à @ àà ˜ àà ð àÐ ˜è  ÐFUREN€AND€GINSBURG,€P.A.;€andà  àà è à)à @ àSupreme€CourtÐ ~Î ÐWILLIAM€GORDON€BELL;€and€à 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àNo.€03S01„9809„CV„00101Ð d´ ÐHUNTON€&€WILLIAMS;€andà 8 àà  àà è à)Ð Jš ÐLONG,€RAGSDALE€AND€WATERS,à  àà è à)Ð 0€ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à)Ìà Ø àDefendants„Appellees.à 8 àà  àà è à)à @ àÐ üL Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àÌòòÔ‡ô¡ôXXËÔò òÌÌÔ#†XËXôô¡G #ÔFOR€APPELLANTà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àFOR€APPELLEEà ˜ àÐ T¤ ÐFRANCIS€MILLER€BELL:ó óà à àò òóóà 8 àà  àòòœICARD›,€MERRILL,€CULLIS,€TIMM,Ð @ Ðóóó óWilliam€R.€Willis,€Jr.ò òòòà à àà 8 àà  àFUREN€&€GINSBURG,€P.A.:Ô‡ô¡ôXXËÔÐ ,| Ðó óóóÔ#†XËXôô¡Í #ÔAlan€D.€Johnsonà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àWilliam€T.€RamseyÐ h ÐWILLIS€&€KNIGHTà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àW.€David€BridgersÐ þN ÐNashville,€Tennesseeà à àà 8 àà  àNEAL€&€HARWELL,€PLCÐ ä4 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àNashville,€TennesseeÌÔ‡ô¡ôXXËÔÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àò òòòÔ#†XËXôô¡±#ÔÔ‡&i! &XXËÔFORó ó€ò òAPPELLEE€WILLIAM€G.€BELL:Ô#†XËX &&i!B#Ôó óóóÐ n"¾! Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àThomas€S.€Scott,€Jr.Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àDan€D.€RheaÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àARNETT,€DRAPER€&€HAGOODÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àò òòòÔ‡&i! &XXËÔFOR€APPELLEE€HUNTON€&€WILLIAMS:Ð Â'#' Ðà Ø àÔ#†XËX &&i!#Ôà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àóóó óJohn€P.€KonvalinkaÐ ˜(è#( Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àSusan€Kerr€LeeÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àTonya€Kennedy€CammonÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àGRANT,€KONVALINKA€&€HARRISONÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àChattanooga,€TennesseeÌà Ø àÌò òòòÔ‡&i! &XXËÔà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àFOR€APPELLEE€LONG,€RAGSDALE€&€à  # àÐ ü-L). Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àWATERS:ó óóóÐ Ò."*/ ÐÔ#†XËX &&i!õ#Ôà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àDarryl€G.€LoweÐ ¨/ø*0 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àLOWE,€SHIRLEY€&€YEAGERÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àKnoxville,€Tennesseeà ð àà H! àà  # àÐ t1Ä,2 Ðà Ø àÌÔ€ô¡ôXXËÔÓ*€Ð(˜,ø%ŒX°œX*ÓÔ‡„® „ôô¡ÔÌÌà@VV(Ìàò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ#†ô¡ô „„® Ý#ԈРô5D16 ÐÌÌÌœñÇñÌñÇññÇñÑ©>ÑÑ` °ÑÑ, °ÑÑ  ÑñÇñÔ€XËXôô¡ÔTRIAL›€COURT€ANDÐ ’9â4: ÐñÇñÑ©>ÑÑ` °ÑÑ, °ÑÑ  ÑñÇñCOURT€OF€APPEALS€AFFIRMED.à  àà D àà p àà œ àà È àà ô àà  àà L àà x àDROWOTA,€J.€Ð  x:È5;— ÐÑ©>ÑÑ` °ÑÑ, °ÑÑ  ÑÓÓÑ€dO ÑÑ€ïÑà 4 àà ` àWe€granted€this€appeal€to€determine€whether€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€statesÏa€cause€of€action€for€abuse€of€process.€€We€conclude€that€the€complaint€fails€toÏallege€one€of€the€essential€elements€of€the€tort€„„€an€improper€act€in€the€use€ofÏprocess.€€Accordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€whichÏupheld€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€for€failure€to€state€aÏclaim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6).ÌÌÌà@óó)Ìàòòò òBACKGROUNDóóó óˆÐ Œ` Ðà 4 àà ` àThis€action€arose€from€a€dispute€over€the€property€of€the€plaintiff,€FrancesÏMiller€Bell.€€€Frances€Bell€is€the€widow€of€Malvern€Bell.€€Janet€Snyder€is€FrancesÏBellððs€daughter€from€a€previous€marriage€and€is€currently€serving€as€Frances€BellððsÏconservator€and€attorney„in„fact.€€The€defendant,€William€Bell,€is€Malvern€BellððsÏnephew.€The€other€defendants€are€various€law€firms€that€have€representedÏWilliam€Bell€in€various€legal€proceedings.€€Because€this€action€was€dismissed€forÏfailure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted,€the€following€summary€ofÏfacts€alleged€in€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€are€taken€to€be€true.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ø&Ì  ÐÌà 4 àà ` àFrances€Bell€and€Malvern€Bell€were€married€in€1976.€€It€was€the€secondÏmarriage€for€both.€€Because€Frances€Bell€was€an€independently€wealthy€divorceeÏand€Malvern€Bell€had€a€relatively€small€net€worth,€they€executed€a€prenuptialÏagreement€which€provided€that€each€would€maintain€and€devise€his€or€her€ownÏrespective€estate€independent€of€the€other.Ð À1”', Їà 4 àà ` àIn€October€of€1994,€while€she€and€Malvern€Bell€were€living€in€Florida,ÏFrances€Bell€suffered€a€stroke€which€impaired€her€ability€to€walk,€talk,€and€write.€ÏFollowing€the€stroke,€Frances€Bell€signed€a€durable€power€of€attorney€namingÏœMalvern›€Bell€as€her€attorney„in„fact.€€Janet€Snyder,€who€lived€in€Knoxville€at€thisÏtime,€spoke€with€Frances€Bell€before€the€power€of€attorney€was€signed€and€agreedÏit€was€necessary€if€Frances€Bell€intended€to€remain€in€Florida.€€Over€the€ensuingÏmonths€Frances€Bellððs€condition€worsened,€and€in€March€of€1995,€she€wasÏrelocated€from€Florida€to€a€Knoxville€nursing€home€near€Snyderððs€residence.€ÏMalvern€Bell€remained€in€Florida.€€ÌÌ€à 4 àà ` àNot€long€after€Frances€Bell€relocated€to€Knoxville,€Malvern€Bellððs€healthÐ $ø Ðdeteriorated.€€On€the€advice€of€Snyder,€Frances€Bell€executed€a€new€durableÏpower€of€attorney€which€added€Snyder€as€œherñöÆñ€ñöÆñalternate›€attorney„in„fact€andÏprovided€that€it€was€made€in€conformance€with€Tennessee€and€Florida€law.€ÏMalvern€Bellððs€health€continued€to€decline€and€on€October€26,€1995,€he€wasÏdeclared€incompetent€and€Snyder€became€attorney„in„fact€for€Frances€Bell.€ÏMalvern€Bell€died€a€week€later€on€November€3,€1995.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àAfter€Malvern€Bellððs€death,€Frances€Bell,€by€and€through€Snyder,€herÏattorney„in„fact,€sued€William€Bell€in€Florida€for€conversion€of€her€funds€andÏmisappropriation€of€a€personal€computer.€€This€lawsuit€concerns€allegations€thatÏMalvern€Bell,€during€the€time€he€had€power€of€attorney€over€his€wifeððs€affairs,Ïmisappropriated€more€than€one€million€dollars€of€Frances€Bellððs€assets€and€placedÏthem€into€the€Malvern€Hill€Bell€Trust€(ð ðTrustðð).€€Frances€Bell€was€named€a€life„¼income€beneficiary€of€the€Trust€with€William€Bell€and€his€four€sisters€receiving€theÐ L5 +0 Ðremaining€funds€under€Malvern€Bellððs€will.€€William€Bell€was€also€named€trustee.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àWilliam€Bell€retained€the€law€firm€of€Icard,€Merrill,€Cullis,€Timm,€Furen€&ÏGinsburg€(ð ðIcard€Merrillðð),€a€defendant€in€this€appeal,€to€represent€him€in€theÏFlorida€litigation.€€On€December€6,€1995,€William€Bell,€by€and€through€counsel,Ïfiled€a€motion€to€dismiss€or€abate€the€Florida€action€asserting€that€Snyder€was€theÏtrue€party€pursuing€the€action€under€a€durable€power€of€attorney€that€was€invalidÏunder€Florida€law.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àOn€December€11,€1995,€five€days€after€filing€the€motion€to€dismiss€or€abateÏthe€Florida€action,€William€Bell,€represented€by€the€law€firm€of€Long,€Ragsdale,€&ÏWaters,€a€defendant€in€this€appeal,€filed€a€petition€in€the€Chancery€Court€of€KnoxÏCounty€seeking€appointment€of€a€conservator€for€Frances€Bell.€€The€petitionÏalleged€that€Snyder€had€brought€the€Florida€litigation€under€an€invalid€power€ofÏattorney€and€for€an€improper€purpose€and€asserted€that€an€attorney€conservator,ÏDavid€Draper,€should€be€appointed€to€determine€whether€the€Florida€litigation€wasÏin€Frances€Bellððs€best€interest.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àDuring€arguments€before€the€Florida€court€on€William€Bellððs€motion€toÏdismiss€or€abate,€an€attorney€with€Icard€Merrill€challenged€Snyderððs€authority€toÏinstitute€suit€pursuant€to€the€power€of€attorney.€€In€support€of€this€œñ÷Æñchallengeñ÷ÆññøÆñargumentñøÆññùÆñ,ñùÆñ›€theÏattorney€cited€a€Florida€statute׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€which€suspends€all€powers€of€attorney€during€theÐ è/¼%* Ðpendency€of€an€ð ðincapacity€proceedingð ð€and€informed€the€Florida€court€that€aÏconservatorship€proceeding€was€pending€in€Tennessee.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€According€to€theÐ ø Ì Ðcomplaint,€the€Icard€Merrill€attorney€also€informed€the€Florida€court€that€WilliamÏBell€had€no€interest€in€Frances€Bellððs€welfare€and€the€only€motive€in€filing€theÏconservatorship€proceeding€in€Tennessee€was€to€affect€the€Florida€litigation.€ÌÌà 4 àà ` à€Approximately€two€weeks€later,€on€February€1,€1996,€William€Bell€voluntarilyÏdismissed€the€Tennessee€conservatorship€petition.€€On€February€15,€1996,ÏSnyder€filed€a€conservatorship€petition€in€Knox€County€Chancery€Court€seeking€toÏhave€the€Chancellor€name€Snyder€as€Frances€Bellððs€conservator.€€On€FebruaryÏ21,€1996,€Snyder€also€filed€against€William€Bell€an€abuse€of€process€andÏmalicious€prosecution€suit€on€behalf€of€Frances€Bell.€€William€Bell€retained€the€lawÏfirm€of€œHunton›€&€Williams,€also€a€defendant€in€this€appeal,€to€represent€him€in€thatÏaction.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àOn€June€4,€1996,€William€Bell,€again€represented€by€Long,€Ragsdale,€&ÏWaters,€filed€a€second€petition€to€have€a€Knoxville€attorney,€John€A.€Walker,€II,Ïappointed€conservator€for€Frances€Bell.€€This€petition€œñúÆñagain€ñúÆñalleged›€that€anÏindependent€conservator€was€necessary€to€evaluate€whether€or€not€the€FloridaÏlitigation€was€in€Frances€Bellððs€best€interests.€€On€June€28,€1996,€theÏconservatorship€petitions€were€consolidated.€ÌÌà 4 àà ` à€On€July€1,€1996,€Frances€Bell€voluntarily€dismissed€her€suit€for€abuse€ofÐ ´1ˆ', Ðprocess€and€malicious€prosecution.€€On€July€30,€1996,€during€hearings€before€theÏFlorida€court,€an€attorney€for€Icard€Merrill€explained€that€the€conservatorshipÏproceeding€in€Tennessee€had€been€brought€for€two€reasons:€1)€to€protect€FrancesÏBellððs€interests€since€she€was€a€life„income€beneficiary€of€the€Malvern€Hill€BellÏTrust€which€was€a€defendant€in€the€Florida€litigation;€and€2)€to€protect€the€interestsÏof€all€the€trust€beneficiaries€by€challenging€the€authority€of€Snyder€to€pursueÏlitigation€against€the€Trust€on€behalf€of€her€mother.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àà Œ àOn€August€16,€1996,€the€Chancellor€heard€arguments€on€SnyderððsÏmotion€to€dismiss€William€Bellððs€second€conservatorship€petition.€€At€this€hearingÏWilliam€Bell€was€represented€by€both€Hunton€&€Williams€and€Long,€Ragsdale€&ÏWaters.€€The€Chancellor€granted€Snyderððs€motion€and€dismissed€the€secondÏpetition.€€Thereafter,€on€August€19,€1996,€William€Bell€moved€to€intervene€inÏSnyderððs€conservatorship€proceeding.€€The€Chancellor€denied€the€motion€toÏintervene,€and€Snyder€was€appointed€conservator€on€November€7,€1996.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àOn€January€13,€1997,€Snyder€filed€the€present€suit€on€behalf€of€Frances€BellÏagainst€William€Bell€and€the€law€firms€which€have€represented€him€in€the€FloridaÏlitigation€and€in€the€conservatorship€proceedings€in€Tennessee.€€The€complaintÏalleges€that€William€Bell€and€the€law€firm€defendants,€acting€in€concert,€filed€theÏtwo€petitions€for€the€appointment€of€an€independent€conservator€for€Frances€BellÏsolely€to€ð ðscuttleðð€the€Florida€lawsuit€against€William€Bell.€€The€complaint€soughtÏdamages€for€abuse€of€process€and€civil€conspiracy€to€abuse€process.€€€ÌÌò òà 4 àà ` àó óPursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6),€each€of€the€defendants€filed€motionsÐ L5 +0 Ðto€dismiss€the€complaint€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€beÏgranted.€€Following€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€granted€the€motions€and€dismissedÏthe€plaintiffððs€complaint€as€to€all€defendants€stating€that€the€complaint€containedÌÓÓÌà8 4 àà8` 4ì"4ì"àno€allegation€from€which€proof€then€can€be€adduced€to€support€thatÏthe€defendants€in€the€course€of€all€these€activities€that€have€beenÏattributed€to€them€actually€abused€process;€that€is,€they€used€theÏprocess€of€the€Chancery€Court€after€it€was€issued€for€some€purposeÏfor€which€that€process€was€not€designed€in€the€prosecution€ofÏconservatorship€proceedings.Ð ` À!` À! ÐÌÌÓÓà 4 àà ` àThe€plaintiff€appealed,€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏdismissal,€finding€that€even€if€the€complaint€were€assumed€òòarguendoóó€to€allege€anÐ rF Ðulterior€motive€in€the€use€of€process,€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€was€properÏbecause€the€complaint€did€not€allege€the€second€element€of€the€tort€„„€an€improperÏact€in€the€use€of€process.ò ò€€ó óThe€Court€of€Appeals€emphasized€that€the€ð ðmereÐ Ú® Ðexistence€of€an€ulterior€motive€in€doing€an€act€.€.€.€does€not€suffice,ðð€and€statedÏthat€ð ðmerely€instituting€civil€proceedings€is€generally€not€sufficient€to€support€anÏabuse€of€process€claim.ðð€€Thereafter€we€granted€the€plaintiffððs€application€forÏpermission€to€appeal€and€now€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals.ÌÌÌà@SS%Ìàòòò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWóóó óˆÐ z+N!% Ðà 4 àà ` àA€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€uponÏwhich€relief€can€be€granted€tests€only€the€legal€sufficiency€of€the€complaint,€not€theÏstrength€of€a€plaintiffððs€proof.€€Such€a€motion€admits€the€truth€of€all€relevant€andÏmaterial€averments€contained€in€the€complaint,€but€asserts€that€such€facts€do€notÏconstitute€a€cause€of€action€as€a€matter€of€law.€€In€ruling€upon€a€motion€to€dismiss,Ð ‚4V*/ Ðcourts€should€construe€the€complaint€liberally€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff,€taking€allÏallegations€of€fact€as€true.€€The€motion€to€dismiss€should€be€denied€unless€itÏappears€that€the€plaintiff€can€prove€no€set€of€facts€in€support€of€her€claim€thatÏwould€entitle€her€to€relief.€€In€considering€this€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏthe€defendantsðð€motions€to€dismiss,€we€take€all€allegations€of€fact€in€the€plaintiffððsÏcomplaint€as€true,€and€review€the€lower€courtsðð€legal€conclusions€de€novo€with€noÏpresumption€of€correctness.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòStein€v.€Davidson€Hotel€Co.óó,Ð ôÈ  Ð945€S.W.2d€714,€716€(Tenn.€1997);€òòPursell€v.€First€American€Natððl€Bankóó,€937Ð À”  ÐS.W.2d€838,€840€Tenn.€1996);€òòCook€v.€Spinnakerððs€of€Rivergate,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2dÐ Œ` Ð934,€938€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌÌà@ÄÄ&Ìàòòò òABUSE€OF€PROCESSóóó óˆÐ ¼ Ðà 4 àà ` àThe€plaintiff€maintains€that€her€complaint€alleges€both€elements€of€the€tort€ofÏabuse€of€process€„„€an€ulterior€motive€and€an€improper€act€in€the€use€of€process.€ÏShe€points€to€the€allegations€of€the€complaint€which€charge€that€theÏœconservatorñûÆñshipñûÆñ›€petition€was€filed€only€to€gain€a€collateral€advantage€in€the€FloridaÏlitigation€and€the€allegations€which€charge€an€attorney€for€Icard€Merrill€attemptedÏto€use€the€conservatorship€proceeding€to€dismiss€or€abate€the€Florida€litigation.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àIn€response,€the€defendants€argue€that€even€assuming€the€complaint€allegesÏthe€first€element€of€abuse€of€process,€the€existence€of€an€ulterior€motive,€theÏcomplaint€does€not€allege€the€second€element€of€the€tort.€€According€to€theÏdefendants,€neither€initiation€of€the€conservatorship€proceeding€nor€reference€to€itÏin€the€Florida€litigation€constitutes€an€improper€act€in€the€use€of€the€process€toÐ X5,+0 Ðperform€a€function€or€obtain€a€result€which€the€process€was€not€intended€by€law€toÏeffect.€€We€agree.ÌÌà 4 àà ` àIn€Tennessee€there€are€two€tort€actions€which€may€be€brought€to€obtainÏredress€for€the€alleged€misuse€of€legal€process€by€another:€malicious€prosecutionÏand€abuse€of€process.€€òòDonaldson€v.€Donaldsonóó,€557€S.W.2d€60,€62€(Tenn.Ð (ü  Ð1977);€òòPriest€v.€Union€Agencyóó,€174€Tenn.€304,€125€S.W.2d€142,€143€(1939).€€ToÐ ôÈ  Ðmake€out€a€claim€for€malicious€prosecution,€a€plaintiff€must€show€that€theÏdefendant€maliciously€brought€a€prior€suit€against€him€or€her€without€probableÏcause,€and€that€the€prior€suit€was€terminated€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff.€€òòRoberts€v.Ð X, ÐFederal€Express€Corp.óó,€842€S.W.2d€246,€248€(Tenn.€1992).€€To€establish€a€claimÐ $ø Ðfor€abuse€of€process€in€Tennessee,€as€in€a€majority€of€other€jurisdictions,€twoÏelements€must€be€alleged:€ð ð(1)€the€existence€of€an€ulterior€motive;€and€(2)€an€actÏin€the€use€of€process€other€than€such€as€would€be€proper€in€the€regularÏprosecution€of€the€charge.ðð€€òòPriestóó,€174€Tenn.€at€307,€125€S.W.2d€at€143€(internalÐ T#( Ðquotations€and€citations€omitted);€1€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòAbuse€of€Processóó€ðð€5€(1994).Ð  %ô ÐÌÒHÀÒà 4 àà ` àAbuse€of€process€differs€from€malicious€prosecution€in€that€abuse€of€processÏlies€ð ðfor€the€improper€use€of€process€òòòòafteróóóó€it€has€been€issued,€not€for€maliciouslyÐ „*X $ Ðcausing€process€to€issue.ðð€€òòPriestóó,€174€Tenn.€at€306,€125€S.W.2d€at€143€(emphasisÐ T,("& Ðadded)€(internal€citations€and€quotations€omitted);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Restatement€(Second)Ð  .ô#( Ðof€Torts€ðð€682€(1977)€(ð ðThe€subsequent€misuse€of€the€process,€though€properlyÏobtained,€constitutes€the€misconduct€for€which€the€liability€is€imposed.€.€.€.);€FowlerÏV.€Harper€et€al.,€òòThe€Law€of€Tortsóó€ðð€4.9€at€4:84€(3rd€ed.€1995)€(ð ðThe€action€is€not€forÐ „3X). Ðthe€wrongful€bringing€of€an€action€or€prosecution,€but€for€the€improper€use,€or€ratherÐ P5$+0 ÐÑï ÑÑ XÑÑ  ÑñûÆñÑï ÑÑ XÑÑ  ÑñûÆñððabuse,ðð€of€process€in€connection€therewith€.€.€.€.);€W.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,€òòProsserÐ ,  Ðand€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€ðð€121€at€897€(5th€ed.€1984)€(ð ð[T]he€gist€of€the€tort€isÐ ø Ì Ðnot€commencing€an€action€or€causing€process€to€issue€without€justification,€butÏmisusing,€or€misapplying€process€justified€in€itself€for€an€end€other€than€that€which€itÏwas€designed€to€accomplish€[footnote€omitted].ðð).Ìà 4 àà ` àAs€this€Court€emphasized€in€òòPriestóó,€Ð (ü  ÐÓÓà8 4 àà8` 4d#4d#àThe€test€as€to€whether€there€is€an€abuse€of€process€is€whether€theÏprocess€has€been€used€to€accomplish€some€end€which€is€without€theÏregular€purview€of€the€process,€or€which€compels€the€party€againstÏwhom€it€is€used€to€do€some€collateral€thing€which€he€could€not€legallyÏand€regularly€be€compelled€to€do.Ð ` 8"` 8" ÐÌ174€Tenn.€at€307,€125€S.W.2d€at€144.€€ÓöTÓAbuse€of€process€does€not€occur€unless€theÏð ðprocess€is€perverted,€i.e.,€directed€outside€of€its€lawful€course€to€theÏaccomplishment€of€some€object€other€than€that€for€which€it€is€provided.ðð€€òòId.óó€€TheÐ ðÄ Ðmere€existence€of€an€ulterior€motive€in€doing€an€act,€proper€in€itself,€is€not€sufficient.€ÏòòId.óó€€An€action€for€abuse€of€process€cannot€be€sustained€where€the€process€wasÐ ˆ!\ Ðemployed€to€perform€no€other€function€than€that€intended€by€law.€€òòId.óó€€The€badÐ T#( Ðintent€must€culminate€in€an€actual€abuse€of€the€process€ð ðby€perverting€it€to€a€use€toÏobtain€a€result€which€the€process€was€not€intended€by€law€to€effect.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€308,€125Ð ì&À  ÐS.W.2d€at€144.€€ð ðThe€improper€purpose€usually€takes€the€form€of€coercion€to€obtainÏa€collateral€advantage,€not€properly€involved€in€the€proceeding€itself,€such€as€theÏsurrender€of€property€or€the€payment€of€money,€by€the€use€of€the€process€as€aÏthreat€or€a€club.ðð€€Keeton€et€al.,€òòsupraóó€€ðð€121€at€898.Ð .ð#( ÐÌà 4 àà ` àMere€initiation€of€a€law€suit,€though€accompanied€by€a€malicious€ulteriorÏmotive,€is€not€abuse€of€process.€€òòSeeóó€òòPriestóó,€174€Tenn.€at€308,€125€S.W.2d€at€144;Ð €3T). Ðòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòOren€Royal€Oaks€Venture€v.€Greenberg,€Bernhard,€Weiss€&€Karma,€Inc.óó,Ð L5 +0 Ð728€P.2d€1202,1208€(Cal.€1986)€(ð ð[T]he€mere€filing€or€maintenance€of€a€lawsuit€„„Ïeven€for€an€improper€purpose€„„€is€not€a€proper€basis€for€an€abuse€of€processÏaction.ðð);€Ô‡X÷!XXX]ùÔòòJoseph€v.€Markovitzóó,€551€P.2d€571,€575€(Ariz.€App.€1976)€(ð ð[P]roof€ofÐ Ä ˜ Ðabuse€of€process€requires€some€act€beyond€the€initiation€of€a€lawsuit.ðð);€òòHall€v.Ð ¨| ÐHollywood€Credit€Clothing€Co.óó,€147€A.2d€866,€868€(D.C.€Mun.€App.€1959)€(ð ðTheÐ ˆ\ Ðmere€issuance€of€the€process€is€not€actionable,€no€matter€what€ulterior€motive€mayÏhave€prompted€it;€the€gist€of€the€action€lies€in€the€improper€use€after€issuance.ðð);ÏòòYoder€v.€Adriaticoóó,€459€So.2d€449,€450€(Fla.€App.€1984)€(ð ð[T]he€tort€of€abuse€ofÐ (ü  Ðprocess€is€concerned€with€the€improper€use€of€process€after€it€issues.ðð);€òòBrown€v.Ð Ü ÐRobertsonóó,€92€N.E.2d€856,€858€(Ind.€App.€1950);€òòBrody€v.€Rubyóó,€267€N.W.2d€902,Ð è¼ Ð905„06€(Iowa€1978);€òòFriedman€v.€Dozorcóó,€312€N.W.2d€585,€594„95€(Mich.€1981);Ð Èœ ÐòòEdmonds€v.€Delta€Democrat€Publððg€Co.óó,€93€So.2d€171,€174€(Miss.€1957);€òòHauser€v.Ð ¨| ÐBartowóó,€7€N.E.2d€268€(N.Y.€1937)€(ð ðThere€must€be€a€further€act€done€outside€theÐ ˆ \ Ðuse€of€process€„„€a€perversion€of€the€process.ðð);€òòClermont€EnvironmentalÐ h"< ÐReclamation€Co.€v.€Hancockóó,€474€N.E.2d€357,€361€(Ohio€App.€1984)€(ð ð[I]f€one€uses€Ð H$ Ðprocess€properly,€but€with€a€malicious€motive,€there€is€no€abuse€of€process€.€.€.€.ðð);ÏòòAnn„Margaret€v.€High€œSocððy›€Magazine,€Inc.óó,€498€F.€Supp.€401,€407€(S.D.€N.Y.Ð (Ü  Ð1980)€(ð ð[A]€summons€and€complaint€are€not€process€capable€of€being€abused.ðð);ÏòòManufacturers€&€Jobbers€Fin.€Corp.€v.€Laneóó,€19€S.E.2d€849,€853€(N.C.€1942)€(ð ðTheÐ È+œ!$ Ðgist€of€an€action€for€abuse€of€process€is€the€improper€use€of€the€process€after€it€hasÏbeen€issued.ðð);€òòSnyder€v.€Byrneóó,€770€S.W.2d€65,€67€(Tex.€App.€1989);€òòMullins€v.Ð ˆ/\%( ÐSandersóó,€54€S.E.2d€116,€121€(Va.€1949);€òòBatten€v.€Abramsóó,€626€P.2d€984,€990Ð h1<'* Ð(Wash.€App.€1981)€(ð ð[T]here€must€be€an€act€after€filing€suit€using€legal€processÏempowered€by€that€suit€to€accomplish€an€end€not€within€the€purview€of€the€suit.ðð);Ð (5ü*. Ðòòseeóó€òògenerallyóóÔ#†X]ùXXX÷!Ù\#ÔÔ‡X÷!XXX]ùÔ€Keeton€et€al.,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€121€at€898€(€ð ð[T]here€is€no€liability€where€theÐ ,  Ðdefendant€has€done€nothing€more€than€carry€out€the€process€to€œiñüÆñtñüÆñs›€authorizedÏconclusion,€even€though€with€bad€intentions.ðð);€Annotation,€80€A.L.R.€580€(1932).Ô#†X]ùXXX÷!áe#Ô€€Ð ì À ÐÌà 4 àà ` àThe€requirement€of€a€subsequent€improper€act€in€the€use€of€process€after€the€Ïinitiation€of€a€law€suit€is€designed€to€accommodate€the€freedom€of€an€individual€toÏseek€redress€in€the€courts€and€the€interest€of€a€potential€defendant€in€being€freeÏfrom€unjustified€litigation.€€òòSeeóó€òòOren€Royal€Oaks€Ventureóó,€728€P.2d€at€1209.€€TheÐ Ô  Ðrequirement€also€serves€to€prevent€a€chilling€effect€on€claims€well„founded€in€factÏand€law€and€asserted€for€the€legitimate€purpose€of€redressing€a€grievance.€òòId.óó;€òòseeóóÐ ˜l Ðòòalsoóó€òòDevaney€v.€Thriftway€Marketing€Corp.óó,€953€P.2d€277,€285€(N.M.€1997).€€In€lightÐ d8 Ðof€the€important€functions€served€by€this€requirement,€as€evidenced€by€the€numberÏof€jurisdictions€which€apply€it,€we€have€no€hesitation€in€reaffirming€this€CourtððsÏstatement€in€òòPriestóó:€abuse€of€process€œñýÆñð ðñýÆñlies›€only€ð ðfor€the€improper€use€of€processÐ È!œ Ðòòòòafteróóóó€it€has€been€issued,€not€for€maliciously€causing€process€to€issue.ðð€170€Tenn.€atÐ ”#h Ð306,€125€S.W.2d€at€143€(internal€citations€and€quotations€omitted)€(emphasisÏadded).€€In€so€holding,€we€reject€the€plaintiffððs€suggestion€that€filing€an€action€for€anÏimproper€ð ðulterior€motiveðð€is€alone€sufficient€to€give€rise€to€a€claim€for€abuse€ofÏprocess.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòOren€Royal€Oaks€Ventureóó,€728€S.W.2d€at€1209.Ð È*œ $ ÐÌà 4 àà ` à€Considering€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€in€light€of€these€governing€legalÏprinciples,€we€conclude€the€trial€court€and€Court€of€Appeals€properly€dismissed€theÏplaintiffððs€complaint€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€ÏThe€complaint€does€not€allege€the€second€element€of€abuse€of€process€„„€anÏimproper€act€in€the€use€of€process€which€occurred€after€the€conservatorship€petitionÐ 5d+0 Ðwas€filed.€€Mere€filing€of€the€petition€is€not€sufficient.€€As€the€Court€of€AppealsÏrecognized,€under€Tennessee€law,€any€person€with€knowledge€of€an€individualððsÏneed€for€a€conservator€may€petition€the€court€to€appoint€a€conservator.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€34„13„102€(1996€œRepl›.).ÌÌà 4 àà ` àMoreover,€despite€the€plaintiffððs€assertions€to€the€contrary,€an€improper€act€inÏthe€use€of€process€did€not€occur€when€William€Bell€and€Icard€Merrill€advised€theÏFlorida€court€of€the€pendency€of€the€conservatorship€proceeding€in€Tennessee€andÏinvoked€a€Florida€statute€in€support€of€a€motion€to€dismiss€or€abate€the€FloridaÏlitigation.€€These€allegations€do€not€charge€an€action€that€perverted€the€process€to€aÏuse€to€obtain€a€result€which€the€process€was€not€intended€by€law€to€effect.€TheÏFlorida€statute€provided€for€the€suspension€of€powers€of€attorney€during€theÏpendency€proceedings€to€determine€a€principalððs€capacity.€€òòSeeóó€n.2,€òòsupraóó.€€TheÐ ¼ Ðlitigation€in€Florida€was€instituted€by€Snyder,€exercising€power€of€attorney€forÏFrances€Bell.€€The€statute€potentially€could€have€resulted€in€a€stay€of€the€FloridaÏlawsuit€until€conclusion€of€the€conservatorship€proceeding.€€Since€it€was€WilliamÏBell€who€filed€the€conservatorship€proceeding,€it€was€appropriate€for€William€Bell€toÏadvise€the€Florida€court€that€he€had€filed€a€petition€in€Tennessee€seekingÏappointment€of€a€conservator€for€€Frances€Bell.€€Because€litigation€is€often€costlyÏand€because€the€purpose€of€a€conservatorship€proceeding€is€to€supervise,€protect,Ïand€assist€ð ðthe€person€or€property€or€both€of€a€disabled€person,ðð׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€William€BellððsÐ .ð#( Ðrequest€that€the€Florida€litigation€be€stayed€until€resolution€of€the€conservatorÏproceeding€was€appropriate.€€œñþÆñHowever,›€ñþÆññÿÆñHowever,€ñÿÆñnowhere›€does€the€complaint€allege€that€theÐ ´1ˆ', Ðdefendants€used€the€conservatorship€proceeding€as€a€ð ðthreatðð€or€a€ð ðclubðð€to€extortÏfrom€the€plaintiff€an€agreement€to€dismiss€or€settle€the€Florida€litigation.€€MerelyÏadvising€a€Florida€court€of€the€pendency€of€the€proceeding€in€conjunction€with€theÏstatute€does€not€constitute€an€improper€act€in€the€use€of€process.€€Accordingly,€weÏconclude€that€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€fails€to€allege€one€of€the€essential€elements€ofÏabuse€of€process€„„€an€improper€act€in€the€use€of€process;€therefore€the€complaintÏfails€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€For€the€same€reason,€theÏcomplaint€also€fails€to€state€a€claim€for€conspiracy€to€abuse€process.€€òòSeeóó€òòMerritt„Ð À”  ÐChapman€&€Scott€Corp.€v.€Elgin€Coal,€Inc.óó,€358€F.Supp.€17,€21€(E.D.€Tenn.€1972).€€Ð Œ` ÐÌÌà@hh*àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óˆà È àà ô àÐ ðÄ Ðà 4 àà ` àBecause€we€conclude€that€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€fails€to€allege€one€of€theÏessential€elements€of€abuse€of€process,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€which€upheld€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€for€failureÏto€state€a€cause€of€action.ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌÌà 4 àà ` àà Œ àà ¸ àà ä àà  àà < àà h àà ” àà À àà ì à__________________________________Ìà 4 àà ` àà Œ àà ¸ àà ä àà  àà < àà h àà ” àà À àà ì àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,Ìà 4 àà ` àà Œ àà ¸ àà ä àà  àà < àà h àà ” àà À àà ì àJUSTICEÌÌò òÌÌÌÌConcur:ó óÐ ¾2’(- ÐAnderson,€C.J.ÌBirch,€Holder,€Barker,€œJJ.ñÇñÌñÇñ›ñÇñÌÑdOÑѰ` ÑѰ, ÑÑ  ÑñÇñ