ÿWPC3# …#†VU:Ü % 0 44Pd 0xs 0Dë 0J/ 0Ty 0^Í 0h+ 0r“ 0| 0† 0 1u— U, 0d8 U,œ U *È B)ò DC AM^?«ê Bø¼–цgív~z D3øvÓ+ 0@þ AO>!Æ! 0PS" 0D£" D/ç" B#˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0ÙP wD6 ×J·^:·ˆ: ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Óc`…tÔôÔô3|xó(((3ÝÙ$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ 5Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òJanuary€29,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€Brody€òòNegligently€Inflicted€Psychic€Injuries:€€A€Return€to€Reasonóó€7Ïà àVill.L.Rev.€232€(1961„62);€Calvert€Magruder,€òòMental€and€Emotional€DisturbanceÏà àin€the€Law€of€Tortsóó,€49€Harv.L.Rev.€1033€(1936);€Archibald€H.€Throckmorton,Ïòòà àDamages€for€Frightóó,€34€Harv.L.Rev.€260€(1921).Ì d ²Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€do€not,€by€our€adoption€of€the€general€negligence€approach,€necessarilyÏà àabandon€the€"zone€of€danger"€approach€used€in€òòSheltonóó.€€Indeed,€since€theÏ"zone€à àof€danger"€approach€is,€in€reality,€merely€a€way€of€defining€and€limiting€theÏà àelements€of€duty€and€proximate€or€legal€cause,€the€principles€of€the€approachÏcan€à àlikely€be€integrated€into€the€general€negligence€framework.€€The€specifics€ofÏsuch€à àan€integration€must,€however,€await€an€appropriate€case.€€Ì ŒÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒI€disagree€with€the€other€members€of€the€court€as€to€the€precise€scopeÏof€these€limitations.€òòSeeóó€òòOwens€v.€Truckstops€of€Americaóó,€___€S.W.2d€___Ï(Tenn.€1996)(Drowota,€J.€dissenting).€Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒAlthough€the€relationship€between€Ms.€Barnett€and€Ms.€Taylor€is€notÏmade€clear€in€the€record,€Ms.€Barnett€admitted€in€the€answer€that€the€car€wasÏbeing€used€for€a€family€purpose.Ì ƒÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòBervoetsóó€and€òòVolzóó€are€the€only€post„òòMcIntyreóó€cases€in€which€an€argumentÏà àconcerning€the€abolition€of€joint€and€several€liability€was€made€and€the€issueÏà àsquarely€presented.€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@$$$$'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5((3¾¸$¢¢Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÑ7€7 XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑØ ØÓ&€XÐd&ÓÙ€€ÙßL€!" ;+'h|` Å `€€Lßà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURTÏOF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLE€ÌÌÌÌÌBOBBY€L.€CAMPER,€II,à àà àà à)à àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ì€à àPlaintiff„Appellant,à àà àà à)à àà àFiled:€€January€29,€1996€à àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àSULLIVAN€CIRCUITà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà à)à àÌDANIEL€B.€MINOR,€Administratorà à)à àHon.€Roger€E.€Thayer,€Judgeà àÌad€litem€of€the€ESTATE€OF€à àà à)à àÌJENNIFER€L.€TAYLOR,€and€à àà à)ÌSHARON€R.€BARNETT,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àDefendants„Appellees.à àà à)à àNo.€03S01„9502„CV„00013ÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appellantóó:à àà àà àòòFor€Defendants„Appelleesóó:ÌÌJohn€P.€Chilesà àà àà àà àJack€M.€VaughnÌKingsport,€Tennesseeà àà àà àFuller€&€VaughnÌà àà àà àà àà àà àKingsport,€TennesseeÌThomas€F.€BloomÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌà@ àÔ€„ÔÌÌÌà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSEDÌAND€CAUSE€REMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.€à àÇÓÓà àIn€this€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€case,€the€plaintiff€Bobby€L.ÏCamper,€II,€appeals€from€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgment€granting€the€defendantsÏa€summary€judgment.€€This€case€presents€two€issues€for€our€determination:€(1)Ïwhether€a€non„negligent€driver€who€suffered€no€substantial€physical€injury€mayÏrecover€for€emotional€injuries€under€the€facts€presented€in€this€case;€and€(2)Ïwhether€the€"family€purpose€doctrine"€survives€the€adoption€of€comparativeÏnegligence€and€the€abolition€of€joint€and€several€liability.ÌÌÓ  Óò òòòFACTS€AND€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYóóó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àOn€April€14,€1992,€the€plaintiff€Camper€was€driving€his€cement€truck€alongÏSouth€Wilcox€Drive,€a€four„lane€highway€in€Kingsport,€Tennessee.€€At€the€sameÏtime,€Jennifer€L.€Taylor,€a€16€year€old€driver€of€a€car€owned€by€Sharon€Barnett,Ïwas€proceeding€on€Reservoir€Road,€a€two„lane€road€that€intersects€with€SouthÏWilcox€Drive.€€€As€Camper€approached€the€South€Wilcox„Reservoir€RoadÏintersection,€which€is€controlled€by€a€stop€sign,€Ms.€Taylor,€who€had€beenÏstopped€at€this€intersection,€suddenly€pulled€out€in€front€of€Camper.€€The€vehiclesÍcollided,€and€Ms.€Taylor€was€killed€instantly.€€Camper€exited€his€truck€momentsÏafter€the€crash,€walked€around€the€front€of€his€vehicle,€and€viewed€Ms.€Taylor'sÏbody€in€the€wreckage€from€close€range.€€€Ìà àMr.€Camper€subsequently€brought€an€action€against€Daniel€B.€Minor,€theÏadministrator€of€Ms.€Taylor's€estate,€and€Sharon€Barnett,€seeking€to€recover€forÏthe€emotional€injuries€he€allegedly€received€as€a€result€of€viewing€Ms.€Taylor'sÏbody€soon€after€the€accident.€€In€his€complaint,€Camper€did€not€allege€that€heÏsustained€any€substantial€physical€injury€in€the€accident;€instead,€he€alleged€thatÏ"as€a€result€of€this€accident,€the€plaintiff€suffers€from€personal€injuries€to€hisÏnerves€and€nervous€system€known€as€a€post€traumatic€disorder€[sic],€which€injuryÏis€serious€and€disabling€to€him."€€€In€his€deposition,€Mr.€Camper€testified€as€to€theÏnature€of€his€injuries€as€follows:ÌÌÓ` N <çô¤ÓÓÓà8 àà8 àQ:€€Okay.€€At€the€time€of€the€accident,€when€theÏaccident€occurred,€were€you€injured€as€a€resultÏof€this€accident?ÌÌà8 àà8 àA:€€Not€physically,€but€emotionally€and€mentallyÏI€was.ÌÌà8 àà8 àQ:€€All€right.€€Now€„„€so€when€you€say€youÏweren't€injured€physically,€no€broken€bones,€noÏcuts,€no€bruises,€no€back€problems,€no€nothingÏ[sic]?ÌÌà8 àà8 àA:€€No,€sir.€€I€had€a€small€scrape€on€my€knee.ÌÌà8 àà8 àQ:€€Okay.€€But€nothing€to€warrant€doctors'€care.ÌÌà8 àà8 àA:€€No,€sir.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€his€affidavit,€Mr.€Camper€stated€"[t]hat€as€a€result€of€the€collision€inÏwhich€I€was€involved,€I€have€sustained€mental€and€emotional€injuries€resulting€inÏloss€of€sleep,€inability€to€function€on€a€normal€basis,€outbursts€of€crying€andÏdepression.€€It€has€been€necessary€for€me€to€be€under€the€care€and€treatment€of€aÏpsychiatrist€and€counselors€and€further€that€I€am€taking€medication€in€order€toÏhelp€relieve€me€of€my€suffering."€€Camper€testified€in€his€deposition€that€he€neverÏfeared€for€his€own€safety€during€the€accident,€and€that€his€emotional€injuriesÏresulted€solely€from€seeing€Ms.€Taylor's€body€in€the€car€immediately€after€theÏaccident.€€ÌÌà àAbout€two€weeks€after€the€accident,€Mr.€Camper€consulted€a€psychiatristÏabout€his€mental€problems€stemming€from€the€accident.€€He€went€to€theÏpsychiatrist's€office€twice;€but€he€stated€that€he€quit€going€because€he€could€notÏafford€it€and€because€the€medication€the€psychiatrist€prescribed€left€him€unable€toÏfunction.€€Camper€later€consulted€a€second€psychiatrist.€€(This€visit€was€threeÏdays€before€Camper's€deposition;€he€stated€in€his€deposition€that€his€lawyer€hadÏarranged€for€the€consultation.)€€This€second€psychiatrist€referred€Camper€to€anÏapparently€more€affordable€center€for€counseling;€at€the€time€of€the€deposition,Ïhowever,€Camper€had€not€yet€had€an€appointment€at€this€counseling€center.€ÏDespite€the€fact€that€the€record€reflects€that€Camper€has€undergone€someÏpsychiatric€treatment,€it€contains€no€expert€medical€evidence€detailing€his€allegedÏmental€and€emotional€injuries.€€ÌÌà àAfter€the€complaint€was€filed,€the€defendants€filed€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€arguing€that€damages€for€emotional€injuries€were€not€recoverableÏbecause€Camper€did€not€suffer€any€physical€injury€and€because€he€did€not,€at€theÏtime€of€the€accident,€fear€for€his€own€safety.€€The€defendants€relied€upon€òòSheltonÍv.€Russell€Pipe€and€Foundry€Co.óó,€570€S.W.2d€€861€(Tenn.€1978)€to€support€thisÏargument.Ì€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€denied€the€defendants'€motion,€finding€that€òòSheltonó󀄄€aÏ"zone€of€danger"€case€in€which€a€father€sued€for€emotional€injuries€after€learningÏof€his€daughter's€injury€in€an€automobile€accident€in€which€the€father€was€notÏinvolved€„„€did€not€apply€because€"the€plaintiff€was€personally€involved€in€theÏautomobile€accident€and€suffered€minor€injuries."€€The€defendants€then€soughtÏpermission€for€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€Rule€9,€Tenn.R.App.P.€€TheÏtrial€court€granted€the€motion,€stating€that€"there€[do]€not€appear€to€be€anyÏreported€decisions€on€this€topic€since€òòSheltonóó€was€decided€in€1978[;€and€it]Ïwould€be€proper€to€have€the€question€determined€as€to€whether€a€cause€of€actionÏactually€exists€under€the€facts€of€this€case€before€convening€a€trial."€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€TheÏintermediate€court€reasoned€that€because€Camper's€alleged€emotional€injuriesÏoccurred€after€the€accident,€when€he€saw€Ms.€Taylor's€body€in€the€wreckage,€theÍplaintiff€failed€to€provide€evidence€that€he€was€in€fear€for€his€own€safety€„„one€ofÏthe€òòSheltonóó€elements€for€recovering€for€mental€injuries.€€€The€Court€also€statedÏthat€the€plaintiff€failed€to€satisfy€another€requirement€enunciated€in€òòSheltonó󀄄€thatÏthe€plaintiff€have€a€"close€relationship"€with€the€deceased.€€In€the€instant€case,€theÏcourt€said,€there€was€no€proof€that€Camper€and€Ms.€Taylor€had€such€aÏrelationship.€€Because€it€determined€that€the€plaintiff€failed€to€satisfy€the€òòSheltonóóÏrequirements€for€a€prima€facie€case€of€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress,Ïthe€Court€granted€the€defendants'€motion€for€summary€judgment.ÌÌà àCamper€then€filed€an€application€for€permission€to€appeal€pursuant€toÏRule€11,€Tenn.R.App.P.€€We€granted€the€application€to€address€these€importantÏissues€of€Tennessee€tort€law.€ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òIó óóó.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€first€issue€for€our€consideration€concerns€the€viability€of€Camper'sÏclaim€against€both€defendants€for€his€emotional€damages.€€Because€the€law€ofÍnegligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€is€one€of€the€most€disparate€andÏconfusing€areas€of€tort€law,€we€believe€that€it€would€be€useful€to€briefly€survey€theÏapproaches€used€by€other€jurisdictions€before€turning€to€a€discussion€of€theÏgermane€Tennessee€cases.€ÌÌÓ  ÓòòNegligent€Infliction€of€Emotional€Distress€Law€in€Generalóóà àÌÓ  ÓÌà àAny€survey€of€the€law€in€this€area€must€begin€with€a€clear€and€frankÏrecognition€that€the€law€of€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress,€however€it€isÏformulated€in€a€specific€jurisdiction,€is€fundamentally€concerned€with€striking€aÏbalance€between€two€opposing€objectives:€first,€promoting€the€underlyingÏpurpose€of€negligence€law€„„€that€of€compensating€persons€who€have€sustainedÏemotional€injuries€attributable€to€the€wrongful€conduct€of€others;€and€second,Ïavoiding€the€trivial€or€fraudulent€claims€that€have€been€thought€to€be€inevitableÏdue€to€the€subjective€nature€of€these€injuries.€€The€tension€produced€by€thisÏongoing€attempt€to€winnow€out€invalid€claims€at€the€summary€judgment€level€hasÏcaused€inconsistency€and€incoherence€in€the€law;€indeed,€as€the€WashingtonÍSupreme€Court€aptly€stated€some€years€ago,€"any€attempt€at€a€consistentÏexegesis€of€the€authorities€is€likely€to€break€down€in€embarrassed€perplexity."€ÏòòHunsley€v.€Giardóó,€553€P.2d€1096,€1098€(Wash.€1976).ÌÌà àThe€first€attempt€by€the€courts€to€mediate€between€these€competingÏconcerns€took€the€form€of€the€classic€"physical€impact"€rule.€€Under€this€rule,Ïwhich€was€formulated€in€Britain€in€the€mid€to€late€nineteenth€century,€òòseeóó€òòLynch€v.ÏKnightóó,€9€H.L.C.€577€(1861);€òòVictorian€Ry.€Comm's€v.€Coultasóó,€13€A.C.€222€(P.C.Ï1888),€a€plaintiff€may€not€recover€for€emotional€injuries€unless€he€or€she€sufferedÏan€actual€physical€impact€or€contemporaneous€physical€injury€caused€by€theÏdefendant's€negligence.€€In€other€words,€if€the€defendant's€negligence€causesÏboth€a€physical€impact€or€injury€òòandóó€emotional€distress€then€the€plaintiff€mayÏrecover€damages€not€only€for€the€physical€injury€but€also€for€the€emotionalÏdistress.€€€Although€the€physical€impact€rule€was€overturned€in€Britain€onlyÏthirteen€years€after€òòVictorian€Ry.€Comm'sóó€was€decided,€òòseeóó€òòDulieu€v.€White€&ÏSonsóó,€2€K.B.€669€(D.C.€1901),€it€had€already€been€adopted€in€the€United€States€inÏNew€York€and€in€Massachusetts.€€òòMitchell€v.€Rochester€Ry.€Co.óó,€45€N.E.€354€(N.Y.Í1896);€òòSpade€v.€Lynn€&€B.€R.€Co.óó,€47€N.E.€88€(Mass.€1897).€€The€physical€impactÏrule€was€also€adopted€in€a€number€of€other€jurisdictions€in€the€late€nineteenthÏand€early€twentieth€centuries.€€òòSeeóó€Archibald€H.€Throckmorton,€òòDamages€forÏFrightóó,€34€Harv.L.Rev.€260,€264,€265€(1921).€ÌÌà àThree€principal€reasons€were€usually€advanced€by€courts€in€support€ofÏthe€classic€physical€impact€rule:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€first€deals€with€medical€science's€difficulty€in€provingÏcausation€between€the€claimed€damages€and€the€alleged€fright.€ÏThe€second€involves€the€fear€of€fraudulent€or€exaggeratedÏclaims.€€Finally,€there€is€the€concern€that€such€a€rule€[allowingÏrecovery€without€a€physical€injury]€will€precipitate€a€veritableÏflood€of€litigation.€€òòÌÌNiederman€v.€Brodskyóó,€261€A.2d€84,€85€(Penn.€1970)€(abandoning€theÏrequirement€of€a€physical€impact€as€a€precondition€to€recovery€for€damages€forÏemotional€distress).€€€€ÌÌà àÌÌÓÓà àHowever,€as€several€courts€and€commentators€have€pointed€out,× ƒ# ××  ×€theÏreasoning€advanced€in€support€of€the€physical€impact€rule€is€seriously€flawed.€ÏFirst,€the€fact€that€a€case€may€be€difficult€to€prove€does€not€in€itself€justify€aÏprohibition€on€the€cause€of€action;€instead,€this€difficulty€may€be€addressed€inÏrules€concerning€the€development€of€the€evidence.€€Second,€because€imaginaryÏand€fraudulent€claims€may€be€just€as€likely€in€cases€in€which€an€actual€physicalÏinjury€occurred,€there€is€no€reason€to€bar€this€cause€of€action€simply€out€a€fear€ofÏsuch€lawsuits;€the€trial€courts,€through€the€rules€of€evidence€and€the€adversarialÏsystem,€can€guard€against€these€types€of€cases.€€Finally,€there€are€at€least€twoÏreasons€that€the€fear€of€a€flood€of€litigation€should€not€be€used€to€completely€bar€aÏclaim€for€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress:€€(1)€€courts€are€charged€withÏthe€duty€of€providing€a€remedy€to€those€who€are€injured;€(2)€€states€which€haveÏrules€other€than€the€physical€impact€rule€have€apparently€not€suffered€any€suchÏflood€of€litigation.€€ÌÌà àDespite€this€widespread€criticism€of€the€physical€impact€rule,€and€the€factÏthat€it€was€been€abandoned€by€many€courts,€òòseeóó€òòBass€v.€Nooney€Co.óó,€646ÏS.W.2d€765€(769)€(Mo.€1983)€(abandoning€the€classic€impact€rule);€òòBattalla€v.ÏStateóó,€176€N.E.2d€729,€730€(N.Y.€1961)€(overruling€òòMitchell€v.€Rochester€Ry.€Co.óóÏand€abandoning€the€physical€impact€rule),€several€jurisdictions€still€apply€theÏrule.€€òòSeeóó€òòR.€J.€v.€Humana€of€Florida,€Inc.óó,€625€So.2d€360€(Fla.€1995);€òòHammondÏv.€Central€Lane€Communications€Ctr.óó,€816€P.2d€593€(Or.€1991);€òòOb„Gyn€Assc's€ofÏAlbany€v.€Littletonóó,€386€S.E.2d€146€(Ga.€1989);€òòGarrison€v.€Medical€Ctr.€ofÏDelawareóó,€581€A.2d€288€(Del.€1988);€òòDeutsch€v.€Sheinóó,€597€S.W.2d€141€(Ky.Ï1980).€€However,€in€some€of€these€states€the€rigidity€of€the€impact€rule€has€beenÏlessened€due€to€the€way€in€which€it€has€been€applied.€€For€instance,€even€thoughÏa€physical€impact€is€required€before€a€plaintiff€may€recover€damages€forÏemotional€distress,€the€courts€have€carved€out€explicit€exceptions€to€thisÏrequirement.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòR.€J.€v.€Humana€of€Florida,€Inc.óó,€652€So.2d€at€363Ï(reaffirming€the€physical€impact€rule€but€noting€exceptions€in€cases€of€intentionalÏinfliction€of€emotional€distress,€bystander€cases€involving€the€witnessing€of€theÍdeath€or€serious€injury€of€a€close€family€member,€and€in€actions€for€wrongfulÏdeath);€òòMillington€v.€Kubaóó,€523€N.W.2d€787€(Iowa€1995)€(declining€to€make€newÏexception€to€the€physical€injury€rule€but€noting€that€exceptions€are€allowed€inÏbystander€cases€and€in€cases€concerning€medical€professionals€providingÏmedical€services€to€patients);€€òòHammond€v.€Central€Lane€Communications€Ctr.óó,Ï816€P.2d€at€596€„€598€(declining€invitation€to€abandon€physical€impact€rule€butÏnoting€that€Oregon€law€allows€for€recovery€for€psychic€injury€alone€in€threeÏsituations);€òòNaccash€v.€Burgeróó,€290€S.E.2d€825€(Va.€1982)€(general€rule€requiresÏtortiously€caused€physical€injury€but€the€court€has€allowed€two€exceptions€andÏallowed€a€third€exception€based€upon€the€particular€facts€of€this€case).€€The€factÏthat€courts€have€repeatedly€found€it€necessary€to€craft€formal€exceptions€to€theÏrule€suggests€that€the€physical€impact€rule€provides€an€arbitrary€and€inadequateÏmeans€of€reconciling€the€competing€concerns€of€the€law.€€ÌÌà àAnother€way€in€which€the€potential€harshness€of€the€physical€impact€ruleÏhas€been€ameliorated€is€that€courts€have€permitted€recovery€for€emotionalÏinjuries€in€cases€in€which€the€actual€physical€injury€or€impact€sustained€by€theÍplaintiff€was€òòde€minimisóó.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòDeutsch€v.€Sheinóó,€597€S.W.2d€€at€146€(notingÏthat€the€"amount€of€physical€contact€or€injury€that€must€be€shown€is€minimal€€.€€.€€.€Ï[and€that]€contact€however€slight,€trifling€or€trivial€will€support€a€cause€of€action,"Ïthe€court€found€that€being€"bombarded€by€x„rays"€was€"physical€contact.").€€ÌÌà àAn€approach€that€is€closely€related€to,€but€distinct€from,€the€classicÏphysical€impact€rule€may€be€characterized€as€the€"physical€manifestation"€rule.€ÏLike€the€impact€rule,€the€physical€manifestation€rule€requires€that€the€plaintiffÏsustain€a€"physical€injury,"€but€the€requisite€injury€may€either€be€shown€by€proofÏof€a€contemporaneous€physical€injury€òòoróó€by€proof€of€physical€symptoms€orÏmanifestations€of€the€emotional€injury.€€This€approach€is€utilized€in€severalÏjurisdictions.€€òòSeeóó€€òòSullivan€v.€Boston€Gas€Co.óó,€605€N.E.2d€805€(Mass.€1993);ÏòòThorpe€v.€State€Dept.€of€Correctionsóó,€575€A.2d€351€(N.H.€1990);€€òòBrown€v.ÏMatthews€Mortuary,€Inc.óó,€801€P.2d€37€(Idaho€1990);€òòMoresi€v.€Stateóó,€567€So.2dÏ1081€(La.€1990);€òòMuchow€v.€Lindblandóó,€435€N.W.2d€918€(N.D.€1989);€òòReilly€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€547€A.2d€894€(R.I.€1988);€òòWright€v.€Coca„Cola€Bottling€Co.óó,€414ÏN.W.2d€608€(S.D.€1987);€òòEllington€v.€Coca€Cola€Bottling€of€Tulsaóó,€717€P.2d€109Í(Okla.€1986);€òòSears€Roebuck€&€Co.€v.€Youngóó,€384€So.€2d€69€(Miss.€1980);€òòVanceÏv.€Vanceóó,€408€A.2d€728€(Md.€1979);€òòTowns€v.€Andersonóó,€579€P.2d€1163€(Colo.Ï1978);€òòJohnson€v.€Stateóó,€334€N.E.2d€590€(N.Y.€1975);€òòDaley€v.€LaCroixóó,€179ÏN.W.2d€390€(Mich.€1970);€òòDoe€v.€Greenville€Hosp.€Systemóó,€448€S.E.2d€564€(S.C.ÏCt.€App.€1994).€€This€broader€approach€is€based€upon€the€recognition€that€theÏphysical€impact€rule€unfairly€and€arbitrarily€excludes€plaintiffs€with€meritoriousÏclaims€of€serious€emotional€injury.€€It€is€thus€an€attempt€to€strike€a€balanceÏbetween€the€realization€that€serious€emotional€distress€can€result€even€in€theÏabsence€of€a€physical€injury€with€the€longstanding€concerns€over€trivial€orÏfraudulent€claims.€€However,€like€the€physical€impact€rule,€courts€have€found€itÏnecessary€to€both€make€exceptions€to€the€physical€manifestation€rule€and€to€findÏ"physical€injury"€in€cases€in€which€the€physical€component€of€the€injury€was€òòdeÏminimisóó.€€For€this€reason,€the€physical€manifestation€rule,€like€the€physical€impactÏrule,€is€open€to€criticism€as€an€arbitrary€and€underinclusive€approach.ÌÌà àOther€jurisdictions€do€not€require€the€plaintiff€to€present€evidence€of€aÏphysical€injury€at€all;€rather,€these€jurisdictions€use€a€variety€of€approaches€toÍseparate€the€meritorious€claims€from€the€nonmeritorious€ones.€€One€suchÏapproach€is€the€"zone€of€danger"€doctrine.€€Under€this€doctrine,€a€plaintiff€mayÏrecover€for€emotional€distress€if,€as€a€result€of€the€defendant's€negligence,€theÏplaintiff€either€suffered€a€physical€injury€or€was€placed€in€immediate€danger€ofÏphysical€harm€and€contemporaneously€feared€for€his€or€her€own€safety.€€òòSeeóó,Ïòòe.g.óó,€òòConsolidated€Rail€Corp.€v.€Gotshallóó,€114€S.Ct.€2396€(1994)€(adopting€theÏzone€of€danger€test€for€actions€under€the€Federal€Employers€Liability€Act,€45ÏU.S.C.€ðððð€51„60);€òòK.€A.€C.€v.€Bensonóó,€527€N.W.2d€553€(Minn.€1995);€òòGrube€v.ÏUnion€Pacific€RR€Co.óó,€886€P.2d€845€(Kan.€1994)€(applying€òòGotshallóó€in€a€stateÏcourt€action€under€the€FELA);€òòJones€v.€Howard€Universityóó,€589€A.2d€419€(D.C.Ï1991);€€òòJohnson€v.€Rogersóó,€763€P.2d€771€(Utah€1988)€(recognizing€seriousÏconcerns€about€the€zone€of€danger€rule,€but€concluding€that€it€strikes€a€"fairÏbalance");€òòVaillancourt€v.€Medical€Center€Hospital€of€Vermontóó,€425€A.2d€92€(Vt.Ï1980);€òòNiederman€v.€Brodskyóó,€261€A.2d€84€(Pa.€1970).ÌÌà àThe€zone€of€danger€test€is€somewhat€broader€than€either€of€the€physicalÏinjury€approaches€discussed€above.€€However,€this€test,€which€arose€primarilyÍfrom€"near„miss"€automobile€accident€cases,€is€based€upon€a€questionableÏpremise:€€that€emotional€injuries€result€òòonlyóó€from€fear€of€physical€harm.€€While,€asÏa€practical€matter,€many€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€cases€may€wellÏinvolve€either€physical€injuries€or€fear€of€physical€harm,€there€are€certainly€casesÏin€which€neither€is€implicated.€€Examples€of€such€cases€are€the€failure€to€timelyÏdeliver€telegrams€concerning€the€imminent€death€or€serious€illness€of€a€lovedÏone,€mishandling€the€corpse€of€a€loved€one,€or€the€unauthorized€dissemination€ofÏprivate€information.€€In€such€cases,€applying€the€zone€of€danger€doctrine€isÏillogical,€and€courts€utilizing€the€doctrine€have€been€compelled€to€createÏexceptions€to€fit€these€factual€situations.€€ÌÌà àAnother€approach€that€does€not€necessarily€require€any€evidence€of€aÏphysical€injury€is€the€"foreseeability"€approach.€€Under€this€approach,€the€keyÏinquiry€is€whether€it€was€reasonably€foreseeable€that€the€defendant's€specificÏcourse€of€conduct€would€cause€the€plaintiff€serious€emotional€distress.€€TheÏforeseeability€approach,€which€was€first€utilized€by€the€California€Supreme€CourtÏin€òòDillon€v.€Leggóó,€441€P.2d€912€(Cal.€1968),€is€applied€in€a€few€jurisdictions.€òòSeeóóÍòòJohnson€v.€Ruark€Obstetricsóó,€395€S.E.2d€85€(N.C.€1990);€òòGammon€v.€OsteopathicÏHosp.€of€Maineóó,€534€A.2d€1282€(Me.€1987);€òòGates€v.€Richardsonóó,€719€P.2d€193Ï(Wyo.€1986);€òòJames€v.€Liebóó,€375€N.W.2d€109€(Neb.€1985);€òòBass€v.€Nooney€Co.óó,Ï646€S.W.2d€€765€(Mo.€1983).€€Although€this€approach€has€the€merit€ofÏrecognizing€that€emotional€injuries€may€occur€without€a€concomitant€physicalÏinjury,€and€is€flexible€enough€to€cover€factual€situations€for€which€the€zone€ofÏdanger€test€is€clearly€inapposite,€it€provides€little,€if€any,€concrete€guidelines€forÏtrial€courts€and€juries€to€use€in€deciding€how€each€case€should€be€resolved.€€ÌÌà àA€final€approach€that€does€not€require€any€evidence€of€a€physical€injuryÏmight€be€characterized€as€the€"general€negligence€approach."€€Courts€using€thisÏapproach€have€rejected€the€above„mentioned€specially€crafted€rules€and€haveÏconcluded€that€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€cases€should€beÏanalyzed€no€differently€than€any€other€negligence€case;€and€that€the€properÏapplication€of€the€familiar€elements€of€negligence€is€the€preferable€way€in€whichÏto€sort€out€the€genuine€from€the€false,€the€serious€from€the€trivial.€òòSeeóó€òòBowen€v.ÏLumbermans€Mut.€Cas.€Co.óó,€517€N.W.2d€432€(Wis.€1994);€òòBurgess€v.€SuperiorÍCourt€(Gupta)óó,€831€P.2d€1197€(Cal.€1992);€òòCorgan€v.€Muehlingóó,€574€N.E.2d€602,Ï606€(Ill.€1991);€òòSt.€Elizabeth€Hosp.€v.€Garrardóó,€730€S.W.2d€€649€(Tx.€1987);€òòShultzÏv.€Barber€Glass€Co.óó,€447€N.E.2d€109€(Ohio€1983);€;€òòHunsley€v.€Giardóó,€553€P.2dÏ1096€(Wash.€1976).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòTaylor€v.€Baptist€Medical€Ctr.óó,€400€So.2d€369€(Ala.Ï1981)€(although€not€clearly€stated,€court€appears€to€use€general€negligence€lawÏapproach);€òòMontinieri€v.€Southern€New€England€Tel.€Co.óó,€398€A.2d€1180€(Conn.Ï1978)€(although€not€clearly€stated,€court€appears€to€use€general€negligence€lawÏapproach).ÌÌà àMoreover,€because€of€their€concerns€over€the€possibility€of€trivial€orÏfraudulent€lawsuits,€some€courts€following€this€approach€have€imposed€aÏrequirement€€that€in€order€to€recover,€the€plaintiff's€emotional€injury€must€haveÏbeen€"serious"€or€"severe."€€òòSeeóó€òòBurgessóó,€831€P.2d€at€1200,€n.€6€("[t]he€purposeÏof€this€requirement€is€to€guard€against€the€litigation€of€trivial€or€fraudulentÏclaims.");€òòShultzóó,€447€N.E.2d€at€113€("we€hold€that€a€cause€of€action€may€beÏstated€for€the€negligent€infliction€of€òòseriousóó€emotional€disturbance€without€aÏcontemporaneous€physical€injury)€(emphasis€added);€òòSt.€Elizabeth€Hosp.óó,€730ÍS.W.2d€at€653€(stating€that€"freedom€from€severe€emotional€distress€is€an€interestÏwhich€the€law€should€serve€to€protect.").€Thus,€concerns€about€possible€frivolousÏor€fraudulent€lawsuits€are€dealt€with€by€strengthening€the€"injury"€or€"loss"Ïelement€of€the€basic€negligence€framework.€€ÌÓ  ÓòòÌTennessee€Negligent€Infliction€of€Emotional€Distress€Lawóó€ÌÓ  ÓÌà àWith€these€approaches€and€their€respective€strengths€and€weaknessesÏin€mind,€we€now€turn€to€the€Tennessee€cases€in€this€area.€€€The€early€TennesseeÏcases€€can€clearly€be€placed€in€the€"physical€manifestation"€category.€€ForÏexample,€in€òòMemphis€State€R.R.€Co.€v.€Bernsteinóó,€137€Tenn.€637,€194€S.W.€902Ï(1917),€the€plaintiffs€were€riding€in€a€bus€that€became€involved€in€an€accidentÏwith€a€streetcar.€€Apparently€one€of€the€plaintiffs€was€not€physically€injured,€butÏsued€to€recover€for€her€fright€and€its€physical€consequences.€€At€trial,€the€judgeÏinstructed€the€jury€that€the€plaintiff€could€recover€for€her€fright,€but€failed€to€instructÏthe€jury€that€the€plaintiff€could€only€do€so€if€she€demonstrated€physicalÏmanifestations€of€such€fright.€€The€jury€found€for€the€plaintiff,€but€this€CourtÍreversed€and€remanded€for€a€new€trial,€concluding€that€"the€authorities€are€quiteÏin€accord€that€mere€fright€cannot€be€made€the€basis€of€a€cause€of€action,€and€thatÏdamages€cannot€be€allowed€for€fright€alone."€€194€S.W.2d€at€902.€€The€CourtÏacknowledged,€however,€that€the€physical€injury€need€not€manifest€itselfÏsimultaneously€with€the€traumatic€event.€€Instead,€the€Court€concluded€that€"theÏbetter€reasoned€cases€hold€that€there€may€be€a€recovery€for€bodily€pain€andÏsuffering€proximately€following€fright€occasioned€by€the€negligence€of€aÏdefendant."€€òòIdóóòò.óó€€ÌÌà àòòBernsteinóó€has€never€been€overruled€and€has€been€followed€byÏTennessee€courts€over€the€years.€€òòSeeóóòò,€óóòòe.g.óóòò,€óóòòBowers€v.€Colonial€Stages€InterstateÏTransitóóòò,óó€163€Tenn.€502,€43€S.W.2d€497€(1931);€òòAll€€v.€John€Gerber€Co.óóòò,óó€36€Tenn.ÏApp.€134,€252€S.W.2d€138,€142€(1952);€òòTrent€v.€Barrowsóóòò,óó€55€Tenn.€App.€182,€397ÏS.W.2d€409€(1965);€òòMedlin€v.€Allied€Investment€Coóó.,€217€Tenn.€469,€398€S.W.2dÏ270€(1966).€€However,€as€the€preceding€general€overview€of€the€law€would€leadÏone€to€expect,€the€cases€have€been€far€from€consistent.€€€At€a€very€early€stage€inÏthe€law's€development,€this€Court€carved€out€an€exception€to€the€physicalÍmanifestation€rule€by€holding,€in€òòHill€v.€Traveler's€Ins.€Coóó.,€154€Tenn.€295,€294ÏS.W.€1097€(1927),€that€a€plaintiff€could€recover€for€mental€damages€occasionedÏby€the€defendants'€mutilation€of€her€husband's€dead€body€during€an€autopsy,Ïnotwithstanding€that€the€plaintiff€had€neither€suffered€a€contemporaneousÏphysical€injury€nor€exhibited€physical€symptoms€of€her€alleged€mental€injuries.€ÏThis€Court€explained€its€departure€from€the€òòBernsteinóó€rule€by€simply€stating€"thatÏmental€suffering€and€injury€to€the€feelings€would€be€ordinarily€the€natural€andÏproximate€result€of€knowledge€that€the€remains€of€a€deceased€husband€had€beenÏmutilated,€is€too€plain€to€admit€of€argument."€€òòHillóó,€294€S.W.€at€1099.€€òòSee€alsoóóÏòòWadsworth€v.€Western€Union€Tel.€Coóó.,€86€Tenn.€695,€8€S.W.€574€(1888)Ï(establishing€a€similar€exception€where€message€carrier€failed€to€deliverÏtelegraphs€to€plaintiff€regarding€the€imminent€death€of€her€brother,€thusÏpreventing€her€from€sitting€by€his€bedside€when€he€died).€€€ÌÌà àAnother€important€exception€to€the€physical€manifestation€rule€has€beenÏcreated€in€what€may€be€termed€the€"bystander"€cases.€€Although€older€lawÏprevented€a€plaintiff€from€recovering€from€emotional€damages€caused€byÍwitnessing€the€injury€or€death€of€a€third€person,€òòseeóó€òòNuckles€v.€Tennessee€Elec.ÏPower€Coóó.,€155€Tenn.€611,€299€S.W.775€(1927),€Tennessee€courts€have€sinceÏutilized€a€zone€of€danger€test€to€govern€when€a€person€may€recover€for€emotionalÏdamages€resulting€from€simply€witnessing€the€death€or€injury€of€a€third€person.€ÏSpecifically,€the€plaintiff€must€either€have€sustained€a€physical€injury€or€mustÏhave€feared€for€his€or€her€own€physical€well„being.€€In€addition,€the€bystander„plaintiff€must€have€had€a€"close€relationship"€with€the€injured€or€deceasedÏperson.€€òòBurroughs€v.€Jordanóó,€224€Tenn.€418,€456€S.W.2d€652€(1970);€òòShelton€v.ÏRussell€Pipe€and€Foundry€Coóó.,€570€S.W.2d€861€(Tenn.€1978).à àÌÌà àThis€inconsistency€in€the€law€has€not€been€confined€to€creating€outrightÏexceptions€to€the€òòBernsteinóó€rule.€€Rather,€in€some€instances€Tennessee€courtsÏhave,€without€explicitly€rejecting€the€rule,€applied€it€in€such€a€way€as€to€soften€itsÏpotential€harshness.€€For€example,€in€òòJohnson€Freight€Lines,€Inc.€v.€Tallentóó,€53ÏTenn.€App.€464,€384€S.W.2d€46€(1964),€Margaret€Tallent,€the€plaintiff,€hadÏexperienced€severe€mental€and€emotional€problems€in€late€1958€and€early€1959,Ïbut€had€regained€her€health€through€extensive€hospitalization€and€electric€shockÍtreatments.€€In€July€1961,€the€plaintiff€was€involved€in€a€car€accident€with€theÏdefendant€in€which€she€was€"thrown€into€the€dashboard,"€but€received€noÏphysical€injuries.€€Soon€thereafter€the€plaintiff€allegedly€suffered€a€relapse€intoÏher€"previous€emotional€upset";€and€she€brought€an€action€against€the€defendantÏfor€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress.€€Despite€only€a€modicum€of€evidenceÏthat€the€plaintiff's€injuries€had€manifested€themselves€physically,€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€affirmed€the€trial€court's€denial€of€the€defendant's€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€citing€the€fact€that€the€plaintiff's€prior€mental€condition€and€recoveryÏwere€undisputed,€and€that€her€allegations€concerning€her€post„accident€mentalÏcondition€were€supported€by€lay€testimony€and€the€testimony€of€a€psychiatrist€andÏmedical€doctor.€€Therefore,€the€Court's€analysis€focussed€on€the€quality€ofÏevidence€presented€in€support€of€the€plaintiff's€claim€rather€than€the€physicalÏmanifestations€of€the€emotional€injuries.ÌÌà àAn€even€clearer€departure€from€a€strict€interpretation€of€the€"physicalÏmanifestation"€rule€occurred€several€years€later€in€òòLaxton€v.€Orkin€ExterminatingÏCoóó.,€639€S.W.2d€431€(Tenn.€1982).€€In€òòLaxtonóó,€the€defendant€negligentlyÍcontaminated€the€plaintiff's€water€supply€with€a€dangerous€chemical€whileÏspraying€for€insects.€Although€evidence€presented€at€trial€indicated€that€theÏplaintiffs€drank€the€contaminated€water€and€that€the€chemical€in€the€water€couldÏbe€harmful,€a€medical€examination€revealed€that€no€physical€damage€had€beenÏdone.€€Moreover,€this€Court€conceded€that€"the€mental€anxiety€of€the€Laxtons€didÏnot€evidence€itself€in€any€physical€way."€òòLaxtonóó,€639€S.W.2d€at€433.€ÏNotwithstanding€the€plaintiffs'€clear€failure€to€meet€the€requirements€of€theÏphysical€manifestation€rule,€we€allowed€a€recovery.€€After€citing€several€cases€inÏwhich€the€plaintiff€had€recovered€after€ingesting€disgusting€matter€despiteÏsuffering€no€contemporaneous€physical€injury€and€presenting€no€evidence€ofÏphysical€manifestations€of€the€alleged€emotional€injuries,€òòFord€v.€Roddy€Mfg.€Coóó.,Ï448€S.W.2d€433€(Tenn.€App.€1969)€(insects€in€soft€drink);€òòRoddy€Mfg.€Co.€v.€Coxóó,Ï7€Tenn.€App.€147€(1927)(dead€mouse€in€soft€drink);€òòBoyd€v.€Coca„Cola€BottlingÏWorksóó,€177€S.W.2d€80€(Tenn.€1914)€(cigar€stub€in€soft€drink),€€we€reasoned€thatÏ"even€though€the€tests€proved€negative,€in€our€opinion€a€jury€could€find€sufficientÏ'injury'€to€these€plaintiffs€to€justify€a€recovery€for€their€natural€concern€and€anxietyÏfor€the€welfare€of€themselves€and€their€children."€€òòIdóó.€at€434.€€We€concluded€byÍholding€that:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àin€addition€to€cases€where€it€has€previously€been€allowed,Ïrecovery€for€the€negligent€infliction€of€mental€anguish€should€beÏallowed€in€cases€where,€as€a€result€of€defendant's€negligence,€aÏplaintiff€has€ingested€an€indefinite€amount€€of€a€harmfulÏsubstance.€€In€such€cases€the€finder€of€fact€may€conclude€thatÏthe€plaintiff€has€sustained€sufficient€physical€injury€to€support€anÏaward€for€mental€anguish€even€if€subsequent€medical€diagnosisÏfails€to€reveal€any€other€physical€injury.€€€€€ÌÌòòIdóó.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àAs€is€the€case€with€the€general€overview€presented€above,€TennesseeÏcourts€have€continually€found€it€necessary€to€deviate€from€the€"physicalÏmanifestation"€rule€by€either€formally€creating€exceptions€to€the€rule€or€byÏapplying€the€rule€in€a€nonrigorous€fashion.€€This€practice€of€creating€òòad€hocóóÏexceptions€has€made€our€law€of€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distressÏconfusing€and€unpredictable;€indeed,€the€practice€appears€to€have,€as€theÏplaintiff€here€argues,€"robbed€the€law€of€logic,€consistency€and€fairness."€€ÌÌà àAlthough€there€is€some€truth€to€this€charge,€the€Tennessee€cases€in€thisÏarea€do€contain€a€common€thread:€the€courts'€desire€to€separate,€at€the€primaÏfacie€stage€and€in€a€meaningful€and€rational€manner,€the€meritorious€cases€fromÏthe€nonmeritorious€ones.€€Indeed,€in€òòCarroll€v.€Sisters€of€St.€Francis€HealthÏServices,€Incóó.,€868€S.W.2d€585€(Tenn.€1993),€a€case€in€which€the€plaintiff€sued€aÏhospital€to€recover€for€her€fear€of€contracting€AIDS€after€pricking€her€fingers€onÏdiscarded€needles,€we€acknowledged€this:ÌÌÓÓà8 àUnder€the€older€law,€a€plaintiff€was€required€to€show€that€he€orÏshe€had€sustained€a€physical€injury€before€being€allowed€toÏrecover€for€emotional€and€mental€damages.€€The€physical€injuryÏrequirement€served€to€objectify€the€inquiry;€it€assured€that€theÏplaintiff's€allegations€of€emotional€injury€were€grounded€in€anÏindependently€verifiable€event.€€Although€the€degree€of€physicalÏinjury€required€to€substantiate€the€plaintiff's€emotional€damagesÏclaim€was€not€always€consistent,€and€was€sometimes€quiteÏnegligible,€the€requirement€nevertheless€remained€central€to€thisÏarea€of€negligence€law.ÌÌà8 àIt€is€certainly€true€that€the€physical€injury€requirement€has€beenÏgradually€weakened€so€that€a€minimal€physical€injury€will€nowÏsuffice.€€This€shift€in€the€law,€however,€does€not€signal€anÏabandonment€of€the€objectivizing€function€served€by€theÏphysical€injury€requirement,€but€is€rather€a€product€of€theÏrealization€that€the€physical€injury€requirement€no€longerÍproperly€serves€that€function€in€many€modern€actions€forÏemotional€damages.€ÌÌòòCarrollóó,€868€S.W.2d€at€593.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àAlthough€our€seemingly€disparate€cases€in€this€area€are€thusÏreconcilable€on€a€functional€level,€we€nevertheless€agree€with€the€plaintiff€hereÏand€with€many€other€jurisdictions€that€the€time€has€come€to€abandon€the€rigid€andÏoverly€formulaic€"physical€manifestation"€or€"injury"€rule.€€This€rule€has€proved€toÏbe€inflexible€and€inadequate€in€practice;€and,€as€noted€in€the€preceding€section,€itÏcompletely€ignores€the€fact€that€some€valid€emotional€injuries€simply€may€not€beÏaccompanied€by€a€contemporaneous€physical€injury€or€have€physicalÏconsequences.€€Therefore,€in€accordance€with€our€statement€in€òòCarrollóó€that€"[weÏhave]€realized€that€in€some€situations,€whether€the€plaintiff€has€incurred€a€literalÏphysical€injury€has€little€to€do€with€whether€the€emotional€damages€complained€ofÏare€reasonable,"€òòidóó.€at€594,€we€conclude€that€the€rule€shall€no€longer€be€used€toÏtest€the€validity€of€a€prima€facie€case€of€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress.ÌÌà àThis€negative€conclusion€logically€raises€its€positive€counterpart:€what€isÏrequired€to€make€out€a€prima€facie€case?€€After€considering€the€strengths€andÏweaknesses€of€the€options€used€in€other€jurisdictions,€we€conclude€that€theseÏcases€should€be€analyzed€under€the€general€negligence€approach€discussedÏabove.€€In€other€words,€the€plaintiff€must€present€material€evidence€as€to€each€ofÏthe€five€elements€of€general€negligence€„„€duty,€breach€of€duty,€injury€or€loss,Ïcausation€in€fact,€and€proximate,€or€legal,€cause,€òòKilpatrick€v.€Bryantóó,€868€S.W.2dÏ594,€598€(Tenn.€1993);€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.€1993)€„„Ïin€order€to€avoid€summary€judgment.€€€€Furthermore,€we€agree€that€in€order€toÏguard€against€trivial€or€fraudulent€actions,€the€law€ought€to€provide€a€recoveryÏonly€for€"serious"€or€"severe"€emotional€injury.€€òòBurgess€v.€Superior€CourtÏ(Gupta)óó,€831€P.2d€1197,€1200€(Cal.€1992);€òòSt.€Elizabeth€Hosp.€v.€Garrardóó,€730ÏS.W.2d€649,€653€(Tx.€1987).€€A€"serious"€or€"severe"€emotional€injury€occursÏ"where€a€reasonable€person,€normally€constituted,€would€be€unable€toÏadequately€cope€with€the€mental€stress€engendered€by€the€circumstances€of€theÏcase."€€òòRodrigues€v.€Stateóó,€472€P.2d€509,€520€(Haw.€1970);€òòPaugh€v.€Hanksóó,€451ÏN.E.2d€759,€765€(Ohio€1983);€òòPlaisance€v.€Texaco,€Incóó.,€937€F.2d€1004,€1010€(5thÍCir.€1991);€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€54,€at€364„65,€n.€60.€ÏFinally,€we€conclude€that€the€claimed€injury€or€impairment€must€be€supported€byÏexpert€medical€or€scientific€proof.€€òòSeeóó€òòLeong€v.€Takasakióó,€€520€P.2d€758,€766„67Ï(Haw.€1974)("the€plaintiff€should€be€permitted€to€prove€medically€the€damagesÏoccasioned€by€his€mental€responses€to€defendant's€negligent€act")€€.€€€€ÌÌà àHaving€so€concluded,€we€have€no€alternative€but€to€remand€this€case€forÏfurther€proceedings€consistent€with€the€approach€that€we€adopt€today.× ƒ% ××  ×€€AÏremand€is€necessary€because€in€the€trial€court€the€defendants€simply€argued€thatÏthey€were€entitled€to€a€summary€judgment€because€(1)€the€plaintiff€had€receivedÏno€physical€injury€„„€a€requirement€under€the€prior€law;€and€(2)€that€the€plaintiffÏhad€not€been€in€fear€for€his€own€safety,€as€required€by€òòSheltonóó.€€Because€theÏgeneral€negligence€approach€was€not€controlling€at€the€time€the€defendantsÍsubmitted€their€summary€judgment€motion,€they€clearly€have€failed€to€prove€thatÏno€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists€as€to€those€elements€of€negligentÏinfliction€of€emotional€distress€that€we€adopt€herein,€and€that€they€are€entitled€to€aÏjudgment€as€matter€of€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€214„16€(Tenn.Ï1993).€€Because€the€defendants€failed€to€carry€their€initial€burden€pursuant€toÏRule€56,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€we€cannot€approve€of€the€summary€judgment€grantedÏby€the€Court€of€Appeals.€€ÌÓ  Óòòò òÌIIó óóó.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€second€issue€for€our€determination€pertains€to€the€potential€liabilityÏof€defendant€Sharon€Barnett,€the€owner€of€the€vehicle€Ms.€Taylor€was€driving€atÏthe€time€of€the€accident.€€This€issue€is€whether€the€family€purpose€doctrineÏremains€valid€in€light€of€our€adoption€of€comparative€fault€and€the€limitationsÏimposed€upon€the€doctrine€of€joint€and€several€liability.× ƒ& ××  ×€€In€order€to€resolve€thisÍissue,€we€must€first€examine€the€requirements€of€the€family€purpose€doctrine€andÏits€policy€justifications.× ƒ' ××  ×€ÌÌà àThe€family€purpose€doctrine€has€been€in€effect€in€Tennessee€for€nearlyÏeighty€years,€òòKing€v.€Smytheòòóó,óó€140€Tenn.€217,€204€S.W.€296€(1918),€andÏaccording€to€at€least€one€court,€has€been€"firmly€established€in€this€state."€ÏòòStephens€v.€Jonesòòóó,óó€710€S.W.2d€38,€42€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€Under€the€doctrine,Ïthe€head€of€a€household€who€maintains€a€motor€vehicle€for€the€general€use€andÏconvenience€of€the€family€is€liable€for€the€negligence€of€any€member€of€the€familyÏdriving€the€vehicle,€provided€the€driver€received€express€or€implied€consent.€€€€Ìà àÌà àThe€family€purpose€doctrine€is€applicable€when€two€requirements€haveÏbeen€satisfied.€€First,€the€head€of€the€household€must€maintain€an€automobile€forÏthe€purpose€of€providing€pleasure€or€comfort€for€his€or€her€family.€€òòScates€v.ÏSandeferóóòò,óó€163€Tenn.€558,€44€S.W.2d€310€(1931).€€Second,€the€family€purposeÍdriver€must€have€been€using€the€motor€vehicle€at€the€time€of€the€injury€"inÏfurtherance€of€that€purpose€with€the€permission,€either€expressed€or€implied,€ofÏthe€owner."€€òòReddingóóòò,óó€230€S.W.2d€at€205.€€òòSee€alsoòòóó€óóòòStephens€v.€Jonesóóòò,€óó710ÏS.W.2d€38€(Tenn.€App.€1984);€€òòLong€v.€Tomlinóóòò,óó€22€Tenn.€App.€607,€125€S.W.2dÏ171€(1938).€€ÌÌà àTennessee€courts€have€offered€a€number€of€justifications€for€the€familyÏpurpose€doctrine.€€First,€the€doctrine€is€based€in€part€on€the€presumption€that€theÏchild€is€subject€to€parental€control.€€òòAdkins€v.€Nanneyóóòò,óó€169€Tenn.€67,€82€S.W.2dÏ867€(1935).€€By€imposing€vicarious€liability,€the€courts€hoped€to€provide€parentsÏwith€an€incentive€to€ensure€that€the€actions€of€their€children€conform€to€theÏrequirements€of€law.€€As€stated€by€the€òòKingóó€court,€€"[i]f€owners€of€automobiles€areÏmade€to€understand€that€they€will€be€held€liable€for€injury€to€person€and€propertyÏoccasioned€by€their€negligent€operation€by€infants€or€others€who€are€financiallyÏirresponsible,€they€will€doubtless€exercise€a€greater€degree€of€care€in€selectingÏthose€who€are€permitted€to€go€upon€the€public€streets€with€such€dangerousÏinstrumentalities."€€€€òòKingóóòò,óó€204€S.W.€at€298.€€Second,€the€courts€justified€theÍdoctrine€on€a€somewhat€modified€form€of€the€"enterprise€theory."€€As€one€courtÏexplained€in€an€unpublished€opinion€in€1993,€"one€who€furnishes€and€maintainsÏthe€vehicle€for€the€convenience€of€his€family€members€is€regarded€as€makingÏsuch€use€his€own€business€so€thatòò€óóòòthe€family€member€driver€is€furthering€theÏowner's€own€purposeóóòò.óó"€€(emphasis€added).€€The€courts€reasoned€that€becauseÏthe€head€of€the€household€was€benefiting€from€such€activity,€he€or€she€ought€toÏbe€liable€for€the€accidents€that€will€inevitably€result.€€Finally,€the€doctrine€wasÏthought€important€in€providing€innocent€victims€"substantial€justice."€€As€this€CourtÏexplained€in€òòKingóóòò,ÌóóÌà8 àÓÓ[A]s€a€matter€of€practical€justice€to€those€who€are€injured,€weÏcannot€close€our€eyes€to€the€fact€an€automobile€.€.€.€is€dangerousÏto€life€and€limb€and€must€be€operated€with€care.€€If€anÏinstrumentality€of€this€kind€is€placed€in€the€hands€of€his€family€byÏa€father,€for€the€family's€pleasure,€comfort,€and€entertainment,Ïthe€dictates€of€natural€justice€should€require€that€the€ownerÏshould€be€responsible€for€its€negligent€operation,€because€onlyÏby€doing€so,€as€a€general€rule,€can€justice€be€attained.€€AÏjudgment€for€damages€against€an€infant€.€.€.€would€be€an€emptyÏform.ÌÌòòKingóó,€204€S.W.€at€298.€€ÌÌÌà àÌÓÓà àThe€defendants€argue€that€the€family€purpose€doctrine€is€merely€aÏvariant€of€joint€and€several€liability,€and€that€because€this€Court€has€stated€thatÏjoint€and€several€liability€no€longer€exists€as€an€independent€legal€doctrine,€òòseeóóÏòòBervoets€v.€Harde„Ralls€Pontiac,€Incóó.,€891€S.W.2d€905,€907€(Tenn.€1994),€theÏfamily€purpose€doctrine€is€no€longer€valid.€€Therefore,€they€conclude,€Ms.€BarnettÏcannot€be€held€liable€for€the€actions€of€Ms.€Taylor.ÌÌà àWe€cannot€accept€this€argument.€€Our€statements€in€òòBervoetsóó€and€òòVolz€v.ÏLedesóó,€895€S.W.2d€677,€680€(Tenn.€1995),× ƒ( ××  ×€regarding€the€doctrine€of€joint€andÏseveral€liability€were€made€in€situations€where€multiple€tortfeasors€committedÏseparate,€independent€acts€that€combined€to€cause€a€single,€indivisible€injury€toÏthe€plaintiff.€€€Therefore,€our€earlier€rulings€concerning€joint€and€several€liabilityÏconcerned€apportioning€liability€among€persons€whose€active€negligenceÏcontributed€to€the€plaintiff's€injury.€€òòOwens€v.€Truckstops€of€Americaóó,€___€S.W.2dÍ___€(Tenn.€1996)(Drowota,€J.€dissenting).€€ÌÌà àIn€stark€contrast,€the€family€purpose€doctrine€does€not€involve€such€aÏsituation.€€Rather,€that€doctrine€attaches€liability€to€the€head€of€the€household€notÏbecause€of€any€negligent€act€committed€by€that€person,€but€because€of€theÏagency€relationship€that€is€deemed€to€exist€between€the€head€of€the€householdÏand€the€driver€of€the€family€car.€€In€other€words,€the€actions€of€the€driver€areÏimputed€to€the€head€of€the€household€as€a€matter€of€public€policy;€and€the€plaintiffÏdoes€not€have€to€prove€negligence€on€the€part€of€the€head€of€the€household€inÏorder€to€recover€from€him€or€her€when€the€plaintiff€is€injured€by€the€tortiousÏconduct€of€the€driver.€€òòSee€generallyóó€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó,€ððÏ73,€at€524„27€(5th€ed.€1984).ÌÌà àOnce€the€nature€of€the€family€purpose€doctrine€and€the€proper€scope€ofÏour€prior€statements€regarding€joint€and€several€liability€are€understood,€itÏbecomes€clear€that€those€statements€do€not€affect€the€viability€of€the€familyÏpurpose€doctrine.€€This€same€conclusion€was€reached€by€the€New€Mexico€CourtÍof€Appeals€in€an€analogous€context:€ÌÌÓÓà8 à[T]he€abolition€of€joint€and€several€liability€when€tortfeasors€areÏnegligent€does€not€necessarily€undermine€principles€of€vicariousÏliability.€€There€are€still€situations€in€which€a€party€who€is€withoutÏfault€is€responsible€for€paying€compensatory€damages€causedÏby€the€fault€of€another.€€To€take€the€example€closest€in€point,€theÏrule€of€respondeat€superior€provides€that€a€faultless€employer€isÏnevertheless€liable€for€torts€committed€by€an€employee€in€theÏcourse€and€scope€of€employment.€€òòBecause€liability€is€notÏpredicated€on€the€fault€of€the€employer,€the€abolition€of€joint€andÏseveral€liability€does€not€eliminate€respondeat€superior€liabilityóó.ÌòòÌMedina€v.€Graham's€Cowboys,€Inc.óóòò,óó€827€P.2d€859,€863€(N.M.€App.€1992)Ï(emphasis€added€and€citations€omitted).€€ÌÌà àÌÌÌÓÓà àBecause€our€conclusion€as€to€the€second€issue€does€not€affect€ourÏholding€as€to€the€first,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€is€hereby€reversedÏand€the€case€remanded€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÌÓ` N øô¤ÓÓÓÌÌà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àFrank€F.€Drowota,€IIIÌà àà àJusticeÌÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.€J.ÌReid,€Birch,€White,€JJ.Ìà àà àà àà à