ÿWPC[ …# VU:a %› 04¡4Õéøw@ 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0h< 0r¤ 0| 0†’ 0 1u¨ U, 0dI U,­ U*Ù B)DC, AMo¼v~Õ BSvÓp D3C 0@v AO¶Æ 0DË D/ B>˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  ÓGav tÔôÔô3|x òDóUôDõEöU÷Dø«ùÓ€ 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd€-!Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌApril€22,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@ dStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ , ÑÑ ` Ñ›Ñ7€WðXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑØ ØÓ&€X°d&Óœ›œÙ€€ÙßL€"#!;+'h|` ç `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE€ÌÌÌÌÌJ.€LEE€DOUGLAS,€D.D.S.,à àà à)à àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àà àAppellee,à àà àà àà àœ)à àà àFiled:€April€22,€1996›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àDAVIDSON€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àHon.€Irving€Kilcrease,€ChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€01S01„9508„CH„00138ÌÌÌòòFor€Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Appellantóó€:à àà àà àà àÌÌPhillip€W.€Kendrickà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌKendrick€&€Kendrickà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌBrentwood,€Tennesseeà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMichael€E.€MooreÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSolicitor€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMichael€W.€CatalanoÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSandra€E.€KeithÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED.à àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€œJ.ÇÓÓ›à àIn€this€case€involving€the€commercial€speech€doctrines€of€the€FirstÏAmendment,€€the€Tennessee€State€Board€of€Dentistry€(Board)€appeals€from€theÏCourt€of€Appealsðð€judgment€vacating€the€public€reprimand€issued€by€the€Board€toÏJ.€Lee€Douglas,€a€licensed€dentist,€for€violation€of€the€Boardððs€advertising€rules.€ÏThis€case€presents€the€following€issue:€whether€the€Board€may€require€Douglas€„„€a€general€dentist€who€practices€orthodontics€but€is€not€specially€certified€as€anÏorthodontist€„„€to€include€in€advertisements€of€his€orthodontics€practice€theÏdisclaimer€that€he€is€performing€the€services€as€a€general€dentist,€when€theÏBoard€has€not€presented€any€evidence€that€the€public€has€been€œharmed€by›Ïadvertisements€without€the€required€disclaimer.€€For€the€reasons€that€follow,€weÏreverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals,€and€reinstate€the€public€reprimandÏissued€by€the€Board.ÌÌà@ àòòò òREGULATORY€BACKGROUNDó óóóà à€€€ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€63„5„107€provides€that€ð ðit€is€unlawful€for€any€person€toÏpractice€dentistry€...€in€this€state,€except€those€who€are€now€licensed€or€certifiedÍpursuant€to€law€and€those€who€may€hereafter€be€licensed€or€certified€andÏregistered€pursuant€to€this€chapter.ðð€€Responsibility€for€licensing€members€of€theÏdental€profession€rests€with€the€Board.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€63„5„101.€€In€additionÏto€conferring€licenses€upon€general€dentists,€the€Board€is€authorized€to€certifyÏspecialists€in€certain€fields.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€63„5„112€provides,€in€pertinentÏpart:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àNo€licensed€dentist€shall€hold€himself€out€to€the€public€as€aÏspecialist,€or€being€specially€qualified€in€any€particular€branch€ofÏdentistry,€or€as€giving€special€attention€to€any€branch€of€dentistry,€orÏlimiting€his€practice€to€any€to€any€branch€of€dentistry,€until€he€hadÏcomplied€with€the€additional€requirements€established€by€the€board,Ïand€has€been€issued€a€certificate€by€the€board€authorizing€him€to€doÏso.€€The€board€is€authorized€to€certify€specialists€in€the€followingÏbranches€of€dentistry:€Ìà àà àà àà àà àÌà8 à(1)€Oral€surgery€and/or€oral€maxillofacial€surgery;Ì€€à8 à(2)€òòOrthodonticsóó;Ìà8 à(3)€Periodontics;Ìà8 à(4)€Prosthodontics;Ìà8 à(5)€Pediatric€dentistry;Ìà à(6)€Endodontics;à àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà à(7)€Oral€pathology;€andÌà8 à(8)€Any€other€branch€of€dentistry€hereafter€recognized€andÏapproved€by€it.ÌÌ(Emphasis€added).à àÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€fact€that€a€licensed€general€dentist€does€not€possess€a€certification€inÏone€of€the€above„named€specialities€does€not€prevent€him€or€her€from€practicingÏa€speciality.€€If€such€a€general€dentist€chooses€to€advertise€concerning€a€specialtyÏbranch€of€his€or€her€practice,€however,€the€advertisement€is€governed€by€BoardÏRule€0460„2„.10(5)(b),€which€provides€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àA€licensee€who€possesses€a€verifiable€combination€of€educationÏand€experience€is€not€prohibited€from€including€in€his€practice€oneÏor€more€specialty€branches€of€dentistry.€€However,€any€suchÏadvertisement€of€such€practice€shall:ÌÌà8 à1.€Not€use€the€terms€specialty,€specializing,€specialist,€or€practiceÏlimited€to;€andÌÌà8 à2.€òòContain€the€statement€ð ðthe€services€are€being€performed€orÏprovided€by€a€general€dentist,ðð€and€such€statement€must€appear€orÏbe€expressed€in€the€advertisement€as€conspicuously€as€the€branchÏof€dentistry€advertisedóó.ÌÌÓÓ(Emphasis€added).€€ÌÌà àThis€requirement,€and€all€others€concerning€advertising€by€the€dentalÏprofession,€is€explained€in€the€Boardððs€ð ðPolicy€Statementðð€which€appears€in€theÏpreamble€to€the€administrative€regulations.€€That€statement€œprovides:›€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€lack€of€sophistication€on€the€part€of€many€members€of€the€publicÏconcerning€dental€services,€the€importance€of€the€interests€affectedÏby€the€choice€of€dentists€and€the€foreseeable€consequences€ofÏunrestricted€advertising€by€dentists,€which€is€recognized€to€poseÏspecial€possibilities€for€deception,€require€that€special€care€be€takenÏby€dentists€to€avoid€misleading€the€public.€€ÌÌà8 àDentists€must€be€mindful€that€the€benefits€of€advertising€dependÏupon€its€reliability€and€accuracy.€€Since€advertising€by€dentists€isÏcalculated€and€not€spontaneous,€reasonable€regulation€designed€toÏfoster€compliance€with€appropriate€standards€serves€the€publicÏinterest€without€impeding€the€flow€of€useful,€meaningful,€andÏrelevant€information€to€the€public.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓFinally,€the€Board€is€empowered€to€punish€licensees€who€violate€its€rules.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€63„5„124(a).à8 àÌÌÓ  Óòòò òFACTS€AND€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àJ.€Lee€Douglas€has€been€licensed€to€practice€as€a€general€dentist€inÏTennessee€since€1984.€€Dr.€Douglasðð€practice€includes€orthodontics,€and€hisÏbusiness€cards€read€ð ðJ.€Lee€Douglas,€DDS,€Family€Dentistry,€Cosmetic€Dentistry,ÏOrthopedics/òòOrthodonticsóó,€TMJ€Dysfunction.ðð€€Moreover,€the€language€ð ðJ.€LeeÏDouglas,€D.D.S.,€Dentistry,€TMJ,€òòOrthodonticsóóðð€is€printed€on€the€doorway€to€hisÏœoffice.€(emphasis€added).›€€Dr.€Douglas€does€not,€however,€possess€specialtyÏcertification€as€an€orthodontist.ÌÌà àIn€February€1991€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Health,€Division€of€HealthÏRelated€Boards,€filed€a€notice€of€charges€against€Dr.€Douglas,€alleging€that€heÏhad€violated€Board€Rule€0460„2„.10(5)(b)€by€failing€to€state€on€his€business€cardsÏand€doorway€that€the€advertised€orthodontic€services€ð ðare€being€œprovided€by›€aÏgeneral€dentist.ðð€€Dr.€Douglas€answered€the€charges€by€arguing,€òòinter€aliaóó,€thatÏthe€rule€and€related€statutes€violated€his€rights€to€free€speech€as€guaranteed€byÏthe€First€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€19€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution.€€Dr.€Douglas€also€argued€that€the€words€on€the€card€andÏdoor€ð ðwere€neither€actually€or€inherently€deceptive,€nor€were€they€false,Ífraudulent,€or€misleading.ððÌÌà àAfter€a€hearing,€the€Board€found€Dr.€Douglas€in€violation€of€the€rule.€€ItÏexplained€its€conclusion€in€a€series€of€special€verdict€questions€propounded€to€itÏby€the€Department€of€Health,€the€most€important€of€which€are€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 à...à8 àÌà8 àÌÌà8 à8.€Q:€Did€the€respondent€fail€to€include€a€disclaimer€on€his€businessÏcards€which€indicated€he€was€not€a€specialist€in€orthodontics€or€thatÏthe€services€offered€are€being€performed€or€provided€by€a€generalÏdentist?€€€€€Ìà8 à€€€€€A:€Yes.ÌÌà8 à9.€Q:€Is€the€advertising€by€a€general€dentist€that€he€performsÏorthodontics€as€part€of€his€practice€without€indicating€that€he€is€not€aÏspecialist€misleading€or€deceptive€to€the€public?ÌÌà8 à€€€€A:€Yes.ÌÌà8 à€€€€Why?ÌÌà8 à€€€If€a€person€advertises€a€specialty,€a€layperson€would€assume€thatÏa€specialist€is€practicing€that€area€of€dentistry€but€with€a€disclaimer,Ïthey€would€not.ÌÌà8 à...ÌÌÌÌBased€upon€its€findings,€the€Board€issued€a€public€reprimand€to€Dr.€Douglas.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àDr.€Douglas€appealed€from€the€Boardððs€decision€to€the€Davidson€CountyÏChancery€Court.€€That€court€affirmed€the€Boardððs€decision;€and€specificallyÏrejected€his€constitutional€argument,€reasoning€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThis€Court€finds€unpersuasive€the€petitionerððs€claim€that€Rule€0460„2„.10(5)(b),€as€applied€to€him,€is€unconstitutional.€€The€Court€notesÏthat€the€regulation€at€issue€does€not€ban€or€prohibit€petitionerððsÏadvertising,€but€rather€requires€him€to€use€specified€disclaimingÏlanguage.€€The€court€further€notes€that€the€regulation€of€theÏpractices€of€dentistry€and€orthodontics€implicate€important€issues€ofÏpublic€health€and€safety,€in€that€these€practices€involve€performanceÏof€procedures,€often€invasive€in€nature,€requiring€special€knowledgeÏand€skill.€€The€Court€also€notes€that€the€potential€for€self„deceptionÏis€self„evident€in€the€case€presented;€i.e.,€where€the€public€isÏpresented€with€an€advertisement€for€the€provision€of€orthodonticÏservices€and€is€unaware€of€the€fact€that€the€practitioner€is€notÏcertified€in€orthodontics€by€the€Tennessee€Board€of€Dentistry.€ÏTherefore,€the€Court€is€satisfied€that€the€public€interest€wouldÏwarrant€the€disclaimer€required€by€Rule€0460„2„.10(5)(b)€in€thisÏcase.€€The€Court€has€examined€the€case€law€presented€to€it€by€theÏpetitioner€...€and€is€satisfied€that€this€present€decision€is€inÍaccordance€with€that€case€law.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àDr.€Douglas€then€appealed€to€the€Court€of€Appeals,€which€reversed€theÏjudgment€of€the€Board€and€the€chancery€court.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€stated€thatÏrecent€commercial€speech€cases€of€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court,€namely€òòIbanez€v.ÏFlorida€Department€of€Business€and€Professional€Regulation,€Board€ofÏAccountancyóó,€€512€U.S.€___,€114€S.Ct.€2084,€129€L.Ed.2d€118€(1994)€andÏòòEdenfield€v.€Faneóó,€507€U.S.€___,€113€S.Ct.€1792,€123€L.Ed.2d€543€(1993),Ïrequire€governmental€bodies€seeking€to€place€restrictions€on€commercial€speechÏto€prove€that€the€harms€sought€to€be€prevented€are€real€and€that€the€regulationsÏwill€alleviate€such€harms€œin€a€direct€and€material€way.€€The›€Court€concluded€thatÏbecause€the€Board€œmerely€cited€the€ð ðpolicy€statementðð€in€support€of€Rule€0460„2„.10(5)(b),€and€did›€not€adduce€any€evidence€that€the€public€had€actually€beenÏœharmed€by›€an€advertisement€of€a€specialty€practice€that€did€not€include€theÏdisclaimer,œ€the€rule€was€unconstitutional€as€applied€to€Dr.€Douglas.€€ÌÌà àThe€Board€applied€for€permission€to€appeal€pursuant€to€Rule€11,€Tenn.€R.ÍApp.€P.€€We€granted€that€application€to€address€this€issue€of€first€impression.ÌÌà@ àòòò òANALYSISó óóóÌÌà àIt€is€well„settled€that€commercial€speech€such€as€advertising€is€afforded€aÏqualified€protection€under€both€the€federal€and€state€constitutions.€€òòVirginiaÏPharmacy€Board€v.€Virginia€Citizens€Consumer€Councilóó,€425€U.S.€748,€96€S.Ct.Ï1517,€45€L.Ed.2d€346€(1976);€òòBigelow€v.€Virginiaóó,€421€U.S.€809,€95€S.Ct.€821,€44ÏL.Ed.€600€(1975);€òòH€&€L€Messengers,€Inc.€€v.€City€of€Brentwoodóó,€577€S.W.2d€444Ï(Tenn.€1979).€€€The€rationale€for€this€qualified€protection€is€that€only€truthful€andÏlegitimate€information€benefits€consumers€in€the€commercial€realm;€therefore,Ïstates€are€allowed€to€regulate€commercial€speech€to€a€significantly€greaterÏdegree€than€other€areas€of€expression.€€òòVirginia€Pharmacy€Boardóó,€425€U.S.€atÏ772,€n.24,€96€S.Ct.€at€1530.€ÌÌà àIn€òòCentral€Hudson€Gas€v.€Public€Service€Commission€of€New€Yorkóó,€447ÏU.S.€557,€100€S.Ct.€2343,€65€L.Ed.€2d€341€(1980),€the€United€States€SupremeÍCourt€held€that€commercial€speech€should€be€subjected€to€intermediate€„„€asÏopposed€to€strict€„„€scrutiny;€and€it€enunciated€the€following€test€for€determiningÏthe€constitutionality€of€such€speech:ÌÌÓÓà8 àFor€commercial€speech€to€come€within€that€provision€[the€FirstÏAmendment],€it€at€least€must€concern€lawful€activity€and€not€beÏmisleading.€€Next,€we€must€ask€whether€the€asserted€governmentÏinterest€is€substantial.€€If€both€inquiries€yield€positive€answers,€weÏmust€determine€whether€the€regulation€directly€advances€theÏgovernmental€interest€asserted,€and€whether€it€is€not€moreÏextensive€than€is€necessary€to€serve€that€interest.ÌÌòòCentral€Hudsonóó,€447€U.S.€at€566,€100€S.Ct.€at€2351.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àSubsequent€cases€have€clarified€the€òòCentral€Hudsonóó€analysis;€it€is€nowÏsettled€that€the€State€may€completely€ban€commercial€expression€that€is€eitherÏactually€or€inherently€misleading€without€further€justification.€€òòEdenfield€v.€Faneóó,Ï507€U.S.€___,€___,€113€S.Ct.€1792,€1799,€123€L.Ed.2d€543€(1993)€(ð ðour€casesÏmake€clear€that€the€State€may€ban€commercial€expression€that€is€fraudulent€orÏdeceptive€without€further€justificationðð);€òòPeel€v.€Attorney€Registration€andÏDisciplinary€Commissionóó,€496€U.S.€91,€111,€110€S.Ct.€2281,€2293,€110€L.Ed.2dÍ83€(1990)€(ð ðState€may€not€...€completely€ban€statements€that€are€not€actually€orÏinherently€misleadingðð);€òòIn€re€R.M.J.óó,€455€U.S.€191,€203,€102€S.Ct.€929,€937,€71ÏL.Ed.2d€64€(1982)€(ð ðMisleading€advertising€may€be€prohibited€entirely.ðð).€ÏHowever,€when€the€State€seeks€to€ban€commercial€speech€that€is€not€actually€orÏinherently€misleading€or€deceptive,€the€State€must€prove€that€(1)€the€harms€that€itÏseeks€to€rectify€by€the€regulation€are€real,€not€purely€hypothetical;€and€(2)€that€theÏregulation€directly€and€materially€advances€the€Stateððs€interest€in€preventing€theÏspecific€type€of€deception€at€hand.€€òòEdenfieldóó,€507€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€1800.ÌÌà àDr.€Douglas€argues€that€these€well„settled€propositions€apply€to€the€BoardÏrule€at€issue€in€this€case.€€€He€contends€that€since€the€Board€presented€noÏevidence€that€any€advertisement€without€the€disclaimer€served€to€mislead€theÏpublic,€but€merely€relied€upon€the€ð ðpolicy€statement,ðð€the€board€failed€to€carry€itsÏburden€of€justifying€the€rule.€€As€support€for€this€argument,€Dr.€Douglas€citesÏòòEdenfieldóó,€òòsupraóó.€€€ÌÌà àIn€òòEdenfieldóó€the€U.€S.€Supreme€Court€struck€down€a€Florida€ruleÍprohibiting€CPAs€from€directly€soliciting€clients.€€The€Courtððs€analysis€focussed€onÏthe€Florida€Board€of€Accountancyððs€proffered€justification€for€the€rule€„„€that€it€wasÏnecessary€to€ensure€CPA€independence€during€audits€of€their€clients€and€toÏprevent€overreaching€by€CPAs.€€In€concluding€that€this€justification€wasÏinadequate,€the€Court€stated:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€[Florida€Board€of€Accountancy]€has€not€demonstrated€that,€asÏapplied€in€the€business€context,€the€ban€on€CPA€solicitationÏadvances€its€asserted€interests€in€any€direct€and€material€way.€€ItÏpresents€no€studies€that€suggest€personal€solicitation€of€prospectiveÏbusiness€clients€by€CPAs€creates€the€dangers€of€fraud,Ïoverreaching,€or€compromised€independence€that€the€Board€claimsÏto€fear.€€The€record€does€not€disclose€any€anecdotal€evidence,Ïeither€from€Florida€or€another€State,€that€validates€the€boardððsÏsuppositions.€€This€is€so€even€though€21€States€place€no€specificÏrestrictions€of€any€kind€on€solicitation€by€CPAs,€and€only€threeÏStates€besides€Florida€have€enacted€a€categorical€ban.€€Not€evenÏ[plaintiffððs]€own€conduct€suggests€that€the€Boardððs€concerns€areÏjustified.€€The€only€suggestion€that€a€ban€on€solicitation€might€helpÏprevent€fraud€and€overreaching€or€preserve€CPA€independence€isÏthe€affidavit€or€Louis€Dooner,€which€contains€nothing€more€than€aÏseries€of€conclusory€statements€that€add€little€if€anything€to€theÏBoardððs€original€statement€of€its€justifications.€€ÌÌòòEdenfieldóó,€507€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€at€1800„01.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€Board€concedes€that€if€Rule€046„„2„.10(5)(b)€was€a€total€prohibition€ofÏspecialty€advertising,€it€would€have€failed€to€carry€its€burden€under€òòEdenfieldóó.€ÏHowever,€the€Board€points€out€that€the€rule€does€not€prohibit€speech€at€all,€butÏthat€it€merely€requires€general€dentists€to€disclose€certain€additional€information€ifÏthey€wish€to€advertise€the€specialty€branches€of€their€practice.€€The€Board€arguesÏthat€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€has€treated€regulations€requiring€additional€speechÏmuch€more€deferentially€than€absolute€bans€on€speech;€and€that€under€itsÏdecisions,€namely€òòZauderer€v.€Office€of€the€Disciplinary€Councilóó,€471€U.S.€655,Ï105€S.Ct.€2265,€85€L.Ed.2d€652€(1985),€the€rule€is€constitutional€as€applied€to€Dr.ÏDouglas.€ÌÌà àIn€òòZaudereróó€the€petitioner,€an€attorney,€published€an€advertisement€thatÏoffered€to€represent€women€injured€as€a€result€of€using€the€Dalkon€ShieldÏintrauterine€device€on€a€contingent„fee€basis;€the€advertisement€also€containedÏan€accurate€drawing€of€the€device.€€The€advertisement€did€not€disclose€whetherÏthe€potential€clients€would€be€responsible€for€court€costs,€as€opposed€to€legalÏfees,€if€their€suits€were€unsuccessful.€€ÌÌà àThe€disciplinary€counsel€of€the€Ohio€Supreme€Court€brought€chargesÏagainst€the€attorney,€alleging€that€he€had€violated€rules€prohibiting€attorneys€fromÏsoliciting€employment€with€advertisements€concerning€a€specific€legal€problem;Ïand€a€rule€that€prohibited€attorneys€from€using€illustrations€in€advertising.€€TheÏBoard€also€charged€the€attorney€with€violating€a€rule€that€required€lawyers€toÏdisclose€whether€€the€contingent„fee€rate€is€computed€before€or€after€theÏdeduction€of€court€costs.€€The€board€hearing€the€matter€found€the€attorney€guiltyÏof€violating€all€these€rules.€€ÌÌà àOn€review,€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€concluded€that€the€rules€prohibitingÏadvertisements€for€a€specific€legal€problem€and€the€rule€prohibiting€illustrationsÏwere€violative€of€the€First€Amendment.€€Since€the€advertisements€were€truthful,Ïthe€Court€stated,€the€State€was€required€to€assert€a€substantial€interest€and€toÏprove€that€the€rules€advanced€the€interests€in€a€direct€and€material€way.€ÏAlthough€the€Court€found€the€Stateððs€proffered€interest€in€preventing€deception€toÏbe€substantial,€it€disagreed€with€the€argument,€set€forth€by€the€State,€that€theÍinherent€ambiguity€of€attorney€advertising€as€compared€to€other€types€ofÏadvertising€mandated€its€broad€prophylactic€rules.€€The€Court€reasoned€that€theÏvalidity€of€attorney€advertising€was€no€more€difficult€to€ascertain€than€other€types.€ÏAs€to€the€rule€prohibiting€illustrations,€the€Court€was€much€more€explicit€about€theÏStateððs€failure€to€prove€that€the€use€of€illustrations€created€the€risk€of€deception.€ÏThe€Court€stated:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€Stateððs€arguments€amount€to€little€more€than€unsupportedÏassertions:€nowhere€does€the€State€cite€any€evidence€or€authority€ofÏany€kind€for€its€contention€that€the€potential€abuses€associated€withÏthe€use€of€illustrations€in€attorneysðð€advertising€cannot€be€combatedÏby€any€means€short€of€a€blanket€ban.€€Moreover,€none€of€the€StateððsÏarguments€establish€that€there€are€particular€evils€associated€withÏthe€use€of€illustrations€in€attorneysðð€advertisements.ÌÌòòZaudereróó,€471€U.S.€at€648„49,€105€S.Ct.€at€2280.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€Courtððs€analysis€as€to€the€constitutionality€of€the€disclosure€rule€was,Ïhowever,€radically€different.€€The€Court€explained€that:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àAppellant€contends€that€assessing€the€validity€of€the€Ohio€SupremeÍCourtððs€decision€to€discipline€him€for€his€failure€to€include€in€theÏDalkon€Shield€advertisement€the€information€that€clients€might€beÏliable€for€significant€litigation€costs€even€if€their€lawsuits€wereÏunsuccessful€entails€precisely€the€same€inquiry€as€determining€theÏvalidity€of€the€restrictions€on€advertising€content€discussed€above.€ÏIn€other€words,€he€suggests€that€the€State€must€establish€either€thatÏthe€advertisement,€absent€the€required€disclosure,€would€be€false€orÏdeceptive€or€that€the€disclosure€requirement€serves€someÏsubstantial€governmental€interest€other€than€preventing€deception;Ïmoreover,€he€contends€that€the€state€must€establish€that€theÏdisclosure€requirement€directly€advances€the€relevantÏgovernmental€interest€...€€Not€surprisingly,€appellant€claims€that€theÏState€has€failed€to€muster€substantial€support€for€any€of€the€findingsÏrequired€to€support€the€restriction.ÌÌà8 àAppellant,€however,€overlooks€material€differences€betweenÏdisclosure€requirements€and€outright€prohibitions€on€speech.€€InÏrequiring€attorneys€who€advertise€their€willingness€to€representÏclients€on€a€contingent„fee€basis€to€state€that€the€client€may€have€toÏbear€certain€expenses€even€if€he€loses,€Ohio€has€not€attempted€toÏprevent€attorneys€from€conveying€information€to€the€public;€it€hasÏonly€required€them€to€provide€somewhat€more€information€than€theyÏmight€otherwise€be€inclined€to€present.€€We€have,€to€be€sure,€heldÏthat€in€some€instances€compulsion€to€speak€may€be€as€violative€ofÏthe€First€Amendment€as€prohibitions€on€speech€...€[citing€cases].ÌÌà8 àBut€the€interests€at€stake€here€are€not€of€the€same€order€[as€in€thoseÏcases].€€€Ohio€has€not€attempted€to€ððprescribe€what€shall€beÏorthodox€in€politics,€nationalism,€religion,€or€other€matters€of€opinionÏor€force€citizens€to€confess€by€word€or€act€their€faith€therein.ðð€€TheÏState€has€attempted€only€to€prescribe€what€shall€be€orthodox€inÏcommercial€advertising,€and€its€prescription€has€taken€the€form€of€aÍrequirement€that€appellant€include€in€his€advertising€purely€factualÏand€uncontroversial€information€about€the€terms€under€which€hisÏservices€will€be€available.€€Because€the€extension€of€FirstÏAmendment€protection€to€commercial€speech€is€justified€principallyÏby€the€value€to€consumers€of€the€information€such€speech€provides,Ïappellantððs€constitutionally€protected€interest€in€òònotóó€providing€anyÏparticular€factual€information€in€his€advertising€is€minimal.€€Thus,€inÏvirtually€all€our€commercial€speech€decisions€to€date,€we€haveÏemphasized€that€because€disclosure€requirements€trench€muchÏmore€narrowly€on€an€advertiserððs€interests€than€do€flat€prohibitionsÏon€speech,€ððwarnings€or€disclaimers€might€be€appropriatelyÏrequired€...€in€order€to€dissipate€the€possibility€of€consumerÏconfusion€and€deception.ððÌÌà8 àWe€do€not€suggest€that€disclosure€requirements€do€not€implicate€theÏadvertiserððs€First€Amendment€rights€at€all.€€We€recognize€thatÏunjustified€or€unduly€burdensome€disclosure€requirements€mightÏoffend€the€First€Amendment€by€chilling€protected€commercialÏspeech.€€But€we€hold€that€an€advertiserððs€rights€are€adequatelyÏprotected€as€long€as€disclosure€requirements€are€reasonablyÏrelated€to€the€Stateððs€interest€in€preventing€deception€of€consumers.ÌÌòòZaudereróó,€471€U.S.€at€650„51,€105€S.Ct.€at€2281„82€(emphasis€in€original)Ï(citations€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€òòZaudereróó€court€proceeded€to€apply€this€standard€to€the€disclosureÏrule,€and€it€determined€that€the€rule€was€not€violative€of€the€First€Amendment.€€ItÏreasoned€that:€Ì€€ÌÓÓà8 àThe€assumption€that€substantial€numbers€of€clients€would€be€misledÏis€hardly€a€speculative€one:€it€is€commonplace€that€members€of€theÏpublic€are€often€unaware€of€the€technical€meanings€of€such€termsÏas€ð ðfeesðð€and€ð ðcostsðð€„„€terms€that,€in€ordinary€usage,€might€well€beÏvirtually€interchangeable.€€When€the€possibility€of€deception€is€asÏself„evident€as€it€is€in€this€case,€we€need€not€require€the€State€toÏððconduct€a€survey€of€the€...€public€before€it€[may]€determine€that€theÏ[advertisement]€had€a€tendency€to€mislead.ðð€€The€Stateððs€positionÏthat€it€is€deceptive€to€employ€advertising€that€refers€to€contingent„feeÏarrangements€without€mentioning€the€clientððs€liability€for€costs€isÏreasonable€enough€to€support€a€requirement€that€informationÏregarding€the€clientððs€liability€for€costs€be€disclosed.ÌÌòòZaudereróó,€471€U.S.€at€652„53,€105€S.Ct.€at€2282„83€(citations€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àòòZaudereróó€is€on€point€with€the€case€at€hand;€and€under€the€less€exactingÏstandard€enunciated€therein,€it€would€appear€that€Board€Rule€0460„2„.10(5)(b)Ïpasses€constitutional€muster.€€Dr.€Douglas,€however,€argues€that€this€is€not€so€forÏtwo€reasons.€€First,€he€argues€that€whereas€the€potential€for€deception€inÏòòZaudereróó€was€ð ðself„evident,ðð€thereby€making€the€Stateððs€position€reasonable,€theÏpotential€for€deception€in€this€case€is€not€self„evident.€€Dr.€Douglas€presumablyÏdoes€not€contest€the€Boardððs€finding€that€some€consumers€of€dental€services€mayÍerroneously€assume€that€a€general€dentist€advertising€a€specialty€without€theÏrequired€disclaimer€is,€in€fact,€a€certified€specialist.€€Rather,€he€appears€to€argue€„„€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€specifically€stated€„„€that€the€possibility€of€deception€isÏnot€self„evident€because€it€is€not€immediately€apparent€that€even€a€consumerÏoperating€under€such€a€false€assumption€would€actually€be€harmed€by€it.€€TheÏunstated€premise€underpinning€this€argument€is€that,€pursuant€to€BoardÏregulations,€a€general€dentist€performing€a€specialty€branch€possesses€theÏnecessary€education€and€experience€to€perform€the€specialty;€and€thus€it€isÏirrational€to€simply€presume€that€the€patient€will€likely€be€harmed€by€theÏerroneous€assumption.€€Ìà àÌà àThe€answer€to€this€argument€is€that€the€Board€„„€the€body€with€legallyÏrecognized€expertise€in€dental€matters€and€charged€with€the€duty€of€supervisingÏthe€profession€„„€believes€it€worthwhile€to€certify€specialists€in€certain€fields;€andÏthe€Board€deems€it€justifiable€to€formulate€its€advertising€policies€in€light€of€theÏcertification€scheme.€€We€will€not€second„guess€the€wisdom€of€this€judgment,Ïespecially€given€the€extremely€minimal€extent€to€which€the€disclosureÍrequirement€impinges€upon€the€First€Amendment€rights€of€general€dentists.€€If€theÏBoard€had€enacted€a€rule€completely€preventing€general€dentists€fromÏadvertising€a€speciality€branch,€€our€conclusion€would€likely€have€been€different.€ÏThen€we€would€have€been€faced€with€a€situation€in€which€a€general€dentist,€afterÏhaving€satisfied€the€Boardððs€requirements€to€practice€a€specialty€branch,€wasÏnevertheless€arbitrarily€prohibited€from€informing€the€public€about€his€or€herÏpractice.€€This€case,€however,€presents€no€such€problem.ÌÌà àThe€other€argument€advanced€by€Dr.€Douglas€is€much€more€substantial.€ÏHe€argues€that€in€òòIbanezóó,€òòsupraóó,€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€effectively€repudiatedÏthe€òòZaudereróó€disclosure€analysis,€and€instead€required€that€the€State€justifyÏdisclosure€requirements€in€the€same€way€that€it€must€justify€total€prohibitions.€ÏThus,€Dr.€Douglas€argues,€òòZaudereróó€is€inapplicable;€and€because€the€BoardÏpresented€nothing€but€the€ð ðpolicy€statementðð€in€justification€of€the€rule,€it€failed€toÏcarry€its€burden€of€proof.ÌÌà àIn€òòIbanezóó€the€Florida€Board€of€Accountancy€charged€the€petitioner€with,Íamong€other€things,€violating€Board€rules€against€deceptive€advertising€by€usingÏthe€title€Certified€Financial€Planner€(CFP)€in€firm€letterhead,€business€cards,€andÏa€yellow€pages€listing.€€The€Board€pointed€out€that€it€did€not€recognize€the€CFPÏdesignation;€it€argued€that€the€use€of€the€designation€implied€state€approvalÏthereof€and€was€thus€inherently€misleading.€€ÌÌà àOn€review,€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€struck€Floridaððs€blanket€ban€on€theÏuse€of€the€CFP€designation.€€It€noted€that€the€designation€was€well„established;Ïthat€it€was€granted€only€after€an€applicant€met€certain€requirements€establishedÏby€a€national€board€of€standards;€and€that€the€petitioner€was€in€fact€a€CFP.€ÏBecause€the€information€was€truthful,€and€because€the€Board€failed€to€provideÏany€evidence€that€the€CFP€designation€actually€misled€the€public,€the€CourtÏstruck€the€blanket€ban.ÌÌà àMuch€more€important€for€purposes€of€this€case€was,€however,€the€CourtððsÏtreatment€of€the€alternative€contention€advanced€by€the€Board€„„€that€it€couldÏconstitutionally€require€the€petitioner€to€include€a€disclaimer€in€herÍadvertisements.€€€The€Court€had€the€following€to€say€in€response€to€thisÏargument:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€Board€alternatively€contends€that€Ibanezðð€use€of€the€CFPÏdesignation€is€ððpotentially€misleading,ðð€entitling€the€Board€to€ððenactÏmeasures€short€of€a€total€ban€to€prevent€deception€or€confusion.ðð€€IfÏthe€ððprotections€afforded€commercial€speech€are€to€retain€theirÏforce,ðð€we€cannot€allow€rote€invocation€of€the€words€ððpotentiallyÏmisleadingðð€to€supplant€the€Boardððs€burden€to€ððdemonstrate€that€theÏharms€it€recites€are€real€and€that€its€restriction€will€in€fact€alleviateÏthem€to€a€material€degree.ðð€€òòEdenfieldóó,€507€U.S.€at€___,€113€S.Ct.€atÏ1800.ÌÌà8 àThe€Board€points€to€[its€rule]€which€prohibits€use€of€any€ððspecialistððÏdesignation€unless€accompanied€by€a€disclaimer,€made€ððin€theÏimmediate€proximity€of€the€statement€that€implied€formal€recognitionÏas€a€specialistðð;€the€disclaimer€must€ððstate€that€the€recognizingÏagency€is€not€affiliated€with€or€sanctioned€by€the€state€or€federalÏgovernment,ðð€and€it€must€set€out€the€recognizing€agencyððsÏððrequirements€for€recognition,€including,€but€not€limited€to,Ïeducation,€experience,€and€testing.ðð€€Given€the€state€of€this€record€„„Ïthe€failure€of€the€Board€to€point€to€any€harm€that€is€potentially€real,Ïnot€purely€hypothetical€„„€we€are€satisfied€that€the€Boardððs€action€isÏunjustified.€€We€express€no€opinion€whether,€in€other€situations€orÏon€a€different€record,€the€Boardððs€insistence€on€a€disclaimer€mightÏserve€as€an€appropriately€tailored€check€against€deception€andÏconfusion,€rather€than€one€imposing€ððunduly€burdensomeÏdisclosure€requirements€[that]€offend€the€first€amendment.ðð€ÏòòZaudereróó,€supra,€471€U.S.€at€651,€105€S.Ct.€At€2282.€€This€much€isÏplain,€however:€the€detail€required€in€the€disclaimer€currentlyÍdescribed€by€the€Board€effectively€rules€out€notation€of€theÏððspecialistðð€designation€on€a€business€card€or€letterhead,€or€in€aÏyellow€pages€listing.ÌÌòòÌÌÓÓIbanezóó,€512€U.S.€at€___,€114€S.Ct.€At€2090€(some€citations€omitted).€€Moreover,Ïlater€in€the€opinion€the€òòIbanezóó€court€made€the€following€statements:€ð ð...€we€stressÏagain€the€failure€of€the€Board€to€back€up€its€alleged€concern€that€the€designationÏCFP€would€mislead€rather€than€inform,ðð€512€U.S.€at€___,€114€S.Ct.€at€2091;€andÏð ð[w]e€have€never€sustained€restrictions€on€constitutionally€protected€speech€on€aÏrecord€so€bare€as€the€one€on€which€the€Board€relies€here.ðð€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àThus,€there€is€some€support€for€Dr.€Douglasððs€argument€that€òòIbanezóóÏconstitutes€an€implicit€repudiation€of€the€òòZaudereróó€disclosure€analysis;€and€it€isÏclear€that€such€an€interpretation€would€doom€the€Board€rule€at€issue€here.€€To€soÏinterpret€òòIbanezóó,€however,€would€conflict€with€established€principles€of€caseÏconstruction€and€judicial€review.€€First,€it€is€well„settled€that€because€of€theÏimportance€of€the€doctrine€of€òòstare€decisisóó,€a€subsequent€case€is€not€to€beÏregarded€as€overruling€a€prior€one€òòsub€silentioóó€if€an€alternative,€logical€reading€ofÍthe€later€case€is€possible.€€This€is€especially€true€in€the€constitutional€context,Ïwhere€it€is€the€reviewing€courtððs€duty€to€harmonize€potentially€conflicting€case€lawÏif€the€constitutionality€of€a€statute€or€regulation€is€at€stake.€€òòMonday€v.€Millsapsóó,Ï197€Tenn.€295,€271€S.W.2d€857€(1954);€òòBarnes€v.€Walkeróó,€191€Tenn.€364,€234ÏS.W.2d€648€(1951).€€ÌÌà àWith€this€in€mind,€we€read€òòIbanezóó€to€mean€that€the€disclaimer€violated€theÏFirst€Amendment€simply€because€it€was€ð ðunduly€burdensomeðð€under€theÏòòZaudereróó€analysis.€€Indeed,€because€the€incredible€detail€prescribed€by€theÏregulation€precluded€the€inclusion€of€the€CFP€designation€in€the€spatially€limitedÏforms€of€advertising€at€issue€in€the€case€„„€firm€letterhead,€business€cards€and€theÏyellow€pages€„„€it€is€not€at€all€surprising€that€the€Court€concluded€that€theÏdisclaimer€constituted€a€òòde€factoóó€prohibition.€€ÌÌà àOur€conclusion€that€the€òòIbanezóó€court€did€not€intend€to€repudiate€òòZaudereróóÏis€also€supported€by€the€fact€that€the€Court€was€not€convinced€that€even€theÏinclusion€€of€the€extravagantly€detailed€disclaimer€would€have€shielded€theÍpetitioner€from€the€reprimand.€€In€a€footnote,€the€Court€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 àUnder€the€Boardððs€regulations,€moreover,€it€appears€that€even€aÏdisclaimer€of€the€kind€described€would€not€have€saved€Ibanez€fromÏcensure.€[Another€rule]€flatly€bans€ððstating€a€form€of€recognition€byÏany€entity€other€than€the€Board€that€uses€the€term€certified.ðð€ÏSeparate€and€distinct€from€that€absolute€prohibition,€the€regulationsÏfurther€proscribe€ððstating€or€implying€that€the€licensee€has€receivedÏformal€recognition€as€a€specialist€in€any€aspect€of€publicÏaccounting,€unless€the€statement€contains€a€copiously€detailedÏdisclaimer.ÌÌòòÌÌÓÓIbanezóó,€512€U.S.€at€___,€114€S.Ct.€at€2091,€n.11.€€Thus,€it€appears€that€the€CourtÏmay€have€simply€concluded€that€òòIbanezóó€was€ð ðnot€a€disclaimer€case,ðð€andÏtherefore€focussed€its€attention€on€the€lack€of€proof€in€the€record.€€ÌÌà àHaving€interpreted€òòIbanezóó€as€an€extension€rather€than€a€repudiation€ofÏòòZaudereróó,€we€conclude€that€the€Board€rule€passes€constitutional€muster€underÏthat€analysis.€€The€disclaimer€at€issue€here,€in€stark€contrast€to€the€one€presentedÏin€òòIbanezóó,€is€scarcely€burdensome€at€all.€€General€dentists€are€merely€required€toÏinclude€a€one„sentence€explanation€in€their€advertisements€of€specialtyÍbranches.€€This€is€not€a€sufficient€burden€to€warrant€the€drastic€action€of€striking€aÏduly€enacted€administrative€rule.€€ÌÌà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€isÏreversed€and€the€judgment€of€the€Davidson€County€Chancery€Court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à______________________________________€€Ïà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌReid,€Birch,€and€White,€JJ.à à€