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Bj!˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 , øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù-»~g ,Ø'à(v(2\i$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ4°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XAóXXXÔÔ€òõòXXAóÔà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó3|x @"Arial Regular, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô Ó€   ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d$$$$'ÿÿdxd))))7Border 1dd€-+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òMarch€11,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€To€the€extent€that€òòRabidueóó€required€an€employee€to€establish€psychological€harm,€it€hasÏbeen€abrogated.€€òòHarris€v.€Forklift€Sys.,€Inc.óó,€__€U.S.€__,€114€S.Ct.€367,€126€L.Ed.2d€295€(1993).€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Either€actual€or€constructive€knowledge€will€suffice.Ì ¯Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€In€the€federal€system,€the€clearly€erroneous€standard€of€review€applies€to€factual€findingsÏmade€by€either€a€jury€or€a€€judge€sitting€without€a€jury.€€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€52(a).€€In€Tennessee,€factualÏfindings€by€a€judge€are€afforded€a€presumption€of€correctness,€but€will€be€overturned€if€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€In€contrast,€factual€findings€by€a€jury€are€reviewedÏunder€a€much€more€deferential€standard€of€review€and€will€be€disturbed€only€if€there€is€no€materialÏevidence€to€support€the€verdict.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€€òòHumphrey€v.€David€Witherspoon,€Inc.óó,Ï734€S.W.2d€315€(Tenn.€1987)(workers'€compensation€case€discussing€the€differences€betweenÏthe€two€standards€of€review).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€''X„d&ÓÑ#€''Xd#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€AóXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€X8d&ÓÙ€€ÙßL€,.+;+'h|Æ` Å `€€Lßà@ àò òIN€THE€SUPREMEÏCOURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÓÓó óBRENDA€CAMPBELL,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€ò òòòFiled:€€March€11,€1996ó óóóÌà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€KNOX€CHANCERYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€HON.€FREDERICK€D.€McDONALD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€€CHANCELLORÌFLORIDA€STEEL€CORPORATION,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)€€€€€€NO.€€03„S„01„9502„CH„00017ÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:ó óóóÌJim€D.€Owenà àà àà àà àà àGavin€S.€ApplebyÌOWEN,€EDWARDS€&€BRYANTà àà àErin€E.€MatthewsÌKnoxville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àPOWELL,€GOLDSTEIN,€FRAZER€&Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€MURPHYÌRobert€S.€Oliveà àà àà àà àAtlanta,€GeorgiaÌSandra€G.€OliveÌOLIVE€&€OLIVE,€P.C.à àà àà àL.€Caesar€Stair,€IIIÌKnoxville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àBERNSTEIN,€STAIR€&€McADAMSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌò òòòà@ àFor€Amicus€Curiae,€Tennessee€Association€of€Business:ó óóóÌà àà àà àà àW.€Ovid€Collins,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àCharles€Hampton€WhiteÌà àà àà àà àRebecca€Wells„DemareeÌà àà àà àà àCORNELIUS€&€COLLINSÌà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌò òÔ€(„Ôà@ àòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÌÔ€(XÔÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALSÌAFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àANDERSON,€C.J.ÇÓÓÑ7€ Aó XXdæXXdæ7Ñà àWe€granted€this€appeal€to€determine€whether€"cold„shoulder€treatment"Ïof€an€employee,€which€is€neither€racially€nor€sexually€explicit,€may,€if€based€onÏrace€or€gender,€constitute€unlawful€harassment€in€violation€of€the€TennesseeÏHuman€Rights€Act€and€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€Act.ÌÌà àPlaintiff,€Brenda€Campbell,€an€African„American€female,€brought€thisÏemployee€discrimination€action€under€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€andÏTitle€VII€of€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€Act,€alleging€sexual€and€racial€harassmentÏagainst€her€employer,€Florida€Steel€Corporation,€based€upon€the€behavior€of€Ïthree€of€her€co„workers.ÌÌà àAfter€a€bench€trial,€the€trial€court€first€found€that€Campbell€had€beenÏsubjected€to€racial€and€sexual€harassment,€but€concluded€that€Florida€SteelÏhad,€after€receiving€notice€of€its€existence,€promptly€eliminated€the€harassment.€ÏThe€trial€court€further€found€that€after€the€harassment€was€terminated,ÏCampbell's€co„employees€subjected€her€to€"cold„shoulder€treatment,"€and€thatÏFlorida€Steel€was€aware€of€the€treatment€but€failed€to€promptly€eliminate€it.€€As€aÏresult,€the€trial€court€concluded€Campbell€was€constructively€discharged€andÏentitled€to€damages.€€ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€trial€court's€damage€award€was€reversed€by€the€Court€ofÏAppeals,€which€concluded€that€neither€the€federal€nor€state€act€requireÏemployers€"to€ensure€a€pleasant€social€environment,"€and€that€there€was,Ïtherefore,€no€constructive€discharge.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€also€decided€thatÏthe€appellate€standard€of€review€should€be€òòde€novoóó€because€the€"issue€ofÏconstructive€discharge€is,€at€least€partially,€a€question€of€law."€ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€result€reached€by€the€Court€of€Appeals,€but€disagreeÏwith€the€rationale.€€First,€we€disagree€with€the€Court€of€Appeals'€conclusion€thatÏconduct€must€be€explicitly€sexual€or€racial€in€nature€to€constitute€unlawfulÏharassment.€€We€conclude€that€any€disadvantageous€treatment€of€an€employeeÏwhich€would€not€occur€but€for€the€employee's€race€or€gender€may,€if€sufficientlyÏpervasive,€constitute€unlawful€harassment€in€violation€of€Title€VII€and€theÏTennessee€Act.€€ÌÌà àSecond,€we€disagree€that€the€finding€of€constructive€discharge€in€thisÏcase€is€subject€to€òòde€novoóó€review.€€A€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law€are€subjectÏto€òòde€novoóó€review,€while€a€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€afforded€aÏpresumption€of€correctness.€€We€conclude€that€the€trial€court€correctly€appliedÏthe€law€of€constructive€discharge,€and€that€its€factual€finding€of€constructiveÍdischarge€is€to€be€reviewed€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)€and€mustÏbe€afforded€a€presumption€of€correctness.ÌÌà àBecause,€in€this€case,€the€evidence€preponderates€against€€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€that€the€employer€failed€to€respond€promptly€and€effectively€to€theÏcold„shoulder€treatment€and€also€against€its€finding€of€constructive€discharge,Ïwe€affirm€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgment€reversing€the€trial€court€on€theÏseparate€grounds€stated.ÌÌà@ àòòò òB€A€C€K€G€R€O€U€N€Dó óóóà àÌà àThe€plaintiff,€Brenda€Campbell,€was€hired€by€defendant,€Florida€Steel,€onÏSeptember€19,€1988,€as€a€yard€helper.€€In€this€entry€level€position,€Campbell€didÏnot€work€in€any€particular€area€of€the€plant,€but€received€daily€work€assignmentsÏfrom€her€supervisor,€Stephen€Nash.€€Approximately€five€weeks€after€being€hired,ÏCampbell€fell€while€on€the€job€and€broke€her€arm.€€As€a€result€of€the€accident,Ïshe€was€assigned€to€light€duty€work€in€the€"mechanic€shop."€€Ernesto€Bosch€wasÏthe€temporary€supervisor€in€the€mechanic€shop,€substituting€for€Nash,€at€theÏtime€Campbell€was€assigned€to€that€area.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€undisputed€that€prior€to€her€assignment€to€the€mechanic's€shop,€ÏCampbell€had€not€previously€been€sexually€or€racially€harassed€by€anyone€atÏFlorida€Steel.€€It€is€also€undisputed€that€she€was€subjected€to€both€sexual€andÏracial€harassment€by€three€co„workers€from€the€time€she€was€temporarilyÏassigned€to€the€mechanic€shop€on€December€15,€1988,€until€December€31,Ï1988.€€At€that€time,€another€co„worker€informed€Bosch€that€Campbell€was€upsetÏby€sexual€and€racial€comments€being€directed€towards€her€by€other€employeesÏin€the€mechanic€shop.€€Later€that€day,€Bosch€questioned€Campbell€about€theÏsituation€and,€for€the€first€time,€was€informed€about€the€specific€sexual€and€racialÏremarks€directed€toward€Campbell€by€three€of€her€co„workers.€€That€evening,€atÏa€New€Year's€Eve€party,€Bosch€discussed€the€situation€with€Bill€Kipp,€theÏEmployee€Relations€Manager€for€Florida€Steel.€€ÌÌà àJanuary€4,€1989,€was€Campbell's€first€day€back€to€work€after€the€NewÏYear's€Eve€holiday,€and€coincidentally,€Nash€resumed€his€supervision€of€theÏmechanic€shop€that€same€day.€€Shortly€after€the€workday€began,€Campbell€andÏNash€were€called€to€meet€with€Kipp€and€Kurt€Zetzsche,€the€Knoxville€plantÏmanager,€regarding€the€incidents€of€harassment€Campbell€had€discussed€withÏBosch€on€December€31,€1988.€€During€that€meeting,€at€the€urging€of€Nash,€KippÍand€Zetzsche,€Campbell,€for€the€first€time,€identified€the€three€harassing€co„workers.ÌÌà àImmediately€following€the€meeting€with€Campbell€on€January€4,€1989,ÏNash,€Kipp,€and€Zetzsche€met€individually€with€each€of€the€three€co„workersÏCampbell€had€identified.€€Each€man€was€reprimanded€and€warned€that€if€theÏbehavior€persisted,€it€would€result€in€further€disciplinary€action,€up€to€andÏincluding€termination.€Written€documentation€of€the€reprimands€were€placed€inÏthe€employees'€personnel€files.ÌÌà àFollowing€the€January€4,€1989,€meeting,€Campbell€was€purposefullyÏreassigned€to€other€areas€of€the€plant€so€that€she€could€avoid€contact€with€theÏharassing€co„workers.€€From€that€time,€Campbell's€contact€with€those€three€co„workers€was€minimal,€and€it€is€undisputed€that€no€additional€racial€or€sexualÏcomments€were€directed€toward€Campbell€after€the€January€4th€meeting.ÌÌà àThereafter,€however,€Campbell€expressed€concern€to€her€supervisor€thatÏsome€of€her€co„workers€were€giving€her€the€"cold„shoulder€treatment."€ÏAccording€to€Campbell,€her€fellow€employees€would€ignore€her€completely,Ïshun€her,€and€prevent€her€from€sitting€down€in€the€lunch€and€break€areas,Íthough€previously,€they€had€made€room€for€her€to€join€them.€€At€times,€her€co„workers€would€leave€the€room€when€she€entered.ÌÌà àNash€testified€that€after€the€January€4th€meeting,€he€spoke€to€CampbellÏon€a€daily€basis,€and€that€she€discussed€with€him,€in€general€terms,€the€cold„shoulder€treatment,€but€she€did€not€identify€the€specific€individuals€involved,Ïdespite€his€repeated€attempts€to€elicit€names.€€At€trial,€Campbell€still€did€notÏidentify€specific€individuals€involved€in€the€cold„shoulder€treatment.ÌÌà àIn€response€to€her€complaints,€Nash€assured€Campbell€that€theÏatmosphere€would€improve€with€time,€and€he€said€that€Campbell€acknowledgedÏthat€the€cold„shoulder€treatment€was€improving.€€Nash€admitted€that€he€neverÏspecifically€advised€Campbell's€co„workers€to€talk€to€her,€but€said€that€he€did€tryÏto€involve€Campbell€in€conversations€with€her€co„workers€at€every€opportunity.ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€the€"cold„shoulder€treatment,"€Campbell€testified€that€onÏmore€than€one€occasion€after€the€January€4th€meeting,€one€of€the€originalÏharassers€privately€made€threatening€comments€to€her,€such€as,€"shh,€hereÏcomes€the€snitch,"€and€on€one€such€occasion€said,€€"you€know€what€we€do€to€aÏsnitch,"€while€hitting€the€palm€of€his€hand€with€an€object.€€Campbell€concededÍthat€she€never€related€any€of€these€comments€to€Florida€Steel€managementÏpersonnel,€and€the€trial€court€specifically€found€that€Florida€Steel€had€no€actualÏor€constructive€knowledge€of€any€of€these€incidents.ÌÌà àOn€January€14,€1989,€two€weeks€after€Florida€Steel€took€corrective€actionÏto€eliminate€the€harassment,€Campbell€resigned.€€Several€Florida€SteelÏrepresentatives,€including€Nash,€tried€to€convince€Campbell€to€reconsider€herÏdecision.€€Nash€offered€Campbell€a€temporary€transfer€to€the€warehouse,€whichÏshe€refused.€€Following€her€resignation,€Campbell€filed€this€employeeÏdiscrimination€action,€alleging€that€she€had€been€subjected€to€sexual€and€racialÏharassment€which€created€a€hostile€work€€environment€that€resulted€in€herÏconstructive€discharge.ÌÌà àThe€case€was€tried€without€a€jury€in€Chancery€Court€over€a€period€of€fourÏdays.€€The€Chancellor€concluded€that€Campbell€had€been€subjected€to€racialÏand€sexual€harassment€by€three€of€her€co„workers,€but€that€Florida€Steel€hadÏpromptly€and€properly€acted€to€eliminate€the€harassment€after€receiving€noticeÏof€its€existence.€€The€Chancellor€also€determined€that€Florida€Steel€had€noticeÏof€€the€cold„shoulder€treatment,€but€chose€to€take€a€"wait€and€see"€approach,Ïand,€as€a€result,€failed€to€eliminate€it.€€Accordingly,€the€Chancellor€found€thatÍCampbell€was€constructively€discharged€and€awarded€$15,416€in€back€pay,Ï$10,000€for€mental€distress,€$5,898.40€for€fringe€benefits€lost,€$25,416€inÏattorney's€fees,€and€$2,248€for€costs€and€expenses€of€litigation.€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€court's€finding€that€Campbell€hadÏbeen€subjected€to€a€hostile€work€environment,€and€held€that€Florida€Steel€hadÏpromptly€and€properly€dealt€with€the€sexual€and€racial€harassment€afterÏreceiving€notice€of€its€existence.€€The€Court€of€Appeals,€however,€reversed€theÏtrial€court's€finding€of€constructive€discharge€and€dismissed€the€action,Ïconcluding€that€neither€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€nor€the€Federal€CivilÏRights€Act€require€employers€"to€ensure€a€pleasant€social€environment."€€SinceÏ"[t]he€cold„shoulder€treatment€was€not€itself€of€a€racial€or€sexual€nature,"€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€explained,€Florida€Steel€had€no€legal€duty€to€eliminate€it€and€isÏnot€subject€to€liability€for€its€continuation.€ÌÌà àWe€granted€Campbell's€application€for€permission€to€appeal€to€considerÏthis€important€question.€€ÌÌÌà@ àò òòòHOSTILE€€WORK€€ENVIRONMENT€€HARASSMENTóóó óÌà àThe€disputed€issues€in€this€appeal€are€whether€the€Court€of€AppealsÏerred€in€concluding€that€Florida€Steel€had€no€duty,€under€either€Title€VII€of€theÏFederal€Civil€Rights€Act€or€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€to€eliminate€theÏcold„shoulder€treatment€which€was€not€racially€derogatory€or€sexually€explicit€inÏnature,€and€whether€the€Court€of€Appeals€erred€in€concluding€that€CampbellÏwas€not€constructively€discharged.€€ÌÌà àResolution€of€these€issues€requires€an€examination€of€the€law€relating€toÏhostile€work€environment€harassment€and€constructive€discharge.€€This€CourtÏhas€not€addressed€the€issues€raised€in€this€appeal€previously,€and€indeed,ÏTennessee€authority€on€the€subject€is€sparse.ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€with€Title€VII€of€€the€Civil€Rights€Act€of€1964,€whichÏmakes€it€unlawful€for€an€employer€to€"discriminate€against€any€individual€withÏrespect€to€.€.€.€compensation,€terms,€conditions€or€privileges€of€employmentÏbecause€of€such€individual's€race,€color,€religion,€sex,€or€national€origin."€€42ÏU.S.C.€ðð2000e„2(a)(1).ÌÌà àLikewise,€under€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€it€is€unlawful€for€anÏemployer€"to€discriminate€against€an€individual€with€respect€to€compensation,Íterms,€conditions,€or€privileges€of€employment€because€of€such€individual'sÏrace,€creed,€color,€religion,€sex,€age,€or€national€origin."€€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„401(a)(1)€(1991€Repl.).ÌÌà àThe€stated€purpose€and€intent€of€the€Tennessee€Act€is€to€provide€forÏexecution€within€Tennessee€of€the€policies€embodied€in€the€federal€civil€rightsÏlaws.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„101(a)(1)€(1991€Repl.);€òòBennett€v.€Steiner„Liff€&ÏIron€&€Metal€Co.óó,€826€S.W.2d€119,€121€(Tenn.€1992).€€€Accordingly,€our€analysisÏof€the€issues€in€this€€appeal€is€the€same€under€both€the€Tennessee€HumanÏRights€Act€and€Title€VII€of€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€Act.ÌÌà àIt€is€beyond€dispute€that€both€the€Federal€and€State€Acts€apply€to€claimsÏof€discrimination€based€on€the€existence€of€a€hostile€work€environment.€€TheÏFifth€Circuit€was€apparently€the€first€court€to€interpret€Title€VII€to€cover€suchÏclaims.€€In€òòRogers€v.€E.E.O.C.óó,€454€F.2d€234€(5th€Cir.€1971),€that€courtÏrecognized€that€"today€employment€discrimination€is€a€far€more€complex€andÏpervasive€phenomenon,"€and€held€that€Title€VII€"sweeps€within€its€protectiveÏambit€the€practice€of€creating€a€working€environment€heavily€charged€withÏethnic€or€racial€discrimination."€€òòIdóó.€at€238.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€first€explicitly€recognized€that€hostileÏenvironment€harassment€claims€are€cognizable€under€Title€VII€in€òòMeritor€v.€Sav.ÏBank,€FSB€v.€Vinsonóó,€477€U.S.€57,€106€S.Ct.€2399,€91€L.Ed.2d€49€(1986),€aÏsexual€harassment€case.€€The€Supreme€Court€approvingly€cited€òòRogersóó€for€theÏproposition€that€"Title€VII€affords€employees€the€right€to€work€in€an€environmentÏfree€from€discriminatory€intimidation,€ridicule,€and€insult."€€òòIdóó.,€477€U.S.€at€65,Ï106€S.Ct.€at€2405.€€Observing€that€courts€previously€had€applied€that€principle€toÏharassment€based€on€race,€religion,€and€national€origin,€òòid.óó,€the€òòMeritoróó€courtÏconcluded€that€"a€hostile€environment€based€on€discriminatory€òòsexualóóÏharassment"€should€likewise€be€prohibited€under€Title€VII.€€òòId.óó,€477€U.S.€at€66,Ï106€S.Ct.€at€2405€(emphasis€in€original).€€More€recently,€in€òòPatterson€v.€McLeanÏCredit€Unionóó,€491€U.S.€164,€109€S.Ct.€2363,€105€L.Ed.2d€132€(1989),€theÏSupreme€Court€explicitly€affirmed€the€proposition€that€racial€harassment€inÏemployment€is€actionable€under€Title€VII.€€òòId.óó,€491€U.S.€at€180,€109€S.Ct.€atÏ2374.€€ÌÌà àHostile€work€environment€harassment€occurs€"where€conduct€has€theÏpurpose€or€effect€of€unreasonably€interfering€with€an€individual's€workÏperformance€or€creating€an€intimidating,€hostile,€or€offensive€workingÏenvironment."€€òòMeritoróó,€477€U.S.€at€65,€106€S.Ct.€at€2404.€€ÌÌà àTo€prevail€on€a€hostile€work€environment€claim€in€a€sexual€harassmentÏcase,€an€employee€must€assert€and€prove€that€(1)€the€employee€is€a€member€ofÏa€protected€class;€(2)€the€employee€was€subjected€to€unwelcomed€sexualÏharassment;€(3)€the€harassment€occurred€because€of€the€employee's€gender;Ï(4)€the€harassment€affected€a€"term,€condition,€or€privilege"€of€employment;€andÏ(5)€the€employer€knew,€or€should€have€known€of€the€harassment€and€failed€toÏrespond€with€prompt€and€appropriate€corrective€action.€€òòRabidue€v.€Osceola€Ref.ÏCo.óó,€805€F.2d€611,€620€(6th€Cir.€1986);× ƒ/ ××  ×€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCortes€v.€Maxus€ExplorationÏCo.óó,€977€F.2d€195,€199€(5th€Cir.€1992);€òòAndrews€v.€City€of€Philadelphiaóó,€895ÏF.2d€1469,€1482€(3rd€Cir.€1990);€òòHirschfeld€v.€New€Mexico€Corrections€Dept.óó,Ï916€F.2d€57,€575€(10th€Cir.€1990);€òòParoline€v.€Unisys€Corpóó.,€879€F.2d€100,€105Ï(4th€Cir.€1989)(revs'd€in€part€on€other€grounds,€900€F.2d€27€(4th€Cir.€1990)€(enÏbanc));€òòHall€v.€Gus€Constr.€Co.,€Inc.óó,€842€F.2d€1010,€1013€(8th€Cir.€1988);€ÏòòHuddleston€v.€Roger€Dean€Chevrolet,€Inc.óó,€845€F.2d€900,€904€(11th€Cir.€1988).ÌÌà àSimilarly,€in€order€to€prevail€on€a€hostile€work€environment€racialÏharassment€claim,€a€plaintiff€must€prove€(1)€membership€in€a€protected€class;€(2)Íracially€motivated€conduct€that€constituted€an€unreasonably€abusive€orÏoffensive€work„related€environment€or€adversely€affected€the€reasonableÏemployee's€ability€to€do€his€or€her€job;€and€(3)€the€employer€knew€or€shouldÏhave€known€of€the€harassment€and€failed€to€respond€with€prompt€andÏappropriate€corrective€action.€€òòDavis€v.€Monsanto€Chemical€Co.óó,€858€F.2d€345Ï(6th€Cir.€1988);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDaniels€v.€Essex€Group,€Inc.óó,€937€F.2d€1264,€1270€(7thÏCir.€1991).ÌÌà àIn€either€context,€"[c]onduct€that€is€not€severe€or€pervasive€enough€toÏcreate€an€objectively€hostile€or€abusive€work€environment„„an€environment€thatÏa€reasonable€person€would€find€hostile€or€abusive„„is€beyond€Title€VII'sÏpurview.€€Likewise,€if€the€victim€does€not€subjectively€perceive€the€environmentÏto€be€abusive,€the€conduct€has€not€actually€altered€the€conditions€of€the€victim'sÏemployment€and€there€is€no€Title€VII€violation."€€€òòHarrisóó,€____€U.S.€at€___,€114ÏS.Ct.€at€370.ÌÌà àIn€determining€whether€an€environment€is€hostile€or€abusive,€a€court€mustÏconsider€the€totality€of€the€circumstances.€€òòIdóó.€€While€no€single€factor€is€requiredÏor€conclusive,€considerations€relevant€to€the€determination€include,€but€are€notÏlimited€to,€the€frequency€of€the€discriminatory€conduct;€its€severity;€whether€it€isÍphysically€threatening€or€humiliating,€or€a€mere€offensive€utterance;€whether€itÏunreasonably€interferes€with€an€employee's€work€performance;€and€theÏemployee's€psychological€well„being.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€conduct€underlying€a€hostile€environment€claim€need€notÏbe€clearly€sexual€in€nature.€€Before€1985,€there€were€court€decisions€indicatingÏthat€the€predicate€acts€underlying€a€sexual€harassment€claim€had€to€be€clearlyÏsexual€in€nature.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòDownes€v.€F.A.A.óó,€775€F.2d€288,€290€(Fed.€Cir.Ï1985).€€However,€in€òòMcKinney€v.€Doleóó,€765€F.2d€1129€(D.C.€Cir.€1985),€theÏDistrict€of€Columbia€Court€of€Appeals€rejected€that€narrow€definition€and€heldÏ"that€any€harassment€or€other€unequal€treatment€of€an€employee€or€group€ofÏemployees€that€would€not€occur€but€for€the€sex€of€the€employee€or€employeesÏmay,€if€sufficiently€patterned€or€pervasive,€comprise€an€illegal€condition€ofÏemployment€under€Title€VII."€€òòIdóó.,€765€F.2d€at€1138„39.ÌÌà àOther€courts€considering€the€issue€since€have€agreed€with€the€òòMcKinneyóóÏrationale€and€have€concluded€that€"intimidation€and€hostility€toward€womenÏbecause€they€are€women€can€obviously€result€from€conduct€other€than€explicitÏsexual€advances."€€òòHallóó,€842€F.2d€at€1014;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòHarrisóó,€___€U.S.€at€___,€114ÏS.Ct.€at€372€(Ginsburg,€J.,€concurring)(The€key€issue€"is€whether€members€ofÍone€sex€are€exposed€to€disadvantageous€terms€or€conditions€of€employment€toÏwhich€members€of€the€other€sex€are€not€exposed");€òòKing€v.€Hillenóó,€21€F.3d€1572,Ï1583€(Fed.€Cir.€1994);€òòKopp€v.€Samaritan€Health€Sys.,€Inc.óó,€13€F.3d€264,€269Ï(8th€Cir.€1993);€òòAndrewsóó,€895€F.2d€at€1485;€òòHicks€v.€Gates€Rubber€Coóó,€833€F.2dÏ1406,€1415€(10th€Cir.€1987).ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€same€reasoning€applies€to€racial€harassment€hostileÏenvironment€claims.€€Racial€harassment€can€exist,€though€the€conduct€at€issueÏis€not€racially€derogatory€in€nature.€€The€key€inquiry€is€whether€an€employee,€orÏa€group€of€employees,€of€one€race€has€been€subjected€to€disadvantageousÏterms€or€conditions€of€employment€to€which€members€of€another€race€are€notÏexposed.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòFirefighters€Inst.€for€Racial€Equality€v.€City€of€St.€Louisóó,€549ÏF.2d€506€(8th€Cir.€1977)(Holding€that€the€city's€duty€to€provide€aÏnondiscriminatory€working€environment€required€it€to€provide€by€regulation€thatÏon„duty€firefighters€would€not€be€permitted€to€use€city€kitchen€facilities€if€theÏfirefighters'€supper€clubs€excluded€black€firefighters€from€membership).€€ÏIndeed,€as€the€òòHarrisóó€court€recognized,€a€plaintiff€need€only€prove€that€Ï"discriminatory"€conduct€resulted€in€a€hostile€work€environment.€€òòHarrisóó,€___ÏU.S.€at€___,€114€S.Ct.€at€370.ÌÌà àFinally,€Title€VII€does€not€impose€strict€liability€for€hostile€environmentÏclaims.€€Even€if€an€employee€establishes€the€existence€of€a€hostile€workÏenvironment,€the€plaintiff€will€not€recover€under€Title€VII€unless€the€proofÏdemonstrates€that€the€employer€either€knew€or€should€have€known€of€theÏharassment,€òòandóó€failed€to€take€prompt€and€appropriate€remedial€action.€€òòNash€v.ÏElectrospace€System,€Inc.óó,€9€F.3d€401,€403€(5th€Cir.€1993);€òòSteele€v.€OffshoreÏShipbuilding,€Incóó,€867€F.2d€1311,€1316€(11th€Cir.€1989);€òòBarrett€v.€Omaha€Nat.ÏBankóó,€726€F.2d€424,€427€(8th€Cir.€1984).ÌÌà àTitle€VII€does€not€precisely€define€"prompt€and€appropriate€remedialÏaction;"€however,€in€general,€employers€are€required€to€take€steps€"reasonablyÏcalculated"€to€terminate€the€harassment.€€òòSaxton€v.€American€Tel.€&€Tel.€Co.óó,€10ÏF.3d€526,€536€(7th€Cir.€1993)(citing€cases).€€Of€course,€what€remedial€action€isÏreasonable€and€appropriate€will€vary€depending€on€the€circumstances€of€eachÏcase.€€òòDavisóó,€858€F.2d€at€349.ÌÌà àApplying€the€foregoing€principles€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€it€is€clear€thatÏthe€trial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€correctly€concluded€that€Campbell€wasÏsubjected€to€hostile€work€environment€sexual€and€racial€harassment,€and€thatÏupon€receiving€notice,€Florida€Steel€promptly€and€effectively€eliminated€theÍharassment€that€was€explicitly€sexual€and€racial€in€nature.€€We€cannot,€however,Ïagree€with€the€Court€of€Appeals'€€broad€statement€that€Title€VII€does€not,€underÏany€circumstances,€require€an€employer€to€eliminate€conduct€which€is€notÏracially€derogatory€or€sexually€explicit€in€nature.€€We€conclude€that€if€anÏemployee€is€subjected€to€discriminatory€conduct€on€the€basis€of€race€or€gender,Ïand€the€discriminatory€treatment€creates€a€hostile€work€environment€and€theÏemployer€has€notice,€a€duty€exists€on€the€part€of€the€employer€to€take€promptÏand€appropriate€remedial€action,€reasonably€calculated€to€terminate€theÏharassment.ÌÌà àApplying€that€standard€to€the€specific€facts€in€this€case,€we€observe€thatÏNash,€Campbell's€immediate€supervisor,€testified€that€he€spoke€with€CampbellÏon€a€daily€basis€after€the€January€4th€meeting€at€which€action€had€been€taken€toÏeliminate€sexual€and€racial€harassment.€€When€she€complained€of€the€cold„shoulder€treatment,€he€repeatedly€requested€that€she€provide€the€names€ofÏthose€individuals€involved.€€Campbell€never€identified€any€of€the€individualsÏinvolved,€even€when€Nash€suggested€specific€names€to€her.€€From€herÏviewpoint,€€Campbell€was€no€doubt€faced€with€a€Hobsonððs€choice€„€identify€theÏoffenders,€be€labeled€a€snitch€and€suffer€the€consequences,€or€refuse€to€identifyÏthem,€making€it€impossible€for€the€company€to€alleviate€the€problem,€andÍcontinue€to€suffer.€€The€threats€from€one€of€the€original€harassers€may€have€hadÏsome€influence€as€well.€€In€any€event,€she€chose€to€keep€silent.ÌÌà àKipp,€Florida€Steel's€personnel€manager,€testified€that€had€the€plaintiffÏidentified€the€individuals€engaging€in€the€cold„shoulder€treatment,€companyÏofficials€would€have€taken€action.€€In€addition,€Nash€testified€that€at€everyÏopportunity€he€involved€Campbell€in€conversations€with€other€employees€in€theÏplant,€and€that,€at€one€point,€Campbell€told€him€that€the€situation€was€improving.€€ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€evidence€establishes€that€Florida€Steel€attemptedÏto€address€the€problem,€but€was€limited€by€Campbell's€reluctance€to€ð ðsnitchðð€onÏher€fellow€employees.€€Accordingly,€even€if€we€assume€that€Campbell€wasÏsubjected€to€the€cold„shoulder€treatment€because€of€her€race€or€gender,€andÏfurther€assume€that€such€discriminatory€conduct€resulted€in€a€hostile€workÏenvironment,€we€still€agree€with€the€Court€of€Appeals'€conclusion€that€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€court's€finding€that€Florida€Steel€failedÏto€take€prompt€and€appropriate€remedial€action€to€eliminate€the€cold„shoulderÏtreatment.€€Instead,€we€conclude€that€Florida€Steel€responded€appropriatelyÏbased€on€the€available€information,€and€is€not€liable€under€either€Title€VII€or€theÏTennessee€Human€Rights€Act€for€hostile€work€environment€harassment.ÌÌà àWe€next€consider€the€Court€of€Appeals€conclusion€that€Campbell€failed€toÏestablish€that€she€was€constructively€discharged.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òCONSTRUCTIVE€DISCHARGEóóó óÌà àThe€doctrine€of€constructive€discharge€first€developed€under€the€NationalÏLabor€Relations€Act€and€is,€in€that€branch€of€law,€well„established.€€òòSeeóó€òòGoss€v.ÏExxon€Office€Sys.,€Co.óó,€747€F.2d€885,€887€(3rd€Cir.€1984)(citing€cases).ÌÌà àIn€òòYoung€v.€Southwestern€Sav.€&€Loan€Ass'nóó,€509€F.2d€140,€144€(5th€Cir.Ï1975),€the€former€Fifth€Circuit€determined€that€when€"an€employee€involuntarilyÏresigns€in€order€to€escape€intolerable€and€illegal€employment€requirements"€toÏwhich€the€employee€is€subjected€because€of€race,€color,€religion,€sex,€orÏnational€origin,€the€employer€has€committed€a€constructive€discharge€inÏviolation€of€Title€VII€of€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€Act.ÌÌà àWhile€application€of€the€constructive€discharge€doctrine€now€hasÏreceived€apparently€universal€recognition€among€the€federal€circuit€courts€ofÏappeal,€òòGossóó,€747€F.2d€at€887,€there€is€a€divergence€of€opinion€among€theÍfederal€circuits€as€to€the€factors€necessary€to€support€a€finding€of€constructiveÏdischarge,€and€as€to€the€standard€of€appellate€review€applicable€to€a€finding€ofÏconstructive€discharge.€€ÌÌà àMost€courts€begin€with€the€proposition€that€a€constructive€dischargeÏexists€"if€working€conditions€would€have€been€so€difficult€or€unpleasant€that€aÏreasonable€person€in€the€employee's€shoes€would€have€felt€compelled€toÏresign."€€òòBruhwiler€v.€University€of€Tennesseeóó,€859€F.2d€419,€421€(6th€Cir.Ï1988);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòSaxtonóó,€10€F.3d€at€537;€òòCortesóó,€977€F.2d€at€200;€òòHirschfeldóó,€916ÏF.2d€at€580;€òòParolineóó,€879€F.2d€at€109;€òòManey€v.€Brinkley€Mun.€Waterworks€andÏSewer€Dept.óó,€802€F.2d€1073,€1075€(8th€Cir.€1986);€òòWardwell€v.€School€Board€ofÏPalm€Beach€County,€Flaóó.,€786€F.2d€1554,€1557€(11th€Cir.€1986).ÌÌà àHowever,€courts€disagree€as€to€whether€a€plaintiff€must€show€that€theÏdiscrimination€complained€of€amounted€to€an€intentional€course€of€conduct€onÏthe€part€of€the€employer€calculated€to€force€the€employee's€resignation.€€TheÏminority€view€is€that€an€employee€must€prove€that€the€actions€complained€ofÏwere€intended€by€the€employer€as€an€effort€to€force€the€employee€to€quit.€€òòMartinÏv.€Cavalier€Hotel€Corp.óó,€48€F.3d€1343,€1354€(4th€Cir.€1995);€òòManeyóó,€802€F.2d€atÏ1075.€€However,€a€majority€of€courts€considering€the€issue€require€only€aÍshowing€that€the€employer€knowingly× ƒ0 ××  ×€permitted€conditions€of€discrimination€inÏemployment€so€intolerable€that€a€reasonable€person€subject€to€them€wouldÏresign.€€In€other€words,€a€showing€that€a€reasonable€employer€would€haveÏforeseen€the€employee's€resignation,€given€the€intolerable€conditions€ofÏemployment.€€òòWheeler€v.€Southland€Corp.óó,€875€F.2d€1246,€1249€(6th€Cir.€1989);Ïòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòStetson€v.€NYNEX€Service€Co.óó,€995€F.2d€355,€360„61€(2d€Cir.Ï1993)(ADEA€claim);€òòJurgens€v.€E.E.O.C.óó,€903€F.2d€386,€390€(5th€Cir.€1990);ÏòòWatson€v.€Nationwide€Ins.€Co.óó,€823€F.2d€360,€361€(9th€Cir.€1987)(Title€VII€racialÏdiscrimination€claim);€òòGarner€v.€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.óó,€807€F.2d€1536,€1539Ï(11th€Cir.€1987);€òòCalhoun€v.€Acme€Cleveland€Corp.óó,€798€F.2d€559,€561€(1st€Cir.Ï1987)(ADEA€claim);€òòDerr€v.€Gulf€Oil€Corp.óó,€796€F.2d€340,€344€(10th€Cir.€1986);ÏòòGossóó,€747€F.2d€at€888.€€ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€majority€rule€that€requires€only€a€showing€that€aÏreasonable€employer€would€have€foreseen€the€employee's€resignation,€givenÏthe€intolerable€conditions€of€employment,€and€hold€that€to€establish€aÏconstructive€discharge,€an€employee€need€only€show€that€the€employerÏknowingly€permitted€conditions€of€discrimination€in€employment€so€intolerableÏthat€a€reasonable€person€subject€to€them€would€resign.€€This€standard€isÍparticularly€appropriate€in€the€context€of€hostile€work€environment€harassment,Ïwhere€it€would€be€very€difficult,€if€not€impossible,€for€a€plaintiff€to€prove€that€anÏemployer€imposed€the€intolerable€working€conditions€with€the€specific€intent€toÏforce€the€employee€to€resign.€€ÌÌà àWe€emphasize,€however,€that€in€the€context€of€a€hostile€workÏenvironment€claim,€that€standard€requires€a€plaintiff€claiming€constructiveÏdischarge€to€demonstrate€that€the€harassment€is€so€severe€or€pervasive€thatÏwork€conditions€were€intolerable,€a€showing€greater€than€the€minimum€requiredÏto€prove€a€hostile€work€environment.€€òòLandgraf€v.€USI€Film€Productsóó,€968€F.2dÏ427,€430€(5th€Cir.€1992);€€òòHenry€v.€Lennox€Indus.,€Inc.óó,€768€F.2d€746,€752€(6thÏCir.€1985).€€The€policy€and€purpose€of€Title€VII€of€the€Federal€Civil€Rights€ActÏand€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€is€to€end€discrimination€in€employment.€ÏIn€our€view,€that€policy€will€be€best€served€if,€"wherever€possible,€unlawfulÏdiscrimination€is€attacked€within€the€context€of€existing€employmentÏrelationships."€€òòJurgensóó,€903€F.2d€at€390.€€That€policy€is€furthered€by€requiringÏplaintiffs€who€claim€constructive€discharge€to€demonstrate€that€the€workÏenvironment€is€not€only€hostile€and€abusive,€under€the€Title€VII€standardsÏdiscussed€above,€but€is€so€intolerable€that€a€reasonable€person€subjected€to€itÏwould€resign.Ìà àÌà àFinally,€we€address€the€appropriate€standard€of€appellate€reviewÏapplicable€to€a€finding€of€constructive€discharge.€€The€overwhelming€majority€ofÏother€courts€€considering€the€issue€have€concluded€that€constructive€dischargeÏis€a€question€of€fact€and,€therefore,€have€accorded€deference€to€a€trial€court'sÏdetermination€of€the€issue.€€òòCortesóó,€977€F.2d€at€200;€òòHirschfeldóó,€916€F.2d€at€575;ÏòòSteeleóó,€867€F.2d€at€1317;€òòHuddlestonóó,€845€F.2d€at€905;€òòGossóó,€747€F.2d€at€888„89.€€Only€the€Sixth€Circuit€has€expressed€apparent€disagreement,€statingÏinstead€that€"constructive€discharge€is,€at€least€partially,€a€question€of€law€andÏmust€therefore€be€reviewed€by€this€Court€òòde€novoóó."€€òòYates€v.€Avco€Corp.óó,€819ÏF.2d€630,€636€(6th€Cir.€1987).€€Despite€its€statement€in€òòYatesóó,€the€Sixth€CircuitÏactually€has€applied€the€clearly€erroneous€fact€question€standard€whenÏreviewing€the€question€of€constructive€discharge€in€subsequent€cases.€ÏòòBruhwileróó,€859€F.2d€at€421(applying€the€clearly€erroneous€standard€of€review);Ïòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòWheeleróó,€875€F.2d€at€1249(quoting€òòYatesóó,€but€applying€a€clearlyÏerroneous€standard);€òòHenryóó,€768€F.2d€at€751„52€(stating€that€the€issue€ofÏconstructive€discharge€depends€upon€the€facts€of€each€case€and€applying€theÏclearly€erroneous€standard€of€review).ÌÌà àOur€reading€of€the€òòYatesóó€decision€convinces€us€that€the€Sixth€Circuit€didÏnot€reject€the€proposition€that€constructive€discharge€is€a€question€of€fact,€butÏwas€merely€pointing€out,€in€that€case,€the€principle€that€a€determination€of€theÏissue€of€constructive€discharge€involves€an€application€of€law€to€facts.€€If€the€trialÏcourt€correctly€states€the€legal€standard,€then€findings€as€to€whether€the€factsÏmeet€the€legal€standard€are€accorded€full€deference,€and€in€the€federal€system,Ïwill€be€disturbed€only€if€clearly€erroneous.€€If€the€trial€court€misstates€theÏgoverning€law,€however,€an€appellate€court€need€not€afford€full€deference€toÏthose€factual€determinations€that€depend€upon,€or€incorporate,€the€erroneousÏrule€of€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòDanielsóó,€937€F.2d€at€1269€(discussing€the€principle€in€theÏcontext€of€a€hostile€work€environment€claim).€€ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€standard€of€appellate€review€applicable€to€findings€of€factÏby€a€trial€court€sitting€without€a€jury€is€actually€a€general€statement€which€readilyÏaccommodates€determinations€which€require€an€application€of€law€to€fact.× ƒ1 ××  ×€ÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)€provides€that€"[u]nless€otherwise€required€by€statute,Íreview€of€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court€in€civil€actions€shall€be€òòde€novoóó€uponÏthe€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€ofÏthe€findings,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise."€€ÏTennessee€law€is€clear€that€the€presumption€of€correctness€of€Rule€13(d)Ïapplies€only€to€findings€of€fact€and€not€to€conclusions€of€law.€€òòHillsboro€PlazaÏEnter.€v.€Moonóó,€860€S.W.2d€45,€47€(Tenn.€€App.€1993).€€It€therefore€follows€that€aÏtrial€court's€conclusions€of€law€are€subject€to€òòde€novoóó€review,€while€a€trial€court'sÏfindings€of€fact€must€be€afforded€a€presumption€of€correctness€and€not€€beÏdisturbed€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€agree€with€the€Sixth€Circuit's€conclusion€that€theÏdetermination€of€whether€or€not€a€constructive€discharge€exists€requires€anÏapplication€of€law€to€facts€and€hold€that€Tennessee€appellate€courts€reviewing€aÏnon„jury€determination€of€the€issue€should€apply€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€€ÌÌà àAlthough€the€record€reflects€that€the€trial€court€applied€the€correct€legalÏstandard€when€determining€constructive€discharge€in€this€case,€we€agree€withÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€court'sÏfinding€of€constructive€discharge.€€The€evidence€does€not€establish€that€FloridaÏSteel€knowingly€permitted€conditions€of€discrimination€in€employment€soÍintolerable€that€a€reasonable€person€in€Campbell's€shoes€would€have€feltÏcompelled€to€resign.€€Indeed,€as€we€previously€concluded,€Florida€Steel,€onceÏnotified€of€the€cold„shoulder€treatment,€promptly€made€a€reasonable€effort€toÏremedy€the€situation,€based€on€the€information€available.€€One€of€the€factorsÏwhich€the€trial€court€characterized€as€"a€very€substantial€and€significant€reason"Ïfor€Campbell's€resignation€was€the€threats€made€by€her€co„worker.€€Yet,€the€trialÏcourt€specifically€found€that€Florida€Steel€did€not€know,€and€had€no€reason€toÏknow,€that€the€co„worker€previously€reprimanded€for€harassing€Campbell€hadÏprivately€threatened€her€after€the€reprimand.€€Had€Campbell€informed€FloridaÏSteel€of€those€threats,€the€trial€court€also€specifically€found€that€Florida€SteelÏwould€have€immediately€discharged€the€harassing€employee.€€In€addition,ÏCampbell€worked€only€two€weeks€after€the€sexually€and€racially€explicitÏharassment€ceased€and€informed€Florida€Steel€during€that€period€that€theÏsituation€was€improving.€€Moreover,€Florida€Steel€management€personnel€triedÏto€dissuade€her€from€her€resignation€decision€through€her€final€day€ofÏemployment.€€ÌÌà àBecause€Florida€Steel€responded€reasonably€to€the€cold„shoulderÏtreatment,€and€had€no€knowledge€of€the€threats€which€the€trial€courtÏcharacterized€as€a€"substantial€and€significant€reason"€for€Campbell'sÍresignation,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€of€constructive€discharge.€€€Accordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€ofÏthe€Court€of€Appeals.ÌÌà àWe€cannot€end€this€opinion€without€emphasizing€that€we€are€limited€inÏthis€appeal€to€considering€the€liability€of€an€employer€based€on€the€employerððsÏknowledge€of€and€response€to€its€employeesðð€misconduct.€€The€employeesððÏmisconduct€in€this€case,€as€reflected€by€the€record,€was€totally€and€completelyÏreprehensible.€€We€condemn€in€the€strongest€possible€terms€the€appallingÏtreatment€of€this€employee€because€of€her€race€and€gender.€ÌÌà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àHaving€determined€that€Florida€Steel€is€not€liable€to€Campbell€for€hostileÏwork€environment€sexual€and€racial€harassment€under€either€Title€VII€of€theÏFederal€Civil€Rights€Act€or€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€and€that€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€court's€finding€of€constructiveÏdischarge,€we€affirm€the€Court€of€Appeals'€judgment€dismissing€the€case,€uponÏthe€separate€grounds€stated.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€plaintiff,ÏBrenda€Campbell,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àRILEY€ANDERSON,€CHIEF€JUSTICEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDrowota,€Reid,€Birch,€and€White,€JJ.Ì