ÿWPC– 4# èU:ó %- 0 434g{ 0xŠ 0D 0JF 0T 0^ä 0hBª 0@ªw ê 0rô 0Pf 0|¶ 0†2Ƹ 0~ 1u AOƒ 0DÒ U, 0dB U,¦ BÒ U*ï D3 B)L D/u DC¤ Bç AM ¶Q \ˆYäé=&v~EvÓØHP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0†,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Ó»\2 tÔôÔô3|xâ(((3ÝÙ$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÞ2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô((3¾¸$¢¢Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  Ý2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú2Ú  Úó ó< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco d< Œ 9p`(Arial$$$$'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d**'÷ÿ dxd''''7Border 1ddüÿP Pd)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔó óÌò òÔ€%¼ÔJanuary€29,Ï1996ó óÔ€%XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€%ÂÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€%XÔ wÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Sixth€Amendment€provides,€in€pertinent€part,€that:€"In€all€criminalÏà àà àprosecutions,€the€accused€shall€...€have€the€assistance€of€counsel€for€hisÏà àà àdefense."€Ì RÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝArt.€I,€ðð€9€provides,€in€pertinent€part:€"That€in€all€criminal€prosecutions,€theÏà àaccused€hath€the€right€to€be€heard€by€himself€and€his€counsel€..."Ì OÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝArt.€I,€ðð€8€provides,€in€pertinent€part:€"That€no€man€shall€be€taken€or€imprisonedÏà à...€but€by€the€judgment€of€his€peers€or€the€law€of€the€land."Ì ßÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòMirandaóó€protection€is€not€available€when€the€police€request€a€suspect€to€submitÏto€à àa€blood€alcohol€test€because€such€a€test€is€not€deemed€to€be€an€interrogationÏà àwithin€the€meaning€of€òòMirandaóó.€€Rather,€it€constitutes€police€words€or€actionÏà à"normally€attendant€to€arrest€and€custody,"€òòRhode€Island€v.€Innisóó,€446€U.S.€291,Ïà à301,€100€S.Ct.€1682,€1689,€64€L.Ed.2d€297€(1980),€such€as€requests€to€submitÏto€à àfingerprinting€or€photography.€€òòNevilleóó,€459€U.S.€at€464,€103€S.Ct.€at€923,€n.15.€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSee€e.góó.,€òòBiggers€v.€Stateóó,€411€S.W.2d€696€(Tenn.€1967);€òòState€v.€McAlisteróó,Ïà à751€S.W.2d€436€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987);€òòState€v.€Mabonóó,€648€S.W.2d€271Ïà à(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982);€òòState€v.€Hendersonóó,€623€S.W.2d€638€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€à à1981);€òòTrail€v.€Stateóó,€526€S.W.2d€127€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1974).€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€##X„d&ÓÑ#€##Xd#ÑÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ , ÑÑ ` ÑÑ7€—‹XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÙ€ÙßL€+,);+'h|åÜ `€€Lßà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE€ÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àà àòòFORÏPUBLICATIONóóà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àà àà àà àà àà àAppellee,à àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€€€Filed:€€January€29,€1996Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àPUTNAM€CRIMINALÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌBILLY€D.€FRASIER,à àà àà à)à àHon.€John€A.€Turnbull,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€01S01„9503„CC„00036à àÌÌÌòòFor€Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Appellantóó:ÌÌCharles€W.€Bursonà àà àà àà àDonald€G.€DickersonÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àCookeville,€TennesseeÌÌKathy€MoranteÌDeputy€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌWilliam€Edward€Gibson€ÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌThirteenth€Judicial€DistrictÌÌOwen€G.€BurnettÌAssistant€District€AttorneyÌCookeville,€Tennesseeà@ àÔ€%„ÔÌà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÌÌà àà àà àà àO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€%XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALSÌAFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.ÌÌÓÓà àThis€case€presents€the€following€issues€for€our€determination:€(1)€whetherÏa€person€who€has€been€stopped€by€the€police€for€driving€under€the€influenceÏ(DUI)€has€a€right,€under€either€the€state€or€federal€constitutions,€to€consult€with€anÏattorney€prior€to€making€a€decision€as€to€whether€to€submit€to€or€refuse€a€blood€orÏbreath€test;€and€(2)€whether€such€a€person's€state€or€federal€constitutional€rightÏagainst€self„incrimination€prohibits€a€refusal€to€submit€to€such€a€test€from€beingÏadmitted€as€evidence€at€trial,€when€the€person€was€not€informed€that€theÏevidence€could€be€used€against€him€or€her.€€We€answer€both€questions€in€theÏnegative,€and€therefore€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,Íwhich€declined€to€suppress€the€evidence€of€the€refusal.€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÓ  ÓòòÌò òFACTS€AND€PROCEDURAL€HISTORYó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àOn€May€25,€1992,€Officer€Reno€Martin€of€the€Cookeville€Police€DepartmentÏstopped€Billy€D.€Frasier,€the€defendant,€after€he€drove€his€vehicle€through€a€redÏlight.€€Frasier€smelled€of€alcohol;€and€Officer€Martin€arrested€him€for€DUI€afterÏFrasier€failed€a€field€sobriety€test.€€€After€the€arrest€„„€which€was€not€preceded€by€aÏrecitation€of€any€òòMirandaóó€rights€„„€Officer€Martin€requested€that€Frasier€submit€to€aÏbreath€test.€€Frasier€asked€to€speak€to€an€attorney€before€making€this€decision,Ïand€he€also€offered€to€take€a€blood€test€in€lieu€of€the€breath€test.€€Officer€MartinÏdenied€both€these€requests.€€Frasier€ultimately€refused€to€submit€to€the€test;€andÏhe€signed€an€implied€consent€form€which€explained€that€a€refusal€to€submit€to€theÏtest€could€result€in€the€suspension€of€his€driver's€license.€However,€the€impliedÏconsent€form€did€not€reveal€that€his€refusal€to€submit€to€the€test€could€beÏintroduced€as€evidence€against€him€at€trial;€and€Officer€Martin€did€not€orallyÏadvise€him€of€this.ÌÌà àAfter€the€grand€jury€indicted€Frasier,€he€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€ofÏhis€refusal€to€submit€to€the€breath€test.€€Following€an€evidentiary€hearing,€the€trialÏcourt€found€that:€(1)€the€defendant€was€never€"Mirandized";€(2)€the€defendantÏrequested€and€was€not€permitted€to€call€his€attorney€before€he€refused€to€take€theÏbreath€test;€(3)€the€implied€consent€form€did€not€advise€defendant€that€his€refusalÏto€take€the€test€could€be€used€as€evidence€against€him;€and€(4)€defendant€wasÏnot€advised€orally€that€his€refusal€to€take€the€test€could€be€used€against€him.€ÏBased€on€these€findings,€the€trial€court€suppressed€the€evidence€of€Frasier'sÏrefusal€to€take€the€test.€€The€State€then€appealed€from€this€ruling€to€the€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals€pursuant€to€Rule€9,€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€€€€€€à àÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,€while€agreeing€with€the€trial€court'sÏfindings€of€fact,€held€that€the€evidence€of€defendant's€refusal€to€submit€to€the€testÏwas€not€due€to€be€suppressed€under€several€of€the€decisions€of€that€court.€ÏBecause€this€Court€has€not€yet€addressed€these€issues,€we€granted€Frasier'sÏRule€11€application€for€that€purpose.ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òRIGHT€TO€COUNSEL€CLAIMó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€first€issue€that€we€address€is€whether€Frasier€had€a€constitutional€rightÏto€speak€with€an€attorney€prior€to€making€the€decision€as€to€whether€to€submit€toÏor€refuse€the€breath€test.€€First,€we€note€that€Frasier€has€no€such€right€under€theÏSixth€Amendment× ƒ- ××  ×€to€the€federal€constitution€or€its€state€counterpart,€Tenn.€Const.ÏArt.€I,€ðð€9.× ƒ. ××  ×€€In€òòState€v.€Mitchellóó,€593€S.W.2d€280€(Tenn.€1980),€a€case€dealing€withÏa€defendant's€constitutional€right€to€counsel€at€a€post„arrest€lineup,€we€surveyedÏthe€applicable€federal€and€state€precedent€and€concluded€that:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àWe€hold€that€right€to€counsel€attaches€when€adversary€judicialÏproceedings€are€initiated.€€Initiation€is€marked€by€formal€charge,Ïwhich€we€construe€to€be€an€arrest€warrant,€or€at€the€time€of€theÍpreliminary€hearing€in€those€rare€cases€where€a€preliminaryÏhearing€is€not€preceded€by€an€arrest€warrant,€or€by€indictment€orÏpresentment€when€the€charge€is€initiated€by€the€grand€jury.ÌÌòòMitchellóó,€593€S.W.2d€at€286.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€accordance€with€the€United€States€Supreme€Court's€decision€in€òòKirby€v.ÏIllinoisóó,€406€682,€92€S.Ct.€1877,€32€L.Ed.2d€411€(1972),€we€stated€that€an€arrestÏwarrant€signalled€the€initiation€of€formal€proceedings€because€the€warrant€"bringsÏto€an€end€the€investigative€stage€and€inaugurates€the€beginning€and€adversarialÏstage"€of€a€criminal€case.€€òòIdóó.€€It€was€only€then,€we€reasoned,€that€the€State€clearlyÏcommits€itself€to€prosecution€and€"a€defendant€finds€himself€faced€withÏprosecutorial€forces€of€organized€society."€€òòIdóó.€at€287,€quoting€òòKirbyóó,€406€U.S.Ï689„90,€92€S.Ct.€at€1882.€€ÌÌà àEven€though€we€concluded€that€an€arrest€warrant€was€necessary€for€theÏconstitutional€right€of€counsel€to€attach,€we€also€noted€that€a€criminal€defendant€isÏnot€without€a€degree€of€constitutional€protection€even€before€that€stage.€€WeÏspecifically€addressed€the€situation€of€a€defendant€subjected€to€a€lineup€after€aÍwarrantless€arrest:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àWhen€an€arrest€is€made€without€a€warrant€and€a€lineup€isÏconducted€there€is€no€constitutional€right€to€counsel;€however,€evenÏthen€the€accused€is€constitutionally€protected€against€unnecessarilyÏsuggestive€procedures.€€We€noted€in€òòForbes€v.€Stateóó,€that€'since€theÏidentification€occurred€during€the€investigative€phase€and€prior€toÏarrest,€we€are€not€dealing€with€the€Sixth€Amendment€right€toÏcounsel.'€€However,€we€considered€the€Due€Process€aspect€andÏdetermined€that€the€identification€procedure€was€not€impermissiblyÏsuggestive.€€ÌÌòòMitchellóó,€593€S.W.2d€at€286,€n.4€(citations€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àTurning€to€the€case€at€hand,€it€is€undisputed€that€Frasier€was€arrestedÏwithout€a€warrant;€therefore,€the€constitutional€right€to€counsel€as€defined€inÏòòMitchellóó€never€attached.€€Frasier€acknowledges€this,€but€argues€that€since€theÏdecision€of€whether€to€submit€to€or€refuse€the€test€is€a€"critical€stage"€of€theÏproceedings,€the€Due€Process€clause€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€Art.€I,€ðð€8,× ƒ/ ××  ×Ïrequires€that€he€be€afforded€a€right€to€counsel.€€ÌÌà àIn€assessing€the€merits€of€this€argument,€we€first€note€that€someÏjurisdictions€have€held€that€the€notion€of€fundamental€fairness,€as€embodied€inÏthe€Due€Process€Clause,€requires€that€a€DUI€defendant€be€permitted€to€consultÏwith€an€attorney€before€making€this€decision.€€òòSites€v.€Stateóó,€481€A.2d€192€(Md.Ï1984);€òòState€v.€Newtonóó,€636€P.2d€393€(Or.€1981);€òòScarborough€v.€Stateóó,€261€So.Ï2d€475€(Miss.€1972).€€The€rationale€for€the€rule€was€aptly€set€forth€by€the€court€inÏòòSitesóó,€òòsupraóó:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€due€process€clause€...€has€long€been€recognized€as€a€source€ofÏa€right€to€counsel€independent€of€the€Sixth€Amendment€[andÏanalogous€state€constitutional€provisions]€where€critically€importantÏto€the€fairness€of€the€proceedings€...€The€concept€of€a€due€processÏright€[has€been€described]€as€a€guarantee€of€respect€for€thoseÏpersonal€immunities€which€are€so€rooted€in€the€traditions€andÏconscience€of€our€people€as€to€be€ranked€as€fundamental€or€implicitÏin€the€concept€of€ordered€liberty.€€While€the€exact€contours€of€theÏdue€process€right€are€not€definable€with€precision,€the€right€...€is€oneÏthat€assures€that€convictions€cannot€be€brought€about€in€criminalÏcases€by€methods€which€offend€a€sense€of€justice.ÌÌòòSitesóó,€481€A.2d€at€199€(citations€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àAfter€explaining€the€essence€of€the€due€process€notion,€the€òòSitesóó€courtÏstated€that€"we€think€to€unreasonably€deny€a€requested€right€of€access€to€counselÏto€a€drunk€driving€suspect€offends€a€sense€of€justice€which€impairs€theÏfundamental€fairness€of€the€proceeding,"€òòidóó.€at€200;€and€it€concluded€that€theÏstate€and€federal€Due€Process€Clauses€required€that€the€defendant€be€afforded€aÏright€to€counsel.€€Having€come€to€this€conclusion,€however,€the€òòSitesóó€court€wasÏquick€to€qualify€it:ÌÌÓÓà8 à[The€Due€Process€clauses€require€that€the€defendant€be€afforded€aÏright€to€communicate€with€counsel],€as€long€as€such€attemptedÏcommunication€will€not€substantially€interfere€with€the€timely€andÏefficacious€administration€of€the€testing€process.€€In€this€regard,€it€isÏnot€possible€to€establish€a€bright€line€rule€as€to€what€constitutes€aÏreasonable€delay,€although€the€statute€itself€mandates€that€in€noÏevent€may€the€test€be€administered€later€than€two€hours€after€theÏdriver's€apprehension.€€Of€course,€it€is€the€statutory€purpose€toÏobtain€the€best€evidence€of€blood€alcohol€content€as€may€beÏpracticable€in€the€circumstances,€and€it€is€common€knowledge€thatÏsuch€content€dissipates€rapidly€with€the€passage€of€time.€€Thus,€ifÏcounsel€cannot€be€contacted€within€a€reasonable€time,€the€arresteeÏmay€be€required€to€make€a€decision€regarding€testing€without€theÏadvice€of€counsel.€€We€emphasize€that€in€no€event€can€the€right€toÏcommunicate€with€counsel€be€permitted€to€delay€the€test€for€anÏunreasonable€time€since,€to€be€sure,€that€would€impair€the€accuracyÍof€the€test€and€defeat€the€purpose€of€the€statute.ÌÌ€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€are€not€insensitive€to€the€due€process€concerns€in€this€context.€€It€doesÏstrike€one€as€unfair€that€a€person€suspected€of€DUI,€particularly€one€who€has€hadÏno€prior€experience€with€the€law,€should€be€compelled€to€make€a€decision€havingÏsuch€important€consequences€for€his€or€her€guilt€or€innocence€without€the€benefitÏof€counsel.€€Having€stated€this,€however,€we€nevertheless€believe€that€the€òòSitesóóÏcourt's€above„quoted€qualification€of€the€due€process€argument€carries€with€it€theÏseeds€of€that€argument's€destruction.€€It€is€common€knowledge€that€a€person'sÏblood€alcohol€content€rapidly€dissipates€over€time;€therefore,€delaying€the€testÏwhile€waiting€on€counsel€to€arrive€would€potentially€compromise€the€accuracy€ofÏthe€test.€€This€is€a€crucial€consequence,€given€the€importance€of€scientificÏevidence€in€DUI€cases.€€Moreover,€as€the€òòSitesóó€court€noted,€it€is€impossible€toÏformulate€rigid€temporal€boundaries€for€such€a€right,€as€blood€alcohol€contentÏdissipates€at€widely€divergent€speeds,€depending€on€the€person's€body€size€andÏmetabolism.€€In€short,€the€òòpromptóó€administration€of€the€blood€alcohol€test€is€aÍnecessary€condition€for€its€efficacy;€and€we€conclude€that€the€State's€interest€inÏhaving€an€accurate€measurement€of€the€defendant's€blood€alcohol€level,€coupledÏwith€the€manifold€practical€problems€inherent€in€a€òòSitesóó„type€rule,€override€theÏdue€process€concerns€cited€by€the€defendant.€€Therefore,€we€hold€that€a€personÏarrested€without€a€warrant€on€a€reasonable€suspicion€of€DUI€does€not€have€a€dueÏprocess€right€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution€to€consult€with€an€attorney€beforeÏmaking€the€decision.ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òTHE€IMPROPER€EVIDENCE€CLAIM€ó óóóÓ  ÓÌà àThe€next€issue€we€address€is€whether€the€admission€into€evidence€of€theÏdefendant's€refusal€to€submit€to€the€test€violated€either€his€due€process€rights,€orÏhis€rights,€either€under€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€federal€constitution€or€Article€I,Ïðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€against€self„incrimination.€We€first€note€thatÏthe€defendant's€arguments€under€the€federal€constitution€can€be€rather€quicklyÏdisposed€of.€€In€òòSouth€Dakota€v.€Nevilleóó,€459€U.S.€553,€103€S.Ct.€916,€74€L.Ed.2dÏ748€(1983),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€addressed€precisely€the€sameÏfactual€situation€and€the€same€arguments;€and€the€Court€rejected€bothÍcontentions.€€With€regard€to€the€due€process€claim,€the€Court€acknowledged€thatÏit€had€held€that€a€prosecutor€could€not€use€a€defendant's€silence€after€òòMirandaóóÏwarnings€were€administered€to€impeach€the€defendant's€testimony€at€trial.€€òòDoyleÏv.€Ohioóó,€426€U.S.€610,€96€S.Ct.€2240,€49€L.Ed.2d€91€(1976).€€However,€itÏdistinguished€the€State's€use€of€"silence"€in€the€context€of€a€request€for€a€bloodÏalcohol€test€„„€a€situation€for€which€òòMirandaóó€protection€is€unavailable× ƒ0 ××  ×€„„€from€thatÏpresented€in€òòDoyleóó,€stating€that:ÌÌÓÓà8 àWe€do€not€think€it€fundamentally€unfair€for€South€Dakota€to€use€theÏrefusal€to€take€the€test€as€evidence€of€guilt,€even€though€respondentÏwas€not€specifically€warned€that€his€refusal€could€be€used€againstÏhim€at€trial€...ÌÌà8 àThe€òòMirandaóó€warnings€emphasize€the€dangers€of€choosing€toÏspeak€('whatever€you€say€can€and€will€be€used€as€evidence€againstÏyou€in€court'),€but€give€no€warning€of€adverse€consequences€fromÏchoosing€to€remain€silent.€€This€imbalance€in€the€delivery€of€theÍòòMirandaóó€warnings,€we€recognized€in€òòDoyleóó,€implicitly€assures€theÏsuspect€that€his€silence€will€not€be€used€against€him.€€The€warningsÏchallenged€here,€by€contrast,€contained€no€such€misleading€implicitÏassurances€as€to€the€relative€consequences€of€his€choice€...€[T]heÏofficers€specifically€warned€respondent€that€failure€to€take€the€testÏcould€lead€to€loss€of€driving€privileges€for€one€year.€€It€is€true€theÏofficers€did€not€inform€respondent€of€the€further€consequence€thatÏevidence€of€refusal€could€be€used€against€him€in€court,€but€we€thinkÏit€unrealistic€to€say€that€the€warnings€given€here€implicitly€assure€aÏsuspect€that€no€consequences€other€than€those€mentioned€willÏoccur.€€Importantly,€the€warning€that€he€could€lose€his€driver'sÏlicense€made€it€clear€that€refusing€the€test€was€not€a€'safe€harbor,'Ïfree€of€adverse€consequences.ÌÌà8 àWhile€the€State€did€not€actually€warn€respondent€that€the€test€resultsÏcould€be€used€against€him,€we€hold€that€such€a€failure€to€warn€wasÏnot€the€sort€of€implicit€promise€to€forego€use€of€evidence€that€wouldÏunfairly€'trick'€respondent€if€the€evidence€were€later€offered€againstÏhim€at€trial.€€We€therefore€conclude€that€the€use€of€evidence€ofÏrefusal€after€these€warnings€comported€with€the€fundamentalÏfairness€required€by€due€process.ÌÌòòNevilleóó,€459€U.S.€at€565„66,€103€S.Ct.€at€923„24.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€its€rationale€as€to€the€Fifth€Amendment€claim,€the€Court€first€noted€thatÏòòSchmerber€v.€Californiaóó,€384€U.S.€757,€86€S.Ct.€1826,€16€L.Ed.2d€908€(1966),Ïclearly€established€that€a€State€could€compel€a€defendant€to€submit€to€a€bloodÏalcohol€test€without€violating€the€Fifth€Amendment.€€The€Court€then€considered€aÍdefendant's€refusal€to€take€such€a€test:ÌÌÓÓà8 à[T]he€values€behind€the€Fifth€Amendment€[being€free€of€compulsoryÏself„incrimination]€are€not€hindered€when€the€state€offers€a€suspectÏthe€choice€of€submitting€to€the€blood„alcohol€test€or€having€hisÏrefusal€used€against€him.€€The€simple€blood„alcohol€test€is€so€safe,Ïpainless,€and€commonplace,€that€respondent€concedes,€as€heÏmust,€that€the€State€could€legitimately€compel€the€suspect€againstÏhis€will,€to€accede€to€the€test.€€Given,€then,€that€the€offer€of€taking€aÏblood„alcohol€test€is€clearly€legitimate,€the€action€becomes€no€òòlessóóÏlegitimate€when€the€State€offers€a€second€option€of€refusing€the€test,Ïwith€the€attendant€penalties€for€making€that€choice.€Nor€is€this€aÏcase€where€the€State€has€subtly€coerced€respondent€into€choosingÏthe€option€that€it€had€no€right€to€compel,€rather€than€offering€a€trueÏchoice.€€To€the€contrary,€the€State€wants€respondent€to€choose€toÏtake€the€test,€for€the€inference€of€intoxication€arising€from€a€positiveÏblood„alcohol€test€is€far€stronger€than€a€refusal€to€take€the€test.ÌÌòòNevilleóó,€459€U.S.€at€563,€103€S.Ct.€at€922€(emphasis€in€original).ÌÌÌÓÓÌà àThe€rules€enunciated€in€òòNevilleóó€have€been€followed€many€times€by€ourÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€òòState€v.€Morganóó,€692€S.W.2d€428€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1985);€òòState€v.€Wrightóó,€691€S.W.2d€564€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984);€òòState€v.€Smithóó,Ï681€S.W.2d€569€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984).€€Despite€this,€€the€defendant€arguesÍthat€the€evidence€of€his€refusal€should€be€suppressed€because€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€affords€criminal€defendants€broader€protection€against€self„incrimination€than€the€federal€constitution.€€The€defendant€cites€as€support€for€thisÏassertion€the€fact€that€Article€I,€ðð€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€provides€thatÏ"the€accused€...€shall€not€be€compelled€to€give€òòevidenceóó€against€himself,"Ïwhereas€the€Fifth€Amendment€of€the€federal€constitution€provides€that€€"no€personÏ...€shall€be€compelled€in€any€criminal€case€to€be€a€òòwitnessóó€against€himself."€Ï(emphasis€added).€€The€defendant€admits€that€the€Fifth€Amendment€has€beenÏconstrued€to€prohibit€statements€of€only€a€"testimonial€or€communicative€nature,"Ïòòseeóó€òòSchmerber€v.€Californiaóó,€384€U.S.€€at€763„64,€86€S.Ct€at€1832,€and€not€"real"Ïevidence,€such€as€blood,€hair€samples,€and€fingerprints.€€And€he€admits€thatÏTennessee€courts€have€followed€the€òòSchmerberóó€distinction.€€Nevertheless,€heÏargues€that€the€word€"evidence"€in€Art.€I,€ðð€9€is€not€limited€to€statements€of€aÏ"testimonial€or€communicative€nature,"€but€that€it€means€"whatever€is€submitted€toÏthe€judge€or€jury€to€elucidate€an€issue,€to€prove€a€case,€or€to€establish€or€disproveÏa€fact€in€issue,"€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€79€(Tenn.€1993)(Reid,€J.Ïdissenting)€„„€including€evidence€of€a€refusal€to€submit€to€the€test.€€The€defendantÍrelies€heavily€upon€the€dissent€in€òòHarrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€at€78„81€(Tenn.€1992)€toÏsupport€his€argument.€€ÌÌà àInitially,€while€we€stated€in€òòDelk€v.€Stateóó,€590€S.W.2d€535,€540€(Tenn.Ï1979),€that€Tennessee's€prohibition€against€self„incrimination€is€no€broader€orÏdifferent€than€its€federal€counterpart,€it€is€true€that€this€Court€is€not€bound€by€theÏinterpretations€of€the€Fifth€Amendment€by€the€federal€courts,€except€to€the€extentÏthat€they€establish€a€"floor"€of€constitutional€protection.€€Thus,€this€Court€is€free€toÏconstrue€Art.€I,€ðð€9€more€broadly€than€the€Fifth€Amendment.€€The€fact€that€we€haveÏthis€power,€however,€obviously€does€not€mean€that€we€are€compelled€to€do€so;Ïand€we€have€never€construed€the€word€"evidence"€in€Art.€I,€ðð€9€literally,€as€theÏdefendant€urges.€€Indeed,€even€Justice€Reid's€dissent€in€òòHarrisóó,€which€simplyÏsuggested€the€possibility€of€such€a€literal€interpretation,€did€not€ultimatelyÏendorse€that€position€in€an€unambiguous€fashion.€€Rather,€Justice€Reid€based€theÏdissent€on€an€entirely€different€ground,€arguing€that€the€defendant's€refusal€toÏprovide€a€handwriting€exemplar€violated€Art.€I,€ðð€9€because€the€act€of€giving€aÏhandwriting€sample€was€"communicative€or€testimonial"€in€the€òòSchmerberóó€sense.ÍIn€other€words,€Justice€Reid€argued€that€because€the€defendant€had€the€òòchoiceóó€ofÏeither€intentionally€altering€his€or€her€handwriting€or€providing€a€"true"€sample,Ïthe€act€of€providing€a€handwriting€exemplar€thus€involved€the€òòveracityóó€of€theÏdefendant,€the€"heart€of€testimonial€evidence."€Ñ ° ÑòòHarrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€at€80.€€€JusticeÏReid€carefully€distinguished€this€type€of€evidence€from€"real"€evidence,€statingÏthat€"it€is€not€within€the€accused's€power€to€change€his€fingerprints,€hair,€òòbreathóó,Ïor€blood."€€òòIdóó.€(emphasis€added).€€€€ÌÌà àHere,€by€contrast,€the€refusal€to€submit€to€the€test€did€not€involve€theÏdefendant's€veracity€in€any€way.à àHis€refusal€of€the€test€was€functionally€the€sameÏas€if€he€had€submitted€to€the€test€„„€in€neither€instance€was€the€defendant€forcedÏto€choose€between€participating€truthfully€or€giving€false€testimony.€€Thus,€theÏdefendant's€argument€fails€under€the€actual€analysis€employed€by€the€òòHarrisóóÏdissent.ÌÌà àIn€summary,€we€decline€to€overrule€a€long€line€of€Tennessee€cases× ƒ1 ××  ×€byÏadopting€a€literal€interpretation€of€the€term€"evidence";€and€we€formally€announceÍour€agreement€with€the€principles€enunciated€in€òòNevilleóó.€Because€the€refusal€ofÏthe€test€did€not€violate€the€defendant's€right€against€self„incrimination€underÏòòNevilleóó,€we€hereby€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€à8 àÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÌÌConcur:ÌAnderson,€C.€J.ÌBirch,€J.ÌÌWhite,€J.€„€Not€Participating.ÌÌReid,€J.€„€Dissenting€„€See€Separate€Dissent.