ÿWPC$ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝUHå 0D- w@q 4± Å 0lÔ 0D@ 0J„ 0TÎ " 0^* 0hˆ 0rð 0|b 0†Þ 0d Bô 1u 0d† D3êU> 0@[U*›yÅU 6>B)tDC AMàU*-W¬rv~#vÓ¡ AOt"ÆÃ" 0D‰# D/Í# Bü#˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLDÒ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù-<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý "b#$D%&D'D(ue)Ó€56ÍD0"Ôô3|x6((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ 'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Times oÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ)ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d11117Border 1dd€-2Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÔ€4ÔÔ€4ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€4XÔÌÌò òSeptember€2,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€4ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ¢Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ôÔ(e)€If€the€owner€or€operator€of€any€motor€vehicle€which€causes€bodilyÏinjury€or€property€damage€to€the€insured€is€unknown,€the€insured€shall€have€noÏright€to€recover€under€the€uninsured€motorist€provision€unless:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(1)(A)€Actual€physical€contact€shall€have€occurredÏbetween€the€motor€vehicle€owned€or€operated€by€suchÏunknown€person€and€the€person€or€property€of€theÏinsured;€orÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€(B)€The€existence€of€such€unknown€motorist€isÏestablished€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence,€otherÏthan€any€evidence€provided€by€occupants€in€the€insuredÏvehicle;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€The€insured€or€someone€in€the€insuredððs€behalfÏshall€have€reported€the€accident€to€the€appropriateÏlaw€enforcement€agency€within€a€reasonable€time€afterÏits€occurrence;€andÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€The€insured€was€not€negligent€in€failing€toÏdetermine€the€identity€of€the€other€vehicle€and€theÏowner€or€operator€of€the€other€vehicle€at€the€time€ofÏthe€accident.ÌÌÌÔ€0ÂÔ ûÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€,ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ôÔThe€ð ðclear€and€convincingðð€standard€falls€somewhere€between€theÏð ðpreponderance€of€the€evidenceðð€in€civil€cases€and€the€ð ðbeyond€a€reasonableÏdoubtðð€standard€in€criminal€proceedings.€€To€be€ð ðclear€and€convincing,ðð€theÏevidence€must€ð ðproduce€in€the€mind€of€the€trier€of€facts€a€firm€belief€orÏconviction€as€to€the€allegations€sought€to€be€established.ðð€€òòHobson€v.€Eatonóó,Ï399€F.2d€781,€784€n.2€(6th€Cir.€1968),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€394€U.S.€928€(1969).€Ïð ðClear€and€convincing€evidence€means€evidence€in€which€there€is€no€serious€orÏsubstantial€doubt€about€the€correctness€of€the€conclusions€drawn€from€theÏevidence.ðð€€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896,€901€n.3€(Tenn.€1992).€ÏòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Armstrongóó,€859€S.W.2d€323,€328€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€,ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÒ ° ÒÒ À ÒÒ 8 ÒÒ À ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑØ ØÓ&€Ðd&ÓÓ&€..XÐd&ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€,GXXdÈdÈ7ÑÖ€/ÖÑ  ÑÔ€0Ôœ›Þ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSeptember€2,€1997à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòà àFORÏPUBLICATIONóóÌ̜ـ€ÙßR€352A1-j|E†` Å `€€@ÿRß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌJAMES€R.€FRUGE€AND€JANE€FRUGE,à à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiffs„Appellants,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Shelby€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€George€H.€Brown,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€No.€02S01„9601„CV„00005Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌJOHN€DOE€AND€JANE€DOE,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendants„Appellees.à àà à(ÌÌÌÌÒ 8 ÒÒ X ÒòòFor€Plaintiffs„Appellantsóó:à àà àà àòòFor€Defendants„AppelleesÏà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àState€Farm€InsuranceÏCompanyóó:ÌÌR.€Sadler€Bailey,€Jr.à àà àà àà àRobert€M.€FargarsonÌMemphisà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphisÌÌC.€Phillip€M.€Campbellà àà àà àà àMartin€W.€ZummachÌMemphisà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphisÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àOF€COUNSEL:ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNeely,€Green,€Fargarson,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€Brooke€&€SummersÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphisÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌÌÌÌJUDGMENTS€OF€COURT€OF€APPEALSÌAND€TRIAL€COURT€REVERSED;€CASEÌREMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àREID,€J.ÌÒ 8 ÒÒ H ÒÓÓÓ ` T` ò h—X ÓÔ€0ŠÔà àÔ€0XÔThis€case€presents€for€review€the€decision€of€the€Court€ofÏAppeals€affirming€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€summary€judgment€denyingÏthe€plaintiffsðð€claims€under€the€uninsured€motorist€statute.€€ThatÏdecision€is€reversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded.ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌÌà àOn€November8,€1991,€shortly€before€6:30€p.m.,€theÏplaintiffs,€James€R.€Fruge€and€Jane€Fruge,€husband€and€wife,€sustainedÏpersonal€injuries€in€an€automobile€accident€which€occurred€as€theÏvehicle€operated€by€Mr.Fruge€entered€Interstate€40€from€Front€StreetÏin€Memphis.€€According€to€their€deposition€testimony€filed€by€theÏinsurer,€State€Farm€Insurance€Company,€in€support€of€its€motion€forÏsummary€judgment,€their€vehicle€was€proceeding€along€the€approach€rampÏto€I„40€when€Mrs.Fruge€warned€Mr.Fruge,€who€was€watching€the€trafficÏapproaching€on€I„40€from€behind€his€vehicle,€that€a€parked€vehicleÏwith€no€lights€was€obstructing€their€lane€of€traffic.€€Mr.FrugeÏswerved€his€vehicle€in€order€to€avoid€striking€the€parked€vehicle€andÏthereby€lost€control€of€his€vehicle,€which€then€crashed€into€aÍretaining€wall.€€Immediately€thereafter,€other€vehicles€were€involvedÏin€a€collision€at€the€same€location.€€The€plaintiffsðð€vehicle€did€notÏmake€physical€contact€with€the€parked€vehicle€or€any€of€the€otherÏvehicles.€€The€plaintiffs€do€not€know€of€any€eyewitnesses€to€theirÏaccident.€ÌÌà àMemphis€police€officer€W.€R.€Rutherford€arrived€on€the€sceneÏat€approximately€7€p.m.€€His€affidavit,€filed€by€the€plaintiffs€inÏresponse€to€the€insurerððs€motion€for€summary€judgment,€contains€theÏfollowing€account€of€his€investigation:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àOn€November€8,€1991€at€approximately€6:45Ïp.m.,€a€call€was€received€by€the€Memphis€PoliceÏDepartment€regarding€a€traffic€problem€on€or€nearÏthe€Hernando„DeSoto€Bridge€involving€multipleÏvehicles.€€I€was€dispatched€and€arrived€on€theÏscene€at€approximately€7:00€p.m.€Due€to€the€extentÏof€vehicle€involvement€and€the€need€to€clear€theÏroadway€as€quickly€as€possible,€I€called€forÏassistance€to€secure€the€scene.ÌÌà8 àà àWhile€completing€my€routine€investigation,€IÏnoted€the€probable€source€of€the€resultingÏcollisions€to€be€a€brown€Ford€ThunderbirdÏautomobile€that€had€apparently€ran€out€of€gas€andÏwas€blocking€one€or€more€lanes€of€westboundÏtraffic.€€Although€vehicles€either€struck€theÏretaining€wall€or€struck€other€vehicles,€theÏabandoned€automobile€was€not€struck€by€any€of€theÏinvolved€parties.€€The€abandoned€automobile€wasÏunlicensed,€was€without€a€driver€and€had€to€beÏtowed€from€the€scene€by€wrecker€so€that€theÏroadway€could€be€finally€cleared.€€I€was€unable€toÏidentify€the€driver€of€the€abandoned€vehicle€andÏthe€vehicle€was€not€claimed€before€being€towed€toÍthe€City€Lot€for€storage.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€plaintiffs€filed€suit€for€damages€against€unknownÏdefendants€and€served€State€Farm€with€process.€€State€Farm€answeredÏthe€complaint€and€subsequently€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,Ïclaiming€there€was€no€material€issue€of€disputed€fact.€€The€trialÏcourt€granted€the€motion€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed.ÌÌÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÌà àThe€issue€to€be€decided€is€whether€the€uninsured€motoristÏinsurance€carrier€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment.€€This€is€a€questionÏof€law,€and€there€is€no€presumption€in€favor€of€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision.€€Rule€56.03,€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€provides,Ïin€pertinent€part:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThe€[summary]€judgment€sought€shall€be€renderedÏforthwith€if€the€pleadings,€depositions,€answersÏto€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,Ïtogether€with€the€affidavits,€if€any,€show€thatÏthere€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€factÏand€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€aÏjudgment€as€a€matter€of€law.ÌÓÓÌÌà àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€only€whereÏthe€movant€has€demonstrated€that€there€is€no€disputed€material€fact€toÏbe€resolved€and€the€moving€party,€therefore,€is€entitled€to€judgmentÏas€a€matter€of€law.€€When€there€is€a€genuine€dispute€regarding€anyÏmaterial€fact€or€the€conclusions€or€inferences€to€be€drawn€from€theÏfacts,€summary€judgment€does€not€lie.€€Summary€judgment€is€not€aÏsubstitute€for€the€trial€of€issues€of€fact.€€Determinations€ofÏcredibility,€the€weight€to€be€given€evidence,€and€the€inferences€to€beÏdrawn€from€facts€proven€are€jury€functions.€€When€ruling€on€a€motionÏfor€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimateÏview€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€non„moving€party,€allow€allÏreasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,€and€disregard€allÏopposing€evidence.€€The€evidence€of€the€non„movant€is€taken€as€trueÏand€all€reasonable€inferences€in€the€non„movantððs€favor€will€beÏallowed.€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993).€€Summary€judgmentÏis€not€a€disfavored€procedural€device€and€may€be€used€to€conclude€anyÏcivil€case,€including€negligence€cases,€that€can€be€and€should€beÏresolved€on€legal€issues€alone,€òòMansfield€v.€Colonial€Freight€Systemsóó,Ï862€S.W.2d€527€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€but,€as€a€general€rule,Ïnegligence€cases€are€not€amenable€to€disposition€on€summary€judgment.€ÏòòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€767,€775„76€(Tenn.€1991);€òòKeene€v.ÏCracker€Barrel€Old€Country€Store,€Inc.óó,€853€S.W.2d€501,€502„503€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1992).ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àThis€case€is€controlled€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€56„7„1201(e)Ï(1994).× ƒ6 ××  ×€€In€order€to€prevail€on€a€claim€for€uninsured€motoristÏbenefits,€the€insured€must€meet€the€requirements€of€subsections€1(A)Ïor€1(B)€and€(2)€and€(3).€€State€Farm€does€not€deny€that€Mr.and€Mrs.ÏFruge€have€complied€with€subsections€(2)€and€(3).€€The€plaintiffs€doÏnot€claim€that€their€vehicle€experienced€actual€physical€contact€withÏthe€vehicle€parked€on€the€highway.€€Consequently,€the€case€turns€onÍthe€provisions€of€subsection€(B):€€ð ðThe€existence€of€such€unknownÏmotorist€is€established€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence,€other€thanÏany€evidence€provided€by€occupants€in€the€insured€vehicle.ðð€€Since,Ïfor€the€purposes€of€subsection€(B),€the€plaintiffs€cannot€rely€uponÏtheir€own€testimony,€the€statements€contained€in€Officer€RutherfordððsÏaffidavit€are€determinative.ÌÌà àOfficer€Rutherford,€of€course,€did€not€witness€the€accident.€ÏHowever,€in€the€course€of€his€investigation,€he€did€observe€evidenceÏof€the€collision,€including€the€location€where€it€occurred,€theÏposition€and€condition€of€the€plaintiffsðð€vehicle€and€the€presence€ofÏother€damaged€vehicles€at€that€location.€€Officer€Rutherford€€saw,Ïupon€his€arrival€at€the€scene€approximately€30€minutes€after€theÏaccident€occurred,€a€brown€Ford€Thunderbird€automobile€parked€in€theÏplaintiffsðð€proper€traffic€lane.€€He€stated€that€he€was€unable€toÏascertain€the€identity€of€the€owner€or€operator€of€that€parkedÏvehicle.€€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€Officer€RutherfordððsÏtestimony€was€not€sufficient€to€defeat€the€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€That€court€found€that€Officer€Rutherfordððs€testimony€doesÏnot€prove€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence€the€existence€of€anÏabandoned€automobile€that€caused€the€plaintiffsðð€damages.€€AccordingÍto€that€courtððs€interpretation€of€the€statute,€the€insured€must€proveÏby€clear€and€convincing€evidence,€not€produced€by€the€occupants€of€theÏvehicle,€the€existence€of€the€vehicle€and€also€that€the€vehicle€causedÏthe€injuries.€€The€court€stated€that€under€Rule€602,€Tennessee€RulesÏof€Evidence,€Officer€Rutherfordððs€testimony€was€not€admissible€on€theÏissue€of€causation€because€he€did€not€witness€the€accident.€€The€courtÏconcluded€there€was€no€proof€of€causation.€€ÌÌà àThe€decision€by€the€Court€of€Appeals€puts€into€perspectiveÏfor€analysis€the€evidence€necessary€to€defeat€the€insurerððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€in€an€action€for€uninsured€motorist€benefits.€€PriorÏto€the€1989€amendment€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€56„7„1201,€there€could€beÏno€recovery€unless€there€was€actual€physical€contact€between€theÏuninsured€motoristððs€vehicle€and€the€insuredððs€vehicle.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,ÏòòHoyle€v.€Carrollóó,€646€S.W.2d€161€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€requirement€ofÏphysical€contact€with€the€vehicle€operated€by€the€unknown€motoristÏprohibited€recovery€in€cases€where€the€unknown€motorist€caused€theÏaccident€but€there€was€no€physical€contact€between€the€vehicles.€ÏSubsection€(e)(1)(B),€enacted€in€1989,€allows€recovery€in€cases€where,Ïfor€example,€the€insured€is€forced€off€the€road€by€an€unknown€motoristÏwithout€physically€striking€the€insuredððs€vehicle.€€The€high€standardÏof€proof€required€by€the€amendment,€clear€and€convincing€evidenceÏproduced€by€witnesses€other€than€the€occupants,€obviously€was€intendedÍby€the€legislature€as€a€safeguard€against€bogus€claims€arising€fromÏone„vehicle€accidents.€€òòCf.óó€òòid.óó€at€162.ÌÌà àEven€though€the€statute€is€subject€to€more€than€one€possibleÏinterpretation,€it€appears€that€the€requirements€of€subsection€(B)Ïapply€only€to€the€òòexistenceóó€of€the€unknown€motorist.€€Prior€to€theÏamendment,€there€was€no€requirement€in€the€statute€that€the€conditionsÏessential€for€coverage€be€proved€by€more€than€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence.€€Ô€,Ô€€Ô€0ÔGenerally,€an€insurance€claim€can€be€proven€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence.ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€burden€of€proof€is€generally€upon€aÏplaintiff€to€establish€a€case€under€a€policy€ofÏinsurance.€€The€plaintiff€must€prove€all€materialÏallegations€of€the€complaint€by€a€fairÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence,€and€the€insurerÏneed€not€offer€any€testimony€in€order€to€complainÏof€the€insufficiency€of€the€evidence€to€support€aÏjudgment€against€it.ÌÌÌÌ21€John€Alan€Appleman€&€Jean€Appleman,€òòInsurance€Law€and€Practiceóó€ðð€ÌÌ12091€(1980).€€ÓÓSo,€in€the€absence€of€a€statutory€provision,€proof€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€sufficient.€€In€addition,€analysis€ofÏthe€language€of€the€statute€leads€to€the€same€conclusion.€€CausationÏis€not€mentioned€in€subsection€(B).€€The€only€reference€in€subsectionÏ(B)€to€another€portion€of€the€statute€is€in€the€phrase€ð ðsuch€unknownÏmotorist,ðð€which€refers€to€that€portion€of€section€(e)€which€definesÍunknown€motorist€as€ð ðthe€owner€or€operator€of€any€motor€vehicle€whichÏcauses€bodily€injury€or€property€damage€to€the€insured.ðð€€The€clauseÏð ðwhich€causes€bodily€injury€or€property€damageðð€only€identifies€theÏowner€or€operator.€€Additional€language€would€be€necessary€to€indicateÏclearly€that€causation,€as€well€as€existence,€must€be€proven€by€clearÏand€convincing€evidence.€€Since€the€requirement€of€subsection€(B),Ïclear€and€convincing€evidence€other€than€evidence€provided€byÏoccupants€in€the€insured€vehicle,€applies€only€to€the€existence€of€theÏunknown€motorist,€the€other€essential€elements€of€the€claim,€includingÏcausation,€may€be€established€by€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€ÏAlso,€evidence€produced€by€the€occupants€of€the€vehicle€is€notÏinadmissible€as€to€those€elements.€€ÌÌà àThe€next€question€is€whether€the€evidence€presents€issues€ofÏdisputed€fact.€€As€stated€above,€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€whereÏthere€is€no€disputed€material€fact.€€The€evidence€before€the€CourtÏpresents€two€issues€of€disputed€material€fact,€the€existence€of€theÏunknown€motorist€and€the€cause€of€the€plaintiffsðð€accident.€€OfficerÏRutherfordððs€testimony€is€probative€of€the€existence€of€a€motorÏvehicle€the€owner€and€operator€of€which€are€unknown.€€A€jury€couldÏfind€that€such€evidence€is€clear€and€convincing.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€The€testimony€ofÍOfficer€Rutherford€and€the€plaintiffs€is€probative€of€the€fact€thatÏthe€parked€vehicle€was€the€cause€of€the€accident.€€On€summary€judgmentÏmotion,€the€non„moving€party€is€not€required€to€present€conclusiveÏevidence€of€all€the€essential€elements,€only€material€evidence€onÏwhich€a€jury€could€find€the€facts;€the€weight€to€be€given€evidence€isÏthe€exclusive€prerogative€of€the€jury.€€A€jury€could€find€on€theÏevidence€in€the€record€and€on€the€reasonable€inferences€that€could€beÏdrawn€therefrom€that€an€unknown€motorist€existed€and€also€that€theÏunknown€motorist€caused€the€accident.€Ì€€Ìà àState€Farm€likens€the€parked€vehicle€in€this€case€to€theÏladder€lying€on€the€travelled€portion€of€an€interstate€highway€inÏòòBruno€v.€Blankenshipóó,€876€S.W.2d€294€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€In€thatÏcase,€the€Court€of€Appeals€sustained€summary€judgment€for€the€insurerÏbecause€it€found€no€evidence€tracing€the€ladder€to€a€motorist.€€ÌÌà àThe€case€before€the€Court€is€different€because€it€involves€aÏmotor€vehicle,€and€the€statute€imposes€liability€on€the€ownership€andÏoperation€of€motor€vehicles.€€The€presence€of€an€unlighted€motorÍvehicle€on€the€travelled€portion€of€a€busy€highway€at€night€is€certainÏevidence€of€negligence,€even€if€it€was€dropped€there€by€an€alienÏspacecraft.€€That€vehicle€was€owned€by€someone,€and€that€someone€is€anÏunknown€motorist€within€the€meaning€of€the€statute.€€Whether€thatÏvehicle€was€present€when€Mr.Fruge€lost€control€of€his€vehicle€andÏwhether€it€was€the€cause€of€the€plaintiffsðð€accident€are€fact€issuesÏfor€the€jury.€€€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€the€trial€court€areÏreversed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€Ìproceedings.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€State€Farm€Insurance€Company.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌÌConcur:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Birch,€Ì€€€and€Holder,€JJ.Ì