ÿWPC€- …# VUNa %¯ 0ëµ4  ´ U>à 0/ 0D0 t 0Jt w"¾ 0Tà 0^4 0h’ 0rú 0|l 0†è 0n 1uþU,s 0dŸU,U>/ BmU6ŠB)ÀDCé AM,U*y D3£ÝÖÁ³ 0@tp´°$¶Ô v~Š$vÓ& AOÛ+Æ*, 0Dð, D/4- Bc-˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ÃøÌ$¡¡Ó  ÓÑŒ Œ ÑÑÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X¢XXXÔÑ  ÑÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑnnG P 3|x©<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular(ß(3+¤$¤¤Ý ƒøÌ!ÝÓ  ÓÑŒ °ÑѰÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X»#XXXÔÑ  ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔœDžÓ€¨©2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman d< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial$$$$'ÿÿdxd ÓÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌFebruaryÏ26,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó ó ·Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€statute€under€which€Gray€was€indicted€provided€thatÏ"[a]ny€person€who€shall€carnally€know€and€abuse€a€female€under€theÏage€of€twelve€years€shall,€on€conviction,€be€punished€as€in€theÏcase€of€rape."€€Code€of€Tenn.€€ðð€10784€(1932).€€Rape€wasÏpunishable€by€electrocution€or€life€imprisonment.€€òòId.óó€ðð€10781.€ÏThe€carnal€knowledge€statute€was€amended€in€1974,€and€theÏpunishment€for€conviction€was€reduced€to€ten€years€to€life.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„3705€(Supp.€1974).€€In€1978,€the€statute€wasÏrepealed€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„3701€to€39„3708€(Supp.€1978).€ÏUnder€today's€law,€Gray€would€be€charged€with€"rape€of€a€child,"ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„522€(Supp.€1995),€and€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€is€either€four€years€or€the€date€the€child€reaches€theÏage€of€majority,€whichever€occurs€later.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„2„101(d)(1990).Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝUnder€the€savings€statute,€"any€offense,€as€defined€by€[aÏrepealed€statute],€committed€while€such€statute€.€.€.€was€in€fullÏforce€and€effect€shall€be€prosecuted€under€such€.€.€.€statute€inÏeffect€at€the€time€of€the€commission€of€the€offense."€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„114€(Supp.€1975).€€Currently,€this€statute€is€codifiedÏat€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„112€(1991),€which€provides€that€"in€theÏevent€the€subsequent€act€provides€for€a€lesser€penalty,€anyÏpunishment€imposed€shall€be€in€accordance€with€the€subsequentÏact."Ì ¦Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThis€reasoning€is€consistent€with€the€apparent€intent€of€theÏlegislature€because€it€has€since€amended€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€in€child€sex€abuse€cases€so€that€prosecution€must€beÏinitiated€within€four€years€or€no€later€than€the€date€the€childÏreaches€majority,€whichever€occurs€later.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„2„101(d)(1990).Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€other€states€have€framed€their€own€tests€forÏdetermining€when€pre„accusatorial€delay€violates€due€processÏrights.€€For€example,€the€State€of€Washington€applies€theÏfollowing€three„prong€test:€"'(1)€The€defendant€must€show€he€wasÏprejudiced€by€the€delay;€(2)€the€court€must€consider€the€reasonsÏfor€the€delay;€and€(3)€if€the€State€is€able€to€justify€the€delay,Ïthe€court€must€undertake€a€further€balancing€of€the€State'sÏinterest€and€the€prejudice€to€the€accused.'"€€òòState€v.€Chavezóó,€761ÏP.2d€607,€613€(Wash.€1988)(quoting€òòState€v.€Alvinóó,€746€P.2d€807Ï(Wash.€1987)).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÓ` °˜XÓÑ7€¦<XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßL€(+';+'h|ˆ` ‚- `€€LßÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à)€€€FORÏPUBLICATIONÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€FILED:ÏFebruary€26,€1996Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€WILSONÏCOUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€HON.ÏJAMES€O.€BOND,ÌHAROLD€WINTER€GRAYà àà àà àà à)à à€€ÏJUDGEÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à)Ì€€€€€à àAppellantà àà à€€€€€€à à)€€€NO.€01„S„01„9411„CR„00138ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àà àFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌB.F.€"Jack"€Lowery€€€€à àà àCharles€W.ÏBursonÌLebanon,€TNà àà àà àà àAttorney€GeneralÏ&€ReporterÌÌà àà àà àà àà àEugene€J.€HoneaÌà àà àà àà àà àAssistantÏAttorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TNÌÌà àà àà àà àà àTom€P.€Thompson,ÏJr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àJohn€D.€Wootten,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àHartsville,€TNÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌ€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àòòOPINIONÌÌÌÌÌÌÌóóÌÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€REVERSED;ÌJUDGMENT€OF€THE€TRIAL€COURT€REINSTATED.€€€€à àà àà àBIRCH,€J.ÌÓÓà àOn€September€15,€1992,€a€Wilson€County€grand€juryÏindicted€Harold€Winter€Gray,€the€defendant,€upon€a€single€chargeÏof€carnal€knowledge€of€a€female€under€the€age€of€twelve.× ƒ, ××  ×€€TheÍindictment€alleged€that€the€offense€occurred€in€the€early€monthsÏof€1950.à àÌÌà àIn€a€pretrial€motion€to€dismiss€the€indictment,€GrayÏcontended€that€prosecution€was€barred€by€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€and€that€the€indictment€violated€his€due€process€andÏspeedy€trial€rights€under€the€constitutions€of€the€United€StatesÏand€the€State€of€Tennessee.€He€based€these€contentions€on€theÏprejudice€to€his€rights€occasioned€by€the€forty„two„year€periodÏbetween€the€act€alleged€and€the€indictment.€€The€trial€courtÏagreed€with€Gray's€contentions€and€dismissed€the€indictment.€€ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€considered€the€State'sÏappeal€pursuant€to€Rule€3,€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€€After€a€searchingÏanalysis,€the€court€rendered€an€opinion€in€which€it€articulatedÏthree€significant€conclusions:€(1)€the€general€savings€statuteÏsaved€the€prosecution€of€the€cause€from€the€operation€of€theÍstatute€of€limitations;× ƒ. ××  ×€(2)€the€State€bore€no€responsibility€forÏthe€delay€in€prosecuting€the€case;€and€(3)€the€State€did€notÏviolate€Gray's€due€process€rights.€€Pursuant€to€this€analysis,€theÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€reversed€the€trial€court's€judgment,Ïreinstated€the€indictment,€and€remanded€the€cause€for€furtherÏproceedings.€€à àÌà àÌà àWe€accepted€Gray's€application€for€review€under€Rule€11,ÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.,€in€order€to€determine€whether€"pre„accusatorialÏdelay"€in€this€case€violated€Gray's€constitutional€rights.€€We€useÏ"pre„accusatorial"€to€refer€to€the€period€of€time€between€theÏcommission€of€an€offense€and€its€disclosure€to€law€enforcementÏauthorities.€€Other€jurisdictions€refer€to€this€period€as€"pre„indictment."€€However,€under€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€believeÏ"pre„accusatorial"€is€more€appropriate€because€"pre„indictment"Ísuggests€that€the€State€has€knowledge€of€the€offense,€which€is€notÏthe€case€here.ÌÌà àAfter€a€thorough€examination€of€the€record€and€a€carefulÏconsideration€of€the€issue€presented,€we€have€concluded€that€theÏprosecution€should€not€continue.€€Accordingly,€for€the€reasonsÏoutlined€below,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€and€reinstate€the€trial€court's€order€dismissing€theÏindictment.ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àIÌÌà àAt€the€outset,€we€agree€with€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€that€the€prosecution€of€Gray€is€not€barred€by€the€statuteÏof€limitations.€€However,€because€we€find€the€constitutional€issueÏdispositive,€we€need€not€further€address€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€issue.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àIIÌÌà àMary€Joanne€Gray€Perdue,€who€was€approximately€fifty„three€years€old€at€the€time€of€the€hearing,€testified€that€inÏearly€1950,€Gray,€her€uncle,€penetrated€her€vaginally.€€In€1950,ÏGray€was€approximately€nineteen,€and€Perdue€was€eight.€€SheÏtestified€that€Gray€told€her€at€the€time€that€he€would€be€killedÏif€she€told€anyone.€€Thereafter,€rumor€and€innuendo€about€Gray'sÏsexual€conduct€with€Perdue€and€other€nieces€coursed€through€theÏsmall€community€where€they€lived.€€Nothing€definitive€was€said€orÏdone,€however,€until€early€1992.€€On€that€occasion,€Perdue€had€aÏconversation€with€her€cousin€in€which€the€women€expressed€to€eachÏother€their€concern€for€Gray's€granddaughter.€€The€apparent€rootÏof€their€concern€was€the€fear€that€Gray€might€treat€theÏgranddaughter€or€other€young€female€family€members€as€he€hadÏtreated€them.€€ÌÌà àFollowing€the€conversation€with€her€cousin,€PerdueÏdiscussed€the€matter€with€other€family€members€and€an€attorney.€ÏIt€was€after€these€discussions€that€Perdue€decided€to€lodge€aÏformal€complaint€against€Gray;€she€accomplished€this€by€contactingÍthe€District€Attorney€General.€€The€matter€was€referred€to€AgentÏDonna€Pence,€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation.€€Perdue€cooperatedÏwith€the€investigators€and€the€District€Attorney€General;€theÏindictment€followed€shortly€thereafter.€€When€asked,€at€theÏhearing€on€Gray's€motion€to€dismiss,€why€she€had€waited€so€longÏbefore€coming€forward€with€this€information,€Perdue€responded,Ï"For€years€I€thought€that€I€had€done€something€that€possiblyÏcaused€him€to€do€this€to€me.€€But€over€the€years€I€realized€thatÏthere's€nothing€that€a€young€child€can€do€to€cause€an€adult€to€doÏthis€to€them."€€ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€Gray€insists€that€the€trial€court€properlyÏdismissed€the€indictment€against€him€as€violative€of€his€dueÏprocess€rights€because€(1)€the€victim€waited€forty„two€yearsÏbefore€filing€charges€against€him,€and€(2)€there€was€noÏjustification€for€the€delay.€€He€urges€that€the€pre„accusatorialÏdelay€caused€him€substantial€prejudice€because€he€"is€placed€withÏthe€awesome€task€of€trying€to€recall€people€and€events€[forty„two]Ïyears€ago."ÌÌà àIn€Tennessee,€the€law€is€well„settled€that€"[d]elayÏbetween€the€commission€of€an€offense€and€the€commencement€ofÏadversarial€proceedings€does€not€violate€an€accused's€consti„tutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial."€€òòState€v.€Dykesóó,€803€S.W.2dÏ250,€255€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990)(citing€òòUnited€States€v.€Marionóó,Ï404€U.S.€307€(1971);€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352€(Tenn.€1981);ÏòòState€v.€Waltonóó,€673€S.W.2d€166,€170€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984);ÏòòBoswell€v.€Stateóó,€528€S.W.2d€825,€826„27€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1975)).€ÏHowever,€as€the€òòDykesóó€court€further€recognized,€the€"'delay€mayÏoccur€in€such€a€manner€that€the€defendant's€Fifth€Amendment€rightÏto€due€process„„in€contrast€to€the€Sixth€Amendment€right€to€speedyÏtrial„„is€violated.'"€€òòId.óó€(quoting€òòBakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€at€354);€òòseeÏalsoóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Lovascoóó,€431€U.S.€783€(1977).€€Additionally,Ïas€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€once€noted,€"[w]hile€there€is€noÏconstitutional€right€to€be€arrested,€courts€have€recognized€thatÏan€unreasonable€delay€between€the€commission€of€the€offense€andÏthe€arrest€may€violate€the€defendant's€constitutional€rights€ifÏthe€delay€results€in€prejudice€to€him€or€was€part€of€a€deliberate,Ïpurposeful€and€oppressive€design€for€delay."€€òòHalquist€v.€Stateóó,Ï489€S.W.2d€88,€93€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1972),€òòrev'd€on€other€groundsóó,ÍòòState€v.€Jonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€209€(Tenn.€1980)(citation€omitted).€ÏThus,€according€to€the€òòDykesóó€court,€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à[b]efore€an€accused€is€entitled€toÏrelief€based€upon€the€delay€betweenÏthe€offense€and€the€initiation€ofÏadversarial€proceedings,€the€accusedÏmust€prove€that€(a)€there€was€aÏdelay,€(b)€the€accused€sustainedÏactual€prejudice€as€a€direct€andÏproximate€result€of€the€delay,€andÏ(c)€the€State€caused€the€delay€inÏorder€to€gain€tactical€advantageÏover€or€to€harass€the€accused.€ÌÌÓÓ803€S.W.2d€at€256.ÌÌà àGray€and€the€State€address€the€òòDykesóó€test€in€theirÏbriefs.€€On€one€hand,€Gray€contends€that€he€has€satisfied€theÏrequirements€of€òòDykesóó.€€In€his€view,€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏapplied€the€third€prong€of€€òòDykesóó€too€narrowly.€€He€urges€that€theÏState€stands€in€the€shoes€of€the€victim;€therefore,€he€attributesÏto€the€State€the€victim's€delay€in€filing€charges.€€Assuming,Ïòòarguendoóó,€that€òòDykesóó€is€the€standard,€we€find€this€argumentÏunpersuasive€and€agree€with€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€thatÏthere€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€that€the€State€caused€theÏdelay.€€The€State€cannot€be€held€responsible€for€conduct€of€whichÍit€had€no€knowledge,€to€which€it€had€not€acquiesced,€and€overÏwhich€it€had€no€control.€€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€the€State€insists€that€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€finding€that€the€delay€in€bringing€the€prosecutionÏviolated€Gray's€Fifth€Amendment€due€process€rights€because€theÏtrial€judge€ignored€the€òòDykesóó€requirements.€€The€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€agreed,€finding€the€third€prong€of€òòDykesóó€dispositive.€€WeÏconclude€otherwise.€€In€òòDykesóó,€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏaddressed€the€issue€whether€the€delay€between€the€allegedÏcommission€of€an€offense€and€the€initiation€of€criminalÏproceedings€violated€the€defendant's€speedy€trial€or€due€processÏrights€where€the€State€had€knowledge€of€the€offense.€€The€caseÏbefore€us€is€different.€€First,€in€òòDykesóó€the€interim€between€theÏalleged€offense€and€the€indictment€was€approximately€one€year.€€InÏcontrast,€the€interim€in€the€case€under€review€was€forty„twoÏyears.€€Second,€in€òòDykesóó,€the€State€had€knowledge€of€the€offenseÏfrom€the€time€of€commission.€€In€the€instant€case€there€was€noÏsuch€knowledge.€€Thus,€we€find€the€òòDykesóó€three„pronged€test€to€beÏinapposite€here.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€before€the€Court,€Perdue€has€accused€Gray€ofÏsexually€penetrating€her€when€she€was€eight€years€old€in€earlyÏ1950.€€She€testified€that€for€more€than€forty€years„„until€MarchÏ26,€1992„„she€kept€her€silence€about€the€incident.€€There€is€noÏevidence€in€the€record€that€Gray€tried€to€conceal€his€allegedÏconduct€or€that€he€threatened€the€victim€in€any€way.€€PerdueÏtestified€that€she€had€been€"bothered"€by€her€memory€of€theÏincident€throughout€her€childhood€and€adult€life.€€Finally,€theÏrecord€shows€that€she€continued€to€interact€with€the€defendantÏthrough€the€years.€€Under€these€facts,€the€trial€court€correctlyÏheld€that€forty„two€years€"is€much€too€long€to€wait€beforeÏprosecuting€an€alleged€offense€where€the€prosecutor€[victim]€is€ofÏlegal€age€for€the€great€majority€of€this€time€.€.€.€."× ƒ/ ××  ×€ÌÌà àIn€holding€that€òòDykesóó€does€not€apply€to€theÏcircumstances€here,€we€are€left€with€the€task€of€determining€theÏappropriate€standard€by€which€to€measure€pre„accusatorial€delay„„the€period€of€time€between€the€commission€of€the€offense€and€itsÏdisclosure€to€law€enforcement€authorities.€€This€precise€issue€hasÏneither€been€discussed€nor€decided€in€Tennessee.€€Hence,€we€lookÏto€other€jurisdictions€for€guidance.ÌÌà àThe€California€Supreme€Court's€opinion€in€òòPeople€v.ÏMorrisóó,€756€P.2d€843€(Cal.€1988),€provides€some€guidance,€althoughÏit€deals€with€the€related€issue€of€pre„indictment€delay.€€MorrisÏwas€sentenced€to€death€for€a€September€1978€murder.€€756€P.2d€atÏ849.€€By€February€1979,€the€police€had€ample€evidence€linkingÏMorris€to€the€crime;€however,€charges€were€not€filed€against€himÏuntil€May€1982.€€òòId.óó€€In€òòMorrisóó,€the€court€declared,€"AnÏunreasonable€delay€between€the€time€an€offense€is€committed€and€anÏaccusatory€pleading€is€filed€may€violate€a€defendant's€right€to€aÏfair€trial€and€due€process€of€law€under€.€.€.€the€CaliforniaÏConstitution€and€the€Fifth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution."€€756€P.2d€at€866.€€The€California€courtÏfurther€stated€that€a€pre„complaint€delay€must€be€evaluated€byÏweighing€any€prejudice€the€delay€caused€the€defendant€againstÏjustification€for€the€delay.€€òòId.óó€€The€court€continued,€ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 à"In€the€balancing€process,€theÏdefendant€has€the€òòinitialóó€burden€ofÏshowing€some€prejudice€before€theÏprosecution€is€required€to€offer€anyÏreason€for€the€delay.€The€showing€ofÏprejudice€requires€some€evidence€andÏcannot€be€presumed."€€Prejudice€mayÏbe€shown€by€loss€of€materialÏwitnesses€due€to€lapse€of€time€orÏloss€of€evidence€because€of€fadingÏmemory€attributable€to€the€delay.ÌÌÓÓ756€P.2d€at€866€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€of€New€York€also€provides€someÏguidance€on€the€issue.€€In€òòPeople€v.€Singeróó,€376€N.E.2d€179€(N.Y.Ï1978),€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€felony„murder.€€The€crimeÏoccurred€on€October€22,€1970;€however,€the€defendant€was€notÏarrested€and€charged€until€May€1974.€€In€its€discussion,€the€courtÏcommented€on€the€distinction€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€makesÏwhen€evaluating€pre„arrest€or€pre„accusatorial€delay€and€post„arrest€or€post„indictment€delay.€€The€New€York€court€noted,ÌÓÓÌà8 àà8 àCharacterization€of€the€delay€asÏ"preindictment"€or€"postindictment"Ïis€often€determinative.€€Delay€inÏbringing€the€defendant€to€trialÏafter€indictment€or€arrest€isÏmeasured€against€the€Sixth€AmendmentÏspeedy€trial€requirement€which€takesÏinto€account€a€number€of€factors,Ïincluding€actual€or€potentialÍprejudice€to€the€defendant's€caseÏthrough€the€loss€of€witnesses€andÏthe€dulling€of€memory.€ÏPreindictment€delay,€on€the€otherÏhand,€is€governed€by€the€due€processÏclause€which€generally€requires€aÏshowing€of€actual€prejudice€beforeÏdismissal€would€be€warranted.ÌÓÓÌ376€N.E.2d€at€185€(citations€omitted).€€The€court€further€statedÏthat€this€"distinction€is€based€essentially€on€the€theory€that€theÏspeedy€trial€guarantee€was€designed€primarily€'to€prevent€undueÏand€oppressive€incarceration€prior€to€trial,€[and]€to€minimizeÏanxiety€and€concern€accompanying€public€accusation.'"€€òòId.óóÏ(quoting€òòMarionóó,€404€U.S.€at€320).€€Moreover,€observed€the€court,Ï"[t]he€distinction€assumes€that€these€considerations€do€not€becomeÏrelevant€until€the€defendant€has€been€arrested€or€formallyÏaccused."€€òòId.óó€€ÌÌà àFurther,€while€the€Supreme€Court€"has€recognized€.€.€.Ïthat€any€delay€in€bringing€the€defendant€to€trial€may€impair€hisÏright€to€a€fair€trial,€.€.€.€it€has€assumed€that€the€Statute€ofÏLimitations€is€the€primary€safeguard€against€potential€prejudiceÏwhen€there€has€been€a€delay€in€arresting€or€formally€charging€theÏdefendant."€€òòId.óó€(citing€òòMarionóó,€404€U.S.€at€321„23).€€In€òòMarionóó,Íthe€Court€observed€that€the€statute€of€"limitation€is€designed€toÏprotect€individuals€from€having€to€defend€themselves€againstÏcharges€when€the€basic€facts€may€have€become€obscured€by€theÏpassage€of€time€and€to€minimize€the€danger€of€official€punishmentÏbecause€of€acts€in€the€far„distant€past."€€404€U.S.€at€323.ÌÌà àOther€courts€point€to€statutes€of€limitations€as€theÏfirst€barrier€of€protection€against€unwarranted€unconstitutionalÏprejudice.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€€òòState€v.€Princeóó,€581€So.€2d€874,€877€(Ala.ÏCrim.€App.€1991)("statute€of€limitations€is€the€principal€device€Ï.€.€.€to€protect€against€prejudice€arising€from€a€lapse€of€timeÏbetween€the€commission€of€a€crime€and€an€indictment€or€arrest");ÏòòState€v.€Chavezóó,€761€P.2d€607,€613€(Wash.€1988)€("statutes€ofÏlimitations€are€the€'primary€guarantee€against€bringing€overlyÏstale€criminal€charges'")(quoting€òòState€v.€Hageróó,€507€P.2d€159Ï(Wash.€Ct.€App.€1973)).€€However,€in€the€case€under€review,€theÏstatute€of€limitations€affords€Gray€no€protection€whatsoeverÏagainst€prejudice€possibly€inherent€in€the€delay.€€The€reason€isÏthat€the€offense€here€charged€has€no€period€of€limitation.€€Thus,Ïwe€are€reluctant€to€assess€the€delay€here€under€the€limited€dueÍprocess€standard€established€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòMarionóó€andÏòòLovascoóó.€ÌÌà àHaving€reviewed€the€existing€law€on€the€issue,€weÏobserve€that€the€òòMarionóó„òòDykesóó€approach€to€pre„accusatorial€delayÏis,€in€application,€extremely€one„sided.€€It€places€a€daunting,Ïalmost€insurmountable,€burden€on€the€accused€by€requiring€aÏdemonstration€not€only€that€the€delay€has€caused€prejudice€butÏalso€that€the€State€orchestrated€the€delay€in€order€to€obtain€aÏtactical€advantage.€€Thus,€under€the€facts€before€us,€applicationÏof€so€stringent€a€standard€would€force€a€result€we€would€considerÏunconstitutional,€unwarranted,€and€unfair.€€To€accomplish€justiceÏwhile€preserving€Gray's€right€to€a€fair€trial€requires,€in€ourÏview,€a€less€stringent€standard.€Ìà àÌà àToday€we€articulate€a€standard€by€which€to€evaluate€pre„accusatorial€delay€and€hold€that€an€untimely€prosecution€may€beÏsubject€to€dismissal€upon€Fifth€and€Fourteenth€Amendment€dueÏprocess€grounds€and€under€Article€I,€ðððð€8€and€9,€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution€even€though€in€the€interim€the€defendant€was€neitherÏformally€accused,€restrained,€nor€incarcerated€for€the€offense.€ÍIn€determining€whether€pre„accusatorial€delay€violates€dueÏprocess,€the€trial€court€must€consider€the€length€of€the€delay,Ïthe€reason€for€the€delay,€and€the€degree€of€prejudice,€if€any,€toÏthe€accused.× ƒ0 ××  ×€€òòSeeóó€òòLovascoóó,€431€U.S.€at€790€("proof€of€prejudice€isÏgenerally€a€necessary€but€not€sufficient€element€of€a€due€processÏclaim,€.€.€.€the€due€process€inquiry€must€consider€the€reasons€forÏthe€delay€as€well€as€the€prejudice€to€the€accused").€€ÌÌà àWe€now€apply€the€standard€we€have€articulated€to€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€here€present€to€determine€whether€theÏprosecution€of€Gray€shall€proceed.€€We€hold€that€it€shall€not.€€WeÏfind€that€the€length€of€the€delay€was€profoundly€excessive,€and€noÏreasonable€justification€for€such€delay€has€been€demonstrated.€ÏGray€has€made€a€òòprima€facieóó€showing€of€prejudice.€€As€the€trialÏcourt€correctly€found,€the€record€reveals€at€least€three€instancesÍof€prejudice:€€(1)€the€lapse€of€time€has€diminished€the€victim'sÏmemory;€(2)€witnesses€thought€to€be€material€are€now€unavailable;Ïand€(3)€the€victim€cannot€specifically€date€the€incident,€therebyÏrequiring€Gray€to€account€for€his€whereabouts€and€his€conductÏduring€a€six„month€period€forty„two€years€past.ÌÌà àAs€the€Supreme€Court€declared€in€òòMorrissey€v.€Breweróó,Ï"due€process€is€flexible€and€calls€for€such€procedural€protectionsÏas€the€particular€situation€demands."€€408€U.S.€471,€481€(1972);Ïòòaccordóó€òòState€v.€Pearsonóó,€858€S.W.2d€879,€885€(Tenn.€1993).€ÏFinally,€under€the€facts€of€this€case,€prosecution€of€Gray€wouldÏviolate€the€concepts€of€fundamental€fairness€and€substantialÏjustice€embodied€in€the€due€process€clause€of€the€Fifth€andÏFourteenth€Amendments€of€the€United€States€Constitution,€as€wellÏas€Article€I,€ðð€8,€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€is€reversed;€the€trial€court's€order€dismissing€theÏindictment€is€reinstated.ÌÓÓÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Reid,€White,€JJ.Ì