ÿWPCà8 Å# ÖUNá %/ 045U:ib£U:«w@å4%9 0DH 1mŒ 0cù 0@\œ 0J¤ 0Tî 0^B 0h  0r 0|z 0†ö 0| B 1u) U,ž 0dÊ 0B.!U,p!U>œ!U *Ú!U*"€."®#À%¶Ù'v~0vÓ 2 0à7˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù-,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular {U|D}D~E€U‚ƒ„Êe#„!%~§ 3|x„(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó#.e37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;³»$´´Ô2.eÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à2 ÿÿ$Squareððà0 à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ2¦$Squareððà0  à< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times vÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒÄ$ÝÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€òòMutual€Life€Ins.€Co.€of€New€York€v.€Distrettióó,€159€Tenn.€138,€17€S.W.2d€11€(1929).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒÄ$ÝÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€That€level€is€more€than€twice€the€.08€percent€required€to€ð ðcreate€a€presumptionðð€thatÏHarrell€was€ð ðunder€the€influenceðð€of€an€intoxicant€and€her€driving€ability€was€impaired.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€55„10„408(b)(1995€Supp.).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒÄ$ÝÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòWeil€v.€Federal€Kemper€Life€Assur.€Co.óó,€866€P.2d€774€(Cal.€1994)(In€Bank);ÏòòSmith€v.€Continental€Cas.€Co.óó,€203€A.2d€168€(D.C.€App.€1964);€òòEvans€v.€Metropolitan€Life€Ins.ÏCo.óó,€174€P.2d€961€(Wash.€1946).Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒÄ$ÝÓ  ÓÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔò òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóó óÝ  Ý€òòINA€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Brundinóó,€533€P.2d€236€(Alaska€1975);€òòKnight€v.€Metropolitan€Life€Ins.ÏCo.óó,€437€P.2d€416,€420€(Ariz.€1986);€òòCarroll€v.€CUNA€Mut.€Ins.€Soc.óó,€894€P.2d€746€(Colo.€1995);ÏòòGulf€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Nashóó,€97€So.€2d€4,€10€(Fla.€1957);€òòDawson€v.€Bankersðð€Life€Co.óó,€247€N.W.€279,Ï282€(Iowa€1933);€òòFryman€for€Fryman€v.€Pilot€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€704€S.W.2d€205,€206€(Ky.€1986);ÏòòSchonberg€v.€New€York€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€104€So.€2d€171€(La.€1958);€òòCollins€v.€Nationwide€Life€Ins.ÏCo.óó,€294€N.W.2d€194,€196€(Mich.€1980);€òòTaylor€v.€New€York€Life€Ins.€Co.óó€222€N.W.€912€(Minn.Ï1929);€òòMurphy€v.€Travelers€Ins.€Co.óó,€2€N.W.2d€576,€580€(Neb.€€1942);€òòCatania€v.€State€Farm€LifeÏIns.€Co.óó,€598€P.2d€631,€633€(Nev.€1979);€òòScott€v.€New€Empire€Ins.€€Co.óó,€400€P.2d€953,€955€(N.M.Ï1965);€òòBurr€v.€Commercial€Travelers€Mut.€Acc.€Assððnóó,€67€N.E.2d€248,€252€(N.Y.€1946);€òòCooper€v.ÏNew€York€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€180€P.2d€654€(Okla.€1947);€òòBotts€v.€Hartford€Acc.€&€Indem.€Co.óó,€585€P.2dÏ657,€660€(Or.€1978);€òòBeckham€v.€Travelers€Ins.€Co.óó,€225€A.2d€532,€534€(Pa.€1967);€òòWest€v.ÏCommercial€Ins.€Co.€of€Newark,€N.J.óó,€528€A.2d€339€(R.I.€1987);€òòRepublic€Nat.€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.ÏHeywardóó,€536€S.W.2d€549,€557€(Tex.€1976);€òòCarter€v.€Standard€Acc.€Ins.€Coóó.,€238€P.€259,€275Ï(Utah€1925);€òòWiger€v.€Mut.€Life€Ins.€Co.€of€New€Yorkóó,€236€N.W.€534,€538€(Wis.€1931);€òòWickman€v.ÏNorthwestern€Nat.€Ins.€Co.óó,€908€F.2d€1077€(1st€Cir.€1990);€òòWhitaker€v.€State€Farm€Mut.€Auto€Ins.ÏCoóó,€768€P.2d€320€(Kan.€App.€1989);€òòConsumers€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Smithóó,€587€A.2d€1119,1124„25Ï(Md.€App.€1991);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€John€D.€Ingram€and€Lynne€R.€Ostfeld,€òòThe€Distinction€BetweenÏAccidental€Means€and€Accidental€Results€in€Accidental€Death€Insuranceóó,€12€Fla.€St.€U.€L.€Rev.€1,€9Ï(1984);€1A€Appleman,€òòInsurance€Law€and€Practiceóó,€ðð€360,€pp.€475„76.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò(­+2æ“$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑÀ°ÑÑ̰ÑÒ4°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XìåXXXÔÔ€òCäòXXìåÔò òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóó óÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€&&X„d&ÓÑ#€&&Xd#ÑÔ€'ÔÓ  ÓÝ  Ý›Ò 4 ÒÒ ° ÒÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÓ  ÓÔ€(ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€UXXdìXXdì7ÑØ ØÓ&€))XÐd&Óà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœò ò€€€€òòFOR›€PUBLICATIONó óóóÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœò òòòFiled:€€€September€3,€1996óó›€ó óÌÌÌDANNY€RAY€œHARRELL›,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€KNOX€CHANCERYÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€HON.€H.€DAVID€œCATE›,Ì€œVs›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àà àCHANCELLORÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌTHE€MINNESOTA€MUTUAL€LIFEà à)ÌINSURANCE€COMPANY,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€€03„S„01„9508„CH„00098Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:ó óóóÌÌRufus€W.€œBeamer›,€Jr.à àà àà àArthur€G.€œSeymour›,€Jr.ÌKnoxville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àRobert€L.€KahnÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœFRANTZ›,€œMcCONNELL›€&€œSEYMOUR›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òÔ€(„Ôà0 àà àà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÔ€(XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED;ÌREMANDED€TO€TRIAL€COURT.à àà àà àà àà àANDERSON,€JÇÑ7€ìÛXXdìXXdì7ÑÓÓÑ  Ñà àWe€granted€this€appeal€to€determine€whether€we€should€retain€"theÏòòDistrettióó€Rule× ƒ* ××  ×"€adopted€by€this€Court€sixty„seven€years€ago.€€The€rule€providesÏthat€before€a€death€will€be€considered€accidental€under€the€terms€of€anÏinsurance€contract,€the€means,€as€well€as€the€result,€must€be€involuntary,Ïunexpected,€and€unusual.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€Chancellor€held€that€the€plaintiff's€death€in€an€automobileÏcollision€was€caused€by€her€driving€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant,€and€itÏtherefore€was€not€"death€by€an€accidental€injury€which€was€unintended,Ïunexpected,€and€unforeseen"€and,€as€a€result,€benefits€were€not€payable€on€theÏinsurance€contract.€€The€Court€of€Appeals,€while€noting€that€the€rule€had€beenÏcriticized€and€rejected€by€a€number€of€jurisdictions,€nevertheless€affirmed.ÌÌà àAfter€careful€consideration,€we€have€determined€that€we€should€join€theÏgrowing€number€of€jurisdictions€which€have€abandoned€the€distinction€betweenÏ"accidental€means"€and€"accidental€results."€€We€do€so€because€the€distinctionÏis€contrary€to€the€understanding€and€reasonable€expectations€of€the€averageÏinsurance€policyholder€and€contrary€to€the€plain€meaning€of€the€terms€of€theÏinsurance€contract.€€We€also€think€there€is€a€fundamental€flaw€in€analyzingÍinsurance€contract€terms€under€tort€principles,€such€as€foreseeability.€€We,Ïtherefore,€overrule€òòDistrettióó€and€its€progeny,€reverse€the€Court€of€Appeals,€andÏremand€this€case€to€the€trial€court€for€entry€of€a€judgment€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff.ÌÌÇà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDóóó óÌà àOn€December€18,€1990,€at€approximately€9:30€p.m.,€Robin€Denise€HarrellÏdied€as€a€result€of€injuries€she€sustained€in€an€automobile€collision€onÏMaynardville€Highway,€a€four„lane€road€divided€by€a€grass€median€in€KnoxÏCounty,€Tennessee.€€The€car€Robin€Harrell€was€driving€crossed€the€grassÏmedian€and€struck€two€southbound€cars.€€Tests€performed€on€a€blood€sampleÏtaken€after€Harrellððs€death€revealed€a€blood„alcohol€level€of€.20€percent.× ƒ+ ××  ×ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€her€death,€Robin€Harrell€and€her€husband,€Danny€RayÏHarrell,€the€plaintiff€in€this€appeal,€were€insured€under€a€credit€life€policy€issuedÏby€the€defendant,€The€Minnesota€Mutual€Life€Insurance€Company€(hereafterÏð ðMinnesota€Lifeðð).€€This€policy€provides€for€payment€of€the€balance€of€theÏmortgage€on€the€home€owned€by€Robin€and€Danny€Ray€Harrell€in€the€eventÏeither€suffered€death€by€ð ðaccidental€injury.ðð€€At€the€time€of€Robin€Harrellððs€death,Ïthe€mortgage€balance€was€approximately€$48,000.€€With€regard€to€coverage€forÏaccidental€death,€the€policy€provided€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àò òWhat€does€death€by€accidental€injury€mean?ó óÌÌà8 àà8 àDeath€by€accidental€injury€as€used€in€this€certificateÏmeans€that€your€death€results,€directly€andÏindependently€of€all€other€causes,€from€an€accidentalÏdrowning€or€from€an€accidental€injury€which€wasÏunintended,€unexpected€and€unforeseen.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àDanny€Ray€Harrell€filed€a€claim€with€Minnesota€Life€for€payment€underÏthe€policy,€but€Minnesota€Life€denied€the€claim.€€Harrell,€thereafter,€brought€thisÏaction€seeking€to€recover€under€the€policy.€€For€answer,€Minnesota€Life€deniedÏthat€Robin€Harrell€died€from€ð ðan€accidental€injury€which€was€unintended,Ïunexpected,€and€unforeseen.ðð€€Instead,€Minnesota€Life€argued€that€her€deathÏwas€the€foreseeable€consequence€of€driving€an€automobile€under€the€influenceÏof€alcohol.€€ÌÌà àFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€Chancellor,€relying€upon€a€prior€decision€ofÏthis€Court,€òòMutual€Life€Insurance€Co.€of€New€York€v.€Distrettióó,€159€Tenn.€138,€17ÏS.W.2d€11€(1929),€and€a€long€line€of€authority€applying€ð ðthe€òòDistrettióó€rule,ððÏdismissed€the€case,€finding€specifically€that€Robin€Harrellððs€death€did€not€resultÏð ðdirectly€and€independently€of€all€other€causes€.€.€.€from€an€accidental€injuryÏwhich€was€unintended,€unexpected,€and€unforeseen.ðð€€Danny€Harrell€appealed,Ïarguing€that€the€òòDistrettióó€rule€should€be€modified€or€overturned.€€While€notingÏthat€the€€rule€has€been€criticized€and€rejected€by€a€number€of€jurisdictions,€theÍCourt€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€Chancellor,€stating€that€ð ðTennessee€remainsÏcommitted€to€the€rule€that€before€a€death€will€be€considered€accidental€theÏò òmeans€as€well€as€the€resultó ó€must€be€involuntary,€unexpected,€andÏunusual.ðð€€(Emphasis€added.)ÌÌà àThereafter,€we€granted€the€plaintiff€permission€to€appeal€to€consider€thisÏimportant€question€of€insurance€law€„„€whether€recovery€under€an€accidentalÏdeath€insurance€policy€requires€that€the€means€causing€death,€as€well€as€theÏresulting€death,€be€involuntary,€unexpected,€and€unusual.€ÌÌà@ àòòò òACCIDENTAL€DEATHÌó óóóà àIn€this€appeal,€Danny€Harrell€urges€this€court€to€abandon€the€òòDistrettióó€ruleÏwhich€differentiates€between€"accidental€means"€and€"accidental€results."€ÏHarrell€argues€that€this€Court€should€adopt€a€rule€that€would€allow€recovery€ifÏdeath€is€accidental€in€the€common€meaning€of€the€word,€regardless€of€theÏnature€of€the€means€which€precipitated€the€accidental€death,€and€asserts€such€aÏrule€is€consistent€with€the€plain€understanding€and€objectively€reasonableÏexpectations€of€the€average€insured.€ÌÌà àMinnesota€Life€responds€that€the€longstanding€rule€established€by€thisÏCourt€in€òòDistrettióó,€that€death€is€not€ð ðaccidentalðð€if€it€is€a€foreseeable€result€of€aÏvoluntary€act,€should€be€reaffirmed,€and€that€Robin€Harrellððs€death€was€aÏforeseeable€result€of€her€driving€an€automobile€under€the€influence€of€anÏintoxicant.€€€€ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€of€this€issue€with€a€review€of€the€case€law€in€thisÏjurisdiction.€€The€decisions€of€the€lower€courts€in€this€case€were€based€upon€thisÏCourtððs€decision€in€òòDistrettióó€interpreting€accidental€death.€€There,€Distretti€wasÏrobbed€at€gunpoint€by€bandits.€€As€the€bandits€were€fleeing,€Distretti€armedÏhimself,€ran€outside€the€store,€and€opened€fire€on€them.€€The€bandits€shot€back,Ïand€Distretti€was€killed.€€His€wife€brought€suit€to€recover€under€a€life€insuranceÏpolicy€which€paid€ð ðupon€receipt€of€due€proof€that€such€death€resulted€fromÏbodily€injury€effected€solely€through€external€violent€and€ò òaccidental€meansó ó."€Ï(Emphasis€added.)€€The€òòDistrettióó€court€denied€recovery,€concluding€thatÏDistrettiððs€death€was€a€foreseeable€result€of€his€voluntary€act€of€chasing€theÏbandits€and€shooting€at€them,€and€therefore,€his€death€was€not€produced€byÏð ðaccidental€means,ðð€for€purposes€of€the€insurance€policy.€ÌÌà àThe€distinction€adopted€by€the€òòDistrettióó€court€between€death€byÏð ðaccidental€meansðð€and€ð ðaccidental€deathðð€was€explained€succinctly€byÏProfessor€Couch€as€follows:€ÌÌÓÓà8 à[œA]ccidental›€death€is€an€unintended€and€undesigned€result€arisingÏfrom€acts€voluntarily€done,€whereas€death€by€accidental€means€isÏa€result€arising€from€acts€unintentionally€done€or€eventsÏundesignedly€occurring.€€The€term€ððaccidental€meansðð€refers€to€theÏoccurrence€or€happening€which€produces€the€result,€rather€thanÏthe€result;€it€is€concerned€with€the€cause€of€the€harm€rather€thanÏthe€character€of€the€harm.ÌÌÌÌÓÓ10€Couch,€Insurance€2d€(Rev.€ed.)€ðð€41:29,€pp.€44„45€(1982€&€Supp.€1995)Ï(footnotes€omitted).€€Therefore,€under€the€òòDistrettióó€rule,€a€death€that€is€caused€byÏan€insuredððs€intentional€act,€or€is€a€foreseeable€consequence€of€an€insuredððsÏvoluntary€act,€is€not€considered€ð ðaccidental.ðð€€Though€the€distinction€arose€in€theÏòòDistrettióó€case€and€other€cases€where€the€specific€term€ð ðaccidental€meansðð€wasÏused€in€insurance€contracts,€the€distinction€has€been€applied€in€cases,€such€asÏthis€one,€where€the€term€is€not€a€part€of€the€insurance€contract.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,ÏòòSpears€v.€Commercial€Ins.€Co.€of€Newark,€N.J.óó,€866€S.W.2d€544€(Tenn.€App.Ï1993).€€The€òòDistrettióó€rule€has€never€been€overruled€and€has€been€approved€andÏapplied€in€various€contexts€in€later€Tennessee€cases.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòSeeley€v.€PilotÏFire€&€Cas.€Co.óó,€432€S.W.2d€58€(Tenn.€1968);€òòBaker€v.€National€Life€&€Acc.€Ins.ÍCo.óó,€201€Tenn.€247,€298€S.W.2d€715€(1956);€òòJones€v.€Firemanððs€Fund€AmericanÏLife€Ins.€Co.óó,€731€S.W.2d€532€(Tenn.€App.€1986);€òòNicholas€v.€Provident€Life€andÏAcc.€Ins.€Co.óó,€61€Tenn.€App.€633,€457€S.W.2d€536€(1970).€€Indeed,€theÏdistinction€between€ð ðaccidental€meansðð€and€ð ðaccidental€resultsðð€has€beenÏapplied€in€Tennessee€in€a€case€similar€to€the€Harrell€case€to€deny€recoveryÏunder€an€accidental€death€policy€for€an€insured€party€who€had€been€killed€in€aÏone€car€accident€while€intoxicated.€€òòHobbs€v.€Provident€Life€&€Acc.€Ins.€Co.óó,€535ÏS.W.2d€864€(Tenn.€App.€1975).€€The€òòHobbsóó€court€concluded€that€ð ðthe€danger€ofÏinjury€or€death€as€result€of€operating€a€motor€vehicle€while€intoxicated€is€aÏforeseeable€one€and€the€appellate€courts€of€this€State€have€repeatedly€held€thatÏdeath€is€not€caused€by€accidental€means,€within€the€meaning€of€an€insuranceÏpolicy€if€it€is€a€foreseeable€result€of€a€voluntary€and€unnecessary€act€or€course€ofÏconduct€of€the€insured.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€535€S.W.2d€at€866.€€€Ìà àÌà àWhile€Tennessee€has€remained€committed€to€the€distinction€betweenÏð ðaccidental€meansðð€and€ð ðaccidental€death,ðð€commentators€and€many€otherÏcourts€have€criticized€the€distinction€as€illusory€and€contrary€to€the€normalÏexpectations€of€the€average€policy€holder.€€ÌÌà àThe€rejection€of€the€distinction€between€"accidental€means"€andÏ"accidental€results"€was€first€articulated€by€Justice€Cardozo€more€than€sixtyÏyears€ago€in€dissent€in€òòLandress€v.€Phoenix€Mut.€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€291€U.S.€491,€54ÏS.€Ct.€€461,€463,€78€L.€Ed.€934€(1934).€€There,€the€insured€died€after€sufferingÏsunstroke.€€The€majority€said€that€since€the€insured€voluntarily€exposed€himselfÏto€the€sun€and€there€were€no€unforeseen€intervening€causes,€the€death€was€notÏcaused€by€accidental€means.€€òòIdóó.,€291€U.S.€at€496,€54€S.€Ct.€at€462.€€JusticeÏCardozo€strongly€disagreed:Ì€ÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€attempted€distinction€between€accidental€results€andÏaccidental€means€will€plunge€this€branch€of€the€law€into€aÏSerbonian€Bog.€€Probably€it€is€true€to€say€that€in€the€strictest€senseÏand€dealing€with€the€region€of€physical€nature€there€is€no€suchÏthing€as€an€accident.€€.€.€.€On€the€other€hand,€the€average€man€isÏconvinced€that€there€is,€and€so€certainly€is€the€man€who€takes€outÏa€policy€of€accident€insurance.€€It€is€his€reading€of€the€policy€that€isÏto€be€accepted€as€our€guide,€with€the€help€of€the€established€ruleÏthat€ambiguities€and€uncertainties€are€to€be€resolved€against€theÏcompany.€€.€.€.€€When€a€man€has€died€in€such€a€way€that€his€deathÏis€spoken€of€as€an€accident,€he€has€died€because€of€an€accident,Ïand€hence€by€accidental€means.€€.€.€.€€If€there€was€no€accident€inÏthe€means,€there€was€none€in€the€result,€for€the€two€areÏinseparable.€€.€.€.€€There€was€an€accident€throughout,€or€there€wasÏno€accident€at€all.€€ÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.,€291€U.S.€at€499,€54€S.€Ct€at€463€(Cardozo,€J.,€dissenting).€€Justice€CardozoððsÏviews€in€dissent€have€now€gained€the€support€of€the€great€majority€ofÏjurisdictions.€€ÌÌà àProfessor€Appleman€also€illustrates€the€fallacy€of€the€distinction€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àAlmost€every€action€we€take€has€some€element€of€design;€if€weÏdrive€an€automobile€upon€the€highway,€where€another€collidedÏwith€us,€could€this€not€have€been€foreseeable,€or€at€least€within€theÏrealm€of€potential€so€far€as€the€ð ðmeansðð€were€concerned?€€EveryÏinstance€where€a€person€walks,€or€jumps,€and€slips€or€falls,€comesÏwithin€a€like€category.€€To€permit€a€rigid€construction€of€suchÏexpressions€is€to€permit€a€deception€to€be€practiced€upon€theÏpublic.€€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓ1A€Appleman,€òòInsurance€Law€&€Practiceóó,€ðð€363€at€p.€492€€(1981€&€Supp.€1995).€ÌÌà àAlthough€a€few€courts€in€other€jurisdictions€still€cling€to€the€distinction,× ƒ, ××  ×Ïmost€courts€have€either€abolished€the€distinction€or€refused€to€recognize€it€in€theÍfirst€place€when€considering€whether€a€particular€death€or€injury€is€accidental.× ƒ- ××  ×€ÏUnder€the€more€recent€cases,€the€unexpected€consequences€of€an€individualððsÏvoluntary€behavior€provide€the€accidental€element€for€purposes€of€an€insuranceÏpolicy.€€òòCarroll€v.€CUNA€Mut.€Ins.€Soc.óó,€894€P.2d€at€751.€ÌÌà àA€good€example€of€the€persuasive€analysis€used€in€such€cases€isÏprovided€by€the€Texas€Supreme€Court,€which€abandoned€the€distinctionÏbetween€"accidental€means"€and€"accidental€results,"€reasoning€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àTexas€courts€have€waded€through€Justice€Cardozoððs€SerbonianÏbog,€and€we€are€now€convinced€that€the€terms€ððaccidental€deathððÏand€ððdeath€by€accidental€meansðð€as€those€terms€are€used€inÍinsurance€policies,€must€be€regarded€as€legally€synonymousÏunless€there€is€a€definition€in€the€insurance€contract€itself€whichÏrequires€a€different€construction.€€These€terms€in€an€insuranceÏcontract€should€be€given€their€ordinary€and€popular€meaningÏaccording€to€the€understanding€of€the€average€man;€the€courtððsÏguide€should€not€be€the€technical€meaning€of€the€words€used,€butÏrather€the€intention€of€the€parties€as€inferred€from€the€contract€as€aÏwhole.€€ò òA€fine€distinction€between€means€and€resultsÏwould€never€occur€to€an€average€policyholder,€and€theÏinsurer€should€not€be€able€to€escape€liability€by€resortÏto€such€a€technical€definition.€€If€the€insurer€wishes€toÏdistinguish€between€accidental€results€and€injuriesÏcaused€by€accidental€means,€he€should€do€so€expressly,Ïso€as€to€give€the€policyholder€clear€notice€of€anyÏlimitations€of€liability€which€the€insurer€wishes€toÏimpose€by€use€of€the€latter€term.ó óÌÌÌÌòòÓÓRepublic€Nat.€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Heywardóó,€536€S.W.2d€at€557€(emphasis€added).€ÏLike€the€Texas€Supreme€Court,€almost€every€court€rejecting€or€abandoning€theÏdistinction€has€found€the€distinction€contrary€to€both€the€plain€meaning€of€theÏterms€and€the€understanding€and€reasonable€expectations€of€the€averageÏpolicyholder.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòCarroll€v.€CUNA€Mut.€Ins.€Soc.óó,€894€P.2d€at€753;€òòBuck€v.ÏGulf€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€548€So.€2d€at€718.€€In€addition,€many€courts€have€concludedÏthat€the€distinction€itself€arises€from€an€inappropriate€importation€of€the€tortÏconcept€of€foreseeability€into€private€insurance€contracts.ÌÌà àFor€example,€the€Michigan€Supreme€Court,€in€òòCollins€v.€Nationwide€LifeÏIns.óó,€explained€that€ð ðneither€the€level€of€foreseeability€requisite€for€tort€liabilityÏnor€for€criminal€recklessness€is€sufficient€to€render€a€mishap€a€'œnonaccident›'Ïwhen€conduct€is€measured€against€the€terms€of€an€accidental€death€insuranceÏpolicy.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€294€N.W.2d€at€196.€€In€a€similar€fashion,€the€Kentucky€SupremeÏCourt€observed€that€the€ð ðfundamental€flawðð€with€the€distinction€betweenÏaccidental€means€and€accidental€results€is€ð ðthat€it€subjects€contract€terms€toÏanalysis€under€tort€principles,€such€as€fault€and€foreseeability.ðð€€òòFryman€v.€PilotÏLife€Ins.€Co.óó,€704€S.W.2d€at€206.€€In€rejecting€the€distinction,€the€Kentucky€CourtÏsaid€ð ðwe€are€reluctant€to€analyze€contract€terms€under€principles€which€haveÏtechnical€meaning€in€other€areas€of€the€law.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àAfter€careful€consideration€and€a€thorough€review€of€the€cases€on€theÏsubject,€we€are€persuaded€that€the€better€reasoned,€more€logical€approach€is€toÏabandon€the€distinction€between€"accidental€means"€and€"accidental€results."€ÏTennessee,€therefore,€joins€the€growing€number€of€jurisdictions€which€haveÏemerged€from€the€ð ðSerbonian€bog.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€analysis€used€in€construing€insurance€contracts€is€well€settled.€€LikeÏother€contracts,€insurance€contracts€should€be€construed€so€as€to€give€effect€toÍthe€intention€and€express€language€of€the€parties.€€òòTata€v.€Nicholsóó,€848€S.W.2dÏ649,€650€(Tenn.€1993).€€Words€in€an€insurance€policy€are€given€their€commonÏand€ordinary€meaning,€with€ambiguous€language€construed€against€theÏinsurance€company€and€in€favor€of€the€insured.€€òòIdóó.€€The€distinction€we€hadÏadopted€in€òòDistrettióó€is€contrary€to€those€now€familiar€rules€of€construction.€€In€ourÏview,€an€insured€should€not€have€to€consult€a€long€line€of€case€law€or€lawÏreview€articles€and€treatises€to€determine€the€coverage€he€or€she€is€purchasingÏunder€an€insurance€policy.€€Policy€language€should€be€given€its€plain€meaning,Ïunless€a€technical€meaning€is€clearly€provided€in€the€insurance€policy.€€òòElsner€v.ÏWalkeróó,€879€S.W.2d€852€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€As€the€Texas€Supreme€CourtÏrecognized,€it€is€inconceivable€that€the€average€insured€would€understand€theÏfine€distinction€between€"accidental€means"€and€"accidental€results."€€ÌÌà àIn€addition,€we€agree€that€the€importation€of€the€tort€principle€ofÏforeseeability€into€the€interpretation€of€a€private€insurance€contract€isÏinappropriate.€€As€Justice€Mosk€observed€in€dissent€in€òòWeil€v.€Federal€KemperÏLife€Assur.€Co.óó,€ð ð[œt]he›€insurance€company€does€not€represent€the€public€safetyÏconcerns€of€society€but€the€commercial€interest€of€its€owners.€€Nor€was€theÏcompany€forced€to€issue€the€policy;€it€voluntarily€did€so€for€the€purpose€ofÏprofiting€from€the€transaction.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€866€P.2d€at€806.€€Insurance€companies€draftÍthe€policies€they€sell€and€are,€therefore,€free€to€exclude€injury€or€death€thatÏresults€from€reckless€and€foolhardy€acts.€€With€simplicity€and€clarity€ofÏexpression€they€may€remove€all€doubt.€€òòKnight€v.€Metropolitan€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€437ÏP.2d€at€420.€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€òòDistrettióó,€its€progenitors€and€progeny€are€overruled.€€FromÏthis€day€forward,€in€Tennessee€law€there€is€no€distinction€between€"accidentalÏdeath"€and€death€by€"accidental€means"€in€determining€coverage€under€anÏinsurance€policy.€€Instead,€if€death€is€the€unanticipated€and€unexpected€result€ofÏan€intentional,€voluntary€act,€it€is€accidental€in€the€ordinary€and€plain€sense€ofÏthe€word€and€recovery€is€available€under€an€accidental€death€insurance€policy.€€ÌAccidental€deaths€or€injuries€which€are€included€within€this€definition,€but€whichÏthe€insurance€company€does€not€intend€be€covered,€can€be€specificallyÏexcluded€in€the€insurance€policy.ÌÌà àWhere,€as€here,€the€insured€died€as€the€result€of€an€intentional€act,€suchÏas€voluntary€intoxication,€but€did€not€intend€or€expect€death€to€result,€such€deathÏis€accidental€for€the€purposes€of€an€accidental€death€policy.€€Accordingly,€weÏconclude€that€Robin€Harrellððs€death€resulted€from€an€ð ðaccidental€injury€whichÏwas€unintended,€unexpected€and€unforeseen.ððÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àBecause€we€conclude€that€the€distinction€between€ð ðaccidental€meansððÏand€ð ðaccidental€resultsðð€is€illusory,€for€the€reasons€previously€articulated,€weÏabandon€the€distinction.€€Accordingly,€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€judgment€isÏreversed,€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€entry€of€judgment€inÏfavor€of€the€plaintiff,€Danny€Ray€Harrell.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€theÏdefendant,€The€Minnesota€Life€Insurance€Company,€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àRILEY€ANDERSON,€JUSTICEÌÌÌò òCONCUR:Ìó óÌBirch,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Reid,€and€White,€JJ.ÌÌÌà à