ÿWPCu  4# è %ó 0 (ù4!5 0ÆD 0D UNN 0Jœ 0TæU::w@t 0^´ 0h 0rz 0|ì 0†h 0î 1u~ U,ó 0d ƒ B‹ U,¨ U>Ô U* U*< èf ÝN{+b¦A®gïÎVv~$vÓ¢˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0  X($¡¡#g 3|x= (v(2T$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X×—XX XÔÔ€òø™òXX×—ÔÒ°ÒÒ„°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular 2 P3 U4 D5 U6 D7 D8 D9 : = a2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times ÞÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€In€its€application€for€permission€to€appeal€the€State€requested€that€this€Court€reconsider€itsÏholding€in€òòState€v.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992).€€However,€the€State€in€its€brief€to€theÏCourt€has€expressed€its€intention€to€no€longer€pursue€that€issue€in€light€of€òòState€v.€Bigbeeóó,€885ÏS.W.2d€797€(Tenn.€1994),€which€reaffirmed€the€holding€in€òòMiddlebrooksóó.€€In€any€event,€a€majority€ofÏthis€Court€as€presently€constituted€also€reaffirms€the€holding€in€òòMiddlebrooksóó.€Ì ÓÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Harris€was€also€convicted€of€especially€aggravated€robbery€and€aggravated€burglary.€€The€trialÏcourt€imposed€sentences€of€twenty„five€and€six€years,€respectively,€on€each€of€those€convictions,Ïwhich€are€not€at€issue€in€this€appeal.€€Ì qÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€The€statute€provides:€"The€murder€was€committed€while€the€defendant€was€engaged€inÏcommitting,€or€was€an€accomplice€in€the€commission€of,€or€was€attempting€to€commit,€or€was€fleeingÏafter€committing€or€attempting€to€commit,€any€first€degree€murder,€arson,€rape,€robbery,€burglary,€theft,Ïkidnaping,€aircraft€piracy,€or€unlawful€throwing,€placing€or€discharging€a€destructive€device€or€bomb."Ì- ù- 7Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòBenton€v.€Marylandóó,€395€U.S.€784,€89€S.Ct.€2056,€23€L.Ed.2d€707€(1969).Ì ]Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòState€v.€Maupin›óó,€859€S.W.2d€313,€315€(Tenn.€1993);€òòœLavon›€v.€Stateóó,€586€S.W.2d€112,€114Ï(Tenn.€1979).Ì ÄÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Contrary€to€the€dissent's€characterization€of€this€Court's€decision€in€òòState€v.€Branamóó,€855ÏS.W.2d€563€(Tenn.€1993),€we€have€never€previously€held€that€resentencing€is€precluded€inÏcircumstances€such€as€those€presented€in€this€appeal.€€Relief€was€granted€in€òòBranamóó€ò òsolely€ó óbecauseÏthe€death€sentence€was€disproportionate€under€both€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€We€simplyÏheld€that€under€state€and€federal€law€ð ðdeath€is€a€disproportionate€penalty€.€.€.€where€it€is€imposedÏagainst€a€defendant€solely€for€participation€in€a€robbery€in€which€another€robber€takes€life,€withoutÏproof€that€the€defendant€himself€attempted€or€intended€to€kill€or€intended€that€lethal€force€be€used.ðð€ÏòòIdóó.,€at€570.€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€''X„d&ÓÑ#€''Xd#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€.ÑÑ7€XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€)ÔòòØ ØÓ&€**XÐd&Ó›œ›à@ àóóIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONòòÌÌÌóóœà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€à à€€€òòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONó óÌ›ÌóóSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àœ)à à€€òòò òFiled:€April€15,€1996ó ó›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóó)Ìà àAppellant,à àà àà àà à)à àœ€€€SHELBY›€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœHON.›€œJOSEPH€B.€McCARTIE,›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àœ€€€€à à€€€€€JUDGE›ÌœTIM0THY›€D.€HARRIS€andà àà àà à)à àÌCRAIG€THOMPSON,à àà àà àœ)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)à àNo.€02S01„9410„CR„00071€and›Ìà àAppellees.à àà àà àà àœ)à àNo.€02S01„9410„CR„00075›Ì̛̜ÌÌòòò òFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àà àFor€Appellee€Harris:ó óÌÌóóCharles€W.€œBurson›à àà àà àà àà àHarry€U.€œScruggs›ÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌÌœAmy€L.€Tarkingtonà àà àà àà àà àDavid€C.€StebbinsÌChristina›€S.€œShevalier›à àà àà àà àœ(formerly€with€the€Capital€Case›ÌAssistant€œAttorneys›€Generalà àà àà àœ€€€€Resource€Center)ÌNashville,€Tennesseeà à›à àà àà àœColumbus,€Ohio›ÌœÌGlenn€I.€Wrightà à›à àà àà àà àò òòòFor€Appellee€œThompson:óóó ó›ÌœGerald€HarrisÌPaul€F.€Goodmanà àà àà àà àà àJohn€G.€OlivaÌAssistant€District€Attorneys›à àà àà àœNashville,€Tennessee›ÌœMemphis,€Tennessee›Ìœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDavid€C.€StebbinsÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(formerly€with€the€Capital€Case€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€ÏResource€Center)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àColumbus,€Ohio›ÌÌœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCarolyn€WatkinsÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àEdward€G.€ThompsonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Public€DefendersÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€Tennessee›ÌœÌÌ̛̜›à@ àò òÔ€)„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€)¼Ôó óÌÔ€)XÔÌÌÌœ›ÌœREVERSED›€AND€REMANDED.à àà àà àà àà àANDERSON,€C.J.à à€ò òÌÑ P ÑÑ ` ÑÓÓòòà àóóó óThe€single× ƒ+ ××  ×€issue€in€this€consolidated€appeal€is€purely€a€question€of€law€andÏrequires€a€determination€of€whether€a€remand€for€resentencing€is€appropriate€whenÏan€appellate€court€in€a€capital€case€concludes€the€sole€aggravating€circumstanceÏfound€by€the€original€sentencing€jury€is€legally€invalid€and€sets€aside€the€sentenceÏof€death.€€Because€there€is€no€legal€principle€which€precludes€the€State€fromÏseeking€the€death€penalty€upon€resentencing,€a€remand€for€that€purpose€isÏappropriate.€€Accordingly,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals'€judgments€modifying€theÍsentences€to€life€imprisonment€are€reversed€and€the€cases€remanded€to€theÏrespective€trial€courts€for€resentencing.€€€€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àIn€separate€trials€in€the€Shelby€County€Criminal€Court,€the€defendants,ÏTimothy€D.€Harris€and€Craig€Thompson,€were€each€convicted€of€first„degree€felonyÏmurder€during€the€course€of€a€robbery,€and€sentenced€to€death.€€ÌÌà àAs€to€Harris,€the€proof€introduced€by€the€State€established€that€on€theÏevening€of€May€29,€1990,€Jack€Thomas€was€shot€to€death€as€he€sat€in€his€carÏoutside€his€home€in€Memphis.€€The€incident€began€when€four€young€menÏapproached€Thomas€as€he€was€placing€some€items€in€his€car.€€At€least€two€of€theÏmen€were€armed.€€When€Thomas€realized€that€the€men€intended€to€rob€him,€heÏjumped€in€his€car€and€closed€the€door.€€Thomas€suffered€eight€gunshot€wounds€inÏthe€attack,€during€which€the€rear€window€of€his€car€was€shattered€by€gunfire.€ÏThomas's€girlfriend,€who€was€inside€the€house€at€the€time,€identified€the€defendantÏas€one€of€the€four€young€men€she€saw€approach.€€She€did€not€see€the€defendantÍwith€a€gun,€but€saw€another€of€the€men€shoot€Thomas€four€times.€€While€she€hidÏinside€the€house,€three€of€the€men€ransacked€the€bedroom.€€During€this€time,ÏThomas€was€shot€several€times€at€close€range.€€€€€A€cellular€phone€and€goldÏnecklace€were€taken€in€the€robbery.€€Although€Harris€admitted€participation€in€theÏburglary€and€in€planning€the€robbery,€he€claimed€that€he€was€unarmed€and€did€notÏshoot€Thomas.€€While€the€identity€of€the€person€who€shot€Thomas€was€neverÏdefinitively€established,€Harris's€fingerprint€was€lifted€from€the€passenger€door€ofÏthe€victim's€car.€€The€jury€convicted€Harris,€based€on€that€evidence,€of€felonyÏmurder€committed€during€the€course€of€a€robbery.œ× ƒ, ××  ×›ÌÌà àAt€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€State€relied€on€evidence€presented€duringÏtrial€and€testimony€from€the€victim's€mother.€€Harris€testified€in€his€own€behalf,Ïadmitting€that€he€had€instigated€the€robbery,€but€claiming€that€he€had€neverÏintended€that€Thomas€be€shot.€€He€expressed€remorse€and€regret€for€whatÏhappened.€€The€defense€also€relied€on€testimony€from€the€defendant's€aunt.€€At€theÍtime€of€the€killing,€Harris€was€twenty€years€old,€a€high€school€graduate€with€no€priorÏcriminal€record.ÌÌà àBased€on€the€proof,€the€jury€imposed€the€death€penalty€after€finding€that€theÏState€had€proven,€beyond€a€reasonable,€doubt€that€the€murder€had€occurredÏduring€the€commission€of€a€robbery€and€that€the€aggravating€circumstanceÏoutweighed€the€mitigating€factors.€€ÌÌà àAs€to€Craig€Thompson,€the€proof€introduced€at€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trialÏestablished€that€on€December€16,€1990,€Thompson€entered€a€Delta€ExpressÏMarket€in€Memphis€and€shot€to€death€the€clerk,€Carrie€Lee€Walker.€€A€second€clerkÏwho€had€fled€to€the€back€of€the€store€identified€Thompson€as€a€person€matching€theÏdescription€of€the€killer,€while€a€customer€identified€Thompson€as€the€man€whoÏcame€out€of€the€store€with€a€gun€in€his€hand.€€In€addition,€the€homicide€wasÏvideotaped€by€a€security€camera,€and€the€jury€saw€the€tape€and€photographs€madeÏfrom€it.€€Thompson€also€admitted€shooting€the€clerk€to€the€driver€of€the€get„away€carÍand€to€a€friend,€but€claimed€that€the€clerk€was€trying€to€shoot€him.€€The€juryÏconvicted€Thompson€of€felony€murder€during€the€commission€of€a€robbery.ÌÌà àAt€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€State€relied€on€the€proof€presented€at€trial€andÏin€addition,€introduced€testimony€from€Walker's€sister.€€Testifying€for€the€defense,ÏThompson's€mother€said€that€he€was€eighteen€or€nineteen€years€old€at€the€time€ofÏthe€killing,€had€no€prior€criminal€record,€and€had€been€a€well„behaved€honorÏstudent€from€a€stable€family€until€he€came€to€Tennessee€and€joined€the€Navy€at€ageÏseventeen.ÌÌà àBased€on€the€proof,€the€jury€imposed€the€death€penalty€after€finding€that€theÏState€had€proven,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€that€the€murder€had€beenÏcommitted€during€the€commission€of€a€robbery,€and€that€the€aggravatingÏcircumstance€outweighed€the€mitigating€factors.€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€during€the€sentencing€phase€of€each€case,€the€State€presentedÏproof€to€establish€the€aggravating€circumstance€that€the€killing€occurred€during€theÏcourse€of€a€robbery.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(I)(7)(1991€Repl.).× ƒ- ××  ×ÌÌà àEach€defendant€separately€appealed€to€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏraising€numerous€issues€for€review.€€The€intermediate€court,€in€each€case,€affirmedÏthe€conviction,€but€reversed€the€sentence€of€death€concluding€that€the€jury'sÏreliance€on€the€felony€murder€aggravating€circumstance€at€the€sentencing€hearingÏwas€contrary€to€òòMiddlebrooksóó.€€In€that€case,€this€Court€held€that,€when€a€defendantÏis€convicted€of€felony€murder,€the€State's€use€of€felony€murder€as€an€aggravatingÏcircumstance€at€the€sentencing€hearing€violates€Article€I,€Section€16,€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution€because€the€aggravating€circumstance€is€a€duplication€ofÏthe€crime€itself€and€does€not€narrow€the€class€of€death„eligible€defendants€as€isÏconstitutionally€required.€€Reasoning€that€resentencing€is€precluded€because€theÍsentencing€jury€relied€upon€only€one€aggravating€circumstance€which€was€legallyÏinvalid€to€support€imposition€of€the€death€penalty,€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏmodified€the€sentence€in€each€case€to€life€imprisonment.€€The€State€filedÏapplications€for€permission€to€appeal,€which€were€granted,€and€thereafter,€theÏcases€were€consolidated€for€hearing€and€decision.€€For€the€reasons€that€follow,€theÏjudgments€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€modifying€each€sentence€to€lifeÏimprisonment€are€reversed€and€the€cases€remanded€to€the€respective€trial€courtsÏfor€resentencing.ÌÌà@ àòòò òDOUBLE€JEOPARDYóóó óÌà àResolution€of€the€issue€in€this€appeal€requires€œa›€review€of€€well„settledÏprinciples€of€double€jeopardy€jurisprudence.€€The€Fifth€Amendment€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€is€applicable€to€the€states€through€the€Fourteenth€AmendmentÏDue€Process€Clause,× ƒ/ ××  ×€and€provides€that€no€person€shall€"be€subject€to€the€sameÏoffense€to€be€twice€put€in€jeopardy€of€life€or€limb."€€Similarly,€Article€I,€Section€10€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Constitution€provides€"[t]hat€no€person€shall,€for€the€same€offence,Íbe€twice€put€in€jeopardy€of€life€or€limb."€€€The€double€jeopardy€provisions€of€theÏstate€and€federal€constitutions€have€heretofore€been€interpreted€as€co„extensive.× ƒ0 ××  ×€ÏThe€double€jeopardy€clauses€wereÌÌÓÓà8 àdesigned€to€protect€an€individual€from€being€subjected€to€the€hazardsÏof€trial€and€possible€conviction€more€than€once€for€an€alleged€offense.Ï.€.€.€€The€underlying€idea,€one€that€is€deeply€ingrained€in€at€least€theÏAnglo„American€system€of€jurisprudence,€is€that€the€State€with€all€its€Ïresources€and€power€should€not€be€allowed€to€make€repeatedÏattempts€to€convict€an€individual€for€an€alleged€offense,€therebyÏsubjecting€him€to€embarrassment,€expense€and€ordeal€andÏcompelling€him€to€live€in€a€continuing€state€of€anxiety€and€insecurity,Ïas€well€as€enhancing€the€possibility€that€even€though€innocent€heÏmay€be€found€guilty.ÌÓÓÌÌòòGreen€v.€United€Statesóó,€355€U.S.€184,€187„88,€78€S.Ct.€221,€223„24,€2€L.Ed.2d€199Ï(1957);€òòState€v.€œMaupin›óó,€859€S.W.2d€at€315;€òòState€v.€Knightóó,€616€S.W.2d€593,€595Ï(Tenn.€1981).ÌÌà àThe€double€jeopardy€guarantee€affords€three€separate€constitutionalÏprotections€against,€1)€a€second€prosecution€for€the€same€offense€after€acquittal;€2)Ïa€second€prosecution€for€the€same€offense€after€conviction;€and€3)€multipleÏpunishments€for€the€same€offense.€€òòNorth€Carolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395€U.S.€711,€716,Ï89€S.Ct.€2072,€2076,€23€L.Ed.2d€656€(1969);€òòState€v.€Mounceóó,€859€S.W.2d€319,Ï321€(Tenn.€1993).€€In€application,€these€protections€forbid€retrial€of€a€defendant€whoÏhas€been€acquitted€and,€when€a€conviction€has€been€set€aside€because€ofÏinsufficiency€of€the€evidence,€double€jeopardy€forbids€giving€the€prosecutionÏ"another€opportunity€to€supply€evidence€which€it€failed€to€muster€in€the€firstÏproceeding."€€òòBurks€v.€United€Statesóó,€437€U.S.€1,€11,€98€S.Ct.€2141,€2147,€57ÏL.Ed.2d€1€(1978).ÌÌà àWhen€a€defendant€obtains€a€new€trial€through€a€successful€appeal€on€someÏbasis€other€than€insufficiency€of€the€evidence,€however,€double€jeopardy€does€notÏpreclude€a€retrial€of€the€defendant.€€òòIdóó.;€òòBall€v.€United€Statesóó,€163€U.S.€662,€16€S.Ct.Ï1192,€41€L.Ed.€300€(1896);€òòState€v.€Campbellóó,€641€S.W.2d€890,€893€(Tenn.€1982).€ÏThe€rationale€for€allowing€retrial€in€such€circumstances€was€aptly€explained€in€ÍòòUnited€States€v.€Tateoóó,€377€U.S.€463,€84€S.Ct.€1587,€12€L.Ed.2d€448€(1964),€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àWhile€different€theories€have€been€advanced€to€support€theÏpermissibility€of€retrial,€of€greater€importance€than€the€conceptualÏabstractions€employed€to€explain€the€òòBallóó€principle€are€theÏimplications€of€that€principle€for€the€sound€administration€of€justice.€ÏCorresponding€to€the€right€of€an€accused€to€be€given€a€fair€trial€is€theÏsocietal€interest€in€punishing€one€whose€guilt€is€clear€after€he€hasÏobtained€such€a€trial.€€It€would€be€a€high€price€indeed€for€society€toÏpay€were€every€accused€granted€immunity€from€punishment€becauseÏof€any€defect€sufficient€to€constitute€reversible€error€in€the€proceedingsÏleading€to€conviction.€€From€the€standpoint€of€a€defendant,€it€is€at€leastÏdoubtful€that€appellate€courts€would€be€as€zealous€as€they€now€are€inÏprotecting€against€the€effects€of€improprieties€at€the€trial€or€pretrialÏstage€if€they€knew€that€reversal€of€a€conviction€would€put€the€accusedÏirrevocably€beyond€the€reach€of€further€prosecution.€€In€reality,Ïtherefore,€the€practice€of€retrial€serves€defendants'€rights€as€well€asÏsociety's€interest.Ìà8 àÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.,€377€U.S.€at€466,€84€S.Ct.€at€1589.€€Accordingly,€no€constitutional€provisionÏprevents€retrial€after€a€reversal€for€legal€error.€€Moreover,€"upon€appellate€reversalÏof€a€conviction€the€Government€is€not€limited€at€a€new€trial€to€evidence€presented€atÏthe€first€trial,€but€is€free€to€strengthen€its€case€in€any€way€it€can€by€the€introduction€ofÏnew€evidence."€òòPickens€v.€Stateóó,€730€S.W.2d€230,€235€(Ark.€1987),€quoting,€òòUnitedÍStates€v.€Shotwell€Mfg.€Coóó.,€355€U.S.€233,€243,€78€S.Ct.€245,€252,€2€L.Ed.2d€234Ï(1957).€€ÌÌà àA€well„settled€corollary€of€the€power€to€retry€a€defendant€is€the€power,€upon€aÏdefendant's€reconviction,€to€impose€whatever€sentence€may€be€legally€authorized,Ïwhether€or€not€it€is€greater€than€the€sentence€imposed€after€the€first€conviction.€ÏòòNorth€Carolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395€U.S.€at€720,€89€S.Ct.€at€2078.€€Imposition€of€aÏparticular€sentence€usually€is€not€regarded€as€an€"acquittal"€of€another€more€severeÏsentence€that€could€have€been€imposed.€€Thus,€the€double€jeopardy€protectionÏimposes€no€absolute€prohibition€on€the€imposition€of€a€harsher€sentence€at€retrialÏafter€a€defendant€has€succeeded€in€having€the€original€conviction€set€aside.€€òòNorthÏCarolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395€U.S.€at€720,€89€S.Ct.€at€2078;€òòUnited€State€v.€DiFrancescoóó,Ï449€U.S.€117,€133€and€137„38,€101€S.Ct.€426,€435€and€437„38,€66€L.Ed.2d€328Ï(1980).€€This€principle€is€generally€known€as€the€"clean€slate€rule"€and€€"restsÏultimately€on€the€premise€that€the€original€conviction€has,€at€the€defendant's€behest,Ïbeen€wholly€nullified€and€the€slate€wiped€clean."€€òòNorth€Carolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395ÏU.S.€at€721,€89€S.Ct.€at€2078.€€Therefore,€upon€retrial,€the€constitutional€guaranteeÍagainst€double€jeopardy€does€not€prohibit€imposition€of€a€legally€authorizedÏsentence,€whether€or€not€it€is€greater€than€the€sentence€imposed€after€the€firstÏconviction.€ÌÌà àOne€exception€to€the€"clean€slate€rule"€has€been€recognized€by€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court€in€the€context€of€bifurcated€capital€prosecution€andÏsentencing€proceedings.€€In€òòBullington€v.€Missourióó,€451€U.S.€430,€101€S.Ct.€1852,Ï68€L.Ed.2d€270€(1981),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that,€a€defendantÏsentenced€to€life€imprisonment€rather€than€death€is€protected€by€the€DoubleÏJeopardy€Clause€against€re„imposition€of€the€death€penalty€when€the€defendantÏobtains€a€reversal€of€the€underlying€conviction,€and€is€retried€and€reconvicted.€€InÏso€holding,€the€Court€acknowledged€the€"clean€slate"€rule,€but€determined€that€theÏrule€is€"inapplicable€whenever€a€jury€agrees€or€an€appellate€court€decides€that€theÏprosecution€has€not€proved€its€case."€€òòIdóó.,€451€U.S.€at€443,€101€S.Ct.€at€1860.€ÏAlthough€recognizing€that€it€is€usually€"impossible€to€conclude€that€a€sentence€lessÏthan€the€statutory€maximum€'œconstitute[s›]€a€decision€to€the€effect€that€theÏgovernment€has€failed€to€prove€its€case,'"€òòidóó.,€(quoting€òòBurks€v.€United€Statesóó,€437Íat€15,€98€S.Ct.€at€2149),€the€Court€found€that€Missouri,€by€"enacting€a€capitalÏsentencing€procedure€that€resembles€a€trial€on€the€issue€of€guilt€or€innocence,€.€.€.€Ïòòexplicitly€requiresóó€the€jury€to€determine€whether€the€prosecution€has€'proved€itsÏcase.'"€€òòIdóó.,€451€U.S.€at€444,€191€S.Ct.€at€1861€(emphasis€in€original).€€Therefore,Ïthe€Court€determined€that€the€jury's€decision€to€sentence€Bullington€to€lifeÏimprisonment€after€his€first€conviction€amounted€to€an€"acquittal"€of€the€deathÏpenalty€under€the€Double€Jeopardy€Clause€which€eliminated€death€from€theÏpunishment€options€available€at€resentencing.ÌÌà àLikewise,€in€òòArizona€v.€Rumseyóó,€467€U.S.€203,€104€S.Ct.€2305,€81€L.Ed.2dÏ164€(1984),€the€Court€applied€the€òòBullingtonóó€principle,€and€held€that€resentencingÏis€barred€following€imposition€of€a€life€sentence,€even€if€imposition€of€the€lifeÏsentence€is€based€on€legal€error.€€In€òòRumseyóó,€an€Arizona€trial€judge€erroneouslyÏconstrued€a€statutory€aggravating€circumstance,€concluded€that€the€State€hadÏfailed€to€prove€the€existence€of€an€aggravating€circumstance,€and€imposed€a€lifeÏsentence.€€Concluding€that€the€trial€court€had€misconstrued€the€aggravatingÍcircumstance,€the€Arizona€Supreme€Court€set€aside€the€life€sentence€andÏremanded€for€resentencing.€ÌÌà àAt€the€resentencing€hearing,€the€State€again€sought,€and€this€time,€obtainedÏthe€death€penalty,€but€on€appeal,€the€Arizona€Supreme€Court,€in€light€of€òòBullingtonóó,Ïdetermined€that€imposition€of€the€death€sentence€violated€the€constitutionalÏprohibition€against€double€jeopardy.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€affirmed,€concluding€that€the€"initialÏsentence€of€life€imprisonment€was€undoubtedly€an€acquittal€on€the€merits€of€theÏcentral€issue€in€the€proceeding„„whether€death€was€the€appropriate€punishmentÏ...."€€òòArizona€v.€Rumseyóó,€467€U.S.€at€211,€104€S.Ct.€at€2310.€€In€so€holding,€theÏCourt€emphasized€that€the€double€jeopardy€effects€of€the€judgment€that€amountedÏto€an€acquittal€on€the€merits€was€not€altered€because€imposition€of€the€life€sentenceÏresulted€from€an€erroneous€interpretation€of€governing€legal€principles.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àMore€recently,€in€òòPoland€v.€Arizonaóó,€476€U.S.€147,€106€S.Ct.€1749,€90ÏL.Ed.2d€123€(1986),€the€scope€and€application€of€the€òòBullingtonóó€rule€was€furtherÏdelineated.€€In€that€case,€the€State€argued€at€the€penalty€phase€of€the€defendants'Ïcapital€murder€trial€the€existence€of€two€aggravating€circumstances:€(1)€the€murderÏwas€committed€for€pecuniary€gain;€and€(2)€the€murder€was€especially€heinous,Ïcruel€or€depraved.€€The€sentencing€judge€imposed€the€death€penalty,€finding€theÏheinous,€cruel,€or€depraved€factor€to€exist,€but€rejecting€the€pecuniary€gain€factorÏbecause,€as€in€òòRumseyóó,€the€sentencing€judge€interpreted€it€as€only€applying€toÏcontract€killings.€€€€In€the€event€that€limiting€construction€was€inaccurate,€however,Ïthe€sentencing€judge€in€òòPolandóó€alternatively€found€the€evidence€sufficient€toÏestablish€the€pecuniary€gain€aggravating€circumstance.€€òòIdóó.,€476€U.S.€at€149,€106ÏS.Ct.€at€1752.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€Arizona€Supreme€Court€reversed€the€convictions€because€ofÏtrial€error€and€remanded€for€a€new€trial.€€With€regard€to€the€penalty€phase,€the€courtÏfound€the€evidence€insufficient€to€support€the€heinous,€cruel,€or€depravedÍcircumstance,€but€held€that€the€pecuniary€gain€factor€was€not€limited€to€contractÏkillings€and€determined€that€factor€could€be€considered€at€resentencing.ÌÌà àThe€defendants€were€retried,€reconvicted€and€again€sentenced€to€death.€ÏThe€trial€judge€found€both€the€especially€heinous,€cruel€or€depraved,€and€theÏpecuniary€gain€aggravating€circumstances€to€be€present.€€On€appeal,€theÏdefendants€challenged€the€State's€use€of€the€pecuniary€gain€factor,€which€was€notÏfound€at€the€original€trial.€€While€again€finding€the€evidence€insufficient€to€supportÏthe€heinous,€cruel€or€depraved€factor,€the€Arizona€Supreme€Court€upheld€theÏpecuniary€gain€factor€and,€after€weighing€the€aggravating€and€mitigatingÏcircumstances,€concluded€that€the€death€penalty€was€appropriate.€€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€granted€review€and€rejected€theÏdefendants'€contention€that€a€capital€sentencer's€failure€to€find€a€particularÏaggravating€circumstance€alleged€by€the€prosecution€constitutes€an€acquittal€of€thatÏcircumstance€for€double€jeopardy€purposes.€€òòPoland€v.€Arizonaóó,€476€U.S.€at€155,Ï106€S.Ct.€at€1755.€€The€òòPolandóó€court€reiterated€that€the€proper€inquiry€underÍòòBullingtonóó€is€whether€the€sentencer€or€reviewing€court€has€concluded€that€theÏprosecution€failed€to€prove€its€case€that€death€is€the€appropriate€punishment.€€òòIdóó.€ÏThe€Court€refused€to€extend€òòBullingtonóó€and€view€the€capital€sentencing€proceedingÏas€a€set€of€mini€trials€on€the€existence€of€each€aggravating€circumstance,€òòidóó.,€476ÏU.S.€at€156,€106€S.Ct.€at€1755,€but€instead€concluded€that€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà à[œa]ggravating›€circumstances€are€not€separate€penalties€orÏoffenses,€but€are€standards€to€guide€the€making€of€the€choiceÏbetween€the€alternative€verdicts€of€death€or€life€imprisonment.€€Thus,Ïunder€Arizona's€capital€sentencing€scheme,€the€judge's€finding€of€anyÏparticular€aggravating€circumstance€does€not€of€itself€"convict"€aÏdefendant€(i.e.,€require€the€death€penalty),€and€the€failure€to€find€anyÏparticular€aggravating€circumstance€does€not€"acquit"€a€defendantÏ(òòi.e.óó,€preclude€the€death€penalty).ÌÌà8 àà àIt€is€true€that€the€sentencer€must€find€òòsomeóó€aggravatingÏcircumstance€before€the€death€penalty€may€be€imposed,€and€that€theÏsentencer's€finding,€albeit€erroneous,€that€no€aggravatingÏcircumstance€is€present€is€an€"acquittal"€barring€a€second€deathÏsentence€proceeding.€€This€is€because€the€law€attaches€particularÏsignificance€to€an€acquittal.€€To€permit€a€second€trial€after€an€acquittal,Ïhowever€mistaken€the€acquittal€may€have€been,€would€present€anÏunacceptably€high€risk€that€the€Government,€with€its€vastly€superiorÏresources,€might€wear€down€the€defendant€so€that€even€thoughÏinnocent€he€may€be€found€guilty.€€This€concern€with€protecting€theÏfinality€of€acquittals€is€not€implicated€when,€as€in€these€cases,€aÏdefendant€is€sentenced€to€death,€òòi.e.óó,€"convicted."€€There€is€no€causeÍto€shield€such€a€defendant€from€further€litigation;€further€litigation€isÏthe€only€hope€he€has.€€The€defendant€may€argue€on€appeal€that€theÏevidence€presented€at€his€sentencing€hearing€was€as€a€matter€of€lawÏinsufficient€to€support€the€aggravating€circumstances€on€which€hisÏdeath€sentence€was€based,€but€the€Double€Jeopardy€Clause€does€notÏrequire€the€reviewing€court,€if€it€sustains€that€claim,€to€ignore€evidenceÏin€the€record€supporting€another€aggravating€circumstance€which€theÏsentencer€has€erroneously€rejected.€€Such€a€rule€would€have€the€oddÏand€unacceptable€result€of€requiring€a€reviewing€court€to€enter€aÏdeath€penalty€"acquittal"€even€though€that€court€is€of€the€view€that€theÏState€has€proved€its€case.€€ÌÌÌÓÓòòPoland€v.€Arizonaóó,€476€U.S.€at€156„57,€106€S.Ct.€at€1755„56€(emphasis€inÏoriginal)(internal€quotations€and€citations€omitted).ÌÌà àBased€on€that€reasoning,€the€Court€in€òòPolandóó€concluded€that€the€trial€court'sÏoriginal€rejection€of€the€pecuniary€gain€factor€did€not€bar€resentencing€since€neitherÏthe€sentencing€judge€nor€the€reviewing€court€found€the€evidence€legally€insufficientÏto€justify€imposition€of€the€death€penalty.€€Therefore,€the€Double€Jeopardy€ClauseÏ"did€not€foreclose€a€second€sentencing€hearing€at€which€the€'clean€slate'€ruleÏapplied."€€òòPoland€v.€Arizonaóó,€476€U.S.€at€157,€106€S.Ct.€at€1756.ÌÌà àAfter€consideration€of€the€foregoing€authorities,€we€conclude€thatÏresentencing€in€these€consolidated€cases€is€not€prohibited€by€either€the€state€orÏfederal€constitutional€prohibition€against€double€jeopardy.€€The€determinativeÏinquiry€under€òòBullingtonóó,€òòRumseyóó,€and€òòPolandóó,€œis:›€œWere›€the€defendants€acquittedÏon€the€merits€of€the€central€issue€in€the€proceeding€„„€whether€death€is€theÏappropriate€punishment?€€The€answer€to€that€inquiry€is€clear.€€The€dissent€fails€toÏrecognize€that€unlike€òòBullingtonóó€or€òòRumseyóó,€the€defendants€in€this€appeal€wereÏinitially€sentenced€to€death,€and€have€not€been€acquitted€of€the€death€penalty.€€TheÏState€did€not€fail€to€prove€its€case€that€death€is€the€appropriate€punishment.€€TheÏerror€present€is€a€legal€error,€not€a€matter€of€insufficient€evidence.€€ÌÌà àBecause€there€has€been€no€acquittal,€a€remand€for€resentencing€is€notÏprecluded.€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€recognized,€a€correspondingÏinterest€to€the€fair€trial€right€of€an€accused€is€society's€interest€in€punishing€one€whoÏhas€been€found€guilty€at€trial.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Tateoóó,€377€U.S.€at€466,€84€S.Ct.€atÏ1589.€€Both€these€defendants€have€been€convicted€of€crimes€for€which€society,Ïthrough€its€elected€officials,€has€seen€fit€to€provide€death€as€a€punishment€option.€ÍBoth€defendants€did€in€fact€receive€the€death€penalty.€€Accordingly,€the€significanceÏsociety€attributes€to€an€acquittal€is€not€involved€in€this€appeal,€and€resentencing€isÏnot€precluded.Ìà à€Ìà àIn€so€holding,€we€join€the€majority€of€jurisdictions€which€have€adopted€theÏanalysis€of€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€in€òòPolandóó,€and€concluded€that€the€capitalÏsentencing€trial€is€not€a€series€of€mini€trials,€and€there€is€no€such€thing€as€anÏacquittal€from€an€aggravating€circumstance.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòPickens€v.€Stateóó,€730€S.W.2dÏ230€(Ark.€1987);€òòPreston€v.€Stateóó,€607€So.2d€404€(Fla.€1992);€òòZant€v.€Reddóó,€290ÏS.E.2d€36€(Ga.€1982);€òòState€v.€Davidóó,€468€So.2d€1133€(La.€1985);€òòCommonwealthÏv.€Zookóó,€615€A.2d€1€(Pa.€1992);€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€410€S.E.2d€547€(S.C.€1991);ÏòòHopkinson€v.€Stateóó,€664€P.2d€43€(Wyo.€1983);€òòcontraóó€òòState€v.€Silhanóó,€275€S.E.2dÏ450€(N.C.€1981);€òòState€v.€Bigenwaldóó,€542€A.2d€442€(N.J.€1988).€€Accordingly,€theÏState€is€free,€at€resentencing€to€introduce€proof€of€any€aggravating€circumstanceÏwhich€is€otherwise€legally€valid.ÌÌà àThe€dissent€would€adopt€a€rule€prohibiting€the€use€of€new€aggravatingÏcircumstances€at€resentencing€in€all€cases€except€the€rare€case€in€which€theÏdefendant€is€convicted€of€a€violent€felony€òòafteróó€the€original€sentencing€hearing.€ÏAccording€to€the€dissent,€the€rule€is€based€on€due€process€and€fundamentalÏfairness.€€The€dissentððs€approach,€however,€is€patterned€on€a€decision€of€the€NewÏJersey€Supreme€Court,€òòState€v.€Bigenwaldóó,€òòsupraóó.€€The€fundamental€fairnessÏlanguage€in€that€case€was€dicta,€and€as€such€is€not€binding€on€that€court€orÏprecedent€for€any€other€court.€€In€fact,€the€New€Jersey€Supreme€Court,€in€òòState€v.ÏKoedatichóó,€572€A.2d.€622€(N.J.€1990),€retreated€from€its€òòBigenwaldóó€language€andÏheld€that€the€State€may,€at€resentencing,€rely€upon€aggravating€circumstances€notÏfound€by€the€jury€in€the€initial€sentencing€hearing.€€ÌÌà àFinally,€and€perhaps€most€importantly,€the€principles€announced€by€dicta€inÏthat€decision,€and€embraced€by€the€dissent€in€this€case,€have€been€adopted€by€noÏother€court,€and€represent€an€isolated€minority€view€which€should€not€be€adoptedÏas€the€law€in€Tennessee.€€The€administration€of€justice€in€this€State€is€better€servedÏby€allowing€resentencing€in€accordance€with€the€analysis€contained€within€theÍUnited€States€Supreme€Court€decisions€previously€discussed.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.ÏMilleróó,€771€S.W.2d€401,€403€(Tenn.€1989)€(discussing€the€òòPolandóó€decision).× ƒ1 ××  ×ÌÌà àMoreover,€the€State€is€not€precluded€by€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12.3€from€relyingÏon€new€aggravating€circumstances€at€resentencing.€€Notice€such€as€that€ruleÏrequires€is€not€constitutionally€mandated,€though€it€is€the€better€practice.€€òòState€v.ÏBerryóó,€592€S.W.2d€553,€562€(Tenn.€1980).€€The€purpose€of€the€rule€is€to€ensure€thatÏthe€defense€receives€timely€notice€to€enable€adequate€trial€preparation.€€In€theÏcontext€of€a€capital€resentencing€hearing€wherein€the€State€intends€to€rely€onÏaggravating€circumstances€different€from€those€relied€upon€at€the€original€trial,€thatÏpurpose€is€fulfilled€by€requiring€the€State€to€file€a€new€notice€under€Tenn.€R.€Crim.ÏP.€12.3,€which€informs€the€defense€of€its€intent€to€seek€the€death€penalty,€includingÏthe€aggravating€circumstances€upon€which€the€State€intends€to€rely,€thirty€daysÍprior€to€the€resentencing€hearing.€€òòCfóó.€òòState€v.€Hinesóó,€____€S.W.2d€____€(Tenn.Ï1995)€(Holding€that€a€new€notice€is€not€required€before€resentencing€if€the€StateÏintends€to€rely€upon€only€those€aggravating€circumstances€noticed€before€the€firstÏtrial).ÌÌà àAs€this€Court€previously€has€observed,€"[o]n€a€resentencing€hearing,€the€ruleÏof€evidence€with€regard€to€the€only€issue€before€the€jury€remains€the€same€„„€bothÏthe€State€and€the€defendant€may€introduce€any€evidence€relating€to€theÏcircumstances€of€the€crime,€relevant€aggravating€circumstances€or€any€mitigatingÏcircumstances,€so€that€the€jury€will€have€complete€information€relevant€toÏpunishment.€€€òòState€v.€Bigbeeóó,€885€S.W.2d€797,€813€(Tenn.€1994).€€Simply€stated,€ifÏthe€offered€evidence€bears€on€punishment,€it€is€admissible."€€òòState€v.€Teagueóó,€897ÏS.W.2d€248,€250€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àAt€resentencing,€the€defendant€is€not€limited€to€proof€of€mitigatingÏcircumstances€presented€in€the€initial€sentencing€hearing.€òòIdóó.€€Neither€is€the€State€Ïlimited,€by€constitutional€restrictions,€or€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12.3,€to€evidenceÍpresented€at€the€first€trial,€but€is€free€to€strengthen€its€case€in€any€way€it€can€by€theÏintroduction€of€new€evidence.€€òòPickens€v.€Stateóó,€730€S.W.2d€at€235,€(quoting,ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Shotwell€Mfg.€Coóó.,€355€U.S.€at€243,€78€S.Ct.€at€252.€€Any€other€ruleÏwould€defeat€the€basic€premise€of€capital€sentencing€proceedings€which€areÏtheoretically€designed€to€allow€the€sentencer€to€consider€all€relevant€evidenceÏregarding€the€nature€of€the€crime€and€the€character€of€the€defendant€to€determineÏthe€appropriate€punishment.€€òòGregg€v.€Georgiaóó,€428€U.S.€153,€96€S.Ct.€2909,€49ÏL.Ed.€2d€859€(1976);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòPreston€v.€Stateóó,€607€So.2d€at€409.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àFor€the€reasons€stated€herein,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals'€judgmentsÏmodifying€the€sentences€in€each€case€to€life€imprisonment€are€reversed€and€eachÏcause€is€remanded€to€the€respective€trial€courts€for€a€resentencing€hearing€in€whichÏthe€State€will€be€free€to€again€seek€the€death€penalty.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€areÏtaxed€equally€to€the€defendants,€Timothy€D.€Harris€and€Craig€Thompson.ÌÓÓÌÌà àœ›à àà àà àà àà àœ_______________________________›Ìà àœ›à àà àà àà àà àœRILEY›€œANDERSON,›€œCHIEF€JUSTICE›€ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDrowota,€J.,€and€Lewis,€Sp.J.ÌÌÌDISSENT:ÌÌReid€and€White,€JJ.€„„€See€Separate€Dissenting€OpinionÌ