ÿWPC® \Ñ&4ó³d, ¼{G®Q¡h¨ÐZKľ¢|æ.(w¼o»<{•Å…Û}Ø•ÃüÕ«ún.®¥½²sÝÁoÄ‹§4¤ ÖD(mÆ È(u;IG•†…=’Áx–À`n²ð¶WæFth²NnÞgw8<|S}´'äÇvÁK¸”ž¶eûÖ…|…zÌPyÛ˜¨S'>8 <'”¢ÞP*Ú_ÛªXGFÒØKf»ÎÄHªf¼·H®N6F‹®FY¡õ®æ\wvÓDæÐδ´-1Aè ­B ˆ m•Þø~|ó¡ÞÙ˜ø òïÕ9¤ÈËͤ÷âΤ{–¡Ê‘þ§ë"ý26æÑ²{%>]—Ó½ùÖæÂï˜Øi„›U§ÖÏß{¯¤^Ø$¶‘b'µ¨å”K£M”]Ðé¿íëÕ O¶wNæ ì‰m—hà~ù¼£˜•’~Q'‹…úˆƒ±ú.3׆ò!ÌŒ<)·o‘-‚š ý[t5 Q11b‰MWü¯Çæ74:Û±õ£³Sþ3ªJÀûvüžš u|]bƒ/ÙV~ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àHon.€G.€Richard€Johnson,€Ð $d ÐSABH„MOR€FLO€INDUSTRIES,à À àà  à)à p àChancellorÐ  J ÐAMERICAN€WATER€HEATER€GROUP,€)à p àÐ ð0 Ðd/b/a€AMERICAN€WATER€HEATERSà  à)Ð Ö ÐEAST,€INC.€and€ZURICH€AMERICANà  à)Ð ¼ü ÐINSURANCEà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ð ¢â Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appelleesà À àà  à)à p àNo.€03S01„9712„CH„00142Ð n® ÐÌòòò òÌÌÌÌFor€the€Appellant:à  àà h àà À àà  àà p àFor€the€Appellees:Ð ê* Ðó óóóÌGreg€Holtà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àJ.€Eddie€LauderbackÐ ¼ ü  ÐSeaton,€Holt€&€Herrinà h àà À àà  àà p àHerndon,€Coleman,€BradingÐ ¢!â! Ð926€W.€Oakland€Ave.à h àà À àà  àà p à€&€McKeeÐ ˆ"È" ÐSuite€220à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à104€E.€Main€StreetÐ n#®# ÐJohnson€City,€Tenn.€€37601à À àà  àà p àP.O.€Box€1160Ð T$” $ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àJohnson€City,€Tenn.€€37605„1160ÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòÓ  ÓM€E€M€O€R€A€N€D€U€M€€€€O€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÐ ž*Þ&+ ÐÌò òòòMembers€of€Panel:Ð p,°(- ÐÌó óóóE.€Riley€Anderson,€Chief€JusticeÐ H.ˆ*/ ÐJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€JudgeÌRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÓâ ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ Ž=Î9@ ЇREVERSED€and€REMANDED.à À àà  àà p àà È àTHAYER,€Special€JudgeÐ À ÐÌÓÓà ` àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€Special€Workers'ÏCompensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€to€the€Supreme€Court€of€findings€ofÏfact€and€conclusions€of€law.€Ìà ` àThe€employee,€Geraldine€Harris,€has€appealed€from€the€action€of€the€trialÏcourt€in€dismissing€her€claim€against€her€employer,€Sabh„Mor€Flo€Industries.Ìà ` àPlaintiff€sustained€a€work„related€injury€during€October€1994€to€her€arm€andÏshoulder.€€After€receiving€some€treatment,€she€returned€to€work€at€a€wage€equal€to€orÏgreater€than€she€had€been€receiving€prior€to€the€accident.€€In€determining€herÏentitlement€to€permanent€disability€benefits,€the€trial€court€found€her€return€to€workÏwas€meaningful€within€the€scope€of€our€statute,€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(1),€and€thatÏsince€her€medical€impairment€rating€was€11%,€the€award€of€permanent€disability€wasÏcapped€at€2€ðð€times€the€medical€impairment,€which€resulted€in€a€27.5%€disabilityÏaward€to€the€body€as€a€whole.Ìà ` àUpon€her€return€to€work,€she€was€given€another€job€where€she€worked€for€fourÏor€five€weeks.€€When€this€job€ended,€she€was€assigned€a€job€classified€as€a€ð ðserviceÏagent.ðð€€This€position€involved€her€understanding€the€basic€parts€of€a€water€heater€inÏorder€to€handle€telephone€customer€complaints.€€She€was€also€required€to€operate€aÏcomputer.€€She€received€several€weeks€of€training€and€attempted€to€perform€her€newÏduties.€€The€record€is€quite€clear€she€did€not€perform€satisfactorily.€€She€testified€sheÏcould€not€do€the€work€and€needed€more€training€and€her€employer€also€felt€she€couldÏnot€do€the€work.€€She€testified€that€after€several€days€attempting€to€do€the€work,€sheÏwas€called€to€the€office€and€was€told,€ð ðwe€donððt€think€you€are€going€to€make€it.ðð€€SheÏwas€terminated€on€April€3,€1997€which€was€less€than€two€months€after€the€FebruaryÏ13th€trial.€€Ìà ` àThe€present€action€seeking€a€reconsideration€of€the€original€award€of€27.5%Ïdisability€under€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(2)€was€instituted€on€May€2,€1997.€€At€thisÏhearing€there€was€a€dispute€between€the€parties€as€to€the€exact€reason€for€plaintiffððsÏdischarge.€€Plaintiff€contended€she€was€terminated€because€she€could€not€performÏthe€duties€she€was€asked€to€do.€€Defendant„employer€contended€she€fell€asleep€onÏthe€job€and€was€terminated€for€refusing€to€obey€a€direct€order.Ð t;´7> Ðà ` àThe€Chancellor€found€she€could€not€do€the€job€because€it€was€beyond€herÏcapabilities.€€On€the€issue€of€reason€for€termination€of€employment,€we€find€theÏrecord€makes€the€following€findings:ÌÒ` ÒÓÓð ðI€find,€according€to€the€plaintiffððs€own€proof,€that€the€reason€that€she€lost€thisÏso„called€subsequent€employment€was€simply€because€she€was€unable€to€doÏit€mentally.ððÌÌ*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€*€ÏÌð ðShe€doesnððt€have€the€education,€the€background,€the€experience,€the€skill,Ïthe€training,€or€the€mental€capacity€to€do€that€computer€job,€.€.€.€.€.ððÌÒ` õÒÌÓÓà ` àAt€the€conclusion€of€plaintiffððs€proof,€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€case€forÏreconsideration€of€the€27.5%€disability€award€because€the€proof€did€not€establish€aÏcausal€connection€between€her€injury€and€the€loss€of€employment.€€In€support€of€thisÏconclusion,€the€court€stated€that€the€termination€of€employment€ð ðwas€not€the€result€ofÏthe€arm€or€shoulder€injuryðð€and€that€she€could€perform€her€last€job€without€botheringÏher€injury.€€The€court€went€on€to€observe€that€this€result€(dismissal€of€the€Ïreconsideration€claim)€did€not€appear€to€be€right€but€the€court€or€counsel€was€notÏaware€of€any€case€dispensing€with€the€requirement€of€establishing€a€causal€Ïconnection€between€the€injury€and€the€subsequent€loss€of€employment.Ìà ` àThe€case€is€to€be€reviewed€de€novo€on€the€record€accompanied€by€aÏpresumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact€unless€the€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence€is€otherwise.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2).€€However,€the€de€novo€reviewÏdoes€not€carry€a€presumption€of€correctness€to€a€trial€courtððs€conclusion€of€law€but€isÏconfined€to€factual€findings.€€òòUnion€Carbide€v.€Huddleston,óó€854€S.W.2d€87,€91€(Tenn.Ð –(Ö$) Ð1993).Ìà ` àThe€first€issue€presents€a€question€of€whether€the€evidence€preponderatesÏagainst€the€factual€findings€by€the€trial€court€in€concluding€the€employee€wasÏdischarged€from€her€employment€for€reasons€not€connected€or€associated€with€herÏwork„related€injury.€€On€this€issue,€we€are€of€the€opinion€the€greater€weight€of€theÏevidence€supports€the€trial€courtððs€findings.Ìà ` àThe€main€issue€presented€is€whether€the€trial€court€was€in€error€in€applyingÏT.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241(a)(2)€to€the€employeeððs€claim€for€a€reconsideration€of€the€award€ofÏdisability.Ìà ` àDefendant„employer€argues€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€dismissing€the€caseÏand€cites€the€case€of€òòBrown€v.€State€of€Tennessee,óó€Special€Workersðð€CompensationÐ ^<ž8? ÐAppeals€Panel,€No.€01S01„9502„BC„00020,€filed€November€22,€1995€at€Nashville.€ÏIn€this€case€the€employee€returned€to€work€after€sustaining€a€work„related€injury€andÏafter€some€period€of€time,€he€voluntarily€resigned.€€On€appeal€the€Panel€ruled€that€inÏorder€to€activate€subsection€(a)(2)€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241,€there€must€be€a€causalÏconnection€between€the€injury€and€the€subsequent€loss€of€employment€and€that€theÏemployee€could€not€activate€subsection€(a)(2)€by€his€voluntary€act€of€resignationÏwhich€had€no€connection€to€his€work„related€injury.Ìà ` àThe€employee€contends€this€rule€must€not€have€any€application€to€the€facts€ofÏthe€present€case€and€if€the€rule€does€apply,€the€employer€will€be€permitted€toÏfrustrate€the€intent€of€the€statute.€€We€are€inclined€to€agree€with€this€argument.Ìà ` àThe€multiplier€statute,€T.C.A.€ðð€50„6„241,€has€been€the€subject€of€muchÏlitigation€since€its€enactment€during€1992.€€This€is€not€because€of€any€vague€orÏambiguous€language€but€because€of€the€difficulty€of€applying€the€general€principlesÏto€so€many€different€factual€circumstances€many€of€which€could€not€reasonably€beÏanticipated.€€Ìà ` àUsually€in€applying€the€statute,€a€court€must€first€determine€whether€the€returnÏto€work€was€meaningful€in€the€sense€of€the€statute.€€Various€Panel€decisions€haveÏheld€that€the€action€of€the€employee€and/or€employer€is€subject€to€the€Ïð ðreasonableness€test.ðð€€òòSee€Newton€v.€Scott€Health€Care€Center,óó€914€S.W.2d€884Ð $X $ Ð(Tenn.€1995).Ìà ` àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€statute€should€not€be€used€by€either€the€Ïemployee€or€employer€as€a€mere€devise€to€reach€a€result€inconsistent€with€itsÏlegislative€intent.€€Thus,€an€employee€may€not€avoid€the€2€ðð€times€cap€by€voluntarilyÏterminating€employment€for€personal€or€insubstantial€reasons.€€Conversely,€theÏemployer€should€not€be€allowed€to€unfairly€limit€an€award€of€disability€by€acceptingÏthe€employee€back€to€impose€a€2€ðð€times€cap€and€then€discharge€the€employeeÏunder€circumstances€where€the€return€to€work€did€not€appear€to€be€meaningful.Ìà ` àWe€do€not€find€the€òòBrownóó€case,€supra,€to€control€the€issue€in€the€presentÐ H4ˆ06 Ðcase.€€In€òòBrownóó€the€employee€was€attempting€to€remove€the€2€ðð€times€cap€by€hisÐ 6X28 Ðown€action€which€was€not€related€to€his€injury.€€In€the€present€case€the€employer€hasÏterminated€the€employment.€€Under€these€circumstances,€we€hold€that€the€causalÏconnection€rule€is€not€a€factor€to€be€considered€and€that€the€employerððs€act€ofÐ €;À7> Ðdischarging€the€employee€is€sufficient€to€activate€the€provisions€of€subsection€(a)(2).€ÏThis€part€of€the€statute€specifically€provides€for€a€new€cause€of€action€when€(1)€theÏemployee€is€no€longer€employed€by€the€pre„injury€employer,€(2)€application€forÏreconsideration€of€the€award€is€made€to€the€appropriate€court€within€one€year€of€theÏemployeeððs€loss€of€employment,€and€(3)€the€loss€of€employment€is€within€400€weeksÏof€the€day€the€employee€returned€to€work.€€All€of€these€requirements€have€been€met.Ìà ` àWe€believe€this€part€of€the€statute€was€enacted€to€protect€an€employee€underÏthe€exact€circumstances€in€present€case.€€The€trial€judge€sensed€the€injustice€whichÏcould€occur€in€applying€the€ð ðcausal€connection€ruleðð€but€felt€bound€by€previous€PanelÏdecisions€which€did€not€appear€to€create€any€exceptions€to€the€general€rule.Ìà ` àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€and€the€case€is€remanded€forÏfurther€proceedings.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€taxed€to€defendant„employer.Ìà ` àÌÔ% € ÔÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àRoger€E.€Thayer,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌE.€Riley€Anderson,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€œJudgeÐ  –(Ö$) ÐÒøÒÔ‡¼h¼XXÈÔÓ  Óñ;ññ;ñ„ñ;ññ;ññ;ñ„„ñ;ñà0 @P àà @¨ àÔ#†XÈX¼¼hm2#ÔÔ‡ŠˆèŠXXÈÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEE€€Ô#†XÈXŠŠˆèô2#ÔÐ À ÐÓŒ2ÓÓ  Óà@@.àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àà @ àÌà @P àà @¨ àà @ àà @X à€€AT€KNOXVILLEÌÓ}3ÓÒøÒà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H àà   àà ø àà P àà ¨ àÌà è àÌà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H àà   àà ø àà P àà ¨ àà  àà X àà °" àÌà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H à€€€à   àÐ J Š Ðà 8 àà à àà 8 àà  àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H àà   àà ø àÌÒ(HÒà è àà @ àÌ€€€€€€€€€GERALDINE€HARRIS,à H àà   à€€)à ø à€WASHINGTON€CHANCERYÐ ü <  Ðà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H à€€€€€€€à   à€€)€à ø à€No.€30935Ð â "  ÐÒ (Òà è à€€Plaintiff„Appellant,à ð àà H à€€€€€€€à   à€€)à ø àà P àà ¨ àà  àÐ È   ÐÓ àœX°œXÓà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð à€€€€à H à€€€€€€€à   à€€)à ø àà P àà ¨ àà  àà X àÐ ®î  Ðà è àà @ àà ˜ à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€)€€€€€€€€€€€No.€€03S01„9712„CH€„00142Ìà è àv.à @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H à€€€€€€€à   à€€)Ð zº  Ðà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H à€€€€€€€à   à€€)Ð `   Ѐ€€€€€€€€SABH„MOR€FLO€INDUSTRIES,à   à€€)€à ø à€€Hon.€G.€Richard€€Johnson.€€€€€€€€Ð F† Ѐ€€€€€€€€AMERICAN€WATER€HEATERà   à€€)€€€€€€€€€€€€€JudgeÐ ,l Ѐ€€€€€€€€GROUP,€dba€AMERICAN€WATER€€)€€€à ø à€€€à P àà ¨ àÐ R Ѐ€€€€€€€€HEATERS€EAST,€INC.€and€ZURICH)€€Ì€€€€€€€€€AMERICAN€INSURANCEà H àà   à€€)Ð Þ Ðà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H àà   à€€)Ìà è à€€€Defendanñ;ñtsñ;ññ;ññ;ñTSñ;ññ;ñTSñ;ññ;ñt/Appelleesà H à€à   à€€)à ø àÐ ªê Ðà è àà @ à€€€€€€€€à ˜ àà ð àà H àà   à€€)à ø àÐ Ð ÐÌà è àà @ à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à   àÓ€Óà ø àà P àà ¨ àà  à€€€€€€Ð \œ Ðà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð à€€€€€JUDGMENT€ORDERÌ€€€€€€€€Ô‡Xód XXXÈÔà è àà @ à€This€case€is€before€the€Court€upon€the€entire€€€€Ð N Ðà è àrecord,€including€the€order€of€referral€to€the€SpecialÏà è àWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel,€and€the€Panel's€¼à è àMemorandum€Opinion€setting€forth€its€findings€of€à X àÐ ø 8# Ðà è àfact€and€conclusions€of€law,€which€are€à ¨ àincorporated€Ð 9"y% Ðà è àherein€by€reference;ÌÌà è à€€€€€€Whereupon,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€¼à è àmemorandum€Opinion€of€the€Panel€should€be€accepted€€€€€Ï€€€€€and€approved;€andÌÌà è à€€€€€€€It€is,€therefore,€ordered€that€the€Panel's€€€€€€Ï€€€€€findings€of€facts€and€conclusions€of€law€are€adopted€€€Ï€€€€€and€affirmed,€and€the€decision€of€the€Panel€is€made€€€€Ï€€€€€the€Judgment€of€the€Court.ÌÌà è à€€€€€€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendant„€¼à è àemployer,for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€¼à è àÌ€€€€€€04/22/99Ô#†XÈX XXód9>#Ô›€