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ÐÌÌÌòòMembers€of€Panelóó:Ð Þ,.(% ÐÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Associate€JusticeÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌJoe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓÌÓ  ÓAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDà  àà p àà È àà  àà x àLoser,€JudgeÓ {ÀÓÐü:L62 ÐÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<ÓòòMEMORANDUM€OPINIONóóÔ'°à ÔÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?Óà ` àThis€workers'€compensation€appeal€has€been€referred€to€the€SpecialÏWorkers'€Compensation€Appeals€Panel€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„225(e)(3)€for€hearing€and€reporting€of€findingsÏof€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€The€employer,€Saturn€Corporation,€insists€(1)Ïthe€evidence€preponderates€against€a€finding€that€the€injury€arose€out€of€and€inÏthe€course€of€the€employment€relationship,€(2)€the€trial€court's€award€ofÏpermanent€partial€disability€benefits€is€excessive€and€(3)€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€court's€findings€with€respect€to€the€employee'sÏweekly€compensation€rate.€€The€employee€or€claimant,€Keel,€insists€the€awardÏshould€be€modified€to€include€temporary€total€disability€benefits€of€$2,495.22.€ÏAs€discussed€below,€the€panel€has€concluded€the€judgment€should€be€affirmedÏas€to€the€issues€raised€by€the€employer€and€remanded€to€the€trial€court€forÏconsideration€of€the€issue€raised€by€the€employee.Ó {ÀÓÌà ` àÌà ` àThe€employee€initiated€this€action€to€recover€workers'€compensationÏbenefits€for€an€injury€which€he€avers€occurred€gradually€as€a€result€of€repetitiveÏuse€of€his€hands€and€arms€at€work.€€After€a€trial,€the€trial€court€awardedÏpermanent€partial€disability€benefits€based€on€thirty€percent€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole€and€found€the€employee's€weekly€compensation€rate€to€be€$415.87.€€OurÏreview€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,€accompanied€by€aÐ 9‰ Ðpresumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„225(e)(2).Ìà ` àÌà ` àUnless€admitted€by€the€employer,€the€employee€or€claimant€has€theÏburden€of€proving,€by€competent€evidence,€every€essential€element€of€his€claim.€ÏòòOster€v.€Yatesóó,€845€€S.W.2d€€215€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€claimant€must€prove€thatÐ ½!  Ðhe€is€an€employee,€that€he€suffered€an€injury€by€accident,€and€that€such€injuryÏby€accident€arose€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€his€employment€by€the€employer.Ìà ` àÌà ` àIn€order€to€establish€that€an€injury€was€one€arising€out€of€the€employment,Ïthe€cause€of€the€injury€must€be€proved.€€òòHill€v.€Royal€Ins.€Co.óó,€937€€S.W.2d€€873Ð +'{"  Ð(Tenn.€1996).€€An€accidental€injury€arises€out€of€one's€employment€when€thereÏis€apparent€to€the€rational€mind,€upon€a€consideration€of€all€the€circumstances,Ïa€causal€connection€between€the€conditions€under€which€the€work€is€required€toÏbe€performed€and€the€resulting€injury,€and€occurs€in€the€course€of€one'sÏemployment€if€it€occurs€while€an€employee€is€performing€a€duty€he€wasÏemployed€to€do.€€òòFink€v.€Caudleóó,€856€€S.W.2d€€952€(Tenn.€1993).€€"Arising€outÐ ¯-ÿ(& Ðof"€refers€to€the€origin€of€the€injury€in€terms€of€causation€and€"in€the€course€of"Ïrelates€to€time,€place€and€circumstance.€€òòMcCaleb€v.€Saturn€Corp.óó,€910€€S.W.2d€Ð Û/++( Ð412€€(Tenn.€1995).€€For€an€accidental€injury€to€be€compensable,€bothÏcomponents€are€required.€€òòChapman€v.€Aetna€Casualty€and€Surety€Co.óó,€221€Ð 2W-* ÐTenn.€€376,€€426€€S.W.2d€€760€(1968).€€Where€a€condition€develops€graduallyÏover€a€period€of€time€resulting€in€a€definite,€work„connected,€unexpected,Ïfortuitous€injury,€it€is€compensable€as€an€injury€by€accident.€€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.Ð I5™0- Ðv.€Reedóó,€209€€Tenn.€€106,€350€€S.W.2d€€65€(1961).€€In€all€but€the€most€obviousÐ _6¯1. Ðcases,€causation€and€permanency€may€only€be€established€through€expertÏmedical€testimony.€€òòThomas€v.€Aetna€Life€and€Cas.€Ins.€Co.óó,€812€€S.W.2d€€278Ð ‹8Û30 Ð(1991).Ìà ` àÌà ` àThe€claimant€began€working€at€Saturn€in€July€of€1990.€€His€firstÏassignment€was€with€Trim€Team€Five,€installing€seat€belts€and€the€passiveÏrestraint€system,€as€well€as€the€"wipe€down€job".€€Around€July€26,€1994,€heÏvisited€Saturn's€Initial€Care€Facility€(ICF)€complaining€of€pain€and€swelling€inÏhis€hands€and€wrists,€following€the€use€of€his€hands€and€palms€to€force€panelsÏinto€place€on€the€frame€of€automobiles€on€the€assembly€line.€€At€trial,€heÏtestified€that€he€had€been€suffering€for€a€period€of€time€before€he€reported€it.€€HeÏalso€testified€that€he€had€quit€bowling€around€the€same€time.Ìà ` àÌà ` àIn€august€of€1994,€he€was€restricted€from€gripping€or€pinching€with€theÏright€hand.€€He€returned€to€ICF€around€November€9th€of€the€same€year€withÏcomplaints€of€numbness€in€his€hands.€€He€was€referred€to€Dr.€Tom€Bartsokas,Ïwhom€he€first€saw€on€November€23,€1994,€a€board€certified€family€practitioner,Ïwho€diagnosed€a€herniated€disk€at€C€6„7.€€Dr.€Bartsokas€referred€him€to€Dr.ÏGeorge€Lien,€a€board€certified€neurosurgeon.€€Ìà ` àÌà ` àDr.€Lien€saw€the€claimant€first€on€May€11,€1995€and€ordered€aÏmyelogram,€which€confirmed€Dr.€Bartsokas's€diagnosis€and€on€July€25,€1995Ïperformed€corrective€surgery.€€The€claimant€also€saw€Dr.€David€Gaw€for€anÏevaluation.Ìà ` àÌà ` àAs€to€causation,€Dr.€Bartsokas€testified€the€herniation€resulted€fromÏnumerous€factors,€including€genetic€predisposition,€smoking,€poor€posture€andÏoccupational€exposure.€€Dr.€Lien€expressed€no€opinion€as€to€causation.€€Dr.€GawÏtestified€the€herniation€was€consistent€with€a€work„related€injury€but€could€haveÏbeen€caused€by€something€else.Ìà ` àÌà ` àThe€employer€contends€the€proof€of€causation€was€too€speculative.€€In€aÏworkers'€compensation€case,€a€trial€judge€may€properly€predicate€an€award€onÏmedical€testimony€to€the€effect€that€a€given€incident€"could€be"€the€cause€of€aÏclaimant's€injury,€when,€from€other€evidence,€it€may€reasonably€be€inferred€thatÏthe€incident€was€in€fact€the€cause€of€the€injury,€òòMcCaleb€v.€Saturn€Corp.óó,€€910€Ð †(Ö#! ÐS.W.2d€€412€(Tenn.€1995),€but€an€award€may€not€be€based€on€conjecture€orÏspeculation.€€òòCollins€v.€Liberty€Mut.€Ins.€Co.óó,€561€€S.W.2d€€456€(Tenn.€1978).€Ð ²*&# ÐAbsolute€certainty€on€the€part€of€a€medical€expert€is€not€necessary€to€support€aÏworkers'€compensation€award,€for€expert€opinion€must€always€be€more€or€lessÏuncertain€and€speculative;€òòKellerman€v.€Food€Lion,€Inc.óó,€929€€S.W.2d€€333Ð ô-D)& Ð(Tenn.€1996);€and,€where€equivocal€medical€evidence€combined€with€otherÏevidence€supports€a€finding€of€causation,€such€an€inference€may€nevertheless€beÏdrawn€under€the€case€law.€€òòJackson€v.€Greyhound€Lines,€Inc.óó,€734€€S.W.2d€€617Ð 61†,) Ð(Tenn.€1987).Ìà ` àÌà ` àFrom€a€consideration€of€those€principles€and€an€examination€of€theÏrecord,€particularly€including€the€testimony€of€the€claimant,€which€the€trialÏjudge€accredited,€we€cannot€say€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findingÏthat€the€injury€was€one€arising€out€of€and€in€the€course€of€the€employment.€€TheÏfirst€issue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€the€employee.Ð Ð8 40 Ðà ` àññÓÝ ÓññÓ {ÀÓÌà ` àThe€employer€next€contends€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€of€thirty€percent€permanent€partial€disability.€€For€injuries€arisingÏafter€August€1,€1992,€in€cases€where€an€injured€worker€is€entitled€to€permanentÏpartial€disability€benefits€to€the€body€as€a€whole€and€the€pre„injury€employerÏreturns€the€employee€to€employment€at€a€wage€equal€to€or€greater€than€the€wageÏthe€employee€was€receiving€at€the€time€of€the€injury,€the€maximum€permanentÏpartial€disability€award€that€the€employee€may€receive€is€two€and€one„half€timesÏthe€medical€impairment€rating€pursuant€to€the€provisions€of€the€òòAmericanÐ 1  ÐMedical€Association€Guides€to€the€Evaluation€of€Permanent€Impairmentóó,€theÐ G—  ÐòòManual€for€Orthopedic€Surgeons€in€Evaluating€Permanent€Physical€Impairmentóó,Ð ]­  Ðor,€in€cases€where€an€impairment€rating€by€any€appropriate€method€is€used€andÏaccepted€by€the€medical€community.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„241(a)(1).€ÏIn€making€determinations,€the€courts€are€to€consider€all€pertinent€factors,Ïincluding€lay€and€expert€testimony,€the€employee's€age,€education,€skills€andÏtraining,€local€job€opportunities€for€the€disabled,€and€capacity€to€work€at€typesÏof€employment€available€in€the€claimant's€disabled€condition.€€òòIdóóòò.óó€€The€claimantÐ á1 Ðhas€returned€to€work€at€a€wage€which€brings€him€within€the€above€rule.Ìà ` àDrs.€Bartsokas€and€Lien€assessed€the€claimant's€medical€impairment€atÏnine€percent€to€the€whole€body,€Dr.€Gaw€fifteen€percent.€€The€trial€court's€awardÏis€more€than€two€and€one„half€times€nine€percent,€but€less€than€two€and€one„halfÏtimes€fifteen€percent.€€It€thus€appears€the€trial€judge€gave€due€consideration€toÏall€the€medical€opinions.€€From€our€examination€of€the€record,€we€cannot€say€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€finding€of€the€trial€court.€€The€second€issueÏis€also€resolved€in€favor€of€the€employee.ññÓÝ ÓññÓ {ÀÓÌà ` àÌà ` àFinally,€the€employer€contends€the€evidence€preponderates€against€aÏweekly€compensation€rate€of€$415.87€and€in€favor€of€a€weekly€compensationÏrate€of€$382.79.€€The€weekly€compensation€rate€for€an€injured€employee'sÏpermanent€partial€disability€is€an€amount€equal€to€sixty„six€and€two€thirdsÏpercent€of€the€employee's€average€weekly€wage€for€the€fifty„two€weeksÏimmediately€preceding€the€injury.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€section€50„6„207(3)(A).Ìà ` àÌà ` àThe€dispute€in€this€case€is€whether€the€injury€occurred€before€or€after€JulyÏ1,€1995.€€If€it€occurred€before€that€date,€the€compensation€rate€is€$382.79.€€If€itÏoccurred€on€or€after€that€date,€but€before€July€1,€1996,€the€rate€is€$415.87,€as€theÏtrial€court€found.€€The€date€of€injury€for€a€gradual€injury€is€the€date€on€which€theÏclaimant€was€forced€to€quit€work€because€of€severe€pain.€€òòLawson€v.€LearÐ €.Ð)' ÐSeating€Corp.óó,€€944€€S.W.2d€€340€(Tenn.€1997).€€In€the€present€case,€theÐ –/æ*( Ðemployee€continued€working€through€July€23,€1995,€just€two€days€before€hisÏcorrective€surgery.€€Thus,€the€evidence€fails€to€preponderate€against€the€findingÏof€the€trial€judge,€and€the€third€issue€is€resolved€in€favor€of€the€employee.Ìà ` àÌà ` àThe€trial€court's€judgment€is€silent€as€to€the€question€of€temporary€totalÏdisability€benefits.€€Thus,€it€appears€the€appeal€was€premature.€€Nevertheless,€weÏhave€reviewed€those€issues€upon€which€the€trial€court€made€a€finding.€€ThisÏcourt,€however,€lacks€any€original€jurisdiction€and€must,€therefore,€remand€theÐ F8–30 Ðcase€the€trial€court€for€an€award€of€temporary€total€disability€benefits,€ifÏappropriate.Ìà ` àÌà ` àAs€to€the€issues€properly€before€this€tribunal,€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€is€affirmed;€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€for€MauryÏCounty.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€defendant„appellant.ññÓÝ ÓññÓ rAÓÌÓ  ÓÓ<(ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX<Ó_______________________________ññÓÝ ÓññÓ rAÓÌÓ  Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Joe€C.€Loser,€Jr.,€Special€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓ?+ÿÿ ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#ÿÿ` ‹X?ÓCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Associate€JusticeÌÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌÓ0ÿÿ` çÈ xÐ (#ÿÿŒX0ӜԆÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôñ ñ