ÿWPCü …# V %a 0\gw@Ã4  0 & 0DÆ  0J 0T\ 0^° 0h 0rv UHè 0|0 0†¬ 02 1u 0d7 B›U6¸U.îB)DCE AMˆ D3ÕU*F2 0@xN¸v~vÓ„ AOWƦ 0Dl D/° BߘHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎX(4aa$¡¡Ó  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  Ñ tLuDvLwDxyzD|Ó€ˆD‰ƒ‰"P 3|x‰(P(3Á_$¤¤Ý ƒaa!ÝÓ  ÓÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà l àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô<à09Z 0Courier (W1) Regular2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Courier% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial <Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌò òAprilÏ21,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€+ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò DÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€distinguish€this€case€from€those€situations€where€carpalÏtunnel€syndrome€develops€as€a€result€of€an€identifiable€traumaticÏevent.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€¢XXdÈdÈ7ÑØ ØÓ&€&&XÐd&ÓÙ€€ÙßR€),(A1-j|` ‚- `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌÌ›Ìà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌœSHEILA›€œI.›€LAWSON€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à)€€€FOR€PUBLICATIONÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€œFILED:€€APRIL€21,›€1997Ìà àPlaintiff„Appelleeà àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€HAMBLEN€COUNTYÌœv.›à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€HON.€W.L.€JENKINS,ÌLEAR€SEATING€CORPORATIONà àà àà à)à à€€€JUDGEÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à)Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellant€€€€€€€à à)€€€NO.€03„S„01„9509„CV„00105ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à àòòà àà àà àà àà àFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌROBERT€D.€VAN€DE€œVUURST›à àà àà àà àROBERT€C.€EDWARDSÌSTEVEN€H.€œTRENT›à àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TNÌJohnson€City,€TNÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÌà@ àòòOPINIONÌÌÌœÌÌÌÌÌ›ÌóóÌÌÌÌÌÌDECISION€OF€THE€PANEL€REVERSED;à à€à àà àà àBIRCH,€C.J.ÌÓÓJUDGMENT€OF€THE€TRIAL€COURT€AFFIRMED.ÇÓ` °‚X˜XÓà àIn€this€case,€the€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€AppealsÏPanel€concluded€that€Sheila€I.€Lawson,€the€employee,€failed€toÏcommence€her€action€for€benefits€within€one€year€of€the€accidentÏcausing€injury.€€After€a€thorough€review€of€the€record,€we€findÏthat€Lawson€commenced€her€action€within€the€applicable€period€ofÏlimitations.ÌÌà@ àIÌÌà àFor€more€than€twenty€years,€Sheila€Lawson€was€employedÏby€Lear€Seating€Corporation€as€a€production€line€worker.€€In€theÏlate€1980's,€she€began€to€experience€pain€and€numbness€in€herÏhands€and€sought€medical€treatment€from€her€family€physician,€JohnÏH.€Kinser,€M.D.€€Kinser€told€her€that€her€problems€were€related€toÏher€job€and€recommended€that€she€be€rotated€to€a€different€job€inÏthe€plant.€ÌÌà àAfter€her€initial€visit€to€Kinser,€Lawson€notified€herÏsupervisor€of€her€problem€with€her€hands€and€requested€a€transferÏto€a€different€machine.€€The€supervisor€granted€her€request,€andÏLawsonððs€symptoms€diminished€for€a€time.€€However,€over€the€nextÍseveral€years,€the€symptoms€periodically€recurred.€€During€thisÏtime,€Lawson€transferred€to€several€different€machines€in€anÏeffort€to€obtain€relief.€€As€she€transferred€from€machine€toÏmachine,€her€symptoms€would€abate€temporarily„„only€to€recur.ÌÌà àSubsequently,€she€developed€pain€in€her€shoulders€andÏarms€because€of€her€efforts€to€compensate€for€the€pain€in€herÏhands.€€Kinser€gave€Lawson€monthly€injections€to€alleviate€theÏpain€in€her€shoulders€and€arms.€€ÌÌà àDuring€this€entire€period,€Lawson€continued€to€workÏfull„time€and€without€restriction.€€She€did€not€file€a€workersððÏcompensation€claim€with€her€employer,€and€Lear€did€not€payÏKinserððs€bills.ÌÌà àOn€the€morning€of€June€17,€1993,€Lawson€tried€to€pick€upÏher€coffee€cup,€but€unable€to€grasp€it,€she€dropped€it.€€AfterÏthis€incident,€Lawson€went€to€the€company€nurse€and€informed€herÏthat€she€could€not€work.€€The€nurse€referred€Lawson€to€the€companyÏdoctor,€who€sent€Lawson€to€E.€Brantley€Burns,€Jr.,€M.D.,€aÏspecialist€in€orthopaedic€medicine.ÌÌà àBurns€diagnosed€carpal€tunnel€syndrome.€€Lear€placedÏLawson€on€temporary€disability.€€She€then€underwent€surgery€onÏboth€wrists.€€Following€a€recuperative€period,€she€returned€toÏwork.€€During€this€period,€Lear€paid€Lawson€workersðð€compensationÏbenefits.ÌÌà àBurns€determined€that€Lawson€had€a€ten€percent€permanentÏpartial€impairment€to€each€upper€extremity.€€In€April€1994,€LawsonÏfiled€this€suit€to€recover€permanent€partial€disability€benefits.ÌÌœÌÌÌ›à@ àIIÌÌà àOur€review€is€òòde€novoóó€on€the€record,€accompanied€by€aÏpresumption€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€correctÏunless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3).ÌÌà àAs€stated,€the€panel€concluded€that€Lawsonððs€claim€wasÏbarred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€We€disagree.€€RepetitiveÏstress€injuries€are€ð ðaccidentalðð€and€do€not€constituteÏoccupational€diseases.€€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.€v.€Reedóó,€209€Tenn.€106,€350ÏS.W.2d€65,€69€(1961).€€Therefore,€a€suit€to€recover€workersððÏcompensation€benefits€for€such€an€injury€must€be€filed€within€oneÏyear€of€the€ð ðaccident€resulting€in€the€injury.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ50„6„203.Ì€€€Ìà àThe€identification€of€the€ð ðaccident€resulting€in€œthe›Ïinjuryðð€is€problematic€in€the€case€of€a€repetitive€stressœ€injuryÏsuch€as€Lawsonððs.€€With€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€and€otherÏrepetitive€stress€injuries,€the€symptoms€appear€and€worsen€over€anÏextended€period€of€time.× ƒ. ××  ×€€As€in€Lawsonððs€case,€the€symptoms€may€beÏepisodic€and€may€subside€when€the€employeeððs€job€is€altered.€ÏThus,€it€is€difficult,€if€at€all€possible,€to€determine€when€theÏð ðaccident€resulting€in€the€injuryðð€occurs.€€Such€a€determinationÏis€important€because€the€statutory€limitation€period€begins€to€runÍonly€after€the€occurrence€of€the€ð ðaccident€resulting€in€the€injury.ððÌÌà àIn€òòBarker€v.€Home„Crest€Corp.óó,€805€S.W.2d€373€(Tenn.Ï1991),€the€issue€was€which€of€two€insurance€carriers€was€obligatedÏto€pay€benefits€for€a€carpal€tunnel€injury.€€Writing€for€theÏCourt,€Justice€Anderson€held€that€because€the€employee€suffered€aÏnew€injury€each€day€at€work€and€since€the€cause€of€those€injuriesÏwas€constant,€the€accidental€injury€occurred€on€the€date€on€whichÏthe€employee€ð ðcould€no€longer€perform€her€work.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€376.€€TheÏdate€of€the€accident€for€purposes€of€ascertaining€the€commencementÏof€the€limitations€period€should€be€the€same€as€the€date€of€theÏaccident€for€purposes€of€ascertaining€which€insurance€companyÏshould€pay€benefits.€€We€see€no€reason€to€distinguish€between€theÏtwo.€€ÌÌà àAs€Professor€Larson€notes:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThis€repeated„trauma€or€cumulativeÏtrauma€doctrine€appears€to€haveÏoriginated€with€the€House€of€LordsÏdecision€in€òòBurrell€&€Sons,€Ltd.€v.ÏSelvageóó€[90€L.J.€1340€(H.L.€1921)],Ïin€which€compensation€was€awardedÏfor€the€disabling€cumulative€effectÏof€a€long€series€of€cuts€andÏscratches€leading€to€infection€andÏarthritis.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€practical€problem€ofÏfixing€a€specific€date€for€theÏaccident€has€generally€been€handledÏby€saying€simply€that€the€date€ofÏthe€accident€is€the€date€on€whichÏthe€disability€manifests€itself.€ÏThus,€in€[òòPtak€v.€General€Elec.€Co.óó,Ï13€N.J.€Super.€294,€80€A.2d€337Ï(1951)],€the€date€of€a€graduallyÏacquired€sacroiliac€strain€wasÏdeemed€to€be€the€first€moment€theÏpain€made€it€impossible€to€continueÏto€work.€.€.€.ÌÓÓÌ1B€Larson,€òòWorkmenððs€Compensation€Lawóó€ðð€39.40€and€ðð€39.50Ï(1987)(citing€òòBrown€Shoeóó,€òòsupraóó)(quoted€with€approval€in€òòBarkeróó,Ïòòsupraóó).ÌÌà àOther€jurisdictions€that€have€addressed€this€issue€haveÏreached€a€similar€conclusion.€€òòSeeóó€òòBerry€v.€Boeing€MilitaryÏAirplanesóó,€20€Kan.€App.2d€220,€885€P.2d€1261,€1268€(Kan.€Ct.€App.Ï1994)(the€date€of€ð ðoccurrenceðð€or€date€of€ð ðinjuryðð€relates€back€toÏthe€last€date€on€which€claimant€worked);€òòRamsey€v.€Weyerhaeuseróó,Ï853€P.2d€774€(Okla.€1993)(date€of€ð ðlast€traumaðð€is€last€dayÏworked);€òòBrooks€Drug,€Inc.€v.€Workmenððs€Compensation€Appeal€BoardÏ(Parker)óó,€161€Pa.€Cmwlth.€81,€636€A.2d€246,€249€(1993)(ð ðEach€dayÍof€work€constituted€a€ððnewðð€injury€in€that€it€further€aggravatedÏClaimantððs€condition€.€.€.€.€€The€date€of€injury€.€.€.€is,Ïtherefore,€the€last€day€Claimant€worked.ðð).ÌÌà àIn€òòBerryóó,€the€Kansas€Court€of€Appeals€discussed€atÏlength€the€problems€associated€with€fixing€the€date€of€theÏaccident€in€carpal€tunnel€injury€cases:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àIn€the€instant€matter,€bothÏthe€ALJ€and€the€Board€concluded€thatÏthe€last€day€of€work€should€beÏdeemed€as€the€date€of€occurrence,€atÏleast€insofar€as€the€bilateralÏcarpal€tunnel€condition€isÏconcerned.€€We€affirm€that€decision.€ÏWe€carry€that€decision€one€stepÏfurther€and€conclude€that€the€lastÏday€of€work€should€be€the€date€fromÏwhen€disability€is€computed€in€allÏcases€involving€carpal€tunnelÏsyndrome€...€.€€If€we€were€toÏadopt€either€the€date€on€which€theÏinjury€ð ðmanifests€itselfðð€or€theÏdate€on€which€the€injury€isÏð ðdiagnosed,ðð€we€would€set€aÏpotential€trap€for€the€individualÏwho,€despite€pain€and€discomfort,Ïcontinues€to€work€long€after€his€orÏher€carpal€tunnel€is€ð ðdiagnosedðð€orÏhas€ð ðmanifested€itself.ðð€€ThoseÏindividuals€would€find€their€claimsÏfor€compensation€barred€by€theÏstatute€of€limitations.€€It€seems€toÏus€that€we€should€adopt€the€ruleÏthat€causes€the€least€potentialÏprejudice€and€upholds€the€spirit€ofÍour€Workers€Compensation€Act.€€WeÏbelieve€use€of€the€last€day€of€workÏaccomplishes€both€of€those€purposes.ÌÌà8 àà8 à.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 àBecause€of€the€complexities€ofÏlocating€the€date€of€injury€in€aÏcarpal€tunnel€syndrome€case,€theÏprocess€is€simplified€and€made€moreÏcertain€by€adopting€a€rule€that€in€aÏcarpal€tunnel€syndrome€action,€theÏdate€from€which€compensation€flowsÏis€the€last€date€worked€by€theÏclaimant.ÌÓÓÌòòBerryóó,€885€P.2d€at€1267„1268.€€We€find€the€policy€reasons€set€outÏby€the€Kansas€court€persuasive.€€Like€the€Kansas€statute,€ourÏworkersðð€compensation€statute€is€remedial€in€nature.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€50„6„116.€€As€we€stated€in€òòBetts€v.€Tom€Wade€Ginóó,€810ÏS.W.2d€140€(Tenn.€1991),ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àthis€Court€must€interpret€thoseÏstatutes€in€a€manner€designed€toÏprotect€workers€and€their€familiesÏfrom€the€economic€devastation€that,Ïin€many€instances,€can€followÏon„the„job€injuries.€€Furthermore,ÏTennessee's€workers'€compensationÏlaws€must€be€construed€so€as€toÏensure€that€injured€employees€areÏjustly€and€appropriately€reimbursedÏfor€debilitating€injuries€sufferedÏin€the€course€of€service€to€theÏemployer.òòÓÓÌÌId.óó€at€142„143€(footnote€omitted).€€Moreover,€our€holding€todayÏestablishes€a€clear€point€at€which€the€limitation€period€begins€toÏrun.›€€See€also€òòCentral€Motor€Express,€Inc.€v.€œBurney›óó,€214€Tenn.Ï106,€377€S.W.2d€947,€951€(1964)(applying€ð ðlast€day€workedðð€rule€toÏfind€workers€notice€of€injury€to€the€employer€timely.)œÌÌà àWe€find€the€issue€raised€in€this€case€distinguishableÏfrom€that€raised€in€òòLivingston€v.€Shelby€Williams€Ind.,€Inc.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€511€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€òòLivingstonóó,€the€employee€fell€andÏhurt€his€back.€€Initially,€the€employee€did€not€think€himselfÏseriously€injured,€and€the€injurious€effects€of€the€fall€were€notÏmanifested€for€several€months.€€In€that€case,€the€date€of€theÏaccident€causing€injury€for€purposes€of€commencing€the€limitationsÏperiod€was€the€date€of€the€fall.€€However,€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€was€suspended€until€by€reasonable€care€and€diligenceÏit€was€discoverable€and€apparent€that€an€injury€had€beenÏsustained.€€òòId.óó€at€515.€€In€òòLivingstonóó,€even€though€notÏimmediately€apparent,€there€was€an€identifiable€event€or€accidentÏafter€which€the€employee€had€an€injury.€€In€the€case€of€aÏrepetitive€stress€injury,€however,€there€is€no€identifiable€event,Ïincident,€or€moment€before€which€the€employee€is€not€injured,€butÍafter€which€the€employee€is€injured.€€Thus,€the€ð ðlast€day€workedððÏrule€that€we€announce€today€applies€only€to€repetitive€stressÏinjuries,€i.e.,›€the€unexpected€or€unusual€injuries€œthat€result›Ïfrom€the€ordinary€or€usual€strain€or€exertion€of€the€employeeððsÏœjob.€òòCentral›€Motor€Expressóó,€377€S.W.2d€at€950.œÌÌà àCarpal€tunnel€syndrome€may€develop€as€a€result€of€aÏtraumatic€event,€and€in€such€situations,€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€would€begin€to€run€when€by€reasonable€care€andÏdiligence€the€compensable€injury€is€discoverable€and€it€isÏapparent€that€such€injury€is€work„related.€€òòLivingston€v.€ShelbyÏWilliams€Ind.,€Inc.óó,€811€S.W.2d€511,€515€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà à€As€in€òòBarkeróó,€the€repetitive€movements€of€LawsonððsÏhands€as€she€performed€her€job€caused€her€injuries.€€Each€dayÏLawson€worked€contributed€to€her€injury.€€Because€there€is€no€oneÏparticular€incident€or€event€identifiable€as€an€ð ðaccidentÏresulting€in€the€injuryðð€and€because€Lawson€suffered€new€trauma€toÏher€hands€each€day€she€worked,€we€hold€that€the€date€of€theÏaccidental€injury€is€the€date€that€Lawson€was€no€longer€able€toÏwork€because€of€her€injury.€€The€record€establishes€that€June€17,Í1993,€was€the€first€day€that€Lawson€was€unable€to€perform€her€job;Ïtherefore,€the€statute€of€limitations€commenced€at€that€time.€€AsÏLawson€filed€this€suit€in€April€1994,€her€claim€is€timely.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€ofÏthis€appeal€are€taxed€to€Lear€Seating€Corporation,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary,€and€Lawsonððs€request€forÏadditional€sanctions€is€denied.ÌÓÓÌà àÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà à________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àADOLPHO€A.€BIRCH,€JR.,€Chief€JusticeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDrowota,€Anderson,€Reid,€JJ.Ì