ÿWPC« ìŒ +¹a_UÛó›ÍñI!ãóé99š“Ù žÎ; 4§Iì•”V*ú­šVP] Öó æ§Q¶ÔãQ/C[ïÖ‰‹Ö÷G&ñò@…ˆCƒ?r¨îoa+IàŠ€Q™«Ø•®—k´Œÿݪ>1j »6ûù„cw}Õ‹Sk;/u Ôx0Yà‡¢† R~`øÞï»IDʯ?ßpïTT¬z-XÂH9cW-‹ Íwi„BÇVûüŠäþ|yrÂñuŸ^ky©I[ɼ~·ÉÔ(¥xïpÍèúÝbêÚ«'Aryf…àØOMí½ê‰¥yÈË?øâTÓ‹ßÙ[¸S–£*ò¹FKt5¼Óâî'˜Qçrð_õïZ((`µ…Ô:ÂDw‡UAÓðØ%>ÙºÏ4ç,;(ŽòÂÏòàѬ—ƒí”=è8ªÿS ®œk*¸F!êd{Åž¿ë¾ZŸ(‚7¡[²´ìz6[ùÝo*òÇ õ|qOú‚kË ÖDiXN4€/½ó¦ÐÎòVð-~—¼4žîpÛßCqˆ!멚ÿ¿Ì);+hQú‰OIKÂjòþŽÕî,V-Ljyð&ªã½zk3Jyk«ûrù·½Á%‹ÔS]e¹¯*# LU :W %‘ 0D—w@Û4/UF>+„ 0ˆ¯ 0D7Á{B< ~ “ ¥¸§P_U:¯éU:êêêêê$$$$$ B, AQIÆš 0D` 0D¤ 0Dèè D/,, B[ D3x˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularX(ñÄ$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒX°Ò DU‘D’U“e”•E–Ó€ ¢©yË&úÿÿú, ú3|x¢,p០  ‹.BernhardMod BT Bold !Ý ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô%¡ôXXÔThe€appellee€was€acquitted€on€the€vehicular€assault€charge.€€Sanchez€was€not€indicted€orÐ  Ðprosecuted€for€his€involvement€at€the€accident€scene.€(8(3Åå$¤¤Ý ƒñÄ!ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ·Ý ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô%¡ôXXÔThe€trial€court€sentenced€the€appellee€to€eleven€months€and€twenty„nine€days,€with€thirty€daysÐ  Ðto€be€served€in€jail€and€the€remainder€to€be€served€on€probation.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€fined€himÏ$250.00,€revoked€his€driverððs€license€for€one€year,€and€ordered€him€to€attend€DUI€school. 8Ý ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô%¡ôXXÔAt€trial,€the€appellee€was€questioned€as€to€why€his€recollection€of€events€differed€from€what€heÐ  Ðhad€originally€told€Trooper€Smothers€at€the€accident€scene.€€The€appellee€testified€that€he€told€TrooperÏSmothers€that€he€could€have€been€driving€the€automobile€during€the€accident.€€The€appellee€explained,Ïhowever,€that€his€original€version€of€events€was€unreliable€due€to€his€stress€and€injuries€arising€from€theÏaccident.€ Ñ  Ñ Ý ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô%¡ôXXÔòòCompareóó€òòBrownóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€581.€€In€òòBrownóó,€the€jury€rendered€a€general€verdict€of€guilt€onÐ  Ðthe€single€charge€of€cocaine€possession€with€the€intent€to€sell.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€€The€evidence,€however,€depictedРƾ Ðat€least€four€incidents€of€cocaine€possession€by€which€the€jury€could€have€potentially€based€its€guiltyÏverdict.€€òòId.óó€ øÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X:ÁXXXÔÔ€›mXX:ÁÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X:ÁX›mÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€19,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó ®Ý ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ‡ôeðôXXÔIn€the€appeal€below,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€addressed€whether€the€indictment€wasÐ  Ðconstitutionally€deficient€for€failing€to€include€a€charge€of€DUI€under€criminal€responsibility.€€TheÏintermediate€appellate€court€upheld€the€indictment€as€meeting€the€notice€requirements€announced€inÏòòWarden€v.€Stateóó,€214€Tenn.€391,€381€S.W.2d€244,€245€(1964).€€The€sufficiency€of€the€indictment€was€notÐ B : Ðraised€in€this€appeal.€€However,€we€have€chosen€to€address€it€based€upon€the€principles€of€due€processÏthat€are€at€issue.€ FÝ ƒ Åå$ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°Òà Ø àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ô%¡ôXXÔThis€problem€is€often€reflected€in€sex„abuse€and€child„abuse€cases€where€the€State€establishesÐ  Ða€pattern€of€criminal€activity€committed€by€the€accused,€but€is€unable€to€present€detailed€evidenceÏconcerning€the€specific€criminal€acts€and€the€dates€in€which€those€acts€occurred.€€òòSeeóó€òòTidwell€v.€Stateóó,Ð „| Ð922€S.W.2d€497,€500„501€(Tenn.€1996);€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€134,€136„37€(Tenn.€1993).€€€€€€,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ÷Ý ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X:ÁXXXÔÔ€›mXX:ÁÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X:ÁX›mÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€6,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒñÄ!ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÝ  Ýñ“ñ›ñ“ññ“ñ›ñ“ñѰÑÑ€°ÑÓÓÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€:ÁXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ€P¨ ÑÓ=€:ÁXÐXdÐd=Óœñ¢ññ¢ññ¢ññ ñœñ ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E  ` 8ttxPXð  rßñ¢ññ ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E  ` 8ttxPXð  rßñ–ñœñ–ññ ññ–ññ–ññ¢ñßt€ )>.*jx{Â` `€€@ELÊ` 8ttxP„( È tß›ñ¢ñà@‰‰ €àòòIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEóóˆÐ  Ðòòà@»»*€àAT€NASHVILLEóóˆÐ ÔÌ ÐÌÓÓÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àò òFOR€PUBLICATIONó óÐ R J Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àAppellant,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àò òFILED:€€òòJuly€6,€1999€óóó óÐ $  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHUMPHREYS€CIRCUITÐ öî  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)ÌJAMES€R.€LEMACKSà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHON.€ROBERT€E.€BURCH,Рº  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àJUDGEÐ ¨   Ðà Ø àAppellee.à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð Ž†  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àñ’ñœñ’ññ“ñœñ“ñNO.€01S01„9803„CC„00049ñ“ñ›ñ“ñà  # àñ’ñœñ’ññ“ñœñ“ñÐ tl Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àñ“ñ›ñ“ñà  à)Ìñ“ñœñ“ñà Ø àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà 0 àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà ˆ àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà à àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà 8 àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà  àñ’ñ›ñ’ñ)à è à(D.U.I.)Ð @8 Ðñ’ñ›ñ’ñà Ø àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà 0 àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà ˆ àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà à àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà 8 àñ’ñ›ñ’ñà  àñ’ñ›ñ’ñ)Ìñ“ñ›ñ“ñÌñ“ñœñ“ñññÌñññ‘ññ‹ñÌñ‹ñà Ø àà Ø àà Ø àà Ø àà Ø à›Ìñ‘ñòòForñ“ñ›ñ“ñ€the€Appellantóó:à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:Ð ØÐ ÐÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àJ.P.€BradleyÐ ¤œ ÐAttorney€General€&€Reporterà 8 àà  àà è àWaverly,€TennesseeÐ Š‚ ÐÌMichael€E.€MooreÌSolicitor€GeneralÌÌDaryl€J.€BrandÌSenior€CounselÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€TennesseeÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àÌÌÓ™ÓÌÌñ“ñœñ“ñññÌñññ“ñ›ñ“ñÌÌñ“ñœ›ñ“ñà@ää-€àò òÔ‡RÓÌà Ø àThis€Court€has€previously€held€that€criminal€responsibility€is€a€codification€of€theÏcommon„law€theories€of€aiding€and€abetting€and€accessories€before€the€fact.€€òòState€v.Ð Ä,¼%* ÐCarsonóó,€950€S.W.2d€951,€955€(Tenn.€1997).€€As€stated€in€the€Sentencing€CommissionÐ .ˆ', ÐComments,€ð ð[t]he€revised€code€does€not€utilize€these€[common„law]€terms;€instead,€itÏprovides€that€any€person€may€be€charged€as€a€party€if€he€or€she€is€criminallyÏresponsible€for€the€perpetration€of€the€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„401ÏSentencing€Commission€Cmts.€€ÌÐ Œ7„06 Ðà Ø àIt€is€well€established€that€any€person€who€aides€or€abets€in€the€commission€of€aÏcriminal€offense€is€guilty€in€the€same€degree€as€the€principal€who€committed€the€crime.€ÏòòPresley€v.€Stateóó,€161€Tenn.€310,€30€S.W.2d€231,€233€(1930);€òòJenkins€v.€Stateóó,€509Ð   ˜ ÐS.W.2d€240,€245€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1974)€(citing€22€C.J.S.€òòCriminal€Lawóó€ðð€88(1),€atÐ l d Ð260„61),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1974).€€Similar€to€that€traditional€common€law,€aÐ <4 Ðdefendant€indicted€and€subsequently€convicted€of€an€offense€by€way€of€criminalÏresponsibility€is€considered€to€be€a€principal€offender€of€the€crime€for€the€purposes€ofÏdue€process€and€our€criminal€law.€€òòCarsonóó,€954€S.W.2d€at€954;€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€910Ð ¤œ  ÐS.W.2d€897,€900€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„401€SentencingÏCommission€Cmts.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€Ìà Ø àIn€this€case,€the€theory€of€criminal€responsibility€was€raised€by€the€evidence€atÏtrial.€€Under€that€theory,€if€the€jury€found€that€the€appellee€aided€or€otherwise€permittedÏSanchez€to€drive€the€appelleeððs€automobile€at€a€time€when€Sanchez€was€intoxicated,Ïthen€the€appellee€was€guilty€of€DUI.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402.€€In€addition,Ð 8 0 Ðthe€appellee€was€guilty€of€DUI€if€the€jury€found€that€he€was€driving€the€automobileÏwhile€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401(a)(1).€Ð Ð#È  ÐThe€trial€court,€therefore,€properly€instructed€the€jury€on€both€theories€of€guilt.€€€ÌÌà Ø àAs€DUI€was€the€only€crime€charged€in€this€case,€we€conclude€that€the€generalÏverdict€satisfied€the€appelleeððs€right€to€a€unanimous€jury.€€The€right€of€jury€unanimityÏhas€never€required€more€than€a€general€verdict€in€cases€where€only€one€offense€is€atÏissue€based€upon€a€single€criminal€occurrence.€€òòSeeóó€òòSchad€v.€Arizonaóó,€501€U.S.€624,Ð ˜.', Ð631„32,€111€S.Ct.€2491,€2497,€115€L.Ed.2d€555€(1991);€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€920€S.W.2dÐ d0\). Ð247,€257„58€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995)€(holding€that€where€only€one€offense€is€at€issue,Ïthe€juryððs€consideration€of€criminal€responsibility€along€with€a€theory€of€direct€liabilityÏdid€not€violate€the€right€of€jury€unanimity),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1996).€€In€suchÐ È5À.4 Ðcases,€as€here,€where€the€State€seeks€to€prove€one€crime€arising€from€one€event,€weÏmay€presume€that€the€juryððs€general€verdict€was€unanimous.€€òòSeeóó€òòBrownóó,€823€S.W.2dÐ ÔÌ Ðat€583.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCarter€v.€Stateóó,€958€S.W.2d€620,€624€(Tenn.€1997)€(stating€thatÐ   ˜ Ðwhere€a€defendant€is€charged€with€first€degree€murder,€a€general€verdict€of€guilt€onÏthat€charge€is€valid€even€if€the€jury€is€instructed€on€both€premeditated€and€felonyÏmurder).€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà@,,/€àò òII.ó óˆÐ œ”  ÐÌà Ø àThe€next€issue€is€whether€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€sustain€theÏappelleeððs€conviction€based€upon€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€of€Sanchez.€ÏThis€Court€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€for€a€lack€of€sufficient€evidence€unless€theÏfacts€contained€in€the€record€and€any€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom€areÏinsufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€for€a€rational€trier€of€fact€to€find€the€defendant€guiltyÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€WeÐ < 4 Ðreview€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State€and€do€not€engage€in€theÏassessment€of€witness€credibility€or€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€to€the€evidence.€ÏòòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).Ð  %˜" ÐÌà Ø àTo€sustain€a€conviction€of€DUI€in€this€case,€the€State€was€required€to€proveÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€either€the€appellee€drove€his€automobile€on€a€publicÏroad€while€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€or€that€he€allowed€Sanchez€to€operateÏthe€automobile€at€a€time€when€Sanchez€was€under€the€influence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ55„10„401(a)(1).€€If€the€jury€relied€on€the€theory€of€criminal€responsibility,€it€wasÏrequired€to€find€one€of€the€following€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt:€(1)€the€appelleeÏcaused€or€aided€Sanchez€to€engage€in€the€unlawful€conduct€and€the€appellee€had€theÏculpability€required€for€DUI;€(2)€the€appellee€acted€with€intent€to€promote€or€assist€theÐ Ì5Ä.4 Ðcommission€of€DUI€and€he€solicited,€directed,€or€aided,€or€attempted€to€aid€Sanchez€toÏcommit€the€offense;€or€(3)€the€appellee€failed€to€make€a€reasonable€effort€to€preventÏcommission€of€the€DUI€and€he€had€a€duty€imposed€by€law€to€prevent€the€commissionÏof€the€offense.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402.€€€€€€€Ð l d ÐÌà Ø àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€was€sufficient€toÏsupport€the€DUI€conviction€based€upon€criminal€responsibility.€€At€trial,€there€wasÏtestimony€from€both€the€appellee€and€eyewitness€Jennifer€Barker€that€Sanchez€wasÏdriving€the€automobile€just€before€the€accident.€€Sanchez€had€possession€of€theÏappelleeððs€car€keys€when€he€and€the€appellee€agreed€to€leave€the€party€with€theirÏfriends.€€Three€eyewitnesses€testified€that€Sanchez€had€been€drinking€alcoholicÏbeverages€for€approximately€six€hours€prior€to€the€accident€and€that€he€was€ð ðveryÏintoxicated.ðð€€Based€upon€that€evidence,€the€jury€could€have€reasonably€inferred€thatÏSanchez€drove€the€automobile€while€impaired€by€an€intoxicant€and€that€the€appelleeÏpermitted€or€otherwise€aided€Sanchezðð€act€of€driving€in€that€condition.€€ÌÌà@.€àò òIII.ó óˆÐ È#À  ÐÌà Ø àFinally,€it€is€appropriate€to€address€whether€the€appelleeððs€indictment€wasÏconstitutionally€valid€even€though€it€did€not€include€language€pertaining€to€criminalÏresponsibility.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€We€conclude€that€the€indictment€was€valid€in€describing€the€DUIÐ +ü#( Ðoffense,€including€the€time,€date,€and€location€where€the€offense€allegedly€occurred.€ÏThe€theories€available€to€support€a€conviction€of€that€offense€were€not€required€to€beÏincluded€in€the€indictment.€€€€€Ð h0`). Ðà Ø àIt€is€a€well„known€principle€of€law€that€a€criminal€indictment€must€include€aÏsufficient€description€of€the€charged€offense€to€insure€that€the€accused€understandsÏthe€special€nature€of€the€charge€he€is€called€upon€to€answer.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443Ð   ˜ ÐU.S.€307,€314,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2786,€61€L.Ed.2d€560€ñ“ñœñ“ñ(1979);€ñ“ñ›ñ“ññ“ñœñ“ñòòState€v.€Byrdóó,€820€S.W.2dÐ l d Ð739,€740„41€(Tenn.€1991).ñ“ñ›ñ“ñ€€The€essential€functions€of€the€indictment€are€to€provideÏnotice€of€the€charged€offense,€to€enable€the€trial€court€to€enter€a€proper€judgmentÏupon€conviction,€and€to€afford€protection€for€the€accused€against€double€jeopardy.€Ïñ“ñœòòóóñ“ñòòByrdóó,ñ“ñ›ñ“ñ€820€S.W.2d€ñ“ñœñ“ñatñ“ñ›ñ“ñ€ñ“ñœñ“ñ741.ñ“ñ›ñ“ñÐ œ”  ÐÌà Ø àThe€indictment€charged€that€the€appellee€was€driving€or€was€in€control€of€aÏmotor€vehicle€on€a€public€road€in€Humphreys€County,€Tennessee€on€October€31,Ï1993,€while€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401Ð ÌÄ Ð(1991).€€Because€the€appellee€was€charged€with€the€one€offense€of€DUI,€theÏindictment€satisfied€the€notice€requirements€under€ñ“ñœòòóóñ“ñòòByrdóóñ“ñ›ñ“ñ€even€though€it€did€notÐ d\ Ðspecifically€include€language€of€criminal€responsibility.ÌÌà Ø àAs€previously€mentioned,€criminal€responsibility€is€not€a€recognizable€offense€inÏitself,€but€is€solely€a€theory€by€which€the€State€may€hold€the€defendant€liable€for€the€Ïprincipal€offense€committed€by€another.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402.€€AnÐ `'X $ Ðindictment€that€charges€an€accused€on€the€principal€offense€ð ðcarries€with€it€all€theÏnuances€of€the€offense,ðð€including€criminal€responsibility.€€òòJohnsonóó,€910€S.W.2d€atÐ ø*ð#( Ð900€(quoting€from€òòState€v.€Lequireóó,€634€S.W.2d€608,€615€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981)).€Ð Ä,¼%* ÐTherefore,€to€the€extent€that€the€State€sought€to€convict€the€appellee€of€DUI€by€way€ofÏcriminal€responsibility,€the€indictment€was€constitutionally€valid€in€charging€only€DUI.€ÏIn€addition,€we€note€that€it€was€the€appellee€himself€who€presented€evidence€whichÏallowed€the€State€to€pursue€the€theory€of€criminal€responsibility.€€Under€thoseÏcircumstances,€we€have€no€concerns€about€the€sufficiency€of€notice.€€€€ÌÐ Œ7„06 Ðò òà@ŒŒ*€àCONCLUSIONó ó€€€ˆÐ  ÐÌà Ø àWe€conclude€that€the€general€verdict€of€guilt€satisfied€the€appelleeððs€right€of€juryÏunanimity€even€though€the€jury€was€instructed€that€it€could€convict€the€appellee€of€DUIÏeither€based€upon€his€own€commission€of€the€offense€or€by€criminal€responsibility€forÏSanchezðð€commission€of€the€offense.€€Having€further€determined€that€the€indictmentÏand€the€convicting€evidence€were€sufficient,€we€reverse€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏand€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€The€conviction€of€DUI€is€reinstated€withÏcosts€of€this€appeal€taxed€to€the€appellee.ÓÓà è àÐ tl ÐÌÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à_______________________________ÌÓ@hÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUSTICEÌÌÓÓCONCUR:ÌÓqiÓÓÓÌAnderson,€C.J.,ÌDrowota,€Holder,€JJ.Ó¡iÓÌDISSENT:ÌBirch,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœñ”ñÐ ²6ª/5 ÐÑP¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÌà@±±$€àSUPREME€COURT,€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð l d Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHUMPHREYS€CIRCUITÐ R J Ðà Ø àAppellant,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNO.€8500€BelowÐ 80 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNO.€01S01„9803„CC„00049Ð ü  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)ÌJAMES€R.€LEMACKSà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€Reversed;Ð ÐÈ  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àTrial€Court€Affirmedà ð àÐ ¶®  Ðà Ø àAppellee.à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð œ”  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àÐ ‚z  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àÌÌÌòòà@TT,€àJUDGMENTóóÓvjӈР ÐÌà Ø àThis€case€was€heard€on€the€record€on€appeal€from€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals,€the€Stateððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€having€heretofore€beenÏgranted,€with€briefs€and€argument€of€counsel;€and€upon€consideration€thereof,€thisÏCourt€is€of€the€opinion€that€there€was€no€violation€of€the€appelleeððs€right€to€aÏunanimous€jury€and€that€the€evidence€was€legally€sufficient€to€support€a€convictionÏunder€criminal€responsibility.ÌÌà Ø àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€filed€herein,€it€is,€therefore,€ordered€andÏadjudged€that€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€is€reversed€and€the€caseÏis€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€of€Humphreys€County€for€the€execution€of€theÏjudgment€of€that€court€and€for€the€collection€of€costs€accrued€below.ÌÌà Ø àCosts€of€this€appeal€shall€be€paid€by€the€appellee,€James€R.€Lemacks,€forÏwhich€execution€shall€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓ¦jÓÌÌÌÌ07/06/99Ó¿rÓñ”ñ›