ÿWPCO( …# VUNa %¯ 0DµUPùUHI b‘ 0`™ 0ˆù 0D w@Å 4  ( 0J0 0Tz 1mÎ 0c; 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh 0dÝU>AU 6 D3µ‘è By 0@–B)ÖDCÿ AMBU*/¹›èðƒv~svÓñ 0wÄ! 0Š;" 0 Å" 0´e# 0Ç$ 0Ûà$ 0ï»% AOª&Æù& 0D¿' D/( B2(˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò&ruZ ‹8CaslonOpnface BT Regular<à09Z 0Courier (WT) Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(8(3ß«$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó =D>?@ÀAÀBÀCÀDÀEÀFӀ܀ƒ"ÔôB3|xQ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôtuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;s˜$´´Ô2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New,,,,'ÿÿdxd ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd€-/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€1ÔÔ€1ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔÌÌò òAprilÏ7,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€1ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ‘Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔTennÔ€)XÔ.€Ô€)ôÔCode€Ann.€ðð€50„1„304€states:ÌÌÌà8 à(a)€No€employee€shall€be€discharged€or€terminated€solely€forÏrefusing€to€participate€in,€or€for€refusing€to€remain€silentÏabout,€illegal€activities.ÌÌà8 à(b)€As€used€in€this€section,€ð ðillegal€activitiesðð€meansÏactivities€which€are€in€violation€of€the€criminal€or€civilÏcode€of€this€state€or€the€United€States€or€any€regulationÏintended€to€protect€the€public€health,€safety€or€welfare.ÌÌà8 à(c)€Any€employee€terminated€in€violation€of€subsection€(a)Ïshall€have€a€cause€of€action€against€the€employer€forÏretaliatory€discharge€and€any€other€damages€to€which€theÏemployee€may€be€entitled.€.€.€.Ì æÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔà8 àIn€every€building€or€structure€exits€shall€be€soÏarranged€and€maintained€as€to€provide€free€andÏunobstructed€egress€from€all€parts€of€theÏbuilding€or€structure€at€all€times€when€it€isÏoccupied.€€No€lock€or€fastening€to€prevent€freeÏescape€from€the€inside€of€any€building€shall€beÏinstalled€except€in€mental,€penal,€or€correctiveÏinstitutions€where€supervisory€personnel€isÏcontinually€on€duty€and€effective€provisions€areÏmade€to€remove€occupants€in€case€of€fire€or€otherÏemergency.ÌÌ29€C.F.R.€ðð€1910.36(b)(4)€(1996).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò(OÞ{$µµà0  àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(b²D$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xÓñ$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒÆ‚$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿù…$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³¶4$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Ǫ»$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€¼ XXdÈdÈ7ÑÖ€+ÖÑ  ÑœÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àApril€7,€1997Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌ›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌ̜ـ€ÙßR€02/A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›à@ àœAT€KNOXVILLE›Ì̛̜ÌÌœMAXINE€O.€MASON,›à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àœPlaintiff„Appellee,›à àà àœ(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Sevier€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(›Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ(€€Hon.€Ben€W.€Hooper,€II,›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ(€€Judge›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€No.€03S01„9606„CV„00061›ÌœKENNETH€M.€SEATON€AND€WIFE,à à(ÌLAUREL€SEATON€d/b/a€GRANDà à(ÌHOTEL,›à àà àà àà àà à(Ìœà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendants„Appellants.à à(ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àà àòòFor€Defendants„Appellantsóó:ÌÌJames€H.€Ripleyà àà àà àà àDouglas€L.€DuttonÌÒ € ÒÒ à Ò€€Sharp€&€Ripleyà àà àà àà àAmy€V.€HollarsÌSeviervilleà àà àà àà àà à€€Hodges,€Doughty€&€CarsonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville€›ÌÌœÌÌÌÌ›ÌÌà@ àòòò òÔ€)èÔÔ€ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€)ÔÔ€)XÔóóó óÌœÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€COURT€OF€APPEALSÌAFFIRMED;€CASE€REMANDED€TOÌTRIAL€COURT.›à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€REID,€J.ÇÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÓ` °‚X.h—XÓà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€decision€of€theÏCourt€of€Appeals,€reversing€the€trial€court,€that€the€actionÏof€retaliatory€discharge€"for€refusing€to€remain€silent€aboutÏillegal€activities"€does€not€require€a€showing€that€theÏemployer€expressly€or€implicitly€directed€the€employee€toÏremain€silent€about€the€illegal€activity.€€This€Court€affirmsÏthe€decision€and€rationale€of€the€Court€of€Appeals.ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌÌà àThe€case€is€before€the€Court€on€the€defendants'Ïmotion€for€summary€judgment€asserting€that€the€complaint€doesÏnot€state€a€cause€of€action€for€retaliatory€discharge€forÏviolation€of€the€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„1„304Ï(1991).× ƒ3 ××  ×€€ÌÌà àThe€evidence€submitted€in€opposition€to€the€motionÏshows€that€the€plaintiff,€Maxine€O.€Mason,€worked€in€theÏlaundry€room€of€a€hotel€owned€and€operated€by€the€defendants,ÏKenneth€M.€and€Laurel€Seaton.€€The€laundry€room€had€threeÏdoors,€two€of€which€were€located€on€the€east€side€of€theÏlaundry€room€and€provided€access€to€the€area€of€the€hotelÏdesignated€the€convention€center.€€The€other€door€was€locatedÏon€the€west€side€of€the€laundry€room€and€opened€to€theÏoutside.€€Gas€fired€dryers€were€located€along€the€wall€betweenÏthe€east€doors€and€the€west€door.€€These€dryers€hadÏaccidentally€caught€on€fire€on€previous€occasions.€€TheÏplaintiff€had€noticed€in€the€laundry€room€unprotectedÏelectrical€wiring€and€uncovered€electrical€junction€boxes,Ïwhich€after€her€discharge,€were€found€to€be€in€violation€ofÏthe€fire€code.€€ÌÌà àSometime€prior€to€being€discharged€from€herÍemployment,€the€plaintiff€saw€maintenance€personnel€installingÏlocks€on€the€two€doors€providing€access€to€the€conventionÏcenter.€€The€plaintiff€was€told€that€these€two€doors€wouldÏremain€locked,€and€the€only€means€of€entering€or€leaving€theÏlaundry€room€would€be€the€door€at€the€opposite€end€of€theÏroom.€€The€plaintiff€expressed€to€management€personnel€herÏconcern€that€she€and€other€laundry€room€personnel€could€beÏtrapped€in€the€laundry€room€in€the€event€a€fire€started€at€oneÏof€the€gas€fired€dryers.€€When€pleas€by€the€plaintiff€andÏothers€failed€to€dissuade€management€from€its€decision€to€lockÏthe€doors€at€the€east€end€of€the€laundry€room,€the€plaintiffÏtelephoned€the€city€fire€and€police€department.€€As€the€resultÏof€the€plaintiff's€call,€police€and€fire€department€officersÏmade€an€investigation€at€the€hotel.€€At€the€insistence€of€theÏofficers,€the€hotel€manager€discussed€with€the€plaintiff€herÏsafety€concerns.€€As€the€result,€the€defendants€agreed€thatÏone€door€on€the€east€end€of€the€laundry€room€would€remainÏunlocked€until€7€p.m.€of€each€day.€€ÌÌà àSubsequently,€the€defendants€were€cited€for€codeÏviolations€unrelated€to€the€locked€doors,€for€which€they€paidÍa€penalty.€€An€industrial€safety€expert€testified€that€lockingÏboth€doors€at€the€east€end€of€the€laundry€room€would€haveÏcreated€a€condition€dangerous€to€workers€in€that€room€and€wasÏa€violation€of€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1910.36(b)(4)€(1996).× ƒ4 ××  ×€€ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff's€employment€was€terminated€six€daysÏafter€the€date€on€which€she€protested€the€defendants'€decisionÏto€lock€the€doors€and€reported€her€concerns€to€city€officials.€ÏPrior€to€that€event,€management€had€expressed€noÏdissatisfaction€with€the€plaintiff's€work.€€No€reason€wasÏgiven€for€her€discharge.€€At€no€time€did€the€defendantsÏinstruct€the€plaintiff€to€remain€silent€regarding€theÏconditions€in€the€laundry€room.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€whether€the€plaintiff€wasÏdischarged€from€her€employment€solely€for€reporting€conditionsÏin€the€laundry€room€was€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact.€ÏThe€trial€court€further€found€that€whether€the€activityÏreported€by€the€plaintiff€was€illegal€also€was€a€disputedÏissue€of€material€fact.€€However,€the€court€found€theÏplaintiff€had€failed€to€submit€evidence€that€she€was€forced€byÏher€employer€to€violate€a€law€or€regulation€or€to€remainÏsilent€about€the€violation,€and€on€that€basis,€dismissed€theÏcomplaint.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€found€the€record€presented€aÏdisputed€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€every€essential€elementÏof€the€cause€of€action€alleged€and€remanded€the€case€forÏtrial.ÌÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àReview€in€this€Court€is€limited€to€the€question€ofÏwhether€the€plaintiff€failed€to€present€evidence€supportingÏevery€essential€element€of€a€cause€of€action€under€Section€50„1„304.€€Rule€56.03€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€ProcedureÏprovides€that€summary€judgment€"shall€be€rendered€forthwith€ifÏthe€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€inter‚rogatories,€andÏadmissions€on€file,€together€with€the€affi‚davits,€if€any,€showÏthat€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€andÏthat€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw."ÌÌÒ 0 ÒÒ À ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` …°Ó[W]hen€the€facts€material€to€theÏapplication€of€a€rule€of€law€areÏundisputed,€the€application€is€a€matter€of€Ïlaw€for€the€court€since€there€is€nothingÏto€submit€to€the€jury€to€resolve€in€favorÏof€one€party€or€the€other.€€In€otherÏwords,€when€there€is€no€dispute€over€theÏevidence€establishing€the€facts€thatÏcontrol€the€application€of€a€rule€of€law,Ïsummary€judgment€is€an€appropriate€meansÏof€deciding€that€issue.ÌÌÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒòòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€214„15€(Tenn.Ï1993).ÓÓà à"Construction€of€[a]€statute€and€application€of€theÏlaw€to€the€facts€[are€questions]€of€law."€€€òòBeare€Co.€v.ÏTennessee€Dept.€of€Revenueóó,€858€S.W.2d€906,€907€(Tenn.€1993).ÍIt€follows€that€the€issues€raised€by€the€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€of€whether€the€plaintiff€failed€to€present€evidenceÏsupporting€the€essential€elements€of€the€cause€of€action,€areÏquestions€of€law.€€Consequently,€the€scope€of€review€is€deÏnovo€with€no€presumption€of€œcorrectness.›€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï13(d);€òòUnion€Carbide€Corp.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€87,€91Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€"No€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€toÏdecisions€granting€[or€denying]€summary€judgments€because€theyÏinvolve€only€questions€of€law.€€Thus,€on€appeal,€we€must€makeÏa€fresh€determination€concerning€whether€or€not€theÏrequirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56€have€been€met."€€òòCowden€v.ÏSovran€Bank/Central€Southóó,€816€S.W.2d€741,€744€Ì(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌÌà àThe€defendants'€position€is€that€the€activitiesÏreported€by€the€plaintiff€were€not€illegal€within€the€meaningÏof€the€statute,€the€plaintiff€failed€to€show€a€causalÏrelationship€between€her€call€to€the€fire€and€policeÏdepartment€and€her€discharge,€and€the€plaintiff€was€notÍinstructed€to€remain€silent€within€the€meaning€of€the€statute.€€ÌÌà àThe€record€clearly€supports€the€concurrent€findingsÏby€the€trial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€on€the€first€twoÏissues.€€ÌÌà àThe€testimony€of€the€expert€on€industrial€safetyÏthat€locking€the€doors€created€a€dangerous€working€condition,Ïand€the€existence€of€code€violations€were€sufficient€evidenceÏof€illegal€activity€to€overcome€the€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€This€evidence€is€sufficient€to€show€"illegalÏactivity,"€which€is€defined€as€"activities€which€are€inÏviolation€of€the€criminal€or€civil€code€of€this€state€or€theÏUnited€States€or€any€regulation€intended€to€protect€the€publicÏhealth,€safety€or€welfare."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„1„304(b).€ÏThe€statute's€protection€extends€to€employees€who€haveÏreasonable€cause€to€believe€a€law,€regulation,€or€rule€hasÏbeen€violated€or€will€be€violated,€and€in€good€faith€reportÏit.€€òòSee€e.g.óó,€òòMelchi€v.€Burns€Int'l€Security€Services,€Inc.óó,Ï597€F.Supp.€575,€583€(E.D.€Mich.€1984).ÌÌà àThe€evidence€also€would€support€a€verdict€that€theÏplaintiff's€employment€was€terminated€solely€because€sheÏreported€the€conditions€in€the€laundry€room,€including€theÏinstallation€of€locks,€to€city€officials.€€In€òòAnderson€v.ÏStandard€Register€Coóó.,€857€S.W.2d€555€(Tenn.€1993),€andÏòòConatser€v.€Clarksville€Coca„Colaóó,€920€S.W.2d€646€(Tenn.Ï1995),€the€Court€discussed€the€element€of€causal€relationshipÏbetween€protected€conduct€and€discharge€from€employment.€€InÏòòAndersonóó,€the€employee€was€discharged€pursuant€to€a€faciallyÏneutral€absence€control€policy€for€absences€caused€by€a€work„related€injury.€€She€alleged€that€she€was€discharged€becauseÏshe€asserted€a€workersðð€compensation€claim€for€the€injury.€ÏThe€employer€stated€that€she€was€discharged€because€she€wasÏð ðmedically€unable€to€perform€her€job€duties.ðð€€òòAnderson€v.ÏStandard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€at€556.€€In€that€case,€theÏCourt€stated€that€one€element€of€the€cause€of€action€forÏretaliatory€discharge€for€asserting€benefits€under€theÏworkersðð€compensation€law€was€that€ð ðthe€claim€for€workersððÏcompensation€benefits€was€a€substantial€factor€in€theÏemployerððs€motivation€to€terminate€the€employeeððs€employment.ðð€ÏòòId.óó€at€558.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓThe€burden€of€proof€rests,€of€course,€uponÏthe€plaintiff€to€prove€the€elements€of€theÏcause€of€action,€including€a€causalÏrelationship€between€the€claim€forÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits€and€theÏtermination€of€employment.€€Proof€ofÏdischarge€without€evidence€of€a€causalÏrelationship€between€the€claim€forÏbenefits€and€the€discharge€does€notÏpresent€an€issue€for€the€jury.€€However,Ïproof€of€a€causal€link€between€the€claimÏfor€benefits€and€the€employeeððs€dischargeÏimposes€upon€the€employer€the€burden€ofÏshowing€a€legitimate,€non„pretextualÏreason€for€the€employeeððs€discharge.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÌòòId.óó€at€558„59.€€Finding€that€the€employee€had€failed€to€showÏthat€the€claim€for€benefits€was€a€factor€in€the€discharge,€theÏCourt€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€toÏthe€employer.€€In€òòConatseróó,€the€employee€had€worked€for€fourÏmonths€before€sustaining€an€on€the€job€injury,€and€wasÏterminated€three€days€after€returning€to€work.€€The€employerÏdenied€that€the€claim€for€workersðð€compensation€benefits€was€aÏsubstantial€factor€in€its€decision€to€discharge€the€employee,Ïclaiming€that€the€employee€was€discharged€because€he€was€notÏphysically€strong€enough€to€perform€the€job.€€The€employeeÏargued€that€his€discharge€only€three€days€after€returning€toÍwork€constituted€a€prima€facie€showing€that€the€termination€ofÏhis€employment€was€in€retaliation€for€the€assertion€of€aÏworkersðð€compensation€claim.€€The€Court€stated,ÌÌÒ 0 ÒÒ À ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓà8 àThat€evidence€is€notÏsufficient.€€Even€inÏthe€quote€fromÏLarsonððs€treatise€onÏWorkersðð€CompensationÏLaw€relied€upon€byÏthe€employee,Ïproximity€in€timeÏwithout€evidence€ofÏsatisfactory€jobÏperformance€does€notÏmake€a€prima€facieÏcase.€€2A€ArthurÏLarson,€òòThe€Law€ofÏWorkmenððsÏCompensationóó,Ïðð68.36(c),€p.€13„318Ï(1994).ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÌòòConatser€v.€Clarksville€Coca„Colaóó,€920€S.W.2d€at€648.ÌÌà àAs€stated€in€òòConatseróó,€proximity€in€time€between€theÏprotected€act€and€the€discharge€is€not€sufficient€to€establishÏa€causal€relationship.€€However,€as€stated€in€òòAndersonóó,Ïevidence€of€a€causal€link€between€the€protected€act€and€theÏemployee's€discharge€imposes€upon€the€employer€the€burden€ofÍshowing€the€reason€for€the€discharge.€€For€the€context€inÏwhich€the€evidence€of€causation€must€be€viewed,€guidance€isÏprovided€in€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€where€the€Court€stated,€ð ðIn€makingÏthis€determination€[of€whether€a€genuine€issue€exists],€theÏcourt€is€to€view€the€evidence€in€a€light€favorable€to€theÏnonmoving€party€and€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€hisÏfavor.ðð€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d.€at€215.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓAppropriate€application€of€the€Rule€isÏmore€likely€to€be€achieved€if€litigantsÏand€courts€alike€keep€in€mind€that€theÏpurpose€of€a€summary€judgment€proceedingÏis€not€the€finding€of€facts,€theÏresolution€of€disputed,€material€facts,€orÏthe€determination€of€conflictingÏinferences€reasonably€to€be€drawn€fromÏthose€facts.€€ð ðThe€purpose€is€to€resolveÏcontrolling€issues€of€law,€and€thatÏalone.ðð€€€òòBellamy€v.€Federal€Exp.€Corp.óó,Ï749€S.W.2d€31,33€(Tenn.€1988).€ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÌòòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€216.€€Since€the€trial€court€is€notÏto€resolve€issues€of€fact€in€deciding€a€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment,€the€determination€of€whether€the€circumstances€giveÏrise€to€an€inference€of€retaliatory€discharge€"must€be€aÏdetermination€of€whether€the€proffered€admissible€evidenceÏshows€circumstances€that€would€be€sufficient€to€permit€aÍrational€finder€of€fact€to€infer€a€[retaliatory]€motive.€€ItÏis€not€the€province€of€the€summary€judgment€court€itself€toÏdecide€what€inferences€should€be€drawn.ðð€€òòChambers€v.€TRM€CopyÏCtrs.€Corp.óó,€43€F.3d€29,€38€(2nd€Cir.€1994).ÌÌà àHere,€the€essential€factor€to€be€determined€is€theÏemployer's€motivation.€€Evidence€of€that€motivation€is€largelyÏwithin€the€possession€of€the€defendants.€€Consequently,€where,Ïas€in€this€case,€the€plaintiff's€claim€of€causation€isÏconsistent€with€the€facts€and€circumstances€shown,€and€theÏemployer€chooses€to€offer€no€explanation€for€the€employee'sÏdischarge,€fairness€requires€that€any€credible€evidence€fromÏwhich€the€trier€of€fact€could€infer€causation€will€defeat€theÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€plaintiff€in€this€case€isÏnot€guilty€of€the€"generalizations€and€conclusions"€found€toÏbe€fatal€in€òòChism€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.óó,€òòseeóó€p.€[slip€op.Ïat€15],€òòinfraóó.€€She€affirmatively€states€that€she€had€neverÏreceived€any€reprimand€or€adverse€evaluation,€and€that€she€wasÏa€good€and€loyal€employee.€€This€evidence€is€uncontested.€ÏUnder€the€circumstances€of€this€case,€the€plaintiff'sÏaffidavit€is€not€merely€conclusory€and€must€be€given€someÍeffect.€€The€evidence€of€a€good€work€history€presented€by€theÏplaintiff,€in€the€context€of€the€facts€and€circumstances€ofÏthis€case,€is€sufficient€to€establish€a€causal€relationshipÏbetween€her€reporting€of€the€suspected€illegal€activity€at€herÏplace€of€employment€and€her€discharge.€€€€ÌÌà àIn€summary,€the€record€shows,€for€the€purposes€ofÏthis€appeal,€that€the€plaintiff,€without€having€been€directedÏby€her€employer€to€remain€silent€about€illegal€activity,€wasÏdischarged€solely€because€she€reported€that€activity.€€TheÏfinal€issue,€then,€is€whether€there€can€be€a€violation€of€theÏstatute€in€the€absence€of€a€prior€directive€by€the€employer.€€ÌAn€affirmative€response€to€this€question€is€required€by€theÏpurpose€for€which€the€statute€was€enacted€as€well€as€theÏlanguage€of€the€statute€itself.ÌÌà àPrior€decisions€by€this€Court€reflect€the€resolutionÏby€the€legislature€and€the€Court€of€the€competing€interests€ofÏemployers€and€employees.€€"The€cause€of€action€for€retaliatoryÏdischarge€defines€the€balance€point€between€the€employment„at„will€doctrine€and€rights€granted€employees€under€well„definedÍpublic€policy.ðð€€òòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2dÏat€556;€òòReynolds€v.€Ozark€Motor€Lines,€Inc.óó,€887€S.W.2d€822,Ï824€(Tenn.€1994).€€Employment„at„will€is€the€fundamentalÏprinciple€controlling€the€relationship€between€employers€andÏemployees.€€That€principle€was€stated€in€òòHarney€v.€MeadowbrookÏNursing€Centeróó,€784€S.W.2d€921,€922€(Tenn.€1990),€as€follows:€Ï"The€long€standing€rule€in€this€State€is€that€an€employee„at„will€may€be€discharged€without€breach€of€contract€for€goodÏcause,€bad€cause€or€no€cause€at€all,€without€being€therebyÏguilty€of€legal€wrong."€€This€doctrine€recognizes€thatÏemployers€need€the€freedom€to€make€their€own€businessÏjudgments€without€interference€from€the€courts.€"[A]nÏemployer's€ability€to€make€and€act€upon€independentÏassessments€of€an€employee's€abilities€and€job€performance€asÏwell€as€business€needs€is€essential€to€the€free„enterpriseÏsystem."€€òòClifford€v.€Cactus€Drilling€Corp.óó,€353€N.W.2d€469,Ï474€(Mich.€1984).€€However,€even€under€the€common€law,€anÏemployee€is€protected€from€discharge€in€retaliation€forÏattempting€to€exercise€a€statutory€or€constitutional€right,€orÏin€violation€of€a€well„defined€public€policy.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,ÏòòConatser€v.€Clarksville€Coca„Colaóó,€920€S.W.2d€646€(Tenn.Í1995);€òòReynolds€v.€Ozark€Motor€Lines,€Inc.óó,€887€S.W.2d€822Ï(Tenn.€1994);€òòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2dÏ555€(Tenn.€1993);€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896Ï(Tenn.€1992);€òòChism€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.óó,€762€S.W.2d€552Ï(Tenn.€1988);€òòClanton€v.€Cain„Sloan€Co.óó,€677€S.W.2d€441€(Tenn.Ï1984).ÌÌà àIn€òòChism€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.óó,€762€S.W.2d€552Ï(Tenn.€1988),€the€Court€rejected€a€complaint€asserting€thatÏthe€plaintiff€was€terminated€ð ðsolely€for€refusing€toÏparticipate€in,€continue€to€participate€in,€or€to€remainÏsilent€about€illegal€activities.ðð€òòIdóó.€at€553.€€However,€theÏCourt€stated,ÌÌÒ 0 ÒÒ À ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓWe€do€not€intend€to€disparage€such€anÏaction.€€The€Court€is€generally€preparedÏto€uphold€such€claims€in€appropriateÏcases,€such€as€the€òòClantonóó€case.€€MereÏgeneralizations€and€conclusions,€however,Ïwill€not€suffice€when€a€pleading€isÏchallenged€by€a€Rule€12€or€Rule€56€motion.€ÏCertainly€it€would€have€been€a€simpleÏmatter€to€amend€the€complaint€or€to€file€aÏspecific€affidavit€if€the€plaintiff€wereÏin€fact€discharged€because€he€refused€toÏparticipate€in€illegal€activities,€toÏcontinue€to€participate€therein€or€toÏremain€silent€about€them€as€stated€in€hisÍappellate€brief.ÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€557.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896€(Tenn.Ï1992),€the€employee€was€discharged€because€of€his€juryÏservice.€€At€trial,€he€was€awarded€compensatory€and€punitiveÏdamages.€€The€issue€was€whether€damages€were€limited€toÏreinstatement€and€lost€wages€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€22„4„108,€which€states,€ð ðNo€employer€shall€discharge€or€in€anyÏmanner€discriminate€against€an€employee€for€serving€on€juryÏduty€....ðð€€In€holding€that€the€statutory€remedy€was€notÏexclusive,€the€Court€reviewed€the€common€law€of€retaliatoryÏdischarge,€stating,€€"the€tort€action€of€retaliatory€dischargeÏ[is]€available€to€employees€discharged€as€a€consequence€of€anÏemployerððs€violation€of€a€clearly€expressed€statutory€policy."€ÏòòIdóó.€at€899.ÌÌà àThe€case€of€òòReynolds€v.€Ozark€Motor€Lines,€Inc.óó,€887ÏS.W.2d€822€(Tenn.€1994),€arose€prior€to€enactment€of€theÏstatute€at€issue€in€this€case.€There€the€claim€for€retaliatoryÍdischarge€was€based€upon€a€discharge€caused€by€an€employeeððsÏrefusal€to€violate€the€safety€provisions€of€the€TennesseeÏMotor€Carriers€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€65„15„101€(1993).€€TheÏplaintiffs€were€discharged€because€they€refused€to€violateÏregulations€adopted€pursuant€to€the€Act€which€require€that€theÏdriver€of€a€motor€vehicle€inspect€the€vehicle€and€be€satisfiedÏthat€the€vehicle€is€in€safe€operating€condition€before€it€isÏoperated€on€a€public€road.€€The€Court€held€that,€ÌÌÒ 0 ÒÒ À ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p ÒÓÓ€€€€€€The€duties€imposed€by€the€Act€uponÏowners€and€operators€relate€directly€andÏsubstantially€to€the€safety€of€all€personsÏusing€the€streets€and€highways.€...ÌÌ€€€€€€These€statutes€and€regulationsÏclearly€indicate€that€the€legislature,€inÏenacting€the€Tennessee€Motor€Carriers€Act,Ïhas€declared€that€the€public€policy€ofÏTennessee€includes€the€protection,€safety,Ïand€welfare€of€the€traveling€public,Ïincluding€those€persons€who€operate€motorÏvehicles€regulated€by€the€Act.€ÏRetaliatory€discharge€of€employees€forÏrefusing€to€violate€those€provisionsÏdesigned€to€protect€the€public€wouldÏseriously€impair€the€legislative€plan€forÏensuring€highway€safety.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌÌòòIdóó.€at€824„25.€€ÓÓThe€Court€in€òòReynolds€v.€Ozark€Motor€Linesóó,Ïfound€that,€under€the€common€law,ÌÓÓÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ 0 ÒÒ p Òthe€action€[of€retaliatory€discharge]€willÏlie€where€the€employer€has€violated€aÏclear€public€policy€evidenced€by€anÏunambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€orÏregulatory€provision€and€the€employerððsÏviolation€was€a€substantial€factor€in€theÏemployeeððs€discharge.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ p ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌÌòòId.óó€at€823.Ì€ÌÌÌÓÓà àBy€enacting€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„1„304,€the€PublicÏProtection€Act€of€1990,€also€commonly€known€as€the€"whistle„Ïblower"€statute,€the€legislature€extended€the€common€law€toÏprotect€employees€not€only€from€discharge€for€failing€toÏviolate€a€statute,€regulation€or€rule,€but€also€from€dischargeÏfor€refusing€to€remain€silent€about€the€existence€of€suchÏviolations€at€their€place€of€employment.€€The€enactment€is€aÏstatutory€recognition€that€the€protection€of€employees€whoÏreport€violations€of€laws,€regulations,€and€rules€is€a€part€ofÏTennessee€public€policy.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòid.óó€at€824.€€Based€on€theÏfacts€before€the€Court,€a€jury€could€find€that€the€plaintiff'sÏdischarge€was€a€violation€of€that€public€policy.€€ÌÌà àÔ€)&ÔThe€œallegations€of€the€plaintiff's›€œdischarge›€alsoÏœwould€constitute€a›€violation€of€the€plain€language€of€theÏstatute.€€Ô€)XÔUnder€the€statute,€an€employer€cannot€dischargeÏemployees€for€refusing€"to€participate€in,€or€for€refusing€toÏremain€silent€about,€illegal€activities"€at€the€work€place.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€€50„1„304(a).€€The€action€or€conduct€forÏwhich€the€statute€provides€vindication€is€not,€as€theÏdefendants€insist,€disobeying€the€employer's€instructions,€butÏrather€is€terminating€the€plaintiff's€employment€forÏexercising€a€right€granted€by€law.€€It€is€axiomatic€that€anÏemployer€who€is€engaged€in€illegal€activity€does€not€want€thatÏactivity€reported€to€those€officials€who€are€responsible€forÏenforcing€the€law.€€Illegal€activity€in€a€work€environmentÏcannot€exist€without€at€least€the€forbearance€of€the€workers.€ÏRequiring€an€explicit€instruction€by€the€employer€as€anÏessential€component€of€the€cause€of€action€would€defeat€theÏpurpose€of€the€statute.€€Under€the€defendants'€interpretationÏof€the€statute,€an€employer€would€never€be€liable€forÏdischarging€an€employee€for€reporting€illegal€activity€so€longÏas€the€employer€had€not€expressly€forbade€the€employee€fromÏreporting€the€activity.€€As€stated€by€the€Court€of€Appeals,Í"[s]tatutes€are€not€to€be€construed€so€strictly€as€to€defeatÏthe€obvious€intention€of€the€legislature."€€òòState€v.€Nettoóó,Ï486€S.W.2d€725,€728€(Tenn.€1972).€€ÌÌà àThe€literal€language€of€the€statute€does€not€submitÏto€the€narrow€interpretation€advanced€by€the€defendants.€€TheyÏfocus€on€the€word€"refusal"€and€insist€there€can€be€no€refusalÏwithout€an€instruction.€€In€the€statute,€the€thing€refused€isÏ"to€remain€silent€about€illegal€activity."€€Remaining€silentÏis€the€opposite€of€speaking€œout,›€and€refusing€to€remain€silentÏis€the€same€as€speaking€out.€€The€clear€meaning€of€the€statuteÏis€that€employees€have€the€absolute€right€to€speak€out€aboutÏillegal€activities€in€their€workplaces.€€The€declaration€byÏword€or€deed€that€one€refuses€to€remain€silent€about€aÏsituation€does€not€imply€that€there€has€been€an€order€toÏremain€silent.€€This€statute€does€not€require€a€showing€thatÏthe€employer€instructed€the€employee€to€refrain€from€reportingÏthe€illegal€activity;€consequently,€lack€of€such€evidence€isÏnot€fatal€to€the€cause€of€action.ÌÌà@ àò òVó óÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€is€affirmed,Ïand€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings.ÌÌÌà àThe€costs€are€taxed€to€the€appellees,€Kenneth€M.ÏSeaton€and€Laurel€Seaton.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà à€__________________________Ìà àà àà à€Reid,€J.ÌÌÌConcur:ÌÌBirch,€C.J.,€Drowota€and€Anderson,€JJ.ÌÌÌ