ÿWPCGH …# VUNa %¯ 0lµw@! 4a u 0°„ 0D4 x 0J€ 0TÊ AM k 0^k AMÉ 0h 0r~ 0|ð 0†l 0ò 1u‚ B÷ 0d D3xU« 0pU>pU*®B)ØDC AMDU*‘Ü»—'©¦}O!OÌ#ý(y*Ž‘-2< 8g\9ŽÃ;v~Q?vÓÏ@ AO¢FÆñF 0D·G D/ûG B*H˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀäÌÀÀÌÀä0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(D'–$¡¡ÑŒ Œ ÑÑÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Ó UDEEÓ€$z!3|x$(`(3µ$¤¤Ý ƒ'–!ÝÑŒ °ÑѰÑÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô !" ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a) dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ$$$$'ÿÿdxd KÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€3XÔÌÌò òOctoberÏ28,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€3ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó(H"ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóHarper€was€sought€by€police€for€robbing€a€Chattanooga€man,€forcing€him€into€the€trunk€of€his€car,Ïand€stealing€the€car€two€days€prior€to€his€abduction€of€Mrs.€McClung.€€It€was€this€stolen€car€that€Harper€droveÏfrom€Chattanooga€to€the€Memphis€parking€lot€where€he€abducted€Mrs.€McClung.€€Ì †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€"òòDuty€to€police€premisesóó.€€Since€the€possessor€is€not€an€insurer€of€the€visitorððs€safety,€[theÏpossessor]€is€ordinarily€under€no€duty€to€exercise€any€care€until€[the€possessor]€knows€or€has€reason€to€knowÏthat€the€acts€of€the€third€person€are€occurring,€or€are€about€to€occur.€[The€possessor]€may,€however,€know€orÏhave€reason€to€know,€from€past€experience,€that€there€is€a€likelihood€of€conduct€on€the€part€of€third€persons€inÏgeneral€which€is€likely€to€endanger€the€safety€of€the€visitor,€even€though€[the€possessor]€has€no€reason€toÏexpect€it€on€the€part€of€any€particular€individual.€€If€the€place€or€the€character€of€[the]€business,€or€[the]€pastÏexperience,€is€such€that€[the€possessor]€should€reasonably€anticipate€careless€or€criminal€conduct€on€the€partÏof€third€persons,€either€generally€or€at€some€particular€time,€[the€possessor]€may€be€under€a€duty€to€takeÏprecautions€against€it.€.€.€.ðð€€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€344,€comment€f€(1965).Ì uÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€rule€adopted€in€òòCornpropstóó€has€also€been€applied€to€criminal€acts€of€third€parties€not€occurringÏon€defendant's€parking€lot,€or€even€its€premises.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòLouoria€v.€Brummettóó,€916€S.W.2d€929€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1995)(Shooting€occurred€off€defendant's€premises€by€individuals€who€had€previously€stolen€guns€fromÏdefendant€store);€òòDellinger€v.€Pierceóó,€848€S.W.2d€654€(Tenn.€App.€1992)(assault€in€defendant€theater'sÏlobby).Ì ŸÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóòòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€Comment,€òòAnn€M.€v.€Pacific€Plaza€Shopping€Center:€€The€California€Supreme€CourtÏRetreats€From€Its€Totality€of€the€Circumstances€Approach€to€Premises€Liabilityóó,€28€Ga.€L.€Rev.€1053€(1994);ÏComment,€òòBusiness€Ownersðð€Duty€to€Protect€Patrons€from€the€Criminal€Acts€of€Third€Parties€in€Louisianaóó,Ï53€La.€L.€Rev.€1847€(1993);€Robertson,€òòNegligence€Liability€for€Crimes€and€Intentional€Torts€Committed€byÏOthersóó,€67€Tul.€L.€Rev.€135€(1992);€Friedman€and€Worthington,€òòTrends€in€Holding€Business€OrganizationsÏLiable€for€the€Criminal€Acts€of€Third€Persons€on€the€Premises:€A€Texas€Perspectiveóó,€32€S.€Tex.€L.€Rev.€257Ï(1991);€Kaufman,€òòWhen€Crime€Pays:€Business€Landlordððs€Duty€to€Protect€Customers€from€Criminal€ActsÏCommitted€on€the€Premisesóó,€31€S.€Tex.€L.€Rev.€89€(1990);€Comment,€òòBusiness€Ownersðð€Duty€to€ProtectÏInvitees€from€Third€Party€Criminal€Attacksóó,€54€Mo.€L.€Rev.€443€(1989);€Comment,€òòBusiness€Invitersðð€DutyÏto€Protect€Invitees€from€Criminal€Actsóó,€134€U.€Pa.€L.€Rev.€883€(1986);€Comment,€ð ðòòAm€I€my€BrotherððsÏKeeper?ðð:€Cornpropst€v.€Sloan,€A€Business€Proprietorððs€Civil€Liability€for€Criminal€Attacks€to€an€Invitee€by€aÏThird€Partyóó,€9€A.€J.€Trial€Advoc.€473€(1986).Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIt€should€be€noted€that€òòGoldbergóó,€one€of€the€primary€cases€relied€upon€by€the€majority€inÏòòCornpropstóó,€has€since€been€abandoned€by€the€New€Jersey€Supreme€Court,€as€that€court€has€adopted€theÏapproach€espoused€by€òòRestatement€(Secondóó)€ðð€344.€€òòButler€v.€ACME€Markets,€Inc.óó,€445€A.2d€1141€(N.J.Ï1982).€€Ironically,€New€Jersey€law€is€now€consistent€with€the€position€taken€by€Justice€Henry€in€his€dissentÏin€òòCornpropstóó.€€Ì EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóóà8 àEveryone€can€foresee€that€commission€of€crime€virtually€anywhere€and€atÏany€time.€€If€foreseeability€itself€gave€rise€to€a€duty€to€provide€ððpoliceÏprotection€for€others,€every€residential€curtilage,€every€shop,€every€store,Ïevery€manufacturing€plant€would€have€to€be€patrolled€by€the€private€arms€ofÏthe€owner.€€And€since€hijacking€and€attach€upon€occupants€of€motorÏvehicles€are€also€foreseeable,€it€would€be€the€duty€of€every€motorist€toÏprovide€armed€protection€for€his€passengers€and€the€property€of€others.€€OfÏcourse,€none€of€this€is€at€all€palatable.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€question€is€not€simply€whether€a€criminal€event€is€foreseeable,€but€whether€à àaÏòòdutyóó€exists€to€take€measures€to€guard€against€it.€€Whether€a€duty€Ìà àà àexists€is€ultimately€a€question€of€€fairness.€.€.€.ððÌÌòòGoldberg€v.€Housing€Auth.€of€Newarkóó,€186€A.2d€at€293.à àÌà àÌ óÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€ð ð[I]t€does€not€seem€that€shifting€the€financial€loss€caused€by€crime€from€one€innocent€victim€toÏanother€innocent€victim€is€proper.ðð€€òòDavis€v.€Allied€Supermarkets,€Inc.óó,€547€P.2d€at€965.€€The€OklahomaÏSupreme€Court€repudiated€its€òòDavisóó€decision€in€òòLay€v.€Dwormanóó,€732€P.2d€455,€460€(Okla.€1986).Ì oÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€This€approach€is€consistent€with€the€approach€taken€in€òòDoe€v.€Linder€Const.€Co.,€Inc.óó,€845ÏS.W.2d€173€(Tenn.€1992).€€There,€we€dealt€with€the€liability€of€a€builder€for€an€assault€occurring€to€aÏpurchaser€of€property€after€a€third€party€and€an€employee€of€the€builder€used€€the€builderððs€key€to€enter€theÏpremises€of€the€purchaser€and€commit€various€crimes.€€In€holding€for€the€builder,€we€stated€that€ð ð[finding]Ïcircumstances€such€as€minor€thefts,€unexplained€use€of€a€bathroom,€and€unsubstantiated€rumors€to€beÏsufficient€notice€on€which€to€base€liability€for€subsequent€criminal€assaults€is€not€the€law€in€Tennessee.€.€.€.ðð€ÏòòDoe€v.€Linder€Const.€Co.,€Inc.óó,€845€S.W.2d€at€180.Ì „Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAs€stated€by€one€of€the€amicus€participants€in€this€case,€ð ð[i]f€the€premises€owner€does€nothing€toÏmake€himself€or€herself€aware€of€the€potential€imminent€probability€of€harm€to€a€customer,€then€no€liabilityÏwill€extend€under€the€[current]€rule.€€The€effect€is€that€ignorance€translates€into€nonliability€and€economic€blissÏfor€merchants,€while€business€patrons€can€easily€be€victimized€by€criminals€who€stalk€the€malls€and€parkingÏlots€of€shopping€and€retail€centers.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€31€So.€Tex.€L.€Rev.€at€110„11€(€ð ðOnly€by€imposing€a€duty€toÏprotect€will€business€proprietors€have€the€necessary€incentive€to€take€measures€that€will€limit€the€number€ofÏcrimes€committed.€.€.€.€While€very€generalized€economic€incentives€will€encourage€owners€to€take€some€stepsÏto€reassure€customers€about€their€safety,€common€experience€demonstrates€that€these€incentives€are€notÏenough€to€encourage€efficient€crime€prevention.ððÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ).Ì ÷Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€.ôÔà8 àÔ€.XÔ[O]f€all€the€involved€parties,€the€cost€of€crime€reduction€is€cheapest€to€theÏlandowner.€€For€the€criminal,€imposing€civil€liability€on€him€in€addition€toÏexisting€criminal€sanctions€does€not€deter€him€from€committing€the€crime.€ÏImposing€duty€on€the€patron,€so€that€he€must€protect€and€compensateÏhimself,€may€result€in€crime€reduction,€but€only€at€the€expensive€cost€of€theÏpatron€staying€home.€€While€the€patron€can€prevent€crime€by€not€going€outÏat€night,€the€price€of€staying€home€is€high€not€only€for€him€but€also€forÏsociety€in€general.€€As€opposed€to€the€transient€patron,€who€has€littleÏinformation€about€the€crime€problem€on€the€landownerððs€premises€and€littleÏability€to€directly€influence€it,€the€landowner€can€be€much€more€effective€inÏdealing€with€the€problem.€€While€the€patron€holds€just€one€expensiveÏoption,€staying€home,€the€landowner€holds€many€options€ranging€fromÏinstallation€of€better€lighting,€fences,€or€guard€service,€to€even€varyingÏhours€of€operation.€€All€of€these€options€should€be€less€expensive€and€muchÏmore€effective€in€deterring€crime€than€the€patronððs€sole€choice€of€stayingÏhome.ÌÌBazyler,€ð ðThe€Duty€to€Provide€Adequate€Protection:€Landownerððs€Liability€for€Failure€to€Protect€Patrons€fromÏCriminal€Attack,ðð€21€Ariz€L.€Rev.€727,€747„48€(1979).Ì 2Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAlthough€the€measures€varied,€one€business€even€posted€guards€in€five€separate€watchÌtowers€located€throughout€its€parking€lot.Ì ]Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAs€we€have€said€before,€ð ðthe€degree€of€foreseeability€needed€to€establish€a€duty€decreases€inÏproportion€to€the€magnitude€of€the€foreseeable€harm.ðð€€òòPittman€v.€UpJohn€Co.óó,€890€S.W.2d€at€433.€€Accord,ÏòòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€at€171€(ð ðAs€the€gravity€of€the€possible€harm€increases,€the€apparentÏlikelihood€of€its€occurrence€need€be€correspondingly€less€to€generate€a€duty€of€precaution.ðð).Ì „Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIn€an€article€written€for€a€trade€publication,€it€was€acknowledged€that€80%€of€crime€at€Wal„MartÏstores€occurred€in€the€parking€lots€or€the€exterior€perimeter€of€the€stores.€€The€article€praised€newlyÏimplemented€parking€lot€security€measures€ranging€from€roving€patrols€to€employees€wearing€orange€vests€toÏsurveillance€cameras.€€These€measures€were€said€to€produce€"outstanding"€results€in€reducing€crime,€helpingÏ"halt€many€crimes€in€progress,"€and€providing€"crucial€evidence€to€local€[law€enforcement€authorities]."€€TheÏarticle€also€noted€that€the€costs€of€these€security€measures€"wasn't€quite€as€expensive€as€what€[the€store]€hadÏbeen€doing.€€So€[the€store]€saved€a€little€money€and€did€much€more€effective€work."ÌPtPtHPð€ÿÜÿìô”(üHPð€P € €'Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€.ÔÑ Œ ÑÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ , ÑÑ  ÑÔ€.¼ÔÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ñ7€æzXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓØ ØÓ&€//XÐd&Óœ›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌÌÌROGER€L.€McCLUNG,€Individually€à àà à)à àò òòòFORÏPUBLICATIONóóó óÌand€on€behalf€of€his€Minor€Children,à àà à)ÌBRIDGET€L.€McCLUNG,€KYLEÏL.à àà à)à àœò òòòFiled:€October€28,€1996ó óóó›ÌMcCLUNG,€and€BENJAMIN€L.€à àà à)ÌMcCLUNG,à àà àà àà àà à)à àShelbyÏCountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)à àHon.ÏDððArmy€Bailey,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.Ï02S01„9512„CV„00122ÌœßL€+1;+'h|m` ˆ, `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌDELTA€SQUARE€LIMITED€à àà àà à)ÌPARTNERSHIP,€a€North€Carolina€Limitedà à)ÌPartnership,€DELTA€SQUARE€G.€P.,€INC.,à à)Ìa€North€Carolina€Corporation,€SAMUEL€M.à à)ÌLONGIOTTI,€and€WAL„MART€STORES,à à)ÌINC.,€a€Delaware€Corporation,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Appellee€Delta€Square€LimitedÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPartnership,€Delta€Square€G.€P.,€Inc.,€ÌóóBruce€S.€Kramerà àà àà àà àà àòòand€Samuel€M.€LongiottióóÌMelissa€R.€Mageeà àÌBOROD€&€KRAMERà àà àà àà àJohn€D.€RichardsonÌMemphis,€TNà àà àà àà àà àKevin€CombsÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àTHE€RICHARDSON€LAW€œFIRMÌòòFor€Amicus€Curiaeóó:›à àà àà àà àMemphis,€TNÌÌœTom€Nelson›à àà àà àà àà àœòòFor›€Appellee€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.óóÌœNational€Victim€Center›à àà àà àà àÌœArlington,€VA›à àà àà àà àà àW.O.€Luckett,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àROSSIE,€LUCKETT,€PARKER€Ìà àà àà àœà àà à›à àà àà à&€LAUGHLINÌœà àà àà àà à›à àà àà àMemphis,€TNÌœÇJeffrey€R.€WhiteÌAssociation€of€Trial€Lawyers€of€AmericaÌWashington,€D.C.ÌÌJohn€H.€SteinÌNational€Organization€for€Victim€AssistanceÌWashington,€D.C.€€ÌÌTracy€ShawÌAlice€Margaret€EssaryÌInternation€Mass€Retail€AssociationÌNashville,€TN€€ÌÌKenneth€R.€ShuttleworthÌArchie€Sanders,€IIIÌTennessee€Defense€Lawyers€AssociationÌMemphis,€TNÌÌR.€Sadler€BaileyÌTennessee€Trial€Laywers€AssociationÌMemphis,€TN€€ÌÌMary€Ann€ParkerÌTrial€Lawyers€for€Public€Justice,€P.C.ÌNashville,€TNÌÌLeslie€BruechnerÌTrial€Lawyers€for€Public€Justice,€P.C.ÌWashington,€D.C.ÌÌJane€Nady€BurnleyÌVictimsðð€Assistance€Legal€Organization,€Inc.ÌMcLean,€VAÌÌÌà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÌÌÌÌJUDGMENT€OF€COURT€OF€APPEALSÌAND€TRIAL€COURT€REVERSED;ÌCASE€REMANDEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWHITE,€J.ÇÓÓà àà àThis€case€presents€the€question€of€the€continued€viability€of€òòCornpropst€v.ÏSloanóó,€528€S.W.2d€188€(Tenn.€1975),€in€which€this€Court€strictly€limited€the€duty€of€careÏowed€by€owners€and€occupiers€of€business€property€to€customers.€€Here,€plaintiffððs€wife,Ïa€customer€at€a€shopping€center,€was€abducted€from€the€parking€lot,€and€later€raped€andÏmurdered.€€Plaintiff€sought€recovery€against€defendants,€owners,€operators,€and€tenants,Ïbased€on€negligence€for€not€providing€security€in€their€parking€lot.€€The€trial€courtÏgranted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€defendants€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed.€ÏWe€granted€plaintiffððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€to€review€the€standard€forÏdetermining€business€owner€liability€for€injuries€occurring€on€the€business€premises€andÏcaused€by€the€criminal€acts€of€third€parties.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.ó óÌÓ  Óà àà àOn€September€7,€1990,€thirty„seven€year„old€Dorothy€McClung,€plaintiffððsÏwife,€went€shopping€at€Wal„Mart€in€the€Delta€Square€Shopping€Center€in€Memphis.€€AsÏshe€was€returning€to€her€parked€car€around€noon,€Mrs.€McClung€was€abducted€atÍgunpoint€and€forced€into€her€car€by€Joseph€Harper,€a€fugitive€from€Chattanooga.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€Later,ÏHarper€raped€Mrs.€McClung€and€forced€her€into€the€trunk€of€her€car€where€sheÏsuffocated.€€Her€body€was€found€by€hunters€in€a€field€in€Arkansas€the€day€after€theÏabduction.€€Harper€confessed,€and€was€convicted€of€kidnapping,€rape,€and€murder.€€HeÏcommitted€suicide€after€being€sentenced€to€life€in€prison.ÌÌà àà àPlaintiff€filed€suit€against€defendants€on€his€own€behalf€and€on€behalf€of€hisÏand€Mrs.€McClungððs€three€minor€children.€€In€his€suit,€he€alleged€that€defendant€Wal„Mart,€the€anchor€tenant€at€the€Delta€Square€Shopping€Center,€and€defendant€DeltaÏSquare,€the€owner€and€operator€of€the€center,€were€negligent€in€failing€to€provideÏsecurity€measures€for€the€parking€lot€and€that€their€negligence€was€the€proximate€causeÏof€Mrs.€McClung's€death.€€ÌÌà àà àFeeling€compelled€to€follow€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòCornpropst€v.€Sloanóó,Ï528€S.W.2d€188€(Tenn.€1975),€the€trial€court€reluctantly€granted€defendantsðð€motions€forÍsummary€judgment.€€The€trial€judge€noted€that€he€was€ð ðbothered€by€the€view€that€theÏentrepreneur€has€no€responsibility€irrespective€of€the€nature€of€the€risk€created€outside€ofÏthe€place€of€business€„„€the€risk€of€criminal€activity.ðð€€In€affirming€the€grant€of€summaryÏjudgment,€the€Court€of€Appeals€observed€that€ð ð[a]lthough€the€Supreme€Court€may€wish€toÏadopt€a€broader€rule€of€liability€for€shopping€center€owners,€operators,€and€merchantÏtenants,€we€are€constrained€to€follow€the€test€established€in€òòCornpropstóó.ðð€€We€grantedÏreview€to€determine€whether€the€decision€in€òòCornpropstóó€should€be€retained€as€the€ruleÏfor€determining€liability€under€circumstances€in€which€injury€occurring€on€businessÏpremises€is€caused€by€the€criminal€acts€of€third€persons.ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÌò òA.ó óÌÓ  Óà àà àAs€is€noted,€this€case€is€before€the€Court€on€the€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment.€€Therefore,€we€must€review€the€record€without€attaching€anyÏpresumption€of€correctness€to€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€to€determine€whether€theÏabsence€of€genuine€issues€of€material€facts€entitle€defendants€to€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw.€€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23€(Tenn.€1995);€òòAnderson€v.€Standard€RegisterÍCo.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555€(Tenn.€1993);€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993).€€InÏreviewing€the€record,€we€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€plaintiffÏand€draw€all€inferences€in€plaintiffððs€favor.€€If€both€the€facts€and€conclusions€to€be€drawnÏfrom€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€one€conclusion,€summaryÏjudgment€should€be€granted.€€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€26.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓò òB.ó óÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àTo€establish€negligence,€one€must€prove:€€(1)€a€duty€of€care€owed€byÏdefendant€to€plaintiff;€(2)€conduct€falling€below€the€applicable€standard€of€care€thatÏamounts€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;€(3)€an€injury€or€loss;€(4)€cause€in€fact;€and€€(5)Ïproximate,€or€legal,€cause.€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153€(Tenn.€1995).€€OurÏfocus€here€is€primarily€on€the€first€element:€the€duty€of€care.€€That€question€„„€the€dutyÏwhich€the€defendant€owed€plaintiff€„„€is€a€question€of€law€to€be€determined€by€the€court.ÏòòPittman€v.€UpJohn€Co.óó,€890€S.W.2d€425,€428€(Tenn.€1994);€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854ÏS.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà àà àWe€have€defined€duty€of€care€to€be€the€legal€obligation€owed€by€defendantÏto€plaintiff€to€conform€to€a€reasonable€person€€standard€of€care€for€protection€againstÏunreasonable€risks€of€harm.€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€153.€€The€ð ðimposition€of€aÏlegal€duty€reflects€societyððs€contemporary€polices€and€social€requirements€concerning€theÏright€of€individuals€and€the€general€public€to€be€protected€from€anotherððs€act€orÏconduct.ðð€€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€at€870.€ð ðIndeed,€it€has€been€stated€that€ððdutyÏis€not€sacrosanct€in€itself,€but€is€only€an€expression€of€the€sum€total€of€thoseÏconsiderations€of€policy€which€lead€the€law€to€say€that€the€plaintiff€is€entitled€toÏprotection.ðð€ðð€€òòIdóó.€€(quoting€W.€Keeton,€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€ðð€53€atÏ358€(5th€ed.€1984));€òòaccordóó€òòCraig€v.€A.A.R.€Realty€Corp.óó,€576€A.2d€688,€692€(Del.€Sup.Ï1989)€(duty€is€ð ðfrequently€an€expression€by€the€court€of€evolving€public€policyðð).€ÌÌà àà àAssuming€a€duty€is€owed,€it€must€be€determined€whether€defendant€has€Ïexercised€reasonable€care€under€the€circumstances.€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€atÏ153.€€If€defendant€has€not,€the€duty€has€been€breached.€€òòIdóó.€at€153„54.€€In€this€regard,€weÏhave€observed€that€ð ð[t]he€term€reasonable€care€must€be€given€meaning€in€relation€to€theÏcircumstances.€Ordinary,€or€reasonable,€care€is€to€be€estimated€by€the€risk€entailedÍthrough€probable€dangers€attending€the€particular€situation€and€is€€to€be€commensurateÏwith€the€risk€of€injury.ðð€€òòDoe€v.€Linder€Const.€Co.,€Inc.óó,€845€S.W.2d€173,€178€(Tenn.Ï1992)(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€based€the€award€of€summaryÏjudgment€€in€this€case€on€€òòCornpropst€v.€Sloanóó,€528€S.W.2d€188€(Tenn.€1975),€in€whichÏthis€Court€held€that€shop€owners€do€not€owe€to€customers€a€duty€to€protect€them€againstÏcriminal€acts€of€third€parties€unless€the€owner€knew€or€should€have€know€the€acts€wereÏoccurring€or€about€to€occur.€€In€that€case,€decided€more€than€two€decades€ago,€a€femaleÏshopper,€while€walking€to€her€car€in€a€shopping€centerððs€parking€lot,€was€assaulted€andÏnarrowly€escaped€being€kidnapped.€€She€sued€the€shopping€centerððs€owners,€operators,Ïand€tenants€for€negligence€in€failing€to€provide€adequate€security€measures€to€protectÏcustomers€from€reasonably€foreseeable€criminal€conduct.€€She€alleged€that€there€were€noÏsecurity€guards€in€the€parking€lot€and€that€no€other€protective€measures€were€used€orÏinstalled.€€She€claimed€that,€prior€to€her€attack,€other€acts€of€violence€had€occurred€eitherÏon€the€premises€or€in€the€immediate€area€of€the€shopping€center.€€òòCornpropst€v.€Sloanóó,Ï528€S.W.2d€at€190„91.€€Thus,€plaintiff€contended€that€defendants€were€negligent€in€thatÍthey€ð ðknew,€or€in€the€exercise€of€reasonable€care€and€ordinary€care€should€have€known€.Ï.€.€that€the€Plaintiff€invitee€would€be€exposed€to€potential€danger€and€personal€harm,€andÏunprotected€against€criminal€acts€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€191.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€Court€in€òòCornpropstóó€began€its€analysis€by€observing€that€the€commonÏlaw€imposed€no€duty€on€anyone,€except€the€government,€to€protect€others€from€criminalÏacts€of€unknown€third€persons,€even€though€it€did€impose€upon€merchants€a€duty€toÏexercise€reasonable€care€to€maintain€their€premises€in€a€reasonably€safe€condition.€ÏòòCornpropst€v.€Sloanóó,€528€S.W.2d€at€191.€€The€Court€noted,€however,€that€exceptions€toÏthe€common€law€rule€had€developed€in€circumstances€in€which€a€ð ðspecial€relationshipðð,Ïsuch€as€a€common€carrier€and€€passenger€or€innkeeper€and€guest,€existed€between€theÏparties,€but€refused€to€base€liability€on€the€relationship€between€the€owner€or€occupier€ofÏbusiness€property€and€the€customer.€€òòIdóó.€at€191„93.ÌÌà àà àChoosing€to€follow€the€œthen„prevailing›€rule,€the€òòCornpropstóó€Court€refusedÏto€impose€a€duty€in€the€case€which€it€characterized€as€involving€ð ðvague€allegation[s]€thatÏvarious€crimes,€assaults€and€other€acts€of€violence€had€been€committed€either€on€theÍpremises€or€in€the€immediate€area.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€193.€€The€Court€deemed€it€unfair€to€impose€aÏduty€upon€the€shopping€center€owner€because€the€attacker€ð ðgave€no€notice€by€word,€act,Ïdress€or€deed€prior€to€the€commission€of€the€attack€that€would€have€indicated€to€anyoneÏan€intention€of€purpose€to€commit€an€assault.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€197.€In€affirming€the€dismissal€ofÏthe€complaint,€the€Court€adopted€the€following€rule,€which€has€become€the€analyticalÏfocal€point€in€these€types€of€cases:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThere€is€no€duty€upon€the€owners€or€operators€of€a€shoppingÏcenter,€individually€or€collectively,€or€upon€merchants€andÏshopkeepers€generally,€whose€mode€of€operation€of€theirÏpremises€does€not€attract€or€provide€a€climate€for€crime,€toÏguard€against€the€criminal€acts€of€a€third€party,€òòunless€theyÏknow€or€have€reason€to€know€that€acts€are€occurring€orÏabout€to€occur€on€the€premises€that€pose€imminentÏprobability€of€harmóó€to€an€invitee;€whereupon€a€duty€ofÏreasonable€care€to€protect€against€such€act€arises.€€ÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€198€(emphasis€added).€€Thus,€òòCornpropstóó€established€the€principle€in€Tennessee€thatÏbusinesses€not€attracting€or€providing€œa€favorable›€environment€for€crime€have€no€duty€toÏprotect€customers,€unless€(1)€the€business€knows€or€has€reason€to€know€that€criminal€actsÏare€occurring€or€about€to€occur€on€the€premises,€which€(2)€pose€an€imminent€probabilityÏof€harm€to€a€customer.€€In€determining€whether€the€business€had€reason€to€know,€theÍCourt€concluded€that€ð ð[c]onditions€in€the€area€[of€the€defendant€business]€are€irrelevant.ðð€ÏòòIdóó.€at€197.ÌÌà àà àThe€Courtððs€decision€was€not€unanimous.€€In€a€dissent,€Justice€Henry€opinedÏthat€the€standard€ð ðaffords€virtually€no€protection€to€shopping€center€invitees€.€.€.€andÏvirtually€immunizes€the€owner€against€liability.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€200€(Henry,€J.,€dissenting).€ÏHe€found€the€rule€to€be€unduly€restrictive€and€ð ðnot€in€the€best€interest€of€the€consumingÏpublicðð€given€the€ð ðmodern€phenomenon€of€merchandising€and€marketing€throughÏcommunity€shopping€centersðð€that€result€in€ð ðenormous€congregations€of€potential€andÏactual€shoppers€in€relatively€compact€areas.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€199„200€(Henry€J.,€dissenting).€ÏJustice€Henry€advocated€(as€did€the€trial€judge€in€this€case)€the€adoption€of€the€ruleÏexpressed€in€the€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€344€(1965).€€That€rule€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àA€possessor€of€land€who€holds€it€open€to€the€public€for€entryÏfor€.€.€.€business€purposes€is€subject€to€liability€to€members€ofÏthe€public€while€they€are€upon€the€land€for€such€a€purpose,Ïfor€physical€harm€caused€by€the€accidental,€negligent,€orÏintentionally€harmful€acts€of€third€persons€or€animals,€and€byÏthe€failure€of€the€possessor€to€exercise€reasonable€care€to€(a)Ïdiscover€that€such€acts€are€being€done€or€are€likely€to€beÏdone,€or€(b)€give€a€warning€adequate€to€enable€the€visitors€toÏavoid€the€harm,€or€otherwise€to€protect€them€against€it.ÌÌÌÓÓòòCornpropst€v.€Sloanóó,€528€S.W.2d€at€œ201€(Henry,›€J.,€dissenting).€€Justice€Henry€reliedÏspecifically€upon€comment€(f)€to€section€344× ƒ5 ××  ×€to€suggest€that€a€merchant€might€know€orÏhave€reason€to€know€of€the€likelihood€of€criminal€conduct€by€unknown€third€personsÏbased€upon€past€experience.€€Therefore,€he€suggested€that€a€duty€of€care€should€beÏpresent€in€such€circumstances€even€though€the€merchant€has€no€reason€to€expect€criminalÏconduct€by€any€particular€person€at€a€particular€time.€€The€òòCornpropstóó€majority€labeledÏthe€òòRestatementóó€approach€as€ð ðpatently€unfair€and€unjustðð€because€it€was€based€on€aÏð ðvagueðð€duty.€€òòIdóó.€at€195.ÌÌà àà àAlthough€òòCornpropstóó€is€the€only€case€of€its€kind€decided€by€this€Court,€theÏCourt€of€Appeals€has€decided€several€similar€cases.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòLewter€v.€OððConnorÍœMgmt.›€Inc.óó,€886€S.W.2d€253€(Tenn.€App.€1994),€òòGray€v.€McDonaldððs€Corp.óó,€874€S.W.2dÏ44€(Tenn.€App.€1993);€òòPage€v.€American€Nat.€Bank€&€Trust€Co.óó,€850€S.W.2d€133€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1991).€€These€decisions€and€others€not€reported€have€interpreted€òòCornpropstððsóóÏð ðimminent€probabilityðð€requirement€to€require€ð ðactual€notice€of€the€imminent€probabilityÏof€the€[criminal]€act,€as€distinguished€from€the€knowledge€that€other€similar€acts€hadÏoccurred€in€the€past€and€similar€acts€might€occur€in€the€future.ðð€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòLewter€v.ÏOððConnor€Mgmt.€Inc.óó,€886€S.W.2d€at€258.€€An€unreported€case€has€construedÏòòCornpropstððsóó€imminent€harm€requirement€to€be€present€only€if€criminal€acts€wereÏpresently€occurring€or€about€to€occur€on€defendantððs€premises.€€The€intermediate€courtÏhas€declined€to€deem€past€criminal€acts€as€sufficient€to€give€defendant€notice€andÏconsistently€has€deemed€conditions€in€the€area€surrounding€defendantððs€premises€asÏirrelevant.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòGray€v.€McDonaldððs€Corp.óó,€874€S.W.2d€at€45.€€No€Tennessee€caseÏhas€found€that€facts€similar€to€those€in€òòCornpropstóó€or€in€the€case€before€the€CourtÏimposed€a€duty€of€care€upon€which€liability€could€be€based.× ƒ6 ××  ×ÌÓ  Óò òÌÌC.ó óÌÓÓà àà àà àÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€òòCornpropstóó€Court€had€little€case€law€to€guide€itsÏdecision.€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó€Annotation,€òòLiability€of€Owner€or€Operator€of€Shopping€Center,Ïor€Business€Housed€Therein,€for€Injury€to€Patron€on€Premises€from€Criminal€Attack€byÏThird€Partyóó,€93€A.L.R.3d€999€(1979).€€Since€òòCornpropstóó,€however,€numerous€courts€andÏcommentators€have€considered€a€business€ownerððs€duty€to€protect€its€customers€fromÏinjuries€caused€by€criminal€acts€of€unknown€third€persons.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€Not€only€has€the€subject€Ïreceived€considerable€attention€in€the€legal€literature,€courts,€as€a€result€of€the€prevalenceÏof€violent€crimes€at€commercial€establishments,€have€reexamined€the€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòCraig€v.ÍA.A.R.€Realty€Corp.óó,€576€A.2d€at€693€n.€4€(ð ðAs€the€means€of€merchandising€has€changedÏto€shopping€centers€and€malls€with€attendant€private€parking,€the€common€lawÏconcerning€the€business€property€ownerððs€liability€to€customers€for€personal€injury€byÏcriminal€attacks€.€.€.€in€the€parking€lots€has€also€been€undergoing€drastic€change.ðð);ÏComment,€òòBusiness€Ownersðð€Duty€to€Protect€Invitees€from€Third„Party€CriminalÏAttacksóó,€54€Mo.€L.€Rev.€443,€455€(1989)(ð ðThe€imposition€of€liability€upon€businessÏowners€for€third„party€criminal€attacks€upon€their€premises€is€quickly€becoming€a€wellÏrecognized€and€viable€theory€of€recovery.ðð);€€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Comment,€òòBusiness€Invitersðð€DutyÏto€Protect€Invitees€From€Criminal€Actsóó,€134€U.€Pa.€L.Rev.€883,€886€(1986).€€ParkingÏlots€in€particular€have€provided€fertile€ground€for€crime€because€customers€usuallyÏpossess€money€or€recently€purchased€merchandise.€€Thus,€the€criminal€ð ðin€search€ofÏvaluables€need€not€take€a€chance€on€the€unknown€assets€of€some€passerby.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€886.€ÏEven€so,€while€courts€agree€that€businesses€have€a€duty€to€exercise€reasonable€care€inÏmaintaining€their€premises€in€a€reasonably€safe€condition,€disagreement€still€exists€onÏwhether€that€duty€encompasses€taking€œany€measures€to€protect€customers€from€injuriesÏcaused€by€the€criminal€acts€of€unknown€third€persons.€€òòIdóó.€at€888.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€early€cases,€courts€generally€denied€recovery€to€customer€victimsÏunder€the€theory€that€the€business€had€no€duty€to€protect€its€patrons€from€criminalÏattacks.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòDavis€v.€Allied€Supermarkets,€Inc.óó,€547€P.2d€963€(Okla.€1976);€òòCookÏv.€Safeway€Stores,€Inc.óó,€354€A.2d€507€(D.C.€Cir.€1976);€òòNigido€v.€First€Nat.€Bank€ofÏBaltimoreóó,€288€A.2d€127€(Md.€1972);€òòRadloff€v.€Nat.€Food€Stores,€Inc.óó,€121€N.W.2d€865Ï(Wis.€1963);€€òòGoldberg€v.€Housing€Auth.€of€Newarkóó,€186€A.2d€291€(N.J.€1962)× ƒ8 ××  ×›.€€TheÏinitial€reluctance€to€impose€a€duty€was€attributed€to€several€reasons,€including€generalÏprinciples€of€fairness€given€the€unpredictable€nature€of€criminal€conduct,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.òòóó,ÏòòóóGoldberg€v.€Housing€Auth.€of€Newarkóó,€186€A.2d€at€297œ× ƒ9 ××  ×›;€òòDavis€v.€Allied€Super€Markets,ÍInc.óó,€547€P.2d€at€965;œ× ƒ: ××  ×›€fear€of€creating€an€undue€economic€burden€upon€commercialÏenterprise€and€the€consuming€public,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòNappier€v.€Kincadeóó,€666€S.W.2d€858,€860Ï(Mo.€App.€1984);€belief€that€protecting€citizens€is€a€function€of€the€government€thatÏshould€not€be€shifted€to€the€private€sector,€òòseeóó,òò€e.g.óó,€òòidóó.;€desire€that€merchants€not€becomeÏinsurers€of€€customer€safety,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòShaner€v.€Tuson€Airport€Auth.,€Inc.óó,€573€P.2dÏ518,€522€(Ariz.€App.€1977);€and€the€notion€that€the€criminalððs€act€constituted€aÏsuperseding,€intervening€cause€sufficient€to€break€the€causational€chain€of€liability,€òòseeóó,Ïòòe.g.óó,€òòFord€v.€Monroeóó,€559€S.W.2d€759,€762€(Mo.€App.€1977).€€These€justifications€forÏnot€imposing€a€duty€relied€upon€in€òòCornpropstóó,€form€the€basis€of€defendantsðð€argumentÏhere.€€ÌÌà àà àNotwithstanding€the€reluctance€to€impose€a€duty€on€business€owners,€theÏmajority€of€courts€that€have€considered€the€issue€have€been€unwilling€to€hold€that€aÏbusiness€never€has€a€duty€to€protect€customers€from€criminal€acts.€€Instead,€most€haveÏheld€that,€while€not€insurers€of€their€customersðð€safety,€businesses€do€have€a€duty€to€takeÏreasonable€precautions€to€protect€customers€from€foreseeable€criminal€acts.€€òòTaco€Bell,ÏInc.€v.€Lannonóó,€744€P.2d€43,€46„47€(Colo.€1987).€€This€is€the€position€taken€in€sectionÏ344€of€the€òòRestatement€(Secondóó),€comment€f,€and€followed€by€several€states.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,ÏòòZueger€v.€Carlsonóó,€542€N.W.2d€92,€96„97€(N.D.€1996);€òòErichsen€v.€No„FrillsÏSupermarketsóó,€518€N.W.2d€116,€118„19€(Neb.€1994);€€òòMundy€v.€Dept.€of€Health€&ÏHuman€Res.óó,€620€So.2d€811,€813„14€(La.€1993);€òòCotterhill€v.€Bafileóó,€865€P.2d€120,€122„23€(Ariz.€App.€1993);€òòDoud€v.€Las€Vegas€Hilton€Corp.óó,€864€P.2d€796,€799€(Nev.€1993);ÏòòTaco€Bell,€Inc.€v.€Lannonóó,€744€P.2d€at€48;€òòMadden€v.€C€&€K€Barbeque€Carryout,€Inc.óó,Ï758€S.W.2d€59,€62€(Mo.€1988);€òòJardel€Co.,€Inc.€v.€Hughesóó,€525€A.2d€518,€525€(Del.Ï1987);€òòMartinko€v.€H„N„W€Associatesóó,€393€N.W.2d€320,€321„22€(Iowa€1986);€òòButler€v.ÏACME€Markets,€Inc.óó,€445€A.2d€1141,€1145„46€(N.J.€1982);€òòFoster€v.€Winston„SalemÏJoint€Ventureóó,€281€S.E.2d€36,€38„39€(N.C.€1981);€òòNallan€v.€Helmsley„Spear,€Inc.óó,€407ÏN.E.2d€451,€457„58€(N.Y.€1980);€€òòUihlein€v.€Albertsonððs,€Inc.óó,€580€P.2d€1014,€1018€(Or.Í1978);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDonnell€v.€Spring€Sports,€Inc.óó,€920€S.W.2d€378,€383€(Tex.€Civ.€App.Ï1996)€(duty€imposed€when€third€partyððs€criminal€conduct€is€a€foreseeable€result€ofÏpremiseððs€ownerððs€negligence);€òòAnn€M.€v.€Pacific€Plaza€Shopping€Centeróó,€863€P.2d€207,Ï212€(Cal.€1993)€(foreseeability€is€crucial€factor€in€determining€existence€of€duty€toÏprotect€against€criminal€acts);€òòSeibert€v.€Vic€Regnier€Builders,€Inc.óó,€856€P.2d€1332,€1338Ï(Kan.€1993)€(duty€to€protect€patrons€exists€when€business€ð ðcould€reasonably€foresee€thatÏits€customers€have€a€risk€of€peril€above€and€beyond€the€ordinary€and€that€appropriateÏsecurity€means€should€be€taken.ðð);€òòShell€Oil€Co.€v.€Diehlóó,€422€S.E.2d€63,€64€(Ga.€App.Ï1992)€(ð ðThe€proprietor€of€a€business€has€a€duty,€when€he€can€reasonably€apprehendÏdanger€to€a€customer€from€the€misconduct€of€[others]€to€exercise€ordinary€care€to€protectÏthe€customer.€.€.€.ðð);€òòLucht€v.€Stage€2,€Inc.óó,€606€N.E.2d€750,€754€(Ill.€App.€1992)Ï(businesses€owe€customers€a€duty€ð ðto€reasonably€guard€against€acts€of€third€parties€whenÏsuch€attacks€are€reasonably€foreseeableðð);€òòErickson€v.€Curtis€Inv.€Co.óó,€447€N.W.2d€165,Ï168„69€(Minn.€1989)€(duty€to€protect€patrons€depends,€in€part,€on€foreseeability€of€riskÏinvolved);€òòBullard€v.€Ehrhardtóó,€324€S.E.2d€61,€62€(S.C.€1984)€(ð ðThe€duty€of€a€storeÏowner€to€its€invitees€is€to€take€reasonable€care€to€protect€them.€€This€duty€does€not€extendÍto€protection€from€criminal€attacks€from€third€parties€unless€the€store€owner€knew€orÏhad€reason€to€know€of€the€criminal€attack.ðð).€€ÌÌà àà àBased€on€this€analysis€of€the€decisions€of€other€jurisdictions,€we€mustÏœdisavow›€the€observation€made€in€òòCornpropstóó€that€"conditions€in€the€œarea€[of›€the€defendantÏbusiness]€are€irrelevant"€in€assessing€the€foreseeability€of€a€criminal€act.€€òòCornpropst€v.ÏSloanóó,€528€S.W.2d€at€197.€€It€makes€little€sense€to€ignore€the€frequency€and€nature€ofÏcriminal€activity€in€the€immediate€vicinity€of€the€business,€such€as€an€adjacent€parkingÏlot,€if€the€crucial€inquiry€is€the€foreseeability€of€a€criminal€act€occurring€on€defendant'sÏpremises.€€Conditions€in€the€immediate€vicinity€of€defendant's€premises€are€relevant€inÏmaking€this€determination.€€We€also€find€that€foreseeability€of€harm€on€which€liabilityÏmay€be€imposed€is€not€limited€to€criminal€acts€of€third€parties€that€are€known€or€shouldÏbe€known€to€pose€an€imminent€probability€of€harm€to€customers.€€òòIdóó.€at€198.€€ConditionsÏother€than€those€which€pose€an€imminent€threat€to€persons€on€the€premises€are€relevant€toÏthe€foreseeability€of€harm.ÌÌà àWe,€therefore,€join€those€courts€which€generally€impose€a€duty€upon€businesses€toÏtake€reasonable€measures€to€protect€their€customers€from€foreseeable€criminal€attacks.€ÏBecause€those€courts€do€not€universally€agree€on€the€meaning€of€ð ðforeseeability,ðð€furtherÏconsideration€is€required.€€€In€determining€foreseeability,€some€courts€have€utilized€€theÏso„called€ð ðprior€incidents€rule.ðð€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòPolomie€v.€Golub€Corp.óó,€640€N.Y.S.2d€700Ï(N.Y.€App.€Div.€1996);€òòThiele€v.€Rieteróó,€838€S.W.2d€441€(Mo.€Ct.€€App.€1992);ÏòòGalloway€v.€Bankers€Trust€Co.óó,€420€N.W.2d€437€(Iowa€1988);€òòTolbert€v.€Captain€JoeððsÏSeafood,€Inc.óó,€€316€S.E.2d€11€(Ga.€App.€1984);€òòTaylor€v.€Hockeróó,€428€N.E.2d€662€(Ill.ÏApp.€1981).€€Under€this€rule,€plaintiff€must€introduce€evidence€of€prior€incidents€ofÏcrime€on€or€near€defendantððs€premises€in€order€to€establish€foreseeability.€€Courts€vary,Ïhowever,€on€whether€the€prior€crimes€must€be€of€the€same€general€type€and€nature€as€theÏpresent€offense.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòTaylor€v.€Hockeróó,€428€N.E.2d€at€664„65€(holding€thatÏprevious€crimes€against€property€were€insufficient€to€give€rise€to€a€duty€to€protectÏcustomers€from€personal€assaults);€òòPolomie€v.€Golub€Corp.óó,€640€N.Y.S.2d€at€701Ï(ð ð[T]here€is€no€requirement€that€the€past€experience€relied€on€to€establish€foreseeabilityÏbe€of€the€same€type€of€criminal€conduct€to€which€plaintiff€was€subjected.€.€.€.ðð);€òòJardelÏCo.,€Inc.€v.€Hughesóó,€523€A.2d€at€525€(limiting€the€foreseeability€standard€to€the€sameÍcrime€as€the€one€complained€of€is€unrealistic€because€ð ð[s]o€called€ððproperty€crimes,ðð€suchÏas€shoplifting,€may€turn€violent€if€a€chase€ensues.€.€.€.ðð);€òòGalloway€v.€Bankers€Trust€Co.óó,Ï420€N.W.2d€439€(same).€€The€modern€trend,€however,€does€not€deem€foreseeability€asÏnecessarily€dependent€upon€evidence€of€the€same€type€of€prior€crimes€occurring€on€orÏnear€defendantððs€premises,€òòDoud€v.€Las€Vegas€Hilton€Corp.óó,€864€P.2d€at€799„80,€butÏrequires€ð ðinquiry€[into]€the€location,€nature€and€extent€of€previous€criminal€activities€andÏtheir€similarity,€proximity€or€other€relationship€to€the€crime€in€question.ðð€€òòPolomie€v.ÏGolub€Corp.óó,€640€N.Y.S.2d€at€701.€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€prior€incidents€approach€to€foreseeability€has€been€lauded€asÏpreventing€businesses€from€effectively€becoming€insurers€of€public€safety€sinceð ð[i]t€isÏdifficult,€if€not€impossible,€to€envision€any€locale€open€to€the€public€where€theÏoccurrence€of€violent€crime€seems€improbable.ðð€òòAnn€M.€v.€Pacific€Plaza€ShoppingÏCenteróó,€863€P.2d€at€215„16.€€At€the€same€time,€€the€rule€has€been€labeled€ð ðfatally€flawedððÏin€several€respects:ÌÓÓà àà8 àFirst,€the€rule€leads€to€results€which€are€contrary€to€publicÏpolicy.€€The€rule€has€the€effect€of€discouraging€landownersÏfrom€taking€adequate€measures€to€protect€premises€whichÍthey€know€are€dangerous.€€This€result€contravenes€the€policyÏof€preventing€future€harm.€€Moreover,€under€the€rule,€theÏfirst€victim€always€loses,€while€subsequent€victims€areÏpermitted€recovery.€€Such€a€result€is€not€only€unfair,€but€it€isÏinimical€to€the€important€policy€of€compensating€injuredÏparties.€€Surely,€a€landowner€should€not€get€one€free€assaultÏbefore€he€can€be€held€liable€for€criminal€acts€which€occur€onÏhis€property.ÌÌà àà8 àà àSecond,€a€rule€which€limits€evidence€of€foreseeabilityÏto€prior€similar€criminal€acts€leads€to€arbitrary€results€andÏdistinctions.€€Under€this€rule,€there€is€uncertainty€as€to€howÏð ðsimilarðð€the€prior€incidents€must€be€to€satisfy€the€rule.€€TheÏrule€raises€a€number€of€other€troubling€questions.€€ForÏexample,€how€close€in€time€do€the€prior€incidents€have€to€be?€ÏHow€near€in€location€must€they€be?€€The€rule€invitesÏdifferent€courts€to€enunciate€different€standards€ofÏforeseeability€based€on€their€resolution€of€these€questions.ÌÌà àà8 àà àThird,€the€rule€erroneously€equates€foreseeability€of€aÏparticular€act€with€previous€occurrences€of€similar€acts.€.€.€.Ïð ð[T]he€fortuitous€absence€of€prior€injury€does€not€justifyÏrelieving€defendant€from€responsibility€for€the€foreseeableÏconsequences€of€its€acts.ððÌÌà àà8 àà àFinally,€the€ð ðprior€similar€incidents€ruleðð€improperlyÏremoves€too€many€cases€from€the€juryððs€consideration.€€It€isÏwell„established€that€foreseeability€is€ordinarily€a€question€ofÏœfact.Ì›ÌÓÓòòœIsaacs›€v.€Huntington€Memorial€Hosp.óó,€695€P.2d€653,€658„59€(Cal.€œ1985)(citations›Ïomitted).€€ÌÌà àà àBecause€of€these€criticisms,€several€courts€have€rejected€the€prior€incidentsÏrule€in€favor€of€a€ð ðtotality€of€the€circumstancesðð€approach,€in€which€the€foreseeability€ofÏcriminal€conduct€may€be€determined€by€considering€all€of€the€circumstances€includingÏthe€nature€or€character€of€the€business,€its€location,€and€prior€incidents€of€crime,€if€any.€ÏòòSee,óó€òòe.g.óó,€òòDoud€v.€Las€Vegas€Hilton€Corp.óó,€864€P.2d€796;€òòSeibert€v.€Vic€RegnierÏBuilderððs€Inc.óó,€856€P.2d€at€1332;€òòReitz€v.€Mayóó,€583€N.E.2d€1071€(Ohio€App.€1990);ÏòòIsaacs€v.€Huntington€Memorial€Hosp.óó,€695€P.2d€653.€€The€totality€approach€seeks€to€avoidÏdetermining€foreseeability€by€the€ð ðrigid€application€of€a€mechanicalðð€prior€incidents€rule,ÏòòIsaacs€v.€Huntington€Memorial€Hosp.óó,€695€P.2d€at€653,€which€requires€ð ðfinite€distinctionsÏbetween€how€similar€prior€incidents€must€be,ðð€òòReitz€v.€Mayóó,€583€N.E.2d€at€1075.€€ÌÌà àà àNonetheless,€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€approach€has€been€criticizedÏas€well,€as€being€too€broad€a€standard,€effectively€imposing€an€unqualified€duty€to€protectÏcustomers€in€areas€experiencing€any€significant€level€of€criminal€activity.€€òòSeeóó€òòAnn€M.€v.ÏPacific€Plaza€Shopping€Centeróó,€863€P.2d€at€215.€€The€approach€might€deem€criminalÏattacks€on€customers€foreseeable€as€a€result€of€circumstances€such€as€the€level€of€crime€inÍthe€neighborhood,€inadequate€lighting,€or€architectural€designs,€even€if€no€prior€instancesÏof€crime€had€occurred.€€òòSeeóó€òòIsaacs€v.€Huntington€Memorial€Hosp.óó,€695€P.2d€653.€€As€aÏpractical€matter,€the€totality€approach€arguably€requires€businesses€to€implementÏexpensive€security€measures€(with€the€costs€passed€on€to€consumers)€and€makes€them€theÏinsurers€of€customer€safety,€two€results€which€courts€seek€to€avoid.€€Businesses€may€reactÏby€moving€from€poorer€areas€where€crime€rates€are€often€the€highest.€€Not€surprisinglyÏthen,€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€test€has€been€described€as€ð ðimprecise,ðð€ð ðunfair,ððÏand€ð ðtroublesomeðð€because€it€makes€liability€for€merchants€even€less€predictable€thanÏunder€the€prior€incidents€rule.€€òòSeeóó€Comment,€òòAnn€M.€v.€Pacific€Plaza€Shopping€Center:€ÏThe€California€Supreme€Court€Retreats€from€its€Totality€of€the€Circumstances€ApproachÏto€Premises€Liabilityóó,€28€Ga.€L.€Rev.€1053,€1063€(1994);€Kaufman,€òòWhen€Crime€Pays:ÏBusiness€Landlordððs€Duty€to€Protect€Customers€from€Criminal€Acts€Committed€on€theÏPremisesóó,€31€S.€Tex.€L.€Rev.€89,€112€(1990);€€Note,€òòCriminal€Attacks€on€the€Premises:ÏLandownerððs€Duty€after€Isaacs€v.€Huntington€Hospitalóó,€21€Tort€&€Ins.€L.J.€386,€392Ï(1986).ÌÌà àà àHaving€found€that€because€of€its€severe€limitations,€the€rule€advanced€inÏòòCornpropstóó€is€œobsolete,›€and€having€found€further€that€the€prior€incidents€rule€and€theÏtotality€of€the€circumstances€approach€do€not€provide€a€suitable€balance€between€theÏburden€of€the€duty€to€be€imposed€and€the€nature€of€the€rights€to€be€protected,€we€turn€toÏour€own€decisions€for€guidance€in€determining€the€appropriate€duty€of€care.€€€ÌÌà àOur€recent€pronouncements€concerning€the€duty€of€care€in€negligence€cases€revealÏa€balancing€approach€consistent€with€our€prevailing€principles€of€fairness€and€justice.€€InÏòòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150€(Tenn.€1995),€we€observed€that€"[a]€risk€isÏunreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€a€duty€to€act€with€due€care€if€the€foreseeable€probabilityÏand€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€defendant's€conduct€outweigh€the€burden€upon€defendant€toÏengage€in€alternative€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€the€harm."€€òòMcCall€v.€Wilderóó,Ï913€S.W.2d€at€153.€€We€have€also€noted€that€several€factors€are€to€be€considered€inÏdeciding€whether€a€risk€is€an€unreasonable€one,€thereby€giving€rise€to€a€duty.€€"ThoseÏfactors€include€the€foreseeable€probability€of€the€harm€or€injury€occurring;€the€possibleÏmagnitude€of€the€potential€harm€or€injury;€the€importance€or€social€value€of€the€activityÏengaged€in€by€defendant;€the€usefulness€of€the€conduct€to€defendant;€the€feasibility€ofÍalternative,€safer€conduct€and€the€relative€costs€and€burdens€associated€with€that€conduct;Ïthe€relative€usefulness€of€the€safer€conduct;€and€the€relative€safety€of€alternativeÏconduct."€€òòIdóó.€at€153.€€Thus,€resolution€of€the€case€before€the€Court€can€be€accomplishedÏby€utilizing€existing€principles€of€law€which€provide€the€proper€analytical€framework€forÏdetermining€the€œduty€owed€in€a€particular€case.Ìà àÌà àSimilarly,€all€of€our€recent€cases€addressing€the€existence€or€non„existence€of€aÏduty€utilize€a€balancing€approach.€€òòSeeóó€òòWoodson€v.€Porter€Brown€Limestone€Coóó.,€9€6ÏS.W.2d€896€(Tenn.€1996)(analysis€of€duty€in€negligent€entrustment€case);€òòEaton€v.ÏMcLainóó,€891€S.W.2d.€587€(Tenn.€1994)(analysis€of€whether€homeowner's€duty€of€careÏincluded€duty€to€guard€against€guest€falling€down€staircase);€òòPittman€v.€Upjohn€Coóó.,€890ÏS.W.2d€4€€(Tenn.€1994)(analysis€of€whether€manufacturer€of€drug,€doctor,€and€pharmacyÏowed€duty€to€grandson€of€patient€who€mistakenly€took€medication€believing€it€to€beÏaspirin);€òòHaynes€v.€Hamilton€Countyóó,€883€S.W.2d€606€(Tenn.€1994)(analysis€of€duty€ofÏpolice€officer€to€innocent€third€parties€during€high„speed€chase);€òòSpeaker€v.€Cates€Coóó.,Ï879€S.W.2d€813€(Tenn.€1994)(analysis€of€€duty€of€owner€manager€and€security€service€ofÏapartment€complex€to€tenant€murdered€by€former€roommate);€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€859ÍS.w.2d€865€(Tenn.€1993)(analysis€of€duty€of€physician€to€non„patient€to€warn€of€risks€ofÏexposure€to€Rocky€Mountain€Spotted€Fever);€òòDoe€v.€Linder€Construction€Coóó.,€845ÏS.W.2d€173€(Tenn.€1992)(analysis€of€duty€of€builder,€real€estate€broker,€and€employee€toÏpurchaser€who€was€raped€by€builder's€employee);€òòHames€v.€Stateóó,€808€S.W.2d€41€(Tenn.Ï1991)(analysis€of€duty€of€state„owner€of€golf€course€to€golfer€killed€by€lightning€onÏcourse);€òòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€767€(Tenn.€1991)(analysis€of€duty€ofÏautomobile€owner€who€left€keys€in€car€to€person€injured€by€thief€driving€the€car).ÌÌà àThus,€our€decisions€regarding€the€existence€of€a€duty€in€a€negligence€actionÏgenerally€demonstrate€a€balancing€approach.€€At€least€one€other€state,€California,€hasÏadopted€a€ð ðbalancingðð€approach€to€determine€duty.€€This€approach€retains€some€beneficialÏfeatures€of€both€the€prior€incidents€and€totality€of€the€circumstances€tests,€but€avoidsÏsome€of€the€problems€associated€with€each.€€òòAnn€M.€v.€Pacific€Plaza€Shopping€Centeróó,Ï863€P.2d€207.€€The€balancing€approach€acknowledges€that€duty€is€a€flexible€concept,€andÏseeks€to€balance€the€degree€of€foreseeability€of€harm€against€the€burden€of€the€duty€to€beÏimposed.€€òòIdóó.€at€215.€€A€high€degree€of€foreseeability€of€harm€would€justify€a€moreÏonerous€burden€than€would€a€limited€degree€of€foreseeability€of€harm.€€òòIdóó.€€Moreover,Íthe€balancing€approach€recognizes€that€the€presence€or€absence€of€prior€similar€incidentsÏof€crime€is€an€important€factor€in€determining€the€degree€of€foreseeability.€€òòIdóó.€€It€hasÏbeen€noted€that€ð ðby€establishing€[a€balancing]€approach€that€[is]€more€flexible€than€theÏstrict€prior€similar€incidents€rule,€[a€Court]€avoid[s]€the€pitfalls€of€that€rule€while€solvingÏthe€problems€of€[the]€more€liberal€totality€of€the€circumstances€approach.ðð€€28€Ga.€L.ÏRev.€at€1068„69.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òD.ó ó€€ÌÓ  Óà àà àAfter€careful€consideration€of€the€jurisprudence€of€other€jurisdictions€andÏour€own,€we€adopt€the€following€principles€to€be€used€in€determining€the€duty€of€careÏowed€by€the€owners€and€occupiers€of€business€premises€to€customers€to€protect€themÏagainst€the€criminal€acts€of€third€parties:€€A€business€ordinarily€has€no€duty€to€protectÏcustomers€from€the€criminal€acts€of€third€parties€which€occur€on€its€premises.€€TheÏbusiness€is€not€to€be€regarded€as€the€insurer€of€the€safety€of€its€customers,€and€it€has€noÏabsolute€duty€to€implement€security€measures€for€the€protection€of€its€customers.€ÏHowever,€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€steps€to€protect€customers€arises€if€the€businessÏknows,€or€has€reason€to€know,€either€from€what€has€been€or€should€have€been€observedÍor€from€past€experience,€that€criminal€acts€against€its€customers€on€its€premises€areÏreasonably€foreseeable,€either€generally€or€at€some€particular€time.€€Ìà àIn€determining€the€duty€that€exists,€the€foreseeability€of€harm€and€the€gravity€ofÏharm€must€be€balanced€against€the€commensurate€burden€imposed€on€the€business€toÏprotect€against€that€harm..€€In€cases€in€which€there€is€a€high€degree€of€foreseeability€ofÏharm€and€the€probable€harm€is€great,€the€burden€imposed€upon€defendant€may€beÏsubstantial.€€Alternatively,€in€cases€in€which€a€lesser€degree€of€foreseeability€is€present€orÏthe€potential€harm€is€slight,€less€onerous€burdens€may€be€imposed.€€By€way€ofÏillustration,€using€surveillance€cameras,€posting€signs,€installing€improved›€lighting€or€Ïfencing,€or€removing€or€trimming€shrubbery€might,€in€some€instances,€be€cost€effectiveÏand€yet€greatly€reduce€the€risk€to€customers.€€òòSeeóó€òòSeibert€v.€Vic€Regnier€Builders,€Inc.óó,Ï856€P.2d€at€1339„40.€€In€short,€"the€degree€of€foreseeability€needed€to€establish€a€dutyÏdecreases€in€proportion€to€the€magnitude€of€the€foreseeable€harm"€and€the€burden€uponÏdefendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct.€€òòPittman€v.€UpJohn€Co.óó,€890€S.W.2d€at€433Ï(Tenn.€1994).€"As€the€gravity€of€the€possible€harm€increases,€the€apparent€likelihood€ofÏits€occurrence€need€be€correspondingly€less€to€generate€a€duty€of€precaution."€€òòProsser€&ÏKeeton€on€the€Law€of€Tortsóó€at€171.€€The€degree€of€foreseeability€needed€to€establish€aÍduty€of€reasonable€care€is,€therefore,€determined€by€considering€both€the€magnitude€ofÏthe€burden€to€defendant€in€complying€with€the€duty€and€magnitude€of€the€foreseeableÏharm.ÌÌà àà àAs€a€practical€matter,€the€requisite€degree€of€foreseeability€essential€toÏestablish€a€duty€to€protect€against€criminal€acts€will€almost€always€require€that€priorÏinstances€of€crime€have€occurred€on€or€in€the€immediate€vicinity€of€defendantððs€premises.€ÏCourts€must€consider€the€location,€nature,€and€extent€of€previous€criminal€activities€andÏtheir€similarity,€proximity,€or€other€relationship€to€the€crime€giving€rise€to€the€case€ofÏaction.× ƒ; ××  ×€€To€hold€otherwise€would€impose€an€undue€burden€upon€merchants.Ìà àà àÌà àà àThe€balancing€approach€we€adopt€appropriately€addresses€both€theÏeconomic€concerns€of€businesses€and€the€safety€concerns€of€customers€who€are€œharmedÍdue›€to€the€negligence€of€one€œseeking€their€business.›€€The€interpretation€of€the€noticeÏrequirement€of€€òòCornpropstóó,€òòseeóó€text€preceding€n.€2,€òòsupraóó,€virtually€eliminated€theseÏcauses€of€action.€€The€criminal€who€intends€to€strike€in€defendantððs€parking€lot€will€notÏenter€defendantððs€store€to€announce€his€intentions€and€€thereby€provide€defendant€actualÏnotice€of€the€impending€attack.€€€In€short,€this€new€rule€provides€the€fairest€and€mostÏequitable€results.€€It€creates€a€duty€in€limited€circumstances,€giving€€merchants€neitherÏabsolute€immunity€nor€imposing€absolute€liability.€€It€recognizes€the€national€trend€thatÏbusinesses€must€justifiably€expect€to€share€in€the€cost€of€crime€attracted€to€the€business.€ÏIt€encourages€a€reasonable€response€to€the€crime€phenomenon€without€makingÏunreasonable€demands.ÌÌà àà àThe€standard€we€adopt€is€the€product€of€attempts€by€many€jurisdictions€toÏdeal€with€this€admittedly€difficult€issue.€€While€embracing€neither€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances€nor€the€prior€incidents€tests€in€toto,€we€have€retained€the€desirable€featuresÏof€both€approaches,€while€avoiding€the€inherent€problems€associated€with€each.€€ForÏexample,€we€have€preserved€the€primary€advantage€of€the€prior€incidents€rule€by€notÏcreating€an€environment€where€businesses€are€essentially€held€strictly€liable€for€customerÍsafety.€€At€the€same€time,€our€approach€should€enable€meritorious€cases€to€proceed€to€theÏjury€which€is€typical€of€deserving€cases€tried€under€the€totality€of€the€circumstancesÏapproach.€€Moreover,€rather€than€having€an€incentive€to€do€nothing€(out€of€fear€ofÏhaving€assumed€a€duty),€businesses€will€be€encouraged€to€take€reasonable€securityÏprecautions,€another€characteristic€of€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€test.× ƒ< ××  ×€€TheÏmerchant€is€in€the€best€position€to€know€the€extent€of€crime€on€the€premises€and€is€betterÏequipped€than€customers€to€take€measures€to€thwart€it€and€to€distribute€the€costs.€€òòCraigÍv.€A.A.R.€Realty€Corp.óó,€576€A.2d€at€693.× ƒ= ××  ×€ÌÌÌ.à@ àò òE.ó óÌà àà àHaving€established€the€appropriate€test€for€determining€the€duty€of€care€inÏcases€involving€business€premises€liability€for€the€acts€of€unknown€third€parties€and€forÏthe€purpose€of€offering€an€illustration€of€the€analysis€required€of€courts€in€these€type€ofÏcases,€€we€return€to€the€facts€of€the€case€at€bar.€€Here,€plaintiffððs€wife€was€returning€toÍher€car€in€defendantsðð€parking€lot€when€she€was€accosted.€€Plaintiff€argues€that€because€ofÏpast€crimes€committed€on€or€near€€defendantsðð€parking€lot,€a€requisite€degree€ofÏforeseeability€to€impose€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€precautions€was€established.€€ToÏsupport€this€contention,€plaintiff€relies€upon€records€from€the€Memphis€PoliceÏDepartment,€which€indicate€that€from€May,€1989€through€September,€1990,€whenÏplaintiffððs€wife€was€abducted,€approximately€164€criminal€incidents€had€occurred€on€orÏnear€defendantsðð€parking€lot.€€He€also€relies€on€the€fact€that€defendantsðð€nearbyÏcompetitors€provide€outdoor€security€measures€œand€that€Wal„Mart€uses€heightenedÏsecurity€measures€at€other€locations.ÌÌà àà àIn€response,€defendants€argue€that€no€duty€of€reasonable€care€should€beÏimposed€because€the€attack€on€plaintiffððs€wife€was€neither€foreseeable€nor€preventible.€ÏDefendants€claim€they€had€no€notice€that€Harper€was€likely€to€abduct€plaintiffððs€wife,€noÏreason€to€have€anticipated€the€attack€when€it€occurred,€and€no€reasonable€way€to€haveÏprevented€it.€€They€also€assert€that€providing€security€is€prohibitively€expensive,€and€thatÏsecurity€has€little€impact€on€preventing€crime.ÌÌà àà àWe€reject€defendantsðð€argument€that€it€owed€plaintiffððs€wife€no€dutyÏbecause€the€attack€was€not€reasonably€foreseeable.€€In€the€seventeen€months€prior€to€theÏabduction,€the€numerous€reports€of€crime€to€police€on€or€near€defendantsðð€premisesÏincluded€a€bomb€threat,€fourteen€burglaries,€twelve€reports€of€malicious€mischief,€tenÏrobberies,€thirty„six€auto€thefts,€ninety€larcenies,€and€one€attempted€kidnapping€on€aÏparking€lot€adjacent€to€defendantsðð€parking€lot.€€All€of€these€crimes€occurred€on€or€in€theÏimmediate€vicinity€of€defendantsðð€parking€lot,€took€place€within€a€relatively€short€periodÏof€time€prior€to€the€abduction€of€plaintiffððs€wife,€and€involved€a€significant€threat€ofÏpersonal€harm.€€The€record€also€establishes€that€€defendantsðð€premises€was€located€in€aÏhigh€crime€area,€and€that€other€nearby€major€retail€centers€utilized€security€measures€toÏprotect€customers.× ƒ> ××  ×€€The€manager€of€the€Wal„Mart€store€at€the€time€of€the€abductionÏtestified€that€he€would€not€hold€ð ðsidewalk€salesðð€or€place€merchandise€outside€the€store,Ïexcept€for€ð ðdirt,ðð€out€of€fear€€it€would€be€stolen.€€ÌÌà àConsidering€the€number,€frequency,€and€nature€of€the€crimes€reported€to€police,Ïmanagement's€acknowledgement€of€security€problems,€€and€other€evidence€in€the€record,Ïwe€conclude€that€the€proof€would€support€a€finding€that€the€risk€of€injury€to€plaintiffððsÏwife€was€reasonably€foreseeable.€€Of€course,€foreseeability€alone€does€not€establish€theÏexistence€of€a€duty.€€On€remand,€the€magnitude€of€the€potential€harm€and€the€burdenÏimposed€upon€defendants€must€also€be€weighed€to€determine€the€existence€of€a€duty.€ÏWhile€we€know€little€from€this€record€about€the€extent€of€injury€to€customers€as€a€resultÏof€criminal€acts€on€or€near€defendantsðð€premises,€we€are€persuaded€that€whatever€theÏextent€of€the€injuries,€the€magnitude€of€the€potential€harm€was€substantial€given€theÏnature€of€the€crimes€reported€to€police.× ƒ@ ××  ×ÌÌà àà àOn€remand,€the€court€must€also€consider€the€burden€which€the€duty€wouldÏimpose€upon€defendants.€€We€note,€for€example,€that€defendants€contend€that€they€haveÏno€reasonable€means€of€foreseeing€the€possibility€of€crime€on€their€premises;€thatÍsecurity€measures€are€not€effective€in€reducing€crime;€and€that€providing€security€is€costÏprohibitive.€€These€arguments€must€be€considered€on€remand€in€light€of€conflictingÏinformation€supplied€by€one€of€Wal„Martððs€senior€security€and€loss€preventionÏexecutives.× ƒA ××  ×€ÌÌà àà àIn€weighing€the€magnitude€of€harm€and€the€burden€imposed€uponÏdefendant,€the€court€must€consider€whether€imposing€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€measuresÏto€protect€patrons€from€the€consequences€of€criminal€acts€of€third€persons€would€place€anÏonerous€burden€„€economic€or€otherwise€„€upon€defendants.€€€If€it€does€not,€then€theÏcourt€must€consider€whether€the€burden€outweighs€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€theÏpossible€harm,€so€as€to€preclude€the€finding€of€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€steps€to€protectÏpatrons.€€We€hasten€to€point€out,€however,€that€the€question€of€duty€and€of€whetherÏdefendants€have€breached€that€duty€by€taking€or€not€taking€certain€actions€is€one€for€theÍjury€to€determine€based€upon€proof€presented€at€trial.€€Additionally,€if€properly€raised€asÏa€defense,ÌÌunder€our€doctrine€of€comparative€fault,€a€plainiffððs€duty€to€exercise€reasonable€care€forÏher€own€safety€would€be€weighed€in€the€balance.€€òòPerez€v.€McCoskeyóó,€872€S.W.2d€897Ï(Tenn.€1994).€€ÌÌà àà àFinally,€we€must€address€defendantsðð€argument€that€random€criminal€actsÏof€unknown€third€persons€amount€to€superseding,€intervening€causes€for€whichÏdefendants€cannot€be€held€liable€as€a€matter€of€law.€€It€is€true,€as€pointed€out€byÏdefendants,€that€a€superseding,€intervening€cause€can€break€the€chain€of€causation.€€In€thisÏregard,€we€have€stated€that€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà8 à[t]here€is€no€requirement€that€a€cause,€to€beÏregarded€as€the€proximate€cause€of€an€injury,Ïbe€the€sole€cause,€the€last€act,€or€the€one€nearestÏto€the€injury,€provided€it€is€a€substantial€factorÏin€producing€the€end€result.€€An€interveningÏact,€which€is€a€normal€response€created€byÏnegligence,€is€not€a€superseding,€interveningÏcause€so€as€to€relieve€the€original€wrongdoer€ofÏliability,€provided€the€intervening€act€couldÍhave€reasonably€been€foreseen€and€the€conductÏwas€a€substantial€factor€in€bringing€about€theÏharm.€ÌÌÓÓòò›Haynes€v.€Hamilton€Countyóó,€883€S.W.2d€606,€612€(Tenn.€1994)€(quoting€òòMcClenahan€v.ÏCooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€767,€775€(Tenn.€1991)).€€Proximate€cause,€as€well€as€the€existence€ofÏa€superseding,€intervening€cause,€are€jury€questions€unless€the€uncontroverted€facts€andÏinferences€to€be€drawn€from€the€facts€make€it€so€clear€that€all€reasonable€persons€mustÏagree€on€the€proper€outcome.€€òòHaynes€v.€Hamilton€Countyóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€612;€òòCook€v.ÏSpinnakerððs€of€Rivergate,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2d€934,€940€(Tenn.€1994);€òòMcClenahan€v.ÏCooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€at€775„76.ÌÌà àà àIn€conclusion,€this€record,€viewed€in€light€of€€the€principles€set€forth€in€thisÏopinion,€precludes€an€award€of€€summary€judgment.€€Assuming€for€purposes€of€thisÏanalysis€that€defendants€were€negligent,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€all€reasonableÏpersons€must€agree,€as€a€matter€of€law,€that€defendantsðð€negligence€in€failing€to€provideÏany€security€measures€did€not€create€a€favorable€environment€for€criminal€activity.€ÏConsidering€the€number,€nature,€and€frequency€of€crimes€committed€on€or€nearÏdefendantsðð€premises,€it€is€not€beyond€the€realm€of€reasonable€anticipation€that€a€juryÍcould€conclude€that€defendantsðð€negligence€created€a€foreseeable€risk€of€harm€toÏplaintiffððs€wife,€and€that€defendantsðð€negligence€was€a€substantial€factor€in€bringing€aboutÏthat€harm.€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.€€€Such€questions€are€ð ðpeculiarly€for€the€juryððÏgiven€the€present€state€of€this€record.€€òòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,€806€S.W.2d€at€775„76.€€ÌÌà àà àFor€the€reasons€stated€above,€the€judgments€of€the€lower€courts€areÏreversed.€€The€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€withÏthis€opinion.€€œThe€principles€set€forth€today€apply€to€all€cases€tried€or€retried€after€theÏdate€of€this€opinion€and€all€cases€on€appeal€in€which€the€issue€in€this€case€has€been€raised.ÏCosts›€shall€be€taxed€to€defendants.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àPenny€J.€White,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌœBirch,›€C.J.ÌœDrowota,›€Anderson,€Reid,€œJ.J.›ÌÌÌ