ÿWPCö, …U:V % 0C– 0vÙOn­_ 0 ( 44 1mH 0dµ 0 w@¨ 0Jè 0T2 0^† 0hä 0rL 0|¾ 0†: 0À 1uPU,Å Bñ 0d D3z 0@­U,íU6U>OU.B)»DCä AM'U*t-žfËè1©ðÂO²KELv~‘vÓ! 0Šâ& 0 l' 0´ ( 0ÇÀ( 0Û‡) 0ïb* AOQ+Æ + 0Df, D/ª, BÙ,<þ6X9`("Courier 10cpiX(ÿÿ$òòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó(-!2VŽ$¤¤Ý ƒ !ÝÝ  ÝÓÓ€€€€€òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó3|xÅ«<þ6X9`("Courier 10cpiXôxþ6X@É“8Å;X@($¡¡à~| Ø'+uvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à ±I²V³E´DµD¶·D¸¹Ó€Å2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô "#$ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(Modern dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ'''''ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier% Line 7 d66667Border 1dd€-7Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial #Ý ƒ !ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔÔ€9ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€9XÔÌÌò òApril€29,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€9ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ÞÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔRule€23.01€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€provides€that€a€class€action€may€beÏà àbrought€by€a€representative€party€on€behalf€of€all€members€of€the€class€only€if:Ìà àà à(1)à àthe€class€is€so€numerous€that€joinder€of€all€members€is€impracticable,Ìà àà à(2)€€à àthere€are€questions€of€law€or€fact€common€to€the€class,Ìà àà à(3)€€à àthe€claims€or€defenses€of€the€representative€parties€are€typical€of€the€claimsÏà àà àà àor€defenses€of€the€class,€andÌà àà à(4)€€à àthe€representative€parties€will€fairly€and€adequately€protect€the€interest€ofÏà àà àà àthe€class.Ìà àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€23.01.€€The€complaint€in€this€case€alleges,€in€paragraphs€19€through€22,Ïà àthese€prerequisites.Ì ŸÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔWe€have€previously€held€that€because€of€the€identical€language€in€our€Rule€23€and€in€RuleÏà à23€of€€the€Federal€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€that€federal€authority€is€persuasive.€€òòBayberryÏà àAssociates€€v.€Jonesóó,€783€S.W.2d€553€(Tenn.€1990).Ì æÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔWe€remind€defendant€ð ðthat€it€is€the€beast€of€the€common€law€that€the€lowest€shall€have€itsÌà àbenefits€as€well€as€the€highest€feel€its€power€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòCumberland€Telephone€&€TelegraphÌà àCo.€V.€Shawóó,€52€S.W.€163,€164€(Tenn.€1899)(case€allowing€punitive€damage€claim€whenÌà àjury€award€was€$7.50).Ì EÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔPersonal€jurisdiction,€by€contrast€to€subject€matter€jurisdiction,€relates€to€the€ability€toÏà àbring€the€parties€before€the€court.€€òòYoung€v.€Kittrellóó,€833€S.W.2d€505€(Tenn.€App.),€òòpermóó.Ïòòà àtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1992).€€Unlike€subject€matter€jurisdiction,€it€may€be€waived€byÌà àconsent€or€by€failure€to€object.€€òòLanders€v.€Jonesóó,€872€S.W.2d€674,€675€(Tenn.€1994).Ì AÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔThese€procedures€are€outlined€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Sections€29„14„104Ìà à(petition);€„105€(notice€of€petition);€and€„107€(writ€of€inquiry€of€damages).Ì ;Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€&ÔÔ€3ÔÝ  Ý€€€€€òòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÔ€4ÔNotably,€all€of€the€cases€cited€were€also€either€condemnation€or€inverse€condemnationÌà àactions.€€òòShelby€County€v.€Bardenóó,€527€S.W.2d€at€127„28.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ !ÝÔ . ÔÔ€&ÔÓ&€22X„d&ÓÑ#€22Xd#ÑÔ€3ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€4ÔÔ€4¼ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€÷àXdÈdÈ7ÑØ ØÓ&€55X8d&ÓÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßL€8:7;+'h|5L` Å `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌJOE€C.€MEIGHAN,€JR.,à àà àà à)à àòòò òFORÏPUBLICATIONÌó óóófor€himself,€and€others€à àà àà à)à àà àà àÌsimilarly€situated,à àà àà àà à)à àò òòòFiled:€April€29,€1996óóÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà à)à àKnox€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€Dale€C.€Workman,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌU.S.€SPRINT€COMMUNICATIONSà à)à à03S01„9502„CV„00014ÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌDonald€K.€Vowellà àà àà àà àà àJohn€B.€RaysonÌKnoxville,€TNà àà àà àà àà àJohn€C.€Burgin,€Jr.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAdrienne€L.€AndersonÌA.€James€Andrewsà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TNÌKnoxville,€TNà àà àà àÌà àÌThomas€A.€SnappÌKnoxville,€TNÌÌÌòòFor€Amicus€Curiaeóó:ÌÌJ.€Anthony€FarmerÌKnoxville,€TN€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€REVERSED;ÌTRIAL€COURT€PARTIALLYÏAFFIRMED,à àà àà àà àWHITE,€J.ÌPARTIALLY€REVERSED.ÌÓӜр;ÑÇÑ  Ñ›à àIn€this€case€we€are€called€upon€to€examine€the€application€of€Rule€23,ÏTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€to€actions€involving€injuries€to€realÏproperty€and€to€determine€the€available€causes€of€action€and€appropriateÏmeasure€of€damages€in€such€actions.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌà àPlaintiff€Meighan€is€a€property€owner€in€Knox€County,€Tennessee.ÏSouthern€Railway€Company€has€a€railroad€right€of€way€across€plaintiff'sÏland.€Defendant€U.S.€Sprint€is€a€communications€company€who€entered€intoÏa€license€agreement€with€Southern€Railway€allowing€the€installation€ofÏfiber€optic€cable€on€230€miles€of€railroad€right€of€way€in€Tennessee.€ÏPlaintiff's€land€was€among€those€tracts€upon€which€Sprint's€cable€wasÏinstalled.€€Sprint€did€not€avail€itself€to€the€statutory€condemnationÏprocedures,€did€not€get€plaintiffððs€consent,€and€did€not€offer€plaintiffÏcompensation.ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€Sprint's€actions,€plaintiff€filed€suit€in€the€Knox€CountyÏCircuit€Court€alleging€that€the€installation€of€the€cable€constituted€aÏ"taking"€of€plaintiff's€land€and€a€trespass€over€plaintiff's€land.€€PlaintiffÏsought€state„wide€class€action€certification.€€In€his€prayer€for€relief,Ïplaintiff€sought€both€compensatory€and€punitive€damages.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€granted€class€certification€only€as€to€affected€propertyÏowners€in€Knox€County.€€Sprint€moved€to€dismiss€the€trespass€cause€ofÏaction€and€the€punitive€damages€claim.€€The€court€dismissed€the€trespassÏclaim,€but€allowed€the€claim€for€punitive€damages€to€stand.ÌÌà àBoth€parties€sought€and€were€granted€interlocutory€andÏextraordinary€appeals.€€Under€Rule€9,€Tennessee€Rules€of€AppellateÏProcedure,€plaintiff€challenged€the€single„county€class€action€limitation.€ÏBy€virtue€of€a€Rule€10€appeal,€plaintiff€challenged€the€dismissal€of€theÏtrespass€cause€of€action.€€Defendant€challenged,€also€by€virtue€of€Rule€10,Ïthe€certification€of€the€class€action.€Under€Rule€9,€defendant€challenged€theÏruling€allowing€plaintiff's€punitive€damages€claim€to€stand.€€The€Court€ofÏAppeals€affirmed€the€dismissal€of€the€trespass€cause€of€action,€reversed€theÏtrial€court€and€dismissed€the€punitive€damages€claim€and€the€class€actionÏcertification,€thereby€removing€the€need€to€address€the€propriety€of€theÏsingle„county€limitation.€€We€granted€Rule€11€review€to€consider€the€classÏaction€certification,€the€nature€of€the€cause€of€action,€and€the€reliefÏavailable.ÌÌà àThe€resolution€of€this€case€is€affected€by€our€recent€decision€in€òòBuhlÍv.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€840€S.W.2d€904€(Tenn.€1992).€€ThereÏwe€held€that€the€installation€of€telephone€cable€constituted€a€taking€of€theÏlandowner's€property€within€the€meaning€of€the€law€of€eminent€domain.€ÏAccordingly,€the€property€owner€was€entitled€to€compensation.€€œòòBuhl€v.ÏU.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€840›€S.W.2d€at€913.€€Since€òòBuhlóó€clearlyÏestablishes€that€plaintiff€is€entitled€to€relief,€we€turn€our€attention€in€thisÏappeal€to€the€appropriateness€of€class€action€certification,€the€nature€of€theÏcause€of€action,€and€the€available€relief.ÌÌÌÌà@ àò òII.€€Class€Actions€under€Rule€23Ìà@ àA.€€Prerequisites€to€Class€Actionsó óÌÌà àThe€complaint€and€amended€complaint€in€this€action€were€brought€as€Ïclass€actions€under€Rule€23,€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€BothÏalleged€that€the€class€consisted€of€all€persons,€which€included€legal€entities,Ïwho€own€land€in€the€state€of€Tennessee€"across€which€Defendant€SouthernÏRailway€Company€(SRC),€has€maintained€a€railroad€right„of„way,€and/orÏacross€which€the€Defendant€Sprint€has€constructed€a€fiber€opticsÏcommunication€system."€€€The€class€was€further€divided€into€three€sub„classes,€two€of€which€were€distinguished€by€the€manner€of€the€railroad'sÏacquisition€of€the€right€of€way€and€the€third€of€which€consisted€of€landÏover€which€the€railroad€had€no€right€of€way.€€The€complaint€and€amendedÏcomplaint€alleged€all€the€prerequisites€to€class€action€filings× ƒ< ××  ×€set€forth€inÏRule€23.01€and€requested€certification€pursuant€to€subsection€one€or€two€ofÏRule€23.02,€or€alternatively,€pursuant€to€subsection€three.Ìà àÌà àIn€addition€to€the€prerequisites€to€a€class€action€set€forth€in€RuleÏ23.01,€Rule€23.02€further€limits€the€situations€in€which€a€class€action€can€beÏmaintained€to€three.€€The€first,€set€forth€in€Rule€23.02(1),€allows€classÏactions€in€order€to€avoid€prejudice€to€the€parties€which€might€result€fromÏmultiple€suits€about€the€same€subject€matter.€€Since€separate€prosecutionsÏmight€establish€"incompatible€standards€of€conduct"€for€the€defendant€orÏdispositive€adjudications€which€"impair€or€impede"€the€plaintiffs'Ïprotection€of€their€interests,€the€unitary€adjudication€of€a€class€action€isÏpreferable.€€Tenn€.€R.€Civ.€P.€23.02(1)(a)&(b).ÌÌà àThe€second€reason€for€allowing€class€action€adjudication,€set€forth€inÏRule€23.02(2)€applies€to€cases€in€which€injunctive€or€declaratory€relief€isÏthe€predominant€relief€sought.€€Thus,€a€class€action€may€be€maintainedÏwhen€the€party€opposing€the€class€"has€acted€or€refused€to€act€on€groundsÏgenerally€applicable€to€the€class."€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€23.02(2).€€While€thisÏprovision€may€also€apply€in€cases€seeking€monetary€relief,€that€relief€mustÏbe€"secondary€or€ancillary€to€the€predominant€injunctive€or€declarativeÏrelief€sought."€€H.€Newberg,€òòNewberg€on€Class€Actionsóó,€ðð€4.12,€at€294€(2dÏed.€1985)(hereafter€Newberg,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€œ_____,›€at€_____.ÌÌà àThe€third€situation€in€which€class€actions€may€be€maintained€areÏthose€situations€in€which€questions€of€law€and€fact€predominate€overÏindividual€issues€making€a€class€action€the€superior€method€for€a€fairÏresolution€of€the€controversy.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€23.02(3).€€This€provisionÏis€the€most€general,€arguably€encompasses€all€class€actions,€and€is€based€onÏprinciples€of€judicial€economy.€€Newberg,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€4.24,€at€315.€€BecauseÏsubsection€three€requires€notice€to€all€class€members,€and€because€of€its€optÏout€provisions,€certification€under€subsections€(1)€or€(2)€is€generallyÏpreferred.€€òòIdóó.€ðð€4.20,€at€310.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€Meighan€alleged€that€each€of€the€three€categories€for€classÏaction€certification€applied€to€this€lawsuit.€€Defendant€opposed€certificationÏon€all€grounds.€€In€its€order€granting€certification,€the€trial€court€held€asÏfollows:Ìà àà àÓÓà à[I]n€an€inverse€condemnation€case,€such€asÌà àà àthis€one,€venue€means€jurisdiction€and€.€.€.€thisÌà àà àCourt€therefore€has€no€jurisdiction€to€certify€aÌà àà àclass€action€comprised€of€landowners€whose€landÌà àà àlies€outside€Knox€County,€Tennessee;€and€thatÌà àà àwhile€this€action€is€appropriate€for€county„wideÌà àà àcertification€under€Rule€23.02(3),€.€.€.€the€CourtÌà àà àwill€defer€deciding€.€.€.€.ÌÌAfter€considering€further€pleadings,€the€court€certified€the€ÓÓ€action€"as€aÏclass€action€and€order[ed]€that€it€shall€be€so€maintained€pursuant€to€RuleÏ23.02(3)€€€€€.€.€.€."€€The€court€limited€the€class€to€affected€landowners€inÏKnox€County.€€ÌÌà àImplicit€in€the€court's€ruling€was€a€finding€that€plaintiff€hadÏestablished€all€of€the€prerequisites€for€maintaining€a€class€action€under€RuleÏ23.01€as€well€as€a€finding€that€a€class€action€was€appropriate€under€RuleÏ23.02(3).€€It€is€equally€apparent€that€the€trial€court's€redefinition€of€theÏclass€was€prompted€by€the€court's€interpretation€of€venue€and€jurisdictionÏrequirements€in€eminent€domain€actions.€€Both€of€these€rulings€wereÏchallenged€on€appeal.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€the€class€action€certification€"becauseÏthere€are€no€more€remaining€questions€of€law€or€fact€common€to€the€class."€ÏIn€that€court's€opinion,€the€only€remaining€issues€ÌÓÓà8 àare€whether€each€fee€interest€owner€is€entitled€to€recoverÏdamages€and,€if€so,€in€what€amount.€€These€questions€areÏdifferent€for€each€class€member€and€are€therefore€not€commonÏto€the€class€.€.€.€.€Ìà àà àÌà8 àà àBecause€resolution€of€each€plaintiff's€claim€will€requireÏa€detailed€factual€inquiry€as€to€the€market€value€of€thatÏplaintiff's€property€.€.€.€this€case€is€inappropriate€for€classÏaction€treatment.ÌÌÓÓÌà àAs€the€Court€of€Appeals€correctly€noted,€the€determination€of€Ïwhether€an€action€should€proceed€as€a€class€action€is€a€matter€which€is€leftÏto€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€Only€upon€a€finding€of€an€abuseÏof€that€discretion€should€the€trial€judge's€decision€be€modified€on€appeal.€ÏòòSterling€v.€Velsicol€Chemical€Corpóó.,€855€F.2d€1188€(6th€Cir.€1988).€€TheÏCourt€of€Appeals'€conclusion,€prompted€by€our€decision€in€òòBuhlóó,€was€thatÏthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€"because€there€are€no€remainingÏquestions€of€law€or€fact€common€to€the€class."€€We€disagree.ÌÌ€à àThe€decision€in€òòBuhlóó€did€reconcile€one€of€the€legal€issues€in€this€caseÏwhich€was€common€to€all€plaintiffs.€€It€did€not,€however,€resolve€all€theÍcommon€legal€and€factual€issues.€€The€removal€of€one€common€legalÏquestion€is€not€sufficient€grounds€for€decertifying€the€class€if€otherÏcommon€questions€of€law€or€fact€remain.€€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó€C.€Wright,€A.ÏMiller,€M.€Kane,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó,€ðð€1778,€at€522„46€(2d.edÏ1986)(hereafter€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€_____€at€_____.ÌÌà àIt€is€well€established€that€the€existence€of€separate€issues€of€law€andÏfact,€particularly€regarding€damages,€do€not€negate€class€actionÏcertification.€€òòSeeóó€Rules€Advisory€Committee€Notes€to€1966€AmendmentsÏto€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€23,€39€F.R.D.€69€(1966).× ƒ= ××  ×€€While€the€separate€factualÏissue€of€individual€damages€remains,€common€legal€and€factual€issues,Ïincluding€the€nature€of€the€claim€and€of€the€relief,€predominate.€€We€holdÏthat€the€trial€court€properly€exercised€its€discretion€in€certifying€a€classÏaction€in€this€lawsuit€and€that€the€appellate€court€improperly€interferedÏwith€that€discretion€by€decertifying€the€class€based€on€the€òòBuhlóó€decision.ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€being€an€inappropriate€case€for€finding€an€abuse€ofÏdiscretion€on€the€part€of€the€trial€judge,€good€reasons€support€the€initial,€asÏwell€as€the€continued,€certification€of€this€case€as€a€class€action.€€First,€it€isÍproperly€the€trial€court's€prerogative€to€make€the€initial€determination€ofÏand€any€subsequent€modifications€to€class€certification.€€The€trial€courtÏretains€significant€authority€to€redefine,€modify,€or€clarify€the€class.ÌÌà àFurthermore,€and€perhaps€more€importantly,€we€are€mindful€of€theÏgenesis€of€class€actions.€€Historically,€class€actions€were€created€as€a€matterÏof€convenience€"to€afford€partial€justice€to€parties€before€the€court€whenÏthey€were€unable€to€join€all€interested€parties€pursuant€to€the€then„compulsory€joinder€rule€governing€equity€court€procedures."€€òòSeeóóÏòòHansberry€v.€Leeóó,€311€U.S.€32,€41€(1940).€€The€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€has€recognized€that€class€actions€advance€"efficiency€and€economy€ofÏlitigation€which€is€a€principal€purpose€of€the€procedure."€€òòGeneralÏTelephone€Company€v.€Falconóó,€457€U.S.€147,€159€(1982).€€Thus,€in€1980,Ïthe€United€States€Supreme€Court€concluded:Ìà àà àÓÓThe€justifications€that€led€to€the€developmentÌà àà àof€the€class€action€include€the€protection€ofÌà àà àthe€defendant€from€inconsistent€obligations,Ìà àà àthe€protection€of€the€interests€of€absentees,€theÌà àà àprovision€of€a€convenient€and€economical€means€ofÌà àà àdisposing€of€similar€lawsuits,€and€the€facilitationÌà àà àof€the€spreading€of€litigation€costs€among€numerousÌà àà àlitigants€with€similar€claims.ÌÌòòUnited€States€Parole€Commission€v.€Geraghtyóó,€445€U.S.€388,€402„03Ï(1980).ÓÓ€€ÌThus,€while€the€device€has€its€notable€advantages€to€the€parties€to€a€lawsuit,Íit€also€advances€the€interests€of€judicial€economy€and€of€providing€access€toÏthe€courts.€€ÌÌà àThese€are€the€most€notable€of€the€justifications€for€class€certificationÏin€the€case€before€us.€€The€takings€by€this€defendant€potentially€could€resultÏin€hundreds€of€lawsuits€in€dozens€of€courts€occupying€dozens€of€judges.€ÏInconsistent€decisions€regarding€the€trespass€and€punitive€damages€claimsÏwould€be€likely.€€Separate€appellate€decisions€with€differing€results€are€noÏless€likely.€€Determination€of€the€remaining€common€issues€in€a€singleÏforum€is€a€far€superior€method€of€resolution.€€ÌÌà àAdditionally,€the€certification€serves€to€provide€access€to€the€courtsÏto€individual€claimants€whose€small€claims€would€not€otherwise€justifyÏtheir€seeking€relief.€€"Where€it€is€not€economically€feasible€to€obtain€reliefÏwithin€the€traditional€framework€of€a€multiplicity€of€small€individual€suitsÏfor€damages,€aggrieved€persons€may€be€without€any€effective€redressÏunless€they€may€employ€the€class„action€devise."€€òòDeposit€GuarantyÏNational€Bank€v.€Roper,óó€445€U.S.€326,€339€(1980).€€While€defendantÏargues€that€this€merely€allows€plaintiff's€counsel€to€have€a€more€lucrativeÏcase,€historically,€fee€splitting€was€a€primary€impetus€behind€the€classÍaction€device.€€It€is€not€only€not€condemnable,€it€is€commendable.× ƒ> ××  ×ÌÌà àThus,€we€conclude€that€when€a€trial€court€properly€exercises€itsÏdiscretion€and€certifies€a€lawsuit€as€a€class€action€under€Rule€23.02(3),€theÏfact€that€one€of€the€significant€common€legal€issues€is€resolved€prior€to€trialÏdoes€not€justify€a€decertification€of€the€action€if€the€common€questions€ofÏlaw€or€fact€that€remain€predominate.€€More€importantly,€if€the€trial€courtÏhas€properly€exercised€its€discretion€in€certifying€the€class€initially,Ïmodifications€to€that€order€remain€the€trial€court's€prerogative.ÌÌà àDefendant€contends€that€the€sole€remaining€issue€in€this€case€is€theÏamount€of€individual€damages€suffered€by€each€property€owner.€ÏConsequently,€defendant€suggests€that€a€class€action€is€inappropriate.€€WhileÏwe€recognize€that€the€issue€of€compensatory€damages€may€require€someÏindividual€consideration,€we€disagree€with€defendant's€position€that€eachÏowner€will€be€entitled€to€present€detailed€damages€evidence.ÌÌà àIn€a€class€action,€courts€are€not€required€to€conduct€separate€damageÍinquiries€for€each€class€member.€€Instead,€the€court€may€determine€anÏaggregate€damage€amount€for€the€class€as€a€whole.€€Newberg,€òòsupraóó,€ððÏ4.26,€at€321.€€The€trial€court€may€simply€choose€to€divide€the€award€amongÏmembers€or€may€allow€each€plaintiff€to€recover€by€proving€his€or€herÏclaim€against€the€entire€judgment.€€òòSeeóó€òòBoeing€Co.€v.€Van€Gemertóó,€444ÏU.S.€472€(1980).€€This€case€is€particularly€amenable€to€the€aggregateÏdamage€approach.ÌÌà àIt€is€likewise€irrelevant€that€the€case€involves€property€damage.€ÏThough€often€characterized€as€"unique,"€this€quality€does€not€forecloseÏcases€involving€property€damages€from€Rule€23€procedures.€€LiterallyÏdozens€of€class€actions€involving€property€damages€have€proceeded€in€ourÏstate€and€federal€courts.€€òòSeeóóòò€òòóóe.g.óó,€òòLoretto€v.€Teleprompter€ManhattanÏCATV€Corp.óó,€458€U.S.€419€(1982);€òòEyak€Native€Village€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,Ï25€F.3d€773€(9th€Cir.€1994)(after€federal€court€consolidation€andÏremoval);€òòHart€v.€City€of€Detroitóó,€296€N.W.2d€151€(Mich.€App.€1980).€€ÌÌò òà@ àB.€€Venue€in€Class€Actionsó óÌà àHaving€reversed€the€Court€of€Appeals'€decertification€of€this€classÏaction,€we€must€address€plaintiff's€contention€that€the€trial€court's€singleÏcounty€limitation€was€in€error.€€Plaintiff€objects€to€the€trial€court'sÍredefining€of€the€class€to€include€only€those€owners€of€affected€property€inÏKnox€County.€€Defendant€phrases€the€issue€differently€asserting,€as€the€trialÏcourt€did,€that€it€is€a€question€of€subject€matter€jurisdiction.ÌÌà àDefendants€correctly€note€that€the€Circuit€Court€has€subject€matterÏjurisdiction€in€an€eminent€domain€action.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„16„104Ï(1980€Repl.).€€Establishing€the€proper€court€for€the€filing€of€the€action,Ïhowever,€does€not€necessarily€establish€the€proper€or€exclusive€location.€ÏWhile€the€applicable€statute€addresses€the€issue€of€venue,€òòidóó.,€it€does€not€andÏcould€not€purport€to€modify€the€equally€applicable€provisions€of€Rule€23.€ÏWere€the€specific€statutory€provision€regarding€venue€interpreted€asÏdefendant€urges,€class€actions€would,€by€definition,€cease€to€exist€in€this€andÏa€number€of€different€statutory€causes€of€action.€€ÌÌà àSubject€matter€jurisdiction€and€venue€are€two€separate€concepts.€ÏSubject€matter€jurisdiction€concerns€the€authority€of€a€particular€court€toÏhear€a€particular€controversy.€€òòLanders€v.€Jonesóó,€872€S.W.2d€674€(Tenn.Ï1994).€€It€relates€to€the€nature€of€the€cause€of€action€and€the€relief€sought.€ÏòòIdóó.€€It€is€generally€defined€by€the€constitution€or€statute€and€conferred€byÏthe€authority€that€organizes€the€courts.€€òòCooper€v.€Reynoldsóó,€77€U.S.€308Ï(1870);€œòòTurpin›€v.€Conner€Bros.€Exterminating€Co.,€Inc.óó,€761€S.W.2d€296Í(Tenn.€1988).€€Here,€there€is€no€question€that€the€Circuit€Court€for€KnoxÏCounty€has€subject€matter€jurisdiction€over€this€action.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ29„16„104€(1980€Repl.).€€Further,€there€is€no€question€that€the€court€hasÏpersonal€jurisdiction€over€the€parties.× ƒ? ××  ×ÌÌà àVenue,€on€the€other€hand,€is€a€concept€based€on€privilege€of€andÏconvenience€to€the€parties.€€òòTurpin€v.€Conner€Bros.€Exterminating€Co.,ÏInc.óó,€761€S.W.2d€at€œ297.›€€It€is€generally€not€a€condition€precedent€to€theÏcourt's€power,€but€relates€instead€to€the€appropriateness€of€the€location€ofÏthe€action.€€While€there€is€much€debate€regarding€the€connectednessÏbetween€the€two€concepts,€our€rules€of€civil€procedure€have€clearlyÏdistinguished€between€the€two.€€Improper€venue€is€a€matter€which€isÏwaived€unless€contested€in€the€first€pleading.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.08.€ÏSubject€matter€jurisdiction,€on€the€other€hand,€cannot€be€waived,€because€itÏis€the€basis€for€the€court's€authority€to€act.€€ÌòòSeeóó€òòLanders€v.€Jonesóó,€872€S.W.2d€674,€675€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àIn€a€class€action€venue€is€controlled€by€the€residence€of€the€namedÍrepresentative.€€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€1757,€at€91.€€TheÏresidence€of€non„represented€class€members€is€not€dispositive.€€Since€anyÏcontrary€rule€would€be€unworkable,€the€residence€of€non„represented€classÏmembers€may€be€disregarded€rather€than€allowed€to€defeat€venue.€€òòIdóó.€€IfÏevery€member€of€the€class€were€required€to€reside€in€the€venue€where€theÏaction€was€filed,€class€actions€would€cease€to€exist.€€While€the€trial€courtÏretains€discretion€to€grant€or€deny€certification€and€to€define€the€class,€aÏclass€need€not€be€defined€so€as€to€include€only€parties€who€meet€the€venueÏrequirements.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court's€order€redefining€the€class€in€this€case€is€based€on€theÏcourt's€mistaken€belief€that€all€class€members€ò òmustó ó€reside€in€the€sameÏvenue.€€While€the€court€can€limit€the€class€based€on€appropriate€factors,€theÏcourt€is€not€required€to€limit€the€class€based€on€residence.€€Since€the€trialÏcourt's€order€limiting€the€class€to€Knox€County€property€owners€was€basedÏon€a€mistake€of€law,€we€reverse€and€remand.€€On€remand,€the€court€shouldÏconsider€the€numerous€justifications€for€allowing€the€maintenance€of€a€classÏaction€in€this€case€including€judicial€economy,€financial€feasibility,€andÏconsistent€verdicts,€and€should€not€base€any€future€class€determinations€onÏvenue€alone.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.€€Available€Causes€of€Actionó óÌà àOur€decision€in€òòBuhlóó€has€established€that€defendant€has€takenÏplaintiff's€property,€entitling€plaintiff€to€relief.€€The€second€issue€raised€inÏthis€case€concerns€the€available€causes€of€action.€€ÌÌà àPlaintiffððs€complaint€alleges€a€ð ðtakingðð€of€his€land€and€a€trespass€overÏhis€land.€€Consequently,€he€contends,€he€is€entitled€to€damages,€includingÏpunitive€damages,€traditionally€available€in€cases€involving€injury€to€realÏproperty.€€Defendant€challenges€plaintiffððs€right€to€proceed€other€than€byÏthe€statutory€method€prescribed€for€inverse€condemnation€actions.€€ÌÌà àOur€analysis€begins€with€the€statute€itself.€€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€29„16„123(a)€has€remained€unchanged€since€it€wasÏenacted€as€Section€1347€of€the€Code€of€1858.€€It€is€entitled€ð ðAction€initiatedÏby€ownerðð€and€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIf,€however,€such€person€or€company€has€actuallyÏtaken€possession€of€such€land,€occupying€it€for€theÏpurposes€of€internal€improvement,€the€owner€ofÏsuch€land€may€petition€for€a€jury€of€inquest,€inÏwhich€case€the€same€proceedings€may€be€had,€asÏnear€as€may€be,€as€hereinbefore€provided;€or€heÏmay€sue€for€damages€in€the€ordinary€way,€inÏwhich€case€the€jury€shall€lay€off€the€land€by€metesÏand€bounds€and€assess€the€damages,€as€upon€theÏtrial€of€an€appeal€from€the€return€of€a€jury€ofÏinquest.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„16„123(a)(1980€Repl.).€€Plaintiff€argues€thatÏallowing€a€property€owner€to€sue€for€damages€"in€the€ordinary€way"Ïsupports€an€action€for€trespass,€and€consequently,€allows€an€award€ofÏpunitive€damages.€€Defendant€contends€that€the€language€refers€instead€toÏthe€method€of€commencement€of€an€action€by€a€property€owner€against€theÏtaking€authority.€€œÌ›Ìà àWhile€not€œrecent,›€œprior›€decisions€have€resolved€both€of€theseÏcontentions.€€In€òòDuck€River€Valley€Narrow€Gauge€Railroad€Company€v.ÏCochraneóó,€œthis›€Court€described€the€action€by€the€landowner€against€theÏrailroad€company€for€ð ðland€taken€and€appropriated€.€.€.€in€constructing€itsÏroad€across€his€farmðð€as€ð ðan€ordinary€action€of€œtrespass.ð𛀀òòDuck€RiverÏValley€Narrow€Gauge€Railroad€Company€v.€Cochraneóó,€71€Tenn.€478,€479Ï(Tenn.€1879).€€The€question€for€the€Court€was€specifically€whether€theÏstatutory€or€charter€remedies€were€ð ðexclusive€of€all€other€remedies.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àRelying€on€Section€1347€of€the€Code€of€1958,€identical€to€the€presentÏSection€29„16„123(a),€the€Court€found€that€trespass€was€a€viable,Ïalternative€cause€of€action.ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThe€latter€clause€of€this€section€leaves€noÏdoubt€as€to€the€right€of€the€owner€to€bring€anÍaction€in€the€ordinary€way,€which€can€meanÏnothing€else€than€an€action€of€trespass€or€an€actionÏupon€the€facts€of€the€case€to€recover€the€value€ofÏthe€land€and€the€damages.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€At€480.€€Previous€inconsistent€decisions€were€based€on€charterÏprovisions€and€not€on€the€statute.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àThe€Courtððs€decision€in€òòDuck€Riveróó€has€been€consistently€applied.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòSouthern€Railway€Company€v.€Jenningsóó,€171€S.W.€82€(Tenn.Ï1914);€òòHooper€v.€Davidson€Countyóó,€333€S.W.2d€917€(Tenn.€1960);€òòJohnsonÏv.€Roane€Countyóó,€478€S.W.2d€886€(Tenn.€1972);€òòEast€Tennessee€&ÏW.N.C.R.€Co.€V.€Gougeóó,€203€S.W.2d€170€(Tenn.€App.),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,Ï(Tenn.€1947);€òòBetty€v.€Metropolitan€Governmentóó,€835€S.W.2d€1€(Tenn.ÏApp.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1992).€€In€our€later€cases,€we€haveÏmade€the€existence€of€two€separate€remedies€abundantly€clear.€€òòScott€v.ÏRoane€Countyóó,€478€S.W.2d€at€887€(ð ðThe€statute€.€.€.€should€be€read€asÏallowing€two€distinct€actions.€€The€first€being€an€inverse€or€reverseÏcondemnation€action€and€the€second€being€a€suit€for€damages€in€theÏordinary€way.ðð);€òòJohnson€v.€Roane€Countyóó,€370€S.W.2d€at€498€(ð ðTheÏstatute€provides€an€aggrieved€land€owner€with€two€or€alternative€rights€orÏremedies€.€.€.€.ðð).ÌÌà àIn€our€two€most€recent€pronouncements€we€have€faced€the€argumentÏraised€by€defendant€„€that€the€language€refers€only€to€the€manner€ofÏcommencement€rather€than€to€the€nature€of€the€cause€of€action.€€In€bothÏcases,€we€found€no€merit€to€the€argument.€€òòJohnson€v.€Roane€Countyóó,€370ÏS.W.2d€at€498;€òòScott€v.€Roane€Countyóó,€478€S.W.2d€at€887„88.ÌÌà àWhile€it€is€true€that,€under€the€statute,€owner„initiated€inverseÏcondemnation€actions€required€commencement€by€petition€followed€byÏnotice€or€publication,€it€does€not€follow€that€ð ðsue€in€the€ordinary€wayððÏmeans€only,€as€defendant€argues,€that€suit€may€also€be€commenced€byÏsummons.€€Confronted€with€that€issue,€we€have€clarified€that€a€propertyÏowner€who€seeks€the€first€remedy€under€the€statute,€that€being€a€trueÏinverse€condemnation€proceeding,€may€not€institute€the€action€by€summons,Ïbut€must€utilize€the€procedure€outlined€for€taker„initiated€actions.€€òòScott€v.ÏRoane€Countyóó,€478€S.W.2d€at€887.€€Commencement€by€summons,Ïhowever,€is€appropriate€for€suits€seeking€the€second€remedy,€damages€inÏthe€ordinary€way.€€òòIdóó.€œat›€887„88.ÌÌà àWe€uphold€the€long„standing€law€of€this€jurisdiction€that€a€propertyÏowner€whose€property€is€taken€by€an€authority€exercising€the€power€ofÏeminent€domain€has€two€alternative€causes€of€action.€€The€property€ownerÍmay€petition€for€a€jury€of€inquest€as€provided€by€statute.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€29„16„123(a)(1980€Repl.).€€This€alternative,€properly€designated€as€anÏinverse€condemnation€œaction,›€must€be€instituted€in€accordance€with€theÏstatutory€provisions€applicable€to€condemnation€actions€initiated€by€theÏtaking€authority.œ× ƒ@ ××  ×›€€òòJohnson€v.€Roane€Countyóó,€370€S.W.2d€at€498.€ÏAlternatively,€the€property€owner€may€sue€for€damages€in€a€trespassÏaction.€€If€the€owner€proceeds€on€a€trespass€cause€of€action,€the€proceedingÏis€by€jury€ð ðin€the€usual€way.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ29„16„123(a)(1980ÏRepl.)(ð ðin›€which€case€the€jury€shall€lay€off€the€land€by€metes€and€boundsÏand€assess€the€damages,€as€upon€the€trial€of€an€appeal€from€the€return€of€aÏjury€of€inquestðð);€òòidóó.€œat€„118(a)€(ð ð[e]ither›€party€may€also€appeal€from€theÏfinding€of€the€jury,€and,€.€.€.€have€a€trial€anew,€before€a€jury€in€the€usualÏœwayðð).›€€Having€so€concluded,€we€reverse€the€Court€of€Appeals€and€the€trialÏcourtððs€actions€dismissing€the€trespass€claim.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.€€Damages€in€Trespass€Cause€of€Actionó óÌà àOur€final€inquiry€in€this€case,€having€affirmed€the€existence€of€theÏtrespass€cause€of€action,€is€the€appropriate€measure€of€damages.€€Initially,Ïwe€note€that€ð ðthe€rules€for€determining€damages€[in€trespass€actions]€areÍbased€upon€the€purposes€for€which€such€actions€are€maintainable€[includingÏt]o€give€compensation€.€.€.,€[and€t]o€punish€wrongdoers€and€deter€wrongfulÏconduct€€€€€.€.€.€.ðð€€75€œAm.Jur.2d›€Trespass€ðð€118,€at€89€(1991).€€While€bothÏparties€acknowledge€plaintiffððs€right€to€recover€compensatory€damages€forÏthe€taking€of€plaintiffððs€property,€defendant€disputes€any€right€to€recoverÏpunitive€damages.ÌÌà àIn€trespass€actions€generally,€an€award€of€punitive€damages€isÏdiscretionary€with€the€trier€of€fact.€€œòòIdóó.€ðð›€148,€at€111.€€Punitive€damagesÏmay€be€awarded€for€a€trespass€which€is€wanton,€oppressive,€orÏaccompanied€with€outrage€or€other€aggravating€circumstances.€€òòIdóó.,€ðð€150,Ïat€112„13.€€Their€purpose€is€to€punish€for€outrageous€conduct€and€to€deterÏsimilar€future€conduct.€€òòIdóó.,€ðð€148,€at€111.ÌÌà àOur€older€cases€have€applied€these€rules€of€law€in€trespass€actionsÏinvolving€property€takings€by€authorized€authorities.€€In€œthree€casesÏinvolving€the€wrongful€cutting€of€trees€by€authorities,€some€withÏpermission,€some€expressly€without,€we€allowed€the€consideration€ofÏpunitive€damages.€€òòCumberland€Telephone€&€Telegraph€Co.€v.€Shawóó,€52ÏS.W.€163,€164€(Tenn.€1899);€òòCumberland€Telephone€&€Telegraph€Co.€v.ÏPostonóó,€30€S.W.€1040,€1041€(Tenn.€1895);€òòMemphis€Telephone€CompanyÍv.€Huntóó,€1€S.W.€159,€160€(Tenn.€1886).€€In€òòPostonóó€and€òòShawóó,€we€reiteratedÏthe€general€rule€that€the€jury€could,€in€its€discretion,€award€punitiveÏdamages€upon€a€finding€that€the€trespass€„€in€these€cases,€the€cutting€of€treesÏ„€was€done€fraudulently,€wantonly,€oppressively,€or€with€gross€negligence.€ÏòòCumberland€Telephone€&€Telegraph€Co.€v.€Postonóó,€30€S.W.€at€1031;ÏòòCumberland€Telephone€&€Telegraph€Co.€v.€Shawóó,€52€S.W.€at€164.ÌÌà àà àWe€recently€revisited€the€issue€of€punitive€damages€in€trespassÏactions€in€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896,€900€(Tenn.€1992).€ÏThere,€we€relied€on€three€nineteenth€century€cases.ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€an€action€of€trespass€the€jury€[is]€not€restrained,Ïin€their€assessment€of€damages,€to€the€amount€ofÏthe€mere€pecuniary€loss€sustained€by€the€plaintiff,Ïbut€may€award€damages€in€respect€of€theÏmalicious€conduct€of€the€defendant,€and€theÏdegree€of€insult€with€which€the€trespass€has€beenÏattended.€.€.€.€[T]hese€damages€should€operate€toÏpunish€the€defendant€and€deter€others€.€.€.€[and]Ïwere€legally€appropriate€in€cases€of€fraud,€malice,Ïgross€negligence,€or€oppression.ÌÌÓÓòòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€at€900€(quoting€òòWilkins€v.ÏGilmoreóó,€21€Tenn.€140,€141€(1840);€òòPolk,€Wilson,€&€Co.€V.€Fancheróó,€39ÏTenn.€336,€341€(1885);€&€òòBryan€v.€McGuireóó,€40€Tenn.€530,€532€(1859)).ÌÌà àDefendant€argues€that€later€authority€has€abandoned€the€propositionÍset€forth€in€these€earlier€cases.€€It€cites€òòShelby€County€v.€Bardenóó,€527ÏS.W.2d€124,€127€(Tenn.€1975)€and€òòBetty€v.€Metropolitan€Governmentóó,€835ÏS.W.2d€1,€7€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóóòòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1992).€ÏNeither€of€these€cases,€however,€involved€an€owner„initiated€trespass€causeÏof€action.€€òòBardenóó€was€an€inverse€condemnation€action€which€involved€theÏdivision€of€damages€between€a€lessor€and€lessee€of€taken€property.€€òòShelbyÏCounty€v.€Bardenóó,€527€S.W.2d€at€126.€€Our€statement€that€the€ð ðmeasure€ofÏdamages€to€the€landowner€[in€an€inverse€condemnation€action]€is€that€usedÏin€condemnation€cases,ðð€does€not€foreclose€the€availability€of€punitiveÏdamages€in€the€rare,€appropriate€trespass€case€for€two€reasons.€€First,€theÏcase€did€not€involve€the€issue.€€It€was€an€inverse€condemnation€action,€not€aÏtrespass€action.× ƒA ××  ×€€Second,€we€are€not€authorized€by€judicial€decision€to€takeÏaway€a€right€conferred€by€statute.€€Concomitant€with€the€legislative€right€toÏsue€for€trespass€is€the€corresponding€remedy€which€may€in€unusual,€uniqueÏcases€include€punitive€damages.€€ÌÌà àEqually€inapposite€to€defendantððs€position€is€the€òòBettyóó€case.€€ThatÏcase€was€also€an€inverse€condemnation€proceeding,€coupled€with€claimsÏunder€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act.€€Its€thorough€instructionsÍregarding€damages€did€not€purport€to€resolve€the€issue€we€face,€though€itÏdid€acknowledge,€in€dicta,€that€ð ðin€actions€for€ððdamages€in€the€ordinaryÏwayðð€.€.€.€a€property€ownerððs€measure€of€damages€is€the€same€as€in€anyÏother€case€involving€injury€to€real€property.ðð€€òòBetty€v.€MetropolitanÏGovernmentóó,€835€S.W.2d€at€7.ÌÌà àThat€dicta€is€the€holding€of€this€case.€€A€property€owner€who€suesÏfor€damages€in€a€trespass€action€against€a€taking€authority€may,€in€anÏappropriate€case,€recover€punitive€damages.€€Those€appropriate€cases€willÏbe€few.€€Punitive€damages€are€only€available€in€egregious€circumstances€inÏwhich€the€trespass€is€accomplished€fraudulently,€wantonly,€oppressively,€orÏwith€gross€negligence.€€Furthermore,€punitive€damages€are€not€availableÏagainst€many€taking€authorities.€€But€in€those€rare€cases€in€which€theÏrequisite€elements€can€be€established,€punitive€damages€may€be€awarded,€inÏthe€factfinderððs€discretion.ÌÌà àOur€explicit€recognition€that€punitive€damages€are€available€inÏappropriate€cases€based€on€common„law€trespass€rather€than€statutoryÏinverse€condemnation€grounds€is€required€by€legal€and€practicalÏconsiderations.€€The€creation€of€the€statutory€inverse€condemnation€causeÏof€action€does€not€impair€the€common€law€right€of€action€unless€expresslyÍstated.€€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€at€899.€€Here,€the€right€isÏexpressly€reserved,€as€must€be€the€corresponding€remedy.ÌÌà àMoreover,€we€believe€that€the€availability€of€punitive€damages€inÏappropriate€condemnation€cases€is€necessary€to€compensate€fully€aggrievedÏlandowners€in€accordance€with€the€constitution.€€Our€statute€providesÏexplicit€procedures€which€entities€with€the€power€of€eminent€domainÏshould€follow.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€29„16„105€ð!ð€„122€(1980€Repl.).€ÏThose€entities€which€proceed€in€compliance€with€those€procedures€areÏafforded€protections,€including€the€ability€to€avoid€punitive€damagesÏclaims.€€Those€who€fail€to€avail€themselves,€should€under€appropriateÏcircumstances,€be€liable€to€the€landowner€for€the€full€measure€of€damagesÏappropriate€to€the€cause€of€action.€€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€the€priorÏorder€dismissing€the€request€for€punitive€damages.€€On€remand,€the€issueÏwill€be€determined€in€accordance€with€the€principles€set€forth€in€thisÏopinion€and€in€òòHodges€v.€S.C.€Toof€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà@ àò òV.€€Conclusionó óÌà àWe€reverse€the€dismissal€of€class€certification€as€well€as€the€dismissalÏof€the€trespass€cause€of€action€and€punitive€damages€claim.€€We€remand€toÏthe€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€TheÍcosts€of€appeal€are€taxed€to€defendant.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àPenny€J.€White,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌAnderson,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Reid,€Birch,€J.J.ÌÌ