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Bâ!˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular- ù-(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý µ P¶ D· D¸ D¹ Uº P» {¼ ½ D¾ Ӏ܀ƒ"3|xÉ (8(3ß«$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman,,,,'ÿÿdxd ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€3XÔÌÌò òAprilÏ7,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€3ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ôÔòòBuhl€v.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€No.€88MC3956€(Anderson€Co.ÏCh.€Ct.€filed€Oct.€21,€1988);€òòMeighan€v.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,ÏNo.€1„469„90€(Knox€Co.€Cir.€Ct.€filed€June5,€1990);€òòMcCumber€v.€U.S.ÏSprint€Communications€Co.óó,€No.€23,796„III€(Cocke€Co.€Cir.€Ct.€filedÏJune6,€1996).Ì nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ôÔÔ€.ÔòòBuhl€v.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€840€S.W.2d€904€(Tenn.Ï1992);€òòMeighan€v.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€924€S.W.2d€632€(Tenn.Ï1996).€€Ì ‹Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ôÔThe€Act€provides€in€relevant€part:ÌÌà8 àà8 àThe€Supreme€Court€and€all€courts€established€byÏAct€of€Congress€may€issue€all€writs€necessary€orÏappropriate€in€aid€of€their€respectiveÏjurisdictions€and€agreeable€to€the€usages€andÏprinciples€of€law.ÌÌ28€U.S.C.€ðð€1651(a).€€The€state€courts€in€Tennessee€have€essentially€theÏsame€authority€as€this€statute€gives€the€federal€courts.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€16„3„202€(1994).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€)ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  Ý›Ñ p ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€?·XXdÈdÈ7ÑÖ€+ÖÑ  ÑÔ€.ÔØ ØÓ&€//XÐd&ÓœÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àApril€7,€1997Ì›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÔ€.&Ô̜ـ€ÙßR€241A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÔ€.XÔÌÔ€.&ÔJOE€C.€MEIGHAN,€JR.,€FOR€à àà à(ÌHIMSELF,€AND€ALL€OTHERS€à àà à(ÌSIMILARLY€SITUATED,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Plaintiffs„Appellants,à à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Knox€LawÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(€ÌÒ € ÒÒ h Òv.à àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€Dale€C.€Workman,€Judge€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌÒ € ÒÒ À Òà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€S.€Ct.€No.€03S01„9502„CV„00014ÌU.S.€SPRINT€COMMUNICATIONSà àà à(ÌCOMPANY,à àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ì€€€€€Defendant„Appellee.à àà à(ÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiffs„Appellantsóó:à àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appelleeóó:ÌÌDonald€K.€Vowellà àà àà àà àJohn€B.€RaysonÌRobert€R.€Carlà àà àà àà àà àAdrienne€L.€AndersonÌRainwater,€Humble€&€Vowellà àà àà àKramer,€Rayson,ÏLeake,ÌKnoxvilleà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€Rodgers€&€MorganÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxvilleÌA.€James€AndrewsÌKnoxvilleÌÌThomas€A.€SnappÌKnoxvilleÌÌœòòFor›€Plaintiffs€Lawrence€E.€McCumberóóÌòòand€Patricia€Ann€McCumberóó:ÌÌBen€W.€Hooper,€IIIÌCampbell€&€HooperÌNewportÌÌR.€J.€TuckerÌNewportÌÌTom€JesseeÌJessee€&€JesseeÌJohnson€œCityÌÔ€.XÔÌ›à@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌœ›à àÌPETITION€FOR€WRIT€OF€MANDAMUS€œDENIED;ÌORDER€STAYING€PROCEEDINGS€IN€TRIALÌCOURTS€LIFTED.à àà àà àà à›€à àà àà àREID,€J.ÇÑ  ÑÑ , ÑÓÓœÓ` °‚X.h—XÓ›à àThe€case€is€before€the€Court€on€a€petition€for€writÏof€mandamus.€€This€is€one€of€three€casesœ× ƒ5 ××  ×›€in€which€landownersÏhave€filed€suit€against€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€CompanyÏ(Sprint),€asserting€claims€for€inverse€condemnation€andÏtrespass€and€seeking€certification€as€a€class€action.€òòBuhl€v.ÏSprintóó€and€the€instant€case,€òòMeighanóó,€have€been€before€thisÏCourt€on€appeal.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€The€relief€sought€is€an€order€directing€theÏtrial€court€in€òòMcCumber€v.€Sprintóó€to€vacate€its€orderÏcertifying€a€class€action€and€to€defer€to€the€trial€court€inÏthis€case€on€that€issue.€€The€Court,€heretofore,€entered€anÏorder€staying€the€proceedings€in€all€three€cases€pending€thisÏhearing.€ÌÌà@ àò òIÌó óÌà àThese€legal€proceedings€against€Sprint€began€onÏOctober18,€1988€when€John€G.€Buhl,€et€al.,€landowners€inÏAnderson€County€and€outside€Anderson€County,€filed€a€suit€inÏthe€chancery€court€for€Anderson€County,€in€which€the€namedÏplaintiffs,€"for€themselves€and€all€others€similarlyÏsituated,"€sought€certification€of€a€statewide€plaintiffs'Ïclass€consisting€of€the€owners€of€land€in€Tennessee€acrossÏwhich€Southern€Railway€Company€maintains€a€railroad€right„of„Ñ Ø Ñway€and€across€which€Sprint€has€constructed€a€fiber€opticsÏcommunications€system.€€On€appeal€from€cross„motions€forÏsummary€judgment,€this€Court€held€in€òòBuhlóó€that€Sprint's€use€ofÏthe€property€constituted€the€taking€of€an€interest€therein€forÏwhich€the€landowners€were€entitled€to€be€compensated.€€òòBuhl€v.ÏU.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€840€S.W.2d€904€(Tenn.€1992).€ÏCertification€of€the€class€action€was€not€an€issue€on€appealÏof€the€òòBuhlóó€case.€€After€deciding€the€issues€of€law€presented,Ïthe€case€was€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings,€including€the€issue€of€class€certification.€€TheÏopinion€was€filed€on€October€26,€1992.ÌÌà àOn€June5,€1990,€while€the€òòBuhlóó€case€was€on€appeal,ÏJoe€C.€Meighan,€Jr.,€a€landowner€in€Knox€County,€filed€theÍinstant€suit€against€Sprint€in€the€circuit€court€for€KnoxÏCounty€in€which€he,€"for€himself€and€all€others€similarlyÏsituated,"€asserted€the€same€claims€as€those€made€in€the€òòBuhlóóÏcase.€€Meighan€had€sought€to€be€named€a€representativeÏplaintiff€in€the€òòBuhlóó€case,€but€his€claim€was€dismissed€by€theÏtrial€court€because€his€property€was€not€located€in€AndersonÏCounty.€€Meighan€did€not€appeal€the€dismissal€of€his€claim€inÏthe€òòBuhlóó€case.€€The€trial€court€on€remand€stayed€theÏproceedings€in€the€òòBuhlóó€case,€pending€a€decision€in€this€case.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€Knox€County€Circuit€Court€deniedÏplaintiff€Meighan's€prayer€for€certification€of€a€statewideÏclass,€finding€lack€of€jurisdiction,€but€granted€certificationÏof€a€class€limited€to€the€owners€of€land€located€in€KnoxÏCounty.€€It€dismissed€the€claim€based€on€trespass.€€OnÏinterlocutory€appeal,€the€Court€of€Appeals€dismissed€the€KnoxÏCounty€class€action€certification€and€affirmed€the€dismissalÏof€the€action€for€trespass.€€This€Court€reversed,€holding€thatÏthe€Court€of€Appeals€erred€in€limiting€the€class€to€owners€ofÏland€located€in€Knox€County€and€that€the€Court€of€Appeals€alsoÏerred€in€dismissing€the€cause€of€action€based€on€trespass.€€ÏòòMeighan€v.€U.S.€Sprint€Communications€Co.óó,€924€S.W.2d€632Í(Tenn.€1996).€€The€opinion€was€released€on€April29,€1996.€€AÏpetition€to€rehear€was€denied€on€July1,€1996.ÌÌà àOn€June6,€1996,€while€the€òòMeighanóó€case€was€pendingÏbefore€this€Court€on€a€petition€to€rehear,€Lawrence€andÏPatricia€Ann€McCumber,€landowners€in€Cocke€County,€filed€aÏsuit€against€Sprint€in€the€circuit€court€of€Cocke€County€"forÏthemselves€and€all€others€similarly€situated."€€TheÏallegations€are€identical€to€those€in€the€òòMeighanóó€complaintÏexcept€for€the€named€plaintiffs€and€the€requested€class,€whichÏis€all€of€Tennessee€excluding€Knox€County.€€On€the€same€dateÏthe€òòMcCumberóó€complaint€was€filed,€and€without€any€notice,€aÏconditional€order€was€entered€by€the€Cocke€County€courtÏcertifying€a€class€which€included€all€of€Tennessee€except€KnoxÏCounty.€€In€the€order€certifying€the€case€as€a€class€action,Ïthe€Court€relied€upon€the€decision€of€this€Court€in€òòMeighanóóÏfor€its€finding€that€the€allegations€in€òòMcCumberóó€wereÏ"sufficient€to€justify€certification."€€In€excluding€KnoxÏCounty,€the€Court€found€"that€a€prior€class€has€been€certifiedÏas€to€Knox€County,€Tennessee€only."€€€ÌÌà àThe€appeal€in€òòMeighanóó€was€concluded€when€theÍpetition€to€rehear€was€denied€on€July1,€1996.€€This€CourtÏordered€that€the€trial€court€"should€consider€the€numerousÏjustifications€for€allowing€the€maintenance€of€a€class€actionÏin€this€case€including€judicial€economy,€financialÏfeasibility,€and€consistent€verdicts,€and€should€€not€base€anyÏfuture€class€determinations€on€venue€alone."€€òòId.óó€at€639.€ÏHowever,€the€trial€court,€on€remand,€refused€to€considerÏcertification€of€a€statewide€class,€finding€that€alternativeÏhad€been€precluded€by€entry€of€the€certification€order€inÏòòMcCumberóó,€while€òòMeighanóó€was€on€appeal.ÌÌà àOn€the€petition€before€the€Court,€Meighan€seeks€aÏwrit€of€mandamus€directing€the€Cocke€County€court€to€vacateÏits€order€for€class€certification€and€defer€to€any€decision€onÏthat€issue€which€may€be€made€by€the€trial€court€in€this€case.€ÏMcCumber€responds€that€mandamus€does€not€lie€in€this€case,Ïand,€further,€there€has€been€no€error€committed€in€any€of€theÏtrial€courts.€€Sprint's€position€is€that€the€classÏcertification€issue€should€be€determined€by€the€AndersonÏCounty€court€in€the€òòBuhlóó€case.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIó óÌÌà àAs€a€preliminary€matter,€the€Court€notes€that€thereÏare€a€number€of€technical€defects€in€the€petition€for€theÏwrit.€€The€suit€was€not€prosecuted€in€the€name€of€the€state€onÏthe€relation€of€the€petitioner,€as€is€required.€€òòSeeóó€òòWhitesideÏv.€Stewartóó,€91€Tenn.€710,€20€S.W.€245,€246€(1892).€€Also,€theÏpetitioners€did€not€institute€this€suit€against€the€judge€uponÏwhom€it€seeks€a€writ€to€issue,€as€is€required.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏThompsonóó,€118€Tenn.€571,€102€S.W.€349,€351€(1907).€ÏNevertheless,€the€Court€elects€not€to€dismiss€the€petitionÏbecause€of€technical€defects.ÌÌà0 àà àà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àWhether€a€suit€should€be€certified€as€a€class€actionÏin€a€particular€case€is€a€matter€of€judicial€discretion€orÏjudgment€to€be€determined€by€the€application€of€establishedÏlegal€principles€to€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€case.€€ÏAfter€discussing€the€prerequisites€to€a€class€action,€theÏCourt€noted€in€òòMeighanóó,€"the€determination€of€whether€anÏaction€should€proceed€as€a€class€action€is€a€matter€which€isÏleft€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€judge."€€òòMeighanóó,Í924€S.W.2d€at€637.€€The€question€of€whether€the€suit€shouldÏproceed€as€a€class€action€was€presented€in€each€of€these€threeÏcases.€€The€complaint€in€each€case€was€filed€on€behalf€of€theÏnamed€plaintiffs€and€"all€others€similarly€situated"€andÏsought€certification€of€a€statewide€class€of€plaintiffs.€€AÏsubsidiary€issue€presented€in€each€case€was€whether€the€classÏto€be€certified€would€be€statewide€or€limited.€€The€focus€ofÏthis€petition€is€the€trial€court's€decision€in€òòMcCumberóó€toÏcertify€a€statewide€class€except€for€those€landownersÏ"similarly€situated"€in€Knox€County.€ÌÌà àPlaintiff€McCumber€properly€states€that€the€decisionÏregarding€the€certification€of€a€class€action€lies€within€theÏtrial€court's€judicial€discretion,€but€his€insistence€that€theÏcourt's€discretion€is€not€subject€to€review€on€a€petition€forÏwrit€of€mandamus€overstates€the€rule.€€ÌÌà àThe€writ€of€mandamus€is€an€extraordinary€remedy,Ïwhose€purpose€is€to€exert€the€revisory€appellate€power€overÏthe€inferior€courts€where€there€is€no€other€plain,€adequate,Ïand€complete€method€of€obtaining€the€relief€to€which€one€isÏentitled.€€òòAllied€Chemical€Corp.€v.€Daiflon,€Inc.óó,€449€U.S.€€€Í33,€36,€101€S.€Ct.€188,€190€(1980);€52€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòMandamusóó€ððÏ12€(1970).€€Mandamus€generally€will€not€be€issued€if€theÏpetitioner€has€a€legal€remedy€that€is€equally€convenient,Ïcomplete,€beneficial,€and€effective,€but€the€remedy€whichÏwould€preclude€mandamus€must€be€equally€as€convenient,Ïcomplete,€beneficial,€and€effective€as€mandamus,€and€must€alsoÏbe€sufficiently€speedy€to€prevent€material€injury.€€52€Am.ÏJur.€2d€òòMandamusóó€ðððð€46,€49€(1970).€€Although€the€writ€is€moreÏoften€addressed€to€ministerial€acts,€rather€than€discretionaryÏacts,€the€writ€may€be€addressed€to€discretionary€acts€when€theÏact€is€done€in€an€"arbitrary€and€oppressive€manner"€or€whereÏthere€has€been€a€"plainly€palpable"€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏòòPeerless€Const.€Co.€v.€Bassóó,€158€Tenn.€518,€524,€14€S.W.2dÏ732,€733€(1929).€€€ÌÌà àThe€need€for€the€writ€to€be€exercised€by€anÏappellate€court€may€require€an€analysis€different€from€thatÏmade€by€a€trial€court.€€In€considering€a€petition€addressed€toÏa€trial€court,€this€Court€stated:€€The€"essential€purpose€[ofÏthe€writ]€is€to€execute€a€ministerial€function,€not€adjudicateÏa€legal€issue."€€òòPaduch€v.€Johnson€Cityóó,€896€S.W.2d€767,€770Ï(Tenn.€1995).€€The€essential€purpose€of€the€writ€utilized€byÍappellate€courts€was€discussed€in€the€recent€case€of€òòState€v.ÏIrickóó:ÌÌÓÓà0 àà àà0 àà àà8 àà àIt€is€well„settled,€however,€that€the€appellateÏcourts€of€this€state€have€limited€mandamusÏjurisdiction€in€circumstances€under€which€the€writÏis€necessary€to€aid€the€exercise€of€the€appellateÏfunction.€€òòState€v.€Sneedóó,€105€Tenn.€711,€58€S.W.Ï1070€(1900);€òòState€v.€Baby€John€Doeóó,€813€S.W.2d€150Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991);€òòBlanton€v.€TennesseeÏCentral€Ry.€Co.óó,€4€Tenn.€App.€335€(1926);€òòHyde€v.ÏDunlapóó,€3€Tenn.€App.€368€(1926).€€In€òòSneedóó,€thisÏCourt€explained€the€rule€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€granting€of€a€writ€ofÏmandamus€is€the€exercise€of€anÏoriginal,€and€not€an€appellate,Ïjurisdiction,€the€writ€itselfÏbeing€an€original€process.€ÏHence€it€follows€that€in€thoseÏstates€where€the€courts€of€lastÏresort€are€devoid€of€originalÏjurisdiction€and€vested€withÏonly€appellate€powers,€suchÏcourt€cannot€exerciseÏjurisdiction€by€mandamus.€€ò òòòAnÏexception,€however,€isÏrecognized€when€the€issuingÏof€the€writ€is€necessary€inÏaid€of€the€appellate€powersÏof€such€courts,€and€in€suchÏcases€it€is€not€regarded€asÏan€original€proceeding,€butÏas€one€instituted€in€aid€ofÏthe€appellate€jurisdictionÏpossessed€by€the€court.óóÌÌó óà8 àòòId.óó,€105€Tenn.€at€722,€58€S.W.€at€1073Ï(emphasis€added).€€This€mandamusÏjurisdiction€is€merely€ancillary€to€aÍcourt's€appellate€power€and€is€possessed,Ïnot€by€virtue€of€any€statute,€but€underÏthe€common€law,€as€inherent€and€necessaryÏto€the€exercise€of€its€function€as€aÏcourt€of€appellate€jurisdiction.€€òòStateÏex€rel.€Kain€v.€Hallóó,€65€Tenn.€3,€7Ï(1873).Ì€ÌÌÌòòÓÓState€v.€Irickóó,€906€S.W.2d€440,€442€(Tenn.€1995).ÌÌà àThe€order€entered€in€the€òòMcCumberóó€case€sets€forthÏthe€basis€of€the€Court's€decision€certifying€the€action€as€aÏclass€action€and€also€the€basis€for€excluding€residents€ofÏKnox€County€from€the€class.€€For€the€writ€to€lie,€this€orderÏmust€reflect€a€plainly€palpable€abuse€of€discretion.€€TheÏorder€states:ÌÌÓÓà8 àBased€upon€the€opinion€of€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€in€the€case€of€òòJoe€C.ÏMeighan,€Jr.€v.€U.S.€SprintÏCommunications€Companyóó,€21€TAM€19„3,Ïfiled€April€29,€1996,€and€it€appearing€toÏthe€Court€that€the€allegations€and€claimsÏin€the€òòMeighanóó€ruling€are€similar€to€theÏallegations€and€claims€set€forth€in€theÏinstant€case;€and€it€further€appearing€toÏthe€Court€that€the€facts€set€forth€in€theÏplaintiff's€complaint€are€sufficient€toÏjustify€certification€in€accordance€withÏRule€23€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure;€that€no€evidence€is€before€theÏCourt€as€to€any€other€statewideÍcertification€granted€with€regard€to€theÏallegations€and€claims€in€the€instantÏcase;€that€it€appearing€to€the€Court€thatÏa€prior€class€has€been€certified€as€toÏKnox€County,€Tennessee€only;€.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌÓÓThe€òòMcCumberóó€court€obviously€relied€upon€the€decision€of€thisÏCourt€in€òòMeighanóó€to€reach€the€conclusion€that€the€facts€setÏforth€in€identical€complaints€were€sufficient€to€justify€òòoneóóÏclass€action.€€Significantly,€the€òòMcCumberóó€court€did€not€findÏthat€application€of€the€criteria€set€forth€in€Rule€23€to€theÏfacts€and€circumstances€required€that€Knox€County€be€excluded.€ÏThe€order€excludes€Knox€County€because€"a€prior€class€has€beenÏcertified€as€to€Knox€County."€€That€conclusion€rests€on€anÏobvious€fallacy.€€Contrary€to€the€court's€finding,€a€classÏlimited€to€Knox€County€had€not€been€certified€by€the€courtÏthat€had€jurisdiction€of€the€issue.€€The€issue€encompassingÏthe€extent€of€the€class€to€be€certified€was€pending€in€theÏSupreme€Court€at€the€time€the€order€in€òòMcCumberóó€was€entered.€ÏThis€Court€had€announced€its€decision€that€the€trial€court€hadÏerred€in€limiting€the€class€based€on€venue.€€After€rejectingÏevery€argument€advanced€in€favor€of€limiting€the€class,€thisÏCourt€remanded€the€case€to€the€trial€court€with€instructionsÏthat€the€extent€of€the€class€to€be€certified€be€determined€byÍfactors€other€than€venue.€€The€Court€stated:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àOn€remand€the€court€should€consider€theÏnumerous€justifications€for€allowing€theÏmaintenance€of€a€class€action€in€thisÏcase€including€judicial€economy,Ïfinancial€feasibility,€and€consistentÏverdicts,€and€should€not€base€any€futureÏclass€determinations€on€venue€alone.Ì€€ÌÓÓÌòòMeighan€v.€U.S.€Sprintóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€639.€€The€effect€of€theÏtrial€court's€order€in€òòMcCumberóó,€if€allowed€to€stand,€would€beÏthe€pre„emption€of€an€issue€pending€in€this€Court€and€aÏresolution€of€that€issue€contrary€to€an€explicit€holding€byÏthis€Court.€€ÌÌà àThe€issue€of€competing€class€actions€is€discussed€inÏ2€Herbert€B.€Newberg€&€Alba€Conte,€òòNewberg€on€Class€Actionsóó,€ððÏ7.31,€pp.€7„97€(3rd€ed.€1992):Ì€€ÌÓÓà8 àò òMultiple€Class€Suits€BeforeÏDifferent€Courts.ó óÌÓÓÓÓ€Ìà8 àWhen€cases€bearing€similar€classÏallegations€and€similar€causes€of€actionÏare€pending€in€different€courts,€such€asÏdifferent€federal€and€state€courts€orÏdifferent€state€courts,€courts€should€beÏkept€informed€of€class€certificationÍproceedings€relating€to€the€same€cause€ofÏaction,€and€òòrarely€should€the€same€classÏbe€certified€on€the€same€cause€of€actionÏbefore€more€than€one€court,€in€theÏabsence€of€special€circumstancesóó.€€ÌÌà8 àIn€determining€the€superiority€ofÏcertifying€a€class€in€a€particular€forum,Ïthe€court€should€compare€the€advantagesÏof€a€class€suit€in€the€different€fora€andÏshould€weigh€considerations€of€classÏscope,€tolling€of€statute€of€limitationsÏfor€the€benefit€of€the€class,Ïreconciliation€of€pending€individualÏsuits€with€the€certification€of€a€classÏsuit€without€opt„out€rights€under€RuleÏ23(b)(1)€or€(2),€whether€in€fact€a€classÏsuit€is€pending€in€another€more€favorableÏforum,€certification€of€a€class€limitedÏto€selected€issues€or€claims,€the€stateÏof€litigation€progress€in€the€competingÏsuits,€and€a€host€of€other€factors.ÌÌÓÓÌ(Emphasis€added€and€footnotes€omitted.)€ÌÌà àThe€same€authority€addresses€whether€ordersÏcertifying€class€actions€may€be€reviewed€on€petitions€for€writÏof€mandamus:ÌÌÓÓà8 àAn€appeal€by€mandamus€under€the€All€WritsÍAct× ƒ7 ××  ×€provides€another€alternative€forÏinterlocutory€review€of€errant€classÏrulings.€€Mandamus€is€appropriate€forÏabuses€of€discretion,€rather€thanÏmisinterpretations€of€questions€of€law.€ÏIt€may€lie€if€the€district€court,€inÏdetermining€propriety€of€the€classÏaction,€acts€outside€its€jurisdiction,Ïwithout€regard€to€applicable€proceduralÏsafeguards,€or€applies€or€refuses€toÏapply€the€criteria€of€Rule€23€in€anÏarbitrary€manner.€€However,€if€a€districtÏcourt€has€acted€within€its€jurisdictionÏaccording€to€procedural€safeguards€andÏapplies€the€criteria€of€Rule€23€in€aÏnonarbitrary€manner,€mandamus€isÏinappropriate€to€secure€a€de€novo€reviewÏof€the€ruling€on€the€class.€Ì€ÌÓÓÌòòNewbergóó€at€ðð€742,€pp.€7„128„29€(footnotes€omitted).ÌÌà àOther€jurisdictions€have€utilized€the€writ€ofÏmandamus€œand€stayed›€proceedings€to€regulate€class€actions.€€InÏòòNelson€v.€Groomsóó,€307€F.2d€76€(5th€Cir.€1962),€theÍpetitioners'€motion€for€injunctive€relief€was€postponed€by€theÏtrial€judge€because€it€encompassed€the€same€claims€as€a€caseÏpending€in€the€same€federal€district€court.€€On€a€petition€forÏmandamus€directing€the€court€to€promptly€hear€and€determineÏthe€motion,€the€Fifth€Circuit€stated,ÌÌÓÓà8 àWe€have€been€cited€to€and€have€found€noÏcase€deciding€whether€it€is€permissibleÏto€have€pending€in€the€same€districtÏcourt€two€class€actions€seeking€virtuallyÏthe€same€relief,€or€whether€theÏplaintiffs€filing€the€later€class€actionÏshould€more€properly€seek€to€intervene€inÏthe€suit€already€filed€.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 à€€€€€Where€two€actions€involving€the€sameÏparties€and€the€same€issues€are€pendingÏbefore€two€federal€courts€it€has€beenÏheld€that€the€court€in€which€the€secondÏproceeding€is€initiated€will€normally,€inÏthe€absence€of€countervailing€factors,Ïstay€the€proceedings€pending€the€outcomeÏof€the€prior€similar€suit€between€theÏsame€parties€in€the€other€federal€court.ÌÌÌÌòòId.óó€at€78.€€The€Court€denied€the€writ€of€mandamus.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€òòNew€York€State€Teamsters€Conference€Pensio€andÏRetirement€Fund€v.€Hohóó,€554€F.Supp.€519,€529€(N.D.€N.Y.Ï1982),€the€court€stayed€motions€for€summary€judgment€onÍcounterclaims€stating,ÌÌÓÓà8 àthe€issues€herein€are€virtually€identicalÏto€the€pending€class€action€.€.€.€.€ÏTherefore,€in€the€interest€of€judicialÏeconomy,€to€avoid€duplication€of€effortÏby€the€parties,€and€since€the€EasternÏDistrict€action€is€now€at€a€more€advancedÏstage€than€this€case,€this€Court€willÏexercise€its€discretion€to€stayÏproceedings€on€the€instant€counterclaimsÏpending€a€determination€in€the€EasternÏDistrict€case.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€òòJam€Products€v.€Dominick's€Finer€Foodsóó,€458ÏN.E.2d€100,€102€(Ill.€App.€2d€Dist.€1983),€on€appeal€from€theÏdenial€of€a€motion€to€stay€a€suit€by€an€individual€where€aÏclass€action€was€pending€in€a€different€circuit€court,€theÏcourt€stated,ÌÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€When€determining€whether€to€stay€theÏlatter€of€two€suits€brought€concerning€aÏgiven€controversy,€the€courts€consider€aÏnumber€of€factors€which€include:€Ï"comity;€prevention€of€multiplicity,Ïvexation€and€harassment;€likelihood€ofÏobtaining€complete€relief€in€the€foreignÏjurisdiction€and€the€òòresóó€òòjudicataóó€effectÏof€a€foreign€judgment€in€the€localÏforum."ÌÌÌÌÓÓThe€court€granted€the€stay,€concluding€that€the€plaintiffÏcould€obtain€complete€relief€in€the€class€action€and€thatÏthere€was€"no€counterbalancing€reason€appearing€of€record,Ïwhich€would€otherwise€justify€the€maintenance€of€separateÏsuits€in€sister€counties€regarding€the€factual€transactionÏinvolved€œherein."€€òòId.óó›€at€103.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòLusardi€v.€Lechneróó,€855€F.2d€1062€(3rd€Cir.Ï1988),€the€plaintiffs€sought€relief€under€the€All„Writs€Act,Ï28€U.S.C.€ðð€1651,€after€the€district€court€revoked€its€priorÏconditional€certification€of€an€opt„in€class€in€an€ageÏdiscrimination€suit.€€The€Third€Circuit€noted€that€althoughÏthe€writ€of€mandamus€is€seldom€issued,€the€writ€may€issueÏwhere€no€other€adequate€means€of€obtaining€relief€isÏavailable,€and€the€court€below€has€committed€a€clear€error€ofÏlaw.€€òòId.óó€at€1069.€€The€court€found€that€although€it€lackedÏappellate€jurisdiction,€it€would€grant€mandamus€for€theÏlimited€purpose€of€directing€the€district€court€to€vacate€itsÏorder€revoking€class€certification.€€òòId.óó€at€1080.ÌÌà àMore€recently,€the€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€AppealsÏissued€a€writ€of€mandamus€directing€the€district€judge€toÍdecertify€the€plaintiff€class€because€the€district€judge€hadÏtotally€disregarded€the€requirements€of€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€23€andÏhad€made€similar€rulings€in€other€cases€involving€medicalÏproducts€liability€actions.€€òòIn€Re€American€Medical€Systems,ÏInc.óó€75€F.3d€1069€(6th€Cir.€1996).€€The€Sixth€Circuit€heldÏthat€"on€the€extraordinary€facts€of€this€case€.€.€.€theÏdistrict€judge's€disregard€of€class€action€procedures€was€ofÏsuch€severity€and€frequency€so€as€to€warrant€[the€issuance€ofÏthe€writ.]"€€òòId.óó€at€1074.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMatter€of€œRhone„Poulenc›ÏRover,€Inc.óó,€51€F.3d€1293,€1295€(7th€Cir.€1995)€("Mandamus€hasÏoccasionally€been€granted€to€undo€class€certifications€.€.€.Ï.").ÌÌà àIn€a€similar€case,€the€Alabama€Supreme€Court€issuedÏa€writ€of€mandamus€to€stay€the€proceedings€in€one€of€twoÏconflicting€or€overlapping€class€actions.€€òòEx€Parte€LibertyÏNat.€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€631€So.2d€865€(Ala.€1993).€€RobertsonÏfiled€a€class€action€in€Barbour€County€alleging€that€LibertyÏNational,€fraudulently€and€by€misrepresentation,€hadÏinstituted€cancer€insurance€policy€exchange€programs.€€TheÏcourt€certified€the€class.€€Three€weeks€later€Adair€and€othersÏfiled€an€action€in€Mobile€County.€€The€allegations€in€the€twoÍcomplaints€were€virtually€identical.€€Liberty€National'sÏmotion€to€dismiss€the€Mobile€County€action€was€denied.€€InÏresponse€to€a€petition€for€mandamus,€the€Alabama€Supreme€CourtÏacknowledged€that€the€writ€of€mandamus€may€be€issued€onlyÏwhere€there€is€a€clear€legal€right€in€the€petitioner€to€theÏorder€sought,€an€imperative€duty€upon€the€respondent€toÏperform€the€duty,€a€lack€of€another€adequate€remedy,€and€theÏproperly€invoked€jurisdiction€of€the€court.€€òòId.óó€at€867.€ÏHowever,€the€court€went€on€to€find€that€the€law€is€clear€thatÏthe€circuit€court€in€which€jurisdiction€over€a€controversy€wasÏfirst€invoked€has€exclusive€jurisdiction€over€the€case,€andÏthat€the€law€does€not€permit€a€second€circuit€court€toÏadjudicate€the€same€controversy€that€is€being€litigated€in€aÏpending€action€in€another€circuit€court€of€competentÏjurisdiction.€€òòId.óó€€The€court€therefore€granted€the€writ€ofÏmandamus€and€ordered€the€Mobile€County€court€to€stay€itsÏproceedings.ÌÌà àThus,€while€mandamus€relief€is€rarely€justified,Ïthere€is€ample€authority€for€the€issuance€of€the€writ€toÏcorrect€a€class€certification€upon€a€clear€showing€that€theÏtrial€court€has€committed€legal€errors€or€abused€itsÍdiscretion€and€no€other€adequate€remedy€is€available.€€TheÏconclusion€is€that€in€extraordinary€cases,€including€classÏactions,€this€Court€may,€and€properly€should,€issue€a€writ€ofÏmandamus€if€that€action€is€necessary€to€protect€itsÏjurisdiction€or€accomplish€substantial€justice.€€€ÌÌÑ h Ñœ›à àHowever,€the€Court€elects€not€to€issue€the€writ€uponÏthis€application,€because€this€matter€can€be€resolved€in€theÏtrial€courts.€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€stated,Ï"[i]n€order€to€insure€that€the€writ€will€issue€only€inÏextraordinary€circumstances€this€Court€has€required€that€aÏparty€seeking€issuance€have€no€other€adequate€means€to€attainÏthe€relief€he€desires."€€òòAllied€Chemical€Corp.€v.€Daiflon,ÏInc.óó,€449€U.S.€at€36,€101€S.Ct.€at€190.€€Here,€the€partiesÏhave€at€their€disposal€rules€of€procedure€whereby€applicationsÏfor€relief€can€be€presented€to€the€several€trial€courts,€andÏthose€courts€have€the€authority€and€duty€to€grant€appropriateÏrelief.€€The€writ€would€lie€only€in€the€event€appropriateÏrelief€is€requested€but€denied.ÌÌà àConsequently,€the€petition€is€denied.ÌÌœà àThe€order€staying€proceedings€in€the€three€trialÏcourts€is€lifted€as€of€the€date€this€decision,€including€anyÍorders€on€petitions€to€rehear,€becomes€final.€€ÌÌà àCosts›€are€taxed€one„half€to€petitioner€Meighan€andÏone„half€to€McCumber,€who€was€allowed€to€participate€as€aÏparty€in€interest€on€this€appeal.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌœConcur:›ÌœBirch,›€C.J.,€Drowota€and€Ì€€€€€Anderson,€JJ.ÌÌÌÌ€