WPC 24 ZB}HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSXZ2PXPa1Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)$ a2Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)/ a3Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a): 2 faa4Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)E a5Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)P   a6Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)[   a7Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)f  2R0 a8Paragraph1. a. i. (1) (a) (i) 1) a)q X0Í ÍX0Í ÍҫXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXPXXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularX2PP,cAZ"Arial RegularXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,rAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,rAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2P XP,rAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2P XP,rAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2P XP,cAZ"Arial RegularX2P P,cAZ"Arial RegularXZ2P XP,cAZ"Arial RegularXPXXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXK2PP,cAZ"Arial RegularXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXK2PP,cAZ"Arial RegularXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,cAZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularXXZ2PXP,  AZ"Arial RegularX23|x   A'Legal   @--@#PX# #XZ2PXP# !dddd 1 dddd 1  !` 8]1` 8#2PP# FILED#XZ2PXP# November 29, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE #XZ2PXP#AT NASHVILLE   FOR PUBLICATION   Filed: November 29, 1999 BETTY NELSON, #)7 ) Appellee,)#XZ2PXP#MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT#XZ2PXP# ) ) Vs.)  )HON. JAMES E. WALTON, )JUDGE WALMART STORES, INC.,) ) Appellant.)#XZ2PXP#pppNo. M199700040SCWCMCV#XZ2P XP#   #XZ2P XP# #XZ2P XP# For the Appellant:   For Appellee:  Jeffrey P. BoydPatrick Johnson B. Chadwick RickmanJOHNSON, SCRUGGS & ALLEN, KOPET & BOYD, PLLCBARFIELD Jackson, TennesseeNashville, Tennessee 8&#2P P# O P I N I O N #XZ2P XP# SPECIAL WORKERS COMPENSATION  APPEALS PANEL AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.   ANDERSON, C.J. #PX#  #XZ2PXP#ъ#XZ2PXP#We granted the motion to review this workers compensation case#XZ2PXP# to clarify the circumstances under which a workers award limited by the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann.  506241 (1999)=  Ѝ!#K2PP#This case involves Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1), (b). Subsection 241(a)(1) governs cases in which there has been a meaningful return to work and states in pertinent part: where an injured employee is eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, . . . and the preinjury employer returns the employee to employment . . ., the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one half (2) times the medical impairment rating . . . . Id. Subsection 241(b), governing cases in which there has not been a meaningful return to work, states in pertinent part: where an injured employee is eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits, and the preinjury employer does not return the employee to employment . . ., the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is six (6) times the medical impairment rating. Id. #XZ2PXP#= may exceed the statutory caps pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 (1999).  Ѝ#K2PP#ASection 242 allows the trial court to exceed the caps in certain cases if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that three of the four enumerated factors apply: (1) The employee lacks a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma . . .; (2) The employee is fiftyfive (55) years of age or older; (3) The employee has no reasonably transferable job skills from prior vocational background and training; and (4) The employee has no reasonable employment opportunities available locally . . . . Id.  X  In resolving this issue, we also consider whether there was a meaningful return to work as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1). At a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, the parties stipulated a medical impairment rating of 8% to the body as a whole. The trial court determined that there had been a meaningful return to work and concluded that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1) applied, limiting the workers recovery to two and one half times the impairment rating, or 20%. The court further concluded, however, that Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 applied and that the statutory caps should be lifted because of the workers age, lack of education and job skills.#XZ2PXP# The trial court then#XZ2PXP# found that the worker had suffered a permanent partial disability of 60%. #XZ2PXP# On appeal, the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel found that there had been no meaningful return to work, that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b) applied instead, and that the worker was therefore entitled to six times the medical impairment rating, or 48%. The Panel also found that Tenn. Code Ann. 506242 applied so that the award could exceed the statutory caps. The Panel then affirmed the trial courts award of 60% permanent partial disability. We granted the motion for review of the Panels decision and agree with the Panels result that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b) applies because there was no meaningful return to work; that Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 applies as well to allow an award in excess of the statutory cap of six times the medical impairment rating; and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial courts finding of 60% permanent partial disability. #XZ2PXP#The Panel, however, erred by stating that Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 applies to both  506241(a)(i) and  506241(b) when under the plain language of the statute, it does not apply to Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1) and does apply to Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b). #XZ2PXP#Accordingly, we affirm the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panels judgment as modified to reflect that this case is governed by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b) rather than Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a) and that Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 by its specific language applies only to Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b).  BACKGROUND  Betty Nelson, age sixtyseven, worked as a sales associate for Defendant WalMart when she fell while assisting another employee move a rolledup rug. Nelson suffered a broken hip from the fall. The day after Nelsons fall, she was transported to the emergency room where Dr. Steve McLaughlin performed hip surgery. Dr. McLaughlin treated Nelson following the surgery, and he testified that Nelson had suffered a 20% impairment to the lower extremity. The parties agree that this converts into an impairment of 8% to the body as a whole. Dr. McLaughlin imposed restrictions upon Nelson from standing for more than fortyfive minutes without taking a fifteenminute break, from lifting over ten to fifteen pounds on a frequent basis, and from ever lifting over twenty pounds. He recommended that Nelson attempt to return to WalMart and work a fourhour day with the restriction that she take frequent breaks ! setting [sic] and standing. Following Dr. McLaughlins recommendation, Nelson received a letter from WalMart offering her a position in the fitting room answering the telephone. Nelson accepted WalMarts offer and returned to work a fourhour shift on two consecutive days, April 30 and May 1, 1996. Nelsons work in the fitting room, however, required her to constantly stand up and sit down answering the phone and tending to unwanted merchandise customers would leave in the fitting room. Moreover, Nelson said that the only chair in the fitting room was a tall, unsturdy chair that had a sign taped to the wall behind it warning that no one should sit in the chair because it could fall. According to Nelson, WalMart made no attempts to accommodate her need to take frequent breaks, and Nelsons attempts to fulfill the job requirements without accommodations rendered her both mentally and physically exhausted. Consequently, Nelson did not return to work at WalMart. Much later, WalMart offered the position of door greeter, but the offer was made almost a year after Nelson had worked her last shift at WalMart and after the present litigation was filed and preparation for trial had begun, approximately five months before trial. Both Nelson and her daughter, Joan Cato, testified that the injury has been physically and emotionally devastating to Nelson, affecting her ability to walk and care for herself. Dr. Gordon Doss, an occupational expert who evaluated Nelson to assess her ability to work in light of her injury, testified at trial that Nelson had no reasonable employment opportunities. He further testified that at most Nelson could perform parttime sedentary work and that she had no transferable job skills. #XZ2PXP#ьIt was undisputed at trial that Nelson had previously worked for Acme Boot Company for fortyseven years as an unskilled laborer and that she had completed only the ninth grade of high school and had not obtained her GED, nor had she any further education or specialized training. #XZ2PXP#After a bench trial, the trial court found that:  ` ` `  Given the evidence, it does appear that it would be reasonable to expect the Plaintiff to try the job of greeter for the Defendant. Therefore, the Court finds that under the facts of this case, T.C.A.  506241(a)(1) would apply, limiting the Plaintiffs recovery to two and onehalf (2 ) times her impairment rating. The court went on to conclude that Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 applied and that therefore, Plaintiffs recovery is not limited to the multipliers of her impairment rating and awarded 60% permanent partial disability. The Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel found that there had been no meaningful return to work, as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1). The Panel therefore found that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b) should apply, limiting the award to six times the medical impairment rating. The Panel then found that the exception for age, lack of education and job skills set out in Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 also applied and that the statutory cap of six times the medical impairment of 8%, or 48%, could be exceeded. It then affirmed the trial courts award of 60% permanent partial disability. We granted WalMarts motion for review.  ANALYSIS  Standard of Review We begin our analysis by noting the applicable standard of review. In the present case, we are concerned primarily with the construction of a statute and the application of the law to the facts, and it is well settled that we review such questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness given the lower courts judgments. E.g., Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). We review questions of fact de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The extent of vocational disability is a question of fact to be determined from all the evidence, including lay and expert testimony. E.g., Collins v. Howmet Corp., 970 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tenn. 1998). Factors to be considered in determining the extent of vocational disability include the employees job skills and training, education, age, extent of anatomical impairment, duration of impairment, local job opportunities, and the employees capacity to work at the kinds of employment available to her in her disabled condition. Id. The employees own assessment of her physical condition and resulting disability is competent testimony that should be considered as well. Id.  Trial Courts Finding of Disability With the above principles in mind, we consider whether the evidence preponderates against the trial courts finding of permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The worker, Nelson, argues that the proof establishes a permanent total disability. The test of whether an employee is permanently totally disabled requires an inquiry into whether the employee is totally incapacitate[d] . . . from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income . . . . Tenn. Code Ann.  506207(4)(B) (1999) (emphasis added). As pointed out by Nelson, Dr. Doss testified that she has no reasonable employment opportunities. He further testified, however, that Nelson was capable of performing parttime sedentary work, which Dr. Doss defined as work which would allow Nelson to sit as needed and which would not exceed forty hours per week. As noted by the Panel, Dr. Dosss testimony that Nelson was limited to parttime sedentary work is consistent with Dr. McLaughlins limitations that Nelson could only work a job where she would be free to take a fifteen minute break for every fortyfive minutes she stood. Neither Dr. McLaughlin nor Dr. Doss testified that Nelson would be unable to perform the job of a door greeter given these restrictions. In our view therefore, the evidence does not establish that Nelsons injury totally incapacitates her from working at an occupation which brings . . . an income. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial courts finding of permanent partial disability.  Meaningful Return to Work  We next consider whether under the facts of this case there was a meaningful return to work as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241. Subsection 241(a)(1) governs awards in cases where there has in fact been a meaningful return to work. Newton v. Scott Health Care Ctr., 914 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tenn. 1995). Subsection 241(a)(1) states in pertinent part:  ` ` `  [W]here an injured employee is eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, . . . and the preinjury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one half (2) times the medical impairment rating . . . .  Id. (emphasis added). Subsection 241(b), however, governs awards in cases in which there has been no meaningful return to work. This subsection states in pertinent part:  ` ` `  [W]here an injured employee is eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits, and the preinjury employer does not return the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is six (6) times the medical impairment rating.... Id. (emphasis added). We have previously held that to determine whether there has been a meaningful return to work, the courts inquiry must focus on the reasonableness of the employer in attempting to return the employee to work and the reasonableness of the employee in failing to return to work. Newton, 914 S.W.2d at 886. We further reasoned:  ` ` `  If the offer from the employer is not reasonable in light of the circumstances of the employees physical ability to perform the offered employment, then the offer of employment is not meaningful . . . . The resolution of what is reasonable must rest upon the facts of each case and be determined thereby. Id. (emphasis added). The trial court determined that it would be reasonable to expect the Plaintiff to try the job of greeter for the Defendant and consequently found that Nelsons award was governed by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1). The Panel disagreed, however, noting that Nelson did return to work but was unable to perform her assigned duties and quit. We conclude that the Panel correctly reversed the trial courts finding that there had been a meaningful return to work. The record indicates that Nelson returned to work following WalMarts first offer, that WalMart knew of Nelsons limitations at that time, that WalMart made no effort to accommodate her need to take frequent breaks and, in fact, warned employees not to sit in the only chair in the fitting room. We reject WalMarts argument that Nelson was unreasonable in failing to respond to WalMarts offer of the people greeter position when it came a full year after Nelson quit, after litigation had commenced, and during preparation for trial, only five months before trial. In our view, WalMarts offers were not reasonable in light of the circumstances of the employees physical ability to perform the offered employment, Newton, 914 S.W.2d at 886. Accordingly, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial courts finding that there was a meaningful return to work and thus conclude that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b) governs Nelsons award.   Application of Tenn. Code Ann.  506242  We now turn to the lower courts application of Tenn. Code Ann.  506242. This section states that:  ` ` `  the trial judge may award employees permanent partial disability benefits, not to exceed four hundred (400) weeks, in appropriate cases where permanent medical impairment is found and the employee is eligible to receive the maximum disability award under  506241(a)(2) or (b). In such cases the court, on the date of maximum medical improvement, must make a specific documented finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, of at least three (3) of the following four (4) items: ` ` `  (1) The employee lacks a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma or the employee cannot read or write on a grade eight (8) level; ` ` `  (2) The employee is fiftyfive (55) years of age or older; ` ` `  (3) The employee has no reasonably transferable job skills from prior vocational background and training; and ` ` `  (4) The employee has no reasonable employment opportunities available locally considering the employees permanent medical condition. Id. (emphasis added). WalMart first argues that the trial court erred in considering the application of Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 after finding that Nelsons award was governed by Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1). We agree. When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, the assumption is that the legislature intended what it wrote and meant what it said. McClain v. Henry I. Siegel Co., 834 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1992) (citations omitted). By its plain language,  242 makes clear that it only applies to an award under  241(a)(2) or (b) where there has been a loss of employment or no meaningful return to work. See Davis v. Reagan, 951 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1997) ( [I]f the claim does not fall within the purview of  506241(a)(2) or (b), courts simply cannot proceed to  506242.). The trial court erred in considering the application of  242 after it had found that there was a meaningful return to work and that Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1) governed Nelsons award. Unfortunately for WalMart, the trial courts error in applying  242 stems from its erroneous finding that this case is governed by  241(a)(1) rather than  241(b), to which  242 does apply.#XZ2PXP# WalMart argues, however, that the evidence preponderates against the trial courts factual findings under  242(3). WalMart concedes that Nelson has no high school education or GED and is over age 55. See Tenn. Code Ann.  506242(1), (2). WalMart maintains, however, that Nelson has reasonably transferable job skills.#XZ2PXP# Tenn. Code Ann.  506242(3). Dr. Doss testified that Nelson had no such skills, and WalMart offered no expert evidence to the contrary. We therefore reject WalMarts argument that the evidence preponderates against the trial courts factual findings under  242(3).  CONCLUSION  We conclude that there was no meaningful return to work and that the trial court erred in applying Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(a)(1) rather than Tenn. Code Ann.  506241(b). We further conclude that the age, education, and job skills provisions of Tenn. Code Ann.  506242 apply to allow an award in excess of the statutory cap of six times the medical impairment in  241(b), or 48%, and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial courts findings under 242 and the finding of 60% permanent partial disability. Accordingly, we affirm the Panels judgment as modified. Costs of appeal shall be taxed against the appellant for which execution shall issue if necessary. __________________________________ RILEY ANDERSON, CHIEF JUSTICE Concur: Drowota, Birch, Holder, Barker, JJ.