ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU:Ýw@ 4W k 0¤z 0D 0Jb ¬ 0T´ 0^ 0hf 0rÎ 0|@ 0†¼ 0B 1uÒ U,G 0dsb×U,ß B U>(U*fU*B)º D3ãDC AMY 0@¦'æ v~vÓš AOmƼ 0D‚ D/Æ Bõ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡@"Arial Regular ¨©ª«¬Ie­D®¯Ó€¹ºDÒ úÿÿú, ú3|x¼(T(2t$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑÀ°ÑÑ̰ÑÒ4°ÒÒ„°Òà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ- ù-< Œ 9p`(Monaco d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d%%%%'ÿÿdxd))))7Border 1dd€-+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€'ÔÔ€'ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€'XÔÌÌSeptember€16,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÑ À ÑÑ Ì ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Ô€'ÔÔ€'ôÔRule€36€provides€as€follows:€ð ðClerical€mistakes€in€judgments,€orders,€or€other€parts€ofÏthe€record€and€errors€in€the€record€arising€from€oversight€or€omission€may€be€corrected€by€theÏcourt€at€any€time€and€after€such€notice,€if€any,€as€the€court€orders.ððÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€$$X„d&ÓÑ#€$$Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÒ ° ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÑ  ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ „ ÒÑ€ ÑÑ7€'XXdædÈ7ÑÔ€'ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€((XÐd&Ó›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€à àœ€€€€€ò òòòFOR›€PUBLICATIONó óóóÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àœò òFiled:€€September€16,€1996ó ó€€›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€œ€€SUMNER›€CRIMINALÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌœVs›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€D.€KELLY€THOMAS,€JR.,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€€€JUDGE,€By€DesignationÌœSHERYL›€L.€œPENDERGRASS›,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant.à àà àà à)à àNo.à à01„S„01„9507„CR„00110ÌÌÌÌÌÌò òòòFor€Appellant:à àà àà àà àFor€Appellee:ó óóóÌÌLionel€R.€Barrett,€Jr.à àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌLionel€R.€Barrett,€Jr.,€P.C.à àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌNashville,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMichael€E.€MooreÌJohn€œPellegrin›à àà àà àà àSolicitor€GeneralÌGallatin,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àGordon€W.€SmithÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€SolicitorÏGeneral̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€,.+;+'h|¸ì` ç `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,ÏTennesseeÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àLawrence€Ray€WhitleyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€andÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDee€David€GayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àGallatin,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌò òÔ€'„Ôà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÔ€'XÔÌÌÌCOURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€REVERSED;ÌAPPEAL€œDISMISSED;€TRIAL€COURT€ÌJUDGMENT€REINSTATED.›à àà àà àà àà àANDERSON,€J.ÇÓÓà àThe€threshold€issue€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€defendant,€Sheryl€L.ÏPendergrass,€in€pleading€guilty€to€a€drug€charge,€explicitly€reserved€the€right€toÏappeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€was€dispositive€of€the€case,€inÏaccordance€with€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)(2)(iv)€as€it€wasÏinterpreted€by€this€Court€in€òòState€v.€Prestonóó,€759€S.W.2d€647€(Tenn.€1988).ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€held€that€the€defendant€had€substantiallyÏcomplied€with€Rule€37€to€reserve€for€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law,€butÏaffirmed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€on€the€merits.ÌÌà àWe€have€determined€that€the€defendant€failed€to€reserve€the€question€ofÏlaw€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)€as€it€was€interpreted€in€òòState€v.ÏPrestonóó,€òòsupraóó.€€Therefore,€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals'€judgment€is€reversed,€Ïthe€appeal€is€dismissed,€and€the€trial€court€judgment€is€reinstated.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òB€A€C€K€G€R€O€U€N€Dó óóóÌà àBased€upon€information€learned€by€the€Sumner€County€Drug€Task€ForceÏthrough€electronic€surveillance€of€the€cordless€telephone€conversations€ofÍSheryl€Pendergrass€in€October,€1991,€a€search€warrant€was€obtained€for€herÏresidence.€€In€executing€the€warrant€on€October€14,€1991,€officers€discoveredÏmarijuana,€cocaine,€and€drug€paraphernalia.€€As€a€result,€Pendergrass€wasÏindicted€on€November€6,€1991,€with€possession€of€marijuana€with€intent€to€sell,Ïpossession€of€cocaine,€and€possession€€of€drug€paraphernalia.ÌÌà àPrior€to€trial,€Pendergrass€moved€to€suppress€the€items€seized€in€theÏsearch€of€her€residence€on€the€grounds€that€the€surveillance€of€her€cordlessÏtelephone€conversations€violated€her€rights€under€the€Fourth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€ðð€7€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€ÏFollowing€a€hearing,€on€August€14,€1992,€the€trial€court€orally€denied€theÏmotion.€€At€that€time,€defense€counsel€advised€the€court€that€in€all€likelihood€theÏdefendant€would€plead€guilty€and€take€an€appeal€under€Rule€37.€€DefenseÏcounsel€stated€ð ðI€think€this€question€of€law€is€dispositive€of€the€case,ðð€and€ð ð€IÏthink€the€District€Attorney€has€no€objection€to€this.ðð€€Thereafter,€on€August€26,Ï1992,€a€written€order€was€filed€denying€the€motion€to€suppress.€ÌÌà àOn€November€23,€1992,€the€defendant€entered€guilty€pleas€to€theÏcharges€in€the€indictment.€€Immediately€before€the€guilty€plea€hearing,€however,Íthe€defense€was€allowed€to€re„open€the€proof€on€the€motion€to€suppress€andÏadditional€testimony€was€presented.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€proof,€defenseÏcounsel€again€stated€that€a€Rule€37€appeal€would€be€taken.€€The€trial€court€didÏnot€make€a€final€ruling€on€the€motion€to€suppress€at€that€time,€but€proceededÏinto€colloquy€with€the€defendant€in€order€to€determine€whether€the€pleas€wereÏbeing€entered€voluntarily€and€knowingly.€€During€the€colloquy,€the€court€told€theÏdefendant,€ð ð[n]ow€if€you€plead€guilty,€these€[convictions]€will€go€on€your€record,Ïof€course,€determined€by€the€outcome€of€the€appeal.€€But€for€the€purposes€now,Ïweððre€going€to€assume€that€this€is€going€to€be€it.ðð€€The€trial€courtððs€minutes€ofÏNovember€23€reflect€the€guilty€pleas,€but€make€no€mention€of€a€Rule€37€appeal.ÌÌà àAfter€considering€the€supplemental€evidence,€the€trial€court,€onÏDecember15,€1992,€entered€a€second€order€denying€the€motion€to€suppress.€ÏThereafter,€on€January€15,€1993,€the€trial€court€conducted€a€sentencing€hearingÏand€imposed€a€total€effective€sentence€of€two€(2)€years€in€community€correctionsÏand€a€fine€of€$3,000.€€Judgments€entered€on€that€date€in€accordance€withÏSupreme€Court€Rule€17€contained€no€reference€to€a€reservation€of€the€right€toÏappeal€a€certified€question€of€law€dispositive€of€the€case.€ÌÌà àThe€defendant€filed€a€notice€of€appeal€ð ðpursuant€to€Rule€37"€onÏFebruary12,€1993.€€On€February€19,€1993,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order,Ïpurporting€to€note€the€appeal€of€a€certified€question€of€law,€which€provides€asÏfollows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àIt€appears€that€the€Defendant,€SHERYL€PENDERGRASS,Ïby€and€through€counsel,€has€timely€filed€a€Notice€of€Appeal€in€thisÏcase.€€The€Defendant€is€appealing€a€certified€question€of€law€withÏregard€to€a€Motion€to€Suppress€evidence.ÌÌà8 àà àIt€appears€that€the€Defendant€filed€a€Motion€to€SuppressÏevidence€based€upon€allegations€that€the€State€illegally€obtainedÏevidence€by€listening€to€conversations€of€the€Defendant€and€otherÏpersons€by€electronically€monitoring€the€Defendantððs€cordlessÏtelephone€conversations.€€This€Motion€was€heard€on€August€14,Ï1992.€€The€Court€entered€an€order€overruling€the€DefendantððsÏMotion.€€Subsequently€on€November€23,€1992€a€hearing€was€hadÏto€supplement€the€record€and€the€Court€duly€considered€all€theÏnew€evidence€presented€with€regard€to€the€suppression€of€theÏevidence€and€after€considering€all€of€the€other€evidence€enteredÏanother€order€overruling€the€Motion€to€Suppress.€€The€DefendantÏentered€a€plea€of€guilty€on€that€day€and€subsequently€a€sentencingÏhearing€was€held€on€January€15,€1993.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€Defendant€has€now€timely€filed€a€Notice€of€Appeal€andÏhas€explicitly€reserved€with€consent€of€the€State€and€of€the€trialÏcourt€the€right€to€appeal€the€certified€question€of€law€that€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.ÌÌÓÓÌà àIn€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,€the€State€sought€dismissal€of€the€appealÏon€the€ground€that€the€defendant€had€failed€to€comply€with€the€requirements€ofÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37€as€it€was€interpreted€in€òòPrestonóó.€€While€concluding€that€theÏJanuary€15,€1993€judgments€failed€to€satisfy€Rule€37€and€òòPrestonóó,€theÏintermediate€court€refused€to€dismiss€the€appeal,€finding€that€the€February€19,Ï1993€order€constituted€substantial€compliance.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏthen€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€on€the€merits,€however,€finding€that€theÏsurveillance€did€not€violate€the€defendantððs€constitutional€rights.€€Thereafter,€weÏgranted€permission€to€appeal.ÌÌà@ àòòò òRESERVATION€OF€A€QUESTION€OF€LAWÌà àóóó óThe€State€argues€that€this€appeal€should€be€dismissed€because€(1)€theÏjudgments€appealed€from€make€no€reference€at€all€to€reserving€a€certifiedÏquestion€of€law;€(2)€a€subsequently€entered€order€purporting€to€reserve€theÏappeal€was€entered€after€the€trial€court€lost€jurisdiction€and€cannot€be€reviewedÏas€merely€a€correction€of€a€clerical€error;€and€(3)€the€subsequently€entered€orderÏfails€to€sufficiently€state€a€certified€question€or€demonstrate€that€the€question€isÏdispositive€of€the€case.ÌÌà àWe€begin€our€analysis€with€an€examination€of€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)€andÏour€interpretation€of€the€rule€in€òòState€v.€Prestonóó,€òòsupraóó.ÌÌà àTennessee€Rule€of€Criminal€Procedure€37(b)(2)(iv)€provides€in€pertinentÏpart€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àÌà8 àà àAn€appeal€lies€.€.€.€€from€any€judgment€of€conviction€upon€aÏplea€of€guilty€or€nolo€contendere€if€[d]efendant€explicitly€reservedÏwith€the€consent€of€the€court€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€questionÏof€law€that€is€dispositive€of€the€case.à àÌÌÌÌÓÓIn€òòPrestonóó,€759€S.W.2d€647€(Tenn.€1988),€this€Court€addressed€theÏrequirements€of€Rule€37(b),€noting€that€ð ð[t]his€is€an€appropriate€time€for€thisÏCourt€to€make€explicit€to€the€bench€and€bar€exactly€what€the€appellate€courtsÏwill€hereafter€require€as€prerequisites€to€the€consideration€of€the€merits€of€aÏquestion€of€law€certified€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€œ37(b)(2)(i)›€or€(iv).ðð€€WeÏemphasized€thatÌÓÓà8 à[r]egardless€of€what€has€appeared€in€prior€petitions,€orders,Ïcolloquy€in€open€court€or€otherwise,€the€final€order€or€judgmentÏfrom€which€the€time€begins€to€run€to€pursue€a€T.R.A.P.€3€appealÏòòmust€contain€a€statement€of€the€dispositive€certified€question€of€lawÏreservedóó€by€defendant€for€appellate€review€and€the€question€ofÏlaw€must€be€òòstated€so€as€to€clearly€identify€the€scope€and€the€limitsÏof€the€legal€issue€reservedóó.€€For€example,€where€questions€of€lawÍinvolve€the€validity€of€searches€and€the€admissibility€of€statementsÏand€confessions,€etc.,€the€reasons€relied€upon€by€defendant€in€theÏtrial€court€at€the€suppression€hearing€must€be€identified€in€theÏstatement€of€the€certified€question€of€law€and€review€by€theÏappellate€courts€will€be€limited€to€those€passed€upon€by€the€trialÏjudge€and€stated€in€the€certified€question,€absent€a€constitutionalÏrequirement€otherwise.€€Without€an€explicit€statement€of€theÏcertified€question,€neither€the€defendant,€the€State€nor€the€trialÏjudge€can€make€a€meaningful€determination€of€whether€the€issueÏsought€to€be€reviewed€is€dispositive€of€the€case.€€Most€of€theÏreported€and€unreported€cases€seeking€the€limited€appellateÏreview€pursuant€to€Tenn.R.Crim.P.€37€have€been€dismissedÏbecause€the€certified€question€was€not€dispositive.€€Also,€the€orderÏmust€state€that€the€certified€question€was€expressly€reserved€asÏpart€of€the€plea€agreement,€that€the€State€and€the€trial€judgeÏconsented€to€the€reservation€and€that€the€State€and€the€trial€judgeÏare€of€the€opinion€that€the€question€is€dispositive€of€the€case.€€OfÏcourse,€the€burden€is€on€defendant€to€see€that€these€prerequisitesÏare€in€the€final€order€and€that€the€record€brought€to€the€appellateÏcourts€contains€all€of€the€proceedings€below€that€bear€uponÏwhether€the€certified€question€of€law€is€dispositive€and€the€meritsÏof€the€question€certified.€€No€issue€beyond€the€scope€of€theÏcertified€question€will€be€considered.ÌÌÌòòIdóó.,€759€S.W.2d€at€650€(emphasis€added).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€observe€that€a€guilty€plea€constitutes€a€waiver€of€all€nonjurisdictionalÏand€procedural€defects€or€constitutional€infirmities,€òòState€v.€Bilbreyóó,€816€S.W.2dÏ71,€75€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991),€and€that€Rule€37€provides€limited€exceptions€forÍan€appeal€following€a€guilty€plea.€€Obviously,€the€burden€is€on€the€defendant€toÏsatisfy€the€mandatory€prerequisites€of€Rule€37,€as€interpreted€in€òòPrestonóó.€ÌÌà àContrary€to€the€explicit€and€unambiguous€requirements€of€òòPrestonóó,€theÏthree€January€15,€1993€final€judgments€in€this€case,€from€which€the€time€for€aÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€appeal€began€to€run,€make€no€reference€at€all€to€aÏreservation€of€a€dispositive€question€of€law€for€appellate€review.€€Moreover,€theÏjudgments€do€not€contain€an€identification€of€the€scope€and€limits€of€the€legalÏissue€reserved€as€required.€€Nor€do€the€judgments€contain€any€statement€inÏsatisfaction€of€the€reservation€requirements,€nor€do€they€contain€any€statementÏthat€the€question€is€dispositive,€all€explicitly€required€by€òòPrestonóó.€€Finally,€€theseÏjudgments€do€not€refer€to€or€incorporate€any€other€independent€document€whichÏwould€satisfy€the€òòPrestonóó€requirements.€€Accordingly,€as€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€found,€the€judgments€entered€on€January€15,€1993,€completely€fail€toÏcomply€with€Rule€37€and€òòPrestonóó.ÌÌà àThe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals,€however,€also€found€that€the€February€19,Ï1993€order€was€sufficient€to€preserve€the€appeal.€€We€disagree.€€As€a€generalÏrule,€a€trial€courtððs€judgment€becomes€final€thirty€days€after€its€entry€unless€aÍtimely€notice€of€appeal€or€a€specified€post„trial€motion€is€filed.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï4(a)€and€(c);€òòState€v.€Mooreóó,€814€S.W.2d€381,€382€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€TheÏjurisdiction€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€attaches€upon€the€filing€of€theÏnotice€of€appeal€and,€therefore,€the€trial€court€loses€jurisdiction.€€òòState€v.€Peakóó,Ï823€S.W.2d€228,€229€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991);€òòcompareóó€òòSpence€v.€Allstate€Ins.ÏCo.óó,€883€S.W.2d€586,€596€(Tenn.€1994).€€Once€the€trial€court€loses€jurisdiction,€itÏgenerally€has€no€power€to€amend€its€judgment.€€òòMooreóó,€814€S.W.2d€at€382.€ÏIndeed,€it€is€well„settled€that€a€judgment€beyond€the€jurisdiction€of€a€court€isÏvoid.€€òòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€198€Tenn.€600,€281€S.W.2d€492,€497€(1955).ÌÌà àPursuant€to€Rule€36,€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€however,€the€trial€court€retainsÏlimited€power€to€correct€clerical€mistakes€in€judgments€and€other€errors€in€theÏrecord€arising€from€oversight€or€omission.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€inÏthis€case€held€that€the€February€19th€order€was€an€appropriate€action€underÏRule€36€to€correct€the€record€to€reflect€the€understanding€of€the€parties.€€TheÏState€asserts€in€this€Court€that€the€order€was€not€the€mere€correction€of€a€clericalÏerror,€but€instead€was€an€attempt€to€confer€jurisdiction€on€the€Court€of€CriminalÍAppeals€to€hear€and€determine€a€òòPrestonóó€appeal€where€no€jurisdiction€existedÏbecause€of€noncompliance€with€Rule€37.€€We€agree.€€The€requirements€ofÏòòPrestonóó€are€clear.€€The€defendant€failed€to€satisfy€those€requirements.€€TheÏattempt€at€compliance€was€too€late,€as€the€trial€court€lost€jurisdiction€on€FebruaryÏ12,€1993,€when€the€defendant€filed€the€notice€of€appeal.ÌÌà àMoreover,€assuming€for€the€sake€of€argument€that€the€trial€court€hadÏjurisdiction€on€February€19,€1993,€its€order€on€that€date€is€still€insufficient€underÏòòPrestonóó.€€We€have€reviewed€the€February€19th€order€and€have€concluded€that€itÏdoes€not€satisfy€the€unambiguous€mandatory€prerequisites€of€òòPrestonóó.€€TheÏorder€contains€no€clear€identification€of€the€scope€and€limits€of€the€legal€issueÏreserved.€€Such€an€omission€makes€it€impossible€for€appellate€courts€toÏexercise€their€proper€function,€which€is€the€review€of€final€judgments€of€trialÏcourts.€€Under€òòPrestonóó,€review€on€appeal€must€be€limited€to€those€issuesÏð ðpassed€upon€by€the€trial€judge€and€stated€in€the€certified€question.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.,€759ÏS.W.2d€at€650.€€This€case€provides€a€clear€example€of€the€type€of€confusionÏsuch€a€rule€is€intended€to€prevent.€€The€defendant€has€argued€in€this€Court€thatÏsuppression€of€the€evidence€is€required€by€a€statute€which€was€not€even€inÏeffect€when€the€trial€court€ruled€upon€the€motion€to€suppress.€€òòPrestonóó€puts€theÍburden€of€reserving,€articulating,€and€identifying€the€issue€upon€the€defendant.€ÏThe€defendant€in€this€case€clearly€failed€to€fulfill€that€obligation.€€Accordingly,€theÏappeal€must€be€dismissed.ÌÌà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àBecause€we€have€determined€that€the€defendant€failed€to€explicitlyÏreserve€the€right€to€appeal€a€certified€question€of€law€that€was€dispositive€of€theÏcase,€in€accordance€with€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37(b)(2)(iv)€as€itÏwas€interpreted€by€this€Court€in€òòState€v.€Prestonóó,€759€S.W.2d€647€(Tenn.€1988),Ïthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals'€judgment€is€reversed,€the€appeal€is€dismissed,Ïand€the€trial€court€judgment€is€reinstated.€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€theÏdefendant,€Sheryl€L.€Pendergrass,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRILEY€ANDERSON,€JUSTICEÌÌÌÌ(Panel:€€€Birch,€Drowota,€Reid,€and€White)