ÿWPC7  …# VUNa %¯ 0Dµw@ù49 M b\ UFd 0`ª  0ˆ 0Dš 0JÞ 0T( 0^| 0hÚ 0rB 0|´ 0†0 0¶ 1uF 0d»U>U6]œ“ D3/B)b B‹ 0@¨DCè AM+U*x3¢\Õ1v~AvÓ¿ AO’Æá 0D§ D/ë B ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò €DD‚ƒD„…†‡DˆÓ€·‚^!LN3|x“- ù-`.Courier New Regular(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý(8(3ß«$¤¤Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ,,,,'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò++++7Border 1dd€-.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial )Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌò òDecemberÏ23,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€0ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó RÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€'ôÔÔ€(ÔThe€leg€is€a€scheduled€member€having€a€maximum€value€of€200€weeksÏof€benefits.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(3)(A)(ii)(o)€(Supp.€1996).€€TheÏbody€as€a€whole€is€valued€at€400€weeks,€or€twice€the€value€of€a€leg.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„207(3)(f).€€Thus,€an€award€based€on€a€25€percentÏdisability€to€the€leg€equates€to€one€based€on€12.5€percent€disability€toÏthe€body€as€a€whole.€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔIf€in€this€case€the€1991€injuries€to€the€employee's€neck€had€beenÏcompensable,€the€vocational€disability€resulting€from€the€estimatedÏmedical€impairment€of€15€percent€to€the€body€as€a€whole€likely€would€haveÏresulted€in€total€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€wholeÏin€excess€of€100€percent.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÑ  ћԀ(ÔÔ€(&ÔÑ€ ÑÑ7€ ùæ XXdÖdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÖ€)ÖÑ\R AØ'\ÑœÞ ÞÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDecember€23,€1996à àÌ›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌ̜ـ€ÙßR€/1.A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌROGER€A.€PERRY,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Union€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€Billy€Joe€White,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€ChancellorÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌSENTRY€INSURANCE€COMPANY,à àà à(€€No.€03S01„9507„CH„00077Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àœDefendant„Appellant,›à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,€DIRECTOR,à à(ÌDIVISION€OF€WORKERS'€à àà à(ÌCOMPENSATION,€TENNESSEEà àà à(ÌDEPARTMENT€OF€LABOR,€SECONDà à(ÌINJURY€FUND,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àœDefendant„Appellee.›à àà à(Ìœ€›ÌÌòòÔ€(ôÔFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appelleeóó:ÌÌWard€S.€Whelchelà àà àà àà àà àJames€T.€Shea,€IVÌC.€Edward€Danielà àà àà àà àà àBaker,€McReynolds,€Byrne,ÌKnoxvilleà àà àà àà àà àà à€€Brackett,€O'Kane€&€SheaÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxvilleÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAnne€T.€WidsethÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxvilleÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSandra€E.€KeithÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashvilleÌà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€Reporter€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashvilleÌÌÔ€(&ÔÌà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌœ›ÌJUDGMENT€OF€œTRIAL€COURT,€AS›ÌœMODIFIED,€IS€AFFIRMED;€CASE›€ÌœREMANDED.›à àà àà àà àœà àà àà àREID,›€J.Ô€'ÔÔ€'XÔÌÌÓÓÓ` °‚X.h—XÓÔ€(Ôà àThis€case€presents€for€review€the€decision€of€theÏChancery€Court€of€Union€County€apportioning€a€workers'Ïcompensation€award€for€permanent€total€disability€between€theÏemployer€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€The€trial€court€foundÏthe€award€is€controlled€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)Ï(Supp.€1996).€€A€Workersðð€Compensation€Panel,€upon€referenceÏfor€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law€pursuant€to€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(5)€(Supp.€1996),€found€the€award€isÏcontrolled€by€section€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208.€€TheÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€as€modified.ÌÌòòà@ àò òTHE€CASEóóó óÌÌà àIn€this€case,€Roger€Perry,€the€plaintiff„employee,Ïsustained€two€nonwork„related€neck€injuries€in€1991,€both€ofÍwhich€required€surgery€involving€the€employee's€cervicalÏvertebrae.€€A€medical€expert€later€estimated€that€the€injuriesÏand€surgery€resulted€in€a€15€percent€permanent€medicalÏimpairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole.€€Since€the€injuries€wereÏnot€compensable€under€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law,€there€wasÏno€occasion€to€determine€the€vocational€disability€incurred€byÏthe€employee.€€In€1992,€the€employee€sustained€a€work„relatedÏinjury€to€his€right€leg.€€This€injury€was€the€basis€for€aÏcourt„approved€award€of€25€percent€permanent€disability€to€theÏleg.€€On€May10,€1993,€in€the€course€and€scope€of€hisÏemployment,€the€employee€sustained€another€injury€to€his€neck.€ÏThe€medical€expert€testified€that€this€injury€caused€anÏadditional€permanent€medical€impairment€of€20€percent€to€theÏbody€as€a€whole€and€that€this€subsequent€injury€rendered€theÏemployee€permanently€and€totally€disabled.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€the€employee€is€permanentlyÏand€totally€disabled€as€a€result€of€the€May€1993€injury,€and,Ïunder€the€statute,€is€eligible€to€receive€the€temporary€totalÏdisability€payments€plus€275€additional€weeks€of€benefits.€€ÏThis€decision€is€not€contested.€€The€court€further€found€thatÍthe€last€injury€caused€a€50€percent€permanent€vocationalÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€and,€relying€upon€sectionÏ50„6„208(a),€apportioned€the€award€50€percent€to€theÏemployer's€insurer€and€50€percent€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund.ÌÌà àThe€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Panel€found€theÏaward€should€be€apportioned€as€provided€in€section€50„6„208(b)Ïand€that€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€only€12.5Ïpercent€of€the€award€for€permanent€total€disability.€€TheÏPanel€reached€this€conclusion€by€converting€the€award€of€25Ïpercent€permanent€disability€to€the€leg,€to€an€award€of€12.5Ïpercent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€The€Panel€reasonedÏthat€because€the€most€recent€injury€rendered€the€employee€100Ïpercent€disabled,€the€sum€of€the€total€awards€is€112.5Ïpercent,€thereby,€under€section€(b),€it€imposed€upon€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€liability€for€the€amount€of€the€award€inÏexcess€of€100€percent€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€aÍwhole.€€The€Panel€would€assess€12.5€percent€of€the€award€toÏthe€Second€Injury€Fund€and€87.5€percent€to€the€employer'sÏinsurer.ÌÌà àThe€insurer€has€appealed,€insisting€that€the€trialÏcourt€was€correct€in€applying€section€50„6„208(a),€and€thatÏthe€Special€Workersðð€Compensation€Panelððs€finding€should€beÏrejected€by€the€Court.ÌÌòòà@ àò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óóóÌÌà àAt€issue€then,€is€the€construction€of€section€50„6„208,€which€is€a€question€of€law€reviewed€by€this€Court€de€novoÏwith€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòBeare€Co.€v.€TennesseeÏDept.€of€Revenueóó,€858€S.W.2d€906,€907€(Tenn.€1993)Ï("[C]onstruction€of€[a]€statute€and€application€of€the€law€toÏthe€facts€[are€questions]€of€law.");€òòseeóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï13(d);€òòUnion€Carbide€Corp.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€87,€91Ï(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà àThe€rules€regarding€construction€of€workersððÍcompensation€statutes€are€firmly€established.€"Generally,Ïstatutes€in€derogation€of€the€common€law€are€to€be€strictlyÏconstrued€and€confined€to€their€express€terms€.€.€.€."€€òòEzellÏv.€Cockrellóó,€902€S.W.2d€394,€399€(Tenn.€1995).€€"When€theÏwords€of€a€statute€are€plain€and€unambiguous,€the€assumptionÏis€'that€the€legislature€intended€what€it€wrote€and€meant€whatÏit€said.'€€The€pertinent€language€must€be€[applied]€'withoutÏany€forced€or€subtle€construction€extending€its€import.'"€ÏòòMcClain€v.€Henry€I.€Siegel€Coóó.,€834€S.W.2d€295,€296€(Tenn.Ï1992)€(quoting€òòWorrall€v.€Kroger€Co.óó,€545€S.W.2d€736,€738Ï(Tenn.€1977)).€€However,€"[t]he€most€basic€principle€ofÏstatutory€construction€is€to€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€theÏlegislative€intent€without€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€aÏstatute's€coverage€beyond€its€intended€scope."€€òòOwens€v.ÏStateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923,€926€(Tenn.€1995);€òòState€v.€Sligeróó,€846ÏS.W.2d€262,€263€(Tenn.€1993).€€Furthermore,€the€WorkersððÏCompensation€statute€provides€that€the€law€ð ðis€declared€to€beÏa€remedial€statute€which€shall€be€given€an€equitableÏconstruction€by€the€courts€to€the€end€that€the€objects€andÏpurposes€of€this€chapter€may€be€realized€and€attained.ðð€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„116€(1991);€òòBetts€v.€Tom€Wade€Ginóó,€810€S.W.2dÍ140,€142€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà@ àòòò òANALYSISó óóóÌÌà àThe€pertinent€provisions€of€section€50„6„208€are€asÏfollows:ÌÌÓÓà8 à(a)(1)€€If€an€employee€has€previouslyÏsustained€a€permanent€physical€disabilityÏfrom€any€cause€or€origin€and€becomesÏpermanently€and€totally€disabled€throughÏa€subsequent€injury,€such€employee€shallÏbe€entitled€to€compensation€from€suchÏemployee's€employer€or€the€employer'sÏinsurance€company€only€for€the€disabilityÏthat€would€have€resulted€from€theÏsubsequent€injury,€and€such€previousÏinjury€shall€not€be€considered€inÏestimating€the€compensation€to€which€suchÏemployee€may€be€entitled€under€thisÏchapter€from€the€employer€or€theÏemployer's€insurance€company;€provided,Ïthat€in€addition€to€such€compensation€forÏa€subsequent€injury,€and€after€completionÏof€the€payments€therefor,€then€suchÏemployee€shall€be€paid€the€remainder€ofÏthe€compensation€that€would€be€due€forÏthe€permanent€total€disability€out€of€aÏspecial€fund€to€be€known€as€the€"secondÏinjury€fund"€therein€created.ÌÌà8 àÌà à...ÌÌÌà8 à(b)(1)(A)€In€cases€where€the€injuredÏemployee€has€received€or€will€receive€aÏworkers'€compensation€award€or€awards€forÏpermanent€disability€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole,€and€the€combination€of€such€awardsÏequals€or€exceeds€one€hundred€percentÏ(100%)€permanent€disability€to€the€bodyÏas€a€whole,€the€employee€shall€not€beÏentitled€to€receive€from€the€employer€orÏits€insurance€carrier€any€compensationÏfor€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole€that€would€be€in€excess€of€oneÏhundred€percent€(100%)€permanentÏdisability€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€afterÏcombining€awards.ÌÌà8 à€€€(B)€Benefits€which€may€be€due€theÏemployee€for€permanent€disability€to€theÏbody€as€a€whole€in€excess€of€one€hundredÏpercent€(100%)€permanent€disability€toÏthe€body€as€a€whole,€after€combiningÏawards,€shall€be€paid€by€the€secondÏinjury€fund.ÌÌÓÓÌà àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€section€(a)Ïif,€(1)€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€a€permanentÏphysical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin,€and€(2)€theÏemployee€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€theÏresult€of€a€subsequent€compensable€injury.€€Under€section€(a),Ïthe€prerequisites€for€imposing€liability€on€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€are€a€prior€injury,€either€compensable€or€non„compensable,€which€caused€permanent€disability€and€aÍsubsequent€compensable€injury€which€rendered€the€employeeÏpermanently€and€totally€disabled.€€òòMinton€v.€State€Indus.,ÏInc.óó,€825€S.W.2d€73,€76„77€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€section€(b)Ïif€the€sum€of€two€or€more€awards€for€permanent€disability€toÏthe€body€as€a€whole€equal€or€exceed€100€percent€permanentÏdisability.€€òòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2d€809,Ï812€(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà àBased€on€these€provisions,€an€employee€who€hasÏsustained€a€compensable€injury€which€caused€permanentÏdisability€and€who€sustains€a€subsequent€compensable€injuryÏwhich€causes€the€employee€to€be€permanently€and€totallyÏdisabled€will€be€entitled€to€recover€from€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€under€section€(a).€€If€the€sum€of€two€or€more€awards€forÏpermanent€disability€to€the€body€as€a€whole€exceeds€100Ïpercent,€the€employee€also€will€have€met€the€requirements€forÏrecovery€under€section€(b).€€Consequently,€section€(a)€andÏsection€(b)€are€not€mutually€exclusive,€and€an€employee€mayÏmeet€the€criteria€for€recovery€under€both€sections.ÌÌà àHowever,€the€facts€in€this€case€satisfy€only€theÏrequirements€of€section€(a).× ƒ3 ××  ×€€The€employee€sustained€œ›Ïpermanent€physical€œdisability€to€his€leg,›€œand€though›€notÏcompensable,€as€the€result€of€the€first€injuries€to€his€neck,Ïand€he€sustained€a€subsequent€compensable€injury€whichÏrendered€him€permanently€and€totally€disabled.€€The€employee,Ïcontrary€to€the€finding€of€the€Workers'€Compensation€Panel,Ïhas€not€met€the€requirement€of€section€(b)€of€having€receivedÏawards€for€permanent€disability€which€equal€or€exceed€100Ïpercent.€€Even€if€the€award€for€the€leg€injury€is€converted€toÏa€body€as€a€whole€disability€and€added€to€the€50€percentÏpermanent€disability€caused€by€the€last€injury,€the€sum€of€theÏcombined€awards€is€only€62.5€percent.€ÌÌà àUnder€section€(a),€a€permanently€and€totallyÏdisabled€employee€is€entitled€to€recover€from€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€the€amount€whereby€an€award€for€permanent€totalÍdisability€exceeds€the€award€for€the€subsequent€injury.€ÏòòMinton€v.€State€Indus.,€Inc.óó,€825€S.W.2d€at€76„77.€€The€trialÏcourt€found€that€under€section€(a),€the€liability€of€theÏemployer€was€50€percent€and€the€liability€of€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€was€50€percent.€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€insists€that€evenÏif€section€(a)€is€applicable,€the€trial€court€erred€in€itsÏapportionment€of€the€award.€€It€asserts€that€the€permanentÏdisability€caused€by€the€May€1993€injury€was€greater€than€50Ïpercent.€€ÌÌà àAs€to€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court,€ourÏreview€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€upon€the€record€accompanied€by€a€presumptionÏof€the€correctness€of€the€findings,€unless€the€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(2)(Supp.€1996).€€ð ðThis€standard€of€review€differs€fromÏthat€previously€provided€and€requires€this€Court€to€weigh€inÏmore€depth€factual€findings€and€conclusions€of€trial€judges€inÏworkersðð€compensation€cases.ðð€€òòHumphrey€v.€David€Witherspoon,ÏInc.óó,€734€S.W.2d€315€(Tenn.€1987).€€Here,€the€trial€courtÏfound€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àthe€last€injury€was€the€more€serious€andÏthe€one€that€broke€the€camelððs€back,Ï...€but€...€he€had€a€seriousÏvocational€impairment€from€these€previousÏsurgeries€....€€The€Court€is€going€toÏdivide€the€disability€at€50/50.€€FiftyÏfrom€the€previous€injury€and€fifty€fromÏthe€last€injury.ððÌÌÓÓ€ÌThe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€findings€of€theÏtrial€court.€€ÌÌà àConsequently,€as€required€by€section€(a),€theÏemployee€is€entitled€to€compensation€from€the€employer€or€theÏemployer's€insurance€company€only€for€the€disability€thatÏwould€have€resulted€from€the€subsequent€injury,€in€this€case,Ï50€percent€of€the€award;€provided,€that€in€addition€to€suchÏcompensation,€and€after€completion€of€the€payments€therefor,Ïthe€employee€shall€be€paid€the€remainder€of€the€compensationÏthat€is€due€for€his€permanent€total€disability€by€the€SecondÏÑ  ÑInjury€Fund.ÌÌà àThis€decision€accomplishes€the€purpose€of€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund.€€The€employee€receives€full€benefits€for€hisÏpermanent€total€disability;€the€employer's€liability€isÏlimited€to€the€consequences€of€the€subsequent€injury;€and€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€is€liable€for€the€disability€caused€by€theÍnoncompensable€injuries€and€the€prior€compensable€injury€to€aÏscheduled€member.€€òòSeeóó€òòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851ÏS.W.2d€at€813.Ì€Ìà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€that€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€begin€making€payments€immediately€is€contrary€toÏthe€statute.€€Where€liability€is€apportioned€to€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund,€the€payments€by€the€Fund€do€not€begin€untilÏð ðafter€completion€of€the€paymentsðð€by€the€employer.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208(a)(1).€€ð ð[T]he€obligation€of€the€employerÏis€not€only€determined€first€but€is€to€be€paid€first€..€.;Ïthe€obligation€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€not€concurrentÏwith€that€of€the€employer€....ðð€€òòSmith€v.€Liberty€MutualÏIns.€Co.óó,€762€S.W.2d€883,€885€(Tenn.€1988).€ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court,€as€modified,€isÏaffirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€further€proceedings.€€ÌÌÌÌÌà àCosts€are€taxed€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund.à àÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àReid,€J.ÌÌConcur:ÌÌBirch,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Anderson,€JJ.Ì€€€€ÌÌWhite,€œJ.›€„€Not€participating.