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ÔÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€—äXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑØ ØÓ&€,,X8d&ÓÙ€€ÙßL€02/;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREMEÏCOURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌÌMITCHELL€BRIAN€RAMSEY,à à)à àòòò òFORÏPUBLICATIONÌó óóóà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,€à àà à)à àœò òòòFiled:€October€7,€1996óó›Ìó óà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHamilton€CountyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌJAMES€G.€BEAVERS,€à àà àà à)à àHon.€Samuel€H.€Payne,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà à)à àNo.€03S01„9509„CV„00104ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌMark€T.€Youngà àà àà àà àThomas€A.€WilliamsÌHixson,€TNà àà àà àà àà àLEITNER,€WARNER,€MOFFITT,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAMS,€DOOLEY€&Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àNAPOLITANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TNà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÌÌÌÌCOURT€OF€APPEALS€AND€ÌTRIAL€COURT€REVERSEDà àà àà àà àà àà àWHITE,€J.ÌÌÓÓÑ€3ÑÇÑ  Ñà àIn€this€case€we€are€faced€with€the€issue€of€the€continued€viability€ofÏthe€zone€of€danger€test€as€a€limitation€on€liability€when€plaintiff€is€neitherÏphysically€injured€nor€in€an€area€where€physical€injury€is€possible.€€WeÏconclude€that€in€cases€such€as€this,€in€which€œplaintiff€sensorily›€observes€theÏinjury€and€resulting€death€of€his€mother,€recovery€should€be€allowed€underÏcircumstances€in€which€the€œincident€which€produces€the€emotional€injuriesÏand€the€emotional›€injuries€are€reasonably€foreseeable.ÌÌà àMitchell€Ramsey€and€his€mother€were€traveling€on€Highway€58€inÏHamilton€County,€Tennessee.€€Ramseyððs€mother,€who€was€driving€the€car,Ïpulled€into€Ramseyððs€driveway€and€got€out€of€the€car€to€check€the€mailboxÏwhile€Ramsey€remained€seated€in€the€rear€driverððs€side€seat.ÌÌà àDefendant€James€Beavers€was€driving€his€vehicle€north€on€HighwayÏ58.€€His€vehicle€left€the€traveling€portion€of€the€roadway€and€struckÏRamseyððs€mother.€€According€to€Ramsey,€he€heard€the€tires€of€Beaverððs€carÏin€the€gravel€as€it€left€the€roadway.€€Just€as€he€looked,€he€witnessed€hisÏmother€being€struck€by€the€car.ÌÌà àRamseyððs€complaint€details€the€distances€between€the€automobile€inÏwhich€he€was€seated,€the€mailbox,€€and€the€point€at€which€his€mother€wasÍstruck.€€He€alleged€that€ð ðat€the€time€of€the€accident€[he]€feared€for€[his]€ownÏpersonal€safety€due€to€the€close€proximity€[of€the€vehicle].ðð€€In€an€amendedÏcomplaint,€Ramsey€alleged€that€he€suffered€fright,€shock,€and€emotionalÏsuffering€as€a€result€of€his€fear.€€He€also€claimed€to€suffer€ð ðphysical€painÏand€suffering€resulting€from€witnessing€his€motherððs€death.ððÌÌà àDefendant€answered€and€moved€for€summary€judgment.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€In€hisÏmotion€defendant€contended€that€since€ð ðplaintiff€was€not€in€immediateÏthreat€of€physical€harm€[sic]€he€was€not€within€the€ððzone€of€dangerðð€andÏtherefore€may€not€recover€for€the€injuries€claimed.ðð€€The€trial€courtÏagreed€and€sustained€the€motion€dismissing€the€œcase.›€€A€motion€toÏreconsider€was€denied€and€plaintiff€appealed.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€Court€of€Appeals,€Eastern€Division,€affirmed€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court€noting€the€limited€circumstances€under€which€aÏparty€may€recover€for€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress.€ÏSpecifically€the€court€relied€on€òòSheltonóó€for€its€holding€that€a€plaintiff€mayÏnot€recover€for€injuries€resulting€from€psychic€injury€caused€by€concernÏfor€the€welfare€of€a€third€person€who€is€injured€or€threatened€with€injuryÍby€anotherððs€negligence.€€Thus,€the€court€concluded€that€ð ðin€order€toÏsucceed€the€plaintiff€here€must€demonstrate€that€his€claim€relates€to€fear€forÏhis€own€personal€safety€and€not€for€that€of€his€mother.ððÌÌà àAs€both€parties€have€noted€in€briefs€and€at€oral€argument,€our€recentÏdecision€in€òòCamper€v.€Minoróó€impacts€the€result€we€reach€here.€ÏNonetheless,€we€begin€our€analysis€seventy€years€ago.ÌÌà àIn€1927€in€the€case€of€òòNuckles€v.€Tenn.€Elec.€Power€Co.óó,€299€S.W.Ï775€(Tenn.€1927),€this€Court€declared€that€ð ðthere€can€be€[no]€recovery€forÏfright€or€shock€because€of€danger€to€another€or€injuries€upon€another€inÏthe€presence€of€the€plaintiff,€even€though€the€person€imperiled€or€injuredÏwas€near€and€dear€to€the€plaintiff€.€.€.€.ðð€€299€S.W.€at€775.€€OurÏjustification€for€that€wording€was€stated€œsuccinctly:€€ð ðt›ÓÓo€justify€a€recoveryÏin€court,€there€must€be€aÌÌÓÓwrong€done€to€the€person€or€property€of€the€plaintiff.ðð€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àSubsequently,€in€òòShelton€v.€Russell€Pipe€and€Foundry€Co.óó,€570ÏS.W.2d€861€(Tenn.€1978),€a€case€in€which€a€father€attempted€to€recover€forÏemotional€distress€suffered€when€he€was€told€at€the€emergency€room€ofÏdisfiguring€injuries€to€his€daughter,€we€returned€to€the€rule€enunciated€inÍòòNucklesóó.€€While€recognizing€that€the€òòNucklesóó€rule€might€need€modificationÏð ðso€as€to€permit€a€recovery€by€a€close€relative€who€visually€or€audiblyÏwitnesses€an€accident€[involving]€one€ððnear€or€dear€.€.€.€,ðð€ðð€such€a€situationÏwas€not€present€in€òòSheltonóó.€€Rather,€in€òòSheltonóó,€the€fatherððs€distress€resultedÏfrom€his€being€told€of€his€daughterððs€injuries,€not€from€seeing€or€hearingÏthem€occur.€€Thus,€we€left€the€òòNucklesóó€rule€intact€because€of€the€lack€ofÏforeseeability€that€harm€ð ðwould€come€to€one€outside€the€zone€of€danger€andÏbecause€of€the€lack€of€fairness€in€a€rule€which€would€impose€liability€forÏpsychic€injuries€to€one€outside€the€zone€of€danger.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€866.ÌÌà àThe€òòSheltonóó€analysis€œillustrates›€œthe›€concern€of€many€courts€œwhich›Ïhave€tampered€with€and€modified€the€inflexible€zone€of€danger€rule.€€OnceÏthe€rule€is€modified,€either€by€enlarging€the€so„called€zone€of€danger€or€byÏcreating€exceptions€for€injuries€witnessed€or€injuries€to€those€related€toÏplaintiff,€potential€liability€seems€limitless.€€Additionally,€the€difficulty€inÏassessing€and€verifying€the€type€and€extent€of€injuries€involved€isÏstaggering.€€Psychic€injuries€including€fright,€shock,€and€distress,€whenÏdetached€from€any€physical€counterpart,€are€highly€subjective€and€difficultÏto€quantify.ÌÌà àWhile€noting€the€difficulties€that€moving€away€from€the€inflexibleÍzone€of€danger€of€physical€impact€rule€include,€we€are€equally€quick€toÏnote€the€imperfections€in€that€rule€as€well.€€The€zone€of€danger€is€rarelyÏconcrete.€€Its€location€is€subject€to€interpretation.€€Furthermore,€very€realÏinjuries€may€be€suffered€by€those€outside€the€zone€of€danger,€but€close€to€aÏtraumatic,€emotive€event€involving€a€close€relative.ÌÌà àVery€recently€we€revisited€this€interesting,€but€difficult,€area€of€theÏlaw€in€òòCamper€v.€Minoróó,€915€S.W.2d€437€(Tenn.€1996).€€In€òòCamperóó,€theÏdriver€of€a€cement€truck€sued€to€recover€for€the€emotional€distress€heÏsuffered€when€he€viewed€the€body€of€a€deceased€motorist€who€had€pulledÏinto€the€path€of€his€truck.€€Camper€had€experienced€only€minor€physicalÏinjuries€„€a€scraped€knee.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€utilizing€the€meager,€but€existent,€physical€injury€and€theÏplaintiffððs€actual€involvement€in€the€accident,€to€distinguish€the€case€fromÏòòSheltonóó.€€Because€of€the€importance€of€the€issue,€the€trial€judge€granted€anÏinterlocutory€appeal.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€Court€of€Appeals€reversed€and€sustained€defendantððsÏsummary€judgment€motion.€€That€court€reasoned€that€the€allegations€of€theÏcomplaint€failed€to€state€a€cause€of€action€because€plaintiff€failed€to€proveÏthat€he€feared€for€his€own€safety€or€that€he€had€a€close€relationship€with€theÍdeceased.ÌÌà àIn€an€œopinion€containing€an€excellent,›€historical€analysis,€JusticeÏDrowota€tracked€the€development€of€the€law€of€negligent€infliction€ofÏemotional€distress€nationally€and€in€the€Tennessee€courts.€€He€aptly€pointedÏout€that€our€law€had€become€garbled€and€confused€as€the€courts€attemptedÏto€apply€rigid€tests,€then€modified€the€tests€to€reach€œjust›€results.ÌÌà àAs€part€of€his€review,€Justice€Drowota€addressed€the€zone€of€dangerÏtest€œwhich€serves€to€limit€liability€and€on›€which€defendant€in€this€actionÏrelies.€€That€test,€as€defendant€urges,€œand€as€applied€in€Tennessee,€requires›Ïthat€a€plaintiff€desiring€to€recover€for€emotional€injuries€establish€eitherÏthat€he€or€she€sustained€a€physical€injury€along€with€the€emotional€œone,€orÏthat€he€or€she€was€placed€in€immediate€danger€of€physical€harm€and,Ïcontemporaneously,›€œfeared›€for€his€or€her€own€physical€safety.€ÏAdditionally,€œthe€Tennessee€zone€of€danger€rule€requires€that€plaintiff€beÏclosely€related€to€the€actual€injured€party.€€òòSeeóó€òòBurroughs€v.€Jordanóó,€456ÏS.W.2d€652€(Tenn.€1970).€€ÌÌà àNotwithstanding€these€two€prerequisites€to€recovery€under€the€zoneÏof€danger€approach,€both€of€which€were€notably€missing€in€òòCamperóó,€weÍreversed€the€grant€of€summary€judgment€in€that€case.€€Recognizing€theÏinconsistency€of€our€previous€patchwork€approach,€we€adopted€a€generalÏnegligence€approach€which€required€that€plaintiff€prove€the€five€elementsÏof€negligence€and€prove€by€expert€testimony€that€the€emotional€injuryÏsuffered€is€serious€or€severe.€€Specifically,€we€held€that€the€physicalÏmanifestation€or€injury€ruleÌÓÓà8 àà8 àshall€no€longer€be€used€to€test€the€validity€of€aÏprima€facie€case€of€negligent€infliction€ofÏemotional€distress.€.€.€.€[T]he€plaintiff€mustÏpresent€material€evidence€as€to€each€of€the€fiveÏelements€of€general€negligence€.€.€.€in€order€toÏavoid€summary€judgment.€€Furthermore,€.€.€.€inÏorder€to€guard€against€trivial€or€fraudulentÏactions,€the€law€ought€to€provide€a€recovery€onlyÏfor€ð ðseriousðð€or€ð ðsevereðð€emotional€injury.€€ÌÌÓÓòòCamper€v.€Minoróó,€915€S.W.2d€at€446.€€In€shifting€to€this€generalÏnegligence€approach,€we€clearly€vitiated€the€previous€rigid€rule€thatÏrequired€the€presence€or€fear€of€physical€injury€before€emotional€injuriesÏcould€be€compensated.ÌÌà àIn€declining€to€follow€further€the€rigid,€unworkable€physical€injuryÏor€physical€manifestation€rule,€however,€we€did€not€necessarily€obviate€theÏentire€zone€of€danger€test.€€As€Justice€Drowota€noted:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWe€do€not€.€.€.€necessarily€abandon€the€ð ðzone€ofÏdangerðð€approach€used€in€òòSheltonóó.€€Indeed,€sinceÏthe€ð ðzone€of€dangerðð€approach€is,€in€reality,Ímerely€a€way€of€defining€and€limiting€theÏelements€of€duty€and€proximate€or€legal€cause,€theÏprinciples€of€the€approach€can€likely€be€integratedÏinto€the€general€negligence€framework.€€TheÏspecifics€of€such€an€integration€must,€however,Ïawait€an€appropriate€case.ÌÌÓÓ915€S.W.2d€at€446€n.€2.ÌÌà àThis€is€that€appropriate€case.€€Under€the€strict€zone€of€dangerÏapproach€outlined€in€òòSheltonóó,€Ramseyððs€case€would€likely€fail.€€AlthoughÏthe€parties€are€not€wholly€consistent€in€their€statement€of€the€facts,€at€theÏvery€least,€the€case€would€be€remanded€to€the€trier€of€fact€to€determineÏwhether€plaintiffððs€fear€for€his€physical€safety€was€reasonable.ÌÌà àWe€decline€in€light€of€òòCamperóó€to€return€to€the€often€semanticalÏapproach€of€òòSheltonóó.€€Rather,€as€we€did€in€òòCamperóó,€we€modify€existing€lawÏto€more€fairly€and€consistently€set€forth€a€test.€€Rather€than€focusing€onÏsubjective€statements€of€fear€or€surmised€conclusions€of€whether€oneððsÏphysical€location€is€within€the€zone€of€danger,€we€hold€that€in€the€futureÏliability€shall€be€determined€by€application€of€general€negligence€law€as€setÏforth€in€this€opinion.€€ÌÌà àThe€general€negligence€approach€adopted€for€determination€of€casesÍinvolving€emotional€injuries€requires€that€plaintiff€establish€each€of€the€fiveÏelements€of€negligence€„€duty,€breach€of€duty,€injury€or€loss,€causation€inÏfact,€and€proximate€causation.€€While€we€reject€the€rigid€zone€of€dangerÏapproach€set€forth€in€òòSheltonóó,€that€rejection€serves€only€to€dissolve€rigid,Ïoften€nonsensical,€physical€injury€and€contemporaneous€fear€requirements.€ÏIt€does€not€reduce€or€lessen€plaintiffððs€obligation€to€establish€that€theÏemotional€injuries€suffered€were€factually€and€legally€caused€by€the€breachÏof€a€duty€owed€to€plaintiff€by€a€defendant.€€ÌÌà àWe,€therefore,€hold€that€to€recover€for€emotional€injuries€sustainedÏas€a€result€of€death€or€injury€of€a€third€person,€plaintiff€must€establish€thatÏdefendantððs€negligence€was€the€cause€in€fact€of€the€third€personððs€death€orÏinjury€òòasóó€òòwellóó€as€plaintiffððs€emotional€injury.€€Secondly,€plaintiff€mustÏestablish€that€the€third€personððs€death€or€injury€and€plaintiffððs€emotionalÏinjury€were€proximate€and€foreseeable€results€of€defendantððs€negligence.ÌÌà àEstablishing€foreseeability,€and€therefore€a€duty€of€care€to€plaintiff,Ïrequires€consideration€of€a€number€of€relevant€factors.€€The€plaintiffððsÏphysical€location€at€the€time€of€the€event€or€accident€and€awareness€of€theÏaccident€are€essential€factors.€€Obviously,€it€is€more€foreseeable€that€oneÍwitnessing€or€having€a€sensory€observation× ƒ5 ××  ×€of€the€event€will€suffer€effectsÏfrom€it.€€As€has€been€explained:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€impact€of€personally€observing€the€injury„producing€event€in€most,€although€concededly€notÏall,€cases€distinguishes€the€plaintiffððs€resultantÏemotional€distress€from€the€emotion€felt€when€oneÏlearns€of€the€injury€or€death€of€a€loved€one€fromÏanother,€or€observes€pain€and€suffering€but€notÏthe€traumatic€cause€of€the€injury.ÌÌÓÓòòThing€v.€La€Chusaóó,€771€P.2d€814,€828€(Ca.€1989).€€Thus,€plaintiff€mustÏestablish€sufficient€proximity€to€the€injury„producing€event€to€allowÏsensory€observation€by€plaintiff.€€ÌÌà àA€second€factor€is€the€degree€of€injury€to€the€third€person.€€WeÏagree€with€the€New€Jersey€Supreme€Courtððs€analysis€of€this€factor:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhile€any€harm€to€a€spouse€or€a€family€memberÏcauses€sorrow,€we€are€here€concerned€with€aÏmore€narrowly€confined€interest€in€mental€andÏemotional€stability.€€When€confronted€withÏaccidental€death,€€€€€€ð ðthe€reaction€to€be€expectedÏof€normal€persons,ðð€€€€€€.€.€.€is€shock€and€fright.€.€.Ï.€Since€the€sense€of€loss€attendant€to€death€orÏserious€injury€is€typically€not€present€followingÏlesser€accidental€harm,€perception€of€less€seriousÏharm€would€not€ordinarily€result€in€severeÏemotional€distress.ÌÌÓÓòòPortee€v.€Jaffeeóó,€417€A.2d€521,€528€(N.J.€1980).€€Thus,€plaintiff€seekingÍrecovery€for€emotional€injuries€suffered€as€a€result€of€injury€to€a€thirdÏparty€must€establish€that€the€injury€to€the€third€party€was,€or€reasonablyÏwas€perceived€to€be,€serious€or€fatal.ÌÌà àA€third€factor€which€relates€to€the€foreseeability€of€plaintiffððsÏemotional€injury€is€plaintiffððs€relationship€to€the€injured€third€party.€€MostÏcourts€have€required€that€the€relationship€be€ð ðclose.ðð€€In€justifying€thisÏrequirement,€courts€have€deferred€to€medical€judgment€which€is€inÏð ðgeneral[]€agreement€that€a€mere€bystander€who€has€no€significantÏrelationship€with€the€victim€will€not€suffer€the€profound,€systematic€mentalÏand€emotional€reaction€likely€to€befall€a€close€relative.€.€.€.ðð€€òòJames€v.€Liebóó,Ï375€N.W.2d€109,€115€(Neb.€1985).€€Stated€differently:€€ð ðIt€is€the€veryÏnature€of€the€relationship€between€the€plaintiff€and€the€victim€which€makesÏthe€emotional€reaction€experienced€by€the€plaintiff€so€poignant.ðð€€òòHeldrethÏv.€Marrsóó,€425€S.W.2d€157,€163€(W.Va.€1992).€€ÌÌà àWe€reiterate€that€plaintiff€must€establish€that€defendantððs€negligenceÏfactually€and€legally€caused€plaintiff€to€suffer€serious€or€severe€emotionalÏinjuries.€€As€we€made€clear€in€òòCamperóó,€our€ruling€does€not€provideÏrecovery€for€ð ðevery€minor€disturbance€to€a€personððs€mental€tranquility.ðð€ÏòòBarnhill€v.€Davisóó,€300€N.W.2d€104,€107€(Iowa€1981),€but€only€for€seriousÍor€severe€emotional€injuries.€€A€ð ðððseriousðð€or€ððsevereðð€emotional€injuryÏoccurs€where€a€reasonable€person,€normally€constituted,€would€be€unableÏto€adequately€cope€with€the€mental€stress€engendered€by€the€circumstancesÏof€the€case.ðð€€òòCamper€v.€Minoróó,€915€S.W.2d€at€446.€€ÌÌà àOur€holding€in€òòCamperóó€and€here€should€not€be€construed€to€allowÏrecovery€for€fright€or€fear€alone.€€Likewise,€hurt€feelings,€trivial€upsets,Ïand€temporary€discomfort€would€not€be€sufficient€for€recovery.€€OnlyÏthose€serious€or€severe€emotional€injuries€which€disable€a€reasonable,Ïnormally€constituted× ƒ6 ××  ×€person€from€coping€adequately€with€the€stress€areÏsufficient€to€form€the€basis€for€recovery.€€Additionally,€the€ð ðclaimed€injuryÏor€impairment€must€be€supported€by€expert€medical€or€scientific€proof.ðð€ÏòòIdóó.ÌÌà@ àCONCLUSIONÌà àOur€holding€today€abandons€the€hypertechnical€approach€of€the€zoneÏof€danger€rule€and€recognizes€that€in€certain€circumstances€a€plaintiffÏwhose€physical€safety€is€not€endangered€may€nonetheless€sufferÏcompensable€mental€injury€as€a€result€of€injuries€to€a€closely€related€thirdÍperson€which€plaintiff€observes€sensorily.€€As€has€been€recognized:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àTo€require€that€the€plaintiff€must€be€within€theÏzone€of€physical€danger€of€the€defendantððsÏnegligent€conduct€and€fear€for€his€or€her€ownÏsafety€in€order€to€recover€for€the€seriousÏemotional€distress€blatantly€ignores€the€very€causeÏof€the€plaintiffððs€emotional€distress.ÌÌÓÓòòHeldreth€v.€Marrsóó,€425€S.E.2d€at€169.€€Utilizing€the€general€negligenceÏapproach€for€causes€of€action€based€on€negligent€infliction€of€emotionalÏdistress€with€its€traditional€focus€on€foreseeability,€and€requiring€that€theÏinjuries€for€which€compensation€is€sought€be€serious€or€severe,€willÏreasonably€limit€liability€while€allowing€recovery€in€meritorious€cases.ÌÌÌÌÌà àWe,€therefore,€reverse€the€judgments€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€andÏtrial€court€dismissing€this€case.€€We€remand€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏproceedings.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àPenny€J.€White,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌBirch,€C.J.ÌDrowota,€Anderson,€Reid,€J.J.ÌÌ