ÿWPC…9 …# VUNa %¯ 0(µ4Ýñ 0 l 0Dl ° w@¸ 0Jø 0TB 0^– 0hô 0r\ 0|Î 0†J 0Ð 1u` U ,Õ 0À BÁ D3ÞU, 0@=U >}U*»B)åDC AMQU*ž"ÈIêk3מ)už€-Ö­ eƒ#Ïè%Ø·*v~0vÓ 2 AOà7Æ/8 0Dõ8 D/99 Bh9˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡DÒ 3|xs((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó abDcdDefghIiÓ€s2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernPp ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓÑ\R€€\Ñ d'''''ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Monaco("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€3XÔÌÌJuly€15,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ?Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝHolmanððs€friend€tried€repeatedly,€but€unsuccessfully,€to€get€the€lighter€to€light€beforeÏà àleaving€it€there€early€on€the€morning€of€the€fire.Ì aÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€BIC€Corporation€challenges€the€allegation€that€the€lighter€was€the€source€of€theÌà àfire,€the€allegation€was€accepted€as€true€for€purposes€of€the€summary€judgment€motion.Ì ÍÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝClearly,€the€current€Act€allows€recovery€for€injuries€caused€by€either€a€product€in€a€Ìà àð ðdefective€conditionðð€or€an€ð ðunreasonably€dangerousðð€product.€€In€1978€the€GeneralÌà àAssembly€removed€the€requirement€of€establishing€both€conditions.€€1978€Tenn.€Pub.Ìà àActs,€Ch.€703,€ðð€5€(codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„105(a)(1980€Repl.));€òòSmith€v.Ìà àDetroit€Marine€Engineering€Corp.óó,€712€S.W.2d€472,€474„75€(Tenn.€App.€1985),€òòpermóó.Ìà àòòtoóó€òòappealóóòòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1986).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€authors€of€the€Restatement€(Third)€of€Torts,€still€in€draft€form,€have€proposed€Ìà àseparate€standards€of€liability€for€manufacturing€and€design€defects€applying€a€strictÌà àliability€standard€to€the€former€and€a€risk„utility€standard€to€the€latter.€€RestatementÌà à(Third)€of€Torts:€Products€Liability€ðð€2,€comment€a€(Tentative€Draft€No.€1,€1994).Ì …Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAt€least€two€states€have€consistently€followed€an€exclusive€consumer€expectationÌà àapproach.€€Kansas,€in€òòLester€v.€Magic€Chefóó,€641€P.2d€353€(Kan.€1982),€adopted€theÌà àapproach€as€in€accord€with€the€Restatementððs€comment€i.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòBetts€v.€GeneralÌà àMotors€Corp.óó,€689€P.2d€795€(Kan.€1984);€òòBarnes€v.€Vega€Indus.óó,€676€P.2d€761Ìà à(Kan.€1984).€€Likewise,€Nebraska€has€persisted€in€its€exclusive€use€of€the€consumerÌà àexpectation€test,€although€there,€it€is€referred€to€as€a€ð ðuser„contemplationðð€test.€€òòRahmigÌà àv.€Mosely€Machinery€Co.óó,€412€N.W.2d€56€(Neb.€1987);€òòAdams€v.€American€Cyanideóó,Ï498€à àN.W.2d€577€(Neb.€Ct.€App.€1992).Ì vÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSome€versions€of€a€prudent€manufacturer€test€may€deem€the€manufacturer€to€have€actualÏà àknowledge€of€the€productððs€dangerousness,€despite€the€unreasonableness€of€thatÏà àà àassumption.€€Other€approaches€deem€the€manufacturer€to€have€actual€knowledge€ofÏthe€à àproductððs€dangerousness€only€to€the€extent€that€a€reasonable€manufacturer€should€haveÏà àknown.€€The€former€is€a€strict€liability€approach,€the€latter€a€traditional€negligenceÏà àà àapproach.€€Birnbaum,€òòUnmasking€the€Test€for€Design€Defect:€From€Negligence€toÏà àWarranty€to€Strict€Liability€to€Negligenceóó,€33€Vand.L.Rev.€593,€618€(1980)(hereafterÏà àBirnbaum,€òòsupraóó€at€_____).Ì ÌÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝDean€Keetonððs€prudent€manufacturer€test€similarly€relies€on€balancing€of€various€factors,Ìà àbut€differs€in€the€time€at€which€knowledge€of€the€harmful€character€is€imputed.€€Keeton,Ìà àòòManufacturerððs€Liability:€The€Meaning€of€ð ðDefectðð€in€the€Manufacture€and€Design€ofÌà àProductsóó,€20€Syracuse€L.Rev.€559,€568€(1969).€€Since€statute€resolves€this€issue,€theÌà àdistinction€between€the€Keeton€and€Wade€approach€is€of€no€consequence€to€our€analysis.Ìà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„105(b)(1980€Repl.).Ì [Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝDefendantððs€approach€to€the€risk„utility€test€is€that€it€is€ð ðtheðð€test€adopted€by€CaliforniaÌà àin€its€1978€decision€of€òòBarker€v.€Lull€Engineering€Co.óó,€573€P.2d€443€(Ca.€1978).€€In€fact,Ìà àa€risk„utility€analysis,€had€been€employed€by€many€states€prior€to€1978.€€The€CaliforniaÌà àdifference,€however,€was€the€shifting€of€the€burden€of€proof€onto€defendant.€€Birnbaum,Ìà àòòsupraóó,€at€605.Ì ÅÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝDefendant€argues€that€the€two€approaches€are€different€given€the€common„law€originÌà àof€the€tests€and€the€distinct€focuses€of€each€test.€€As€we€have€noted,€the€prudentÏà àà àmanufacturer€test€focuses€on€the€reasonableness€of€the€manufacturerððs€conduct.€Ïà àà àConversely,€defendant€argues€that€the€risk„utility€test€focuses€not€on€theÏmanufacturer€but€à àon€the€product€itself€by€imposing€a€cost„benefit€analysis.€€This€argument€isÏone€of€mere€à àsemantics.€€While€defendant€is€correct€in€its€contention€that€a€risk„utility€approachÏrequires€à àa€balancing€of€the€usefulness€of€the€product€as€compared€to€the€dangerousness€ofÏthe€risk,€à àit€is€the€manufacturer€who,€prior€to€determining€whether€to€market€the€product,Ïanalyzes€à àthe€utility€and€the€benefit.€€The€reasonableness€of€that€decision,€in€light€of€the€utilityÏand€Ìà àrisk,€is€the€focus€of€a€risk„utility€analysis.€€It€varies€little,€if€at€all,€from€the€analysis€underÌà àa€prudent€manufacturer€approach.Ì ÎÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThese€factors€include:Ìà àà à(1)à8 àThe€usefulness€and€desirability€of€the€product€„€itsÏutility€to€the€user€and€to€the€public€as€a€whole.Ìà àà à(2)à8 àThe€safety€aspects€of€the€product€„€the€likelihood€thatÏit€will€cause€injury,€and€the€probable€seriousness€ofÏthe€injury.Ìà àà à(3)à8 àThe€availability€of€a€substitute€product€which€wouldÏmeet€the€same€need€and€not€be€as€unsafe.Ìà àà à(4)à8 àThe€manufacturerððs€ability€to€eliminate€the€unsafeÏcharacter€of€the€product€without€impairing€itsÏusefulness€or€making€it€too€expensive€to€maintain€itsÏutility.Ìà àà à(5)à8 àThe€userððs€ability€to€avoid€danger€by€the€exercise€ofÏcare€in€the€use€of€the€product.Ìà àà à(6)à8 àThe€userððs€anticipated€awareness€of€the€dangersÏinherent€in€the€product€and€their€avoidability,€becauseÏof€general€public€knowledge€of€the€obvious€conditionÏof€the€product,€or€of€the€existence€of€suitableÏwarnings€or€instructions.Ìà àà à(7)à8 àThe€feasibility,€on€the€part€of€the€manufacturer,€ofÏspreading€the€loss€by€setting€the€price€of€the€productÏor€carrying€liability€insurance.ÌÌà àWade,€òòOn€The€Nature€of€Strict€Tort€Liability€for€Productsóó,€44€Miss.L.J.€825,€837„38Ìà à(1973).ÌPtPtStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÓ&€,,X„d&ÓÑ#€,,Xd#ÑÔ€.ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€&=XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€.¼ÔØ ØÓ&€//X°d&Ó›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌÌœFREDERICK›€TURNER€RAY,€à àà à)à àò òòòFOR€PUBLICATIONó óÌóóa€Minor€by€Next€Friend€and€Naturalòòà àóó)òòÌóóMother,€ERMA€L.€HOLMAN,à àà à)à àœòòò òFiled:€July€15,€1996ó óóó›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Petitioner,à àà à)à àCertified€Question€of€LawÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àfrom€the€United€States€CourtÌv.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€€à àà à)à àof€Appeals€for€the€SixthÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€€€€€à àà à)à àCircuitÌBIC€CORPORATION,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àCase€No.€93„6105Ìà àDefendant/Respondent.à àà à)à àNo.€01S01„9501„FD„00011ÌÙ€€ÙœßL€241;+'h|ßf` ç `€€Lß›ÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff/Petitioneróó:à àà àà àòòForÏDefendant/Respondentóó:ÌÌL.€Anthony€Deal€€€€€€€à àà àà àJ.€Brook€Lathram€€€€€€ÌPaul€Berry€Cooper,€IIIà àà àà àSusan€M.€ClarkÌMemphis,€TNà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òO€€P€€I€€N€€I€€O€€NÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àWHITE,€J.ÌÌÌÓӜ̛à àIn€this€Rule€23€case€we€are€called€upon€to€address€whether€ourÏproducts€liability€statute,€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€SectionÏ29„28„101€ð!ð€„108,€provides€for€a€risk„utility€test€in€addition€to€theÏconsumer€expectation€test€for€determining€whether€a€product€isÏunreasonably€dangerous.€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€below,€we€hold€thatÏour€present€statute€provides€for€two€tests:€the€consumer€expectation€testÏand€the€prudent€manufacturer€test.€€The€latter€requires€risk„utilityÏbalancing€in€its€application.ÌÌà@ àò òI.€€Factsó óÌà àOn€September€3,€1982,€the€Memphis€apartment€building€in€whichÏErma€Holman€and€her€two€minor€sons,€Frederick€and€Donnie€Ray,€wereÏresiding€was€destroyed€by€fire.€€A€cigarette€lighter,€manufactured€by€theÏBIC€Corporation,€had€been€left€in€the€apartment€by€a€friend€ofÍHolmanððs.× ƒ5 ××  ×€€When€Holman€left€to€walk€her€oldest€son,€Donnie,€to€the€busÏstop,€four„year€old€Frederick€was€left€alone€in€the€apartment.€€WhenÏHolman€returned,€the€apartment€was€ablaze.€€Young€Frederick€sustainedÏserious€injuries,€including€incapacitating€brain€damage.ÌÌà àTen€years€later,€on€September€3,€1992,€Holman€filed€a€lawsuitÏagainst€BIC€Corporation€on€behalf€of€her€minor€son,€Frederick.€€In€herÏcomplaint,€she€alleged€that€the€source€of€the€fire,× ƒ6 ××  ×€the€BIC€cigaretteÏlighter,€was€an€ð ðunreasonably€dangerousðð€product€within€the€meaning€ofÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€29„28„102(8)€because€it€was€not€child„resistant.€€Specifically,€plaintiff€alleged€that€ð ð[d]efendant€.€.€.Ïmanufactured€an€unreasonably€dangerous€disposable€cigarette€lighterÏwhich€was€unreasonably€dangerous€at€the€time€it€left€the€control€of€theÏDefendant.ðð€€Additionally,€plaintiff€contended€that€defendant€was€liableÏbecause€the€lighter€ð ðwould€not€be€put€on€the€market€by€a€reasonablyÏprudent€manufacturer€or€seller€assuming€that€[the€manufacturer€or€seller]Ïknew€of€its€dangerous€condition.ððÌÌà àBIC€Corporation€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€thatÏthe€product€was€not€unreasonably€dangerous.€€Plaintiff€countered€with€theÏaffidavit€of€an€engineer€whose€opinion€was€that€the€lighter€could€haveÏbeen€manufactured€without€significantly€increasing€the€cost€to€includeÏchild„resistant€features€which€would€more€likely€than€not€have€preventedÏthe€injuries.ÌÌà àThe€federal€district€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€defendant.€ÏPlaintiff€appealed€to€the€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€œwhich›€hasÏcertified€this€question€for€our€consideration:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àwhether€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(8),€inÏaddition€to€the€ð ðconsumer€expectationðð€test,Ïprovides€for€another€separate€and€distinct€testÏfor€determining€whether€a€product€isÏð ðunreasonably€dangerous,ðð€i.e.,€the€ð ðrisk„utilityððÏtest.ÌÌÌÓÓÌà@ àII.€€Background€of€the€ActÌà àThe€Tennessee€Products€Liability€Act€provides€that€a€manufacturerÏor€seller€may€be€liable€for€injuries€caused€by€a€product€that€is€determinedÏto€be€in€a€ð ðdefective€condition€or€unreasonably€dangerous€at€the€time€itÏleft€the€control€of€the€manufacturer€or€seller.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„105(a)€(1980€Repl.).€€In€this€case,€plaintiff€alleges€that€the€BIC€cigaretteÍlighter€was€an€unreasonably€dangerous€product.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€The€Act€defines€anÏunreasonably€dangerous€product€as€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àa€product€[that]€is€dangerous€to€an€extent€beyondÏthat€which€would€be€contemplated€by€theÏordinary€consumer€who€purchases€it,€or€aÏproduct€[that]€because€of€its€dangerous€conditionÏwould€not€be€put€on€the€market€by€a€reasonablyÏprudent€manufacturer€or€seller€assuming€thatÏ[the€manufacturer€or€seller]€knew€of€itsÏdangerous€condition.ÌÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(8)(1980€Repl.).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àUnquestionably,€the€first€clause€of€the€definition€establishes€aÏð ðconsumer€expectationðð€test€for€determining€whether€a€product€isÏunreasonably€dangerous.€€That€test,€defined€generally€as,€whether€theÏproductððs€condition€poses€a€danger€beyond€that€expected€by€an€ordinaryÏconsumer€with€reasonable€knowledge,€has€been€employed€by€many€states.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòCaterpillar€Tractor€v.€Beckóó,€593€P.2d€871€(Alaska€1979);ÏòòBarker€v.€Lull€Engððg€Co.,€Inc.óó,€573€P.2d€443€(Cal.€1978)(one€prong€ofÏtest);€òòOntai€v.€Straub€Clinic€and€Hosp.,€Inc.óó,€659€P.2d€734€(Haw.€1983);ÏòòLester€v.€Magic€Chefóó,€641€P.2d€353€(Kan.€1982);€òòRahmig€v.€MoselyÍMachinery€Co.óó,€412€N.W.2d€56€(Neb.€1987);€òòWoods€v.€Fruehauf€TrailerÏCorp.óó,€765€P.2d€770€(Okla.€1988).€€In€a€host€of€cases,€decided€prior€toÏand€after€the€passage€of€the€Products€Liability€Act,€Tennessee€courts€haveÏused€the€standard.€€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó€òòGann,€et€al.€v.€International€HarvesterÏCo.óó,€712€S.W.2d€100,€105€(Tenn.€1986);€òòPemberton€v.€AmericanÏDistilled€Spirits€Co.óó,€644€S.W.2d€690,€692€(Tenn.€1984);€òòReeve€v.€LoweððsÏof€Boone,€Inc.óó,€754€S.W.2d€67,€71€(Tenn.€œApp.),›€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,Ï(Tenn.€1988).€€While€many€states€are€abandoning€its€approach,× ƒ8 ××  ×€orÏmeshing€it€with€more€sophisticated€proof€requirements,€it€has€remainedÏunchanged€in€our€statute€for€nearly€two€decades.€€òòSeeóó€òògenerallyóó€WilliamÏL.€Prosser€&€W.€Page€Keeton,€òòThe€Law€of€Tortsóó,€ðð€99,€at€669€(5th€ed.Ï1984);€M.€Stuart€Madden,€òòProducts€Liabilityóó€ðð€6.23€(2d€ed.€1994);ÏSchwartz,€òòForward:€Understanding€Products€Liabilityóó,€67€Cal.L.Rev.€435Ï(1979);€Keeton,€òòProducts€Liability€Design€Hazard€and€the€Meaning€ofÏDefectóó,€10€Cumb.L.Rev.€293,€310€(1979).ÌÌà àœIt€is€also€unquestionable›€œthat›€defendant€in€this€case€would€be€entitledÏto€summary€judgment€if€the€consumer€expectation€test€is€the€onlyÍapplicable€standard€for€determining€unreasonable€dangerousness.€€AnÏordinary€consumer€would€expect€that€a€cigarette€lighter,€left€in€the€handsÏof€a€young€child,€could€cause€danger€and€injury€concomitant€to€thatÏoccurring€in€this€case.€€The€more€difficult€question€is€whether€thatÏconclusion€ends€the€inquiry.€€Again,€unquestionably,€it€does€not.ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€the€consumer€expectation€test€clearly€set€forth€in€theÏfirst€clause€of€the€statutory€definition,€the€second€clause,€joinedÏdisjunctively€with€the€first,€establishes€a€second€test.€€That€clause€providesÏthat€a€product€is€unreasonably€dangerous€if€a€reasonably€prudentÏmanufacturer€or€seller,€aware€of€the€productððs€dangerous€condition,Ïwould€not€put€the€product€on€the€market.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(8)(1980€Repl.).€€We€must€determine€whether€that€test,€which€we€willÏrefer€to€as€the€ð ðprudent€manufacturerðð€test,€is€a€separate,€distinct€testÏfrom€the€consumer€expectation€test€found€exclusive€by€the€district€courtÏor€the€risk„utility€test€urged€by€the€plaintiff.ÌÌà@ àA.€€Consumer€Expectation€Test€v.€Prudent€Manufacturer€TestÌà àThe€consumer€expectation€test,€clearly€set€forth€in€the€first€clauseÏof€the€definition€section,€derives€from€the€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Tortsóó,ÏSection€402A.€€€Comment€œ(i)›€to€that€section€states€that€before€a€product€isÍdeemed€unreasonably€dangerous€it€must€be€ð ðdangerous€to€an€extentÏbeyond€that€which€would€be€contemplated€by€the€ordinary€consumer€whoÏpurchases€it,€with€the€ordinary€knowledge€common€to€the€community€asÏto€its€characteristics.ðð€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€402A,€commentÏœi;›€òòVincer€v.€Ester€Williams€All„Aluminumóó,€320€N.W.2d€794,€798„99Ï(Wis.€1975).œ× ƒ9 ××  ×›€€Under€this€test,€a€product€is€not€unreasonably€dangerous€ifÏthe€ordinary€consumer€would€appreciate€the€condition€of€the€product€andÏthe€risk€of€injury.ÌÌà àBy€contrast,€the€prudent€manufacturer€test€imputes€knowledge× ƒ: ××  ×€ofÏthe€condition€of€the€product€to€the€manufacturer.€€The€test€is€whether,Ïgiven€that€knowledge,€a€prudent€manufacturer€would€market€the€product.€ÏòòPhillips€v.€Kimwood€Machine€Co.óó,€525€P.2d€1033,€1036€(Or.€1974).€ÌÌà àSome€jurisdictions€„€notably€Washington€and€Oregon€„€have,€atÏtimes,€€concluded€that€the€two€approaches€are€really€one,€representingÏð ðtwo€sides€of€the€same€coin.ðð€€òòEstate€of€Ryder€v.€Kelly„Springfield€TireÏCo.óó,€587€P.2d€160,€164€(Wash.€1978);€òòPhillips€v.€Kimwood€Machine€Co.óó,Ï525€P.2d€1033,€1036€(Or.€1974).€€In€explaining€this€conclusion€theseÏcourts€have€suggested€that€ð ða€manufacturer€who€would€be€negligent€inÏmarketing€a€given€product€œ€€.›€.€.€,€would€necessarily€be€marketing€aÏproduct€which€fell€below€the€reasonable€expectations€of€consumers€whoÏpurchase€it.ðð€€òòPhillips€v.€Kimwood€Machine€Co.óó,€525€P.2d€at€1037.ÌÌà àClearly,€however,€as€the€courts€combining€the€tests€have€come€toÏrealize,€the€focus€of€the€two€tests€is€entirely€different.€€The€consumerÏexpectation€test€is,€by€definition,€buyer€oriented;€the€prudentÏœmanufacturer€test,›€seller€oriented.€€Notwithstanding€the€œdifference›€inÏfocus,€these€courts€predict€that€the€tests€ð ðshould€produce€similar€results.ðð€ÏòòEstate€of€Ryder€v.€Kelly„Springfield€Tire€Co.óó,€587€P.2d€at€164.ÌÌà àWhile€this€prediction€may€be€accurate,€we€see€distinct€andÏimportant€differences€in€the€consumer€expectation€and€the€prudentÏmanufacturer€tests€under€our€statute.€€First,€the€former€requires€theÍconsumer€to€establish€what€an€ordinary€consumer€purchasing€the€productÏwould€expect.€€The€manufacturer€or€sellerððs€conduct,€knowledge,€orÏintention€is€irrelevant.€€What€is€determinative€is€what€an€ordinaryÏpurchaser€would€have€expected.€€Obviously,€this€test€can€only€be€appliedÏto€products€about€which€an€ordinary€consumer€would€have€knowledge.€ÏBy€definition,€it€could€be€applied€only€to€those€products€in€whichÏð ðòòeveryday€experienceóó€of€the€productððs€users€permits€a€conclusion€.€.€.€.ðð€ÏòòSoule€v.€General€Motors€Corp.óó,€882€P.2d€298,€308€(Ca.€1994)(emphasisÏin€original).€€For€example,€ordinary€consumers€would€have€a€basis€forÏexpectations€about€the€safety€of€a€can€opener€or€coffee€pot,€but,€perhaps,Ïnot€about€the€safety€of€a€œfuel„injection›€engine€or€an€air€bag.ÌÌà àAlternatively,€the€prudent€manufacturer€test€requires€proof€aboutÏthe€reasonableness€of€the€manufacturer€or€sellerððs€decision€to€market€aÏproduct€assuming€knowledge€of€its€dangerous€condition.€€What€the€buyerÏexpects€is€irrelevant€under€this€test.€€In€contrast€to€the€consumerÏexpectation€test,€the€prudent€manufacturer€test€is€more€applicable€to€thoseÏcircumstances€in€which€an€ordinary€consumer€would€have€no€reasonableÏbasis€for€expectations.€€Accordingly,€expert€testimony€about€the€prudenceÏof€the€decision€to€market€would€be€essential.ÌÌà àThe€straight„forward,€unambiguous€language€of€our€statuteÏestablishes€two€distinct€tests€for€ascertaining€whether€a€product€isÏunreasonably€dangerous:€€the€consumer€expectation€test€and€the€prudentÏmanufacturer€test.€€In€addition€to€having€completely€different€focuses,€theÏtwo€tests€have€different€elements€which€require€different€types€of€proof.€ÏThe€two€tests€are€neither€mutually€exclusive€nor€mutually€inclusive.€ÏWhile€the€statute€does€not€limit€applicability€of€the€tests,€the€prudentÏmanufacturer€test€will€often€be€the€only€appropriate€means€forÏestablishing€the€unreasonable€dangerousness€of€a€complex€product€aboutÏwhich€an€ordinary€consumer€has€no€reasonable€expectation.€€Likewise,€itÏmay€form€the€sole€basis€for€establishing€liability€for€a€product€whoseÏdangerousness€is€œthe›€result€of€a€latent€defect.ÌÌà àWe€decline€to€weave€the€two€tests€into€one.€€As€the€Oregon€courtsÏnoted€after€revising€their€previous€combined€approach:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]he€distinction€between€the€[two]€tests€is€notÏmerely€academic.€€The€result€in€some,€perhapsÏmost,€product€liability€cases€might€be€the€sameÏregardless€of€which€test€the€jury€applies;Ïnonetheless,€in€some€cases,€the€difference€in€theÏtests€can€affect€the€outcome.€€A€jury€might€wellÏconclude€that€a€product€is€not€unreasonablyÏdangerous€under€the€cost/benefit€calculus€of€anÏomniscient€reasonable€manufacturer€but€is€stillÏunsafe€in€a€manner,€or€to€an€extent,€not€expectedÏby€an€ordinary€consumer.€.€.€.€€The€difference€inÍperspective€„€ð ðreasonable€manufacturerðð€versusÏð ðordinary€consumerðð€„€can,€as€a€practical€matter,Ïmake€all€the€difference.ÌÌÓÓòòBurns€v.€General€Motor€Corp.óó,€891€P.2d€1354,€1357„58€(Or.€App.€1995).ÌÌò òà@ àó óB.€€Prudent€Manufacturer€Test€v.€Risk„Utility€Testò òà@ àó óÌà àHaving€concluded€that€our€statute€incorporates€a€test€other€than€theÏconsumer€expectation€test€for€proving€the€unreasonable€dangerousness€ofÏa€product,€we€turn€now€to€the€issue€of€the€relationship,€if€any,€betweenÏthat€test€and€the€risk„utility€test€urged€by€plaintiff.à àÌÌà àOur€research€has€revealed€that,€in€reality,€what€plaintiff€refers€to€asÏthe€risk„utility€test€is€more€correctly€an€analysis€which€involves€theÏbalancing€of€numerous€factors.€€Under€the€approach,€the€court€balancesÏthe€usefulness€of€the€product€against€the€magnitude€of€risk€or€dangerÏlikely€to€be€caused€by€the€product.€€òòProsser€&€Keeton€on€Tortsóó€699€(P.ÏKeeton€ed€5th€ed.€1984).ÌÌà àIn€order€to€determine€whether€the€second€test€in€our€statute,€whichÏwe€have€called€the€prudent€manufacturer€test,€anticipates€a€risk„utilityÏanalysis,€we€turn€to€the€most€commonly€used€description€of€both.€ÏGenerally€stated,€the€prudent€manufacturer€test€imposes€liability€inÍcircumstances€in€which€a€reasonably€prudent€manufacturer€withÏknowledge€of€a€productððs€dangerousness€would€not€place€the€product€inÏthe€stream€of€commerce.€€As€expanded€by€Dean€Wade,€the€test€hasÏevolved€into€a€consideration€of€various€œfactors›€which€must€be€weighed€toÏdetermine€whether€the€manufacturer€was€reasonably€prudent.€€The€factorsÏinclude€the€usefulness€and€desirability€of€the€product,€the€safety€aspects€ofÏthe€product,€the€availability€of€a€substitute€product€which€would€meet€theÏsame€need,€the€manufacturerððs€ability€to€eliminate€the€unsafe€character,Ïthe€userððs€ability€to€avoid€danger,€the€userððs€awareness€of€the€danger,€andÏthe€feasibility€of€spreading€the€loss.€€Wade,€òòOn€the€Nature€of€Strict€TortÏLiability€for€Productsóó,€44€Miss.L.J.€825,€837„38€(1973).€€Thus,€DeanÏWade€summarizes€the€test€as€follows:€ð ðA€[product]€is€not€duly€safe€if€it€isÏso€likely€to€be€harmful€to€person€[or€property]€that€a€reasonable€prudentÏmanufacturer,€who€had€actual€knowledge€of€its€harmful€character,€wouldÏnot€place€it€on€the€market.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€39„40.œ× ƒ; ××  ×›ÌÌà àIn€effect,€the€prudent€manufacturer€test,€by€definition,€requires€aÍrisk„utility€analysis.€€The€determination€of€whether€a€product€isÏunreasonably€dangerous€turns€on€whether,€balancing€all€the€relevantÏfactors,€a€prudent€manufacturer€would€market€the€product€despite€itsÏdangerous€condition.€€Naturally,€a€prudent€manufacturer€would€considerÏusefulness,€costs,€seriousness€and€likelihood€of€potential€harm,€and€theÏmyriad€of€other€factors€often€lumped€into€what€plaintiff€called€a€risk„utility€test,€òòseeóó€òòBank€v.€ICI€Americas,€Inc.óó,€450€S.E.2d€671,€673€(Ga.Ï1994)(citing€Preliminary€Draft€No.€1€(April€20,€1995)€œRestatementÏ(Third)€of€Torts:€€Products›€Liability,€ðð€101,€Reporterððs€Notes€to€commentÏœg).›€€These€factors€mirror€those€designated€by€Deans€Wade€and€Keeton€asÏappropriate€for€consideration€under€the€prudent€manufacturer€test.€ÌÌà àDefendantððs€argument€that€the€Tennessee€General€œAssembly›€couldÏnot€have€intended€to€include€the€risk„utility€œtest,›€œ(or€what€we€haveÏdetermined€to€be€a€risk„utility€analysis),€in€the›€1978€enactment€of€theÏProducts€Liability€Act€since€the€test€œoriginated€that€same€year× ƒ< ××  ×€is€notÏpersuasive.€€We€must€interpret€the€plain€language€of€the€legislation,ÏòòMercy€v.€Olsenóó,€672€S.W.2d€196€(Tenn.€1984),€and€we€must€give€effectÍto€ð ðevery€word,€phrase,€clause€and€sentence€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòTidwell€v.€Collinsóó,Ï522€S.W.2d€674,€677€(Tenn.€1975).€€Clearly,€the€legislation€includes€aÏsecond€test€to€determine€whether€a€product€is€unreasonably€dangerous.€ÏWhether€that€test€„€whatever€name€it€is€ultimately€given€„€is€the€same€as€anÏapproach€originating€elsewhere€is€of€no€consequence.€Ì›Ìà àIn€an€aberrant€move,€California€adopted€a€hybrid€consumerÏexpectation€risk„utility€test€that€shifts€the€burden€of€proof€to€defendant€toÏestablish€ð ðthat€on€balance€the€benefits€of€the€challenged€design€outweighÏthe€risk€of€danger€inherent€in€such€design.ðð€€òòBarker€v.€Lull€EngineeringÏCo.,€Inc.óó,€573€P.2d€at€452.€€Setting€aside€this€aberration,€it€is€obvious€thatÏthe€prudent€manufacturer€test€set€out€in€our€statute€and€the€analysis€whichÏplaintiff€refers€to€as€the€risk„utility€test€are€substantially€the€same.œ× ƒ= ××  ×›€€StatedÏmore€precisely,€we€hold€that€the€prudent€manufacturer€test€set€forth€in€theÏTennessee€Products€Liability€Act€requires€a€risk„utility€balancing€ofÍfactors,€including€those€factors€identified€as€part€of€the€Wade„KeetonÏprudent€œÌÌmanufacturer›€test.œ× ƒ> ××  ×›€€The€test€under€our€statute€does€not€include€a€shiftingÏof€the€burden€of€proof€to€defendant.€€Rather,€the€burden€remains€onÏplaintiff€in€a€products€liability€action€to€establish€injury€as€a€result€of€anÏunreasonably€dangerous€product.€€Plaintiff€may€meet€this€burden€eitherÏby€establishing€that€the€product€was€dangerous€beyond€that€contemplatedÏby€an€ordinary€consumer€(consumer€expectation€test)€or€by€establishingÏthat€a€reasonably€prudent€manufacturer,€assumed€to€know€the€productððsÍdangerous€condition,€would€not€have€marketed€the€product€(prudentÏmanufacturer€test€employing€risk„benefit€analysis).ÌÌà àOur€statute€does€not€limit€the€application€of€either€test€to€onlyÏcertain€types€of€actions.€€Nonetheless,€the€consumer€expectation€test€willÏbe€inapplicable,€by€definition,€to€certain€products€about€which€anÏordinary€consumer€can€have€no€expectation.€€Despite€the€potentiallyÏoverlapping€nature€of€the€tests,€plaintiff€here€relied€only€on€the€secondÏtest,€which€we€have€defined€as€requiring€consideration€of€numerousÏfactors.€€Our€statute€clearly€authorizes€plaintiff€to€attempt€to€establish€theÏunreasonable€dangerousness€of€a€product€by€employing€a€prudentÏmanufacturer€test€which€includes€a€risk„utility€balancing€approach.ÌÌà àThe€Clerk€will€transmit€this€opinion€in€accordance€with€Rule€23,ÏSection€8€of€the€Rules€of€the€Supreme€Court.€€The€costs€in€this€Court€willÏbe€taxed€equally€between€plaintiff€and€defendant.Ìà àà àÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àPenny€J.€White,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌœBirch,›€C.J.ÌœDrowota,›€œAnderson,€Reid,›€œJ.J.›ÌÌÌÌÌ