ÿWPC¤ A¹R¢eˆ¯²²ßa¤°Û]‹£H·!¡~à Æñ¨ü^ ú‡:Ü*ýŒ@Au¯†gÞ5% S¿Ç÷~o^lw ôൠƒ,ilTÇf©<õþÚ Ò$µ1…Ñ»æWŸYwsp@%Wf‚IçAZÎcÙ±·ò&V?ݺ5¯ªW¥{ºb4nßþæýÛù ë4«Šzh ü¹ÔJ·°\wlH§&ñø á5ˆVJcC`cÕ[hë·-©1Œ}RF#ž{#Å“T§µ’‚y‹ì¤)«óÌ=›×&»aiÚ}‡{lB6ñÚé9´‡7®à_¯`«ˆÜß ’%7óáŠàþ(Š)P‹§`yÃ3¦¡y$¸=TÿªÄ’ ^¶<Èe#uˆ î¾kêý!æºÐçhÿG©aº¢ú¢‰,îÍâÁÄ#–Ó÷|Ú»^Πmò¶ÿ ;Þ9y(KeyLhÝaI›n@ÈBuYl s·†<åÉS¼Ig1Ešbaáú9eF€yÑö4Øè[$9s„½fóËh4$Öß3ÀÌ ‡;S¦Ï.'ÓŠnë$œú ÕK£iM¼l 0<;…ÞJ`™](v³Â2Sä[€êKÕÒ¿õÍ;‚ÙÌ*# LU :W %‘ 04—4Ëßbî 0³ö 0D©íÂõÙ·‡w@ 0DW º › UU:VVVVÙ AQiƺ 0D€ 0DÄ B D/%% BT D3q˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX( ¤U$¡¡Ó  ÓF&tÔôÔô3|xêB- ù-(c(2÷ $¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô¥ôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ¸Ý ƒ’$ÝÓ  ÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô(ÌôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„2„101(a)€(Supp.€1998). ÏÝ ƒ’$ÝÓ  ÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô(ÌôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendant€had€been€charged€with€first€degree€premeditated€murder. }Ý ƒ÷ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô¥ôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝOral€arguments€were€heard€in€this€case€on€April€14,€1999,€in€Paris,€Henry€County,€as€part€ofÐ ,  Ðthis€Courtððs€S.C.A.L.E.S.›€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourtò ò€Aó ódvancingò ò€Ló óegal€ò òEó óducation€for€ò òSó ótudents)€project.€ ØBÙBÚBÛBDÜBDÝBÞBDßBàBÓ€êB($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó ° Ý ƒ’$ÝÓ  ÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô(ÌôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€rule€has€been€abolished€by€the€legislature€in€four€states.€€òòSeeóó€Cal.€Penal€Code€ðð€194Ð ,  Ð(West€1988€&€Supp.€1999);€Md.€Ann.€Code€art.€27,€ðð€415€(1996);€Mo.€Ann.€Stat.€ðð€565.003€(VernonÏ1979€&€Supp.€1999);€Wash.€Rev.€Code€Ann.€ðð€9A.32.010€(West€1988€&€Supp.€1999)(three„years„and„¼a„day).€The€highest€courts€of€four€additional€states€have€held€that€the€rule€was€abrogated€when€it€wasÏnot€included€as€part€of€a€comprehensive€criminal€code€adopted€by€the€legislature.€€òòCrossóó,€401€S.E.2dÐ $ ø Ðat€511€(Ga.);€òòCarilloóó,€646€N.E.2d€at€584€(Ill.);€òòPeople€v.€Brengardóó,€191€N.E.€850€(N.Y.€1934);€òòState€v.Ð â ¶ ÐHudsonóó,€642€P.2d€331€(Or.€1982).€€€Four€other€states,€Colorado,€Delaware,€North€Dakota,€and€Utah,Ð  t Ðhave€repealed€the€statute€which€had€codified€the€rule.€€òòMinisteróó,€486€A.2d€at€1200€n.4.€€The€rule€hasÐ ^2 Ðbeen€judicially€abrogated€in€ten€jurisdictions.€€òòSeeóó€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1218€(D.C);€òòJonesóó,€518€So.2dÐ ð Ðat€298€(Fla);€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773€(Mass.);€òòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€143€(Mich);€òòState€v.€Youngóó,Ð Ú®  Ð390€A.2d€556€(N.J.€1978);€òòGabehartóó,€836€P.2d€at€102€(N.M.);€òòVanceóó,€403€S.E.2d€at€495€(N.C.);Ð ˜l  ÐòòSandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2d€at€899€(Ohio);€òòLaddóó,€166€A.2d€at€506€(Pa.);€òòPineóó,€524€A.2d€at€1106€(R.I.).€Ð V*  ÐFinally,€the€Connecticut€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€rule€was€not€a€part€of€the€common€law€of€thatÏstate.€€òòValeriano€v.€Bronsonóó,€546€A.2d€1380€(Ct.€1988).€€Of€those€courts€which€have€squarely€faced€theÐ Ò¦  Ðissue,€only€one,€the€Maryland€Court€of€Appeals,€has€declined€to€abrogate€the€rule€and€deferred€toÏlegislative€judgment.€€òòState€v.€Minsteróó,€486€A.2d€1197€(Md.€1985).€€Shortly€thereafter,€the€MarylandÐ N"  Ðstate€legislature€abolished€the€rule.€€Given€these€recent€pronouncements,€the€Rhode€Island€SupremeÏCourt€opined€that€ð ðthe€long€life€of€the€rule€may€result€from€the€infrequency€with€which€the€issue€hasÏbeen€raisedðð€and€from€the€fact€that€courts€ð ðhave€not€been€given€the€opportunity€to€address€itðð€€òòPineóó,€524Ð ˆ\  ÐA.2d€at€1106;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773.€€ ÷Ý ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XçÓXXXÔÔ€J7 XXçÓÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XçÓX J7ÔÐ  ÐÌMay€24,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ÏÝ ƒ÷ $ÝÓ  ÓÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€ô¥ôXXÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€11;€U.S.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€10.€!"#&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd$$$$'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝñàBñ›ñàBñÑ, °ÑÑ` °ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÑ7€çÓXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€Ñò òÓ=€çÓXÐXdÐd=ÓñêBññàBñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E»- ` 8ttxPó, ð  rßñàBññêBññêBññêBññàBñ›ñàBñà@ž ž ÌàÔ‡¼Î'¼XXÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌñêBñœßt€ )>.*jx€;` `€€@E8{ ` 8ttxPp@ ð ; tß›ñêBñà@áá)ÌàAT€œJACKSONÔ#†XçÓX¼¼Î'þ#Ôó óˆÐ @  Ðà@FF&Ìà(HEARD€AT€PARIS)ˆÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÐ Ú ÐSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àÐ ìÀ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àò òFiled:€May€24,€1999ó óÐ Ò¦ Ðà Ø àAppellee,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð ¾’ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àÐ ¤x  Ðv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àSHELBY›€CRIMINALÐ Š^  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)ÌœWILBERT›€K.€ROGERS,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àHon.€œChriñØBñsñØBññÜBññÙBñtñÙBññÖBñoñÖBññÚBñpherñÚBññÜBññÝBñ€B.ñÝBññÛBñsñÛBññÞBñ›€ñÞBññßBñ€ñßBñCraft,›Ð V*  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àJudgeÐ <  Ðà Ø àAppellant.à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð "ö  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àÐ Ü  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€œ02S01›„9804„CR„00035à  # àÐ î Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:à ð àà H! àà  # àÐ  t Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àÌWalker€œGwinn›à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àJohn€Knox€WalkupÐ l@ ÐAssistant€Public€Defenderà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAttorney€General€&€Reporterà  # àÐ R& ÐMemphis,€Tennesseeà à àà 8 àà  àà è àÐ 8  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àMichael€E.€MooreÌW.€Mark€Wardà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àSolicitor€Generalà ð àà H! àà  # àÐ !Ø ÐAssistant€Public€Defenderà à àà 8 àà  àÐ ê!¾ ÐMemphis,€Tennesseeà à àà 8 àà  àà è àTodd€R.€œKelley›Ð Ð"¤ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌTony€N.€œBrayton›à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àNashville,€Tennesseeà H! àà  # àÐ œ$p ÐAssistant€Public€Defenderà à àÐ ‚%V ÐMemphis,€Tennesseeà à àà 8 àà  àà è àWilliam€L.€GibbonsÐ h&< Ð(Trial€Only)à 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÐ N'"  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àœ30th›€Judicial€DistrictÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAmy€œWeirich›Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àMemphis,€Tennessee€Ìà@ÌÌ.ÌàˆÌÌÌÔ€„´.„XXçÓÔÌÌà@VV(ÌàO€P€I€N€I€O€NˆÌÌÌÔ€XçÓX„„´.ÔÌAFFIRMED.à 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àœDROWOTA›,€J.Ð   7à,/9 ÐÓÓà Ø àThe€sole€issue€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€common€law€year„and„a„day€ruleÏis€currently€a€viable€principle€of€criminal€law€in€Tennessee.€€The€defendant€argued€inÏthe€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€that€his€conviction€for€second€degree€murder€shouldÏbe€œset€aside›€because€the€victimððs€death€did€not€occur€within€a€year€and€one€day€ofÏœthe€fatal›€stab€wounds.€€The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€rejected€the€defendantððsÏargument€and€affirmed€his€conviction€upon€finding€that€the€common€law€year„and„a„¼day€rule€was€abolished€by€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.€€For€theÏreasons€that€follow,€we€œhold€that€the€rule€was€not€abolished€by€the€1989€CriminalÏSentencing€Reform€Act.€€However,€the€justifications€originally€supporting€recognitionÏof€the€rule€have€been€eroded€by€advances€in€medical€science,€improved€trialÏprocedure,€and€sentencing€reforms.€€Therefore,€we€hereby€abolish€the€now€obsoleteÏcommon€law€year„and„a„day€rule.€€Because€the€rule€has€been€judicially€abrogated€byÏalmost€every€court€which€has€recently€considered€the€issue,€we€conclude€that€ourÏdecision€does€not€constitute€an€unforseeable€judicial€enlargement€of€a€criminalÏstatute;€therefore,€retrospective€application€of€this€decision€is€not€barred€by€the€exÏpost€facto€clauses€of€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Accordingly,€we€affirm,€onÐ  %ô Ðthe€separate€grounds€stated,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€whichÏupheld€the€defendantððs€conviction€of€second€degree€murder.׃ N×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כР¸(Œ" М̛à@óó)Ìàòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóˆÐ P,$"& Ðà Ø àThe€facts€relevant€to€the€legal€issue€in€this€appeal€are€few€and€undisputed.€€OnÏMay€6,€1994,€the€defendant,€œWilbert›€K.€Rogers,€stabbed€the€victim,€James€œBowdery›,Ð ô/È%* Ðwith€a€butcher€knife.€€One€of€the€stab€wounds€penetrated€the€victimððs€heart.€€œBowdery›Ïwas€treated€at€the€Regional€Medical€Center€in€Memphis,€and€during€a€procedure€toÏrepair€the€damage€to€his€heart,€he€went€into€cardiac€arrest.€€œBowdery›€wasÏresuscitated,€but€he€had€developed€cerebral€hypoxia,€a€condition€which€results€fromÏa€loss€of€oxygen€to€the€brain.€€Bowderyððs€higher€brain€functions€had€ceased,€and€heÏremained€in€a€comatose€state€until€August€7,€1995,€when€he€died€from€a€kidneyÏinfection,€a€common€complication€experienced€by€comatose€patients.€€€ApproximatelyÏœfifteen›€months€had€passed€from€May€6,€1994,€the€day€the€defendant€stabbedÏBowdery,€to€August€7,€1995,€the€day€Bowdery€died.€€However,€according€to€theÏundisputed€testimony€of€Dr.€Jerry€T.€Francisco,€a€pathologist€and€the€medicalÏexaminer€for€Shelby€County,€the€victimððs€death€was€caused€by€cerebral€hypoxiaÏð ðsecondary€to€a€stab€wound€to€the€heart.ððÌÌà Ø àBased€upon€this€proof,€the€jury€found€the€defendant€guilty€of€second€degreeÏmurder.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Relying€upon€the€common€œlaw€year„and„a„day›€rule,€the€defendant€assertedÐ T#( Ðin€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€that€his€conviction€should€be€modified€to€criminalÏattempt€to€commit€murder€because€the€victimððs€death€had€occurred€more€than€a€yearÏand€one€day€after€the€stabbing€incident.€€The€intermediate€court€rejected€theÏdefendantððs€argument€and€held€that€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989Ïabolished€common€law€defenses€including€the€year„and„a„day€rule.€€Because€theÏCriminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€became€effective€in€1989,€approximately€five€yearsÏbefore€the€defendant€committed€this€offense,€the€intermediate€court€also€rejected€theÏdefendantððs€contention€that€abolition€of€the€rule€violates€the€œex€post€facto€prohibitionsÐ ´1ˆ', Ðof€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€Thereafter,€we€granted€the€defendantððsÏapplication€for€permission€to€appeal€and€now€affirm,€on€different€grounds,€theÏjudgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.›ÌÌÌà@BB%Ìàòòò òYEAR„AND„A„DAY€RULEˆÐ (ü  Ðóóó óà Ø àIn€this€appeal,€we€are€called€upon€to€consider,€for€the€first€time€since€1907,€Ð Ô  Ðthe€common€law€year„and„a„day€rule€and€to€determine€whether€or€not€it€currently€isÏa€viable€rule€of€criminal€law€in€Tennessee.€€The€defendant€argues€that€the€rule€wasÏnot€abolished€by€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€because€it€relates€toÏcausation,€œwhich,›€according€to€the€defendant,€is€an€area€of€homicide€law€that€is€stillÏgoverned€by€common€law€principles.€€While€the€defendant€acknowledges€that€thisÏCourt€has€the€authority€to€abrogate€the€rule,€he€argues€that€any€judicial€abrogationÏof€the€rule€must€be€prospectively€applied€to€avoid€violating€œthe€ex€post€factoÏprovisions€of€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€In€response,€the€State€argues€thatÏthis€Court€should€hold€that€the€rule€was€abolished€by€the€comprehensive€CriminalÏSentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.€€Alternatively,€the€State€asks€this€Court€to€judiciallyÏabrogate€the€rule.€€The€State€asserts€that€a€judicial€abrogation€of€the€rule€can€beÏretrospectively€applied€since€it€is€not€an€unforeseeable€judicial€enlargement€of€aÏcriminal€statute.€€We€begin€our€analysis€of€this€issue€with€a€brief€overview€of€theÏhistorical€development€of€the€common€law€rule.ÌÌà@÷÷"Ìàò òòòA.€Historical€Developmentó óóóˆÐ À1”', Ðà Ø àThe€year„and„a„day€rule€is€deeply€rooted€in€the€common€law.€€Its€lineage€isÏgenerally€traced€to€the€thirteenth€century€where€the€rule€was€originally€utilized€as€aÐ d58+0 Ðstatute€of€limitations€governing€the€time€in€which€an€individual€might€initiate€a€privateÏaction€for€murder€known€as€ð ðappeal€of€death.ðð€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Jacksonóó,Ð ø Ì Ð528€A.2d€1211,€1214€(D.C.€1987);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Lewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€771,€773Ð Ä ˜ Ð(Mass.€1980);€òòPeople€v.€Stevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€1143,€145€(Mich.€1982);€òòState€v.Ð d ÐVanceóó,€403€S.E.2d€495,€497€(N.C.€1991);€òòCommonwealth€v.€Laddóó,€166€A.2d€501,€503Ð \0 Ð(Pa.€1960);€òòState€v.€Pineóó,€524€A.2d€1104,€1105€(R.I.€1987);€Comment,€òòTaming€aÐ (ü  ÐPhoenix:€The€Year„And„A„Day€Rule€in€Federal€Prosecutions€for€Murderóó,€59€U.€Chi.Ð ôÈ  ÐL.€Rev.€1337,€1338€(1992).€€The€ð ðappeal€of€deathðð€was€a€private€and€vindictive€actionÏinstituted€by€an€interested€party€and€derived€from€the€Germanic€custom€of€ð ðweregild,ððÏor€compensation€for€death.€€òòId.óó€€€ð ðAppeal€of€deathðð€actions€became€obsolete€and€wereÐ X, Ðabolished€in€1819.€€òòLewisóó,€409€A.2d€at€772.€€By€the€eighteenth€century,€however,€theÐ $ø Ðyear„and„a„day€rule€had€been€extended€to€the€law€governing€public€prosecutions€soÏthat€a€homicide€prosecution€could€not€be€brought€unless€the€victim€died€within€a€yearÏand€one€day€of€the€injury.€€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1214;€òòLewisóó,›€409€N.E.2d€at€772.Ð ˆ!\ ÐÌà Ø àThough€the€rule€began€in€England,€its€applicability€to€criminal€prosecutions€inÏthis€country€was€acknowledged€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€1894€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àIn€cases€of€murder€the€rule€at€common€law€undoubtedly€was€that€noÏperson€should€be€adjudged€ð ðby€any€act€whatever€to€kill€another€whoÏdoes€not€die€by€it€within€a€year€and€a€day€thereafter.€.€.€.ðð€€And€such€isÏthe€rule€in€this€country€in€prosecutions€for€murder,€except€inÏjurisdictions€where€it€may€be€otherwise€prescribed€by€statute.€Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓv.ÓòòLouisville,€Evansville,€&€St.€Louis€œR.R.›€Co.€v.€Clarkeóó,€152€U.S.€230,€239,€14€S.Ct.€579,Ð è/¼%* Ð581,€38€L.Ed.€422€(1894)€(citations€omitted)€(civil€wrongful€death€action).€€€TheÏviability€of€the€rule€in€Tennessee€was€recognized€in€òòPercer€v.€Stateóó,€118€Tenn.€765,Ð €3T). М777,›€103€S.W.€780,€782€(1907),€in€which€this€Court,€quoting€òòWharton€on€Homicideóó,Ð L5 +0 Ðstated:€ð ð[i]n€murder,€the€death€must€be€proven€to€have€taken€place€within€a€year€andÏa€day€from€the€date€of€the€injury€received.ðð€€Sixty„seven€years€passed€before€the€ruleÏwas€next€mentioned€by€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€òòSeeóó€òòCole€v.€Stateóó,€512Ð Ä ˜ ÐS.W.2d€598,€601€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1974)€(ð ðThe€common€law€provides€that€deathÏmust€ensue€within€a€year€and€a€day€from€the€infliction€of€the€mortal€wound€toÏconstitute€punishable€œhomicide.ðð).€€Our›€research€œof€reported€cases€reveals›€œthat€the›Ïrule€was€most€recently€invoked€by€a€defendant€in€a€1995€decision€of€the€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals,€òòState€v.€Ruaneóó,€912€S.W.2d€766,€774€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€Ð À”  ÐIn€òòRuaneóó,€as€here,€the€intermediate€court€opined€that€the€common€law€rule€had€beenÐ Œ` Ðabolished€by€enactment€of€the€œ1989€Criminal›€Sentencing€Reform€œAct.€€òòId.óó›€Ð X, ÐInterestingly,€the€discussion€of€the€rule€in€each€of€these€cases€appears€to€be€dicta.€ÏIt€was€not€a€ground€upon€which€the€decision€rested.€€Despite€the€paucity€of€case€law,Ïboth€parties€to€this€appeal€agree€that€the€year„and„a„day€rule€was€a€part€of€theÏcommon€law€of€this€State.ÌÌà Ø àThree€justifications€are€ordinarily€given€for€the€common€law€rule.€€The€first€andÏmost€often€cited€justification€is€that€thirteenth€century€medical€science€was€incapableÏof€establishing€causation€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€when€a€great€deal€of€time€hadÏelapsed€between€the€injury€to€the€victim€and€the€victimððs€death.€€Therefore,€it€wasÏpresumed€that€a€death€which€occurred€more€than€a€year€and€one€day€from€theÏassault€or€injury€was€due€to€natural€causes€rather€than€criminal€conduct.€€òòSeeóó€òòStateÐ .ð#( Ðv.€Ruaneóó,€912€S.W.2d€766,€774€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€òòPeople€v.€Snipeóó,€192Ð è/¼%* ÐCal.Rptr.€6,€7€œ(Ca.›€œCt.›€App.€1972);€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1216;€òòJones€v.€Duggeróó,€518Ð ´1ˆ', ÐSo.2d€295,€296€(Fla.€Ct.€App.€1987);€òòState€v.€Crossóó,€401€S.E.2d€510,€511€(Ga.€1991);Ð €3T). ÐòòPeople€v.€Carrilloóó,€646€N.E.2d€582,€584€(Ill.€1995);€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773;Ð L5 +0 ÐòòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€145;€òòState€v.€Gabehartóó,€836€P.2d€102,€105€(N.M.€Ct.€App.Ð ,  Ð1992);€òòVanceóó,€403€S.E.2d€at€495;€òòState€v.€Hefleróó,€310€S.E.2d,€313€(N.C.€1984);€òòStateÐ ø Ì Ðv.€Sandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2d€898,€899€(Ohio€Ct.€C.P.€1977);€òòLaddóó,€166€A.2d€at€506;Ð Ä ˜ ÐòòPineóó,€524€A.2d€at€1106.Ð d ÐÌà Ø àœSecond,€it€has€often›€œbeen›€said€that€the€rule€arose€from€the€early€function€of€theÏjury€as€a€reporter€of€the€happenings€of€the€vicinage.€€Even€if€expert€medical€testimonyÏhad€been€adequate€to€establish€causation€at€common€law,€it€would€not€have€beenÏadmissible.€€Unlike€current€procedure,€in€early€English€courts,€jurors€were€requiredÏto€rely€upon€their€own€knowledge€to€reach€a€verdict,€and€they€could€not€rely€upon€theÏtestimony€of€witnesses€having€personal€knowledge€of€the€facts€or€upon€expert€opinionÏtestimony.€€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1216;€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773;€òòStevensonóó,€331Ð ðÄ ÐN.W.2d€at€145„46;€òòSandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2d€at€899.Ð ¼ ÐÌà Ø àFinally,€the€rule€has€occasionally€been€characterized€as€an€attempt€toÏameliorate€the€harshness€of€the€common€law€practice€œof€indiscriminately›€imposingÏthe€death€penalty€for€all€homicides€„€first€degree€murder€and€manslaughter€alike.€ÏòòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1216;€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773;€òòHefleróó,€310€S.E.2d€at€313;€Ð ¸(Œ" ÐòòLaddóó,€166€A.2d€at€506.€€œÐ „*X $ ÐÌ›à@••&Ìàòòò òB.€Modern€Statusóóó óˆÐ .ð#( Ðà Ø àDespite€its€early€common€law€recognition€and€near€universal€acceptance,€theÏâ ârule€has€fallen€into€disfavor€and€has€been€legislatively€or€judicially€abrogated€by€theÐ À1”', Ðvast€majority€of€jurisdictions€which€have€recently€considered€the€issue.œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€Most€courtsÐ ,  Ðâ âdescribe€the€rule€as€outmoded€and€obsolete€since€the€reasons€justifying€itsÏrecognition€no€longer€œexist.€€In›€characterizing€the€rule€as€an€anachronism,€courts€haveÏparticularly€emphasized€the€many€advances€of€medical€science.€€For€example,€the€ÏOhio€Court€of€Common€Pleas€stated:ÌÓӜ̛à8 Ø à[t]oday,€the€retention€of€the€ð ðyear€and€a€dayðð€rule€is€clearly€anÏanachronism.€€The€jury€may€now€rely€on€the€testimony€of€expertÏwitnesses€and€need€not€decide€issues€on€the€basis€of€their€ownÏindividual€knowledge.€€Furthermore,€since€great€advances€have€beenÏmade€in€scientific€crime€detection€and€scientific€medicine,€the€doubtÏthat€a€mortal€blow€is€the€cause€of€death,€when€death€ensues€a€year€andÏa€day€after€the€blow,€has€been€largely€removed.€€Consequently,€aÏperiod€of€a€year€and€a€day€after€which€death€is€conclusively€presumedÏto€result€from€natural€causes€is€no€longer€realistic.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÓDCÓœÌòòSandridgeóó,›€365€N.E.2d€at€899.€€Likewise,€in€holding€that€the€rule€had€been€implicitlyÐ ðÄ Ðabrogated€by€its€omission€from€a€comprehensive€criminal€code€enacted€by€theÏlegislature,€the€Illinois€Supreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø à[m]oreover,€we€note€the€legislatureððs€wisdom€in€abolishing€the€year„¼and„a„day€rule.€€It€was€a€remnant€from€the€days€when€medicine€andÏscience,€both€as€to€diagnosis€and€treatment,€were€so€unsophisticatedÐ  %ô Ðthat€mortally€wounded€persons€commonly€died€shortly€after€theÏinfliction€of€a€grievous€wound.€€In€such€circumstances,€it€wasÏreasonable€to€presume€that€if€a€wounded€person€died€more€than€a€yearÏfrom€the€time€of€the€wound,€the€cause€of€death€was€other€than€theÏwound.€€Modern€medicine,€however,€allows€doctors€to€employ€a€varietyÏof€extraordinary,€even€heroic,€means€to€save€and€prolong€the€lives€ofÏvictims€for€years,€as€opposed€to€days€or€months.€€Also,€diagnostic€post„¼mortem€pathological€procedures€can€now€discover€and€define€theÏcause€of€death€with€great€particularity€and€precision.€€Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÓÓFÓÌòòCarilloóó,€646€N.E.2d€at€585.€€Similarly,€in€judicially€abrogating€the€rule,€the€MichiganÐ â  ÐSupreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø à[t]he€advances€of€modern€medical€science,€by€extending€life€and€byÏproviding€strong€evidence€of€the€cause€of€death,€have€undermined€theÏwisdom€of€the€irrebuttable€presumption€that€the€death€of€one€whoÏexpires€more€than€a€year€and€a€day€after€receiving€an€injury€was€notÏcaused€by€the€injury.€€The€availability€of€modern€life€sustainingÏequipment€and€procedures€raises€the€specter€of€the€choice€betweenÏterminating€life„support€systems€or€allowing€the€defendant€to€escape€aÏmurder€charge.€€The€presumption€was€wooden€and€arbitrary€from€theÏbeginning,€since€it€prevented€a€murder€conviction€even€in€those€rareÏcases€when€causation€could€be€proved.€€Now,€when€medical€causationÏcan€be€proven€with€much€greater€frequency€and€certainty,€the€old€ruleÏis€simply€too€often€demonstrably€wrong€to€be€upheld.Ð Ø À!Ø À! ÐÌÓÙJÓòòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€146.€€The€North€Carolina€Supreme€Court€took€ð ðjudicial€Ð T#( Ðnotice€of€the€rapid€development€and€proliferation€of€the€art€and€science€of€medicineÏand€crime€detection,ðð€and€stated:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àSophisticated€medical€tests,€analyses,€and€diagnoses€allow€positiveÏevidence€to€be€presented€to€a€jury€on€questions€of€causation€in€criminalÏprosecutions.€€For€the€courts€to€remain€judicially€oblivious€of€theseÏadvances€when€considering€whether€to€extend€an€ancient€common€lawÏrule€would€be€folly.€€We€must€let€the€light€of€scientific€developmentÏilluminate€the€legal€issues€of€today.€€It€would€be€incongruous€indeedÏthat€medical€science€has€developed€to€the€point€that€it€may€prolongÏhuman€life€for€long€periods€if€that€same€development€be€utilized€to€barÏconviction€of€a€killer€by€prolonging€the€life€of€his€victim.€€Ó)OÓÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐòòHefleróó,€310€S.E.2d€at€313.€€€Finally,€the€Massachusetts€Supreme€Court€observed€thatÐ ´1ˆ', Ðthe€rule€is€ð ðanachronisticðð€considering€ð ðthe€advances€of€medical€and€related€scienceÏin€solving€etiological€problems€as€well€as€in€sustaining€or€prolonging€life€in€the€faceÐ L5 +0 Ðof€trauma€or€diseaseðð€and€emphasized€that€ð ðthe€relatively€short€time€limit€is€seen€asÏnot€only€capricious€but€as€senselessly€indulgent€toward€homicidal€malefactors.ððÏòòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€773.Ð Ä ˜ ÐÌà Ø àAlthough€the€rule€has€been€judicially€abrogated€in€a€number€of€jurisdictions,Ïnone€of€those€courts€have€adopted€a€new€time€limit€to€replace€the€year„and„a„dayÏrule.€€In€declining€to€do€so,€courts€emphasize€that€no€arbitrary€time€frame€is€neededÏbecause€abolition€of€the€year„and„a„day€rule€does€not€relieve€the€State€of€its€burdenÏof€proving€causation€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€atÐ Œ` Ð1218€(ð ðNor€is€it€to€suggest€that€abrogation€of€the€rule€would€remove€all€limitations€onÏassessing€culpability;€limitations€necessarily€would€exist€by€virtue€of€the€requirementsÏof€due€process€and€the€governmentððs€burden€to€prove€causation€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.ðð);€òòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€146€(ð ðOf€course,€abolition€of€the€ruleÐ ¼ Ðwould€not€relieve€the€prosecution€of€its€duty€to€prove€all€of€the€elements€of€the€crime,Ïincluding€proximate€causation,€beyond€a€reasonable€œdoubt.ðð);›€òòSandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2dÐ T#( Ðat€899€(ð ðFinally,€it€must€be€emphasized€that€the€refusal€to€apply€the€ððyear€and€a€dayððÏrule€does€not€deprive€the€defendant€of€any€fundamental€right.€€In€all€homicide€cases,Ïthe€burden€always€falls€upon€the€prosecution€to€prove€proximate€causation€that€deathÏflowed€from€the€wrongful€act€of€the€defendant.€€That€must€be€the€critical€determinant,Ïand€not€the€expiration€of€some€archaic,€arbitrary€time€period.ðð).€€These€courts€also€Ïœpoint€out›€that€there€is€no€statute€of€limitations€for€murder€prosecutions€and€find€Ïimplementation€of€an€arbitrary€time€limit€which€bars€murder€prosecutions€if€the€victimÏdoes€not€die€within€a€specified€period€of€time€inconsistent€with€public€policy.€€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óóÐ ´1ˆ', ÐòòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€146€(ð ðNo€repose€or€statute€of€limitations€is€available€forÐ €3T). Ðmurder€in€this€state.ðð);€òòLaddóó,€166€A.2d€at€506€(ð ðSociety€is€free€to€prosecute€murderersÐ L5 +0 Ðwithout€a€statutory€limitation,€and€it€is€possible€that€evidence€and€witnesses€may€beÏlost€during€a€long€interval€between€crime€and€trial.€€It€is€therefore€not€a€strange€ideaÏto€put€no€restriction€of€time€upon€the€death€of€the€victim€and€to€require€only€proof€ofÏcausation€of€conventional€quality€at€the€œtrial.ðð).›€ÌÌà Ø àTherefore,€regardless€of€whether€its€demise€was€achieved€by€legislative€orÏjudicial€action,€in€other€jurisdictions,€abolition€of€the€year„and„a„day€rule€has€notÏaltered€the€general€principle€that€causation€be€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€ÏIts€abolition€simply€allows€the€State€to€have€the€opportunity€to€attempt€to€proveÏcausation.€€Having€considered€the€historical€development€of€the€rule€and€the€modernÏtrend€away€from€application€of€the€rule,€we€must€next€decide€whether€the€year„and„a„¼day€rule€remains€viable€in€Tennessee.ÌÌÌà@÷÷%Ìàòòò òC.€Tennessee€StatusóóˆÐ T#( Ðà Ø àó 󜀀The€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€in€this€case€held€that€the€year„and„a„day€ruleÐ ,% Ðwas€abrogated€by€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989.€€The€appellantÏcontends€that€the€intermediate€court€erred€in€reaching€this€conclusion.€€RogersÏargues€that€the€year„and„a„day€rule€is€not€a€defense,€but€a€substantive€principle€ofÏlaw€relating€to€causation.€€Rogers€argues€that€causation€is€an€area€of€homicide€lawÏwhich€is€still€governed€by€common€law€principles.€€Accordingly,€Rogers€argues€thatÏthe€1989€Act€did€not€abolish€the€common€law€year„and„a„day€rule€which€relates€toÏcausation.€€As€support€for€his€argument,€Rogers€relies€upon€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„¼11„104€(1997€Repl.),€which€provides€that€ð ð[t]he€provisions€of€this€title€shall€beÏconstrued€according€to€the€fair€import€of€their€terms,€òòincluding€reference€to€judicialÐ X5,+0 Ðdecisions€and€common€law€interpretationsóó,€to€promote€justice,€and€effect€theÐ ,  Ðobjectives€of€the€criminal€code.ðð€€(Emphasis€added).€€Rogers€contends€that€thisÏstatutory€section€is€further€supported€by€the€Sentencing€Commission€Comments€toÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„102€(1997€Repl.),€which€state€that€ð ðthe€commission€doesÏnot€intend€to€abrogate€the€interpretive€rules€developed€under€common€law€andÏspecifically€includes€such€interpretations€under€ðð€39„11„104.ððÌ€€€€Ìà Ø àAgreeing€with€the€defendant€that€the€year„and„a„day€rule€is€a€substantiveÏprinciple€of€law€rather€than€a€common€law€defense,€the€State€nonetheless€argues€thatÏthe€year„and„a„day€rule€was€abrogated€by€the€1989€Act€because€it€was€not€includedÏas€part€of€the€definition€of€criminal€homicide.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„201Ð $ø Ð(1997€Repl.).€€As€support€for€its€argument,€the€State€points€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„¼11„101(2)€(1997€Repl.),€which€states€that€one€objective€of€the€1989€Criminal€CodeÏwas€to€ð ðgive€fair€warning€of€what€conduct€is€prohibited,€and€guide€the€exercise€ofÏofficial€discretion€in€law€enforcement,€by€defining€the€act€and€culpable€mental€stateÏwhich€together€constitute€the€offense.ðð€€The€State€also€relies€upon€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„11„102(a)€(1997€Repl.),€which€provides€that€ð ð[c]onduct€does€not€constitute€anÏoffense€unless€it€is€defined€as€an€offense€by€statute,€municipal€ordinance,€or€ruleÏauthorized€by€and€lawfully€adopted€under€a€statute.ðð€€Additionally,€the€State€reliesÏupon€the€Sentencing€Commission€Comments€to€Section€102€which€state€ð ð[i]t€is€theÏintent€of€the€commission€that€common€law€offenses€be€replaced€with€statutoryÏoffenses€to€effectuate€the€goals€set€forth€in€ðð€39„11„101(1)€and€(2).ðð€€Finally,€the€StateÏrelies€upon€court€decisions€from€New€York€and€Georgia€which€have€held€that€the€ruleÏwas€abolished€by€passage€of€a€comprehensive€criminal€code.€€òòSeeóó€òòBrengardóó,€191Ð €3T). ÐN.E.€at€850;€òòCrossóó,€401€S.E.2d€at€511.Ð L5 +0 Їà Ø àWe€have€considered€the€provisions€of€the€1989€Act,€and€the€argumentsÏadvanced€by€both€the€defendant€and€the€State,€and€conclude€that€the€common€lawÏrule€was€not€abolished€by€the€Act.€€First,€we€agree€with€the€defendant€that€the€ruleÏwas€not€abolished€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„203(e)(2)(1997€Repl.)€which€providesÏthat€ð ð[d]efenses€available€under€common€law€are€hereby€abolished.ðð€€While€similarÏin€some€respects€to€a€defense€in€the€sense€that€it€precludes€a€conviction,€the€year„¼and„a„day€rule€is€even€more€powerful€than€a€defense€because€it€entirely€precludesÏa€murder€prosecution.€€Secondly,€we€disagree€with€the€Stateððs€basic€assertion€thatÏthe€rule€was€implicitly€abolished€by€its€omission€from€the€statute.€€As€the€defendantÏpoints€out,€causation€is€not€explicitly€included€within€the€statutory€definition€of€criminalÏhomicide;€yet,€the€State€conceded€at€oral€argument€that€the€common€law€causationÏrequirement€was€not€abolished€by€the€1989€Act.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Barnesóó,€703€S.W.2dÐ ðÄ Ð611€(Tenn.€1985);€òòState€v.€Randolphóó,€676€S.W.2d€943€(Tenn.€1984);€òòLetner€v.€Stateóó,Ð ¼ Ð156€Tenn.€68,€299€S.W.€1049€(1927);€òòCopeland€v.€Stateóó,€154€Tenn.€7,€285€S.W.€565€Ð ˆ!\ Ð(1926);€òòOdeneal€v.€Stateóó,€128€Tenn.€60,€157€S.W.€419€(1913)€(discussing€theÐ T#( Ðrequirement€that€causation€be€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt).€€Statutes€inÏderogation€of€the€common€law€are€to€be€strictly€construed.€€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.óó,Ð ì&À  Ð938€S.W.2d€404,€406€(Tenn.€1996).€€As€the€defendant€points€out,€common€lawÏjudicial€decisions€and€interpretive€rules€are€explicitly€approved€by€the€statute€and€byÏthe€Sentencing€Commission€Comments.€€In€addition,€criminal€statutes€are€to€beÏstrictly€construed€against€the€State€and€in€favor€of€the€defendant.€€òòState€v.€Alfordóó,€970Ð .ð#( ÐS.W.2d€944,€947€(Tenn.€1998);€òòState€v.€Boboóó,€727€S.W.2d€945,€952€(Tenn.€1987).€Ð è/¼%* ÐFor€these€reasons,€in€the€absence€of€a€statutory€provision€explicitly€abolishing€theÏcommon€law€rule,€we€are€constrained€to€disagree€with€the€Stateððs€assertion€that€theÏyear„and„a„day€rule€was€abolished€by€the€1989€Act.€Ð L5 +0 Їà Ø àThe€State€strongly€urges€this€Court€to€judicially€abrogate€the€common€law€rule.€ÏWhile€the€defendant€concedes€that€this€Court€has€the€power€to€abrogate€the€rule,€heÏnonetheless€argues€that€we€should€defer€action€on€this€issue€to€the€judgment€of€theÏGeneral€Assembly.€€Rogers€contends€that€the€General€Assembly€is€in€a€betterÏposition€to€determine€an€appropriate€substitute€time€limit€to€replace€the€year„and„a„¼day€rule.ÌÌà Ø àThis€Court€has€ð ðnot€hesitated€to€abolish€obsolete€common„law€doctrines,ðð€andÏwe€have€recognized€that€ð ðwe€have€a€special€duty€to€do€so€where€it€is€the€Court,€ratherÏthan€the€Legislature,€which€has€recognized€and€nurturedðð€the€common€law€rule.€ÏòòDupis€v.€Handóó,€814€S.W.2d€340,€345€(Tenn.€1991)€(internal€quotations€and€citationsÐ $ø Ðomitted).€€Indeed,€we€have€stated€that€ð ðwe€abdicate€our€function,€in€a€field€peculiarlyÏnon„statutory,€when€we€refuse€to€consider€an€old€and€court„made€rule.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Since,Ð ¼ Ðas€previously€stated,€the€year„and„a„day€rule€has€its€roots€in€the€common€law,€andÏhas€in€fact€never€been€a€part€of€the€statutory€law€of€this€State,€we€refuse€theÏdefendantððs€suggestion€to€defer€this€issue€to€the€General€Assemblyððs€judgment.€€ThisÏis€an€issue€of€law€over€which€our€review€is€particularly€appropriate.€€Accordingly,€weÏwill€next€consider€whether€the€rule€should€be€judicially€abrogated.ÌÌà Ø àWithout€question,€the€reasons€which€prompted€common€law€courts€toÏrecognize€the€rule€no€longer€exist.€€Medical€science€can€now€sustain€the€criticallyÏwounded€for€months€and€even€years€beyond€what€might€have€been€imagined€onlyÏa€few€decades€ago.€€Comparable€progress€has€been€made€in€the€development€ofÏdiagnostic€skills,€so€that€problems€of€medical€causation€are€more€readily€resolved.€ÏModern€pathologists€are€able€to€determine€the€cause€of€death€with€much€greaterÐ L5 +0 Ðaccuracy€than€was€possible€in€earlier€times.€€Moreover,€jurors€today€may€rely€uponÏexpert€testimony,€even€when€the€testimony€relates€to€an€ultimate€issue€of€fact€suchÏas€causation.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€704;€òòState€v.€Shuckóó,€953€S.W.2d€662€(Tenn.Ð Ä ˜ Ð1997).€€Indeed,€adoption€of€the€rules€of€evidence€has€made€the€admission€of€expertÏtestimony€routine.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcDaniel€v.€CSX€Transp.,€Inc.óó,€955€S.W.2d€257€(Tenn.€1997)Ð \0 Ð(discussing€admission€requirements).€€Finally,€the€death€penalty€is€no€longerÏindiscriminately€imposed€for€all€homicides.€€In€Tennessee,€the€death€penalty€is€aÏòòpossibleóó€punishment€for€only€one€type€of€homicide€„€first€degree€murder.€€Even€in€firstÐ À”  Ðdegree€murder€cases,€the€death€penalty€is€not€automatically€sought€by€theÏprosecutor,€nor€is€it€automatically€imposed€by€a€jury.€€The€defendant€is€given€a€juryÏsentencing€hearing,€replete€with€procedural€and€substantive€safeguards.€€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð (ü ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204€„„€208€(1997€Repl.€&€Supp.€1998).ÌÌà Ø àð ðWhere€the€reason€fails€the€rule€should€not€apply.ðð€€òòBrown€v.€Selbyóó,€206€Tenn.Ð Œ!` Ð71,€332€S.W.2d€166,€169€(1960).€€We€have€previously€observed€that€ð ð[a]s€a€living€andÏbreathing€thing,€the€law€changes€when€necessary€to€serve€the€needs€of€the€people.€ÏWhen€this€basic€purpose€of€the€law€is€slighted€or€overlooked,€then€it€loses€a€highÏdegree€of€its€majesty.ðð€òòDupisóó,€814€S.W.2d€at€345€(citations€omitted).€€Clearly,Ð ¼(" Ðadvances€in€medical€science,€improved€trial€procedure,€and€sentencing€reform€haveÏeroded€the€reasons€originally€supporting€the€common€law€year„and„a„day€rule.€ÏAccordingly,€we€hereby€abolish€the€common€law€rule,€and€by€doing€so,€join€theÏmajority€of€other€jurisdictions€which€have€recently€considered€the€issue.€€We€alsoÏreject€the€defendantððs€invitation€to€adopt€a€substitute€time€limit€to€replace€the€year„¼and„a„day€rule.€€We€agree€with€those€courts€which€have€held€that€no€arbitrary€timeÏframe€is€needed€because€abolition€of€the€year„and„a„day€rule€does€not€relieve€theÐ P5$+0 ÐState€of€its€burden€of€proving€causation€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óóÐ ,  ÐòòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1218;€òòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€146;€òòSandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2dÐ ø Ì Ðat€899.€€This€safeguard€is€sufficient€to€satisfy€due€process.€€Moreover,€in€light€of€theÏfact€that€there€is€no€statute€of€limitations€for€murder€prosecutions€in€Tennessee,׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð d Ðimposition€of€an€arbitrary€time€limit€to€bar€murder€prosecutions€if€the€victim€does€notÏdie€within€a€specified€period€of€time€is€not€consistent€with€public€policy.ÌÌÌà@ÖÖ!Ìàò òòòD.€€Ex€Post€Facto€Violationó óóóˆÐ Œ` Ðà Ø àHaving€determined€that€the€common€law€rule€should€be€abolished,€we€mustÏnext€consider€the€defendantððs€claim€that€the€ex€post€facto€clauses€of€the€state€andÏfederal€constitution€require€that€our€decision€be€prospectively€applied.€€The€StateÏasserts€that€abrogation€of€the€rule€can€be€retrospectively€applied€since€it€is€not€anÏunforeseeable€judicial€enlargement€of€a€criminal€statute.ÌÌà Ø àBoth€the€United€States€Constitution,€in€Article€I,€Sections€9€and€10,€and€theÏTennessee€Constitution,€in€Article€I,€Section€11,€forbid€the€passage€of€any€ex€postÏfacto€law€by€Congress€or€the€General€Assembly.€€An€ex€post€facto€law€within€theÏmeaning€of€the€federal€and€state€constitution€has€been€defined€as€one€thatÌÓÓà8 Ø àmakes€an€action€done€before€the€passing€of€the€law,€and€which€wasÏinnocent€when€done,€criminal;€and€punishes€such€action.€€Second,Ïevery€law€that€aggravates€a€crime,€or€makes€it€greater€than€it€was,Ïwhen€committed.€€Third,€every€law€that€changes€the€punishment,€andÏinflicts€a€greater€punishment,€than€the€law€annexed€to€the€crime,€whenÏcommitted.€€Fourth,€every€law€that€alters€the€legal€rules€of€evidence,Ïand€receives€less,€or€different,€testimony,€than€the€law€required€at€theÏtime€of€the€commission€of€the€offense,€in€order€to€convict€the€offender.€Ð ¦2z(- ÐÐ Ø À!Ø À! ÐÓ•‰ÓòòCalder€v.€Bullóó,€3€U.S.€(3€Dall.)€386,€1€L.Ed.648€(1798);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòState€v.€Pearsonóó,€858Ð  æ ÐS.W.2d€879,€881€(Tenn.€1993);€òòMiller€v.€Stateóó,€584€S.W.2d€758,€761€(Tenn.€1979)Ð Þ ² Ð(adopting€the€categories€identified€in€òòCalderóó€and€stating€that€ð ðevery€law€which,€inÐ ª~ Ðrelation€to€the€offense€or€its€consequences,€alters€the€situation€of€a€person€to€hisÏdisadvantageðð€constitutes€an€ex€post€facto€law).€ÌÌà Ø àAlthough€both€the€federal€and€state€constitutional€provisions€refer€only€toÏlegislative€acts,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€Fifth€andÏFourteenth€Amendments€prohibit€retroactive€application€of€any€ð ðjudicial€constructionÏof€a€criminal€statute€[that]€is€unexpected€and€indefensible€by€reference€to€the€lawÏwhich€has€been€expressed€prior€to€the€conduct€in€issue.ðð€€òòBouie€v.€City€of€Columbiaóó,Ð  Þ Ð378€U.S.€347,€354,€84€S.Ct.€1697,€1703,€12€L.Ed.2d€894€(1964)€(internal€quotationsÏand€citations€omitted);€òòaccordóó,€òòMarks€v.€United€Statesóó,€430€U.S.€188,€191„92,€97Ð ¢ v ÐS.Ct.€990,€992„93,€51€L.Ed.2d€260€(1977).€€Applying€these€decisions€to€the€facts€inÏthis€case,€we€conclude€that€judicial€abrogation€of€the€year„and„a„day€rule€is€not€anÏunexpected€judicial€construction€that€is€indefensible€by€reference€to€prior€law.€€PriorÏto€the€time€the€defendant€stabbed€the€victim,€the€common€law€rule€had€been€judiciallyÏor€legislatively€abolished€in€many€other€jurisdictions.€€òòSeeóó€Footnote€4,€òòsupraóó.€€SeveralÐ ž)r# Ðadditional€state€courts€had€held€that€the€rule€was€abolished€by€its€omission€fromÏcomprehensive€criminal€codes€similar€to€the€1989€Act.€€òòId.óó€€Moreover,€the€year„and„a„Ð 6- #' Ðday€rule€has€been€mentioned€favorably€in€this€State€only€once€since€1907,€and€thatÏstatement€is€in€a€decision€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€which€is€more€than€twentyÏyears€old.€€Our€research€indicates€that€the€rule€has€never€served€as€the€ground€ofÏdecision€in€any€Tennessee€case.€€As€previously€stated,€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÐ f4:*/ Ðin€òòRuaneóó€opined€that€the€year„and„a„day€rule€had€been€abolished€by€passage€of€theÐ ,  ÐAct.€€Though€the€decision€in€òòRuaneóówas€rendered€after€the€defendant€stabbed€theÐ ø Ì Ðvictim€in€this€case,€its€reasoning€reflects€the€uncertainty€surrounding€the€continuingÏviability€of€the€rule€in€light€of€the€passage€of€the€1989€Act.€€Given€the€fact€that€the€ruleÏhas€been€abolished€by€every€court€which€has€squarely€faced€the€issue,€and€given€theÏfact€that€the€validity€of€the€rule€has€been€questioned€in€this€State€in€light€of€theÏpassage€of€the€1989€Act,€we€conclude€that€our€decision€abrogating€the€rule€is€not€anÏunexpected€and€unforseen€judicial€construction€of€a€principle€of€criminal€law.€ÏMoreover,€we€emphasize€that€abolition€of€the€rule€does€not€allow€the€State€to€obtainÏa€conviction€upon€less€proof,€nor€does€its€abolition€impose€criminal€sanctions€forÏconduct€that€was€heretofore€innocent.€€Accordingly,€we€apply€our€decision€abolishingÏthe€rule€retroactively€to€the€facts€of€this€case€and€affirm€the€defendantððs€conviction.€ÏòòSeeóó€€òòSnipeóó,€102€Cal.€Rptr.€at€9;€òòSandridgeóó,€365€N.E.2d€at€899€(Ohio);€òòLaddóó€166€A.2dÐ ¼ Ðat€506€(Pa.).€òòButóó€òòseeóó€òòJacksonóó,€528€A.2d€at€1223€(D.C.);€òòLewisóó,€409€N.E.2d€at€775Ð ˆ!\ Ð(Mass.);€òòStevensonóó,€331€N.W.2d€at€148€(Mich.);€òòVanceóó,€403€S.E.2d€at€499€(N.C.);Ð T#( ÐòòGabehartóó,€836€P.2d€at€105€(N.M.);€òòYoungóó,€390€A.2d€at€559€(N.J.);€òòPineóó,€524€A.2d€atÐ  %ô Ð1107€(R.I.).ÌÌÌà@,,)Ìàòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óˆÐ P,$"& Ðà Ø àAfter€carefully€considering€the€entire€record,€arguments€of€counsel,€andÏrelevant€statutes€and€precedent,€we€hereby€abolish€the€obsolete€common€law€year„¼and„a„day€rule€and€apply€our€decision€retroactively€since€it€does€not€constitute€anÏunforseeable€judicial€enlargement€of€a€criminal€statute.€€Accordingly,€we€affirm,€onÏthe€separate€grounds€stated,€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€whichÐ X5,+0 Ðupheld€the€defendantððs€conviction€of€second€degree€murder.€€It€appearing€that€theÏdefendant€in€this€cause€is€indigent,€costs€will€be€paid€by€the€State€of€Tennessee.ÓÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌñÒBñÌÌÌÌÌñÒBñà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à____________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àJUSTICEÌÌñÐBñÌñÐBññÑBñÌÌÌñÑBñò òñÍBññÌBñVñÌBññÍBññÓBñÌñÓBññÓBñÌñÓBññÓBñÌñÓBññÓBñÌñÓBññÎBñCñÎBññÌBñoñÌBññÏBñncurñÏBñ:ó óÐ º Ž ÐAnderson,€C.J.ÌBirch,€Holder,€Barker,€JJ.ÌÓGÓÌÌ