ÿWPC/, …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU:Ýw@ 4W k 0Dz 0J¾ 0T 0^\ º 0h 0r* 0|œ 0† 0ž 1u. 0d£ B D3$U >WU*• 0@¿U*ÿB))DCRb• 0 â AMÌÞå ÃùÍÆá´èÖœXraÊ +"v~9#vÓ·$ AOŠ*ÆÙ* 0DŸ+ D/ã+ B,˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLNÒ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ]D]D]D]D ]D ]D ]D ]P ]D]Ó€Úƒç"#3|x](#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d$$$$'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d////7Border 1dd- ù-(’(2žq$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑȰÑÑÚ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€XžXXXÔÔ€ô2êôXXžÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€-0Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌò òOctober€6,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€,ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÔÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝOral€arguments€were€heard€in€this€case€on€April€15,€1997,€in€Chattanooga,€HamiltonÏCounty,€as€part€of€this€Courtððs€S.C.A.L.E.S.›€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourt€ò òAó ódvancing€ò òLó óegal€ò òEó óducation€forÏò òSó ótudents)€project.€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€R.€Evid›.€702.Ì ïÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€R.€Evid›.€704;€In€Tennessee,€the€only€ultimate€issue€about€which€an€expert€explicitlyÏcannot€offer€an€opinion€is€whether€the€defendant€was€or€was€not€sane€at€the€time€of€commission€ofÏthe€criminal€offense.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„501(c)(1996€Supp.).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€defendant€was€sentenced€to€serve€ten€years€on€his€conviction€for€solicitation€toÏcommit€first€degree€murder€and€six€years€on€each€conviction€for€solicitation€to€commit€especiallyÏaggravated€kidnaping.€€The€sentences€were€ordered€to€run€concurrently€for€an€effective€sentenceÏof€ten€years.€Ì ýÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€òòJonesóó€Court€defined€entrapment€as€follows:Ìà8 àà8 à[A]s›€a€general€rule€of€criminal€practice€and€procedure€entrapmentÏoccurs€when€law€enforcement€officials,€acting€either€directly€orÏthrough€an€agent,€induce€or€persuade€an€otherwise€unwillingÏperson€to€commit€an€unlawful€act;€however,€where€a€person€isÏpredisposed€to€commit€an€offense,€the€fact€that€the€lawÏenforcement€officials€or€their€agents€merely€afford€an€opportunityÏdoes€not€constitute€entrapment.ÌœòòIdóó.›€at€220€(internal€citations€omitted).Ì ªÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTo€the€extent€that€òòJonesóó,€òòsupraóó,€viewed€entrapment€as€an€affirmative€defense,€it€is€noÏlonger€applicable.€€òòState€v.€Shropshireóó,€874€S.W.2d€634,€638€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).Ì ÌÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝA€defendant€who€intends€to€rely€upon€entrapment€must€give€the€district€attorney€general€aÏnotice€comparable€to€that€required€for€an€insanity€defense€under€Rule€12.2,€Tenn.€R.€Crim›.€P.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„505€(1991).Ì NÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€subjective€test€was€also€adopted€by€this€Court€in€òòJonesóó,€òòsupraóó.€€òòIdóó.€220„21.Ì WÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝOpinion€testimony€by€lay€witnesses€generally€is€not€admissible€and€is€circumscribed€byÏTenn.€R.€Evid›.€701.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSee€Note€3,€òòsurpaóó.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ À Ò›Ô€,ÔÑ€1ÑÑ7€v XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  Ñò òØ ØÓ&€..X°d&Ӝـ€ÙßR€340A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àÔ€,¼ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌò òà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEó óÔ€,XÔÌœà@ à(HEARD€AT€CHATTANOOGA)›ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòò òFOR€PUBLICATIONó óóóÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,òòà àóóà àà àœ)›à àœò òFiled:ó ó€October€6,€1997›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›Ìà àAppellantà àà àà àà àœ)›à àHon.€Ben€W.€Hooper,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àJudgeÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àœCOCKE›€COUNTYÌMERLIN€EUGENE€SHUCK,à àà àœ)›à àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àSupreme€CourtÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àà àœ)›à àNo.€03„œS01›„9607„CC„00071Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àÌÌÌòòÌÌœÌÌFOR›€STATE/APPELLANTà àà àœà àFOR›€DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:óóÌJohn€Knox€Walkupà àà àà àà àCharles€R.€TerryÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àDenise€S.€TerryÔ€,&ÔÌÔ€,XÔà àà àà àà àà àà àœMorristown›,€TennesseeÌÌMichael€E.€Mooreà àà àà àà àThomas€F.€BloomÌSolicitor€Generalà àà àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à(Appeal€Only)ÌÌGordon€SmithÌAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌÌMichael€J.€œFahey›,€IIÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌNashville,€Tennessee€ÌÌœAlfred€C.€Schmutzer,€Jr.ÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌJames€B.€DunnÌAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌFourth€Judicial€DistrictÌSevierville,€TennesseeÌ̛̜Ô€,„ÔÌÌ›à@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€,XÔÌÌœÌÌÌ›ÌCOURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALSÌAFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.€ÌÓÓà àThe€defendant,€Merlin€Eugene€Shuck,€was€convicted€of€one€count€of€ÏÑ , ÑÑ ` Ñsolicitation€to€commit€first€degree€murder€and€two€counts€of€solicitation€to€commitÏespecially€aggravated€kidnaping.€€The€defense€theory€at€trial€was€entrapment,Ïand€in€support€of€that€defense,€Shuck€sought€to€introduce€expert€testimony€from€aÏneuropsychologist€that€he€had€suffered€a€cognitive€decline€and€significantÏdeterioration€of€his€cognitive€abilities€which€rendered€him€more€susceptible€toÏinducement€than€the€average€person.€€The€trial€judge€refused€to€admit€theÏtestimony€finding€that€it€would€invade€the€province€of€the€jury.€€Concluding€thatÏthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€excluding€the€testimony,€the€Court€ofÍCriminal€Appeals€reversed€the€convictions€and€ordered€a€new€trial.€€Thereafter,Ïwe€granted€the€State€permission€to€appeal€to€consider€whether€expertÏpsychological€testimony€about€a€defendantððs€susceptibility€to€œinducment›€isÏadmissible€under€Tennessee€œlaw€to€establish€entrapment.× ƒ5 ××  ×›€ÌÌà àœWe€conclude€that›€expert€œtestimony€about€a€defendantððs€susceptibility€toÏinducement›€œgenerally€is›€admissible€if€it€ð ðwill€substantially€assist€the€trier€of€fact€toÏunderstand€the€evidence€or€to€determine€a€fact€in€issue,ððœ× ƒ6 ××  ×›€and€is€notÏobjectionable€merely€because€the€expertððs€opinion€embraces€an€ultimate€issue€toÏbe€decided€by€the€trier€of€fact.œ× ƒ7 ××  ×›€€Though€the€admissibility€of€expert€œtestimony€in€aÏspecific€case›€is€a€œdecision€which›€rests€in€the€discretion€of€the€trial€judge,€thatÍdecision€may€be€overturned€on€appeal€upon€a€showing€of€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏFor€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€œconclude€that›€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretionÏby€excluding€the€expert€testimony€proffered€by€the€defendant€and€that€the€errorÏwas€not€harmless.€€Consequently,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€reversing€the€convictions€and€remanding€for€a€new€trial.Ì€Ìà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àThe€defendant,€Merlin€Shuck,€has€worked€as€a€practicing€veterinarian€inÏMorristown€for€over€thirty€years€and€has€been€very€active€in€civic€and€communityÏaffairs.€€In€January€of€1992,€œShuck€hired›€Kathy€Waters€as€an€assistant€in€hisÏveterinarian€clinic.€€Waters€had€moved€to€Morristown€from€New€York€in€1991€withÏher€husband,€David€Waters.€€Prior€to€moving€to€Tennessee,€Kathy€Waters€hadÏbeen€successfully€treated€for€a€cocaine€addiction,€but€she€had€an€alcoholÏproblem€while€she€was€employed€by€the€defendant.€€ÌÌà àDuring€her€employment,€the€defendant€and€Ms.€Waters€developed€aÏrelationship€beyond€that€of€œemployer„employee.›€€Though€the€precise€nature€ofÍtheir€relationship€is€not€clear,€the€record€shows€that€the€defendant,€whileÏattempting€to€help€Waters€with€her€drinking€problem,€tried€to€get€her€involved€inÏhis€church,€persuaded€her€to€be€counseled€by€his€pastor,€provided€her€withÏairline€tickets€to€Florida€to€seek€a€reconciliation€with€her€former€husband€andÏchildren,€assisted€her€in€securing€an€apartment€after€she€left€David€Waters,€andÏprovided€her€with€money€to€buy€furniture€and€pay€debts.ÌÌà àThe€defendant€tried€to€manage€œWatersðð›€personal€relationships€as€well.ÏWitnesses€for€the€State€testified€that€when€Waters€œmissed€work€because€ofÏsickness,€Shuck›€would€go€to€her€apartment,€walk€in€unannounced,€and€berateÏWaters€and€her€husband€for€consuming€alcohol.€€When€Shuck€learned€thatÏWaters€had€developed€a€social€relationship€with€Robert€œCadman›€after€leavingÏher€husband,€he€continued€the€unusual€conduct€by€entering€their€apartmentsÏœunannounced,›€and€berating€the€two€of€them.€When€Waters€left€his€employ,€theÏdefendant€closely€monitored€her€activities€and€repeatedly€contacted€herÏsubsequent€employers€and€acquaintances€demanding€to€know€her€whereabouts.€ÏShuck€even€asked€the€local€cab€company€œto›€œrefuse€to›€transport€Waters€either€toÍœCadman›ððs€apartment€or€the€liquor€œstore.€€According›€to€the€owner€of€the€cabÏcompany,€Shuck,€who€was€a€city€councilman,€€threatened€her€with€politicalÏreprisal€if€œthe€company›€provided€Waters€with€transportation€without€hisÏknowledge.€€On€one€œoccasion,›€when€he€was€unable€to€locate€œWaters,›€ShuckÏposted€ð ðFugitive„at„Largeðð€posters,€and€when€œhe€found›€œher,€Shuck›€locked€WatersÏin€his€clinic€so€she€would€œð ðdry„out.ððÌÌà àThe€investigation€which€ended€with€the€indictments€for€solicitation€beganÏas€a€result€of€an€incident€on€May€18,€1993€when€Shuck€broke€into€CadmanððsÏapartment,€and€was€in€the€process€of€€forcibly€removing€Waters,€when€CadmanÏtelephoned€Emergency€911€for€assistance.€€The€Morristown€Police€DepartmentÏinitiated€an€investigation,€taking€a€statement€from€both€Waters€and€CadmanÏabout€the€incident€and€various€other€alleged€physical€assaults€by€the€defendantÏupon€Waters.€€At€that€time€neither€Waters€nor€Cadman€wished€to€prosecute€theÏdefendant.Ìà àÌà àBecause€Shuck€was€a€city€councilman,€the€investigation€was€transferred€toÍthe€local€district€attorneyððs€office€at€the€end€of€May€of€1993.€€€An€investigator€wasÏassigned€to€the€case,€but€discovered€no€additional€evidence€until€the€end€of€theÏsummer€when€the€investigator€first€spoke€with€Cadman,€who€gave€a€detailed,Ïthree„page€statement€accusing€the€defendant€of€assault,€breaking€and€entering,Ïand€abuse€of€power.€€Thereafter,€the€investigator€visited€Waters€in€the€KnoxÏCounty€jail,€and€was€told€that€Judy€McDaniel,€who€was€employed€by€theÏdefendant,€would€have€further€information€about€the€incidents.ÌÌà àIn€the€meantime,€the€allegations€and€events€had€come€to€the€attention€ofÏLawrence€Myers,€editor€of€a€local€newspaper.€€Myers€interviewed€Waters€andÏCadman€and,€beginning€on€August€24,€wrote€a€number€of€articles€about€theÏsituation.€€In€the€articles,€Myers€printed€a€transcript€of€the€911€telephone€call€andÏrecounted€the€allegations€which€Waters€and€Cadman€had€made€against€Shuck.ÌÌà àThe€official€investigation€continued,€and€on€September€6,€the€investigatorÏwent€to€McDanielððs€home€and€took€a€statement€from€her€concerning€WatersððÏallegations.€€Sometime€after€the€interview,€McDaniel€notified€the€investigator€thatÍthe€defendant€had€made€statements€which€could€be€construed€as€threats€againstÏWaters.€€McDaniel€thereafter€agreed€to€wear€a€body€wire€to€her€job€each€day€atÏthe€defendantððs€clinic.€€ÌÌà àOver€a€period€of€approximately€five€weeks,€McDaniel€taped€variousÏconversations€at€the€clinic.€€On€December€1,€McDaniel€informed€the€investigatorÏthat€€the€defendant,€in€an€unrecorded€conversation,€had€sought€her€help€andÏoffered€to€forgive€a€debt€she€owed€him€if€she€would€agree€to€help€him€get€rid€ofÏKathy€and€David€Waters.€€As€instructed€by€the€investigator,€McDaniel€engagedÏthe€defendant€in€a€taped€conversation€in€which€he€confirmed€the€offer€the€nextÏday.ÌÌà àFour€days€later,€on€December€6,€the€investigator€and€McDaniel€met€withÏofficials€from€the€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation€(T.B.I.›),€and€arranged€for€anÏundercover€T.B.I.€agent€to€pose€as€a€hit€man€in€a€meeting€that€McDaniel€was€toÏset€up€with€the€defendant.€€McDaniel€returned€to€work€and€offered€to€set€up€aÏmeeting€between€the€defendant€and€the€hit€man,€who€she€portrayed€as€œa€friend€ofÍhers€in€Cocke€County.›€€The€defendant€discussed€the€possibility€of€the€meetingÏwith€varying€degrees€of€certainty.€€At€one€point,€he€told€McDaniel€that€he€ð ðmayÏneedðð€the€hit€man€but€was€not€sure€when.€€The€defendant,€thereafter,€increasedÏthe€number€of€people€he€wanted€killed,€adding€Lawrence€Myers€as€a€third€target,Ïbut€he€lowered€the€price€he€was€willing€to€pay€McDaniel€for€her€ð ðhelp.ðð€€AtÏanother€point,€the€defendant€indicated€that€he€would€do€the€crime€himself.€€œAÏshort€time€later€he€expressed€renewed€interest€in€the€meeting,€but€said€he€wasÏtoo€busy€to€discuss›€the€possibility€of€the€meeting€that€week,€œand›€suggested€thatÏthe€ð ðhit€manðð€call€next€week.€€The€defendant€said€that€if€a€meeting€or€agreementÏcould€not€be€worked€out€ð ðthatððs€fine,€no€œproblem.ððÌÌà àThe›€defendant€told€McDaniel€on€œDecember›€15,€that€it€was€a€bad€time€andÏhe€could€not€meet€that€œday.›€€The€next€day,€œ€Thursday,€December€16,€the›Ïdefendant€said,€ð ðletððs€see€what€the€situation€is.€€He€might€not€want€to€do€it€underÏmy€œrequirements.ð ð€€Shuck,›€on€one€occasion,€said€the€hit€man€ð ðmay€not€want€to€doÏit€that€wayðð€and€ð ðthatððs€all€œright.ðð€€However,€later€that€same€day,€in€a€conversationÏthat€was€not›€tape„recorded,€the€defendant€agreed€to€meet€with€the€ð ðhit€manðð€œthatÍevening,€Thursday,›€December€16,€1993.€€œAs€arranged,€the›€defendant€met€withÏthe€undercover€agent,€paid€him€five€hundred€dollars€as€partial€payment€for€theÏmurder€of€œMyers,›€and€said€that€œthe€kidnapping€and€eventual€murder€of€Kathy€andÏDavid€Waters€would€be€deferred€until€after€Christmas.€€The€meeting€between€theÏdefendant€and€the€undercover€agent€was€videotaped€and€the€defendant€wasÏarrested€as€he€left€the€hotel€room€where€the€meeting€transpired.ÌÌ€à àThe€primary€theory€of€defense€throughout€the€trial€was€entrapment.€€InÏorder€to€support€this€theory,€the€defense€sought€to€introduce€expert€testimonyÏfrom€Dr.€Eric€Engum,€a€neuropsychologist,€that€the€defendant€suffered€from€aÏcognitive€decline,€and€the€significant€deterioration€of€the€defendantððs€cognitiveÏabilities€rendered€him€more€susceptible€to€the€persuasion€of€others€to€commit€aÏcrime,€and€particularly€susceptible€to€persuasion€of€a€trusted€employee€andÏconfidante.€€The€trial€judge€ruled€that€the€testimony€was€not€admissible€because€itÏwould€invade€the€province€of€the€jury.ÌÌà àBased€on€the€other€proof€in€the€case,€however,€the€trial€judge€found€thatÍthe€defendant€had€raised€a€viable€defense€of€entrapment€and€instructed€the€juryÏon€that€defense.€€The€jury€found€the€defendant€guilty€of€one€count€of€solicitation€toÏcommit€first€degree€murder€and€two€counts€of€solicitation€to€commit€especiallyÏaggravated€kidnaping.× ƒ8 ××  ×€€The€defendant€appealed,€raising€several€issues.€€TheÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€reversed€the€convictions,€concluding€that€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€excluding€the€expert€testimony€on€the€entrapment€issue.€€Thereafter,€weÏgranted€the€Stateððs€application€for€permission€to€appeal€to€consider€this€importantÏevidentiary€question.€€For€the€reasons€that€follow,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€theÏCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals.ÌÌà@ àòòò òENTRAPMENT€DEFENSEó óóóÌà àA€proper€understanding€of€the€evidentiary€issue€in€this€appeal€requiresÏthat€we€briefly€review€the€development€and€current€status€of€entrapment€as€aÏdefense€in€Tennessee.€€First€recognized€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòSorrells€v.ÍUnited€Statesóó,€287€U.S.€435,€53€S.Ct.€210,€77€L.Ed.€413€(1932),€the€defense€ofÏentrapment€has€been€described€as€ð ðvirtually€unique€to€the€criminal€jurisprudenceÏof€the€United€States.ðð€€òòUnited€States€v.€Websteróó,€649€F.2d€346,€348€(5th€Cir.Ï1981),€quoting€G.€Fletcher,€òòRethinking€Criminal€Lawóó,€ðð€7.3.B›,€at€541€(1978).€€PriorÏto€1980,€Tennessee€was€the€only€jurisdiction€in€the€United€States€which€had€notÏexplicitly€recognized€entrapment€as€a€defense.€€€òòState€v.€Jonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€209,Ï216€(Tenn.€1980).€€Finding€that€the€defense€was€being€applied€in€decisional€law,Ïthis€Court€in€òòJonesóó€expressly€recognized€entrapmentœ× ƒ9 ××  ×›€as€a€valid€affirmativeÏdefense€with€one€exception.€€Reasoning€that€ð ðone€may€not€be€solicited€intoÏsoliciting,ðð€the€òòJonesóó€Court€refused€to€recognize€entrapment€as€a€defense€to€theÏcrime€of€solicitation.ÓÓ€€òòÓÓœIdóó.€at›€220.ÌÌà àFollowing€this€Courtððs€decision€in€òòJonesóó,€the€law€of€entrapment€remainedÏessentially€unchanged€until€the€General€Assembly,€as€part€of€the€CriminalÏSentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989,€codified€all€the€available€defenses€toÏprosecution€in€Tennessee.€€Entrapment€was€included€as€a€general€defense€toÏprosecution€for€all€offenses€and€the€exception€for€the€crime€of€œsolicitation,›Ïadopted€by€œòòJonesóó,›€was€œnot€a€part€of€the€enactment.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Latham›óó,€910ÏS.W.2d€892,€895„96€(Tenn.€œCrim›.€App.€1995).€€Therefore,€entrapment€isÏrecognized€in€Tennessee€as€a€œgeneral€defense× ƒ: ××  ×›€to€solicitation.ÌÌà àAccording€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„505€(1991),€entrapment€occursÏð ðwhen€law€enforcement€officials,€acting€either€directly€or€through€an€agent,Ïinduced€or€persuaded€an€otherwise€unwilling€person€to€commit€an€unlawful€actÏwhen€the€person€was€not€predisposed€to€do€so.ðð× ƒ; ××  ×€€œUnder€this€statute,€inducementÍand€predisposition€are€the€crucial€factors€for€consideration.€€There›€are€twoÏrecognized€tests€for€determining€entrapment,€the€objective€and€subjective€test.€ÏThe€objective€test€is€the€minority€rule€under€which€the€fact€finder€focuses€on€theÏnature€of€the€police€activity€involved,€without€reference€to€the€predisposition€of€theÏdefendant.€€òòJonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€at€219„20.€€The€subjective€test€is€applied€by€aÏmajority€of€jurisdictions€and€requires€the€fact€finder€to€focus€on€the€subjectiveÏintent€of€the€defendant€to€determine€whether€the€defendant€was€predisposed€toÏcommit€the€criminal€œact,›€with€law€enforcement€officials€furnishing€only€theÏœopportunity,›€or€whether€the€defendant€was€an€innocent€person€induced€by€policeÏinto€committing€the€criminal€offense.€€òòJonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€at€219„220;€òòœLatham›óó,€910ÏS.W.2d€at€896;€21€œAm.Jur›.2d€òòCriminal€Lawóó€ðð€205€(1976).ÌÌà àEntrapment,€as€described€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„505€(1991),Ïrequires€the€jury€to€focus€on€the€subjective€intent€of€the€defendant€to€determineÏinducement€and€predisposition;€therefore,€Tennessee€applies€the€subjective€testÏof€entrapment.œ× ƒ< ××  ×›€€Establishing€susceptibility€to€inducement€and€persuasion€wasÍthe€purpose€for€which€the€defendant€sought€to€introduce€the€expert€psychologicalÏtestimony€which€is€at€issue€in€this€appeal.ÌÌà@ àòòò òADMISSIBILITY€OF€EXPERT€TESTIMONYóóó óÌà àThe€State€does€not€contend€that€expert€testimony€about€a€defendantððsÏunique€susceptibility€to€inducement€is€never€admissible.€€Instead,€the€StateÏcontends€that€the€trial€court€in€this€case€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€by€excludingÏsuch€expert€proof.€€Assuming,€however,€that€exclusion€of€the€testimony€was€error,Ïthe€State€argues€that€the€error€was€harmless€because€the€prosecution€proved,Ïbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€that€the€defendant€was€predisposed€to€commit€theÏoffense.ÌÌà àWhile€conceding€that€the€decision€of€whether€to€admit€expert€testimony€isÏgenerally€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€trialÏcourt€abused€its€discretion€in€this€case€because€the€only€reason€given€by€the€trialÏcourt€for€excluding€the€evidence,€that€it€would€invade€the€province€of€the€jury,€isÏnot€a€valid€basis€for€exclusion€under€Tennessee€law.€€€The€error€was€prejudicial,Íthe€defendant€asserts,€because€the€proof€does€not€establish€the€defendantððsÏpredisposition€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌà àThe€admissibility€of€expert€testimony€on€the€defendantððs€unusualÏsusceptibility€to€entrapment€is€a€question€of€first€impression€in€this€Court.ÏHowever,€several€œfederal€and€state›€courts€have€addressed€the€issue€andÏœconcluded€that›€the€admissibility€of€such€proof€is€subject€to€the€applicable€rules€ofÏlaw€and€evidence€which€generally€govern€the€admission€of€expert€œtestimony.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòPeople€v.€Masoróó,€578€N.E.2d€1176€(Ill.€App.€1991);€òòState€v.€Woodsóó,€484ÏN.E.2d€773€(Ohio€Com.Pl.€1984).€›ÌÌà àFor€example,€despite€concluding€that€the€trial€court€acted€within€itsÏdiscretion€in€excluding€expert€testimony€on€a€defendantððs€susceptibility€toÏinducement€because€the€defendant€had€not€given€the€required€notice€until€theÏsixth€day€of€trial,€the€Sixth€Circuit,€in€òòUnited€States€v.€McLernonóó,€746€F.2d€1098Ï(6th€Cir.€1984),€stated€that€ð ðexpert€testimony€concerning€a€defendantððsÏpredisposition€may€be€invaluable€in€an€entrapment€case.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€1115.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòUnited€States€v.€œBenveniste›óó,€564€F.2d€335€(œ9th›€Cir.€1977),€the€NinthÏCircuit€stated€that€an€expertððs€testimony€is€generally€admissible€on€the€issue€ofÏthe€defendantððs€psychological€susceptibility€to€inducement.€€However,€the€courtÏconcluded€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€œby›€excluding€theÏœtestimony€proffered€in€that€case›€on€the€grounds€that€it€would€ð ðconfuse€the€jury€andÏnot€shed€any€light€on€the€issue.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€339.ÌÌà àLikewise,€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Newmanóó,€849€F.2d€156,€165€(5th€Cir.€1988),Ïthe€Fifth€Circuit€concluded€that€when€an€entrapment€defense€is€raised,€expertÏpsychiatric€testimony€is€admissible€to€demonstrate€that€a€mental€disease,€œdefect,›Ïor€subnormal€intelligence€makes€a€defendant€peculiarly€susceptible€toÏinducement€if€the€expert€demonstrates€a€proper€factual€foundation€for€theÏœtestimony,›€either€through€personal€interviews€with€or€psychological€testing€of€theÏdefendant.€€The€trial€courtððs€exclusion€of€the€evidence€in€that€case€was€upheld,Ïhowever,€for€several€reasons€including€the€defendantððs€failure€to€notify€theÏgovernment€of€œhis›€intention€to€offer€the€testimony€until€after€the€government€hadÍrested€its€case€and€€defense€counselððs€failure€to€succinctly€and€clearly€summarizeÏthe€proffered€testimony€in€a€jury„out€hearing.€€œòòIdóó.€at›€165„66.ÌÌà àPerhaps€the€best€statement€of€the€relevance€and€general€admissibility€ofÏsuch€proof€is€contained€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Hillóó,€655€F.2d€512€(œ3rd›€Cir.€1981).€€InÏthat€case,€the€Third€Circuit€reversed€a€district€courtððs€ruling€that€the€testimony€of€aÏclinical€psychologist€was€inadmissible€to€prove€that€the€defendantððsÏpsychological€profile,€subnormal€intelligence,€and€susceptibility€to€persuasionÏmade€him€uniquely€susceptible€to€inducement.€€The€court€concluded:ÌÓÓà8 àTestimony€by€an€expert€concerning€a€defendantððs€susceptibility€toÏinfluence€may€be€relevant€to€an€entrapment€defense.€€An€expertððsÏopinion,€based€on€observation,€psychological€profiles,€intelligenceÏtests,€and€other€assorted€data,€may€aid€the€jury€in€its€determinationÏof€the€crucial€issues€of€inducement€and€predisposition.€.€.€.€€A€juryÏmay€not€be€able€to€properly€evaluate€the€effect€of€appellantððsÏsubnormal€intelligence€and€psychological€characteristics€on€theÏexistence€of€inducement€or€predisposition€without€the€consideredÏopinion€of€an€expert.ÌÌà8 àà àAccordingly,€if€the€expert€can€reach€a€conclusion,€based€onÏan€adequate€factual€foundation,€that€the€appellant,€because€of€hisÏalleged€subnormal€intelligence€and€psychological€profile,€is€moreÏsusceptible€and€easily€influenced€by€the€œurgings›€and€inducementsÏof€other€persons,€such€testimony€must€be€admitted€as€relevant€to€theÍissues€of€inducement€and€predisposition.ÌÌòòÓÓHillóó,€655€F.2d€at€516.ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€decisions€discussed€above€œand€conclude€that€the›Ïadmissibility€of€expert€testimony€on€a€defendantððs€unusual€susceptibility€toÏinducement€is€governed,€like€other€expert€testimony,€by€the€applicable€rules€ofÏlaw€and€evidence.€€Therefore,€our€resolution€of€the€issue€in€this€case€begins€withÏthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€œEvidence.›€€Rule€702,€Testimony€by€experts,€provides:ÌÓӜ̛à8 àIf€scientific,€technical,€or€other€specialized€knowledge€willÏsubstantially€assist€the€trier€of€fact€to€understand€the€evidence€or€toÏdetermine€a€fact€in€issue,€a€witness€qualified€as€an€expert€byÏknowledge,€skill,€experience,€training,€or€education€may€testify€inÏthe€form€of€an€opinion€or€otherwise.ÌÓÓœÌUnder€this€evidentiary›€œrule,›€œthe€inquiry€when€determining€the€admissibility€ofÏexpert€opinion× ƒ= ××  ×›€testimony€œis€will€the€proof›€œð ðsubstantially›€assist€the€trier€of€fact€toÏunderstand€the€evidence€or€to€determine€a€fact€in€œissue.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòMcDaniel€v.€CSXÍTransportation,€Inc.óó,€__€S.W.2d€__€(Tenn.€1997).€€Historically,›€expert€testimonyÏwas€admissible€only€upon€a€showing€of€necessity.€€Neil€P.€Cohen,€Donald€F.ÏPaine,€and€Sarah€Y.€œSheppeard›,€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€ðð€702.1,€p.€354Ï(2d€Ed.€1990).€€For€example,€in€1952€this€Court€held€that€in€order€for€expertÏopinion€testimony€to€be€admissible,€ð ðthe€subject€under€examination€must€be€oneÏthat€requires€that€the€court€and€jury€have€the€aid€of€knowledge€or€experienceÏsuch€as€men€not€specially€skilled€do€not€have,€and€such€therefore€as€cannot€beÏobtained€from€ordinary€witnesses.ðð€€òòœCasone›€v.€Stateóó,€246€S.W.2d€22,€26€(Tenn.Ï1952).€€While€the€substantial€assistance€standard€of€Rule€702,€Tenn.€R.€Evid.,€is€aÏrelaxation€of€the€common€law€necessity€requirement,€it€is€somewhat€stricter€thanÏthe€comparable€federal€rule€of€evidence€which€permits€expert€opinion€testimonyÏupon€a€finding€that€it€merely€assists€the€trier€of€fact.€€Fed.€R.€Evid.€702;€òòseeóó€œòòalsoóóÏòòMcDanielóó,€___€S.W.2d€at€___;›€òòœPrimm›€v.€œWickes›€Lumber€Co.óó,€845€S.W.2d€œ768,Ï770›€(Tenn.€App.€œ1992);€Weinstein,€òòRule€702€of€the€Federal€Rules€of€Evidence€isÏSound:€It€Should€Not€Be€Amendedóó,€138€F.R.D.€631,€636€(1991).ÌÌà àDespite€its€tendency€to€substantially€assist€the€jury,€only€expert€opinionÍtestimony€which€is€based€upon€reliable€facts€or€data€is€admissible€in€Tennessee.€ÏRule€703,€Tenn.€R.€Evid.,€permits€reliance€upon€facts€or€data€perceived€by€orÏmade€known€to€the€expert€at€or€before€the€hearing.€€Moreover,€if›€of€a€typeÏreasonably€relied€upon€by€experts€in€the€particular€field€in€forming€opinions,€theÏfacts€or€data€need€not€be€admissible€in€evidence.€€However,€Rule€703,€unlike€theÏcomparable€federal€rule,€œprovides›€that€ð ð[œt]he›€court€shall€disallow€testimony€in€theÏform€of€an€opinion€or€inference€if€the€underlying€facts€or€data€indicate€lack€ofÏtrustworthiness.ðð€€In€this€respect,€our€rule€expresses€a€greater€concern€with€theÏbases€of€expert€testimony€than€does€Fed.€R.€Evid.€703.€€œòòSeeóó€òòMcDanielóó,€__ÏS.W.2d€at€__;›€òòOmni€Aviation€v.€Perryóó,€807€S.W.2d€276€(Tenn.€App.€œ1990);€R.ÏBanks,€òòSome€Comparisons€Between€the€New€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€andÏthe€Federal€Rules€of€Evidence,€Part€IIóó,€20€Mem.S.U.L.Rev.€499,€559€(1990).›€ÌÌà àIn€contrast,€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€704€is€more€lenient€than€itsÏfederal€counterpart€with€respect€to€the€admissibility€of€opinion€testimony€on€anÏultimate€issue€to€be€decided€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€The€federal€rule€specificallyÏprohibits€expert€testimony€regarding€the€criminal€defendantððs€mental€state€orÍcondition€as€an€element€of€the€crime.€€Fed.€R.€Evid.€704(b).€€Under€TennesseeÏlaw,€ð ð[œt]estimony›€in€the€form€of€an€opinion€or€inference€òòotherwise€admissibleóó€is€notÏobjectionable€because€it€embraces€an€ultimate€issue€to€be€decided€by€the€trier€ofÏfact.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€œ704€(emphasis€added).× ƒ> ××  ×›€€With€respect€to€expert€testimony,Ïthis€rule€is€consistent€with€Tennessee€common€law.€€For€example,€this€Court€inÏ1977€held€that€ð ðan€expertððs€opinion€is€not€objectionable€merely€because€itÏembraces€an€ultimate€issue€to€be€decided€by€the€trier€of€fact,€so€long€as€it€isÏhelpful€to€the€court.ðð€€òòCity€of€Columbia€v.€œC.F.W.›€Const.€Co.óó,€557€S.W.2d€734,€742Ï(Tenn.€œ1977).ÌÌà àOf›€course,€expert€opinion€testimony€which€embraces€an€ultimate€issueÏœmust€be€ð ðotherwise€admissibleðð€and€not€objectionable€on€other€grounds.€€òòSeeóóÏòòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€ðð€704.3,€p.€365„66.€€Indeed,€this€Court,€in€òòState€v.ÏBallard›óó,€855€S.W.2d€557,€562€(Tenn.€1993),€concluded€that€€€expert€testimonyÏabout€symptoms€of€post„traumatic€stress€syndrome€exhibited€by€victims€of€childÏabuse€does€not€ð ðsubstantially€assistðð€a€jury€because€it€attempts€to€evaluate€theÍcredibility€of€witnesses,€a€task€which€a€jury€is€capable€of€performing€withoutÏexpert€testimony,€and€it€is€not€reliable€proof€as€to€the€question€of€whether€œa›Ïœdefendant€commited€the€specific€crime€of€which€he€or€she€is€accused.€€òòIdóó.€at€562;Ïòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€703.€€Under€Tennessee€law,€therefore,€expert€opinionÏtestimony€which€embraces€an€ultimate€issue€of€fact€is€not€automaticallyÏadmissible.€€Such€testimony€is€simply€not€subject€to€exclusion€on€the€sole€basisÏthat€it€embraces€an€ultimate€issue€to€be€decided€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€As€with€mostÏother€evidentiary€questions,€the€admissibility€of€expert€opinion€testimony€is€aÏmatter€which€largely€rests€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€The€trialÏcourtððs€decision€is€not€insulated€from€appellate€review,€however,€and€may€beÏoverturned€€on€appeal€upon€a€showing€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion.€ÏòòBallard›óó,€855€S.W.2d€at€562.ÌÌà àConsidering€the€foregoing€rules€of€evidence€which€govern€theÏadmissibility€of€expert€proof€in€Tennessee,€we€must€now€determine€whether€theÏtrial€court€in€this€case€abused€its€discretion€by€excluding€the€proffered€expertÏtestimony€about€the€defendantððs€susceptibility€to€inducement.€€Recently€weÍconsidered€the€abuse€of€discretion€standard€in€another€context€and€observed:ÌÓӜ̛à8 àDiscretion€denotes€the€absence€of€a€hard€and€fast€rule.€€WhenÏinvoked€as€a€guide€for€judicial€action,€it€requires€that€the€trial€courtÏview€the€factual€circumstances€in€light€of€the€relevant€legalÏprinciples€and€exercise€considered€discretion€before€reaching€aÏconclusion.€€Discretion€should€not€be€arbitrarily€exercised.€€TheÏapplicable€facts€and€law€must€be€given€due€consideration.ÌœÌÓÓòòÌBallard›€v.€œHerzke›óó,€924€S.W.2d€652,€661€(Tenn.€1996)€(internal€citations€omitted)Ï(discussing€the€standard€in€the€context€of€a€trial€courtððs€decision€to€modify€aÏprotective€order).€€We€concluded€that€an€appellate€court€should€find€an€abuse€ofÏdiscretion€when€it€appears€that€a€trial€court€applied€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€orÏreached€a€decision€which€is€against€logic€or€reasoning€that€caused€an€injustice€toÏthe€party€complaining.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àApplying€that€standard€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€we€agree€with€the€Court€ofÏœCriminal€Appeals›€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€excluding€the€expertÏpsychological€testimony€proffered€by€the€defendant.€€As€the€defendant€contends,Ïœthe›€trial€œcourt›€excluded€the€proffered€expert€testimony€on€the€sole€basis€that€itÍembraced€an€ultimate€issue€of€fact€to€be€decided€by€the€jury.€€From€our€review€ofÏthe€offer€of€proof,€œDr.›€Engum€did€not€seek€to€offer€opinion€testimony€on€theÏultimate€issue€of€whether€the€defendant€was€entrapped.€€Instead,€if€permitted€toÏdo€so,€Dr.€Engum€would€have€offered€opinion€testimony,€based€uponÏobservation,€intelligence€tests,€and€other€assorted€data,€that€the€defendant€hadÏsuffered€a€cognitive€decline€and€significant€deterioration€of€his€cognitive€abilitiesÏwhich€rendered€him€more€susceptible€to€inducement€œand€persuasion€than›€theÏaverage€person.€€Even€assuming€that€œDr.€Engum›€had€sought€to€offer€opinionÏtestimony€on€the€ultimate€issue€of€entrapment,€œ€such€testimony€is€notÏobjectionable€if€otherwise€admissible.€€As€we€have€previously€explained,€expertÏtestimony€otherwise€admissible€is€not€subject€to€exclusion€solely€because€itÏembraces€an€ultimate€issue€of€fact€to€be€decided€by€the€jury.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€704.€ÏIn€this€case,€the€trial€courtððs€discretionary€decision€to€exclude€the€expert€testimonyÏwas€based€upon€an€incorrect€legal€standard.ÌÌà àThe€record€does€not€support€the€Stateððs€contention€that€the€ð ðtrial€courtÏcould€have€reasonably€concluded€that€the€doctorððs€testimony€would€not€haveÍððsubstantially€assistedðð€the€jury€and,€in€fact,€could€confuse€it€on€the€ultimateÏquestion€of€inducement.ðð€€Indeed,€nothing€in€the€record€even€hints€that€the€trialÏcourt€based€its€decision€on€these€grounds.€€The€trial€court€acknowledged€that€Dr.ÏEngum€was€qualified,€stating€that€ð ðhe€is€as€qualified€as€anybody€I€know€to€testify.ðð€ÏNothing€in€the€record€indicates€that€the€defendant€failed€to€provide€notice€to€theÏState€as€required€by€the€statute.€€There€is€no€reason€to€assume€that€Dr.€EngumððsÏtestimony€would€be€confusing€to€the€jury€as€he€very€clearly€and€carefullyÏsummarized€the€testimony€in€the€offer€of€proof.€€There€is€no€suggestion€that€theÏfacts€or€data€upon€which€he€based€his€testimony€were€unreliable€orÏuntrustworthy.€€There€is€simply€no€reason€to€conclude€that€the€expert€testimonyÏfailed€the€substantial€assistance€test€of€Rule€702,€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€€Indeed,€as€theÏThird€Circuit€recognized€in€òòHillóó,€òòsupraóó,€a€jury€may€not€be€able€to€properly€evaluateÏthe€effect€of€a€defendantððs€cognitive€and€psychological€characteristics€on€theÏexistence€of€inducement€or€predisposition€without€the€considered€opinion€of€anÏexpert.€€òòIdóó.€at€516.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€byÏexcluding€the€€expert€proof.ÌÌà àHaving€so€concluded,€we€must€next€determine€whether€the€trial€courtððsÏfailure€to€admit€the€testimony€is€an€error€which€affirmatively€appears€to€haveÏaffected€the€verdict.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim›.€P.€52(a).€€The€State€œargues›€that€the€error€wasÏharmless€because€the€proof€shows,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€that€theÏdefendant€was€predisposed€to€commit€the€offense.€€We€disagree.€€ÌÌà àFactors€relevant€to€determining€a€defendantððs€predisposition€include€œ€the›Ïcharacter€or€œreputation›€of€the€defendant,€including€any€prior€criminal€œrecord;›Ïwhether€the€suggestion€of€the€criminal€activity€was€initially€made€by€lawÏenforcement€officials;€whether€the€defendant€was€engaged€in€the€criminal€activityÏfor€profit;€whether€the€defendant€evidenced€reluctance€to€commit€the€offenseÏwhich€was€overcome€only€by€repeated€inducement€or€persuasion€by€lawÏenforcement€officials€or€agents;€the€nature€of€inducement€or€persuasion€engagedÏin€by€law€enforcement€œofficials;€and€any€other›€direct€or€circumstantial€evidenceÏthat€the€accused€was€ready€and€willing€to€engage€in€the€illegal€conduct€inÏquestion.€€In€determining€predisposition€a€court€or€jury€should€consider€the€totalityÏof€the€circumstances.€€òòJonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€at€220;€€òòMcLernonóó,€746€F.2d€at€œ1112.›ÌÌà àEven€though€the€defendantððs€proffered€expert€testimony€was€excluded,Ïœbased€on€the€other€proof€introduced,€the€trial€court€charged€the€jury€on€the€issueÏof€entrapment.€€Moreover,€a€mere€reading€of€the€cold€record€reveals€that€theÏissues€of€inducement€and€predisposition€were€hotly€contested.€€€With€respect€toÏinducement,€the€record€shows€that€many€of€the€discussions€concerning€the€hitÏman€were€initiated€by€McDaniel.€€In€addition,€when€the€defendant€appeared€toÏwaiver€in€his€resolve€to€have€the€meeting€and€commit€the€crime,€McDaniel€wouldÏwarn€the€defendant€that€Waters€was€going€to€cause€him€trouble.€€McDaniel€wouldÏsuggest€that€Shuck€had€to€do€something€to€prevent€Waters€from€ð ðruining€yourÏlife.ðð€€McDaniel€indicated€to€the€defendant€that€he€needed€to€act€quickly€if€he€wasÏgoing€to€do€anything€before€he€was€ruined€by€Waters.€€Finally,€McDaniel€told€theÏdefendant€that€the€hit€man€was€behind€in€child€support€and€had€no€money€forÏChristmas€and€wanted€to€have€the€meeting€as€soon€as€possible.€€At€trial,ÏMcDaniel€admitted€that€she€had€tried€to€talk€Shuck€into€meeting€with€the€hit€man;Ïhowever,€McDaniel€said€that€she€was€concerned€for€the€safety€of€the€potentialÏvictims€because€the€defendant€had€mentioned€that€he€was€talking€to€someoneÍelse€in€Cocke€County€who€he€was€thinking€about€hiring€to€commit€the€murders.ÌÌà àOn€the€issue€of€predisposition,€the€record€does€not€reveal€that€theÏdefendant€had€a€prior€criminal€record€or€a€bad€reputation.€€Indeed,€he€had€been€aÏpracticing€veterinarian€in€the€area€for€thirty€years,€had€served€as€city€councilman,Ïand€been€active€in€other€civic€and€religious€organizations.€€The€defendant€wasÏnot€engaged€in€the€criminal€activity€for€profit€and€the€proof€was€disputed€as€toÏwhether€McDaniel€or€the€defendant€first€suggested€hiring€a€hit€man.€€The€durationÏof€the€alleged€inducement€by€McDaniel€was€lengthy,€some€five€weeks,€and€herÏposition€as€a€trusted€employee€made€the€inducement€more€effective.€€Finally,Ïduring€the€course€of€the€five€week€period,€the€defendant€expressed€reluctanceÏand€uncertainty€about€contacting€a€hit€man€even€up€to€the€day€the€actual€meetingÏoccurred.€€€Considering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances,€including€the€recognitionÏthat€without€the€considered€opinion€of€an€expert€a€jury€may€not€be€able€toÏproperly€evaluate€the€effect€of€a€defendantððs€cognitive€and€psychologicalÏcharacteristics€on€the€existence€of€inducement€and€predisposition,€we€concludeÏthat€the€trial€courtððs€exclusion€of€the€expert€testimony€was€not€harmless€errorÍunder€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).€€Consequently,€we€affirm€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals€judgment€reversing€the€convictions€and€remanding€for€a€new€trial.Ì€Ìà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àWe€conclude€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€excluding€expertÏtestimony€about€the€defendantððs€unique€susceptibility€to€inducement€on€the€soleÏbasis€that€the€expert€testimony€expressed€an€opinion€on€an€ultimate€issue€to€beÏdecided€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€Exclusion€of€the€expert€testimony€was€not€harmlessÏerror.€€Consequently,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Court€of€Criminal€AppealsÏreversing€the€convictions€and€remanding€for€a€new€trial.ÓÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àFRANK€F.€DROWOTA,€III,Ìà àà àà àà àà àJUSTICEÌÌÌò òCONCUR:ó óÌAnderson,€C.J.,ÌReid,€Birch,€Holder,€JJ.ÌÓÓ