ÿWPC&& …# VUNa %¯ 0 (µU:Ýw@ 4W k U<z 0D¶ 0Jú 0TD 0^˜ 0hö 0r^ Ð 0|Ø 0†T 0Ú 1uj 0dß BCU >`U*žU*È D3òB)%DCN 0@‘ AMÑ *b= 0âEÛ'ÖZس2çådÌv~0vÓ® AO$ÆÐ$ 0D–% D/Ú% B &˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ùCDúCDûCDüCDýCDþCDÿCDDDDÓ€ DDÒ #3|x D-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial< Œ 9p`(Times$$$$'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌMay€19,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝHereinafter€ð ðDavidson.ððÌ- ù-(’(27}$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑȰÑÑÚ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÔ€X=§XXXÔÔ€ôºôXX=§Ôà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÑÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝOral€arguments€were€heard€in€this€case€on€April€8,€1997,€in€Union€City,€Obion›€County,€asÏpart€of€this€Courtððs€œS.C.A.L.E.S.›€(ò òSó óupreme€ò òCó óourt€ò òAó ódvancing€ò òLó óegal€ò òEó óducation€for€ò òSó ótudents)Ïproject.€Ì ÌÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTo€maintain€this€delicate€balance,€this€Court€has€emphasized€that€the€exception€to€theÏemployment„at„will€doctrine€must€be€narrowly€applied€and€not€be€permitted€to€consume€the€generalÏrule.€€òòChism›óó,€762€S.W.2d€at€556.€Ì PÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòHennessy›€v.€Coastal€Eagle€Point€Oil€Co.óó,€609€A.2d€11,€17„19€(N.J.€1992).Ì ©Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThough€we€have€examined€and€studied€authority€from€other€states,€to€prevail€on€her€claim,ÏStein€must€point€to€a€clearly€defined€Tennessee€public€policy€€which€was€violated€by€her€dismissal.Ì ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€òòNational€Treasury€Employees€Union€v.€Von€Raab›óó,€489€U.S.€656,€109€S.Ct.€1384,Ï103€L.Ed.2d€685€(1989);€òòSkinner€v.€Railway€Labor€Executiveððs€Associationóó,€489€U.S.€602,€109ÏS.Ct.€1402,€103€L.Ed.2d€639€(1989).Ì ZÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ2$ÝÑ È ÑÑ Ú ÑÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÔ€(ÔÔ€(ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó€Conn.€Gen.€Stat.€ðð€31„51t›€to€œ„51aa›€(1992);€Iowa€Code€Ann.€ðð€730.5€(WestÏ1993).€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÝ  Ý›Ò € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€(ÔÑ€1ÑÑ7€FXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  Ñò òØ ØÓ&€))X°d&Óœ›Þ ÞÌà@ àÔ€(¼ÔIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌò òà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€(XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœà à›à àà àà àà àà àœ›à àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌEVELENE€N.€STEINòò,à àóóà àà àœ)›à àœò òFiled:€€May€19,€1997ó ó›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellantà àà àà àœ)›à àHon.€Hamilton€V.€GaydenÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àJudgeÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÌDAVIDSON€HOTEL€COMPANY,à àà àœ)›à àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à àSupreme€CourtÌà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àœ)›à àNo.€01„S01„9610„CV„00202Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)›à à̜ـ€ÙßR€./,A1-j|…õ:` ç `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌÌÌÌÌòòÌÌÌÌFOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTà àà àFOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:óóÌPatricia€A.€Montgomeryà àà àà àJohn€S.€Hicks,ÌWESTLAKE€&€MARSDEN,€P.C.à àà àÔ€(&ÔStephen€H.€BillerÌÔ€(XÔNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àKatherine€A.€BrownÌà àà àà àà àà àà àBAKER,€DONELSON,€BEARMAN€&€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCALDWELLÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€(„Ôà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÔ€(XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌTRIAL€COURT€ANDÌCOURT€OF€APPEALSÌAFFIRMED.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDROWOTA,€J.€ÌÓÓà àThe€plaintiff,€Evelene€N.€Stein,€a€private€employee,€was€terminated€fromÏÑ , ÑÑ ` Ñher€position€of€banquet€captain€at€the€Holiday€Inn€Crown€Plaza€which€is€ownedÏby€defendant,€Davidson€Hotel€Company,× ƒ0 ××  ×€a€private€employer,€because€sheÏtested€positive€on€a€random€drug€test.€€Stein€brought€suit€against€DavidsonÏalleging€seven€grounds€for€relief.€€Davidson€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€toÏstate€a€claim€and€the€trial€court€granted€the€motion€with€respect€to€five€of€theÏseven€claims€alleged€by€Stein.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment.ÌÌà àWe€granted€this€appeal€to€determine€whether€Stein€has€stated€a€cause€ofÏaction€for€wrongful€discharge.€€We€conclude€that€no€clear€mandate€of€publicÏpolicy€is€violated€when€a€private€employer€dismisses€a€terminable„at„willÏemployee€who€tests€positive€on€a€random€drug€test.€€Therefore,€we€affirm€theÏjudgment€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€SteinððsÏclaim€for€wrongful€discharge.× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌà@ àòòò òBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àStein€began€working€at€the€Holiday€Inn€œCrowne›€Plaza€on€June€6,€1989,Ïwhen€it€was€owned€by€œFlautt›€Properties,€Inc.€€Stein€had€no€written€contract€and€Ïwas€a€terminable„at„will€employee.€€In€September€of€1990,€œFlautt›€sold€the€hotel€toÏDavidson.€€Stein€continued€to€work€at€the€hotel€after€the€sale.€€In€February€ofÏ1992,€Davidson€instituted€a€drug€and€alcohol€testing€program.€€The€programÏincluded€pre„employment€testing,€reasonable€suspicion€testing,€after€accidentÏtesting,€and€random€drug€testing.€€Prior€to€instituting€the€program,€DavidsonÍrequired€all€employees€to€sign€a€consent€and€release€form.€€According€to€SteinððsÏallegations,€any€employee€refusing€to€sign€the€consent€and€release€form€wouldÏhave€been€terminated.€€Stein€does€not€contend€that€she€refused€to€sign€theÏconsent€form,€but€she€alleges€that€she€signed€the€form€only€because€of€theÏperceived€threat€of€termination.ÌÌà àIn€October€of€1994,€Davidson€advised€œStein,›€who€was€employed€in€theÏposition€of€banquet€captain,€that€she€had€been€selected€for€a€random€drug€test.€ÏStein€went€to€Roche€Biomedical€Laboratories,€Inc.€and€provided€a€sample€forÏurinalysis.€€Joe€Dietz,€Steinððs€immediate€supervisor,€thereafter€informed€her€thatÏshe€had€tested€positive€for€drug€use,€but€she€was€not€advised€of€the€drugsÏdetected€or€any€other€information€about€the€positive€result.€€Later€that€day,€SteinÏmet€with€other€Davidson€managers.€€She€denied€using€illegal€drugs€and€askedÏthat€she€be€given€an€opportunity€to€refute€and€disprove€the€positive€test€result.€ÏStein€wanted€to€employ€another€laboratory€to€test€a€different€urine€sample.€ÏDavidson€declined€to€approve€Steinððs€suggestion,€but€instead€offered€to€haveÏRoche€re„test€Steinððs€original€urine€sample.€€Stein€refused€that€offer.€€Thereafter,ÍDavidson€terminated€Steinððs€employment€as€a€result€of€the€positive€drug€test.Ìà àà àÓÓà àà àà àÌÓÓà àOn€January€9,€1995,€Stein€filed€this€action€against€Davidson.€€HerÏcomplaint€€alleged€several€causes€of€action€including:€(1)€wrongful€discharge€inÏviolation€of€public€policy;€(2)€tortious€invasion€of€privacy;€(3)€breach€of€an€impliedÏemployment€contract;€(4)€breach€of€an€implied€covenant€of€good€faith€and€fairÏdealing;€(5)€negligence€on€the€part€of€Davidson;€(6)€negligent€infliction€ofÏemotional€distress€and€outrageous€conduct;€and€(7)€failure€to€pay€Stein€earnedÏvacation€time.€€On€March€7,€1995,€Davidson€filed€a€ð ðMotion€to€Dismiss€or€forÏSummary€œJudgment.ðð€The›€trial€court€granted€Davidsonððs€motion€to€dismiss€forÏfailure€to€state€a€claim€as€to€counts€one,€two,€three,€five,€and€six€on€June€9,€1995.€ÏWith€respect€to€the€fourth€claim,€the€trial€court€took€the€matter€under€advisement,Ïand€with€respect€to€count€seven,€the€trial€court,€after€reviewing€affidavitsÏsubmitted€by€the€parties,€concluded€that€there€was€a€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact€€and€denied€the€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€trial€court€concluded,Ïpursuant€to€Rule€54.02,€Tenn.€R.€œCiv›.€P.,€that€there€were€no€just€reasons€for€delay,Ïand€certified€that€the€order€was€final€for€purposes€of€appeal.ÌÌà àStein€appealed€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€her€wrongful€discharge€andÏtortious€invasion€of€privacy€claims.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏdismissal€of€both€claims.€€Thereafter,€we€granted€this€appeal€to€consider€whetherÏStein€has€stated€a€cause€of€action€for€wrongful€discharge.€€In€resolving€thisÏquestion,€we€must€determine€whether€dismissal€of€a€terminable„at„will€employeeÏfor€testing€positive€on€a€random€drug€test€violates€a€clear€mandate€of€publicÏpolicy.ÌÌÌà@ àòòò òSTANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óóóÌà àA€Rule€12.02(6),€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€aÏclaim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted€tests€only€the€legal€sufficiency€of€theÏcomplaint,€not€the€strength€of€a€plaintiffððs€proof.€€Such€a€motion€admits€the€truth€ofÏall€relevant€and€material€averments€contained€in€the€complaint,€but€asserts€thatÏsuch€facts€do€not€constitute€a€cause€of€action.€€In€considering€a€motion€to€dismiss,Ïcourts€should€construe€the€complaint€liberally€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff,€taking€allÏallegations€of€fact€as€true,€and€deny€the€motion€unless€it€appears€that€the€plaintiffÍcan€prove€no€set€of€facts€in€support€of€her€claim€that€would€entitle€her€to€relief.€ÏòòCook€v.€Spinnakers€of€Rivergate,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2d€934,€938€(Tenn.€1994).€€€InÏconsidering€this€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€the€defendantððs€motion€toÏdismiss,€we€take€all€allegations€of€fact€in€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€as€true,€andÏreview€the€lower€courtsðð€legal€conclusions€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€with€no€presumption€ofÏcorrectness.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòOwens€v.€œTruckstops›€of€Americaóó,€915ÏS.W.2d€420,€424€(Tenn.€1996);€òòCookóó,€òòsupraóó.ÌÌòòò òÔ€ ÔÌà@ àÔ€(ÔRETALIATORY€OR€WRONGFUL€DISCHARGEó óóóÌà àThe€doctrine€of€employment„at„œwilI›€is€a€long€standing€rule€in€this€StateÏwhich€recognizes€the€concomitant€right€of€either€the€employer€or€the€employee€toÏterminate€the€employment€relationship€at€any€time,€for€good€cause,€bad€cause,€orÏno€cause€at€all,€without€being€guilty€of€a€legal€wrong.€€òòœHarney›€v.€œMeadowbrook›ÏNursing€Centeróó,€784€S.W.2d€921,€922€(Tenn.€1990);€òòWatson€v.€Cleveland€ChairÏCoóó.,€789€S.W.2d€538€(Tenn.€1989).€€Both€by€statute€and€case€œlaw›€in€this€andÏother€states,€however,€some€restrictions€have€been€imposed€upon€the€right€of€anÍemployer€to€terminate€an€at„will€employee.€€In€Tennessee€an€employee„at„willÏgenerally€may€not€be€discharged€for€attempting€to€exercise€a€statutory€orÏconstitutional€right,€or€for€any€other€reason€which€violates€a€clear€public€policyÏwhich€is€evidenced€by€an€unambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatoryÏprovision.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòMason€v.€œSeaton›óó,€___€S.W.2d€___€(Tenn.€1997);€òòœConatser›€v.ÏœClarksville›€Coca„Colaóó,€920€S.W.2d€646€(Tenn.€1995);€òòœReynolds›€v.€Ozark€MotorÏLines,€Inc.óó,€887€S.W.2d€822€(Tenn.€1994);€òòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,Ï857€S.W.2d€555€(Tenn.€1993);€òòœHodges›€v.€S.C.€œToof›€&€Co.óó,€833€S.W.2d€896Ï(Tenn.€1992);€òòœChism›€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.óó,€762€S.W.2d€552€(Tenn.€1988);ÏòòœClanton›€v.€Cain„Sloan€Co.óó,€677€S.W.2d€441€(Tenn.€1984).ÌÌà àThis€cause€of€action€for€retaliatory€or€wrongful€discharge,€which€was€firstÏrecognized€by€this€Court€in€òòClantonóó,€òòsupraóó,€strikes€the€balance€between€theÏemployment„at„will€doctrine€and€rights€granted€employees€under€well„definedÏexpressions€of€public€policy.€€òòAndersonóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€556.€€The€employment„at„will€doctrine€recognizes€that€employers€need€freedom€to€make€their€ownÏbusiness€judgments€without€interference€from€the€courts.€€òòMasonóó,€___€S.W.2d€atÍ___€€ð ð[œA]n›€employerððs€ability€to€make€and€act€upon€independent€assessments€ofÏan€employeeððs€abilities€and€job€performance€as€well€as€business€needs€isÏessential€to€the€free„enterprise€system.ð ð€€òòClifford€v.€Cactus€Drilling€Corp.óó,€353ÏœN.W.2d›€469,€474€(Mich.€1984).€€In€contrast,€the€action€for€retaliatory€or€wrongfulÏdischarge€recognizes€that,€in€limited€circumstances,× ƒ4 ××  ×€certain€well„defined,Ïunambiguous€principles€of€public€policy€confer€upon€employees€implicit€rightsÏwhich€must€not€be€circumscribed€or€chilled€by€the€potential€of€termination.€€òòSeeóóÏòòœChism›€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Coóó,€762€S.W.2d€552,€555„57€(Tenn.€1988)(citingÏexamples).€€€Therefore,€the€tort€action€of€retaliatory€or€wrongful€discharge€isÏavailable€to€employees€discharged€as€a€consequence€of€an€employerððs€violationÏof€a€clearly€expressed€public€policy.€€òòœReynolds›óó,€887€S.W.2d€at€823;€òòœHodges›óó,€833ÏS.W.2d€at€899.ÌÌà àThis€Court€has€explained€its€role€with€respect€to€discerning€public€policy€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThis€Court€can€know€nothing€of€public€policyÏexcept€from€the€constitution€and€the€laws,€and€theÏcourse€of€administration€and€decision.€€It€has€noÏlegislative€powers.€€It€cannot€amend€or€modify€anyÏlegislative€acts.€€It€cannot€examine€questions€asÏexpedient€or€inexpedient,€or€as€politic€or€impolitic.€ÏConsiderations€of€that€sort€must,€in€general,€beÏaddressed€to€the€legislature.€€Questions€of€policyÏdetermined€there€are€concluded€here.ÌÌà àà à€€€Ìà8 àà8 àà àThere€are€cases,€it€is€true,€in€which€argumentsÏdrawn€from€public€policy€must€have€large€influence;Ïbut€these€are€cases€in€which€the€course€of€legislationÏand€administration€do€not€leave€any€doubt€upon€theÏquestion€what€public€policy€is,€and€in€which€whatÏwould€otherwise€be€obscure€or€of€doubtfulÏinterpretation,€may€be€cleared€and€resolved€byÏreference€to€what€is€already€received€and€established.Ìà àÌÌòòÓÓœWatsonóó,€789›€S.W.2d€at€540,€(quoting€òòNashville€œRy›.€&€Light€Co.€v.€œLawson›óó,€144ÏTenn.€78,€91,€229€œS.W.›€741€(1920).€€This€Court€does€not€engage€in€hypotheticalÏguessing€to€fashion€public€policy.€€Unlike€other€jurisdictions,× ƒ5 ××  ×€Tennessee€courtsÏdo€not,€in€the€context€of€wrongful€discharge€actions,€attempt€to€discern€publicÏpolicy€from€the€common€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòe.g.óó,€òòœReynolds›óó,€887€S.W.2d€at€823.€€Therefore,Íto€prevail€in€this€appeal,€Stein€must€point€to€a€clear€mandate€of€public€policy,× ƒ6 ××  ×Ïevidenced€by€an€unambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatory€provision,Ïwhich€Davidson€violated€when€it€discharged€her€for€testing€positive€on€a€randomÏdrug€test.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àStein€argues€that€Davidsonððs€dismissal€of€her€contravenes€her€right€toÏprivacy€evidenced€by€Article€I,€Sections€7€and€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€ÏIn€support€of€her€claim,€Stein€also€relies€upon€decisions× ƒ7 ××  ×€of€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€which€address€random€drug€testing€of€government€œemployees,›Ïand€statutes× ƒ8 ××  ×€from€other€states€relating€to€random€drug€testing€of€privateÏemployees.€€Davidson€responds€that€constitutional€provisions€protect€citizensÍfrom€abusive€and€intrusive€government€action€but€do€not€control€relationshipsÏbetween€private€individuals,€including€employer€„€employee€relationships.€ÏSecondly,€Davidson€argues€that,€in€Tennessee,€there€is€no€well„defined€publicÏpolicy€evidenced€by€an€unambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatoryÏprovision€which€precludes€employers€from€dismissing€at„will€employees€who€testÏpositive€for€drug€usage€on€a€random€drug€test.ÌÌà àInitially,€we€address€Steinððs€contention€that€the€constitutional€right€ofÏprivacy€represents€a€clear€public€policy€which€prohibits€a€private€employer€fromÏterminating€employees€who€test€positive€for€drug€use.€€It€is€well„settled€thatÏconstitutional€guarantees€restrain€government€conduct€and€generally€do€notÏrestrain€the€conduct€of€private€individuals.€€òòState€v.€Hudsonóó,€849€S.W.2d€309,€311Ï(Tenn.€1993);€€òòFreshwater€v.€Stateóó,€2€Tenn.€œCrim›.€App.€314,€320,€453€S.W.2d€446,Ï449€(1969);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó,€òòœBorse›€v.€Peace€Goods€Shop,€Inc.óó,€963€F.2d€611,€620€(œ3d›ÏCir.€1992);€òòGilmore€v.€œEnogex›,€Inc.óó,€878€P.2d€360,€365€(Ok.€1994);€òòRoe€v.€QualityÏTransportation€Servicesóó,€838€P.2d€128,€130€(Wash.€App.€œDiv›.€3€1992);€òòbutóó€òòseeóóÏòòLuck€v.€Southern€Pac.€Trans.€Co.óó,€267€Cal.€œRptr›.€618,€627€(1990)€(ballotÍarguments€showed€that€constitutional€provision€applied€to€both€business€andÏgovernmental€activities).€€Contrary€to€Steinððs€claim,€therefore,€the€stateÏconstitutional€guarantee€of€privacy€is€not€a€source€of€public€policy€which€restrictsÏthe€right€of€private€employers€to€discharge€terminable„at„will€employees€who€testÏpositive€on€random€drug€tests.€€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€decisionsÏupon€which€Stein€relies€are€not€applicable€to€this€appeal.€€Those€decisionsÏinvolved€random€drug€testing€of€public€employees€by€government€actors;Ïtherefore,€constitutional€principles€of€privacy€and€search€and€seizure€wereÏimplicated.€€Since€this€appeal€involves€a€private€employer/employee€relationship,Ïthose€important€constitutional€considerations€are€not€at€issue.€ÌÌà àMoreover,€we€have€not€discovered€a€statutory€or€regulatory€provisionÏwhich€represents€a€well„defined€public€policy€that€is€contravened€by€employersÏdischarging€at„will€employees€who€test€positive€for€drug€use€on€random€drugÏtests.€€There€is€certainly€no€statutory€provision€expressly€prohibiting€an€employerÏfrom€discharging€an€employee€who€has€tested€positive€on€a€random€drug€test.€ÏUnlike€some€other€state€statutes€upon€which€Stein€relies,€Tennessee€has€notÍenacted€a€comprehensive€statutory€scheme€to€govern€random€drug€testing€byÏprivate€employers.€€As€the€Court€of€Appeals€recognized,€existing€TennesseeÏstatutes€which€relate€to€random€drug€testing€in€other€contexts€appear€to€favor€theÏpractice.€€The€Legislature€has€specifically€authorized€drug€testing€for€public€highÏschool€students€and€the€security€personnel€employed€by€the€Department€ofÏCorrections€and€Youth€Development.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€49„6„4213€(1996);ÏTenn€Code€Ann.€ðð€41„1„122€(1990€&€Supp.€1996).€€Moreover,€in€1995,€theÏGeneral€Assembly€enacted€a€statute€which€provides€that€private€sectorÏemployees€who€left€their€most€recent€job€ð ðeither€to€avoid€taking€a€drug€or€alcoholÏscreening€test,€or€after€receiving€a€positive€result€to€a€drug€or€alcohol€screeningÏtestðð€are€not€entitled€to€unemployment€compensation.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„7„302(a)(9)€(Supp.€1996).€€Though€not€directly€addressing€random€drug€testing€ofÏprivate€employees,€the€most€straightforward€expression€of€public€policy€withÏrespect€to€dismissing€employees€for€drug€use€was€contained€within€a€statuteÏenacted€on€May€13,€1996,€following€the€release€of€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€decisionÏin€this€case.€€€In€that€statute€the€General€Assembly€declared:ÌÓÓÌà8 àà àIt€is€the€intent€of€the€General€Assembly€to€promote€drug„freeÍworkplaces€in€order€that€employers€in€the€state€be€afforded€theÏopportunity€to€maximize€their€levels€of€productivity,€enhance€theirÏcompetitive€positions€in€the€market€place€and€reach€their€desiredÏlevels€of€success€without€experiencing€the€costs,€delays€andÏtragedies€associated€with€work„related€accidents€resulting€fromÏdrug€abuse€by€employees.€€òòIt€is€further€the€intent€of€the€GeneralÏAssembly€that€drug€abuse€be€discouraged€and€that€employees€whoÏchoose€to€engage€in€drug€abuse€face€the€risk€of€unemploymentóó€andÏthe€forfeiture€of€workersðð€compensation€benefits.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„9„101(a)€(1996€Supp.)€(emphasis€added).€€ConsideringÏthis€unambiguous€pronouncement€and€other€relevant€statutory€provisions,€weÏfind€no€well„defined€public€policy€which€is€violated€by€a€private€employerÏdischarging€an€at„will€employee€who€tests€positive€for€drug€use€on€a€randomÏdrug€test.€€òòGilmoreóó,€òòsupraóó.ÌÌà@ àòòò òCONCLUSIONóóó óÌà àStein€has€failed€to€identify€a€clear€public€policy,€evidenced€by€anÏunambiguous€constitutional,€statutory,€or€regulatory€provision,€that€was€violatedÏby€her€dismissal€for€testing€positive€for€drug€use€on€a€random€drug€test.€ÏTherefore,€she€has€failed€to€allege€an€essential€element€of€her€claim€for€wrongfulÏdischarge.€€Accordingly,€we€affirm€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€judgment€upholding€theÍtrial€courtððs€dismissal€of€Steinððs€claim.€€This€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€courtÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€decision.ÌÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àFrank€F.€Drowota,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àJusticeÌÌœò òConcur:Ìó ó›ÌBirch,€C.J.,ÌAnderson,€Reid,€Holder,€JJ.Ì