ÿWPC5 …# VUNa %¯ 0Dµùw@ 4A U 0`d bÄ UFÌ 0J 0T\ 0^° 0h 0rv 0|è 0†d 0ê 1uz 0dï U>Sn‘nÿU 6m B£B)ÀDCé AM,U*y D3£)Öv~ÿ 0@}vÓ½ AOÆß 0D¥ D/é B˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(óf$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒÀ°Ò =>?E@ADBDC DEÓ€ODÒ 3|xO(83‚ª$©©Ý ƒóf!ÝÒ€°ÒÒÀ°ÒÝ  Ý- ù-`.Courier New Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€!ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€!ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ )ÝÝ  ÝÌÌÌ< Œ 9p`(Courier New d% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial%%%%'ÿÿdxd Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€!ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌDecemberÏ23,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€!ÔÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÝ  Ý›Ñ 4 ÑÑ à ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÖ€"ÖÖ€#ÖÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€$ÔÑ€ ÑÑ7€ ÊÙ XXdÖdÈ7ÑÑ  ќԀ$&ÔÞ ÞÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDecember€23,€1996Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòFOR€PUBLICATIONóóÌÌà@ àIN€THE€SUPREME€COURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÔ€$XÔÌÔ€$&ÔVICKIE€SWEETEN,à àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Coffee€ChanceryÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€Hon.€John€W.€Rollins,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(€€ChancellorÌTRADE€ENVELOPES,€INC.€AND€à àà à(€€ÌCONTINENTAL€CASUALTY€COMPANY,à à(€€No.€01S01„9511„CH„00211ÌÙ€€ÙßR€(+'A1-j|ÿ²` ½1 `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendants„Appellees,à à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìandà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(ÌLARRY€BRINTON,€JR.,€DIRECTOR,€à à(ÌWORKERS€COMPENSATION€DIVISION,à à(ÌTENNESSEE€DEPARTMENT€OF€LABOR,à à(ÌSECOND€INJURY€FUND,à àà àà à(Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à(Ìà àDefendant„Appellant.à àà à(à àÌÔ€$XÔ›ÌòòFor€Plaintiff„Appelleeóó:€€à àà àœòòFor€Defendant„Appellantóó:›ÌÌRussell€D.€Hedgesà àà àà àà àœCharles€W.€Burson›ÌÒ € ÒÒ h ÒMoore€&€Hedgesà àà àà àà àà àœÔ€$&ÔAttorney€GeneralÔ€$XÔ€&€Reporter›ÌTullahomaà àà àà àà àà àà àœNashville›ÌÌœòòFor€Defendants„Appelleesóó:›à àà àà àœDianne€Stamey€DycusÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSenior€CounselÌTerry€L.€Hillà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General's€OfficeÏLaurenn€S.€Disspayne€à àà àà àNashvilleÌÔ€$&ÔManier,€Herod,€Hollabaughà àà àà àÌ€€&€SmithÌNashvilleÔ€$XÔ›à àà àà àà àÌœÌòòFor€Amicus€Curiaeóó:ÌÌHartford€Casualty€Insurance€CompanyÌBlakeley€D.€MatthewsÌLeigh€A.€BuckleyÌCornelius€&€CollinsÌNashville›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌœÒ € ÒÒ À ÒÌà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÌJUDGMENTS€OF€TRIAL€COURT€SETÌASIDE;€CASE€REMANDED€FOR€NEW€ÌTRIAL.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àREID,€J.Ì›ÓÓÓ` °‚X.h—XÓà àThe€director€of€the€Workers'€Compensation€DivisionÏof€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Labor,€as€trustee€for€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€(Second€Injury€Fund),€appeals€from€theÏÑ  ÑÑ ° Ñdecision€of€the€trial€court.€€That€court€approved,€over€theÏobjection€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€a€settlement€agreementÏbetween€the€employee,€Vicki€Sweeten;€the€employer,€TradeÏEnvelopes,€Inc.;€and€the€employer's€insurer,€ContinentalÏCasualty€Co.,€limiting€the€employer's€liability€to€benefitsÏfor€300€weeks.€€Subsequently€at€trial,€the€trial€court€foundÏthe€employee€to€be€totally€and€permanently€disabled€and€heldÏthe€Second€Injury€Fund€liable€for€benefits€continuing€from€theÏexpiration€of€the€300€weeks€until€the€employee€should€becomeÏ65€years€of€age.€€Because€the€court€erred€in€approving€theÏsettlement€over€the€objection€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€bothÏjudgments€are€set€aside,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€a€newÏtrial€on€all€issues.€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òTHE€CASEóóó óÌÌà àThe€employee€received€a€court€approved€permanentÏpartial€disability€award€of€25€percent€to€the€body€as€a€wholeÏas€the€result€of€a€back€injury€sustained€in€the€course€andÏscope€of€her€employment€by€the€employer€in€May€1992.ÏSubsequently,€the€employee€sustained€two€additionalÏcompensable€injuries,€carpal€tunnel€syndrome€in€both€wristsÏand€a€herniated€cervical€disc,€for€which€she€claims€benefitsÏin€this€proceeding.€€ÌÌà àPrior€to€trial,€the€employer€and€its€insuranceÏcarrier€entered€into€an€agreement€with€the€employee€wherebyÏthe€employee€agreed€to€accept€a€lump€sum€of€$69,999€in€fullÏsettlement€of€her€claims€against€the€employer€and€its€insurerÏfor€permanent€disability.€€The€trial€court,€over€the€objectionÏof€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€approved€the€settlement.€€TheÏcourt's€order€recited€that€$69,999€is€"equal€to€or€greaterÏthan€the€compensation€which€would€be€due€the€plaintiffÏemployee€for€a€75€percent€permanent€partial€disability€andÏloss€of€use€of€her€whole€body€in€accordance€with€the€terms€andÏprovisions€of€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law€of€the€State€ofÍTennessee,"€and,€further,€"the€parties€.€.€.€are€notÏrepresenting€to€the€court€that€this€is€the€full€extent€of€theÏinjuries"€sustained,€but€only€"the€full€extent€of€theÏliability€of€the€defendant€employer€and€defendant€insurer€forÏthe€plaintiff's€injuries."€€The€order€also€provided€that€allÏclaims€against€the€Second€Injury€Fund€were€reserved€untilÏtrial.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€of€the€case€was€a€contest€between€theÏemployee€and€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€The€court€found€that€theÏemployee€is€"permanently€and€totally€disabled,€in€that€theÏplaintiff€is€incapacitated€from€working€at€an€occupation€whichÏwill€bring€her€an€income";€that€the€employer€and€its€insurerÏ"have€discharged€their€obligation€by€the€settlement€approvedÏby€this€court€immediately€prior€to€the€trial";€and€that€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund€shall€pay€weekly€benefits€from€May€22,€2000Ïuntil€the€plaintiff€(who€was€then€40€years€of€age)€reaches€theÏage€of€65€years.€€The€effect€of€the€judgment€was€to€grant€theÏemployee€benefits€for€1300€weeks,€give€the€employer€credit€forÏ325€weeks€under€the€settlement€with€the€employee,€and€imposeÏliability€on€the€Second€Injury€Fund€for€975€weeks.ÌÌà àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€appealed.€ÌÌà àThe€case€was€referred€to€a€Workers'€CompensationÏPanel€for€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€but€wasÏwithdrawn€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(e)(3)€(Supp.Ï1996).€€ÌÌà@ àòòò òANALYSISóóó óÌÌà àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€contends€that€its€liabilityÏcannot€be€determined€by€a€settlement€between€the€employee€andÏthe€employer€over€its€objection,€and,€in€any€event,€the€proofÏdoes€not€support€the€trial€court's€finding€that€the€injuriesÏon€which€this€suit€is€based€rendered€the€employee€permanentlyÏand€totally€disabled.€€ÌÌà àThe€Second€Injury€Fund€may€be€liable€to€an€injuredÏemployee€under€the€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„208Ï(Supp.€1996).€€The€Second€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€sectionÏ(a)€of€that€statute€if€an€employee€has€previously€sustained€aÍpermanent€physical€disability€from€any€cause€or€origin€and€theÏemployee€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€theÏresult€of€a€subsequent€compensable€injury.€€Under€section€(a),Ïthe€prerequisites€for€imposing€liability€on€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€are€a€prior€injury,€either€compensable€or€non„compensable,€which€caused€permanent€disability€and€aÏsubsequent€compensable€injury€which€rendered€the€employeeÏpermanently€and€totally€disabled.€€òòPerry€v.€Sentry€Insur.€Co.óó,Ï_____€S.W.2d€_____,€_____€(Tenn.€1996)€[slip€op.€at€7];€òòMintonÏv.€State€Indus.,€Inc.óó,€825€S.W.2d€73,€76„77€(Tenn.€1992).€€TheÏSecond€Injury€Fund€is€liable€under€section€(b)€if€the€sum€ofÏtwo€or€more€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€the€body€as€aÏwhole€exceed€100€percent€permanent€disability.€€òòPerry€v.ÏSentry€Insur.€Co.óó,€_____€S.W.2d€at€_____€[slip€op.€at€8];ÏòòHenson€v.€City€of€Lawrenceburgóó,€851€S.W.2d€809,€812€(Tenn.Ï1993).ÌÌà àLiability€under€section€(a)€is€conditioned€upon€theÏemployee€becoming€permanently€and€totally€disabled€as€theÏresult€of€the€subsequent€injury,€and€liability€under€sectionÏ(b)€is€conditioned€upon€awards€for€permanent€disability€to€theÍbody€as€a€whole,€including€the€award€for€the€last€injury,€Ïexceeding€100€percent.€€Consequently,€the€extent€of€disabilityÏcaused€by€the€last€injury€is€a€critical€factor€in€determiningÏthe€liability,€if€any,€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€ÌÌà àHere,€the€trial€court€approved€a€settlementÏconcerning€the€issue€of€disability€caused€by€the€subsequentÏinjury€though€a€party,€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€did€not€agreeÏto€its€terms.€€That€determination€cannot€be€made,€over€theÏobjection€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund,€by€agreement€between€theÏemployee€and€the€employer.€€ÌÌà àSection€50„6„206€(Supp.€1996)€specifically€providesÏthat€the€Second€Injury€Fund€must€be€made€a€party€in€suitsÏinvolving€second€injuries:€€"In€all€cases€where€suchÏsettlement€proceedings€.€.€.€for€workers'€compensation€.€.€.Ïinvolve€a€subsequent€injury€wherein€the€employee€would€beÏentitled€to€receive€.€.€.€compensation€from€the€'second€injuryÏfund'€.€.€.€the€director€shall€be€made€a€party€defendant€toÏsuch€proceedings.€.€.€."€€As€a€party,€œthe€director's›€consentÏis€required€to€consummate€a€settlement€agreement.€€"AÍsettlement€agreement€is€merely€a€contract€between€the€partiesÏto€the€litigation.€.€.€.€€As€such,€the€formation,Ïconstruction,€and€enforceability€of€a€settlement€agreement€isÏgoverned€by€local€contract€law."€€òòCarr€v.€Runyanóó,€89€F.3d€327,Ï331€(7th€Cir.€1996).€€Under€general€principles€of€contractÏlaw,€a€contract€"must€result€from€a€meeting€of€the€minds€ofÏthe€parties€in€mutual€assent€to€the€terms."€€òòHiggins€v.€Oil,ÏChemical€&€Atomic€Workersóó,€811€S.W.2d€875,€879€(Tenn.€1991)Ï(quoting€òòJohnson€v.€Central€Nat'l€Ins.€Co.óó,€210€Tenn.€24,€34„5,€356€S.W.2d€277,€281€(1962)).€€"It€is€fundamental€that€aÏcontract€is€enforceable€only€to€the€extent€that€it€is€assentedÏto€by€the€parties."€€òòState€v.€Clementsóó,€925€S.W.2d€224,€227Ï(Tenn.€1996).€€Consequently,€the€agreement€between€two€of€theÏparties€that€the€employer's€liability€was€for€75€percent€ofÏthe€permanent€partial€disability,€is€not€binding€on€the€otherÏparty,€the€Second€Injury€Fund.ÌÌÒ € ÒÒ X Òà àBecause€the€Second€Injury€Fund€has€not€settled€theÏliability€issue€by€agreement,€it€is€entitled€to€"submit€theÏentire€matter€for€determination€to€the€judge€.€.€.€to€hear€andÏdetermine€the€issues€and€render€and€enforce€judgment."€€Tenn.ÍCode€Ann.€ðð€50„6„225(a)(1)€and€(c)(1)€(Supp.€l996).€€The€SecondÏInjury€Fund€has€the€right€to€have€"the€entire€matter"€litigatedÏamong€all€of€the€interested€parties.€€œThe›€right€to€have€disputedÏissues€litigated€between€all€of€the€parties€in€workers'Ïcompensation€cases€has€previously€been€recognized€„€this€CourtÏhas€held€that€the€statutory€requirement€that€the€Second€InjuryÏFund€be€given€notice€and€made€a€party€to€proceedings€"is€a€clearÏindication€that€the€Legislature€intended€that€an€employee's€claimÏagainst€the€Second€Injury€Fund€is€to€be€litigated€at€the€sameÏtime€as€the€employee's€claim€against€his€employer."€€òòFarr€v.ÏHeadóó,€811€S.W.2d€894,€896„97€(Tenn.€œ1991);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDailey€v.ÏSouthern€Heel€Co.óó,€785€S.W.2d€344,€346€(Tenn.€1990).›€€The€trialÏcourt€erred€in€approving€the€settlement€over€the€objection€of€theÏSecond€Injury€Fund.€Ìœ›Ò € ÒÒ À ÒÌœ›à àThe€employee,€as€well€as€the€employer,€made€clear€inÏtheir€briefs€and€in€oral€argument€that€no€party€has€filed€aÏpetition€to€have€the€settlement€set€aside.€€Counsel€for€theÏemployee€acknowledge€that€the€employee€may€have€bargained€awayÏsignificant€benefits€to€which€she€may€be€entitled.€€However,Ïtheir€insistence€that€the€settlement€be€allowed€to€standÍassumes€that€an€award€against€the€Second€Injury€Fund€will€beÏapproved.€€They€have€not€addressed€the€alternative€found€byÏthis€Court,€that€no€award€can€be€adjudged€against€the€SecondÏInjury€Fund€when€that€party€effectively€has€been€denied€itsÏday€in€court.€€ÌÌà àThe€workers'€compensation€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ50„6„206€(Supp.€1996),€recognizes€that€"the€interested€partiesÏshall€have€the€right€to€settle€all€matters€of€compensationÏbetween€themselves,"€but€the€statute€also€provides€"but€allÏsettlements,€before€the€same€are€binding€on€either€party,Ïshall€be€reduced€to€writing€and€shall€be€approved€by€theÏ[trial]€judge."€€The€statute€further€provides€that€theÏsettlement€will€be€approved€by€the€judge€only€upon€a€findingÏthat€the€employee€is€receiving€substantially€the€benefitsÏprovided€by€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court's€finding€in€this€case€was€basedÏupon€the€assumption€that€the€liability€of€the€employer€and€theÏliability€of€the€Second€Injury€Fund€could€be€determinedÏseparately.€€As€discussed€above,€the€award€against€the€SecondÍInjury€Fund,€and€the€findings€upon€which€that€award€is€based,Ïare€invalid€as€attacked€on€appeal€by€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€ÏConsequently,€without€an€award€against€the€Second€Injury€Fund,Ïthe€employee,€based€on€the€findings€by€the€trial€court,€hasÏnot€received€substantially€the€benefits€provided€by€theÏWorkers'€Compensation€Law.ÌÌà àThe€result€is€that€the€judgments€entered€in€theÏtrial€court€are€set€aside,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€a€newÏtrial€on€all€issues.€€ÌÌà àFor€guidance€on€the€construction€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€50„6„207(4)€(Supp.€1996),€the€trial€court€may€refer€to€thisÏCourt's€decision€in€òòVogel€v.€Wells€Fargo€Guard€Servicesóó,€_____ÏS.W.2d€_____€(Tenn.€1996).ÌÌà àCosts€are€assessed€against€the€employee€and€theÏemployer€equally.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àREID,€J.ÌÌÌConcur:ÌÌBirch,€C.J.,€Drowota,€Anderson,€œÌ€€€€€and›œ›œ›œ›œ›€White,€JJ.€