ÿWPCì" …# VUNa %¯ 0(µ4Ýñ 1m 0cm 0wÐ 0ŠG Ñ w@Ù 0l 0D… 0JÉ 0T 0^g 0hÅ 0r- 0|Ÿ 0† 0¡ 1u1 0d¦ AM WU>pU*®B)ØDC AMDU*‘ D3» Bî 0X ®cv~vÓ 0 b 0´ 0Ƕ 0Û} 0ïX AOG!Æ–! 0D\" D/ " BÏ"˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡©U!3|x¦  vwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;s˜$´´Ô2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à(OÞ{$µµà0  àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(b²D$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à ‘ “ ” E• – — I˜ ™ Dš › Ó€((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌò òOctober€7,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€)ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial++++'ÿÿdxd d(0"ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  Ò ¤Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAll€persons€who€reach€age€sixty„five,€who€have€been€employed,€and€who€have€paid€intoÌà àthe€Social€Security€Trust€Fund€are€entitled€to€draw€Social€Security€old„age€benefits.€Ïà àThese€benefits€are€not€for€disability.€€An€eligible€worker,€despite€his€or€her€ability€to€work,Ïà àis€entitled€to€receive€Social€Security€old„age€benefits.€€Disability€benefits,€under€theÏà àworkersðð€compensation€statute,€compensate€the€injured€worker€for€that€portion€of€his€orÏà àher€industrial€ability€that€has€been€lost€due€to€injury.€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò(xÓñ$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒÆ‚$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿù…$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³¶4$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Ǫ»$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€v[XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€$¼ÔØ ØÓ&€%%XÐd&ÓßL€"#';+'h|` Å `€€Lß›à@ àIN€THE€SUPREMEÏCOURT€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÌWALTER€P.€VOGEL,à àà àà à)à àòòò òFORÏPUBLICATIONóóÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà à)à àœò òòòFiled:€October€7,€1996ó ó›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóó)òòÌóóv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€John€Turnbull,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌWELLS€FARGO€GUARD€à àà à)à àNo.€03S01„9601„CV„00005ÌSERVICES,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìandà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌDINA€TOBIN,€DIRECTOR€OF€THEà à)ÌDIVISION€OF€WORKERSððà àà à)ÌCOMPENSATION,€TENNESSEEà à)ÌDEPARTMENT€OF€LABOR,€à àà à)ÌSECOND€INJURY€FUND,€STATEà à)ÌOF€TENNESSEE,€and€CHARLESà à)ÌBURSON,€ATTORNEY€GENERALà à)ÌFOR€THE€STATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellants.à àà à)ÌÌÌòòFor€the€Defendant/Appellantsóóà àà àà àòòFor€Plaintiff/Appellee€Vogelóó:ÌòòWells€Fargo€Guard€Servicesóó:Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àDavid€H.€DunawayÌErnest€D.€Bennett,€III€€€€€€€à àà àà àDAVID€H.€DUNAWAY€&ÌNashville,€TNà àà àà àà àà àASSOCIATESÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àLaFollette,€TNÌòòFor€Defendants/AppellantsÌDina€Tobin€and€Charles€Bursonóó:ÌÌCharles€W.€BursonÌAttorney€General€and€Reporterà àà àà àà àÌÌDianne€Stamey€DycusÌSenior€CounselÌœCivil€DivisionÌNashville,€TNÌÌà@ àò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óà àÌÌà àà àà àÌREVERSEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWHITE,€J.ÌÓÓÌà àIn€this€workers'€compensation€case,€we€are€asked€to€review€the€trialÏcourtððs€determination€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)›€is€unconstitutional€and€that€plaintiff€is€entitled€to€life„timeÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits.€€Having€considered€the€positions€of€€theÏparties,€the€plain€language€and€the€legislative€intent€of€the€statute,€and€relevantÏauthority€in€other€jurisdictions,€we€reverse.ÌÌà àWalter€Vogel€was€employed€as€a€security€guard€with€Wells€FargoÏGuard€Services.€€As€part€of€his€obligation,€he€inspected€tractor„trailers.€ÏDuring€one€such€inspection,€he€slipped€on€a€muddy€embankment,€fell,€andÏinjured€his€shoulder€and€back.€€At€the€time€of€his€fall,€Vogel€was€seventy„threeÏyears€of€age€and€had€substantial€preexisting€health€problems,€includingÏstomach€cancer,€heart€difficulties,€lung€problems,€and€arthritic€degenerationÏof€the€spine.€€€ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€his€work„related€fall,€Vogel€€sought€the€care€ofÏorthopedic€doctors.€€Dr.€Donald€Ivey€performed€back€surgery€on€Vogel€andÏassigned€a€twenty„two€percent€physical€impairment€rating€based€on€the€backÏcondition.€€Dr.€James€McKinney,€an€orthopedic€surgeon,€€found€that€VogelÏhad€a€seventy„three€percent€impairment€to€the€body€as€a€whole,€twenty€percentÏof€which€was€attributable€to€Vogel's€back€injuries.€€Another€orthopedicÏdoctor,€Dr.€William€Kennedy,€agreed€that€Vogel€had€significant€bodyÏimpairment€and€attributed€twenty„five€percent€to€the€back€injury.€€Based€onÏthis€evidence,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€medical€evidence€in€the€caseÏsupported€a€finding€of€twenty„three€percent€medical€impairment€to€the€body€asÏa€whole.ÌÌÌà àIn€addition€to€medical€witnesses,€Vogel€presented€the€testimony€of€Dr.ÏNorman€Hankins,€a€vocational€expert.€€Hankins€testified€that€Vogel'sÏvocational€impairment€was€one€hundred€percent.€€As€a€result€of€this€testimony,Ïthe€trial€judge€found€that€Vogel€was€one€hundred€percent€permanently€andÏtotally€disabled€as€a€result€of€the€on€the€job€injury.€€The€state€concedes€that€theÏevidence€supported€this€finding.€€The€trial€court€apportioned€the€liabilityÏsixty„five€percent€to€Wells€Fargo,€Vogel's€present€employer,€and€thirty„fiveÏpercent€to€the€Second€Injury€Fund.€€ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€awarding€benefits,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€statutoryÏscheme€was€unconstitutional.€€Specifically,€the€court€held€that€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€Section€œ50„6„207(4)(A)(i)›ÌÓÓà8 àwould€purport€to€limit€[Vogel's]€recovery€for€the€compensableÏdisability€found€by€the€court€to€exist,€due€to€his€age.€€The€courtÏfinds€that€there€is€no€rational€basis€for€a€situation€which€would,€asÏin€this€case,€if€a€person€was€ninety„nine€(99%)€percent€disabled,Ïaward€him€three€hundred€ninety„six€(396)€weeks€but,€if€he€is€oneÏhundred€(100%)€percent€permanently€and€totally€disabled,€limitÏhim€to€two€hundred€sixty€(260)€weeks.€€The€court€therefore€findsÏafter€reviewing€the€entire€record€that€the€age€related€capsÏcontained€in€the€Tennessee€Worker's€Compensation€Reform€Act€.Ï.€.€should€be€and€the€same€are€declared€to€be€arbitrary,Ïcapricious,€illegal,€and€unconstitutional€under€the€EqualÏProtection€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€of€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution€because€they€unfairly€discriminate€betweenÏworkers€based€on€age.ÌÌÓÓAs€a€result€of€the€trial€judge's€conclusion€that€the€statute€was€unconstitutional,Ïthe€judge€awarded€Vogel€life„time€benefits€under€the€Workers'€€CompensationÏAct.ÌÌà àThe€statute€at€issue€is€part€of€the€Workers'€Compensation€Reform€Act€ofÏ1992.€€It€provides,€in€relevant€part,€that€ÌÓÓà8 àcompensation€shall€be€paid€during€the€period€of€such€permanentÏtotal€disability€until€the€employee€reaches€the€age€of€sixty„fiveÏ(65);€provided,€that€with€respect€to€disabilities€resulting€fromÏinjuries€which€occur€after€age€sixty€(60),€regardless€of€the€age€ofÏthe€employee,€permanent€total€disability€€benefits€are€payable€forÏa€period€of€two€hundred€sixty€(260)€weeks.€€Such€compensationÍpayments€shall€be€reduced€by€the€amount€of€any€old€age€insuranceÏbenefit€payments€attributable€to€employer€contributions€which€theÏemployee€may€receive€under€the€Social€Security€Act,€U.S.C.,€titleÏ42,€chapter€7,€subchapter€II,€as€amended.ÌÌÓÓ€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€50„6„€œ207(4)(A)(i)(1995›€Supp.).€€Vogel€contends€that€theÏstatute€is€constitutionally€infirm€because€of€the€distinctions€it€draws€betweenÏworkers€who€are€injured€before€and€after€age€sixty„five€and€between€workersÏwho€are€injured€before€age€sixty€and€those€who€are€injured€between€the€agesÏof€sixty€and€sixty„five.€€He€challenges€the€statute€as€violating€both€the€equalÏprotection€clause€and€the€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act.ÌÌà@ àI.€€Constitutional€Analysis€GenerallyÌà àWe€begin€with€the€presumption€which€the€law€attaches€and€which€weÏcannot€ignore€that€the€acts€of€the€General€Assembly€€are€constitutional.€€òòSeeóóÏòòe.g.óó,€òòPetition€of€Bursonóó,€909€S.W.2d€768€(Tenn.€1995);€òòDavis„KiddÏBooksellers,€Inc.€œv.›€McWherteróó,€866€S.W.2d€520€(Tenn.€1993);€òòBozeman€v.ÏBarkeróó,€571€S.W.2d€279€(Tenn.€1978).€€In€evaluating€the€constitutionality€of€aÏstatute,€we€must€indulge€every€presumption€and€resolve€every€doubt€in€favorÏof€constitutionality.€€òòPetition€of€Bursonóó,€909€S.W.2d€768€(Tenn.€1995).€€AÏstatute€comes€to€a€court€"clothed€in€a€presumption€of€constitutionality€[since]Ïthe€Legislature€does€not€intentionally€pass€an€unconstitutional€act.ðð€€òòCruz€v.ÏChevrolet€Grey€Iron€Div.€of€General€Motorsóó,€247€N.W.2d€764,€769€(Mich.Í1976).€€Therefore,€notwithstanding€the€trial€judge's€findings€in€this€case,€weÏmust€begin€our€inquiry€with€the€presumption€that€the€statute€in€question€passesÏconstitutional€muster.ÌÌà@ àII.€€Equal€Protection€ChallengeÌà àFrom€the€beginning,€we€turn€to€analyze€the€statute€in€questionÏrecognizing€the€very€real€concern€that€it€violates€equal€protection€byÏclassifying€individuals€differently€based€on€age.€€In€analyzing€equal€protectionÏchallenges,€we€must€first€determine€the€appropriate€measure€of€scrutiny.€€InÏòòBrown€€v.€Campbell€County€Board€of€Educationóó,€915€S.W.2d€407€(Tenn.Ï1995),€we€discussed€the€three€levels€of€scrutiny€applicable€to€discriminationÏclaims€and€concluded€that€claims€such€as€these,€in€which€the€class€allegedlyÏdiscriminated€€against€is€not€a€suspect€class,€should€be€scrutinized€under€theÏrational€basis€test.€€òòBrown€v.€Campbell€County€Board€of€Educationóó,€915ÏS.W.2d€at€413„14.€€We€join€other€jurisdictions€in€applying€the€rational€basisÏtest€to€constitutional€challenges€based€on€age.€€In€a€recent€decision€theÏColorado€Supreme€Court€held€that€"[c]lassifications€based€on€age€are€notÏsuspect€or€special€warranting€strict€scrutiny€or€intermediate€review."€ÏòòIndustrial€Claim€Appeals€Office€v.€Romeroóó,€912€P.2d€62,€66€(Colo.Ï1996)(citing€òòMassachusetts€Board€of€Retirement€v.€Murgiaóó,€427€U.S.€307,Ï313„14€(1976)).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€€òòSasso€v€Ram€Property€Managementóó,€431€So.2d€204,Í221€(Fla.€App.€1983).€€Additionally,€workers'€compensation€benefits€are€notÏdeemed€to€be€fundamental€rights€thereby€triggering€a€higher€standard€ofÏreview.€€òòIndustrial€Claim€Appeals€Office€v.€Romeroóó,€912€€P.2d€at€66.€€ÌÌà àUnder€the€rational€basis€test,€our€inquiry€is€whether€the€classificationÏsystem€has€a€reasonable€relationship€to€a€legitimate€state€interest.€€"Unless€theÏindividual€challenging€the€statute€can€establish€that€the€differences€areÏunreasonable,€the€statute€must€be€upheld.ðð€€òòTennessee€Small€School€Systems€v.ÏMcWherteróó,€851€S.W.2d€139,€154€(Tenn.€1992).€€If€the€classification€isÏnaturally€and€reasonably€related€to€that€which€it€seeks€to€accomplish€it€hasÏpassed€the€rational€basis€test€and€has€met€constitutional€standards.€€Our€chore,Ïthen,€is€to€determine€whether€the€statute€naturally€and€reasonably€relates€toÏlegitimate€state€purposes.€€ÌÌà àOur€Workersðð€Compensation€Act,€like€most,€draws€classifications.€€TheÏfact€that€a€statute€classifies€people€differently,€and€results€in€inequality,€doesÏnot€invalidate€the€statute.€€In€fact,€all€classification€systems€involveÏdiscrimination,€but€ð ðonly€invidious€discrimination€with€no€rational€basis€forÏthe€statutory€classification€.€.€.€offends€the€equal€protection€guarantee.ðð€ÏòòBrown€v.€Goodyear€Tire€&€Rubber€Co.óó,€599€P.2d€1031,€1035€(Kan.€App.Ï1979),€òòaffððdóó,€608€P.2d€1356€(Kan.€1980).€€ÌÌà àAs€is€also€true€of€most€workersðð€compensation€statutes,€our€statute€usesÏage€as€a€basis€for€various€classifications.€€Benefits€are€terminated€forÏpermanently,€totally€disabled€persons€based€on€age€and€the€length€of€benefitsÏfor€others€who€are€permanently€and€totally€disabled€depends€upon€their€age.€€ÌÌà àThe€use€of€age€as€a€basis€for€drawing€distinctions€is€not€necessarilyÏproblematic.€€In€certain€contexts,€age„based€discrimination€has€been€deemedÏrational€and€essential€to€legitimate€governmental€purposes.€€òòSeeóó€òòGregory€v.ÏAshcroftóó,€501€U.S.€452€(1991)(mandatory€judicial€retirement€at€age€seventy€isÏconstitutional);€òòVance€v.€Bradleyóó,€440€U.S.€93€(1979)(mandatory€foreignÏservice€officer€retirement€at€age€sixty€is€constitutional);€òòMassachusetts€BoardÏof€Retirement€v.€Murgiaóó,€427€U.S.€307€(1976)(Massachusetts€ban€onÏemployment€of€police€officer€over€age€fifty€is€constitutional).€€In€the€contextÏof€disability€benefits,€no€presumption€of€rationality€attaches;€consequently,€weÏmust€determine€whether€the€discrimination€is€rationally€related€to€anyÏlegitimate€government€purpose.ÌÌà àOur€statute,€like€many€others,€ties€the€termination€of€benefits€for€theÏpermanently,€totally€disabled€worker€to€the€commencement€of€Social€SecurityÏold„age€benefits.€€Within€this€structure€is€the€basis€for€what€the€state€claims€isÍa€rationally„based€classification.€€The€purpose€of€the€statute,€the€state€contends,Ïis€to€ð ðprovide€permanent€and€total€benefits€to€the€age€of€65,€the€age€when€anÏemployee€is€eligible€for€Social€Security€old„age€benefits.€€This€purpose,€theyÏallege€is€consistent€with€the€overall€purpose€of€workersðð€compensation€law:€theÏreplacement€of€lost€wages.€€òòSeeóóòòVan€Housler€v.€Muelleróó,€741€S.W.2d€329,€330Ï(Tenn.€1987).ÌÌà àThe€issue€of€whether€a€workersðð€compensation€scheme€that€ties€theÏtermination€of€disability€benefits€to€the€onset€of€old„age€benefits€has€led€courtsÏto€different,€somewhat€spirited€debates.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòIndustrial€Claim€Appeals€Office€v.€Romeroóó,€912€P.2d€at€62,€theÏColorado€Supreme€Court€declared€an€age„based€classification€in€its€workersððÏcompensation€law€to€be€unconstitutional.€€The€Colorado€statute€terminatedÏpermanent€total€benefits€ð ðwhen€the€employee€reaches€the€age€of€sixty„fiveÏyears.ðð€€As€a€result,€persons€sixty„five€and€older€who€were€permanently€andÏtotally€disabled€were€denied€benefits€for€work„related€injuries,€while€personsÏwho€suffered€less€œthan›€total€disabilities€were€allowed€to€recover.ÌÌà àThe€Colorado€Court€concluded€that€the€statute€created€a€discriminatoryÏclassification€between€permanently€òòtotallyóó€disabled€workers€age€sixty„five€andÍover€and€permanently€òòpartiallyóó€disabled€workers€age€sixty„five€and€over.€€As€aÏresult,€the€Court€analyzed€the€asserted€governmental€purposes€to€determineÏwhether€the€classification€scheme€was€rationally€related€to€a€legitimateÏgovernment€interest.€€The€state€alleged€two€governmental€interests:Ïprohibiting€duplicate€benefits€and€reducing€the€costs€of€the€compensationÏprogram.€€Upon€review,€the€Court€found€that€ð ðneither€of€those€assertedÏpurposes€are€rationally€related€to€the€classification€created€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€67.ÌÌà àThe€Court€found€the€governmental€purpose€of€providing€a€cost„saving,Ïtrade„off€device,€which€enabled€permanent€total€disability€claimants€under€ageÏsixty„five€to€receive€a€cost€of€living€increase,€to€bear€no€rational€relationshipÏto€the€classification.€€They€concluded€that€ð ð[f]unding€overall€cost„of„livingÏincreases€for€workersðð€compensation€recipients€by€eliminating€benefits€forÏpermanently€and€totally€œdisabled›€persons€age€sixty„five€and€older€is€arbitrary,Ïunfair,€and€irrational.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€69.ÌÌà àIn€analyzing€the€asserted€governmental€purpose€of€preventing€duplicateÏbenefits,€œthe€purpose›€implicit€in€the€stateððs€position€here,€the€Court€noted€thatÏSocial€Security€and€workersðð€compensation€benefits€ð ðdo€not€serve€the€sameÏpurpose€€€€€€.€.€.€.€€Social€security€retirement€benefits€.€.€.€are€not€disabilityÏbenefits,€but€are€old„age€entitlements€serving€the€same€function€as€pensionÍpayments.€€In€contrast,€workersðð€compensation€benefits€are€provided€toÏcompensate€employees€who€suffer€work„related€injuries€for€loss€of€incomeÏresulting€from€such€injuries.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€67„68.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€Court€rejected€the€stateððs€argument€that€it€was€entitled€toÏdraw€distinctions€based€on€administrative€convenience.€€ð ð[T]he€legislature€isÏnot€justified€in€eliminating€workersðð€compensation€benefits€for€all€persons€ageÏsixty„five€and€older€who€have€been€permanently€and€totally€disabled€merelyÏbased€on€the€administratively€convenient€presumption€that€such€personsÏreceive€retirement€benefits.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€68.ÌÌà àThat€classification€which€the€Colorado€Court€characterized€as€anÏð ðadministratively€convenient€presumptionðð€was€lauded€by€the€WashingtonÏSupreme€Court€as€ð ðserv[ing]€a€legitimate€purpose€in€avoiding€duplication€ofÏbenefits.ðð€€òòHarris€v.€State€Department€of€Labor€and€Industriesóó,€843€P.2d€1056,Ï1066€(Wa.€1993).€€The€Washington€Court€discussed€both€the€Florida€approachÏrelied€on€by€Colorado€and€the€Kansas€approach€and€found€the€latter€moreÏpalatable.ÌÌà àIn€the€Florida€decision,€òòSasso€v.€Ram€Property€Managementóó,€452€So.2dÏ932€(Fla.€1984),€the€Court€concluded€that€exclusion€of€those€over€65€fromÍdisability€benefits€was€not€ð ðrationally€related€to€the€prevention€of€ððdoubleÏdippingðððð€since€old„age€benefits€and€disability€benefits€serve€differentÏpurposes.€€òòSasso€v.€Ram€Property€Managementóó,€452€So.2d€at€934€n.3.€€TheÏstatute€survived€an€equal€protection€challenge€because€it€was€rationally€relatedÏto€other€legitimate€government€interests.ÌÌà àThe€Kansas€approach,€which€the€Washington€Court€found€moreÏpersuasive,€adopts€the€theory€that€old„age€and€disability€benefits,€thoughÏdifferent,€are€ð ðsubstantially€similarðð€and€serve€the€same€purpose€„€theÏreplacement€of€wages.€€Thus,€the€Kansas€Court€of€Appeals,€like€theÏWashington€Supreme€Court,€found€that€an€age„based€classification€whichÏterminated€disability€benefits€upon€the€commencement€of€Social€SecurityÏbenefits€ð ð[h]as€a€rational€basis,€is€not€arbitrary,€and€affords€like€treatment€ofÏpersons€similarly€situated.ðð€€òòBrown€v.€Goodyear€Tire€and€Rubber€Co.óó,€599ÏP.2d€1031,€1036€(Kan.€App.€1979),€òòaffððdóó,€608€P.2d€1356€(Kan.€1980).€€òòSeeóóÏòòalsoóó€òòBerry€v.€H.€R.€Beal€&€Sonsóó,€649€A.2d€1101€(Me.€1994).€€ÌÌà àThe€Kansas€and€Washington€approach€views€workersðð€compensationÏbenefits€as€part€of€an€overall€ð ðwage„loss€programðð€which€includesÏunemployment,€disability,€and€retirement€benefits.€€When€viewed€as€a€part€ofÏan€overall€program,€it€is€argued€that€ð ð[t]he€crucial€operative€fact€is€the€wageÍloss,€the€cause€of€the€wage€loss€merely€dictates€the€category€of€legislationÏapplicable.ðð€€4€A.€Larson,€òòWorkmenððs€Compensationóó€ðð€97.10€(1990)ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[I]f€a€work[er]€undergoes€a€period€of€all€threeÏconditions,€it€does€not€follow€that€[the€worker]Ïshould€receive€three€sets€of€benefits€.€.€.€.€[TheÏworker]€is€experiencing€only€one€wage€loss€and,€inÏany€logical€system,€should€receive€only€one€wage„lossÏbenefit.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€Thus,€a€statute€that€includes€termination€of€disability€benefits€uponÏcommencement€of€old„age€benefits,€those€courts€conclude,€is€a€rationally€basedÏstatute.€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àOur€statute€is€not€identical€to€the€Colorado€statute€deemedÏunconstitutional€in€òòRomeroóó.€€Our€statute€terminates€benefits€for€permanently,Ïtotally€disabled€workers€at€age€sixty„five,€but€it€provides€260€weeks€of€benefitsÏfor€any€worker€who€becomes€permanently€and€totally€disabled€after€age€sixtyÏregardless€of€the€age.€€Unlike€the€Colorado€statute,€it€does€not€depriveÏindividuals€like€Vogel,€seventy„three€when€injured,€of€benefits.ÌÌà àWe€conclude€that€our€legislature€intended€to€tie€workersðð€compensationÏbenefits€for€workers€who€are€permanently€and€totally€disabled€to€theÏcommencement€of€Social€Security€benefits.€€The€distinctions€drawn€betweenÏages€sixty€and€sixty„five,€in€an€effort€to€accomplish€that€end,€are€notÍunconstitutional.€€Further€the€260€week€award€for€claimants€injured€after€ageÏsixty€is€rationally€related€to€the€goal€of€assuring€that€employees€have€anÏadequate€recovery.€€While€we€acknowledge€the€œnumerous1›€distinction€betweenÏold„age€and€disability€benefits,œ× ƒ/ ××  ×›€we€conclude€that€the€legislature€wasÏattempting€to€serve€legitimate€state€interest€in€awarding€compensation€benefitsÏfor€the€permanently,€totally€disabled€employee€until€old„age€Social€SecurityÏbenefits€commenced.€€The€scheme€employed,€differentiating€on€the€basis€ofÏage,€bears€a€rational€relationship€to€the€accomplishment€of€that€state€interest.€ÏWe€are€persuaded,€based€on€our€reading€of€our€statute€and€the€excellentÏanalyses€by€other€states€reviewed€in€this€opinion,€that€Section€œ50„6„207(A)(i),›Ïinsofar€as€it€relates€to€termination€of€permanent€total€disability€benefits€forÏworkers€age€sixty€and€over,€does€not€violate€equal€protection.ÌÌà@ àIII.€€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€ChallengeÌà àWe€turn€now€to€the€question€of€whether€the€statutory€scheme€violatesÏthe€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act.€€That€Act€makes€it€unlawful€forÏan€employer€toÌÓÓà8 àà8 àfail€or€refuse€to€hire€or€to€discharge€any€individualÏor€otherwise€(1)€discriminate€against€any€individualÏwith€respect€to€.€.€.€compensation,€terms,€conditions,Ïor€privileges€of€employment,€because€of€suchÏindividualððs€age;€(2)€to€limit,€segregate,€or€classify€.€.Ï.€employees€in€any€way€which€would€deprive€or€tendÏto€deprive€any€individual€or€employmentÏopportunities€or€otherwise€adversely€affectÏ[employeeððs]€status€as€an€employee,€because€of€suchÏindividualððs€age;€or€(3)€to€reduce€the€wage€rate€ofÏany€employee€in€order€to€comply€with€this€chapter.ÌÌÓÓ29€U.S.C.€Section€623(a).€€The€Act€specifically€excludes€"bona€fide€seniorityÏsystem[s]"€from€coverage.€€Thus,€we€must€determine€whether€the€applicationÏof€the€statute€at€issue€concerns€the€"compensation,€terms,€conditions,€orÏprivileges€of€employment"€and,€if€so,€whether€it€violates€the€terms€of€the€ActÏor€is€excluded€from€its€coverage.€€ÌÌà àSome€courts€have€held€that€state€workers'€compensation€statutes€do€notÏconcern€the€"compensation,€terms,€conditions,€or€privileges€of€employment"Ïand€thus€are€not€affected€by€the€Age€Discrimination€in€€Employment€Act.€€òòSeeóó€ÏòòPeck€v.€General€Motors€Corpóó.,€417€N.W.2d€547€(Mich.€App.€1987);€òòO'NeillÏv.€Department€of€Transportationóó,€442€So.2d€961€(Fla.€App.€1983).€€€€TheÏMichigan€Court€of€Appeals€rationalized€that€while€"[t]he€ADEA€addressesÏdiscrimination€by€employers€against€employees,€[t]he€Workers'€Disability€ÏCompensation€Act€is€a€uniform€system€of€compensation€mandated€by€the€stateÏand€not€the€employer."€€òòPeck€v.€General€Motors€Corp.óó,€417€N.W.2d€at€55.€ÍLikewise,€the€Florida€Court€of€Appeals€noted€that€ADEA€provisions€"areÏlimited€to€employment€practices€within€the€control€of€the€employer.ðð€€òòOððNeillÏv.€Department€of€Transportationóó,€€442€So.2d€at€962.€€ÌÌà àWhile€we€find€these€justifications€less€than€probing,€we€are€mindful€ofÏthe€fact€that€even€if€our€statute€concerns€ð ðcompensation,€terms,€conditions,€orÏprivileges€of€employmentðð€such€as€to€fall€under€the€Act,€classifications€basedÏon€age€are€not,€by€definition€a€violation€of€the€Act.€€If€the€differentiation€isÏbased€on€reasonable€factors€other€than€age,€the€classification€is€authorized,Ïeven€if€it€involves€age€discrimination.€€òòBrown€v€Goodyear€Tire€&€RubberÏCo.óó,€599€P.2d€at€1031.ÌÌà àAgainst€this€backdrop,€we€have€plaintiff's€€hollow€claims€that€the€statuteÏviolates€the€Act.€€Plaintiff€argues€that€Congress€has€mandated€a€policy€thatÏpromotes€the€employment€of€older€persons€and€consequently,€decries€the€cut„off€set€by€our€statute.€€Yet,€plaintiff€cites€no€cases€in€which€a€provision€of€aÏworkers'€compensation€statute€terminating€benefits€at€age€sixty„five€has€beenÏdeemed€to€violate€the€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act.€€Furthermore,Ïplaintiff€does€not€describe€how€the€statute€differentiates€between€protectedÏindividuals€and€non„protected€individuals€to€the€detriment€of€older€individuals.€ÏThe€disparity€in€our€statute€is€not€based€on€age,€but€on€degree€of€disability.€ÍSuch€disparity€does€not€violate€the€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act.€€ÌÌÓÓà@ àIV.€€Differentiation€Between€Permanent€Total€Ìà@ àand€Permanent€Partial€BenefitsÌÌÓÓà àUnlike€most€of€the€cases€on€this€subject,€the€constitutional€challengeÏbefore€us€is€not€limited€to€consideration€of€the€reasonableness€of€tieingÏworkersðð€compensation€benefits€to€the€onset€of€Social€Security€old„ageÏbenefits.€€Our€more€difficult€concern€is€a€classification€that€is€not€age„basedÏbut€disability„based.€€Specifically,€while€permanently,€totally€disabled€workersÏlose€their€benefits€at€age€sixty„five€(or€after€260€weeks),€permanently,Ïpartially€disabled€workers€draw€benefits€based€on€a€presumption€that€theÏmaximum€total€benefit€is€400€weeks.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ50„6„207(3)(E)(1995›€Supp.).€€Thus,€a€worker€who€becomes€permanently,€totallyÏdisabled€at€age€sixty€draws€260€weeks€of€benefits€while€the€same€worker€whoÏbecomes€ninety€percent€permanently,€partially€disabled€draws€360€weeks€ofÏbenefits.€€ÌÌà àUndoubtedly,€the€line€drawn€in€this€instance€by€our€legislation€isÏimperfect.€€It€creates€a€result€which,€described€in€its€best€light,€is€odd.€€As€theÏtrial€judge€noted,€plaintiff€would€have€received€more€benefits€from€aÏdetermination€of€òòlessóó€disability.€€Such€a€scheme€is€irrational.€€It€improperlyÍdifferentiates€between€persons€and€cannot€stand.€€ÌÌà àAlthough€we€conclude€that€the€differentiation€between€permanentlyÏtotally€and€permanently€partially€disabled€workers€over€sixty€is€irrational,€weÏdo€not€find€that€conclusion€to€authorize€an€award€of€lifetime€benefits€toÏplaintiff.€€That€remedy,€created€by€the€trial€judge,€is€inappropriate.€€It€is€theÏbusiness€of€the€legislature€to€pass€new€laws€and€modify€existing€ones.€€Thus,€ifÏthe€legislature€deems€the€award€of€lifetime€benefits€the€appropriate€solution,Ïthey€will€undoubtedly€amend€the€permanent,€total€disability€section.ÌÌà àPursuant€to€the€statute,€plaintiff,€an€employee€who€suffered€ð ðinjuries€.€.Ï.€after€age€sixty€œ(60)ðð€is›€entitled€to€benefits€œð ðfor›€a€period€of€two€hundred€sixtyÏ(260)€weeksðð€reduced€œby€appropriate›€old„age€benefits.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ50„6„207(4)(A)(i)(1995›€Supp.).€€In€order€to€lend€some€rationality€to€theÏcompensation€scheme,€we€conclude€that€œthe€260€week€cap€set€forth€inÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€50„6„207(4)(A)(i)€applies€to€all›€injuredÏworkers€over€sixty€who€are€awarded€benefits€under€the€WorkersððÏCompensation€statute€for€permanent€partial€or€permanent€total€œdisability.€€We›Ïrecognize€that€this€conclusion€militates€against€injured€workers€in€someÏcontext€notwithstanding€the€remedial€purpose€of€the€Act.€€It€is,€nonetheless,Ïrequired€to€avoid€an€otherwise€irrational€result.€€Should€the€legislature€intendÍlifetime€benefits€for€all€that€are€permanently€totally€disabled€œand›€a€400€weekÏcap€for€permanent€partial€injuries,€it€may€so€declare.€ÌÌà@ àV.€€ConclusionÌà àThe€purpose€of€the€Workers'€Compensation€Act€is€to€provide€injuredÏworkers€with€periodic€payments€which€€serve€as€a€substitute€for€wages.€€òòVanÏHouse€v.€Mueller€Coóó.,€741€S.W.2d€329,€330€(Tenn.€1987).€€Our€legislature'sÏresponse€in€awarding€benefits€for€permanent€total€disability€until€age€sixty„five,€or€for€260€weeks€for€workers€injured€after€age€sixty,€is€a€rationalÏresponse€to€that€purpose€which€takes€into€account€that€Social€Security€old„ageÏinsurance€benefits€commence€at€age€sixty„five€and€which€considers€as€well€theÏrequirements€of€the€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act.€€We,€therefore,Ïconclude€that€the€provisions€€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€œ50„6„207(4)(A)(i)›€regarding€permanent€total€disability€do€not€violate€either€theÏEqual€Protection€Clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution€or€the€AgeÏDiscrimination€in€Employment€Act.€€ÌÌà àWe,€do€not€find,€however,€the€statuteððs€differential€treatment€ofÏpermanent€total€and€permanent€partial€benefits€for€workers€over€age€sixty€toÏbe€rational.€The€trial€courtððs€award€of€lifetime€benefits€is€reversed.€€PlaintiffÏis€awarded€benefits€for€260€weeks€pursuant€to€the€statute.€€The€costs€areÍdivided€equally€among€the€parties.€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àPenny€J.€White,€JusticeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌœBirch,›€C.J.à àÌœDrowota,›€Anderson,€Reid,€œJ.J.›