WPC5 +]mfaLJBх|Xgt+t|ڼg4zTxt {Ci٘+g1S{oq0a7UH*YXRcß.npDL;M{_~NܴՆ7IcZyX>2*PP^N}o%1hA4f] $mQ ռ6,K} )ѹ%!wҟBbndWSBdN`%JvBӑ{_}P奈  !nr_gEd\(N; /jJ9}bvnRBގYZ*ggI4|m͊C V :=p|s%!q^'D/~j]-il4}<Oo_ȐiM-pț;={nHɽ|}`0$7Fz!3# UN %# 0()U$:Qw@4 0 D( "_"U:U:-$U:( 0D)Z) -#- B80U0U:Y1Y1 AQ11 0D2 0D2 B2323 D/O3O3O~3 D344444444b5 0 5HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nLh(9 Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($,cAZ"Arial Regular I  { DPeӀu[%#3|x  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   3    ThisCourtinBlackrelieduponthisportionoftheYoungdecisionassupportforour ,  holdingthattrialcourtsinTennesseehaveboththeinherentpowertoinitiatecontemptproceedingsandtheconcomitantpowertoappointprivatecounseltoprosecutesuchcontemptactions.(#$  0    2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   8    Despitethedissentscriticism,itisentirelyappropriateunderboththestateandfederal ,  constitutionstoconsiderthefiscalburdenswhichwouldresultfromadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualification.SeePhillips,863S.W.2dat50.Considerationofthe checkbookinfactwas \ 0 mandatedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinMatthews,424U.S.at335,96S.Ct.at903.   SincethedissentagreeswiththemajoritysconclusionthatDueProcessdoesnotmandateadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualifcation,itscriticismoftheunderlyinganalysisispuzzling.Significantly,inallthecasescitedbythedissentinsupportofitscriticism,eitherthisCourtortheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtconcludedthattheconstitutionalrightsofthedefendants  outweighedthefiscaloradministrativeburdensassociatedwiththenewprocedures.Innoneofthosecaseswastherecognitionofadditionalproceduresbasedsolelyuponapotentialand p  theoreticalethicalconflictofinterest,whichistheonlygroundadvancedbythedissentinthiscase \0  tosupportadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualification.  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   9    Surprisinglyfewstatecourtshaveaddressedtheissueinthisappeal.Inadecision  renderedbeforeYoung,theWestVirginiaSupremeCourtemployedsimilarrationaleandadopted p aruleofautomaticdisqualification.Stateexrel.KoppersCo.Inc.v.InternationalUnionofOil, 0 ChemicalandAtomicWorkers,298S.E.2d827(W.Va.1982).Somestatecourtshavefollowed @ Youngwithlittleornoanalysisoftheissue.SeeDiSabatinov.Salicete,671A.2d1344(Del.  1996);DepartmentofSocialServicesexrel.Monterov.Montero,758P.2d690(Haw.App.1988). p Otherstatescourts,alsowithlittleornodiscussion,havenotappliedaruleofautomaticdisqualification.Marciszv.Marcisz,357N.E.2d477(Ill.1976);Lambv.Fowler,574So.2d262  @ (Fla.App.1991);InreMarriageofBetts,558N.E.2d404(Ill.App.1990).  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   7    WhilethisCourtstatedinBlack,supra,thatatrialcourtshouldappointaprivateattorney ,  onlyafterthedistrictattorneyrefusesarequestofthecourttoprosecuteacontemptaction,thatstatementappliesonlyifnoattorneyfamiliarwiththegroundsforcontemptisreadilyavailabletoprosecutetheaction.Forexample,inBlacktheonlyattorneyfamiliarwiththebehaviorallegedly l @ constitutingcontemptwasalsotheprimarywitnessinthecaseandthereforecouldnotprosecutethecontemptaction.SeeTenn.Sup.Ct.R.8,DR5101( lawyershallnotacceptemploymentin   ...litigationifthelawyerknowsoritisobviousthatthelawyer...oughttobecalledasawitness).  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   2    Thebriefsofthepartiestothisappealaswellasthebriefsfiledonbehalfoftheamicus ,  curiaeurgeustodecideotherissuesrelatingtocontemptproceedings.Wedeclinetoaddress   issuesnotpresentedbythisappeal.      ` , ,  AZ"Arial Regular  ,cAZ"Arial Regular  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   8    Despitethedissentscriticism,itisentirelyappropriateunderboththestateandfederal ,  constitutionstoconsiderthefiscalburdenswhichwouldresultfromadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualification.SeePhillips,863S.W.2dat50.Considerationofthe checkbookinfactwas   mandatedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinMatthews,424U.S.at335,96S.Ct.at903. l @ SincethedissentagreeswiththemajoritysconclusionthatDueProcessdoesnotmandateadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualification,itscriticismoftheunderlyinganalysisispuzzling.Significantly,inallthecasescitedbythedissentinsupportofitscriticism,eitherthisCourtortheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtconcludedthattheconstitutionalrightsofthedefendants l@ outweighedthefiscaloradministrativeburdensassociatedwiththenewprocedures.Innoneofthosecaseswastherecognitionofadditionalproceduresbasedsolelyuponapotentialand   theoreticalethicalconflictofinterest,whichistheonlygroundadvancedbythedissentinthiscase   tosupportadoptionofaruleofautomaticdisqualification.  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   6    Contrarytotheplaintiffsassertions,ourdecisioninBlack,supra,doesnotsupportthe ,  propositionthatatrialcourtmayroutinelytaxattorneysfeesascostsincontemptproceedings.Infact,theruleofFergusonv.Paycheck,672S.W.2d746(Tenn.1984),whichwasappliedinBlack,   specificallydoesnotallowatrialcourttotaxascostsfeesforattorneysappointedtoservetheinterestsoflitigants.ThoughtheonlyinterestatissueinBlackwasthevindicationofthecourts ,  authority,mostcontemptcaseswillservetobothvindicatethecourtsauthorityandtobenefitalitigantbyenforcingacourtorder.Thusinthevastmajorityofcontemptproceedings,atrialcourtmaynottaxattorneysfeesascosts.  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   9    Surprisinglyfewstatecourtshaveaddressedtheissueinthisappeal.Inadecision  renderedbeforeYoung,theWestVirginiaSupremeCourtemployedsimilarrationaleandadopted p aruleofautomaticdisqualification.Stateexrel.KoppersCo.Inc.v.InternationalUnionofOil, 0 ChemicalandAtomicWorkers,298S.E.2d827(W.Va.1982).Somestatecourtshavefollowed @ Youngwithlittleornoanalysisoftheissue.SeeDiSabatinov.Salicete,671A.2d1344(Del.  1996);DepartmentofSocialServicesexrel.Monterov.Montero,758P.2d690(Haw.App.1988). p Otherstatescourts,alsowithlittleornodiscussion,havenotappliedaruleofautomaticdisqualification.Marciszv.Marcisz,357N.E.2d477(Ill.1976);Lambv.Fowler,574So.2d262  @ М(Fla.App.1991);InreMarriageofBetts,558N.E.2d404(Ill.App.1990).,cAZ"Arial Regular($$   1    2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   4    Theplaintiffcitesseveralcasesinwhichcourtshaveheldthatdueprocessprecludesa ,  privateattorneyfromrepresentingavictimincivillitigationandsimultaneouslyservingasspecialprosecutorinacriminalcaseinvolvingthesameconduct.Seee.g.Statev.Eldridge,951S.W.2d   775(Tenn.Crim.App.1997);Commonwealthv.Hubbard,777S.W.2d882(Ky.1989);Statev. l @ Storm,661A.2d790(N.J.1995);Kernsv.Wolverton,381S.E.2d258(W.Va.1989);butsee ,  Hopkinsv.State,429So.2d1146(Ala.Crim.App.1983).Thosecasesclearlyaredistinguishable   fromtheissueinthisappeal.  2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   5    ButseeJohnD.Bessler,ThePublicInterestandtheUnconstitutionalityofPrivate ,  Prosecutors,47Ark.L.Rev.511,575(1994);PatriciaMoran,Note,PrivateProsecutorsinCriminal   ContemptActionsUnderRule42(b)oftheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure,54FordhamL.   Rev.1141,114951(1986)(applyingthethreeprongedbalancingtestandconcludingthatDueProcessprecludesallowinganattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtordertoalsoprosecuteacontemptactionallegingaviolationoftheorder).P Pd ""  XXXXe XX   Ad FILEDXX e  December21,1998CecilW.CrowsonAppellateCourtClerkdAh ,cAZ"Arial Regular!"#&C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3$ !  (3$ !   d' dxd E 2C$@@X.XXXAXX.   1    Youngv.UnitedStatesexrel.VuittonetFilsS.A.,481U.S.787,107S.Ct.2124,95 ,  МL.Ed.2d740(1987).$$$$'dxd- -((2.$ !  XXXXXX   0   !  ` XXXX17FXXdd7TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T  > =VXXdd==FXXdd=Ӝr )<,(j 8` `@Ef ` 8ttxP`  rt )>.*jx` `@E] ` 8ttxP tߛ@ \XXINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTENNESSEE  `   @(ATNASHVILLE #XX\#Ԉ t    0      8      @ #9893  T    0      8      @ FORPUBLICATION @ JENNIFERO.WILSON,   8     ) @ Filed:   December   December    21,1998     0      8     ) Appellee,     8     ) @ Hon.MurielRobinson, d    0      8     ) @ Judge, J  Vs.  0      8     ) 0    0      8     ) @ DAVIDSONCIRCUIT v  LARRYARNOLDWILSON, 8     ) @      \    0      8     ) @ SupremeCourt B   Appellant.     8     ) @ No.01S019807CV00130 (   0   XX #XX #FORAPPELLANT:      8     FORAPPELLEE:XX r  #XXb #EarlJ.Porter,Jr.,     8     JohnHerbison ^ Nashville,Tennessee   8     Nashville,Tennessee D JohnJ.Hollins,Sr.DavidL.RaybinHollins,Wagster&Yarbrough,P.C.Nashville,Tennessee @%FORAMICUSCURIAE : 'Z"  XX*(,%XX*RichardsonandBaker <  h          D  p   FamilyLawSectionofthe ), $  ClarkLeeShaw    <  h          D  p   MemphisBarAssociation  R* % Nashville,Tennessee   <  h          D  p   JoyTannerBomar x  +!&  4  `       <  h          D  p   Memphis,Tennessee StateofTennessee    <  ,4#( JohnKnoxWalkup   <  h          D  p    FamilyLawSectionofthe  Z-#) AttorneyGeneral&Reporter h          D  p   TennesseeBarAssociation   .$*  4  `       <  h          D  p   LarryRiceMichaelE.Moore    <  h          D  p   Memphis,Tennessee /D&, SolicitorGeneral    b0'- KathyMoranteDeputyAttorneyGeneralNashville,Tennessee. @VV( OPINION # . #Ԉ 6l-4 XX L;18 >` , `   COURTOFAPPEALSREVERSED.   D  p          L  x DROWOTA,J.  :Z18W >` , `   >` , `    dO  4  ` Wegrantedthisappealtodeterminewhetheraprivateattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderinacivilcasemayprosecuteacriminalcontemptactionallegingaviolationoftheorder.Afterdueconsideration,weconcludethatnoconstitutionalprinciplenorethicalstandardautomaticallydisqualifiestheprivateattorneyforthebeneficiaryoftheorderfromprosecutingacontemptactionforaviolationoftheorder.Accordingly,wereversethejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealswhichadoptedanautomaticruleofdisqualificationandremandthiscausetothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisdecision.@) BACKGROUND  $   4  `  Theplaintiff,JenniferO.Wilson,filedsuitfordivorceagainstthedefendant,  LarryA.Wilson,intheCircuitCourtofDavidsonCounty.Duringthecourseofthislitigation,certainrestrainingorderswereissuedbythecourt,andthereafter,thedefendantfiledapetitionforcontemptagainsttheplaintiffallegingthatshehadviolatedanorderofthetrialcourt.Thepetitionfailedtospecifywhethercivilorcriminalsanctionswerebeingsought. 4  ` Theplaintiffrespondedbyfilingacounterclaimforcontemptagainstthedefendant,andamotiontodisqualifythedefendantsprivatecounselfromprosecutingthecontemptaction.Thetrialcourtdeniedthemotiontodisqualify,butgrantedtheplaintiffpermissiontoseekaninterlocutoryappealfromtheruling.SeeTenn.R.App.P.9 1',  4  ` Thedefendantthereafterfiledasecondpetitionforcontemptalleginga X5,+0 violationofanorderofthetrialcourt.Thispetitionwasaccompaniedbyanoticeofconstitutionalrights.Thetrialcourtissuedanordertoshowcause.Inresponse,theplaintiffagainfiledamotiontodisqualifydefendantsprivatecounselfromprosecutingthecriminalcontemptactiononthebasisthatcounselwassimultaneouslyrepresentingthedefendantintheunderlyingdivorceproceedings.Thetrialcourtagaindeniedthemotionbutgrantedtheplaintiffpermissiontoseekanextraordinaryappeal.SeeTenn.R.App.P.10.    4  ` TheCourtofAppealsgrantedandconsolidatedtheinterlocutoryandextraordinaryappeals.RelyinguponadecisionoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,(  #  1      ׀theCourtofAppealsreversedthetrialcourtsdenialofthemotionsto tH disqualifyandheldthat anappointmentofaninterestedspecialprosecutorinacriminalcontemptproceedingiscontrarytotheethicalstandardsrequiredoflawyersinthepracticeoflaw,aswellasthehighethicalstandardrequiredofthejudicialprocessandistherebyprohibited. 4  ` Thereafter,wegrantedthedefendantsapplicationforpermissiontoappeal,andforthereasonsthatfollow,nowconcludethatnoconstitutionalprinciplenorethicalstandardautomaticallyprecludesaprivateattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderfromprosecutingacontemptactionforanallegedviolationoftheorder.Accordingly,wereversethejudgmentoftheCourtof 0&* Appealsandremandtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisdecision.@- 7hXX.Ԁ    @* ANALYSIS  , @$#X.X7ho%# A.StandardofReview tH   4  ` Recently,inBlackv.Blount,938S.W.2d394(Tenn.1996),thisCourtheld \0  thattrialcourtshaveboththeinherentauthoritytoinitiatecontemptproceedingsandtheconcomitantauthoritytoappointprivateattorneystoprosecutesuchcontemptactions.Id.at40203.Unlikethiscase,however,theconductinBlack  forwhichcontemptproceedingshadbeeninstituteddidnotinvolvetheallegedviolationofacourtorder.Alsounlikethiscase,theprivateattorneyappointedbythetrialcourttoprosecutethecontemptproceedinginBlackdidnotrepresentany l@ ofthelitigantsintheunderlyingactionfromwhichthecontemptchargesarose.Accordingly,inBlackwedidnotaddress,andinfactexpresslyreservedfora # caseinwhichitwassquarelypresented,thequestionofwhetheraprivateattorneyalreadyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderinacivilcasemayprosecuteacontemptactionallegingaviolationofthatorder.Id.at402.Itisthat (x  narrowquestionoflawwhichnowissquarelypresentedinthisappeal.  #  2      ׀X.XXX.ԀSince |*P " thisisaquestionoflaw,ourreviewisdenovoupontherecordbeforethisCourt T,("$ withnopresumptionofcorrectnessattachingtothedecisionsofthelowercourts.Warrenv.EstateofKirk,954S.W.2d722,723(Tenn.1997);#X.XXX.+#X.XXX.Bainv.Wells,936 0%( S.W.2d618,622(Tenn.1997)#X.XXX.>-#X.XXX..#X.XXX.-# ,  @$ B.TheYoungDecision  `  4  ` Priorto1987,theleadingcaseonthisissuewasMcCannv.NewYorkStock tH  Exchange,80F.2d211(2ndCir.1935),inwhichJudgeLearnedHand L  commentedthattoprosecuteanindirectcriminalcontempt,committedoutsidethepresenceofthecourt, thejudgemayprefertousetheattorneyofaparty,whowillindeedordinarilybehisonlymeansofinformation....Thereisnoreasonwhyheshouldnotdoso,andeveryreasonwhyheshould....Id.at214.InYoungv.  UnitedStatesexrel.VuittonetFilsS.A.,481U.S.787,107S.Ct.2124,95 X L.Ed.2d740(1987),however,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtpartedcompanywithJudgeHandwhenitheldthatfederaljudgescouldnolongerappointaprivatelawyerrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtordertoalsoprosecuteacriminalcontemptactionallegingaviolationoftheorder. 4  ` YoungbeganasatrademarkinfringementactionbroughtbyVuittonetFils, )h" S.A.,(Vuitton),amanufacturerofexpensivehandbags,againstseveralbusinesseswhichweremanufacturingandsellinginexpensiveimitationsofVuittonsmerchandise.InJulyof1982,thepartiessettledthetrademarkinfringementcase.Underthesettlementagreement,thedefendantswererequiredtopaydamagesandenjoinedfromusingVuittonsregisteredtrademark.Suspectingthatthedefendantshadviolatedtheinjunction,Vuittoninearly1983 4x*. commissionedaprivatefirmtoconductanundercoverinvestigation.Upondiscoveringevidenceofnoncompliance,Vuittonsattorneyaskedthedistrictcourttoappointhimandhiscolleaguesasspecialcounseltoprosecuteacriminalcontemptactionforviolationoftheinjunction.ThedistrictcourtfoundprobablecausetobelievethatthedefendantswereviolatingtheinjunctionandappointedVuittonsattorneyandhiscolleaguestorepresenttheUnitedStatesincontinuingtheinvestigationandinprosecutingthecontemptaction.Significantly,theappointmentconferreduponVuittonsattorneysallthepowersordinarilypossessedbyagovernmentprosecutor,yettheUnitedStatesAttorneysOfficetooknopartintheprosecutionofthecasebeyondwishingthespecialprosecutor goodluck.Id.,481U.S.at79192,107S.Ct.at2129. p  4  ` Overthenextmonth,thespecialprosecutorcompiledmorethan100audioandvideotapesofmeetingsandwiretappedtelephoneconversationsbetweenthedefendantsandinvestigators.Withthatevidence,thespecialprosecutorrequestedandobtainedanorderfromthedistrictcourtdirectingthedefendantstoshowcausewhytheyshouldnotbecitedforcontemptforeitherviolatingoraidingandabettingtheviolationoftheinjunction.ThedefendantsfiledmotionsopposingboththeshowcauseorderandtheappointmentofVuittonsattorneysasspecialprosecutor.Thedefensemotionsweredenied,andeventuallytwoofthedefendantsenteredguiltypleastocontempt.Severalotherdefendantsweretriedandconvictedofcontempt.Id.,481U.S.at792,107S.Ct.at2129. 0&*  4  ` BeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,thedefendantsadvancedtwo 4h*. primaryargumentsasgroundsforreversaloftheirconvictions.First,theycontendedthatadistrictcourtlacksauthoritytoappointprivatecounseltoprosecuteacontemptactionandthatonlytheU.S.Attorneymayinitiateacriminalcontemptprosecution.Id.,481U.S.at793,107S.Ct.at2130.Alternatively,the  defendantsmaintainedthatadistrictcourtmaynotappointanattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtordertoprosecuteacriminalcontemptactionallegingaviolationofthatorder.Id.,481U.S.at80214,107S.Ct.at <  213538. 4  ` Inrejectingthedefendantsfirstargument,theCourtheldthatdistrictcourtshaveinherentpowerbothtoinitiatecontemptproceedingstopunishdisobediencetotheirordersandtoappointaprivateattorneytoprosecutesuchcontemptactions.Id.,481U.S.at793,107S.Ct.at2130.   #  3      ׀TheCourtcommentedthatthis L  powertoappointshouldbeexercisedsparingly,andonlyafterthepublicprosecutorhasdeniedadistrictcourtsrequesttoprosecuteacontempt.Id.,481 # U.S.at801,107S.Ct.at2133. 4  ` TheSupremeCourt,however,agreedwiththedefendantssecondargumentandfoundthatthedistrictcourterredbyappointinganattorneywhowasrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtordertoprosecuteacriminalcontemptforanallegedviolationoftheorder.TheCourtfirstemphasizedthatprivateattorneysappointedtoprosecutecriminalcontemptactionsrepresenttheinterest 0&* oftheUnitedStatesinvindicatingacourtsauthority.Id.,481U.S.at804,107 ,  S.Ct.at2136.Aprivateattorneyprosecutingacriminalcontempt,therefore,mustassumetheuniqueresponsibilityofagovernmentprosecutorwhichistopursuejusticeandguaranteethat guiltshallnotescapenorinnocencesuffer.Young,  481U.S.at80203,107S.Ct.at2135(quotingBergerv.UnitedStates,295U.S. ` 78,88,55S.Ct.629,633,79L.Ed.1314(1935)). 4  ` Whilerecognizingthataprivatepartysinterestinobtainingthebenefitsofacourtordermaysometimescoincidewiththespecialprosecutorspursuitofjustice,theCourtstressedthatthetwointerestsmayalsoattimesdiverge.Young,481U.S.at805,107S.Ct.at2136.Asexamplesofthepossible p divergence,theCourthypothesizedthatanattorneyforaprivateclientservingasspecialprosecutorofacontemptactionmaybetemptedeithertobringatenuouslysupportedprosecutionortoabandonameritoriousprosecutionifeitheractionwouldinuretothebenefitofhisorherprivateclient.TheCourtdeclaredthatappointingcounselforaninterestedpartytoprosecuteacriminalcontemptaction ataminimumcreate[s]opportunitiesforconflictstoariseandcreate[s]atleasttheappearanceofimpropriety.Id.,481U.S.at806,107S.Ct.at2137.In )X" concludingthatlawyersalreadyrepresentinganinterestedpartyhaveaninsurmountableconflictofinterestiftheyalsoundertaketoprosecuteacriminalcontemptcase,theCourtstated:8 4 8` 4"4"Betweentheprivatelifeofthecitizenandthepublicglareofcriminalaccusationstandstheprosecutor.Thatstateofficialhasthepowertoemploythefullmachineryofthestateinscrutinizinganygivenindividual.Evenifadefendantisultimatelyacquitted,forced 5T+/ immersionincriminalinvestigationandadjudicationisawrenchingdisruptionofeverydaylife.Forthisreason,wemusthaveassurancethatthosewhowouldwieldthispowerwillbeguidedsolelybytheirsenseofpublicresponsibilityfortheattainmentofjustice.Aprosecutorofacontemptactionwhorepresentstheprivatebeneficiaryofthecourtorderallegedlyviolatedcannotprovidesuchassurance,forsuchanattorneyisrequiredbytheverystandardsoftheprofessiontoservetwomasters. ` !` ! Id.,481U.S.at805,107S.Ct.at2138. d8  J 4  ` TheYoungCourtdidnotbaseitsdecisionuponconstitutionalgroundsbut (  insteadannouncedtheruleofdisqualificationinitssupervisoryroleoverlowerfederalcourts.ThoughwearenotconstitutionallyboundtofollowYoung,the  rationaleforthedecisionwasbasedlargelyupontheModelCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhich,asmodified,currentlygovernstheconductofattorneysinTennessee.SeeTenn.Sup.Ct.R.8.Asexplainedbelow,however,wedecline `4 toadopttheruleofautomaticdisqualificationannouncedinYoung. 8!  @  C.ConstitutionalPrinciples  (l!  4  ` Althoughappellatecourtsordinarilydonotaddressconstitutionalissuesifacasemaybedecideduponnonconstitutionalgrounds,inthiscaseadecisionontheconstitutionalissueisnecessarytofullydeterminethecaseandtherightsoftheparties.Statev.Hall,958S.W.2d679,695n.15(Tenn.1995).ThisCourt 0%) previouslyhasopinedthat [d]ueprocess...callsforsuchproceduralprotectionsastheparticularsituationdemands.Phillipsv.StateBoardofRegents,863 3)- S.W.2d45,50(Tenn.1993)(quotingArmstrongv.Manzo,380U.S.545,552,85 5d+/   X    X    X  S.Ct.1187,1191,14L.Ed.2d62(1965)).Indeterminingwhatproceduralprotectionsaparticularsituationdemands,threefactorsmustbeconsidered:(1)theprivateinterestatstake;(2)theriskoferroneousdeprivationoftheinterestthroughtheproceduresusedandtheprobablevalue,ifany,ofadditionalorsubstituteproceduralsafeguards;andfinally,(3)thegovernmentsinterest,includingthefunctioninvolvedandthefiscalandadministrativeburdensthattheadditionalorsubstituteproceduralrequirementwouldentail.Phillips,863S.W.2d <  at50;Matthewsv.Eldridge,424U.S.319,335,96S.Ct.893,903,47L.Ed.2d18     X  (1976).Thoughwehavefoundnootherjudicialdecision  #  4      ׀addressingthe  constitutionalaspectoftheissueinthisappeal,inourview,applicationofthethreeprongedbalancingtestclearlyindicatesthatdueprocessdoesnotprecludeallowinganattorneywhorepresentsthebeneficiaryofacivilcourtordertosimultaneouslyprosecuteacontemptactionforanallegedviolationoftheorder.  #  5      ׀ L   4  ` Atstakeisacontemptdefendantslibertyorpropertyinterest.AdefendantfoundguiltyofgeneralcontemptinTennesseemaybepunishedbyfineorbyimprisonment,orboth.However,anyfineimposedmaynotexceedfiftydollarsandanytermofimprisonmentmaynotexceedtendays.Tenn.CodeAnn.299 )X" 103(Supp.1998).Theriskthatadefendantslibertyinterestwillbeerroneouslydeprivedbythecurrentpracticewhichallowsalitigantsprivateattorneytoprosecutecontemptisslightbecauseitisthetrialjudge,nottheprivateattorney,whoactuallydecideswhetheracontemptactionmayproceed.SeeTenn.R.Crim.  P.42(b).Sincetheriskoferroneousdeprivationisminimal,thereisnorealbenefitorvalueinadoptingarulewhichwouldprecludealitigantsprivateattorneyfromprosecutingacontempt.Finally,tremendousfiscalandadministrativeburdenswouldresultfromasubstituteproceduralrequirement.Contemptproceedingsoftenariseindomesticrelationscasesinstatecourts.However,unlikethefederalsystem,thereisnofundinTennesseefromwhichtocompensateprivatecounselappointedtoprosecutecriminalcontemptactions.  #  6      ׀It p isunrealistictoexpectdistrictattorneystoprosecutecontemptactionsarisingfromallegedviolationsofcivilcourtorders.   #  7      ׀Districtattorneysalreadyhavea L  heavycaseloadprosecutingviolationsofthegeneralcriminallaws.SeeStateex $" relOBrienv.Moreland,778S.W.2d400,406(Mo.App.1989)(discussingsimilar # practicalproblemssurroundingtheruleofautomaticdisqualification).Werewetoholdthatdueprocessprecludesalitigantsprivateattorneyfromprosecuting '  contemptproceedings,manycitizenswouldbedeprivedofthebenefitstowhichtheyalreadyhavebeenadjudgedentitledbystatecourtsandmanystatecourtorderswouldremainunenforced.Theminimalriskthatadefendantwillbeerroneouslydeprivedofhisorherlibertyinterestifalitigantsprivateattorneyprosecutesacontemptproceedingisfaroutweighedbytheveryrealfiscalandadministrativeburdenscertaintoaccompanytheadoptionofasubstituteprocedure.      #  8         WeholdthatDueProcessdoesnotmandateadoptionofarule <  whichautomaticallydisqualifiesalitigantsprivatecounselfromprosecutingacontemptaction. @$D.EthicalStandards  | P  4  ` Wehavealsofoundnoethicalstandardwhichmandatesadoptionofanautomaticruleofdisqualification.WhiletheYoungdecisionistheoretically <$ attractive,manypracticaldifferencesbetweenthefederaljudicialsystemandthecourtsofTennesseeexistwhichamelioratetheperceivedconflictofinterestidentifiedinYoung.Forexample,unliketheprivateattorneysappointedas )" specialprosecutorsinYoung,privateattorneysprosecutingcriminalcontempt ,  actionsinTennesseearenotordinarilyclothedwithallthepowersofapublicprosecutor.Indeed,thereisnohintinthisappealthatthedefendantsattorneyhasbeengiventhepowersofthepublicprosecutorinpursuingthesecontemptactions.Here,unlikeYoung,wesimplyarenotdealingwithaprivateattorney ` whohas thepowertoemploythefullmachineryofthestateinscrutinizinganygivenindividual.Young,481U.S.at805,107S.Ct.at2138.Thepotentialfor <  abuseandoverreachingaboutwhichtheYoungCourtexpressedconcern   thereforedoesnotexistinTennessee. 4  ` Furthermore,wedonotbelievethatappointingaprivateattorneywhorepresentsthebeneficiaryofacourtordertoprosecuteacontemptactionforanallegedviolationofthatordercreatesthepotentialforconflictandtheappearanceofimpropriety.Contemptofcourtisintendedtovindicateacourtsauthorityandtomaintaintheintegrityofcourtorders.Statev.Winningham,958S.W.2d740 # (Tenn.1997).Inacontemptproceedingallegingaviolationofacourtorder,therefore,theinterestoftheprivatelitigantcoincideswiththeinterestofthecourt.Thecommongoalistoforcecompliancewiththecourtorder.Althoughthemotivationalreasonsmaydiffer,theinterestisthesame.Theprivatelawyerisethicallyobligatedtoexercisehisorherindependentprofessionaljudgmenttoprotectthecommoninterest.Tenn.Sup.Ct.R.8,DR5105.Thataprivatelawyeris interestedinprotectingtheinterestofhisorherclientandthelegitimateconcernofthecourtdoesnotdetractfromtheintegrityofthejudicialprocesswhentheinterestoftheclientandtheconcernofthecourtisthesame 4h*. enforcementofacourtorder. 4  ` Additionally,inourviewalitigantsprivateattorneyisnolesslikelytoseekjusticeandnomorelikelytobeinfluencedbyimpropermotivesthanapublicprosecutororadisinterestedprivateattorney.Wereadilyacknowledgethatanattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderwillzealouslyattempttoenforcecompliancewiththeorderifallowedtoprosecuteacontemptproceeding.Thereis,however,nothingimproperaboutzealousprosecution.EventheYoung   Courtrecognizedthatinouradversarysystem, prosecutorsarenecessarilypermittedtobezealousintheirenforcementofthelaw.Young,481U.S.at806,  107S.Ct.at2137.Ifaprosecutoris honestlyconvincedofthedefendantsguilt,theprosecutorisfree,indeedobliged,tobedeeplyinterestedinurgingthatviewbyanyfairmeans.Truedisinterestontheissueofsuchadefendantsguiltisthedomainofthejudgeandthejurynottheprosecutor.Wrightv.UnitedStates, $" 732F.2d1048,1056(2ndCir.1984).Whileprosecutorsareexpectedtoproceedwith eagernessandvigorandarepermittedto strikehardblows,theymaynotstrike foulones.Berger,295U.S.at85,55S.Ct.at633.Theethicalrules '  governingtheconductofallattorneysinTennesseeshouldpreventaprivateattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderfrombecomingoverzealousorfromstrikingfoulblows. 4  ` Furthermore,theproceduralsafeguardsofTenn.R.Crim.P.42(b)ameliorateconcernsthataprivateattorneywillimproperlyinstituteacontemptproceedingincontraventionoftheinterestsofjustice.Inpertinentpartthatrule 4h*. dO` ,   dO` ,   dO` ,   providesasfollows:8 4 8` 4"4"Acriminalcontempt...shallbeprosecutedonnotice.Thenoticeshallstatethetimeandplaceofhearing,allowingareasonabletimeforthepreparationofthedefense,andshallstatetheessentialfactsconstitutingthecriminalcontemptchargedanddescribeitassuch.Thenoticeshallbegivenorallybythejudgeinopencourtinthe  ` presenceofthedefendant,oronapplicationofthedistrictattorneygeneraloranattorneyappointedbythecourtforthatpurpose,byanordertoshowcauseoranorderofarrest.Thedefendantisentitled $  toadmissiontobailasprovidedintheserules.Ifthecontemptchargedinvolvesdisrespecttoorcriticismofajudge,thatjudgeisdisqualifiedfrompresidingatthehearingexceptwiththedefendantsconsent.Uponaverdictoffindingofguiltthecourtshallenteranorderfixingthepunishment. ` !` ! ZzTenn.R.Crim.P.42(b)(emphasisadded.)Underthisrule,acontemptactioncannotproceedunlessthetrialcourtissuesanordertoshowcauseafterreviewingawrittenapplicationoftheprivateattorney.Thetrialcourtobviouslywillrealizewhentheattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofthecourtorderintheunderlyingcivillitigationisalsotheattorneyfilingtheapplicationtoinstitutecontempt.Thetrialcourtwillbeinapositiontocarefullyscrutinizetheapplication.ThejudicialoversightprescribedbyRule42virtuallyeliminatesanydangerthatcontemptdO` ,   actionswillproceedifinstitutedforimpropermotivesorwithoutregardtotheinterestsofjustice.Tofurtherguardagainstthepossibilityofabuse,however,weholdthattheprovisionsofTenn.R.Civ.P.11applytothewrittenapplicationswhichattorneysmustfilewiththetrialcourttoinstitutecontemptproceedings.ItiscertainlyunlikelythatattorneyswillriskRule11sanctionsbyfilingunjustifiedorimpropercontemptapplications. 4  ` Accordingly,weholdthatallowinganattorneyforthebeneficiaryofacourt 0T+/ ordertoprosecuteacontemptproceedingallegingaviolationofthatorderdoes notinvolveaninherentorpotentialconflictofinterestsufficienttowarrant 3/3 adoptionofanautomaticruleofdisqualification.   #  9      ׀   @.@..) CONCLUSION      8   4  ` Forthereasonspreviouslyexplained,weconcludethatnoconstitutionalprinciplenorethicalstandardautomaticallydisqualifiesaprivateattorneyrepresentingthebeneficiaryofacourtorderfromsimultaneouslyprosecutingacontemptactionwhichallegesaviolationoftheorder.Accordingly,wereversethejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealswhichadoptedanautomaticruleofdisqualificationandremandthiscausetothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisdecision. 4  `       <  h   __________________________________ 4  `       <  h   FRANKF.DROWOTA,III, 4  `       <  h   JUSTICE Concur:  %@!$ Anderson,C.J.Holder,Barker,JJ.Birch,J.SeparateDissentingOpinion